United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 9, 2016

Decided November 9, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3863

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RONALD C. BOHN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3: 12CR063‐001

Robert L. Miller, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ronald Bohn pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(j), and was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment, ten months below the

statutory maximum. Although his plea agreement included a broad appeal waiver, Bohn

appealed. His appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to

withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We invited Bohn to comment on

counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. See CIR R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a

brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this

kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 15‐3863    Page 2

thorough, we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey,

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Acting on a tip that Bohn was selling prescription drugs at his rental property, his

parole officer searched the house and found marijuana in a pill bottle. The police then

obtained a warrant to search the property and found four stolen firearms and other

stolen items, including pried‐open safes, prescription drugs, and more than 100 chains

and necklaces. After his motion to suppress the evidence was denied, Bohn entered into

a plea agreement with the government. In the agreement, he admitted that he had

constructively possessed a stolen firearm because he was the landlord and was at the

property performing repairs at the time of the search.   

Counsel first tells us that she has consulted with Bohn and he wishes to withdraw

his guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States

v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel considers challenging whether the plea

was knowing and voluntary, but properly concludes that any such challenge would be

frivolous. The plea colloquy transcript demonstrates that the district court substantially

complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.

See United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349.

As counsel points out, the district court did not advise Bohn that it was obligated to

impose a $100 special assessment, see FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(L), but the error was

harmless because the plea agreement informed Bohn that he would have to pay a

mandatory $100 special assessment. See United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 769 (7th Cir.

2001). Otherwise the court fulfilled its obligation under Rule 11; it advised Bohn of the

nature of the charges, the potential penalties, the trial and appellate rights he waived,

and the sentencing process. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); Davenport, 719 F.3d at 618. The

court also ensured that an adequate factual basis for Bohn’s guilty plea existed and that

he entered into the plea voluntarily. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3).

Counsel also considers whether Bohn could challenge his sentence, but rightly

concludes that this challenge would be foreclosed by the appeal waiver. In his plea

agreement, Bohn expressly waived his right “to appeal or to contest [his] conviction and

[his] sentence or the manner in which [his] conviction or [his] sentence was determined

or imposed. . . .” Because the guilty plea stands, so does the waiver. See United States v.

Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013). Further, the district court did not rely on any

impermissible factors in sentencing, and Bohn’s sentence was within the ten‐year

statutory maximum. See United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).   
No. 15‐3863    Page 3

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.