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iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE PIVOT TO ASIA: 

CAN IT SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION 

FOR 

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 

IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

Douglas T. Stuart

August 2016

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

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ISBN 1-58487-733-2
vii

FOREWORD

This monograph is an audit of the policies pursued by the Obama Administration in support of the 

so-called “pivot to Asia.” After explaining why U.S. 

President Barack Obama chose to accord top priority 

to the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) region, Dr. Douglas T. 

Stuart discusses the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power, which were 

available to Washington to accomplish its goals. Dr. 

Stuart notes that the United States faced some unique 

problems in its efforts to rely upon diplomacy, public 

information, and economics to gain influence in the 

region. Under these circumstances, Washington drew 

upon its substantial regional military presence as the 

foundation for its pivot campaign. Dr. Stuart discusses both the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called 

San Francisco network of U.S.-sponsored security relationships with key regional governments. He notes 

that the Obama Administration has had to adapt its 

policies to the specific interests and concerns of each 

regional actor, with varying degrees of success. He 

accords special attention to the security concerns of 

Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India. 

The Obama team has been encouraged by the 

generally favorable responses of many of its regional 

friends and allies to U.S. calls for enhanced cooperation. Many of these governments view this cooperation 

as a form of insurance in the face of an increasingly 

influential and assertive China. On the other hand, the 

Obama Administration has had to move cautiously, 

since all of these regional actors worry about being 

forced to choose between Washington and Beijing.

In this monograph, Dr. Stuart discusses three 

schools of thought regarding the rise of China: “Con-
tainers,” “Adapters,” and “Game Changers.” In a 

situation in which the Obama Administration cannot make a definitive choice in favor of one of these 

schools of thought, it has opted for a policy of “hedging” in order to keep its options open. Unfortunately, 

it is a comment on the tragic nature of international 

relations that hedging policies are likely to be interpreted negatively by the target of such actions—thus 

moving both nations closer to what Graham Allison 

calls the “Thucydides Trap.” Dr. Stuart recommends 

certain policies that may make this unwanted development less likely.

The final section of this monograph looks beyond 

the Western Pacific, noting the growing importance 

of India and China’s efforts to expand their influence 

into Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. 

Dr. Stuart also discusses the problems that the Obama 

Administration has been forced to confront in other 

places—e.g., Ukraine, Libya, Syria, etc.—that have 

complicated its efforts to keep its focus on the pivot 

strategy in the IAP region. He concludes with some 

lessons for strategists, derived from the Obama team’s 

experience with the pivot.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS T. STUART holds the J. William and Helen 

D. Stuart Chair in International Studies at Dickinson 

College. He is also an adjunct research professor at the 

U.S. Army War College. He is the author or editor of 

11 books, 4 monographs, and over 30 published articles dealing with international affairs. His areas of 

research specialization include U.S. national security 

policymaking, U.S. security issues in the Indo-AsiaPacific (IAP), and U.S. civil-military relations. He is 

the director of an ongoing project on Civilian-Military 

Educational Cooperation, sponsored by the Andrew 

W. Mellon Foundation. Dr. Stuart received his Ph.D. 

in international relations from the University of 

Southern California in 1979.

xi

SUMMARY

Establishing priorities is the indispensable core of 

strategy formulation. The Obama Administration’s 

decision to accord top priority to the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

(IAP) region made good strategic sense both in terms 

of the opportunities presented by the region’s unprecedented economic growth and the risks associated 

with the rapidly changing security environment in the 

IAP. Of special concern to the President and his advisers was the risk that a rapidly rising China would 

engage in policies that would precipitate a military 

confrontation with the United States—a problem that 

Graham Allison has described as the “Thucydides 

Trap.” The Obama Administration’s campaign was 

initially described as a “pivot” strategy, but soon after it was announced, U.S. policymakers backed away 

from that term on the grounds that it sounded too 

tactical and temporary. In fact, the United States has 

recognized the importance of the IAP in general, and 

China in particular, since the late-19th century. This 

monograph begins by placing the pivot in historical 

context and relating it to three earlier U.S. strategies—

the Open Door, Anti-Communist Containment, and 

the Nixon Doctrine. 

President Obama’s top priority at the start of his 

administration was a campaign of economic renewal 

as a precondition for enhanced American influence 

abroad. Two years later, he was ready to launch his 

ambitious pivot campaign in the IAP region. This 

monograph discusses the problems that the Obama 

team faced in its efforts to solicit the support of regional friends and allies. Although the Obama Administration has made every effort to present the pivot as 

a multifaceted strategy that employs all elements of 
national power, it has relied upon the so-called San 

Francisco network of military allies and partners as the 

foundation for its pivot campaign. The United States 

has had considerable success in its efforts to deepen 

and widen this network of security partnerships, due 

in part to the fact that most of these regional actors see 

Washington as a valuable source of insurance in the 

face of an increasingly assertive China. Even though 

the United States has been “pushing on open doors” 

in the IAP region, it has had to tread carefully, in order 

to avoid forcing any of these governments to choose 

between Washington and Beijing. The United States 

has also had to adapt its recruitment efforts to the special interests and concerns of each regional partner. 

This monograph discusses many of these U.S. efforts 

at bilateral and trilateral outreach, with special attention to Japan and South Korea. 

The analysis of the Obama Administration’s efforts to encourage greater cooperation with regional 

friends and allies is followed by a discussion of U.S.-

China relations. Three schools of thought regarding 

the rise of China are discussed, but in a situation in 

which no school of thought can be definitively proven correct, the United States has opted for a hedging 

strategy toward China. Elements of this strategy are 

analyzed, including some of the steps that Washington is currently taking in the IAP in accordance with 

the Air-Sea Battle doctrine; recently re-christened the 

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global 

Commons (JAM-GC). 

The next section of this monograph surveys China’s activities beyond the Western Pacific, including 

its Maritime Silk Road, the Silk Road Economic Belt, 

and its String of Pearls campaign. This section also discusses the challenges that the United States has faced 

xii
xiii

as it seeks to keep its focus on the IAP region despite 

developments in other regions (Ukraine, Syria, etc.). 

This monograph concludes with three lessons for 

strategists, based on the Obama Administration’s experience with the pivot strategy. All three lessons illustrate that the only thing harder than formulating 

a sophisticated long-term strategy is implementing 

and sustaining the policies that are implicit in that 

strategy. 

1

THE PIVOT TO ASIA: 

CAN IT SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION 

FOR AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 

IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

The last few months of Barack Obama’s U.S. presidency are an appropriate occasion for an audit of 

President Obama’s foreign policy. Jeffrey Goldberg 

attempted such an audit in the April 2016 issue of 

The Atlantic, but his focus was on the Middle East in 

general and Syria in particular.1 This monograph will 

focus on the region that has been at the center of President Obama’s grand strategy since he took office—the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP). The economic arguments 

for giving priority to the IAP are well known. In its 

“Global Trends 2025” report, the National Intelligence 

Council listed as one of a small number of “relative 

certainties” that “The unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West 

to East now underway will continue.”2 According to 

Peter Petri:

Since World War II . . . Asia has grown more than 

twice as fast as the rest of the world. . . . Although 

other countries have also experienced rapid economic 

growth over several years, the recent Asian cluster of 

sustained, consistent performance has no parallel.

Petri also contends, “The structure of the U.S. economy is complementary to Asia’s and Asian growth 

presents the United States with many opportunities 

for mutual gain.”3

President Obama came into office convinced that 

the success or failure of U.S. grand strategy in the 21st 

century will be largely determined by developments in 
2

the IAP region. The President also recognized that the 

primary long-term security challenge that the United 

States faces is the rise of China in this region, and the 

possibility that Beijing will become America’s global 

and regional peer competitor. Many international relations scholars have discussed the rise of China as a 

test of A. F. K. Organski’s “power transition thesis.” 

Professor David Lai has summarized this thesis and 

discussed its implications for American national security in his monograph The United States and China in 

Power Transition. Lai notes that:

There is peace and stability [in international relations] 

as long as the dominant nation and its powerful allies maintain firm control. . . . However, international 

relations are always in flux. . . . Challenge to the system will emerge if one or a few of the second-ranked 

big nations that are also dissatisfied with the existing 

international order experience significant increase in 

their national power. 4

Professor Graham Allison, who has described this 

situation as the “Thucydides Trap,” has observed that 

in 12 of 16 instances of great power transition over the 

last 500 years, the result has been war.5 This makes 

the power transition thesis arguably the most reliable 

predictive theory in international relations literature. 

Indeed, the predictive reliability of the power transition thesis is one of the major factors that lead John 

Mearsheimer to describe great power relations as a 

form of tragedy. Mearsheimer concludes his discussion of the risks of U.S.-China confrontation by stating, 

“let us hope that if China becomes especially powerful, the actual results of that development will contradict my theory and prove my prediction wrong.”6

However, he gives the reader no reason to expect that 

positive outcome.
3

China’s recent economic problems have probably 

given Washington a bit more time to adapt to the 

Thucydides Trap, but it would be naïve to believe that 

Beijing will accept a permanent subordinate role in 

either regional or global affairs. Furthermore, as President Obama informed Jeffrey Goldberg:

If China fails; if it is not able to maintain a trajectory 

that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an organizing principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a 

country its size in maintaining the international order; 

if it views the world only in terms of regional spheres 

of influence—then not only do we see the potential for 

conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges 

that are going to come.7

Both the risks associated with China’s rise and the 

opportunities associated with the “unprecedented 

shift in . . . economic power” justify Obama’s decision to accord priority to the IAP region. However, as 

this monograph will illustrate, establishing priorities 

is much easier than implementing and sustaining the 

policies that accord with such priorities.

THE PIVOT TO ASIA

Soon after the Obama Administration announced 

its plans for a “pivot to Asia,” U.S. policymakers began to substitute the term “rebalance” for the word 

“pivot,” on the grounds that rebalance sounded less 

tactical and temporary. This was understandable as 

an exercise in marketing; but the fact is that the IAP 

in general, and China in particular, have been strategic priorities for the United States since the end of the 
4

19th century. Soon after the United States consolidated 

its presence on the West coast, Washington began to 

make plans and develop capabilities for a more assertive and influential role in the IAP. These actions were 

associated with the “Open Door” concept. U.S. policymakers explained this concept in terms of fair trade—

insuring that Americans had the same access to Asian 

resources and markets as other great powers. But the 

Open Door was more than an economic theory. It was 

the Pacific component of an American grand strategy 

of balance of power—a commitment to resist efforts 

by any European or Asian nation to achieve regional 

hegemony as a step toward global dominance. 8

U.S. policymakers were especially concerned about 

the risk that European imperial powers, or the rising 

Japanese empire, would be tempted by the weakness 

of the Ching dynasty to take control of large portions 

of China. From the U.S. perspective, this was intolerable since it could tip the regional, and ultimately the 

global, balance of power. For Washington, China was 

simply too big to fail. To avoid this outcome the United 

States began to pursue an active foreign policy in Asia, 

which included the annexation of Hawaii, a costly and 

frustrating war in the Philippines, and support for the 

international military force that was deployed against 

the Boxer rebellion. In accordance with the logic of the 

Open Door, Secretary of State John Hay explained that 

the United States had intervened against the Boxers 

in order to “preserve [the] Chinese territorial and administrative entity.”9

 In 1907, President Roosevelt sent 

the Great White Fleet, which included 16 battleships, 

to the IAP to reinforce the message that the U.S. commitment to the preservation of a balance of power in 

Asia had become a permanent strategic priority. 
5

The United States has sustained this commitment 

for more than a century. Between 1906 and 1941, U.S. 

defense planners became increasingly convinced that 

Japan represented the most direct threat to this strategic priority. Following World War II, Washington 

made plans and undertook policies to oppose hegemonic ambitions by both Russia and (starting in 

1949) the People’s Republic of China in Asia. These 

policies included the only two major wars fought by 

the United States during the Cold War. Following the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. focus shifted to 

China. George H. W. Bush was convinced that postCold War peace and prosperity required close cooperation between Beijing and Washington. He was also 

convinced that he was uniquely qualified to negotiate 

the terms of a condominium relationship with China, 

both because of his command of U.S.-China issues 

and his personal relationship with many members of 

the Beijing leadership. Unfortunately, China’s brutal 

crackdown on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 

in June of 1989 made it impossible for the Bush Administration to engage Beijing in a substantive dialogue. As a result, all of the legacy issues which had 

bedeviled U.S.-China relations throughout the Cold 

War (the standoff on the Korean peninsula, the status of Taiwan, outstanding territorial disputes in the 

East China and South China Seas, etc.) were still unresolved when Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack 

Obama came to office. What had changed by the time 

that Obama became President was China’s ability to 

defend and advance its national interests, thanks to an 

average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth 

rate of 10.135 percent over 2 decades.10

Jeffrey Bader, who served as senior director for East 

Asian affairs on Obama’s National Security Council 

from 2009 to 2011, has observed that the President’s 
6

advisers recognized even before Obama’s inauguration that “The [Indo-]Asia-Pacific region deserved 

higher priority in American foreign policy.” But he 

also agreed that “A U.S. foreign policy based on a 

weak domestic economy will ultimately be a failure.”11

This was particularly true for an ambitious U.S. foreign policy in the IAP, where all of the nations in this 

region accorded top priority to continued economic 

growth. Therefore, the Obama team had to improve 

the domestic economy and translate that progress into 

an enhanced image among Asian governments before it could pursue an ambitious pivot campaign in 

the IAP. 

The decision to present domestic economic renewal as a foreign policy priority made good sense in 

terms of the immediate challenges faced by the new 

Obama team, but it also created a unique problem for 

the President. By blurring the lines between domestic and international affairs, the Obama Administration lost the natural advantages that Presidents have 

traditionally enjoyed in the realm of foreign policy. 

It meant that partisan opponents, and Congress in 

general, became immediately engaged in the policy 

debates associated with Obama’s renewal campaign. 

The President made this situation even more problematic by defining economic renewal very broadly, 

to include such issues as health care reform, education reform, renewable energy, and improvements in 

transportation infrastructure. His massive stimulus 

package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act, gave every critic something to attack.12

At first, wrestling with Congress made it difficult 

for the President to focus on the IAP. Obama also had 

to accord priority to ending U.S. combat operations in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan. The best that the administration could do under these circumstances was to 
7

send some encouraging diplomatic messages to Asian 

friends and allies, in the form of high-level visits to 

the region. These included Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton’s visit to Asia in February of 2009—less than a 

month after Obama’s inauguration. This was the first 

time since 1961 that a Secretary of State had visited 

Asia before any other region.13 In the same month, the 

President hosted a visit by Japanese Prime Minister 

Taro Aso—the first foreign head of state to visit the 

White House during the Obama era. President Obama 

followed these initiatives in November of 2009, with 

his own visit to Asia. 

In spite of strong political opposition to specific 

elements of the Obama Administration’s economic renewal campaign, the economy had gained enough traction by the start of 2011 that the President was ready 

to go public with the pivot to Asia.14 Many commentators date this ambitious campaign from Secretary of 

State Clinton’s speech on “America’s Pacific Century” 

in October of that year. The Secretary explained why 

this strategy was essential for Washington, “Harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests.” She also made it 

clear that the Obama team was proposing a geographic shift in American priorities, which would require 

an effective demotion of the region that had been the 

focus of U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the 

Republic: 

just as our post-World War II commitment to building 

a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of 

institutions and relationships has paid off many times 

over. . . . The time has come for the United States to 

make similar investments as a Pacific power . . .15
8

Secretary Clinton’s comparison of the Obama Administration’s commitment to Asia against the postWorld War II U.S. commitment to Europe is instructive, because it alerts us to how much has changed 

over the last 7 decades. What is striking about the early 

Cold War era is the number of instruments that were 

available to Washington to influence events abroad. 

U.S. diplomats could draw upon deep international 

reserves of respect, admiration, and appreciation for 

America’s role in World War II. American policymakers were able to sponsor a global economic order that 

was anchored in, and favorable toward, the dollar. The 

Pentagon could formulate plans for a global network 

of alliances, backed up by exclusive control of the 

“absolute weapon.” To their credit, U.S. policymakers 

chose to use the nation’s vast resources to create and 

sustain a multilateral order that provided a degree of 

international security and prosperity that served as 

the basis for Fareed Zakaria’s “rise of the rest.”16 The 

fact that the United States deserves much of the credit 

for this transformation is small consolation for current U.S. policymakers who must rely upon a severely 

reduced cluster of resources to achieve their strategic 

goals.

THE PIVOT AND THE DIME

Students at the U.S. Army War College are encouraged to think about the multifaceted nature of power 

by reference to the acronym DIME – diplomatic, information, military, and economic resources. The rhetoric of the Obama Administration has been consistent 

in its recognition of the need to draw upon these and 

other instruments of power to achieve its goals in the 

IAP. Furthermore, as a Congressional Research Service report has noted:
9

the various new and old military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives have been presented as parts of one 

package. The implication is that going forward, the 

United States will aim to have a much more integrated

approach to the region, in which the various tools of 

power and influence are utilized in a more deliberate 

and coherent fashion.17

It has been difficult, however, for the Obama team 

to reconcile this rhetoric with the reality of American 

power. In this section, the DIME concept will be used 

to highlight some of America’s strengths and weaknesses as they pertain to the pivot to Asia. 

The Obama Administration has made great efforts 

to fulfill the first requirement of diplomacy—showing 

up. The Obama team learned from the record of the 

George W. Bush Administration that Asian governments view the attendance of high-level American 

policymakers at regional meetings as a clear indication 

of Washington’s interest in the region. Jeffrey Bader 

notes that when Condoleezza Rice failed to attend 

two annual meetings of the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) during her 4 year tenure as Secretary of State, key Asian 

governments concluded that “if the distance is too 

great to justify a visit for a conference, it must be too 

great for more serious commitments as well.”18 President Obama and his principal advisers have accorded 

high priority to such regional meetings and have been 

careful to balance bilateral and multilateral meetings 

in Asia and in the United States. 

The Obama team has also been willing to back up 

its rhetoric and its diplomatic visits with substantive 

policies. Arguably, the most important diplomatic initiative by the United States was taken during the first 

year of Obama’s term, when the Unites States signed 
10

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the 

nations of the ASEAN. The United States was the 

only major power in the region that had not signed 

onto the agreement, so this accession eliminated one 

roadblock to active diplomacy in the IAP. Signing the 

treaty cleared the way for American membership in 

the increasingly important East Asia Summit (EAS). 

This accession also helped Washington to counter the 

frequently heard complaint that the United States favored Northeast Asia at the expense of Southeast Asia. 

A few months later, the administration reinforced its 

commitment to both the Southeast Asian region and 

the principles of cooperation inherent in the TAC by 

releasing its Burma Policy Review. The document 

committed Washington to a new campaign of “permissive engagement” with the Burmese government, 

although it did not remove the existing sanctions 

against the regime.19

The Obama Administration has continued to pursue a very ambitious diplomatic agenda in support of 

the pivot to Asia. It has become an active participant 

in the aforementioned regional institutions (ASEAN, ARF, and EAS) and in other regional organizations—such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC), the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)—as a dialogue partner. It has 

also cultivated bilateral relations with China by means 

of various forums, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (initiated during the George W. Bush 

era as the Strategic Economic Dialogue). These efforts 

have resulted in some valuable agreements with Beijing, including the U.S.-China Act on Climate Change, 

confidence-building measures involving mutual notification of major military activities, and a code of conduct for air and sea military encounters.20
11

America’s diplomatic efforts have been applauded 

by its friends and allies in the IAP. Some governments 

nonetheless continue to express doubts about Washington’s ability and will to sustain the pivot over the 

long term. The depth of this suspicion is illustrated 

in a recent collection of essays by experts from nine 

IAP nations: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand 

and India. All of these experts, without exception, 

questioned Washington’s ability to stay the course in 

the IAP in light of the multiple worldwide demands 

on America’s limited resources and the political, economic, and infrastructure problems that continue to 

plague the United States at home.21

The United States has relied upon public information (the “I” in DIME) to reassure these Asian governments. Charmaine Misalucha argues that, at least in 

terms of U.S.-Philippine relations, Washington has 

been fairly successful in its campaign to sell the arguments that undergird its pivot to Asia. She summarizes the American message as follows:

America is reprioritizing towards the Asian region. 

The main objectives are to sustain the United States’ 

leadership, to secure its economic and national interests, and to advance its values. The instruments required to achieve these objectives are strengthening 

bilateral security alliances, deepening working relationships with emerging partners, engaging in multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, 

forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. Crucial in the narrative of the rebalancing strategy is the demonstrated 

fact that the groundwork has already been laid; efforts 

and initiatives have already been taken towards closer 

ties between the United States and Asia.22
12

Misalucha’s positive assessment of America’s campaign of salesmanship is valid not just for U.S.-Philippine relations, but also for U.S. relations with most of 

its friends and allies in the IAP (some exceptions will 

be discussed later in this monograph). 

There can be no doubt that most IAP governments 

have been receptive to America’s message, in large 

part because they are concerned about the prospect 

of Chinese regional domination. Although all of these 

governments recognize that their prosperity is tied to 

the continued success of the Chinese economy, they 

see cooperation with the United States as a valuable 

form of insurance against the possibility that Beijing 

will seek to establish a coercive form of hegemony 

throughout the region. Without attributing it to Chinese bullying, former Assistant Secretary of State for 

East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell confirmed in 

an interview in 2011 that his job was made much easier by the overall mood in the IAP: “I have worked in 

Asia for about 25 years now. I have never . . . worked 

in a period in which the United States’ role was more 

welcome than now.”23 Nevertheless, precisely because 

the basis of this mood is circumstantial, it may change 

very quickly—either because Beijing is successful in 

its “friends with everybody” campaign, or because regional governments conclude that the cost and risk of 

an American insurance policy is too high.

America’s economic power (the “E” in DIME) is 

arguably the most problematic instrument in the nation’s repertoire. Even America’s closest traditional 

allies have made it clear that they are no longer willing to defer to the United States in the management of 

the global economy.24 The problem is especially acute 

among Asian governments that are justifiably proud 

of their economic policies over the last 2 decades, and 
13

still blame the United States for mismanagement of 

the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and for causing the 

2008 Global Financial Crisis. 

The relative decline of American influence within 

the global economy is in stark contrast to the economic 

clout of Beijing, both regionally and globally. As David Shambaugh recently observed, China is “backing 

up its soft-power ventures with serious money,” in 

the form of bilateral aid, development projects, and 

funding for institutional alternatives to the U.S.-sponsored economic order. Shambaugh notes “Together, 

these recent pledges by Beijing add up to $1.41 trillion; in contrast, the Marshall Plan cost the equivalent 

of $103 billion in today’s dollars.”25 Even if one takes 

account of claims that “Chinese aid deliveries lag behind pledges by a considerable margin,” and even if 

one allows for some decline in aid commitments as 

a result of Beijing’s current economic problems, China will remain the most important source of aid and 

investment for many third world nations.26

The problems that the United States has faced in 

marshalling diplomatic, information, and economic 

forms of power are in striking contrast to America’s 

enduring and extraordinary military power. It is, in 

fact, difficult to exaggerate America’s current relative 

military superiority over any prospective global peer 

competitor or any realistic combination of challengers. 

This situation is changing, as The Economist magazine 

recently observed: “Although America still possesses 

by far the most capable armed forces in the world, the 

technological advantage that guarantees it can defeat 

any conceivable adversary is eroding rapidly.”27 Furthermore, the frequently cited trope that the United 

States spends more on defense than the next ten countries is already outdated. If current trends continue, the 
14

United States will spend slightly less by 2020 than the 

combined defense budgets of the next five nations.28

With specific reference to the People’s Republic of 

China, the Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute has asserted that, if Chinese and U.S. trends 

in defense spending continue, Beijing will pass Washington in military spending in real terms in 2035.29 It 

is also worth noting that some nations, and some nonstate actors, have adapted their strategies and developed their military capabilities in order to present the 

United States with asymmetrical threats or to achieve 

limited military goals that are not likely to lead to allout war with the United States. 

These considerations notwithstanding, for the 

foreseeable future U.S. policymakers will be working 

with a massive repertoire of military instruments, and 

a much smaller pallet of diplomatic, information, and 

economic forms of power, to achieve their goals in the 

IAP region. The challenge for the United States will be 

to rely upon its relative military advantages as a foundation for a multifaceted form of engagement with the 

nations of Asia. Washington cannot behave like, or be 

perceived to be, a one-trick pony, even if one of its 

tricks is vastly more impressive than the rest.

THE FOUNDATION: GETTING BEYOND 

SAN FRANCISCO

Prior to the end of World War II, U.S. defense planners began to address the question of how and where 

they could expend military resources in order to insure 

stability and security in the IAP. It soon became apparent that the region was so large and complex that it 

would be extremely difficult to sponsor a multilateral 

defense network of the type that became the North 
15

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the European 

theater. The second-best option that was chosen by the 

United States was a “hub-and-spokes” arrangement of 

bilateral (U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Philippines) and trilateral 

(U.S.-Australia-New Zealand) alliances. This so-called 

San Francisco System of alliances expanded (Taiwan, 

South Korea, etc.) and contracted (South Vietnam, 

the Philippines, New Zealand) throughout the Cold 

War. From time to time, Washington experimented 

with multilateral arrangements in the IAP (most notably, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), but 

the aforementioned problems of geographic size and 

complexity always frustrated these efforts. Contrary to 

the predictions of many experts, however, the system 

not only survived two major wars and the collapse of 

the Soviet Union, but it also came out of the Cold War 

with a new sense of purpose. Indeed, although the San 

Francisco system has often been presented as a weak 

sister to NATO, the Asian hub-and-spokes network 

has not suffered the kinds of problems of identity and 

purpose that have plagued the transatlantic alliance. 

It is not surprising under these circumstances that the 

residual San Francisco system was identified as the 

logical foundation for the Obama Administration’s 

pivot to Asia.

The system was not without defects: first and foremost, it was, and is, geostrategically top-heavy. As a 

result of developments during the Cold War—in particular, the failure of the United States in Vietnam and 

the U.S. loss of bases in the Philippines—the system 

is too dependent on two anchor points in Northeast 

Asia (Japan and South Korea), and comparatively underdeveloped throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, 

and South Asia. This situation poses problems for defense planners who are still committed to a Rimland 

defense posture. It also makes Washington too vulner-
16

able to political changes in South Korea and Japan that 

can create ripple effects across the entire region. These 

problems will be discussed in the next section of this 

monograph.

This top-heavy alliance network is also too dependent on developments in the most unpredictable nation in the world—North Korea. Since the end of the 

Korean War, the United States has developed its bases 

and defense plans in Northeast Asia around two possibilities: a North Korean attack on South Korea and/

or Japan, and chaos in the wake of regime collapse in 

Pyongyang. These threats have helped Washington to 

justify its military presence in Northeast Asia, both to 

the American people and to the publics in South Korea 

and Japan. It has also made it possible for the United 

States to sustain a strong neo-containment posture 

toward China, without having to admit it publicly. 

However, a military presence that is explicitly built 

around the North Korean threat has made the United 

States a captive to developments on the Korean peninsula over which the United States may have little or 

no control. It has also made it possible for opponents 

of the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia to depict the 

United States as a nation that has a stake in the perpetuation of the North-South Korean conflict. 

There are also severe limits to what the United 

States can do on its own to strengthen the San Francisco system as a foundation for a multifaceted pivot 

to Asia. The pivot strategy is, in fact, an extension of 

the Nixon Doctrine, which has been guiding U.S. foreign policies toward the IAP since 1969, when it was 

launched by Richard Nixon at a press conference in 

Guam. The doctrine put Asian friends and allies on 

notice that Washington expected them to become 

more self-reliant in dealing with non-nuclear threats. 
17

According to Melvin Laird, Nixon’s Secretary of 

Defense:

The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting national security strategy strike a balance between what America 

should do and what our friends can do. The doctrine 

permits [the] U.S. to do enough, without doing, or attempting to do, too much.30

At the time, many critics interpreted the Nixon 

Doctrine as a sign of American retreat from its global 

responsibilities; in acutality, as this author has noted 

in a previous study, “In conjunction with the opening 

to China, the Nixon Doctrine helped to make it possible for the Nixon-Henry Kissinger team to scale back 

U.S. strategic ambitions and obligations across the 

region.”31 It preserved America’s regional presence 

and influence by abandoning the quest for regional 

dominance. 

The logic of the Nixon Doctrine has continued to 

guide U.S. foreign policy toward the IAP up to the 

present time. However, circumstances have changed 

in two important respects. First, Washington did not 

have to ask that much of its regional friends and allies 

during the latter stages of the Cold War because of 

the gradual improvement in U.S.-China relations. This 

situation began to change after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as U.S. defense planners began to focus on 

China as a potential threat to U.S. global and regional 

interests. Second, since the arrival of the Obama Administration, the United States has been explicit in its 

recognition of the IAP as the future center of gravity 

of world politics. This has enhanced the negotiating 

leverage of these Asian governments in discussions 

with Washington about capacity building and burden sharing. Under these changed circumstances, 
18

the United States has had to ask more of its regional 

friends and allies, and work harder to get them to 

do more. Washington must also be more concerned 

about the possibility that, as key Asian governments 

enhance their military capabilities, they will use them 

in ways that are incompatible with, or contrary to, the 

interests of the United States.

Having concluded that the San Francisco network 

of friends and allies was the best foundation for the 

pivot, the Obama Administration began to pursue 

very public policies to enhance both the military capabilities of the system and its image as a viable and reliable basis for regional security. The first very public action by the Obama Administration was an agreement 

with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2011 

to provide U.S. Marines with base access in Darwin, 

in the Northern Territory. At present, there are 1,150 

Marines training at this facility, and plans call for up 

to 2,500 Marines in Darwin by 2017. This was followed 

a year later by the announcement that the government 

of Singapore had agreed to allow the U.S. Navy to use 

its Changi Naval Base for the rotational deployment 

of up to four littoral combat ships by 2018. The first 

of such vessels made a port visit to the Changi base 

in 2013. Finally, and most importantly, Secretary of 

Defense Leon Panetta announced that, “By 2020, the 

navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50-

50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic 

to about a 60-40 split between those oceans.” He also 

announced plans to increase the number and size of 

U.S. training exercises with America’s IAP security 

partners.32

Washington has also been working quietly to encourage selected regional governments to sign onto 

new “minilateral” defense cooperation agreements. 

Examples include the U.S.-Australia-Japan Strategic 
19

Dialogue, and the U.S.-Japan-India Trilateral Dialogue. The United States is actively seeking to expand 

upon these existing minilateral arrangements, and 

to identify opportunities for new agreements (between Japan and South Korea, between Japan and 

Vietnam, etc.).

The United States has enjoyed considerable success 

to date in its efforts to cultivate new forms of security 

cooperation in the IAP. To sustain this momentum, 

however, the Obama Administration understands 

that it has to convince key regional governments that 

enhanced cooperation with the United States serves 

their specific long-term national security interests at 

a manageable cost and risk. Rather than a “one-sizefits-all” approach, the United States has been adapting 

its messages to the unique concerns and goals of each 

IAP actor.33 The following section is a brief survey of 

some of these efforts. 

As the principal anchor point in the San Francisco 

system, Japan has been accorded top priority in the 

U.S. rebalancing campaign. The Obama team has intensified efforts, which have been ongoing since the 

latter stages of the Cold War, to convince Tokyo to 

take greater responsibility for its national security and 

to contribute more to both regional and global security. This has forced Washington and Tokyo to publicly 

confront longstanding sources of tension. Since the 

late-1940s, Japan’s relationship with the United States 

has been based on two hard-to-reconcile components: 

a defense treaty, which allows the United States to establish an extensive military presence in Japan; and 

a pacifist constitution, which places strict limits on 

the security assistance that Tokyo can provide to its 

American ally or to its regional neighbors. Over the 

years, many Japanese leaders have complained about 
20

the economic, political, and social costs associated 

with the presence of more than 80-U.S. bases in Japan. 

U.S. policymakers, meanwhile, have often expressed 

frustration with what they see as Japan’s exploitation 

of its pacifist identity to avoid carrying its fair share of 

the defense burden. 

Since coming to office in December of 2012, Prime 

Minister Shinzo Abe has been testing the limits of domestic support for a more active and assertive Japanese defense posture. His government has chipped 

away at the constitutional prohibitions against the 

use of force overseas. He articulated a new vision of 

“collective self-defense” during an April 2015 visit to 

Washington, agreeing to the new Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation: 

the two governments will take measures to ensure 

Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, 

from peacetime to contingencies, including situations 

when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. 34

The two governments agreed to increased bilateral coordination in such areas as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defense, and 

maritime security. They also agreed that U.S.-Japan 

security cooperation would extend to “the Indo-AsiaPacific region and beyond.”35 Tokyo has backed up 

such statements with significant improvements in its 

military capabilities, including steady enhancement 

of its ballistic missile defense system and a commitment to purchase 42 F-35A aircraft.36 According to 

the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 

the acquisition of the F-35’s “. . . will eventually provide the ASDF [Air Self-Defense Force] with a formidable fifth-generation multi-role aircraft with stealth 

characteristics, which should match up well against, 
21

if perhaps not totally surpass, Chinese capabilities.” 

The IISS report goes on to speculate that “This type of 

capability might be used to strike against North Korean missile bases or even the Chinese mainland in a 

contingency, marking a radical departure in Japan’s 

defence-oriented posture.”37

The Obama Administration has encouraged Prime 

Minister Abe’s efforts to improve Japan’s capability 

for “dynamic defense.”38 However, U.S. policymakers recognize that the Prime Minister is out in front 

of the Japanese public on this issue. According to a 

recent Pew Research Center poll, 23 percent of Japanese favor an expanded security role while 68 percent 

are opposed.39 Mr. Abe must also maneuver between 

his desire to reassure Washington of his nation’s military reliability and the need to deal with persistent 

local opposition to U.S. bases in the Okinawa prefecture, which is home to 74 percent of all U.S. bases in 

Japan.40 The United States has attempted to assist the 

Prime Minister in managing this local political problem by agreeing to move 9,000 U.S. Marines to Guam, 

Australia, and Hawaii—and by continuing patiently 

and persistently to negotiate with Japanese stakeholders on plans to move the U.S. Marine Air Base from 

Futenma to Henoko. These deliberations have been 

ongoing since 2006.41 The talks are likely to remain 

tendentious, however, due to the unique three-sided 

(United States, Japan, and Okinawa) nature of the deliberations.42 While Tokyo would like to find a way to 

move forward with the relocation, many Okinawan 

residents continue to register the feelings that former 

Okinawan Governor Hirokazu Nakaima communicated in 2011, when he stated before an American audience that Tokyo would have to rely on “bayonets 

and bulldozers” to move forward with the development of the Henoko base.43
22

It has also been difficult for both Tokyo and Washington to coordinate their policies regarding the Sino-Japanese dispute over ownership of the Senkaku 

(known in China as Diaoyu) Islands. The Obama 

Administration has repeatedly stated that the Islands 

are under the protection of the United States in accordance with Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan defense pact. 

However, the President has also made it clear that he 

expects both parties to seek a peaceful resolution to 

this territorial dispute. Both Beijing and Tokyo continue to play to nationalist constituencies over the status 

of the Senkaku Islands and over unresolved historical 

controversies. Sheila Smith has observed:

by early 2013, it was clear that a mishap or misjudgment could easily propel China and Japan towards the 

use of military force. Many feared that heated popular 

sentiment would exacerbate the sovereignty dispute 

making the spiral of escalation especially difficult to 

control.44

While continuing to work with Tokyo to improve 

bilateral defense cooperation, Washington must also 

press both China and Japan to look for ways to moderate and manage their outstanding disputes. The 

situation is made more complicated by the fact that 

Taiwan is also a claimant to the disputed Islands, and 

as Fu-Kuo Liu has observed, “it would not be in U.S. 

interests to have to deal with two strategic partners 

fighting each other.”45

It will also be hard for Mr. Abe to pursue a more 

ambitious regional security role, since many of Japan’s 

neighbors still harbor suspicions and resentments towards Tokyo due to its activities during World War 

II. Since coming to office, the Prime Minister has visited all ten members of ASEAN in an effort to enhance 
23

Japan’s status and influence in Southeast Asia. However, these efforts have been offset to some extent by 

his controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which 

commemorates, among the more than 2,466,000 divinities, 14 individuals who have been convicted of 

war crimes. Furthermore, in a recent speech marking 

the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Abe 

made it clear that he is unwilling to go further in publicly atoning for Japan’s wartime history.46

Tokyo’s handling of its war record has been a special source of anger among South Koreans, as illustrated by a 2013 poll reported in The Asahi Shimbun, which 

found that 76.6 percent of South Korean respondents 

had either an “unfavorable” or a “relatively unfavorable” opinion of the Japanese.47 Nor is there any reason 

to believe that South Korean leaders are more willing 

to cooperate with Japan than the South Korean public. Current South Korean President Park Geun-hye 

stated in January of 2015 that she was willing to meet 

with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at any time 

and without preconditions, but she refused to engage 

in a bilateral summit with Prime Minister Abe until he 

did more to atone for Japan’s past actions, including 

its treatment of so-called “comfort women.”48

As recent flare-ups on the Korean peninsula illustrate, South Korea occupies a uniquely exposed and 

strategically vulnerable position in the IAP region.49

South Korea has been in a state of war for over 6 

decades with the most unpredictable regime in the 

world—a nuclear-armed opponent that is constantly 

developing its missile and artillery forces, backed by 

a standing army of over 900,000 troops. From time to 

time North Korea engages in outrageously provocative attacks on South Korean territory, citizens, and 

political leaders—often accompanied by warnings of 
24

plans for “all-out war” against South Korea and “preemptive nuclear strikes” against the United States.50

On top of these provocations, Seoul must also be 

constantly aware of the risk of loss of control by the 

regime in Pyongyang. This risk has become more immediate since the arrival of Kim Jong-un, who has 

reportedly been purging, and in many cases executing, North Korean leaders, including his Minister of 

Defense. The South Korean National Intelligence Service estimates that there have been about 70 such executions since Kim took power in December of 2011.51

This turbulence at the top injects an additional level of 

unpredictability into an already dangerously unstable 

situation.

North Korea engaged in two of its most blatant 

acts of aggression in 2010—the sinking of the South 

Korean naval vessel Cheonan in March and artillery attacks on the island of Yeonpyeong in November. Following the Yeonpyeong attack, Seoul complied with 

requests by Washington and other governments for a 

measured response, but South Korea has since made 

it clear that it will not exercise such restraint in the future. In March of 2011, the government issued Defense 

Reform Plan 307, which established new guidelines 

for military responses to North Korean provocations. 

Deterrence by denial, the traditional basis for South 

Korean security, was replaced by a new “proactive deterrence” concept which authorized field commanders to engage in what Abraham Denmark describes 

as “prompt, focused, and disproportionate retaliatory 

(and perhaps even preemptive) actions in order to 

raise the costs to North Korea of small-scale attacks.”52

In 2013, Washington contributed to South Korean 

efforts to bolster its deterrent posture by including 

strategic bombers and a nuclear-powered attack submarine in its combined military exercises with Seoul.53
25

Washington has also offered to provide South Korea 

with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

batteries capable of countering North Korean missile 

attacks in the event of an all-out war on the peninsula. 

U.S. and South Korean efforts to improve extended deterrence are made more difficult by the fact that 

both governments must constantly monitor and adapt 

their policies toward North Korea so that they account 

for Pyongyang’s principal sponsor—China. Beijing 

has more influence than any other government over 

North Korea’s actions, but China has been reminded 

from time to time that no government can confidently 

assume that it has control over the Hermit Kingdom. 

Beijing has publicly begun to express its frustration 

with this situation, as illustrated by its support of severe sanctions on Pyongyang following North Korea’s 

fourth nuclear test.54

Seoul must also accord high priority to continued 

economic cooperation with China. Beijing is Seoul’s 

largest trading partner, with bilateral trade amounting 

to $228.9 billion in 2013. South Korea expects this figure to grow to more than $300 billion per year thanks 

to the recently completed free trade agreement.55 As 

bilateral economic relations continue to improve, 

South Korean diplomatic relations with China have 

also developed. These diplomatic relations developments are illustrated in the recent visit to Beijing by 

South Korea’s President to participate in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of China’s victory over 

Japan in World War II. Her attendance at this event 

was made more notable by the conspicuous absence 

of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

The Obama Administration has demonstrated a 

sophisticated appreciation of South Korea’s difficult 

situation. However, Seoul has still found several rea-
26

sons to be concerned about America’s pivot to Asia. 

First and foremost, it has been hard for South Korean 

defense experts to get excited about a U.S. rebalance 

to the region, because from Seoul’s point of view the 

Americans never left. In a situation in which the U.S. 

military presence on the peninsula has been the reality for three generations of Koreans, American talk of 

a new campaign of active involvement in Asia inevitably raises concerns about risky disruptions and the 

relative demotion of South Korea in America’s foreign 

policy.

Some South Korean defense experts are also worried that the United States will increase its pressure 

on Seoul to develop new modes of defense cooperation with Tokyo. Minilateral defense cooperation between Japan and South Korea is a logical next step in 

Obama’s plans for the pivot to Asia. Unfortunately, 

Prime Minister Abe has widened the gap between Japan and South Korea by his assertions that Japan has 

done enough to atone for its human rights violations 

prior to and during the Second World War; President 

Park sees no domestic political benefit in softening her 

position on Japanese war guilt just to accommodate 

Washington. The two governments also have unresolved disputes over the Dokdo (in Japanese, Takeshima) islets in the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea by 

Koreans).56 Both Japan and South Korea are working 

with the United States to establish minilateral security 

arrangements with other Asian actors. However, as 

valuable as these initiatives are, they tend to make the 

anomaly of Japanese-South Korean animosity more 

evident.

Some South Korean experts view the pivot as posing a long-term problem for Seoul, as it evolves into a 

true pan-Pacific and Indian Ocean security strategy. 
27

Various U.S. initiatives, including the development 

of the American base in Darwin, the expansion of the 

U.S. military presence in Guam, the American port access arrangement with Singapore, and the U.S.-India 

security dialogue all make sense by reference to the 

U.S. pivot. From Seoul’s point of view, however, anything that shifts the focus of U.S. defense planning 

away from the Korean peninsula is a problem. Some 

South Korean defense planners also worry that a panAsian pivot campaign could entrap Seoul in a conflict 

with China over an issue that does not relate to South 

Korean security or national interests. In this regard, 

it is worth noting that South Korea is different than 

most of Washington’s friends and allies in that it does 

not have any territorial disputes with China.

The pivot also has the potential to disrupt South 

Korean efforts at outreach toward North Korea. In an 

important article in Foreign Affairs in 2011, President 

Park committed her government to a Trustpolitik campaign of conditional reconciliation with Pyongyang, 

stating that “even if Seoul must respond forcefully to 

Pyongyang’s provocations, it must also remain open 

to new opportunities for improving relations between 

the two sides.” While recognizing the level of distrust 

and tension that existed on the peninsula, she cited the 

case of the Nixon Administration’s opening to China 

to support her claim that “trust can be built on incremental gains” between North and South Korea.57 President Park has also pursued policies toward China, 

including her attendance at the aforementioned 70th 

anniversary event in Beijing, to advance the cause of 

Trustpolitik. Seoul’s efforts to improve relations with 

Pyongyang have suffered some serious setbacks in recent years, but many South Koreans continue to hope 

for either “incremental gains” or a diplomatic break-
28

through that will at least end the state of war between 

the two nations. 

From Washington’s point of view, Seoul’s efforts 

to improve relations with China, while also seeking 

opportunities for reconciliation with Pyongyang, are 

understandable and commendable. However, they 

also pose potential problems for the pivot strategy, 

and for the long-term maintenance of the San Francisco security network. In the event that South Korea 

should achieve progress in its relations with China 

and North Korea, the presence of American troops in 

South Korea would inevitably become a subject for 

discussion. Under these circumstances, Washington 

might find itself in the position of having to, or seeming to, oppose progress in North-South cooperation 

out of a concern for the ripple effects of the removal of 

U.S. troops from the peninsula. 

In this exquisitely complex situation, both Seoul 

and Washington recognize the need for close policy 

coordination and the preservation of an effective extended deterrence posture. Fortunately, the United 

States can be reassured by the 6 decades of South 

Korean support and gratitude that has its roots in 

America’s intervention in the Korean War. Edward 

Luttwak has argued that close economic cooperation 

and cultural affinity have helped to tip the scales in 

favor of China in South Korea’s balancing act between 

Washington and Beijing. He accuses Seoul of “strategic escapism,” which he asserts “make[s] its practitioners unfit as active allies.”58 Such claims fly in the face 

of the empirical evidence of strong U.S.-South Korean 

defense cooperation for over 6 decades. They also fail 

to credit the sophistication of South Korea’s “middle 

power” diplomacy in northeast Asia.59
29

Washington must also adapt its policies to the 

special circumstances and interests of key friends and 

allies in Oceania and Southeast Asia. The differing reactions of Australia and New Zealand to the American pivot illustrate how hard it is for Washington to 

pursue a one-size-fits-all campaign. At one extreme is 

Canberra, which is publicly supportive of the American pivot strategy. Australians pride themselves on 

having “the other special relationship” with the United States, and many argue that it has the right to claim 

to have the “more special relationship.”60 Canberra reinforced the message of reliable support by its offer in 

2011 to host U.S. troops in Darwin on a rotational basis. Since that time, Canberra has helped Washington 

to sustain the momentum of the pivot by its cultivation of new forms of minilateral defense cooperation 

across the Asian region. Examples include a recently 

announced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 

with Singapore, which will bolster their joint training 

activities, give Singapore increased access to training 

facilities in Australia, and identify new forms of intelligence sharing.61 Australia has also entered into minilateral agreements with Japan on technology sharing 

and policy coordination on territorial disputes in the 

South China Sea.62 Other notable examples include 

the Australian-Indonesian Defense Cooperation Arrangement, the Framework for Security Cooperation 

between Canberra and New Delhi, and Australia’s 

leadership of the Five Power Defense Arrangements, 

which has facilitated consultations and joint exercises 

among Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Singapore, and Malaysia since 1971. As a result of these and 

other initiatives, Canberra has done more than any 

other regional partner of the United States to move the 

San Francisco system from a hub-and-spokes arrange-
30

ment to a web of cross-cutting and mutually reinforcing security agreements.63

While Canberra continues to demonstrate its indispensability as a regional ally and a global security 

partner, Washington would be mistaken to take for 

granted Australia’s unquestioning support of the pivot. While noting that the U.S.-Australia alliance is in 

“remarkably good shape,” Brendan Taylor has identified “a marked disjuncture between official Australian 

pronouncements on the U.S. pivot and the sometimes 

quite heated public debate that has emerged.”64 Taylor traces the expressions of concern and criticism to 

suspicions among Australian policymakers and opinion shapers about America’s ability to work with its 

regional friends and allies to manage the rise of China without slipping into a war. Taylor includes two 

former Prime Ministers—Paul Keating and Malcolm 

Fraser—among the vociferous critics of what Fraser 

describes as “American militarization of the Western 

Pacific and the policies of [anti-Chinese] containment 

that this implies.”65

The suspicions and concerns registered by some influential individuals in Australia are even more prevalent in New Zealand, which views the pivot from its 

own unique geostrategic position. As Robert Ayson 

reminds us, “The distance between Auckland and Tokyo . . . is about the same as that between Tokyo and 

Istanbul. Even Southeast Asia is a long way from the 

New Zealand landmass.”66 This means that New Zealand views much of the U.S. activity in support of the 

pivot as somewhat marginal to its natural strategic orientation toward the South Pacific. The U.S.-New Zealand bilateral security relationship has actually been 

improving since the George W. Bush era—thanks in 

particular to Auckland’s contribution to allied military 
31

operations in Afghanistan since 2001. However, New 

Zealanders also remember that Washington terminated its Australia, New Zealand, United States Security 

Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) obligations toward Auckland 

in 1985, with no appreciable negative impact on New 

Zealand’s security. These factors impose strict limits to how far the United States can go in asking for 

New Zealand’s public support for the pivot, particularly if that support is in the form of increased defense 

spending. 

Concerns about American reliability are also 

prevalent among some Southeast Asian governments. 

Washington has been “pushing on open doors” in 

its security-related discussions with most Southeast 

Asian governments as a result of China’s growing 

force projection capability and increased diplomatic 

assertiveness.67 Most of these regional governments 

have favored a “soft balancing” strategy toward 

China, because they are not convinced of America’s 

long-term reliability, or because of the priority that 

they accord to economic and political cooperation 

with Beijing.68 Soft balancing has taken many forms 

in Southeast Asia, including an increased reliance on 

multilateral institutions—such as ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN + 3, the East Asian Summit, and ASEAN Defense 

Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)—to influence 

Chinese foreign policy. Southeast Asian governments 

have been attracted to such an institutional arrangement since decolonization, both as a means of facilitating cooperation among themselves and as a tactic for 

increasing their diplomatic clout in relations with external great powers. Various unsuccessful attempts by 

the members of ASEAN to present China with a common front on Beijing’s territorial claims in the South 

China Sea have nonetheless been criticized by both 
32

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and ASEAN 

Secretary General Le Luong Minh.69 The United States 

has also expressed its frustration with what it views as 

ASEAN’s dithering in the face of China’s increasingly 

assertive policies in the South China Sea.

Although Southeast Asian governments often attempt to speak with one voice on issues relating to 

the pivot, they still develop their foreign policies and 

security positions by reference to distinct historical experiences and differing national interests. The result 

is a continuum of support for the U.S.-led pivot; from 

Singapore on the explicitly supportive end, to Thailand at the other extreme of publicly expressed suspicion of the pivot and a preference for bandwagoning 

with China. 

The United States accords special status to Singapore, not just because of its strategic location at the 

intersection of the Indian and Pacific ocean, but also 

because it has been a role model for other Southeast 

Asian actors in support of the American pivot. First, 

Singapore has demonstrated its support for United 

States calls for military burden sharing. With a population of less than 1 percent of the nations of Southeast 

Asia, the city-state has the biggest defense budget in 

the region, in both real terms ($9.5 billion) and as a 

percentage of GDP (3.3 percent).70 Second, Singapore 

has actively collaborated with the United States in 

training activities, military exercises, maritime safety 

operations, and disaster relief operations. In 2012, the 

United States and Singapore took the next step in this 

collaborative relationship by entering into a Strategic 

Partnership Dialogue (SPD) covering a wide range of 

security-related issues, including the aforementioned 

forward deployment of U.S. littoral combat ships at 

Changi naval base. According to David Adelman, the 

U.S. Ambassador to Singapore:
33

Having the ships in the region will allow our two countries to pursue one of our primary shared interests: 

maritime security, assuring stability and free trade 

routes in the seas surrounding the Strait of Malacca.71

Singapore has also established itself as an influential host of various security-related conferences, including the prestigious annual Shangri-La Dialogue, 

sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies. Beginning in 2002 as a forum for discussion 

among defense experts, the Dialogue has evolved into 

an opportunity for meetings among high-level policymakers on controversial topics relating to regional 

security. 

Singapore’s leading newspaper The Straits Times attributed the close security cooperation between Singapore and the United States to the fact that the interests 

of the two governments “remain highly complementary: Singapore desires and welcomes a countervailing American presence in the region, while the United 

States needs friendly locations that will facilitate such 

a presence.”72 There is ample reason to be optimistic 

about the future of this bilateral security relationship. 

However, as Tim Huxley has observed, Singapore’s 

forthright support for the American pivot could place 

the city-state in an exposed and unwelcomed position: 

What if the U.S. wanted to use Changi naval base to resupply a carrier battle group during a crisis with China over Taiwan? Or if the USN [U.S. Navy] dispatched 

littoral combat ships from Singapore to support the 

Philippines in a new stand-off with China? Scenarios 

such as these would require extreme adroitness on the 

part of Singapore’s political leadership and diplomats 

to ensure that the expanded security partnership with 

the U.S. would not incur the obligations and costs that 

only an ally would usually be expected to bear.73
34

Each of America’s regional security partners has its 

own comparable list of what if concerns, although 

in many cases these governments have scrupulously 

avoided raising them in public. 

The Philippines can also be counted as an explicit 

supporter of the American pivot strategy. Edward 

Luttwak observed that, “From a Chinese and strategic point of view, the Republic of the Philippines was 

little more than an extension of the United States” 

until the United States was forced to close its bases 

in the Philippines in the early-1990s. He speculates 

that after the U.S. troops departed, China was “very 

well positioned to supplant the United States as a benevolent greater state.”74 Nevertheless, growing tension between Manila and Beijing over the contested 

islands in the South China Sea has forced the Philippines to recommit to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. The two governments have entered into 

an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which 

will allow the United States to use parts of five Philippine military bases.75 Manila is also committed to an 

ambitious campaign of internal balancing, in the form 

of a 25 percent increase in defense spending in 2016.76

Philippine policymakers have made it clear that the 

additional funding, which will be used to purchase 

navy frigates and patrol aircraft, are a direct response 

to Chinese bullying in the South China Sea. While 

Washington approves of Manila’s increased interest 

in defense cooperation, it continues to encourage its 

Asian ally to seek a peaceful resolution to the ongoing 

territorial disputes with China.

Although Thailand is a formal treaty partner with 

the United States, it is located at the other extreme 

from Singapore in terms of its response to the American pivot strategy. As Kitti Prasirtsuk and William 
35

Tow have noted, “there is an evident disconnect between United States and Thai perceptions on how to 

manage the ‘rise of China.’”77 This is partly a function 

of geography; Bangkok does not share a border with 

China and it has no outstanding territorial disputes 

with Beijing. It is also partly attributable to economics. In 2010, China replaced the United States as Thailand’s largest trading partner. Recently, however, the 

principal source of tension between Washington and 

Bangkok has been politics. U.S.-Thai relations were severely damaged in 2014, when Washington cancelled 

$4.7 million in foreign aid to Bangkok in response to 

the second military coup in Thailand over the last decade.78 While it is unlikely that the U.S.-Thai alliance 

will completely collapse, Bangkok will remain more 

of a problem than a solution for American defense 

planners.

By comparison to Singapore, the Philippines, and 

Thailand, the other Southeast Asian governments are 

uncomfortable fence sitters—deeply concerned about 

China’s growing maritime threat and increasing assertiveness, but also suspicious of America’s reliability as a long-term guarantor of regional security and 

prosperity. They will attempt to keep all of their options open, in the face of United States calls for greater 

burden sharing and Chinese efforts at inducement 

and coercion. To date, the United States has demonstrated an understanding of this situation and has 

been content to pursue modest incremental progress 

in bilateral and multilateral security relations consistent with its pivot strategy. Washington has had less 

success, however, in its efforts to convince Beijing to 

live within the constraints imposed by this strategy. 
36

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: THE PIVOT POINT

Most of the scholars and policymakers who follow 

the rise of China and its implications for America tend 

to fall into one of three schools: “Containers,” “Adapters,” or “Game Changers.” 

Containers tend to be focused on the risks associated with the Thucydides Trap. As noted in the introduction to this monograph, history provides strong 

support for the proposition that war is very likely 

when a rising, revisionist power (like China) challenges a dominant status quo power (like the United 

States). This leads many commentators to agree with 

John Mearsheimer in that, “The optimal strategy for 

dealing with China is containment.” Mearsheimer 

also recommends that Washington “stay in the background as much as possible and let China’s neighbors 

assume most of the burden of containing China.” 79

He also asserts that the United States “has a profound 

interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably,” even if it has a negative impact on the U.S. 

economy.80 The common criticism of the Containers is 

that, by treating China as an enemy, they insure that it 

will become one. 

Adapters implicitly or explicitly question the predictive power of the Thucydides Trap in the case of 

U.S.-China relations. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Hugh 

White are influential representatives of this school of 

thought.81 Spokespersons for this school of thought 

point to the cautionary influence of the U.S.-China 

nuclear standoff, and the still-large disparity between 

U.S. and Chinese military capabilities, to support the 

argument that conflict between Washington and Beijing is highly unlikely. They also place a great deal 

of faith in U.S.-China economic interdependence as a 
37

mitigating factor in the bilateral relationship. Finally, 

they believe that Washington and Beijing will find 

common ground in their efforts to manage major international challenges, such as global climate change 

and resource depletion. Critics tend to depict this line 

of argument as wishful thinking, or at least as an unreliable basis for U.S. strategy.

Game Changers are a mixed bag of experts and 

policymakers who focus upon one or more aspects 

of the U.S.-China relationship, which they expect to 

undergo fundamental change. Influential examples 

include Edward Steinfeld’s argument that China will 

be transformed by a process of “self-obsolescing authoritarianism” into a more democratic and benign 

international actor, and claims by Chinese experts 

that China has no interest in challenging the United 

States because it is still a developing country that 

faces numerous domestic problems.82 While many 

game changers argue that the United States does not 

need to be concerned about China’s rise, others warn 

that some of the serious problems that Beijing faces 

(economic, environmental, political, etc.) could trigger dangerously unpredictable developments, which 

would negatively affect its neighbors and the United 

States. Under these circumstances, Game Changers 

tend to favor American efforts to help China achieve 

a soft landing. Other critics, however, argue that there 

is not enough evidence to justify building American 

policies around these claims. 

In recent months, Game Changers have focused 

on the ongoing economic problems that plague Beijing. Most of these problems, including the decline in 

GDP growth and growing debt, are unavoidable for 

an economy that must shift from investments and 

exports to domestic consumption. The situation is 
38

made more difficult, however, by the decline in global 

demand for Chinese products.83 Beijing is reacting 

grudgingly, and in some cases unwisely, to the fact 

that a 6 percent GDP growth is likely to be the new 

normal for the foreseeable future. However, as Simon 

Rabinovitch has observed, “there is a big difference 

between a recession and growth of 6% or so.”84 Yuan 

Yang and Tom Mitchell also remind us: 

it is easy to forget that because China’s economy is 

so much bigger after its tremendous growth spurt, in 

terms of absolute growth it is still contributing more to 

the global economy than it did a decade ago.85

The problem that American strategists face is that 

all three schools of thought—Containers, Adapters, 

and Game Changers—can cite specific trends and behaviors to support their assertions, but none of their 

arguments can be definitively proven or disproven. 

Containers can point to the double-digit People’s Republic of China defense spending and coercive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, but they have 

difficulty directly linking these indicators to the claim 

that China will be a global peer competitor with the 

United States. Adapters can point to examples of Chinese “friends with everybody” behavior, but they cannot assure Beijing’s neighbors that these actions will 

be sustained. Game changers face special problems in 

their efforts to elevate anecdotal evidence of factors 

that could disrupt China’s rise to the level of reliable 

trends. 

In a situation in which no school of thought can 

achieve the status of a dominant paradigm, strategists 

must pursue policies that are appropriate for each of 

the three points of view. With reference to the containment school, caution requires that Washington pre-
39

serve, and in some cases enhance, its military presence 

in the IAP, but it must avoid military policies which 

unnecessarily exacerbate bilateral tensions. In accordance with the logic of adaptation, the United States 

must follow Hugh White’s advice that the United 

States look for ways to “negotiate a new relationship 

with China as soon as possible, before the power balance shifts further China’s way.”86 Finally, the United 

States should be guided by the arguments of the Game 

Changers to look for ways to assist China to cope with 

problems that threaten the survival of the Beijing regime. Reconciling all three of these approaches will 

require a Goldilocks strategy, characterized by the following rules. 

First, continue to pursue military policies built on 

the residual San Francisco security system that do not 

foreclose possibilities for U.S.-China cooperation or 

force America’s regional friends and allies to choose 

sides. Some of the Obama Administration’s policies 

fulfill these standards. If managed properly, the aforementioned 60-40 military shift to the IAP can shore up 

America’s extended deterrence posture without unnecessarily exacerbating Chinese fears. Likewise, the 

new base access agreement between Washington and 

Manila, the development of training facilities in Darwin, and the agreement with Singapore for periodic 

port visits by littoral combat ships can all be managed 

in such a way that they do not precipitate Chinese 

insecurities. These policies are compatible with the 

goals of hardening, improving, and diversifying U.S. 

military assets in the IAP, as articulated in the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle (ASB) doctrine. On the other 

hand, those aspects of ASB which are designed for 

“networked, integrated attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat” Chinese anti-access and area-denial 
40

assets should be avoided. 87 Chinese policymakers will 

inevitably interpret long-range precision strike weapons capable of eliminating PLA missiles and command and control systems on the Chinese mainland 

as a threat to the survival of China’s nuclear force. 

This would make crisis management much more difficult. It might also force some of Washington’s regional 

partners to reassess the costs and benefits of close security cooperation with the United States. The repackaging of the ASB as the Joint Concept for Access and 

Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) will not 

reassure these governments, and it certainly will not 

reassure Chinese defense planners. 

Second, the United States should accord a higher 

priority to enhancing strategic stability in the IAP by 

working with China to develop confidence building, 

conflict avoidance, and crisis management arrangements—especially in the South China and East China 

Seas. Recently, Beijing has engaged in development 

activities designed to present its neighbors with “facts 

on the ground” that favor its claims to the contested territories. Unfortunately, the United States has felt compelled to respond to these provocations by becoming 

more involved in these disputes by the deployment of 

one of its warships through the 12 nautical-mile zone 

around some of the disputed territories in the Spratly 

Islands.88 Some U.S. experts, and some Asian governments, argue that Washington must take these types 

of actions in order to preserve its credibility among its 

regional friends and allies. In fact, U.S. assertiveness 

regarding a complex issue that is not of direct national 

security interest to the United States may actually undermine U.S. efforts to preserve extended deterrence 

in the IAP by shifting attention away from those regional issues that really are of vital national interest to 

the United States.
41

Rather than a militarized approach to these outstanding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 

the United States should continue to press for diplomatic solutions of the type discussed by Clarence Bouchat in a recent monograph.89 To be effective, Washington must be seen by all parties as what Bouchat calls 

an “honest broker.” He sees this as possible because 

Washington “has less direct demands in the disputes, 

garners more trust than most other states, and possesses resources to bear on these problems.”90 It is also 

worth mentioning that the United States could bolster 

its image as an honest broker by ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

While some experts will argue that efforts by the 

United States to demilitarize these territorial disputes 

may simply encourage Beijing to be even more assertive and uncooperative, Avery Goldstein warns the 

United States that there is an even more serious risk 

of crisis mismanagement between Washington and 

Beijing.

Neither China nor the United States has clearly defined its vital interests across broad areas of the western Pacific. . . . Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about 

the ‘redlines’ that cannot be crossed without risking 

conflict increases the chances that either side could 

take steps that it believes are safe but that turn out to 

be unexpectedly provocative.91

Third, the United States needs to increase its diplomatic efforts to convince Beijing that it is prepared to 

accept China as a true partner in the management of 

the global economy. While both parties have made an 

effort to sustain a dialogue on economic matters, they 

often speak different languages. Official Chinese and 

American statements regarding the recently complet-
42

ed 7th round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 

illustrate this problem. David Dollar and Wei Wang 

have pointed out that Chinese representatives have 

been very positive in their assessments of the results 

of these deliberations, while U.S. spokespersons and 

the American media have been much more pessimistic. They conclude that one reason for these different 

perspectives is that “Chinese officials are largely happy with the status quo whereas the U.S. government is 

not.”92 However, as Beijing adjusts to the new normal 

of significantly reduced GDP growth, its world view 

may come more into line with Washington’s, making 

it easier for the two sides to identify opportunities for 

cooperation. 

Over the last 15 years, U.S. policymakers have 

focused on issues in U.S.-China economic relations, 

which, although serious, are not fundamental. Examples include the U.S. trade imbalance with China, 

Chinese currency manipulation, Chinese copyright infringements, and the lack of transparency in Chinese 

economic activities.93 Washington cannot disregard 

these areas of dispute, but it needs to place these issues in context. As the ripple effects from the recent 

downturn in the Chinese economy should make clear, 

China is already an indispensable nation in the global 

economy. Yet Washington and Beijing continue to 

pursue major economic initiatives in relative isolation 

from each other. America’s efforts to construct the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic 

Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been 

separate from China’s sponsorship of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). While accepting in 

principle China’s status as the world’s second biggest 

economy, the United States has yet to engage China 

in wide-ranging substantive discussions about G-2 

global economic cooperation. One model for such dis-
43

cussions is the 2012 Durban Platform talks on climate 

change, which took the form of meta-negotiations, defined as “negotiations about what to negotiate.”94

A more ambitious campaign of diplomatic engagement with China would also benefit from public statements by the United States that recognize significant 

domestic accomplishments by Beijing. U.S. representatives must continue to comment on human rights 

violations and infringements on civil liberties by the 

Chinese government. However, China also deserves 

to be commended for its unprecedented success at 

raising a significant portion of its population out of 

abject poverty in less than 4 decades. As former Director of the Chinese Institute for Strategic Studies Pan 

Zhenqiang recently observed, “China is still burdened 

with 128-million people living in poverty.”95 China’s 

success to date is nonetheless extraordinary, and U.S. 

policymakers can and should celebrate this campaign 

as a major victory in the advancement of human rights. 

Giving credit to China in this way could go a long way 

toward overcoming some of the most serious barriers 

to Sino-American dialogue.

The policies that are recommended in this monograph will be hard for some American experts and 

policymakers to accept if they are still wedded to the 

proposition that the United States must remain the 

dominant player in the IAP region. For the time being, 

the United States is, in fact, the dominant military actor in the region. However, the military chessboard is 

only one of several chessboards upon which the game 

of international relations is being played in the IAP. 

China is arguably already the dominant regional player in terms of economics, and various governments 

are dominant on certain other issues.96 The important 

point is that neither the United States nor China will be 
44

able to muster enough elements of national power to 

achieve regional dominance in the foreseeable future. 

The United States will be adjusting to the implications 

of relative decline within the global economy, while 

concurrently grappling with persistent economic and 

infrastructure problems at home.97 Conversely, China 

will continue to face numerous domestic challenges, 

including problems associated with structural adjustment of the economy, severe problems of pollution, 

and resource scarcity. Beijing will also have to overcome concerted efforts by many of its regional neighbors to “Gulliverize” the People’s Republic of China 

by both hard and soft power forms of balancing.98

Michael Swaine has argued that acceptance by 

both parties of the fact that neither can achieve and 

sustain regional dominance is the necessary first step 

toward “finding a way to develop a mutually beneficial means of transitioning from U.S. predominance 

toward a stable, more equitable balance of power in 

the Western Pacific.”99 It is not, however, a sufficient 

condition for the establishment of such a regional order. Efforts by Washington and Beijing to establish 

procedures and understandings that would facilitate 

cooperation could founder on any of the aforementioned legacy issues that have bedeviled U.S.-China 

relations for decades, including Chinese support 

for North Korea, Chinese claims to Taiwan, and 

the disputed territories in the East China and South 

China Seas. 

Washington will also have to cope with the fact 

that China is a moving target. In an influential article 

in Foreign Affairs, Wang Jisi has argued that China’s 

“core interests” are security, sovereignty, and development.100 If the elements of these three core interests 

were self-evident, it would be relatively easy for the 
45

United States to engage China in substantive dialogue 

about a modus vivendi. Unfortunately, as the history 

of great power transitions makes clear, a rapidly rising power is constantly in the process of redefining 

and expanding its understanding of its non-negotiable core interests, such as security, sovereignty, and 

development. Under these circumstances, it will be 

incumbent upon the United States to constantly reassess and adjust its policies toward China in order to 

sustain bilateral cooperation. 

OBAMA’S PIVOT GOES GLOBAL

Hal Brands has observed that grand strategy “requires ruthless prioritization.” However, he also has 

noted, “even a flawless plan can be bankrupted by 

failures of implementation.”101 It would have been 

nice if managing the pivot to Asia were the only international problem that the Obama team faced. Over the 

last 5 years, however, it has become increasingly obvious to Washington that a campaign that prioritizes the 

IAP must be placed in a larger geostrategic context, 

for three reasons. 

First, even before some U.S. policymakers began 

to lay the foundation for the pivot to Asia, they recognized the difficulty of preserving an artificial distinction between the Indian and Pacific oceans. This conceptual problem became more acute as Washington 

focused more and more of its attention on Southeast 

Asia and Oceania. Key American partners, most notably Australia and Singapore, took the lead in nudging the United States toward an Indo-Pacific, rather 

than a Western Pacific, orientation. Washington also 

took note of the fact that China was guided by its own 

Indo-Pacific perspective, as illustrated by its sponsorship of the Maritime Silk Road and its development of 
46

a “string of pearls” network of port facilities in the Bay 

of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.102

The adoption of an Indo-Pacific orientation by both 

Beijing and Washington has inevitably enhanced India’s strategic importance as “the ultimate pivot state” 

in the pivot strategy.103 With the second largest population in the world, a gross domestic product only 

slightly less than the combined GDP of all ten ASEAN 

countries, an economic growth rate that outpaces China (7.5 percent versus 6.9 percent in 2015), and a geographic placement between the Strait of Malacca and 

the Persian Gulf, India demands, and has received, 

Washington’s increased support.104 Furthermore, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi has 

encouraged such support by an active foreign policy 

that has transformed India’s “look east” campaign into 

an “act east” campaign. This has taken several forms, 

including improvements in India’s maritime power 

projection capability, minilateral defense-cooperation 

agreements, and joint naval exercises with ASEAN 

governments and Australia. 

Barring a significant increase in Chinese aggressive behavior, however, it is not likely that either New 

Delhi or Washington will be pressing for significantly 

enhanced bilateral defense cooperation. India is still 

too enamored of its tradition of “strategic autonomy,” 

and they are still not convinced that the U.S. pivot can 

be relied upon over the long term.105 U.S. defense planners, meanwhile, are reticent to become more deeply 

involved in what Zbigniew Brzezinski has described 

as the competitive triangle between India, China, and 

Pakistan.106 This is particularly true at a time when the 

United States is looking for ways to enhance U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation and influence Pakistan’s 

decisions regarding its nuclear arsenal.107 New Delhi 
47

and Washington can nonetheless take some encouragement from the very considerable overlap in their 

strategic interests and goals in the Indo-Pacific.

Washington and New Delhi also share an interest 

in competing with Beijing for influence in continental South and Central Asia. This vast region, which 

includes much of the area identified by Sir Halford 

Mackinder as the Heartland, has been the focus of 

much of China’s diplomatic and economic activity 

in recent years. Beijing began this campaign in 2001 

with its support for the multi-purpose Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and has since reinforced its efforts with the creation of the Silk Road 

Economic Belt across Central Asia.108 Washington has 

responded to these initiatives with its own New Silk 

Road campaign, which is designed to foster regional 

energy cooperation, assist regional governments to 

integrate into the global economy, and encourage the 

development of trade and transport between Central 

and South Asia. For its part, India’s decision to join 

the SCO can be interpreted as confirmation that New 

Delhi has accepted the need to establish a modus vivendi with China in South/Central Asia as a precondition 

for becoming “a leading power, not just a balancing 

power.”109

China and India must also find ways to reassure 

each other of their support for unrestricted maritime 

transport across the Indo-Pacific. A recent report by 

the IISS makes the case for why the Indo-Pacific area 

is too big to fail; “the economic and strategic interconnectedness of the two-Ocean region translates 

into both mutual benefit . . . and mutual vulnerability.”110 Robert Kaplan argues, “India has aspirations 

for a Monroe Doctrine-style presence throughout the 

Indian Ocean”; while John Mearsheimer states, “We 
48

should expect China to devise its own version of the 

Monroe Doctrine” in the Western Pacific.111 If both of 

these authors are correct, then both India and China 

are pursuing dangerously ill-advised strategies. New 

Delhi cannot realistically assume that it can regulate 

China’s Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean without precipitating confrontations with the People’s 

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) on the high seas or 

facing Chinese military reprisals in the contested regions along their nearly 4,000 kilometer border.112 For 

its part, Beijing cannot realistically expect that it will 

ever be capable of regulating maritime traffic in the 

Western Pacific, even if it succeeds in militarizing and 

establishing control over most of the disputed territories in the East China and South China Seas. America’s naval presence, and the combined naval capabilities of Washington’s regional friends and allies, will 

prohibit such an eventuality. Furthermore, since the 

Indian and Pacific oceans are a single entity for purposes of maritime transit, Indian naval forces would 

pose significant problems for China if it chose to pursue a campaign of maritime domination in the Pacific. 

Indeed, even Washington has come to accept that in 

a globalized international system it can no longer adhere to the exclusionary and interventionist principles 

of the Monroe Doctrine in the western hemisphere.113

China’s global activism—well beyond Mackinder’s 

Heartland—represents the second development that 

has convinced the Obama Administration to widen its 

focus beyond Asia. The Chinese government has concluded that in order to sustain its economic growth 

and insure itself of uninterrupted access to essential 

resources and markets, it has to pursue a globalized 

foreign policy backed up with capabilities for longrange force projection. The United States has respond-
49

ed by competing with Beijing for access and influence 

far beyond the Indo-Pacific and South/Central Asia. 

One result of this competition has been increased leverage for governments and regional organizations 

in Africa and Latin America, who no longer see the 

United States and the institutions of the Washington 

Consensus as the only game in town. African leaders, who have benefited from an estimated $22 billion 

in Chinese investments and the presence of a million Chinese workers on the continent, were underwhelmed when the Obama Administration pledged 

in 2013 to invest $14 billion in the region.114 In the case 

of Latin America, the IISS concludes that, “The region 

has become stronger economically and increasingly 

independent and self-assured on the political front.”115

Under these circumstances, the United States has had 

to look for imaginative ways to use diplomatic, information, and military instruments to compensate for 

Chinese economic advantages in the competition for 

influence in Africa and Latin America.

The third reason why the Obama Administration 

has adopted a global perspective is that it has become 

clear that it made a mistake by implying that the 

pivot to Asia meant that the United States was turning its back on Europe and the Middle East.116 What 

was meant as a strategic adjustment was interpreted 

by some European and Middle Eastern friends and 

allies as irresponsible abandonment. Furthermore, as 

Thomas Christensen has argued: 

the language also created problems with U.S. partners 

in Asia. They were supposed to be reassured, but because the United States had unwittingly suggested 

that it could not handle two problems at once, predictably some of them now worry that the United States 

might pivot away again.117
50

It is ironic that the United States has refocused its 

attention on transatlantic relations in part because it 

has been reminded by Beijing that Europe is still an 

extraordinarily important international actor. Stefan 

Fröhlich contends that European Union (EU)-China 

“relations have undergone an impressive development, and far more and deeper institutional links 

exist between the EU and China than between the 

United States and China.”118 The EU is China’s most 

important trading partner, and China is the EU’s second most important trading partner (after the United 

States). Europe is also the western destination point 

of Beijing’s continental and Maritime Silk Roads. 

The EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 

agreement, which has been in effect since 2003, addresses a range of issues, including foreign affairs, regional and global security, climate change, and global 

economic governance. Furthermore, since 2010 the EU 

and China have held annual summits at the level of 

heads of state or government.119 The EU is therefore 

in a position to play a much more influential and productive role in collaboration with the United States to 

engage China. It can also assist the United States as 

the western departure point of America’s New Silk 

Road campaign of political and economic outreach to 

Central Asia. 

Washington has been frustrated by China’s success in encouraging what Fortune magazine has called 

an “unseemly stampede for membership” in the Asia 

Infrastructure Investment Bank by some of America’s 

transatlantic allies. It is a special source of embarrassment for the Obama Administration that Great Britain 

was the first western nation to join the AIIB, and that 

London has accorded a very high priority to close economic cooperation with Beijing. In preparation for his 

state visit to the United Kingdom, Chinese leader Xi 
51

Jinping praised London for being “the Western country that is most open to China. This is a visionary and 

strategic choice that fully meets Britain’s own longterm interest.”120 As illustrated by the difficult negotiations to create the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Washington will continue to face 

challenges in its efforts to match Chinese economic 

influence with its traditional allies in Europe. Beijing 

will also be able to tell a convincing story about Europe’s essential role as the ultimate destination of the 

One Belt, One Road campaign, backed up with significant funding for much-needed EU infrastructure development projects. If the United States can resist the 

temptation to view Europe’s cooperation with China 

in “us or them” terms, however, it should be able to 

work with its transatlantic partners to find room for 

China in the global economy. Indeed, even Great 

Britain’s evolving “special relationship” with China 

should prove to be an especially valuable resource for 

Washington as it looks for ways to engage and reassure Beijing. 

By contrast to the European situation, where closer 

transatlantic cooperation can actually contribute to an 

American campaign of constructive engagement with 

China, problems in the Middle East threaten to undermine Washington’s ability to sustain the pivot to Asia. 

The Obama Administration has been criticized for not 

becoming more militarily involved in the region—to 

keep the lid on tensions in Iraq and Afghanistan, to 

impose a solution to the Syrian crisis, to end Iran’s nuclear program once and for all. To his credit, the President has resisted these calls. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, two of the individuals who helped to 

shape Obama’s Middle East policies, have explained 

why the President’s posture of restraint makes sense:
52

At the same time that the salience of the Middle East 

to U.S. policy is waning and the interests of the United 

States and its traditional partners in the Middle East 

are diverging, the potential for American military 

power to effect major change in the region is also diminishing. 121

They also assert that any proposal for military action in the Middle East must be weighed against “the 

likelihood of sustained U.S.-Chinese rivalry that will 

inevitably divert U.S. strategic attention to the IndoAsia-Pacific region.”122 As difficult as it will be for 

Obama and his successor to continue to say no to calls 

for regime change and nation building in the Middle 

East, it will be necessary to persevere in order to stay 

focused on the larger strategic goals associated with 

the pivot to Asia.

SUSTAINMENT

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) will continue to be the indispensable foundation for a longterm American pivot strategy in the IAP. As the most 

visible and powerful institutional representation of 

the American-led San Francisco system, USPACOM 

can draw upon approximately 360,000 military and 

civilian personnel, five aircraft carrier strike groups, 

and about 2,500 aircraft to fulfill its missions of deterrence, reassurance, and engagement.123 It is the largest 

unified combatant command, with an area of responsibility that covers about half of the earth’s surface—

from the West coast of the United States to the IndiaPakistan border. This region consists of 36 countries, 

including what the RAND Corporation has described 

as a “dense and wide network of allies, partners and 

friends” that represents an extraordinary strength-
53

multiplier for USPACOM.124 The combatant command 

provides “effective and assured presence” for the 

most militarized region in the world, with 60 percent 

of the world’s population and half of the world’s commercial shipping.125

Much of the expert commentary relating to USPACOM has focused on the roles played by the Air 

Force and Navy, partly because of the uniquely maritime nature of the IAP region and partly because, as 

General George Marshall once complained, these two 

services are more “photogenic” than the Army.126 In 

fact, the importance of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) becomes obvious when we shift the focus from 

operational concepts, which are designed to respond 

to specific military developments (i.e., Air-Sea Battle), 

to a strategy of long-term sustainment of America’s 

presence and influence in the IAP.127 The Army contributes to all three of the aforementioned missions of 

USPACOM. It enhances deterrence by the presence of 

land forces in areas of potential conflict—in particular 

the Korean Peninsula. It also contributes to deterrence 

by its support for air and missile defense. John Deni 

contends that: 

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) of allied and partner 

countries is currently (and appears likely to remain) a 

growth industry for the Army. . . . The Army already 

has the lead role in operating the road-mobile Patriot 

air defense missile. . . . Additionally, the Army is the 

lead service for the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system . . .128

These systems bolster deterrence by “buy[ing]

decision space” according to Admiral Samuel 

Locklear.129
54

USARPAC will be especially important, over the 

long haul, as an instrument for reassurance and productive engagement with IAP allies and partners. The 

Army is the logical partner for most IAP militaries, 

since land forces are the largest services in most IAP 

nations. As a 2014-RAND report noted, “the Army has 

historically been the most influential service in most 

Asian countries.” The report also asserts, “Army-toArmy cooperation may also be less provocative to 

China than interactions aimed at bolstering partners’ 

air and naval capabilities.”130 The Army also bolsters 

America’s influence across the region by its contributions to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 

operations in the IAP—the location of 80 percent of 

the natural disasters that cause loss of life.131

Over the last few years, the Pentagon has taken 

three steps to enhance USARPAC effectiveness in 

the IAP region. Total deployed personnel have been 

increased from approximately 80,000 to 106,000. The 

Army has also introduced a new Pacific Pathways 

initiative which will provide small forward deployed 

units to countries in the region that do not have American military bases. The Army expects these small 

units to participate in 29 regional exercises with 12 

IAP nations over the next 5 years.132 The Army is also 

committed to the development of Regionally Aligned 

Forces with regional expertise and language skills 

that should be more capable of working with local 

populations in the IAP region over the long haul.133

Finally, the RAND corporation predicts that in the future Army units in the IAP region will be “tasked to 

help defend not just air bases but also port, logistics 

depots and hubs, critical geography . . . host-nation 

infrastructure and urban populations.”134
55

Military instruments of power will be necessary, 

but not sufficient, tools for the sustainment of the 

American pivot strategy. Washington must redouble 

its efforts to combine its military activities with ambitious diplomatic, economic, and information initiatives if it hopes to sustain its presence and influence 

across the region. The Obama Administration has 

demonstrated its appreciation of this fact by the priority that it has accorded to its trips to Asian capitals, its 

hosting of meetings with IAP leaders, and its efforts 

to recruit support for the TPP. To keep this momentum going over the long term, Obama’s successors 

will have to engage in what John Deni describes as another fundamental rebalancing: an effort to “rebalance 

American foreign policy generally from over-reliance 

on the military and toward greater reliance on diplomacy and development.” Deni commends the President for his effort to grapple with this challenge, but 

he concludes that his efforts have “largely failed.”135

This should come as no surprise to anyone who has 

studied the evolution and the functioning of the U.S. 

national security bureaucracy. Absent such reform, 

however, it is not likely that the United States will be 

able to preserve and enhance its influence in the IAP 

in the future. 

CONCLUSION

The Obama Administration’s implementation of 

the pivot to Asia over the last 5 years provides three 

important lessons for strategists. First, establishing 

priorities is an essential part of any grand strategy; 

however, priority is not exclusivity. While making 

the case for a nation’s top strategic priority, policymakers must also be explicit about second and third 
56

level challenges and commitments and preserve the 

flexibility to cope with unforeseeable developments. 

Second, any grand strategy should assume the use of 

all elements of national power and, to the extent possible, look for ways to integrate these elements so that 

they are mutually reinforcing. The reality is that states 

rarely have a well-balanced repertoire of elements 

of power. In the case of U.S.-China relations, Washington’s military instruments dwarf its diplomatic, 

information, and economic instruments. China, for 

its part, has economic resources that eclipse its other 

elements of power. Both governments have had difficulty adapting their dominant instruments of power 

to situations that require other forms of influence. 

Third, any grand strategy that involves extended deterrence must accord priority to the reassurance of 

junior partners. Nevertheless—reassurance can invite exploitation. Convincing junior partners that the 

dominant actor will not abandon them in the face of 

rising threats can backfire if it encourages the junior 

partners to assume that they do not have to make a 

significant contribution to the security relationship. 

Efforts by the dominant actor to reassure friends and 

allies can also lead to over-commitment and entanglement in unwanted disputes.

Obama’s pivot to Asia was the right policy for the 

United States in a situation that demanded “a more 

limited set of political objectives abroad.”136 It made 

sense in light of the global shift of economic power 

from west to east. It also made sense as a cautious response to the rise of China as a potential global peer 

competitor. If managed properly, it can still serve as 

the foundation for an American grand strategy that 

defends and advances U.S. national interests, preserves key elements of the liberal international order, 

and facilitates cooperation in the face of threats to the 
57

global commons. This will require Obama’s successor to keep her or his focus on the IAP, while at the 

same time remaining actively but selectively involved 

in other regions and various global issues. It will also 

require the next President to continue to develop and 

employ diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power, so that Washington does not have 

to rely so heavily on military resources. With a more 

balanced repertoire of power, the United States will 

be better prepared to pursue policies that undergird 

peace and prosperity throughout the IAP region, and 

in the words of Lee Kwan Yew, give China “every incentive to choose international cooperation which will 

absorb its energies constructively for another 50 to 100 

years.”137

ENDNOTES

1. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, 

April 2016, pp. 70-90.

2. U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Global 

Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” Global Trends Report No. 

4, Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008, p. iv, 

available from www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20

and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.

3. Peter A. Petri, “Asia and the World Economy in 2030: 

Growth, Integration, and Governance,” in Ashley Tellis, Andrew 

Marble, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2010-11: Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, Washington DC: The 

National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010, pp. 49-50, 67. Petri defines Asia as East Asia and India. 

4. David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2011, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=1093.
58

5. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” in Richard Rosecrance and Steven Miller, eds., The Next Great War? The Roots of 

World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict, Cambridge, MA: 

The MIT Press, 2014, p. 73; For an updated list of test cases, see 

Allison’s website available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/24928/thucydides_trap_case_file.html. It is interesting that 

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made specific references to the 

Thucydides Trap on various occasions. 

6. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 

New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014, p. 411.

7. Goldberg, p. 88.

8. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in International Conditions, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1910, 

pp. 144, 189-206. Mahan makes this point at several places in his 

book.

9. Quoted in John Taliaferro, All the Great Prizes: The Life of 

John Hay, from Lincoln to Roosevelt, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013, p. 381.

10. Author’s calculation, based on data provided by Wayne 

Morrison, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and 

Implications for the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of 

Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2015, p. 6.

11. Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account 

of America’s Asia Strategy, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012, pp. 6-7.

12. Details can be found on the Obama Administration’s official website, available from https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/

recovery/Pages/recovery-act.aspx.

13. Bader, p. 9.

14. See the positive assessment of Obama’s economic initiatives, Andrew Fieldhouse, “President Obama’s Policies Revived 

the Economy” U.S. News & World Report, March 13, 2012, available from www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-obama-turning-the-economy-around/president-obamas-policies-revived-the-economy.
59

15. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” reprinted 

in Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, available from foreignpolicy.

com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

16. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: 

W.W. Norton, 2008. 

17. Mark Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 28, 

2012, available from fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/187389.

pdf.

18. Bader, p. 2.

19. Scot Marciel, “Burma: Policy Review,” Remarks to the 

U.S. Department of State, November 5, 2009, Transcript available from www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/11/131536.htm.

20. For details, see Bonnie Glaser, “A Step Forward in U.S.-

China Military Ties: Two CBM Agreements,” Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, November 11, 2014, available from amti.

csis.org/us-china-cbms-stability-maritime-asia/.

21. William T. Tow and Douglas Stuart, eds., The New U.S. 

Strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot, London, UK: 

Routledge, 2015. 

22. Charmaine G. Misalucha, “Strategic communication: US.-

Philippines relations and the American rebalancing strategy,” in 

Ibid., p. 120.

23. “The Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia,” The Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell 

moderated by FPI Director Robert Kagan, available from www.

foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia.

24. See for example, Howard LaFranchi, “Why World Leaders Smacked Down Obama at G20 Summit,” The Christian Science 

Monitor, November 12, 2010, available from www.csmonitor.com/

USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/1112/Why-world-leaders-smacked-downObama-at-G20-summit.
60

25. David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft Power Push: The Search 

for Respect,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 4, July/August 2015, 

p. 100. 

26. RAND report (2013) quoted in Kent Harrington, “The 

Political Intent of Chinese ‘Aid,’” Taipei Times, March 10, 2016, 

pp. 8-9, available from www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archiv

es/2016/03/10/2003641208/1. 

27. “Who’s Afraid of America?” The Economist, June 13, 2015, 

pp. 57-60. 

28. See Guy Eastman, “Analysis: US No Longer Spends More 

on Defense than Next 10 Biggest Countries Combined,” IHS Jane’s 

360, June 26, 2014, available from www.janes.com/article/40083/

analysis-us-no-longer-spends-more-on-defense-than-next-10-biggestcountries-combined.

29. Cited in “China’s Military Rise: The dragon’s new teeth,” 

The Economist, April 7, 2012, available from www.economist.com/

node/21552193.

30. Melvin R. Laird et al., The Nixon Doctrine, Washington, 

DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 

1972, pp. 6-7.

31. Douglas Stuart, “Obama’s ‘rebalance’ in historical context,” in Tow and Stuart eds., The New U.S. Strategy towards 

Asia, p. 15. 

32. “Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific,” 

BBC News, June 2, 2012, available from www.bbc.com/news/worldus-canada-18305750.

33. On the need to adapt U.S. policies to the unique perspectives of each Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) nation, see Michael Green, 

“China’s Periphery: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests,” 

ORBIS, Vol. 56, Iss. 3, Summer 2012, pp. 357-369, available from 

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438712000312?np=y.

34. U.S. Department of Defense, “The Guidelines for U.S.-

Japan Defense Cooperation,” April 27, 2015, available from www.
61

defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/20150427_--_GUIDELINES_

FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION.pdf.

35. Ibid.

36. For an analysis of the trajectory of Japanese defense 

modernization during the first decade of the 21st century, see 

Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, London, UK: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 

2009; For more recent developments see IISS, The Military Balance: 2016: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and 

Defense Economics, Vol. 116, Iss. 1, London, UK: Routledge, 2016, 

pp. 229-230. 

37. IISS, Strategic Survey 2012: The Annual Review of World Affairs, Vol. 112, Iss. 1, 2012, London, UK: Routledge, pp. 369-370, 

available from www.tandfonline.com/toc/tssu20/112/1#.Vc4MCbJVhBc. 

38. The term was introduced in December 2010, in Japan’s 

National Defense Program Guidelines, available from www.mod.

go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.

39. Jeff Kingston, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’ transforms security 

policy,” The Japan Times, May 23, 2015, available from www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/23/commentary/abe-doctrine-transformssecurity-policy/#.VcNsIbX0-88. 

40. Alexander Cooley, “Politics Under the Pivot: Okinawa’s 

Triangular Base Relations Revisited,” Suntory Foundation Forum Report 006, Reexaming Japan in Global Context Forum, 

Okinawa, JP, June 6, 2014, available from www.suntory.com/sfnd/

jgc/forum/006/pdf/006_en.pdf.

41. See Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rhinehart, U.S. 

Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2014, available from www.fas.org/sgp/

crs/row/R42645.pdf.

42. Cooley, “Politics under the Pivot.” 
62

43. Quoted in Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United 

States, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012, p. 259.

44. Sheila Smith, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance Upgrades and 

Maritime Contention in Asia,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 30, 2015, available from amti.csis.org/the-u-s-japanalliance-upgrades-and-maritime-contention-in-asia/.

45. Fu-Kuo Liu, “The US pivot to Asia: Taiwan’s security 

challenges and responses,” in Tow and Stuart eds., The New U.S. 

Strategy towards Asia, p. 106.

46. Jason Hanna, “Abe: ‘Profound Grief’ for WWII, but Japan 

Can’t Keep Apologizing,” CNN, August 14, 2015, available from 

www.cnn.com/2015/08/14/asia/japan-wwii-abe-apology/.

47. Daisuke Shimizu and Atsushi Hiroshima, “INSIGHT: Do 

South Koreans Really Hate Japan?” The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, 

Japan, June 21, 2013.

48. Sam Kim, “Park Says She’s Ready to Meet Kim Jongun Without Conditions,” Bloomberg Business, January 11, 2015, 

available from www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-12/south

-korea-s-park-ready-to-meet-kim-jong-un-without-conditions. In November of 2015, however, the two leaders did meet while attending a trilateral conference with China.

49. In August 2015, North and South Korea exchanged artillery barrages across the Northern Limit Line (the de facto maritime border). This was followed by a succession of North Korean 

missile launches and a fourth nuclear test by Pyongyang during 

the first months of 2016. See Jethro Mullen, “North Korea issues 

military threats as tensions with South Korea rise,” CNN, August 21, 2015, available from www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/asia/koreastensions/; See also, “North Korea fires five short-range projectiles 

into sea,” The Guardian, March 21, 2016, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/21/north-korea-fires-five-short-rangeprojectiles-into-sea. 

50. For recent warnings of all-out war see Doug Stanglin, 

“N. Korea threatens Seoul with war over military exercises 
63

with U.S.,” USA Today, August 15, 2015, available from www.

usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/08/15/n-korea-threatens-seoulwar-over-military-exercises-US /31774703/; See also, Sara Malm, 

“North Korea warns it is preparing a ‘pre-emptive’ nuclear 

strike against the US,” Daily Mail, March 31, 2016, available from 

www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3516875/North-Korea-warns-preparing-pre-emptive-nuclear-strike-against-US.html?ITO=1490&ns_

mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490.

51. Nick Robins-Early, “What’s behind all the reports of 

North Korea’s purges and executions,” The World Post, May 14, 

2015, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/14/kim-jongun-executes_n_7278804.html.

52. Abraham M. Denmark, “Proactive Deterrence: The challenge of escalation control on the Korean peninsula,” Korean 

Economic Institute Academic Paper Series, December 2011, p. 2, 

available from keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/proactive_

deterrence_paper.pdf.

53. See Changsu Kim, “South Korea’s adaptation to the US 

pivot to Asia,” in Tow and Stuart, eds., The New U.S. Strategy 

towards Asia, pp. 97-8. 

54. “China is no longer prepared to tolerate the cavalier, nearcontemptuous attitude of Kim Jong-un . . .” quoted from Jonathan D. Pollack, “China and North Korea: The long goodbye?” 

The Brookings Institution, entry posted March 28, 2016, available 

from www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/28-

china-north-korea-sanctions-pollack.

55. See Shannon Tiezzi, “It’s Official: China and South Korea 

sign free trade agreement,” The Diplomat, June 2, 2015, available 

from thediplomat.com/2015/06/its-official-china-south-korea-sign-free

-trade-agreement/; See also, “China and South Korea to sign free 

trade deal,” BBC News, November 10, 2014, available from www.

bbc.com/news/business-29983756.

56. It is ironic that one of the few things that North and South 

Korean reportedly agree upon is the Korean claim of sovereignty 

over the Dokdo islets.
64

57. Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind Of Korea: Building Trust 

between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, Iss. 5, 

September/October 2011, pp. 13-18. 

58. Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 179.

59. See Scott Snyder, “South Korea Middle Power Diplomacy 

and the U.S. Rebalance,” Council on Foreign Relations, posted on 

March 24, 2015, available from blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/03/24/southkorean-middle-power-diplomacy-and-the-u-s-rebalance/.

60. For an analysis of this bilateral relationship, see Jeffrey 

McCausland et al., eds., The Other Special Relationship: The United 

States and Australia at the start of the 21st Century, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?

pubID=760.

61. See Prashanth Parameswaran, “Australia and Singapore: What’s in a new strategic partnership?” The Diplomat, June 

30, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/06/australia-andsingapore-whats-in-a-new-strategic-partnership/.

62. See Masaaki Kameda, “Japan, Australia Defense Ministers pledge to boost cooperation,” The Japan Times, June 4, 2015, 

available from www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/04/national/

politics-diplomacy/japan-australia-defense-ministers-pledge-to-boostcooperation/#.VeBddSVVhBc.

63. See Patrick M. Cronin et al., “The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties,” CNAS 

Reports, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2013, available from www.cnas.org/files/documents/

publications/CNAS_AsiaPowerWeb.pdf.

64. Brendan Taylor, “Australia responds to America’s rebalance,” in Tow and Stuart eds., The New U.S. Strategy towards 

Asia, p. 165. 

65. Ibid., p. 161.
65

66. Robert Ayson, “New Zealand’s response,” in Tow and 

Stuart eds., The New U.S. Strategy towards Asia, p. 179.

67. The phrase is borrowed from Robert Keatley, “How China 

Helps the Pivot,” The National Interest, March 21, 2013, which is 

cited in Stuart, “Obama’s ‘rebalance’ in historical context,” p. 22. 

68. On soft balancing, see Andrew Shearer, “Southeast Asia 

and Australia: Case Studies in Responding to China’s Military 

Power,” in Tellis and Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s 

Military Challenge, Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian 

Research, 2012, pp. 241-275.

69. Trefor Moss, “ASEAN Urged to Stand up to Beijing Over 

South China Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2015, available from www.wsj.com/articles/asean-urged-to-stand-up-to-beijingover-south-china-sea-1438690560.

70. Singapore’s population is approximately 5.5 million in a 

region of approximately 618 million people. Figures are for 2015, 

reported by Franz-Stefan Gady, “Singapore’s Defense Budget 

Climbs 5.7%,” The Diplomat, March 19, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/03/singapores-defense-budget-climbs-5-7-percent/.

71. David Adelman, “The U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership: Bilateral Relations Move Up a Weight Class,” The Ambassador’s REVIEW, Spring 2012, Washington, DC: Council of 

American Ambassadors, available from www.ciaonet.org/attachments/20335/uploads. 

72. Quoted by Ralf Emmers, “Security and power balancing: 

Singapore’s response to the US rebalance to Asia,” in Tow and 

Stuart eds., The New U.S. Strategy towards Asia, p. 149. 

73. Tim Huxley, “Singapore and the US: not quite allies,” The 

Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, posted on July 30, 

2012, available from www.aspistrategist.org.au/singapore-and-theUS-not-quite-allies/.

74. Luttwak, p. 197.
66

75. Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Next for US-Philippine Military Ties?” The Diplomat, April 29, 2015, available from 

thediplomat.com/2015/04/whats-next-for-us-philippine-military-ties/; 

See also, Dan Lamothe, “These are the bases the U.S. will use 

near the South China Sea. China isn't impressed.” The Washington Post, March 21, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/21/these-are-the-new-u-s-military-basesnear-the-south-china-sea-china-isnt-impressed/.

76. Molly Riehl, “Philippines Proposes 25% Increase in Defense Spending,” Newsbeat Social, July 21, 2015, available from 

newsbeatsocial.com/watch/0_7d1ab2tl.

77. Kitti Prasirtsuk and William T. Tow, “A reluctant ally? 

Thailand in the US rebalancing strategy,” in Tow and Stuart eds., 

The New U.S. Strategy towards Asia, p. 137. 

78. See Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, and Wil Mackey, 

Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, Washington DC: U.S. 

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 29, 

2015, pp. 2, 11-12. 

79. Mearsheimer, pp. 384-385. 

80. Ibid., p. 388.

81. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, New York: Basic Books, 2012; Hugh White, 

The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power, Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 2012. 

82. See Edward Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise 

Doesn’t Threaten the West, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2012; and statements by Major General Pan Zhenqiang, SinoU.S. Colloquium VIII: Beyond the Current Distrust at the Elliott 

School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 

Washington, DC, October 5, 2015.

83. See the analysis by Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani, “China’s 

Toughest Test Is Within Its Walls,” Financial Times, January 27, 

2016, available from next.ft.com/content/1d446610-ba9f-11e5-b151-

8e15c9a029fb.
67

84. Simon Rabinovitch, “The middling kingdom: Worries 

about the economy will ebb, for now,” The Economist, The World 

in 2016 Special Issue, November 2, 2015, p. 73.

85. Yuan Yang and Tom Mitchell, “China Adds G20-Sized 

Economy Every Year,” Financial Times, January 19, 2016, available from https://next.ft.com/content/e97ae186-be65-11e5-846f-79b

0e3d20eaf.

86. White, p. 153. 

87. See the official statement by the Air-Sea Battle Office, 

November 9, 2011, quoted in Douglas Stuart, “San Francisco 2.0: 

Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot Toward Asia,” Asian Affairs, 

Vol. 39, Iss. 4, 2012, p. 213; On the renaming of Air-Sea Battle, 

see J. Randy Forbes, “RIP Air-Sea Battle?” The National Interest, 

January 29, 2015, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/rip-airsea-battle-12147. 

88. “Who Rules the Waves? China no longer accepts that 

America should be Asia-Pacific’s dominant naval power,” The 

Economist, October 17, 2015, pp. 64-66. 

89. Clarence J. Bouchat, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands 

and U.S. Interests and Approaches, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1187. 

90. Ibid., p. 112.

91. Avery Goldstein, “China’s Real and Present Danger: Now 

is the Time for Washington to Worry,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, 

No. 5, September / October 2013, p. 137.

92. David Dollar and Wei Wang, “S&ED: Chinese and American media tell two tales,” The Brookings Institution, posted June 

29, 2015, available from www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/

posts/2015/06/29-sed-chinese-american-media-dollar-wang.

93. See for example, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 

Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, 2014, avail-
68

able from origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Exe

cutive%20Summary.pdf. 

94. See Daniel Bodansky, “The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options,” Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 

Social Science Research Network, July 10, 2012, available from 

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102994. 

95. Statements during the Sino-U.S. Colloquium VIII.

96. Joseph Nye Jr. deserves credit for the concept of a “threedimensional chessboard.” See Nye Jr., “American Power in the 

21st Century,” The Korea Times, September 14, 2009, available 

from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/09/137_51780.

html. 

97. See the arguments by Joseph Nye, Jr., Is the American Century Over? Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015, pp. 98-99; Brzezinski, 

pp. 46-51; and Richard Haass, Foreign policy begins at home: the 

case for putting America’s house in order, New York: Basic Books, 

2013, p. 161. 

98. See Luttwak’s views regarding “Gulliverization” in The 

Rise of China, p. 264.

99. Michael D. Swaine, “The Real Challenge in the Pacific: 

A Response to ‘How to Deter China,’” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, 

No. 3, May/June 2015, p. 145. 

100. Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 

2011, Vol. 90, Iss. 2, pp. 68-80.

101. Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, 

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014, pp. 4, 11-12. 

102. According to IISS, “the Indian Ocean has replaced the 

Atlantic as the world’s busiest and most strategically significant 

trade corridor, carrying two-thirds of global oil shipments and 

one-third of bulk cargo.” See IISS, The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key Developments and Trends, IISS Strategic 
69

Dossier, London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 

2015, p. 9.

103. Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge Of Geography, New York: 

Random House, 2012, p. 228.

104. “India Outpaces China in 2015 Economic Growth,” BBC 

News, February 8, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/business-35519671.

105. This argument is developed by Mahesh Shankar, “India 

and the US ‘pivot’ to Asia: convergence without change,” in Tow 

and Stuart eds., The New U.S. Strategy towards Asia, p. 191-93. 

106. Brzezinski, pp. 161-165. 

107. See David Sanger and Matthew Rosenberg, “White 

House Set to Sell New Fighter Jets to Pakistan in Bid to Bolster 

Partnership,” The New York Times, October 22, 2015. 

108. For an analysis of China’s activities, see Scott Kennedy 

and David Parker, “Building China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’,”

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

April 3, 2015, available from csis.org/publication/building-chinasone-belt-one-road. 

109. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, quoted in “High Visibility: 

India is reaching out to the world,” The Economist, Special Report 

on India, May 23, 2015, p. 14. 

110. IISS, The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 

2015, p. 22. 

111. Kaplan, p. 250; Mearsheimer, p. 371.

112. Contested regions include the Aksai Chin territory, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Arunachal Pradesh area. 

113. Zachary Keck, “The U.S. Renounces the Monroe Doctrine?” The Diplomat, November 21, 2013, available from thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-us-renounces-the-monroe-doctrine/. 
70

114. Yun Sun and Jane Olin-Ammentorp, “The US and China 

in Africa: Competition or Cooperation?” The Brookings Institution, posted April 28, 2014, available from www.brookings.edu/

blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/28-us-china-africa-policy-sun. 

115. IISS, Strategic Survey 2013: The Annual Review of World 

Affairs, Vol. 113, Iss. 1, 2013, London, UK: Routledge, p. 77.

116. See the statements by Kurt Campbell, former Assistant 

Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, at the SinoU.S. Colloquium VIII.

117. Thomas J. Christensen, “Obama and Asia: Confronting 

the China Challenge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5, September/

October 2015, p. 29.

118. Stefan Fröhlich, The New Geopolitics of Transnational 

Relations, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

2012, p. 131.

119. For details, see “EU-China Summits,” EU External Action website, available from eeas.europa.eu/china/summits_en.htm.

120. Stephan J. Adler and Jason Subler, “Exclusive - China’s Xi lauds Britain for ‘visionary’ openness, prods other 

to emulate,” Reuters, October 17, 2015, available from www.

reuters.com/article/2015/10/18/us-china-britain-xi-exclusiveidusKCN0SC03520151018. 

121. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “The End of Pax 

Americana: Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback Makes 

Sense,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6, November/December 

2015, p. 4. 

122. Ibid., p. 6.

123. Estimates provided by the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) official website, available at www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM.aspx; See also the testimony by Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Statement for the Record presented to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, September 17, 2015, available from www.

pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/617626/
71

statement-before-the-senate-armed-service-committee-on-maritimesecurity-strate.aspx.

124. Terrence K. Kelly et al., “The U.S. Army in Asia, 2030-

2040,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 85.

125. Regarding IAP militarization, and the need for effective 

and assured presence, see the Testimony by Admiral Samuel J. 

Locklear before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 16, 

2015, available from www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/

Locklear_04-16-15.pdf.

126. Quoted in Douglas T. Stuart, Creating The National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 80.

127. Air-Sea Battle has been renamed, and somewhat revised, 

as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). The extent to which this change represents a 

shift from an operational concept to a doctrine remains to be 

seen. It also remains to be seen if America’s friends and allies 

in the IAP region will be more reassured by JAM-GC than they 

were by Air-Sea Battle. See Franz-Stefan Gady, “The Pentagon 

Just Dropped the Air-Sea Battle Name,” The Diplomat, January 22, 

2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-pentagon-justdropped-the-air-sea-battle-name/.

128. John R. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-AsiaPacific,” Parameters, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 79.

129. Locklear Testimony, April 17, 2015. 

130. Kelly et al., p. 87. 

131. General Vincent K. and Maren Leed, “Perspectives on 

East Asia,” Discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 4, 2015, available from 

csis.org/event/perspectives-east-asia.

132. Ibid.
72

133. See Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not As Usual,” 

Parameters, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, pp. 55-63. 

134. Kelly et al, p. 89.

135. John R. Deni, The Real Rebalancing: American Diplomacy 

and the Tragedy of President Obama’s Foreign Policy, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2015, pp. 

xiii, 1, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=1301.

136. Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. 

Grand Strategy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014, p. 166.

137. Graham Allison et al., Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s 

Insights on China, the United States, and the World, Cambridge, MA: 

MIT Press, 2013, p. 46.
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