### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 14
- 00299
- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF K .L.P. AND H.D.P., CH ILDREN

From the 21st District Court Burleson County, Texas Trial Court No. 27,506

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Crystal P. appeals from a judgment that terminated the paren t

- child relationship
between her and her child ren, K.L.P., and H.D.P. In presenting this appeal, counsel has
filed an Anders brief in support of his motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). We grant counsel's motion and affirm. The procedures set forth in Anders v. California are applicable to appeals of orders terminating parental rights. In re E.L.Y. , 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2002, order) (per curiam) (applying Anders to parental termination appeals). See also Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regul atory Servs. , 160 S.W.3d 641, 646

- 647 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2005, pet. denied). In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he hasI n the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 2

conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no potentially plausibl e basis to support an appeal. Counsel certifies he has diligently researched the law applicable to the facts and issues and candidly discusses why, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. In re D.A.S. , 973 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1998). Coun sel has demonstrated he has complied with the requirements of
Anders by (1) providing a c opy of the brief to Crystal and (2) notifying her of her right to
file a pro se response if s he desired to do so. Id

. Crystal filed a pro se response to the
Anders b rief.
The order o f termination recites that Crystal : knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child ren to remain in conditions or s urroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well

- being of the children pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (D), Texas Fami ly Code ; engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child ren with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well

being of the children, pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (E), Texas Family Code ; failed to comply with the provision s of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of the children who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the ab use and neglect of the children, pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (O), Texas Family Code ; used a controlled substance as determined by Chapter 481, Health and Safe ty Code, in a manner that endangered the health and safety of the children, and (1) failed to complete a court

- ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (2) after completion of a court

- ordered substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a cont rolled substance, pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (P), Texas Family Code ;
T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN . § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P) (West 2014 ).I n the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 3

In the Anders brief , counsel analyzes the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support termination. Counsel acknowledges that only one statutory ground is necessary to support an order of termination in addition to a finding that
termination is in the children's best interest. See In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). Counsel further evaluates t he legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. Counsel's brief evidences a professional evaluation of the record for error, and we conclude that counsel performed the duties req uired of an appointed counsel. Due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN . § 101.007 (West 2008). See also In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

- 26 (Tex. 2002). The Family Code permits a court to order termination of parental rights if the petitioner establishes one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of the statute and also proves that termination of the parent

- child relationship is in the
best interest of the child. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN
. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012); Holley v.
Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976). We agree with counsel's evaluation that there is clear and convincing eviden ce to support terminatio n. Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under section 161.001(1), we must also find clear and convincing evidence that termination ofI n the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 4

the parent

- child relationship was in the children's best interest. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE
A NN
. § 161.001(2). Evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest.
See In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28. There is a long

- standing non

- exhaustive li st of factors for a court to consider in deciding the best interest of a child in a termination case. See Holley , 544 S.W.2d at 371

- 72. We agree with counsel's evaluations that there is clear and convincing evidence under the appropriate legal and factua l sufficiency standards for the jury to have determined that termination of the parent

- child relationship was in the best interest of
K.L.P. and H.D.P

. Upon receiving a "frivolous appeal" brief, this Court must conduct a full examination of all proceeding s to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. See
Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 349

- 50, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); see also In
re M.A.R. , No. 10

- 10

- 00237

- CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3596, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Waco May 11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). After our review of the entire record, and counsel's brief, and Crystal’s pro se brief, we agree with counsel that there are no plausible grounds for appeal. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 827

- 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly,

w e affirm the trial court's judgment.
Motion to Withdraw
In accordance with Anders , counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.17 (Tex.I n the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 5

Crim. App. 2008). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. 1 Within five days of the date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to Crystal and to advise her of h er right to pursue a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. See In re K.D. , 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The motion to withdraw is granted , and the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

AL SCOGGINS Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed and mo tion g ranted Opinion delivered and filed April 16, 2015 [CV06]

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Crystal wish to seek further review of this case by this Court or the Texas Supreme Court, sh e must either retain an attorney to file a motion for rehearing or a petition for review or file a pro se motion for rehearing or a petition for review. Any motion for
r ehearing must be filed within fifteen days of this opinion. Any petition for review must be filed within forty

- five days after the date of either this opinion or the last ruling by this Court on all timely

- filed motions for rehearing. See T EX

. R. A PP
. P

. 53.7(a). Any petition for review must comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.2. T EX

. R. A PP
. P. 53.2.