0

United States Army

Mad Scientist:

Megacities and Dense 

Urban Areas in 2025 

and Beyond

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, Fort Eustis, VA.

U.S. Army

Training and

Doctrine Command

Arizona

State

University

Created and edited by: Joel Lawton 

and Major Lori Shields 

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
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Table of Contents 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................9

Mad Scientist Overview.........................................................................................................................9

Objectives of Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Event ..............................................................10

Insights from Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Event ..............................................................11

Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC) Alignment of Insights.........................................................13

Compendium Section Overview.........................................................................................................15

Acknowledgements..............................................................................................................................20

Continuous Engagement.....................................................................................................................21

SECTION 1: “Army Operation in Megacities and Dense Urban Areas”..................................22

Vignette: Calling in the Note...............................................................................................................23

Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Synopsis: ......................................................25

The Mad Scientist Initiative:................................................................................................................27

Megacity and Dense Urban Areas Problem Sets and Event Objectives:....................................28

Event Themes and Insights ................................................................................................................34

Way Forward:........................................................................................................................................37

SECTION 2: MITRE Report..................................................................................................................42

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................45

Introduction: Megacities Initiative for Collaboration and Idea Generation...................................48

General Themes and Challenges......................................................................................................51

Alignment of Contributor Insights to Megacity Objectives .............................................................57

Situational Understanding...............................................................................................................57

Freedom of Movement and Protection..........................................................................................66

Expeditionary Operations................................................................................................................70

Future Training Challenges ............................................................................................................74

Quantitative Summary of Data...........................................................................................................79

Academic Publication Alignment to Megacity Objectives ..............................................................80

Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................90

Appendix 1: Sources............................................................................................................................92

Appendix 2: List of Mad Scientist Megacities Initiative Contributors............................................97

Appendix 3: Methodology .................................................................................................................104
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Appendix 4: Additional Data Analysis Results...............................................................................105

Appendix 5: Terms of Reference.....................................................................................................116

Appendix 6: Administrative Survey Results ...................................................................................125

SECTION 3: Situational Awareness ...............................................................................................134

An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas...................................................136

Introduction......................................................................................................................................136

Background I – Dense Urban Areas............................................................................................137

Background II – IPB: A Dated Methodological Approach .......................................................137

An Urban Analytic Framework: City as a System .....................................................................138

Creating a Tailored Urban Analytic Framework.........................................................................139

Mapping Urban Problem Systems...............................................................................................142

Developing & Analyzing Urban COAs.........................................................................................145

Preparing for the AOC’s Future Operating Environment .........................................................146

Appendix..........................................................................................................................................147

End Notes........................................................................................................................................148

Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks: Using Urban Integration and Connectedness to 

Assess Resilience..............................................................................................................................152

Introduction......................................................................................................................................152

Urban Resilience ............................................................................................................................153

Connectedness, integration, and interdependence ..................................................................153

An analogy from biology................................................................................................................155

Recent empirical evidence............................................................................................................155

The Key to Urban Resilience........................................................................................................156

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................157

End Notes........................................................................................................................................157

Atmospheric Impacts and Effects Predictions and Applications for Future Megacity and Dense 

Urban Area Operations .....................................................................................................................160

Introduction......................................................................................................................................160

Local Duct Weather Concerns Impacting Operations ..............................................................160

Specific Operational Challenges Within Megacity Domains....................................................161

Needed Solutions: Weather Technologies to Change Warfare for Decision Makers at All 

Echelons ..........................................................................................................................................162
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Summary .........................................................................................................................................164

Complex IPB.......................................................................................................................................166

End Notes........................................................................................................................................173

Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI) Sharing for Transnational Threat Actors 175

Global Terrorism Trend Summary ...............................................................................................175

Intergovernmental Organizations: INTERPOL, Europol, NATO, OSCE and Frontex .........176

All-source Intelligence Critical Components: Identity and Biometric Enabled Intelligence 

(BEI) .................................................................................................................................................179

Identity Intelligence Interoperability Assessment, Implications and Way Ahead..................180

Intergovernmental Identity Intelligence Lessons Learned, Best Practices and Solutions ..181

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................182

References and End Notes...........................................................................................................182

It’s in There: Rethinking (?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Megacities/Dense 

Urban Areas........................................................................................................................................185

What is IPB and How is it Evolving in the Dense Urban Environment? ................................186

What is the Operational Environment? .......................................................................................187

How do the Analytical Tools of Intelligence Inform IPB in Urban Settings?..........................189

Dense Urban Areas and Insurgency Theory..............................................................................189

How to Model Overlapping Threats?...........................................................................................190

Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................191

Megacities and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacle or Opportunity?...................................193

Introduction......................................................................................................................................193

Defining the Area of Regard (Megacity and Dense Urban Environments)............................194

SSG Megacity Framework............................................................................................................195

Framework Applied: Regulated Flow Capacity..........................................................................196

Framework Applied: Infrastructure Quality.................................................................................197

Framework Applied: Systems.......................................................................................................198

Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Moving on Up!.....................................................199

Summary .........................................................................................................................................201

Tables...............................................................................................................................................202

End Notes........................................................................................................................................202
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Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly...............................................................................205

Introduction......................................................................................................................................205

The Good.........................................................................................................................................206

The Bad ...........................................................................................................................................209

The Ugly...........................................................................................................................................211

Toward Solutions............................................................................................................................212

End Notes........................................................................................................................................216

Megacity Madness .............................................................................................................................220

End Notes........................................................................................................................................227

Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army....................................228

Megacity Defined............................................................................................................................228

Global Drivers and Trends............................................................................................................228

A PMESII-PT Megacity Analysis..................................................................................................230

Replicating Future Complexities at US Army Training Centers ..............................................233

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................234

Credits..............................................................................................................................................234

End Notes........................................................................................................................................235

Qualitative Analysis Concept in Support of Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) Maneuvers..236

Army Campaign of Learning.........................................................................................................236

Tactical Qualitative Analysis support to AWfC #1.....................................................................237

Implementing Qualitative Analysis as a Concept......................................................................240

End Notes........................................................................................................................................241

Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational Awareness in Dense Urban 

Environments and Mega Cities ........................................................................................................242

Vignette............................................................................................................................................243

Concluding Thoughts.....................................................................................................................244

End Notes........................................................................................................................................245

SECTION 4: Freedom of Movement and Protection ..................................................................246

U.S. Army Mega City Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative Technologies ............247

Introduction......................................................................................................................................247

Emerging, Enduring, and Endearing Technologies. .................................................................248
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Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................252

End Notes........................................................................................................................................253

Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban Environments

..............................................................................................................................................................254

Introduction......................................................................................................................................254

Unmanned Aerial Systems for Future Medical Missions .........................................................255

Novel Medical Uses of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems .......................................................256

Enabling Technologies ..................................................................................................................257

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................259

End Notes........................................................................................................................................259

SECTION 5: Expeditionary Operations .........................................................................................260

A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) versus “Evolution”: When Machines are Smart Enough!

..............................................................................................................................................................261

Today’s Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Technology .......................................................................262

Another view of Human Intelligence............................................................................................262

The Conventional Technology Options and Issues (or - Why isn’t everything automated 

today?) .............................................................................................................................................263

Threats and Opportunities and a Value System........................................................................263

The Paradigm Shift ........................................................................................................................264

What if Accomplishing this is Easy?............................................................................................264

Knowledge Enhanced Electronic Logic (KEEL) Technology[ii]...............................................265

Summary .........................................................................................................................................266

NOW (For Organizations That Can Accept New Ideas)...........................................................267

End Notes........................................................................................................................................268

“TRAuma Care In a Rucksack” (TRACIR), a Disruptive Technology Concept.........................269

Introduction......................................................................................................................................269

Disruptive Technologies................................................................................................................270

Novel Stress-based Biomarkers ..................................................................................................271

Intelligent Trauma Registries........................................................................................................273

Semi-autonomous and Autonomous Resuscitation..................................................................274

Physiologic Data Visualization .....................................................................................................274

Robotic-Driven Assessment & Intervention................................................................................275
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System Miniaturization ..................................................................................................................276

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................276

References ......................................................................................................................................276

Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in Megacities ....278

Introduction......................................................................................................................................278

Methods ...........................................................................................................................................279

Results and Discussion.................................................................................................................280

Conclusions.....................................................................................................................................285

References ......................................................................................................................................288

How to Hold or Take a Big City -- Seven Lines of Effort..............................................................295

How to Organize the Study of a Big City to Support the Seven Lines of Effort....................299

End Notes........................................................................................................................................304

Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source Technologies...306

Introduction......................................................................................................................................306

Background .....................................................................................................................................306

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................313

Pain Management: Maintaining the Force......................................................................................314

Introduction......................................................................................................................................314

Current State of Pain Management from the Battlefield to the Hospital................................314

Level I-II: First-Responder Pain Management on the Battlefield ............................................315

Level III-IV: Theater and Stateside Hospital Pain Management.............................................316

Level V: Pain Management During Stateside Hospitalization and Rehabilitation...............316

Challenges Specific to Densely Populated Urban Operations Environments and 

Asymmetrical Warfare ...................................................................................................................317

Future Directions for Pain Management on the Battlefield ......................................................317

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................317

End Notes........................................................................................................................................318

SECTION 6: Future of Training........................................................................................................320

Man, Computer, and Special Warfare.............................................................................................321

Hybrid-Hype ....................................................................................................................................321

Human-Machine Teaming.............................................................................................................322
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Crimean War--Dawn of Machines................................................................................................324

The Cyber-Enabled Special Warfare Pyramid...........................................................................326

What is it?........................................................................................................................................326

Theory ..............................................................................................................................................327

Form .................................................................................................................................................327

New Practice...................................................................................................................................328

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................329

End Notes........................................................................................................................................329

Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond ...........................................334

Summary .........................................................................................................................................341

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................342

References ......................................................................................................................................342

Technical Challenges for Simulation and Training in Megacities ...............................................344

Introduction......................................................................................................................................344

Background .....................................................................................................................................345

Challenges.......................................................................................................................................346

Data Representation......................................................................................................................346

Environment Model ........................................................................................................................347

Current State of the Art .................................................................................................................349

Future Focus of Science and Technology Investments ...........................................................353

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................355

SECTION 7: About the Authors.......................................................................................................356
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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INTRODUCTION

Mad Scientist Overview

Mad Scientist, organized by the Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) G-2 (Intelligence), provides a 

continuous dialogue with academia, industry, and 

government on the concepts and capabilities needed for the 

future operational environment (OE). Mad Scientist also 

facilitates dialogue in order to define the future OE through 

2050. Mad Scientist supports the examination of the future 

OE through exploring innovative ways to improve the 

effectiveness of the future force to ensure it can accomplish 

a diverse set of missions throughout the full range of military operations. 

Since 2015, TRADOC G-2 has conducted three Mad Scientist events. During 2015, 

TRADOC G-2 conducted two Mad Scientist conferences in April and October. The April 

conference, co-sponsored with Georgetown University and Army Capabilities Integration 

Center’s (ARCIC) Science and Technology Division, focused on how the U.S. could 

maintain its relative technological advantage over increasingly capable adversaries. The 

October conference, conducted with Army University, Army Recruiting Command, and 

the Army Center for Initial Military training studied the Human Dimension of warfare to 

look at steps the Army must take today to ensure highly capable Soldiers tomorrow. 

Finally in April of 2016, Mad Scientist cohosted an event with Arizona State University 

Research Enterprise (ASURE) and the Army’s Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) 

designed to examine complexities of future land forces operating in megacities and dense 

urban areas. 

Insights from these events are used to provide input into concepts and capabilities 

documents, including the Commanding General’s annual requirement to recommend 

science and technology investment priorities to the Army Staff and the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA/ALT). They also 

provide technology based assessments to support Army Capability Development 

activities and provide input to the Army’s Centers of Excellence (CoE) concept and 

capability development. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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Figure 1: Mad Scientist Events

Objectives of Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Event

The Army has studied megacities and dense urban areas for a considerable amount of 

time. Building upon previous work, to include a 2015 report completed by the Chief of 

Staff of the Army (CSA) Strategic Studies Group on megacities, TRADOC G-2 partnered 

with ASURE and ICoE to conduct a Mad Scientist conference (21-22 April 2016, with a 

focus on “Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond”). This event was 

critical in supporting megacity and dense urban areas concept and capability 

development. The conference was used as a venue to validate assumptions or propose 

concepts to interested academic, material developer, and Joint communities. Speakers 

at this event included senior military leadership, ASU professors, engineers, and other 

world renowned experts. In order to ensure that the presenters were subject matter 

experts in their respective fields of study, a call for papers was conducted during the 

selection process.1

The event was organized to study four overarching problem sets that future land forces 

are likely to encounter while operating in megacities or dense urban areas. These 

problem sets additionally served as the conference’s objectives: 1) gain situational 

understanding, 2) enable future force freedom of movement and access, 3) conduct 

 1 Information extracted from Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) article to be published 4th

Quarter Fiscal Year 2016 (PB 34-16-3). The MIPB article also serves as Section 1 of this document. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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expeditionary operations, 4) and mitigate future training challenges. These problems sets, 

formulated as conference objectives, were used as a basis to explore concepts and 

capabilities to match the complexities of these environments.2 

The four problems sets were associated questions to serve as essential elements of 

analysis:

 (1) Situational understanding: What emerging concepts and capabilities will 

enable Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB); Intelligence Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; Mission Command Systems; electronic warfare (EW), 

and a human, demographic, and cultural understanding within megacities/dense urban 

areas?

(2) Freedom of movement and protection: What emerging concepts and 

capabilities will enable access and freedom of movement in, above (buildings and 

airspace), below (sub-terrain), and around megacities? What new capabilities for 

Decentralized Urban Logistics can improve sustainment efficacy in urban areas? What 

will protect vehicles and Soldiers, while enabling freedom of movement, from multitude of 

advanced and conventional military technologies as well as environmental threats (e.g., 

water, sanitation, air pollution; etc.)?

(3) Expeditionary operations: What emerging concepts and capabilities will enable 

expeditionary maneuver; evolve Army Health Support of Operations; enhance the ability 

to manage or influence large population centers, and offer solutions for achieving partner 

interests and strategic objectives throughout a range of military operations (during peace 

and combat operations)?

(4) Future training challenges: What emerging technologies and capabilities must 

the Army explore and adopt in order to realistically represent the complexities of a 

megacity to a training audience (home station and Combat Training Centers) allowing the 

development of cohesive teams that thrive in ambiguity, austerity, or chaos within OE of 

2025 and Beyond. 

Insights from Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Event

Through presentations by subject matter experts on various megacity or dense urban 

area related issues, open discussion, and attendee discourse, TRADOC G-2 and ASURE 

was supplied with insights, technological solutions, and issues to consider as they relate 

to the event’s four core objectives. Over 140 participants attended the conference at 

ASU, nearly 40% from outside the Army. Also more than 500 individuals participated 

 2 Information extracted from Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) article to be published 4th

Quarter Fiscal Year 2016 (PB 34-16-3). The MIPB article also serves as Section 1 of this document. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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through web streaming and a chat room.3 Finally open discourse, the call for papers, and 

presentations ASURE, ICoE, and TRADOC G-2 captured the following insights, which 

will be discussed in greater detail in Sections 1 and 2 of this document: 

Future land forces must develop situational understanding in complex terrain and 

within adaptive systems: The challenge of megacities is density, not just in people, but 

also in data and infrastructure. Understanding terrain is key, particularly physical overlaid 

with cyber-social. Another notion is the invisible geography requires understanding of the 

formal and informal social networks, not obvious to those unfamiliar with the region. 

Other technological solutions enabled by big data analytics of social media will provide 

access to a population’s collective intelligence; insights are achieved through examination 

of aggregate behaviors. This will have to be developed through common data sets for 

megacity models is critical for building a commander’s visualization. Although each 

megacity is unique (e.g., demographics, infrastructure, threats), there are similarities in 

data to frame analysis. 

Situational understanding must also consider how disease vectors are drivers of instability 

in megacities. Surveillance through integrated sensor architectures, of which humans are 

a critical component, is required to achieve accurate, timely diagnosis during a 

humanitarian crises. The interconnectedness of biosecurity underpins a “one health” 

concept. The health of the planet cannot be maintained by ensuring health in first world 

countries. Disease does not recognize socio-economic borders. 

Considering the human dimension is critical: Cyber space must be defined as a 

human space, a global commons of human practice, rapidly becoming the preferred 

space to engage. Additionally, the future will be increasingly populated by a new species: 

“Homosapiens.net,” which will live their entire lives connected to a global virtual network. 

This notion, Homosapiens.net, will gravitate towards virtual environments for learning and 

engagement, and this virtual world will change the concept of identity. 

Protection - Medical considerations are preeminent: Humanitarian missions will 

require a surge capacity due to the sheer density of people. Response forces require 

innovative ways to manage waste disposal and protective suits with communications for 

long duration operations. Capabilities such as ‘Hot Zone Robotics’ could mitigate some 

of the problems with golden hour care for thousands of casualties. Robots will likely be 

capable of conducting triage, providing emotional support, remotely diagnosing, and 

providing basic care. 

 3 For a list of the presenters, biographies, and presentations, please visit the TRADOC G-2 All Partners 

Access Network (APAN) “Megacities and Dense Urban Areas page at: 

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/p/mc
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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The Army will have to expand expeditionary operations capabilities: Future forces 

will likely be enabled by virtual humans or “avatars” in the field, capable of face-to-face 

interactions and conducting interviews, as well as assist Leaders in language translation 

and decision making. The Army must also recognize that human-machine teaming will 

outperform a group of humans working together or a computer working independently. 

This teaming is critical if the environment is too dangerous, imposing restrictions on 

human access. 

Traditional concepts of land warfare of “laying siege” to a megacity or dense urban area 

is an outdated notion. Formations and force structures will have to largely independently 

and dynamically adjust to complex environments. Unmanned systems will help to enable 

this concept and will provide many opportunities for freedom of movement. Such as 

vertical takeoff and landing will be critical in megacities. 

Innovative and new approaches to training must be considered: Due to the 

challenges replicating a megacity training area, virtual environments will be needed to 

emulate specific areas and provide home-station training repetitions. Some of the 

expertise needed to facilitate this will be gained through interdisciplinary collaboration. 

This is critical to understanding and addressing complex problems in megacities. We 

must also recognize that most of this expertise will be outside of the Army. 

Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC) Alignment of Insights

Each year the U.S. Army conducts a Campaign of Learning to help model Army concepts 

that may lead to capabilities or support acquisition efforts corresponding to a projected 

OE. Learning Campaigns include “studies, science and technology, seminars, 

wargames, experiments, and live exercises.”4 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, the Army’s 

overarching guide to 2016’s campaign objectives states that its purpose is to describe "an 

Army learning model that meets the All-Volunteer Army’s need to develop adaptive, 

thinking Soldiers and leaders capable of meeting the challenges of operational 

adaptability in an era of persistent conflict.”5 Learning Concepts are largely derived from 

definitions of the SE by national or service specific documents that may include: The 

National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, The U.S. Army’s 

Operating Concept Win in a Complex World, and TRADOC’s Operational Environments 

to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations.6

 4 US Army. TODAY'S FOCUS: 2013 Army Campaign of Learning. September 21, 2012.

http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-09-21.

5 US Army. "The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015." TRADOC Pam 525-8-2. 2011, 5.

6 Section extracted from: Lawton, Joel and John Hoven, PhD. 2015. “Qualitative Analysis Concept in 

Support of Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) Maneuvers. “ Small Wars Journal. (14 July). 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/qualitative-analysis-concept-in-support-of-force-2025-and-beyondf2025b-maneuvers
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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During successive learning campaigns, the Army identifies broad functional areas needed 

to maintain a decisive advantage in the future OE. These functional areas are supported 

and defined by AWfCs and are given a proponent Army Center of Excellence or 

directorate to advance the development of concepts or capabilities based on their 

respective mission or utility. AWfCs are identified and enduring gaps in current Army 

capabilities that must be addressed to improve chances of success in future conflict. The 

current AWfCs are modeled to support the generating and operational force of 2025 and 

beyond (or F2025B). The 2015- 2016 AWfCs that the Army is using to develop concepts 

include some 20 “first-order problem” areas7: Develop Situational Understanding; Shape 

the Security Environment; Provide Security Force Assistance; Adapt the Institutional 

Army; Counter WMD; Homeland Operations; Conduct Space and Cyber Electromagnetic 

Operations and Maintain Communications; Enhance Training; Improve Soldier, Leader, 

and Team Performance; Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders; Conduct Air-Ground 

Reconnaissance; Conduct Entry Operations; Conduct Wide Area Security; Ensure 

Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 

Environment; Conduct Combined Arms Maneuver; Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, 

and Maintain Freedom of Movement; Integrate Fires; Deliver Fires; Exercise Mission 

Command, and Develop Capable Formations.89

The Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas event provided an unique 

opportunity to help the Army address AWfCs. Through the use of a survey tool, insights 

captured during the conference, and analysis conducted by TRADOC G-2 and the MITRE 

Corporation, AWfCs were associated to capability and technology ideas to address these 

enduring gaps. Section 2 of this document will address AWfC development in more detail

(Quantitative Summary of Data section). Figure 2 broadly links the objectives of the event 

with four AWfCs. 

 7 US Army. Army Warfighting Challenges. Information Paper, ARCIC, TRADOC, 2015, 1.

8 Ibid, 5-6. 

9 Section extracted from: Lawton, Joel and John Hoven, PhD. 2015. “Qualitative Analysis Concept in 

Support of Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) Maneuvers.“ Small Wars Journal. (14 July). 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/qualitative-analysis-concept-in-support-of-force-2025-and-beyondf2025b-maneuvers
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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Compendium Section Overview

Section 1, “Army Operation in Megacities and Dense Urban Areas: A Mad Scientist 

Perspective”: This section includes an article written for ICoE’s Military Intelligence 

Bulletin (MIPB) titled, "Army Operation in Megacities and Dense Urban Areas: A Mad 

Scientist Perspective." The article was written by TRADOC G-2 personnel, Joel Lawton, 

Matthew Santaspirt, Michael Crites, and Major Lori Shields. The article will be published 

during 4th Quarter FY16 (PB 34-16-3). The article details the complexities of land forces 

operating in megacities and dense urban areas (DUAs) and how they are exacerbated by 

geopolitical factors, proliferation of advanced technologies, terrain, demographics, and a 

potential mix of state, non-state, and hybrid actors. It also details the Mad Scientist 

Megacities and Dense Urban Areas conference and defines specific concepts and 

capabilities that future land forces will need to operate in megacities and dense urban 

areas. 

Section 2, MITRE Comprehensive Analysis: This section is a comprehensive report 

developed by the MITRE Corporation. The report provides an overview of capability and 

technology ideas generated through the Mad Scientist Megacities initiative that address 

challenges posed by megacities and dense urban areas. Data for this report was 

captured from the Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas event, Megacity 

publications, and a Mad Scientist technology survey. Material generated through these 

forums is examined from the perspective of four primary Megacity Objectives (Situational 

Understanding, Freedom of Movement and Protection, Expeditionary Operations, and 

Future Training Challenges).

Section 3, Situational Understanding: This section includes published articles from Small 

Wars Journal that we received from the call for papers. The section will explore issues, 

concepts, and capabilities as they relate to future land forces gaining situational 

Figure 2: Mad Scientist Objectives and AWfC Association
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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understanding in megacities or dense urban areas in 2025 and beyond. Featured articles 

include:

(1) “An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas” by William 

Hedges. Excerpt: Even though the Army has revised a great deal of its doctrine and 

associated tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to adapt to an evolving OE 

landscape, our situational understanding largely remains anchored to IPB’s role as a 

MDMP catalyst for all environments. IPB’s orientation is towards linear engagement 

areas and a specific threat methodology and model. It is essentially reductionist and 

quantitative in nature, still supportive of a structurally complex OE; but, often fails to gain 

sight of the dynamics between the components of problems within an interactively 

complex system.

(2) “Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks: Using Urban Integration and 

Connectedness to Assess Resilience” by Shade T. Shutters, Wes Herche and Erin King. 

Excerpt: Over half of humanity now lives in cities, a proportion rising to 80% by 

2100. With this rapid demographic shift has come a new type of geographical entity –

the megacity. In parallel with this trend is a diffusion of world power from traditional 

hegemonic states to networks of diverse types of actors, including non-state entities such 

as megacities.

(3) “Atmospheric Impacts and Effects Predictions for Applications for Future 

Megacity and Dense Urban Area Operations.” by David Knapp, Robb Randall and Jim 

Staley. Excerpt: Weather conditions within these dense urban and complex terrain 

(DUCT) environments will influence a greater populace and can negatively influence 

military operations, community services, and overall situational understanding needed for 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR). Extreme weather conditions will impact DUCT areas often 

already overstressed by uncontrolled growth and a degraded public infrastructure.

(4) “Complex IPB” by Tom Pike and Eddie Brown. Excerpt: The last 15 years of 

conflict have shown the difficulty in understanding the internal dynamics of a foreign 

population. Understanding these internal dynamics, however, is essential to 

implementing policies and taking action to influence the foreign population’s behavior in 

pursuit of U.S. goals. The U.S. Government must improve its capability to rapidly analyze 

foreign populations and the need for this capability will only increase as megacities, with 

their incredibly complex population systems become more numerous.

(5) “Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI) Sharing for Transnational 

Threat Actors” by Victor R. Morris. Excerpt: This article outlines initiatives to enhance 

international identity operations and intelligence product sharing, which are the result of 

compliant biometric data capture, transmission and intelligence fusion among 

intergovernmental law enforcement and military organizations to identify threats. The 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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proposed initiatives describe what is required within international biometric cycles and 

frameworks once an interoperable and compliant environment has been established.

(6) “It’s in There: Rethinking (?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas” by Richard L. Wolfel, Amy Krakowka Richmond, Mark 

Read and Colin Tansey. Excerpt: The complexity of the modern city has been a key 

conclusion in most Army research surrounding military operations in megacities. This 

complexity is based on three fundamental concepts of the modern city. First, modern 

cities are multidimensional. Second, cities are interconnected through globalization. 

Third, cities are uncontrollable.

(7) “Megacities and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacle or Opportunity” by 

Dawn A. Morrison and Colin D. Wood. Excerpt: Current military thinking tends to present 

the megacity and dense urban environment as challenging, intimidating, and as a source 

of anxiety for military commanders who contemplate its operational environment. While 

megacities and dense urban environments are challenging and complex, we argue that 

the unique characteristics of these environments offer many opportunities and leveraging 

points that future U.S. military forces can use to their advantage to conduct successful 

military operations.

(8) “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly” by Russell W. Glenn. Excerpt: 

Today’s armed forces and those accompanying their security efforts worldwide have no 

more conducted major operations in a megacity – those urban areas in excess of ten 

million population – than have they participated in a nuclear war. Fortunately, however –

and unlike the case with the officers above – recent experience and history’s lessons from 

undertakings in cities short of the ten million mark have much to offer.

(9) “Megacity Madness” by Gustav A. Otto and AJ Besik. Excerpt: The paper 

outlines a few ways to think about and analyze a megacity and make recommendations 

to prepare for operations in such an environment. The recommendations herein could 

not all encompassing, and likely never will be. It is an introduction by which a person or 

organization may consider the myriad of issues regarding a megacity, that when 

combined become vexing if not a wicked problem.

(10) “Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the U.S. Army” by 

Darryl Ward. Excerpt: Depending on the statistical reference, there are between 23 and 

30 megacities in the world. Statistical numbers vary primarily due to different 

interpretations of metropolitan limits and surrounding areas. However, regardless of how 

megacities are quantified, trends within the global operational environment (herein 

referred as the “OE”) indicate that the number of urban areas will continue to rise.

(11) “Qualitative Analysis Concept in Support of Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) 

Maneuvers” by Joel Lawton and John Hoven. Excerpt: The use of qualitative analysis 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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within the Army intelligence community can help remedy certain capability gaps in 

obtaining locally nuanced information. Reliance on quantitative driven surveys and 

methods such as PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, 

Information, Physical Environment, and Time) and ASCOPE (Area, Structures, 

Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) questionnaires for understanding 

tactical information works largely from a hypothesis-driven approach which can ignore 

pertinent information (e.g., unknown-unknowns).

(12) “Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational Awareness in 

Dense Urban Environments and Megacities” by Alfred C. Crane and Richard Peeke. 

Excerpt: It may prove beneficial to leverage the internet of things (IOT) in order to provide 

our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines the decisive advantage needed to fight and win 

future armed conflicts. It can be anticipated that connected devices such as game 

consoles, “baby monitors” (1) and “that smart meter (that) knows when you’re home and 

what electronics you use when you’re there” (2), for example, will be prolific in the future 

operating environment. With this in mind, the joint force will have opportunities to use 

these devices to gain and maintain situational awareness in a mega city or dense urban 

environment.

Section 4, Freedom of Movement and Protection: This section includes published 

articles from Small Wars Journal that we received from the call for papers. The section 

will explore issues, concepts, and capabilities as they relate to future land forces gaining 

freedom of movement or protection in megacities or dense urban areas in 2025 and 

beyond. Featured articles include:

(1) “U.S. Army Megacity Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative 

Technologies” by Frank Prautzsch. Excerpt: By 2050, urbanization will arguably be the 

most consequential event in the history of mankind. Out of every 100 children born at 

that time, 57 will be Asian, and 22 will be African. The spectrum of operations spanning 

non-combat and combat missions in the face of natural or adversarial threats, makes 

preparation a multi-dimensional problem requiring significant attention and forethought

(2) “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environments” by Nathan Fisher and Gary R. Gilbert. Excerpt: the growing planned use 

of unmanned systems (UMS) and robotics on the future battlefield affords both great 

opportunities and challenges to far future medical operations, especially in Dense Urban 

Areas. UMS could serve as a force multiplier for medical operations in future 

environments as their capabilities continue to evolve and mature to include providing 

medical logistics support, aid in the delivery of telehealth/teleconsultation to the point of 

care, and provide opportunities for expedited casualty evacuation.

Section 5, Expeditionary Operations: This section includes published articles from Small 

Wars Journal that we received from the call for papers. The section will explore issues, 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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concepts, and capabilities as they relate to future land forces conducting expeditionary 

operations in megacities or dense urban areas in 2025 and beyond. Featured articles 

include:

(1) “A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) versus “Evolution”: When Machines are 

Smart Enough!” by Tom Keeley. Excerpt: There is a general perception that the 

Operational Environment (OE) will “evolve” as technology evolves at an incremental rate: 

smaller, cheaper, faster... The “evolution” term is used throughout the Mad Scientist call 

to action. But there have been revolutions or significant paradigm shifts that have 

transformed the military in the past.

(2) “TRAuma Care In a Rucksack (TRACIR), a Disruptive Technology Concept” by 

Jan Berkow and Ron Poropatich. Excerpt: Trauma care in future military environments 

will require medical technological innovations for an integrated force with the attributes 

and capabilities to mitigate risks and maximize clinical effectiveness in an Anti-Access, 

Area Denial (A2/AD) insurgency scenario.

(3) “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities” by Danielle L. Ippolito. Excerpt: Noninvasive or minimally invasive screening 

methods could enable early intervention, treatment, and informed decision making to 

optimize force readiness. Mapping biomolecular patterns of adverse health effects 

represents a promising solution to the complex problem of assessing health effects after 

exposure to mixtures of different chemicals and /or pollutants and aggregated exposure 

effects over time.

(4) “How to Hold or Take a Big City — Seven Lines of Effort” by Geoff Demarest. 

Excerpt: An American armed force smaller than, say, that used in Sadr City, Baghdad 

might well achieve victory in a future urban environment. Regardless of the size and 

sophistication of the opposing force, the lines of effort for success in taking or holding a 

city can be placed in basically the same seven proposed categories.

(5) “Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies” by Paul O. Kwon. Excerpt: Since 1980, one to three new human infections 

have been identified annually. These Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs) impact social, 

political, economic and environmental arenas.

(6) “Pain Management: Maintaining the Force” by Marcie Fowler and Laura L. 

McGhee. Excerpt: Combat injuries can result in severe acute pain, and options for pain 

control on the battlefield are currently limited. There is a need for improved pain control 

on the battlefield, as well as in higher echelons of casualty care. Initial pain control can 

increase patient comfort and aid in evacuation from the point of injury.
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Section 6, Future Training Challenges: This section includes published articles from 

Small Wars Journal that we received from the call for papers. The section will explore 

issues, concepts, and capabilities as they relate to future land forces training for or in 

megacities or dense urban areas in 2025 and beyond. Featured articles include:

(1) “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare” by Patrick Duggan. Excerpt: Manmachine teaming is inexorable and Special Warfare needs a blueprint to transform along 

with it. With every passing day, our hyper-connected landscape spawns a new class of 

threats more technologically evolved than the last.

(2) “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond” by Brett 

Piekarski, Brian Sadler, Stuart Young, William Nothwang and Raghuveer Rao. Excerpt: 

This paper examines the research challenges and ways we can augment that vision to 

enable even more capable systems and a larger impact on future operations through 

collective heterogeneous systems that exhibit distributed awareness, intelligence, 

adaptable and resilient controls and behaviors, and operational complexity.

(3) “Technical Challenges for Simulation and Training in Megacities” by Jon 

Watkins and Chuck Campbell. Excerpt: Megacities, urban areas with populations over 

10 million people, are of growing importance to the military, and thus are of growing 

importance to training. It is critical for Modeling and Simulation (M&S) applications to 

represent those environments and situations which are inherently unusual or difficult to 

train live.

Acknowledgements 

TRADOC G-2 would like to thank all of our partners and contributing authors who wrote 

papers in response to our call for papers in early 2016. There are many individuals and 

organizations who made contributions to the TRADOC G-2 Mad Scientist Megacities and 

Dense Urban Areas event where we cannot mention them all. We would principally like 

to acknowledge the efforts of:

ASU Research Enterprise (ASURE) for their willingness to co-sponsor the conference, 

logistical support, coordination, analytical support, and much more. Specifically, Dr. Fran 

Zenzen, Chris Fortunato, Jim Russell, and Jennifer Van Paris were instrumental in the 

success of the conference. We cannot thank the diligence and support of these 

individuals enough. 

Small Wars Journal (SWJ) and their Editor in Chief, Dave Dilegge for their willingness to 

publish approximately 25 Mad Scientist related articles. The success of the call for paper 

and their impact on the concepts and capabilities communities would have not been 

possible without the support of SWJ. We encourage readers to visit their site at: 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/. 
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All of the authors and presenters who, most on their own time and expense, made the 

Mad Scientist event a success. We received more than 35 submissions as part of the 

call for papers and hosted more than 20 speakers during the conference at ASU. Each 

of these individuals played a critical role in helping the Army explore the distinctive 

challenges of future land forces operating in megacities and dense urban areas.10 

Continuous Engagement 

To get involved with TRADOC G-2’s Mad Scientist Initiative we encourage all readers to 

join our All Partners Access Network (APAN) webpage at: 

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/. Our APAN site is designed 

around the notion that Mad Scientist is a global, virtual “marketplace of ideas,” enabling 

obscure sources/outsiders to collaborate with the Army so as to bring in new ideas via a 

credible, fair, and transparent process. Therefore, it is open to the public, without 

requiring DoD credentials for access. The site also contains information on future events 

and contains articles, papers, videos, and related content from all past events. 

 10 For a complete list of conference presenters, please visit the TRADOC G-2 Mad Scientist Megacities 

and Dense Urban Areas APAN page at: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/m/mdua
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SECTION 1: “Army Operation in Megacities and Dense Urban Areas”

A Mad Scientist Perspective”: This section includes an article written for ICoE’s Military 

Intelligence Bulletin (MIPB) titled, "Army Operation in Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas: A Mad Scientist Perspective." The article was written by TRADOC G-2 

personnel, Joel Lawton, Matthew Santaspirt, Michael Crites, and Major Lori Shields. 

The article will be published during 4th Quarter FY16 (PB 34-16-3). The article details 

the complexities of land forces operating in megacities and dense urban areas (DUAs) 

and how they are exacerbated by geopolitical factors, proliferation of advanced 

technologies, terrain, demographics, and a potential mix of state, non-state, and hybrid 

actors. It also details the Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas conference 

and defines specific concepts and capabilities that future land forces will need to 

operate in megacities and dense urban areas.
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Army Operations in Megacities and Dense Urban Areas:

A Mad Scientist Perspective

By:

Joel Lawton, Matthew Santaspirt, and Michael Crites

Edited by: Ms. Lori Shields

Vignette: Calling in the Note

On December 7, 2041 the superpower creditor nation, Red, sees an opportunity 

to ascend to the position of premier superpower in the world. Red calls for payment of 

all debts from superpower debtor nation, Blue. The same day, Red successfully seizes 

the Tokyo Stock Exchange with an attack in cyber space.

Acceding to Red’s demands, Blue begins selling off assets in all foreign stock 

exchanges. This action, combined with the threat of cyber-attack from Red, throws all 

markets into turbulence with the exception of White’s market, which is within one 

megacity-state (island) in south Asia. This one market owes its stability to an elite 

division of cyber defense troops that successfully defeats Red’s cyber-attack.

Red uses all the wealth gained from Blue to accelerate economic development of 

Africa, including feeding, clothing, housing, and medically treating Africa’s impoverished 

masses. Red’s information warfare campaign wins approval of global mass media.

The center of world trade, within Blue boundaries, barely survives a cyber-attack 

from Red. With the danger mounting, Blue requests a detachment of cyber defense 

troops from White. White sends a regiment in exchange for ground warfare protection 

from Blue.
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Red determines that controlling the global economy (by uniting its own two stable 

major markets with the Tokyo market and the White market when captured), can be 

accomplished with minimum bloodshed, maximum metal carnage, and localized 

environmental destruction in White. The key to a Red victory involves defeating Blue’s

vaunted robotic forces. The key to a Blue victory involves killing Red’s human 

leadership. These factors place Blue at a distinct disadvantage in public affairs, 

propaganda, and information war. Blue forces moving to deployment must fight 

demonstrators at home.

Red moves a proxy army into attack positions on the ground north of White and a 

proxy navy in the South China Sea because only a physical seizure on the ground can 

gain control of the White stock market intact. Blue lands three armored divisions on the 

ground in White composed of 25 percent armored humans and 75 percent robots. Blue 

establishes a massive air base in White with air forces composed primarily of drones 

with only a small percent of command aircraft manned by human pilots. Humans are all 

leaders while robots are all non-rates. The reverse 75-25 composition characterizes the 

opposing Red forces. Red gains public sympathy by exposing more humans to combat, 

thus strengthening its information warfare position.

The White megacity-state’s electronic warfare envelope extends forty kilometers 

in every direction from the White Stock Exchange. Military units of any attacker cannot 

communicate with each other inside the electronic warfare umbrella except by using 

ancient technology like land line, or at sea, flag and light signals or underwater cable. 

White’s stock market sits four kilometers north of the shoreline. Geography makes an 
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amphibious landing the most likely method of attack, compared with the challenge of 

fighting infantry through forty kilometers of dense urban area without communications.

Any alliance of Red with Green (superpower with proxies of criminal gang 

armies) or Black (regional hegemon with religious militia proxies) represents the most 

dangerous threat course facing Blue-White.

Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Synopsis:

As in the opening vignette, the complexities of land forces operating in 

megacities and dense urban areas (DUAs) are exacerbated by geopolitical factors,

proliferation of advanced technologies, terrain, demographics, and a potential mix of 

state, non-state, and hybrid actors. Urban areas are centers of commerce, 

transportation, politics and perhaps most importantly large portions of a nation’s 

population. The Army has over time developed concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques 

and procedures for operating in them. Such as Army Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (ATTP) 3-06.11, “Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain,” recognizes 

the importance of the Army being proficient in conducting urban operations, “urban 

operations are among the most difficult and challenging missions” and goes on to 

propose ways to “plan, prepare, and execute offensive, defensive, and stability 

operations.”1 However, preparing to conduct operations in a megacity or DUA presents 

a worst case scenario for the Army and Joint Force. Challenges are multifaceted and 

numerous. Future Army forces will have to conduct diverse mission sets not only in 

complex terrain, but against hybrid threats, contested areas, and huge numbers of 
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noncombatants with embedded malicious actors and potentially against enemy 

overmatch technologies. 

The types of tasks that the Army may be required to perform in megacities or in 

DUAs include: Non-combatant evacuation; humanitarian assistance disaster relief 

(HA/DR) missions; raids; deny adversary objectives; counter weapons of mass 

destruction operations; conduct military engagement and security cooperation; provide 

a global stabilizing presence; provide support to civil authorities, and counterterrorism/counterinsurgency missions.2 Urban operations doctrine currently considers 

large cities to have populations from 100,000 to 20 million, where the Army will have to 

prepare to conduct operations in varying scale, scope, range, and in any Operational 

Environment (OE).3 Preparation does not imply intent or desire to operate in these 

environments, but current trends in urbanization increases the possibility for the Army 

and the Joint Force to have to conduct operations in megacities and DUAs.

One of the unique aspects of megacities, examined aside from less populous 

DUAs, is that they are economically interconnected to global systems. At the strategic 

or national level, megacities are “inextricably linked to global economic prosperity... 

warrant[ing] significant attentions across all tenets of national power.”4 Some cities, take 

New York City (NYC) for example, exceed some nation states in gross domestic 

product and flow of commerce. A crisis in a city such as NYC can have global 

implications. During September 11, 2001, global trade markets lost incalculable 

amounts of money. Losses to NYC itself exceeded $95 billion, the insurance industry 

lost more than $40 billion, and another $92 billion was lost to jobs and the economy as 
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a direct result.5 Megacities may hold the world’s concentration of commerce, goods, 

services, exchange of ideas and information inherent in the aggregation of the best and 

brightest of a nation in close contact. The problem is that not all of these cities are as 

resilient (the population’s ability to adapt, overcome, or respond to emergency) to crisis 

as others.6 The Army, Joint Force, and global community must be prepared to react and 

protect these economic powerhouses. Therefore, the Army should similarly be prepared 

to operate in DUAs (i.e., cities with populations less than 10 million), but further be able 

to respond to the scale and scope of a megacity in order to protect the world’s flow and 

exchange resources and finances throughout global markets.

The Mad Scientist Initiative:

As a learning organization, the U.S. Army routinely studies the global 

environment to think, learn, analyze, and implement changes to its doctrine, training, 

and capabilities. Mad Scientist is a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) G-2 initiative organized around themes, problem sets, and challenges the 

Army expects to face in the future OE. Mad Scientist enables continuous dialogue 

between the Joint military, international partners, academia, policy institutions, and 

private sector organizations to assist the Army in exploring the evolution of the OE 

through the year 2050. Furthermore, Mad Scientist examines the effects of technology 

in the far future OE to inform near-term capability investments. Mad Scientist supports 

this through exploring innovative ways to improve the effectiveness of the future force to 

ensure it can accomplish a diverse set of missions throughout the full range of military 

operations (ROMO) - to include operating in megacities and DUAs. 
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Building upon previous work, to include a 2015 report completed by the Chief of 

Staff of the Army (CSA) Strategic Studies Group on megacities, TRADOC G-2 

partnered with Arizona State University (ASU) Foundation, the ASU Research 

Enterprise (ASURE) and the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) to conduct a Mad 

Scientist conference (21-22 April 2016, with a focus on “Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas in 2025 and Beyond.”). This event was critical in supporting megacity and DUAs 

concept and capability development. The conference was used as a venue to validate 

assumptions or propose concepts to interested academic, material developer, and Joint 

communities. Speakers at this event included senior military leadership, ASU 

professors, engineers, and other world renowned experts. In order to ensure that the 

presenters were subject matter experts in their respective fields of study, a call for 

papers was conducted during the selection process.

The event was organized around four overarching problem sets for future land 

forces operating in megacities or DUAs. These problem sets additionally served as the 

conference’s objectives: 1) gain situational understanding, 2) enable future force 

freedom of movement and access, 3) conduct expeditionary operations, 4) and mitigate 

future training challenges. These problems sets were generally defined and were used 

as a basis to explore concepts and capabilities to match the complexities of these 

environments. 

Megacity and Dense Urban Areas Problem Sets and Event Objectives:

(1) Gain Situational Understanding: Megacities are defined as population 

centers with ten million or more residents.7 Currently, 55% of the world’s population 
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lives in urban areas and 13% live in some 24 megacities.8 9 By 2025 there will be nearly 

40 megacities throughout the world, posing challenges to some host nation 

governments to “effectively deal with their explosive growth and maintain security.”10

Globalization, domestic cultural shifts, the ubiquitous flow of information, pervasiveness 

of criminal networks, and social or ethnic demographic pressures will further obfuscate 

clear geographic separation between inhabitants.11

Dense populations, critical infrastructure, and the proliferation of technologies 

that operate within the electromagnetic spectrum pose many challenges to future 

forces. Army forces will not be able to rely on a “template or checklist of reconnaissance 

targets to reveal the nature” of a city.12 Stressors, networks of people, lines of 

communication, flow of commerce, and the capacity (resilience) for a city to overcome 

challenges will vary throughout a single city. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 

(IPB) will have to evaluate a variety of operational data layers that incorporates “multiple 

dimensions simultaneously (surface, subsurface, air, space, cyber, information, etc.) to 

achieve required effects.”13 Intelligence frameworks must adapt interactively to 

“complex operational environments, like dense urban areas, using both urban 

operational data layers and city as a system context and perspectives.”14

The identification and securing of structures or infrastructure may not be easy 

within a megacity or DUA. Forces may have to operate within larger structures, subterrain, or hundreds of feet up within a building. The Army will have to consider how to 
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employ and integrate networks of sensors with socio-cultural data, leverage multiple 

collection means, to develop methods that identify these areas. 

Every DUA or megacity should be considered “unique and must be understood 

within its own historical, cultural, local, regional, and international context.”15 Ergo, the 

Army will examine how to achieve situational understanding under conditions it will have 

to operate within. 

(2) Enable Future Force Freedom of Movement and Access: Current doctrine 

presupposes that Army ground forces will have complete control over “the location and 

circumstance of its next engagement.”16 This prediction assumes that Army task 

organization, formations, and execution of those mission sets will be adequate in any 

environment. The potential for large-scale HA/DR missions, the “dichotomy of threat 

conjoined with growing criticality will produce a complex security environment,” and the 

resources to sustain operations in population centers exceeding 10 million people will 

challenge Mission Command and Army planners.17 The Army will have to consider how 

to organize its forces to unique situations, varied missions, and rapidly changing tactical 

conditions.

Megacities and DUAs will be frequently “challenged by threats to their stability” 

that could require an Army intervention.18 In circumstances where the Army must 

commit air or ground forces, the complexity of a dynamic threat may pose unforeseen 

risk to, for example, Soldier and vehicle protection. A one-size fits all approach to armor 
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and protection systems may not suffice to defend against a host of potential threats in 

densely populated areas. 

Further, both conventional and hybrid threats may employ a host of capabilities 

that can include: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive abilities; 

armor and anti-armor capabilities; improvised explosive devices; air and anti-air 

capabilities; directed energy weapons; personal armor defeating small arms rounds, 

and a multitude of other advanced and conventional military technologies employed by 

non-state, state-sponsored hybrid, and state actors.19 “There is no silver bullet, no 

magic material, or countermeasure” that will protect all Army units, vehicles, and 

Soldiers.20 The Army will have to explore new modular protection systems; new 

personal armor; moveable or adjustable armor; augmenting or replacing forces with 

robotics, artificial intelligence, and other technologies that can “dynamically respond to 

threats, rapidly reacting to changes in the threat picture.”21

It must too take in account how to manage or protect large population centers 

through: defense support to civil authorities, security cooperation activities, large-scale 

operations, protecting critical infrastructure, isolating combatives from the general 

population, and being able to provide rapid HA/DR response.22 23 The Army must

consider the integration of Special Operation Forces to develop capable formations 

designed to operate in a diverse and dynamic OE. Therefore, the Army must find 

solutions to enable freedom of movement and access through developing capabilities 

that efficaciously balance protection with mobility and lethality. 
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(3) Conduct Expeditionary Operations: Expeditionary forces operate as an agile, 

integrated, and rapidly deployable force, able to conduct a wide range of operations, 

from peacetime to high-end forcible entry operations. Expeditionary operations are 

decentralized in nature requiring adaptive Mission Command in order to project power 

across all warfare domains. The Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines expeditionary 

maneuver as the rapid deployment of forces, “positioned forward... [to] respond and 

resolve crises, defeat enemies, establish security, and consolidate gains.” 24 In order to 

conduct expeditionary operations within megacities and DUAs, the Army will have to 

consider new size, weight, and power applications; invest in new vertical lift abilities, 

and the synchronization “of capabilities critical to accomplish the mission.”25

In order for the Army to achieve sustained expeditionary operations across a

ROMO, solutions must focus on the integration of the Army's unique capabilities with 

Naval Expeditionary Forces over four specific areas: 1) The forward deployment of 

expeditionary forces—forces will have to shape the OE, be actively prepared to defuse 

a crisis, and defeat adversaries. 2) Sea basing operations—forces will have to use the 

sea as a base from which to conduct the full ROMO and provide sustained logistical 

support to forward deployed forces. Currently, around 40% of the world’s population 

lives near coastlines and “population density in coastal areas will continue to increase in 

the future.”26 Sea basing allows Naval Forces to physically 'be there' but be off shore. 

Sea basing will allow the Army, Navy and Marine Corps Forces to strengthen 

international partnerships and ensure access to critical regions while reducing visibility 

and dependence on land bases. With Naval Forces controlling the sea, expeditionary 
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forces are capable of presenting the adversary with a mobile and multi-dimensional 

threat. 3) Scalability of forces—expeditionary forces need to provide scalable units and 

capability for crisis response, up to and including forcible entry operations deep into the 

enemy territory. This allows commanders to tailor force footprints to evolving conditions, 

composite forward and merge rapidly deploying forces into a unified force scaled to the 

mission. The scalability of forces will also require decentralized Mission Command 

solutions. 4) Integration—the Army will need to integrate institutional and operational 

capabilities, with unified actions partners, to execute Joint Combined Arms 

Operations.27 Each of these focus areas require new concepts and capabilities to 

support the Army in sustained expeditionary operations in megacities and DUAs. 

(4) Mitigate Future Training Challenges: The Army will have to seek new or 

innovative ways to train the future force to conduct land, sea, air, cyber, and space 

operations in megacities and DUAs. For example, “the Army-at-large must expand the 

training of younger and young officers and noncommissioned officers to include the 

fundamental concepts that enable design methodologies” for solving complicated

tactical problems in these environments.28 Building military operations in urban terrain 

training (MOUT) centers “is impractical to impossible to fully recreate [for] megacities 

(like we do with MOUT sites) or to get access to real-world cities for live training.”29 The 

Army will have to consider ways for Soldiers to think critically about their environments 

and how to adapt to the complexities in these terrains. For the reason that the Army 

cannot fully reconstruct the scale and scope of megacities and DUAs, it will have to 
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consider technology enabled solutions such as virtual reality, immersive gaming, and 

modeling and simulation. 

Event Themes and Insights

The Mad Scientist conference focused on megacities and DUAs in 2025 and 

Beyond was conducted in April of 2016 in conjunction with ASU Foundation, ASURE, 

and ICoE. Through presentations by subject matter experts on various megacity or DUA 

related issues, open discussion, and attendee discourse, we were supplied with 

insights, technological solutions, and issues to consider as they relate to the event’s 

four core objectives.30 

Gain Situational Understanding: In order to effectively operate in a megacity or 

DUA, the Army needs to understand the environment – physical terrain as well as 

human terrain.31 In the era of ubiquitous information, intelligence can be derived from a 

myriad of open-source channels. For instance, through the mapping of geo-located 

tweets, future forces can gain a picture of where incidents are occurring (e.g., natural 

disaster, terrorist attack; etc.), what areas are access denied, and what type of aid is 

needed. Further, all of this information can be received, updated in real time, and 

coupled with full motion video from networked traffic cameras that are already emplaced 

throughout cities.32 This type of information gathering and analysis can save time, fuel, 

and, most importantly, lives through early alerts and optimal route planning. Further, this 

type of technology is already available and will only become more accurate in the future. 

Future forces would also benefit from High Resolution 3D mapping that not only 

represents the physical terrain found in the area of operations, but also the history.33
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

35

Organizing the data in space as well as time will provide increased situational 

understanding that allows the Soldier to recognize and appreciate how the past relates 

to the present.34 A terrain map augmented with cyber-social geography and historical 

events that is laid out spatially and temporally would afford the Soldier with a full suite of 

tools to achieve mission objectives in a megacity or DUA without being hindered by 

cultural or social obstacles.

Enable Future Force Freedom of Movement and Access: Megacities and DUAs 

impose unique restrictions on access to the battlefield due to the density of tall buildings 

and people, as well as the use of subterranean transportation and infrastructure. With 

that, the use of smaller unmanned vehicles will be crucial in the future fight. Evacuating 

personnel will be of vital importance, and unmanned vehicles may be able to do so in 

denied areas. If evacuation is untenable, and treatment is needed right away, Soldiers 

could use an unmanned vehicle that is remotely operated. An unmanned system 

outfitted with sensors and video link would allow medical personnel to diagnose and 

administer treatment to a victim from a safe distance.35 To fully realize this idea, the 

Army could take a system of systems approach to the matter.36 That is, a suite of 

biometric sensors working in conjunction with an unmanned vehicle to diagnose and 

evacuate victims from the crisis area to a medical center where autonomous medical 

treatment can be administered while under the observation of a human (either in person 

or via video link).37 38These highly integrated teams will set the Army apart from our 

adversaries and provide overmatch.
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

36

Conduct Expeditionary Operations: When forces are deployed abroad, the 

challenge will lie in fully understanding the geography as well as the formal and informal 

social networks. Cities in which the Army is likely to operate in the future will have 

geographical indicators that will be invisible to those unfamiliar to the region.39

In the field, Soldiers could take advantage of virtual humans to aid in face-to-face 

interactions and interviews, as well as assist in decision making.40 A human-machine 

hybrid will outperform either a group of humans working together or a computer working 

independently. These virtual humans could help to interface with the local populations 

and increase the amount and accuracy of information received compared to a system 

that used only humans.41 Being able to effectively use the local population as a 

resource will prove invaluable.

Mitigate Future Training Challenges: One of the unique characteristics of a 

megacity is its sheer size and density. Because of this, the Army will have a significant 

challenge in accurately representing a megacity or DUA, both physically and virtually, 

that provides a realistic training environment. 

On the virtual side, current modeling and simulation capabilities simply cannot 

address all the complexities and details that an urban metropolis contains.42 43 The 

future megacity or DUA will have thousands of buildings, and in the megacity with more 

than 10 million people, and miles of infrastructure (both underground and aboveground). 

Complicating things further, the interior layout of each building is of vital importance and 

must be known and mapped out to be of benefit in a training environment. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

37

Perhaps most importantly, each megacity will be distinctly different from every 

other megacity or DUA. This means that creating and training in a virtual model of NYC 

may not adequately prepare Army forces for operating in a city like Lagos, for example. 

In order to build a capability for the future force, the Army will have to identify and 

incorporate only those parts of a megacity or DUA that will matter. Simulations can be 

used to compartmentalize a city and experiment on certain pieces to determine what 

parts are of operational significance.44

As stated in the ‘expeditionary operations’ section, the barriers between humans 

and computers are lowering and machines and people are beginning to merge.45 A 

human-machine hybrid will outperform either a group of people working together, or a 

computer working independently. It is crucial to take advantage of this improvement, but 

we must start now to train our forces on how to act in concert with machines.46 Virtual 

humans (computers that act autonomously and mimic human behavior) have been 

proven to elicit more honest responses from human subjects and were even reported to 

make subjects feel more comfortable and open than a real person.47 This technology 

would prove very useful in training our Soldiers on person to person interactions and 

interviews. It could potentially improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Army training 

while offering potential cost savings by way of being mostly virtual

Way Forward:

The complexities, challenges, and unique environments that megacities and 

DUAs pose to future land forces may require new concepts, capabilities, training, and 

doctrine.48 The Army must seek new efficient and effective science and technology 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

38

solutions accompanied with innovative training methods and supporting doctrine in 

order to operate in these environments.

The four overarching problem sets that Mad Scientist examined – situational 

understanding, future force freedom of movement and access, expeditionary 

operations, and training – are emblematic of most Army, academic, and subject matter 

expert concerns for future land forces operating in megacities and DUAs. These focus 

areas will require Army and Joint innovation champions to advance elements of our

capabilities, training, education, and leader development. Partnerships between the 

DoD and academia, as well as the greater materiel development communities, will have 

to be codified and championed by senior DoD leadership to be successful. Using Mad 

Scientist as a venue and vehicle to explore outside perspectives on this problem set, 

the Army and Future Force will be able to augment its current approach to “Combined 

Arms Operations in Urban Terrain.”

Currently, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) and ICoE are leading the 

Army in concepts and capabilities dealing with the megacity and DUAs problem sets. 

For instance, MCoE has established an Urban Training Detachment at Fort Hamilton, 

NYC and is working in collaboration with ICoE to implement megacity OE 

characteristics at Combat Training Centers.49 The Mad Scientist initiative, ASU 

Research Foundation, ASURE, and ICoE have informed an Army Capabilities 

Integration Center (ARCIC) white paper to the CSA that addresses megacity 

environments, future Army operations in megacities, and required capabilities for those 

environments.50 Finally, ICoE in partnership with ASURE is reviewing doctrine to 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

39

implement new procedures, processes, and methods to conduct IPB in megacities and 

DUAs. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions in this article are those of authors' which were 

derived from insights captured from the 21-22 April Mad Scientist conference. 

Therefore, the opinions may not be reflective of any DoD or USG agency.

Acknowledgements: TRADOC G-2 would like to thank ASU Research Foundation and 

ASURE for their partnership, support, and collaboration during the Megacities and 

Dense Urban Areas conference. We would also like to thank all the presenters, 

attendees, and the online community for their participation. Lastly, a special thanks to 

Small Wars Journal, particularly Dave Dilegge, for helping us with our call for papers 

and for publishing more than 25 articles.

1 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. Headquarter, Department of the Army. ATTP 3-06.11, xii. 

10 June 2011.

2 The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 9. 

31 October 2014. 3 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. Headquarter, Department of the Army. ATTP 3-06.11, xii. 

10 June 2011.

4 “The Megacity: Operational Challenges for Force 2025 and Beyond.” Army Chief of Staff’s Future Study 

Plan, Unified Quest 14. 2014. 5 “How much did the September 11 terrorist attack cost America?” Institute for the Analysis of Global 

Security. (2004). http://www.iags.org/costof911.html. 6 “Megacities and the United States Army: Replicating the Home Field Advantage.” Chief of Staff of the 

Army, Strategic Studies Group Cohort III, July 2015, 87, 107, 153-154, 248, 263, 359. 7 Kotkin, Joel, et al. 2014. “The Problem with Megacities.” Chapman University, Center for Demographics 

and Policy, 7.

8 Ibid, 7.

9 “The Megacity: Operational Challenges for Force 2025 and Beyond.” Army Chief of Staff’s Future Study 

Pan, Unified Quest 14. 2014.

10 COL Marc Harris, et al. 2014. “Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and 

Uncertain Future.” Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group. June, 3

11 Moser, Caroline and Cathy McLlwaine. 2014. “Editorial: New frontiers in twenty-first century urban 

conflict and violence.” International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Vol 26, 2. 2 

October, 336.

 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

40

 12 COL Marc Harris, et al. 2014. “Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and 

Uncertain Future.” Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group. June, 11.

13 “The Megacity: Operational Challenges for Force 2025 and Beyond.” Army Chief of Staff’s Future Study 

Pan, Unified Quest 14. 2014.

14 Hedges, William. 2016. “An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” Small Wars 

Journal. 11 March. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-analytic-framework-for-operations-in-denseurban-areas. 15 COL Marc Harris, et al. 2014. “Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and 

Uncertain Future.” Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group. June, 11.

16 Ibid, 4.

17 Ibid, 5. 

18 Ibid, 5.

19 Lawton, Joel and Philip Serpico. 2015. “Net Assessment: Threats to Future Army Acquisitions.” Small 

Wars Journal. 10 October. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/net-assessment-threats-to-future-armyacquisitions.

20 Scharre, Paul and Alexander Velez-Green. 2015. “Adaptive and Cooperative Protection: New Force 

Concepts for U.S. Army Ground Vehicles.” Center for a New American Security. October, 4.

21 Ibid, 4.

22 Disasters are distinguished as slow onset and rapid onset events. Slow onset disasters are "slowly 

emerging disasters whose ongoing process is discovered, often years or even decades into the disaster" 

(2010). Rapid disasters have "a clear initiating event" and "marks” the start of an event (2010). Ref: Cline, 

Rebecca J., W., Heather Orom, Lisa Berry-bobovski, Tanis Hernandez, C. B. Black, Ann G. Schwartz, 

and John C. Ruckdeschel. 2010. Community-level social support responses in a slow-motion 

technological disaster: The case of Libby, Montana. American Journal of Community Psychology 46, no. 

1-2: 1-18, http://search.proquest.com/docview/746555622?accountid=8289.

23 “The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1,

30 October 2014. 16.

24Ibid, 7.

25 Ibid, 7. 26 “What percentage of the American population lives near the coast?” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), 29 February 2016. http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html.

27 Derived from conversations with Mad Scientist support staff, participants at the 21-22 April 2016 

conference, and MAJ Lori Shields, Strategic Communications, TRADOC G2.

28 “Megacities and the United States Army: Replicating the Home Field Advantage.” Chief of Staff of the 

Army, Strategic Studies Group Cohort III, July 2015, 36. 

29 Watkins, John and Chuck Campbell. 2016. “Technical Challenges for Simulation and Training in 

Megacities.” Small Wars Journal. 12 February. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/technical-challengesfor-simulation-and-training-in-megacities. 30 Most insights were derived from speaker presentations at the 21-22 April 2016 Mad Scientist “Megacities/DUA” 

conference. For a list of the presenters and their topics, please visit the Mad Scientist, All Partners 

Access Network (APAN) website for agenda, speaker presentations, videos, and biographies. The site 

can be found at: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/p/mc. 31 Insight provided by conference speaker, Abe Usher, HumanGeo Group. 32 Insight provided by conference speaker, Frank Prautzsch, Velocity Technology Partners LLC. 33 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. Chris Tucker, Map Story. 34 Ibid. 35 Insight provided by conference speaker, Mr. Nathan Fisher, The Geneva Foundation. 36 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. Brett Piekarski, Army Research Laboratory. 37 Insight provided by conference speaker, Frank Prautzsch, Velocity Technology Partners LLC. 38 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. George Poste, ASU. 39 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. Russel Glenn, Australian National University. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 1 

41

 40 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. William Swartout, USC. 41 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. Brett Piekarski, Army Research Laboratory. 42 Insight provided by conference speakers, Dr. Fran Zenzen, ASU Research Enterprise and John 

Watkins, Dignitas Technologies LLC. 

43 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. Amy Krakowka-Richmond, USMA. 44 Insight provided by conference speakers, Dr. Fran Zenzen, ASU Research Enterprise and John

Watkins, Dignitas Technologies LLC.

45 Insight provided by conference speaker, Dr. William Swartout, USC. 46 Insight provided by conference speaker, COL (Ret.) Kevin Felix, The Roosevelt Group. 47 Ibid. 48 Insight provided by conference speaker, BG John Kem, Army University. 49 Insight provided by conference speaker, CW4 Dennis Castellanos, MCoE. 

50 Report at time of this article is currently in staffing and review. Report title, “U.S. Army White Paper for 

Urban Operations in Megacities: 2020-2040.” Army Capabilities Integration Center. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

42

SECTION 2: MITRE Report 

This section is a comprehensive report developed by the MITRE Corporation. The report 

provides an overview of capability and technology ideas generated through the Mad 

Scientist Megacities initiative that address challenges posed by megacities and dense 

urban areas. Data for this report was captured from the Mad Scientist Megacities and 

Dense Urban Areas event, Megacity publications, and a Mad Scientist technology survey. 

Material generated through these forums is examined from the perspective of four primary 

Megacity Objectives (Situational Understanding, Freedom of Movement and Protection, 

Expeditionary Operations, and Future Training Challenges).
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2 

43

David N. Farrell

Dr. Megan Ward

 

 

U.S. Army TRADOC G-2 

Mad Scientist 

Megacities and Dense 

Urban Areas Initiative:

Data Collection and 

Analysis

Approved for Public Release; Distribution 

Unlimited. Case Number 16-2955.

©2016 The MITRE Corporation. All rights 

reserved.

The views, opinions and/or findings 

contained in this report are those of The 

MITRE Corporation and should not be 

construed as an official government position, 

policy, or decision, unless designated by 

other documentation.

This technical data was produced for the U.S. 

Governmet under Basic Contract No. 

W56KGU-15-C-0010, and is subject to the 

Rights in Technical Data-Noncommercial 

Items clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (FEB 

2012)

Sponsor: U.S. Army TRADOC G-2

Department No.: J62D

Contract No.: W56KGU-15-C-0010

Project No.: 0716A92D-OE

 

Document No: MP160330 

Location: Hampton, VA 

 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of technologies, capabilities, and challenges 

identified through the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2 Mad Scientist 

(MS) initiative addressing megacity and dense urban area (DUA) challenges for 

2025 and beyond.

MS is a TRADOC G-2 initiative organized around themes, problem sets, and 

challenges the Army expects to face in the future Operational Environment (OE) that 

allows for continuous learning, adaptation, innovation, and broader engagement in 

problem solving. Dialogue between Joint military, international partners, academia, 

policy institutions, and private sector organizations will help the Army explore the 

evolution of the OE in support of the Campaign of Learning, 2025 Maneuvers, 

science and technology (S&T) investments, and capability development for the 

Army. MS is exploring innovative ways to improve the effectiveness of the future 

force to ensure it can accomplish a diverse set of missions throughout the full range 

of military operations (ROMO) - to include operating in megacities and DUAs. 

By 2050, 60% of the world’s population is expected to reside in cities. Adversaries 

are increasingly moving to environments where U.S. advantages in detection, 

standoff, and precision firepower may be constrained. Further, the potential for Army 

involvement within cities may be exacerbated by global challenges including: liberal 

trade and economic coordination; climate change; nuclear proliferation; responsibility 

to protect, and failing states and ungoverned areas. The types of tasks that the Army 

may be required to perform in a megacity or in DUAs include: Non-combatant 

evacuation; humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HADR) missions; raids; deny 

adversary objectives; counter weapons of mass destruction operations; conduct 

military engagement and security cooperation; provide a global stabilizing presence; 

provide support to civil authorities, and counter terrorism/counterinsurgency 

missions. Megacity and DUA environments present a number of challenges that the 

Army must prepare for and address if it will be successful in future missions. 

However, military forces are unprepared for future combat in these environments. 

To address this gap in U.S. military capabilities, TRADOC G-2, in collaboration with 

Arizona State University Research Enterprise (ASURE), Army Capabilities 

Integration Center (ARCIC), and the Army’s Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE), 

focused on four primary objectives that align to Army Warfighting Challenges 

(AWFCs) as part of a MS Megacities Initiative with the objective that no U.S. Army 

soldier is at a disadvantage in an urban environment. The four primary megacity 

objectives are:

1) Situational Understanding: What emerging concepts and capabilities will 

enable Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB); Intelligence

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; Mission Command 

Systems; electronic warfare (EW), and a human, demographic, and cultural 

understanding within megacities and dense urban areas (AWFC #1)?
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

46

2) Freedom of Movement and Protection: What emerging concepts and 

capabilities will enable access and freedom of movement in, above (buildings 

and airspace), below (sub-terrain), and around megacities? What new 

capabilities for Decentralized Urban Logistics can improve sustainment 

efficacy in urban areas? What will protect vehicles and Soldiers, while 

enabling freedom of movement, from multitude of advanced and conventional 

military technologies as well as environmental threats (AWFC #16)?

3) Expeditionary Operations: What emerging concepts and capabilities will 

enable expeditionary maneuver; evolve Army Health Support of Operations; 

enhance the ability to manage or influence large population centers, and offer 

solutions for achieving partner interests and strategic objectives throughout a 

range of military operations (during peace and combat operations; AWFC 

#12)?

4) Future Training Challenges: What emerging technologies and capabilities 

must the Army explore and adopt in order to realistically represent the 

complexities of a megacity to a training audience (home station and Combat 

Training Centers) allowing the development of cohesive teams that thrive in 

ambiguity, austerity, or chaos within the Operational Environment of 2025 and 

Beyond (Human Dimension Strategy Strategic Objective #2; AWFC #8).1

Through efforts such as a Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond 

Conference that MS cohosted with ASURE and ICoE, an online MS technology 

survey, and a call for academic publications on megacities and DUAs, the MS 

Megacities Initiative encouraged dialogue and idea generation to support greater 

understanding of the future megacity and DUA OEs and underlying capability and 

technology needs.

This report provides an overview of the results of this MS Megacities Initiative. Data 

was captured from the Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond 

Conference presentations and discussions, academic publications, and MS 

technology survey. Material generated through these forums was examined and 

findings are reported below from the perspective of the four primary megacity 

objectives, highlighting excerpts from MS contributors.2 

The MS Megacities Initiative successfully addressed all four of the megacities 

objectives, finding that the growing complexity of the OE and more lethal opponents 

enabled by technology and connectivity will require advanced situational 

understanding and a system of systems approach to enable decisions making. To 

successfully operate in increasingly dense and complex environments the Army will 

 1 Lawton, Joel and Grubbs, Lee, “Information Paper: Mad Scientist Conference: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas.”

2 MS contributors defined as: Any contributor of insights provided through the MS Megacity Initiative, 

including Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference presenters, authors of academic 

publications submitted in response to the MS call for papers on megacities and DUAs, contributors of ideas to 

the online MS technology survey, and participants discussing megacities and DUAs in the Megacities and 

Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference virtual chat room or Twitter page.
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

47

rely on understanding and modeling interactions between human and physical 

systems and should leverage innovative sources of information and big data 

analytics for situational understanding. The Army will need to integrate expert 

knowledge with collective intelligence and growing sensor data and explore new 

analytic frameworks and innovative emerging technologies. The fundamental role of 

situational understanding in future Army operations is reflected by the results of the 

MS Megacities Initiative where this topic was the predominant theme. 

With a focus on technologies to enable access and freedom of movement, MS 

contributors began to address the Freedom of Movement and Protection megacity 

objective. The Army can leverage the vertical features of megacities and DUAs 

environments, lessons learned from domestic emergency response and evacuation 

research, and technology advancements in unmanned systems to address some of 

these challenges to freedom of movement and protection. 

To address the Expeditionary Operations megacity objective, a number of 

technologies were identified with potential to support medical operations in 

megacities and DUAs, including medical evacuation and care in the field. An 

intelligence model to support unified action, an operational planning framework for 

densely populated urban areas, and the use of virtual humans were proposed to 

enhance situational understanding, planning, and interactions with local populations 

for expeditionary operations. 

The Army will have to continue to explore innovative training methods, new, 

interdisciplinary curriculums, evolving perspectives that embrace complexity, 

flexibility, and originality, and advanced technology solutions that can immerse 

soldiers into megacity environments to address future training challenges. 

In addition to addressing topics related to the 4 primary megacity objectives, MS 

contributors also underscored the importance of trying to attain U.S. objectives 

without having to engage in and deploy military forces to a megacity or DUA.

Although a number of concepts and capability/technology ideas were generated 

through the MS Megacities Initiative, this work has only begun to address the 

complexity of megacities and DUAs. A concerted effort to continue to address this 

topic, to include: ensuring situational understanding remains incorporated into the 

TRADOC S&T Needs for the Warfighter; leveraging the TRADOC critical thinking 

enterprise to focus on megacities and DUAs from the system of systems 

perspective; exploring the utility of various proposed analytic frameworks; further 

examining the human component of megacities and DUAs, including informal social 

networks and governance structures; pilot programs to leverage and integrate 

diverse data sets; exploring collaboration methods to further engage additional 

interdisciplinary subject matter experts; and addressing concepts and capabilities to 

avoid military engagement in megacities and DUAs when possible will further build 

on the success of the MS Megacities Initiative.
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

48

Introduction: Megacities Initiative for Collaboration and Idea Generation 

Mad Scientist (MS) is a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2 initiative 

organized around themes, problem sets, and challenges the Army expects to face in 

the future Operational Environment (OE) for the far future (2040-2050). MS allows 

for continuous learning, adaptation, innovation, and broader engagement in problem 

solving. Dialogue between Joint military, international partners, academia, policy 

institutions, and private sector organizations will help the Army explore the evolution 

of the OE in support of the Campaign of Learning, 2025 Maneuvers, S&T 

investments and capability development for the Army. MS is exploring innovative 

ways to improve the effectiveness of the future force to ensure it can accomplish a 

diverse set of missions throughout the full range of military operations (ROMO) - to 

include operating in megacities and Dense Urban Areas (DUAs). 

By 2050, 60% of the world’s population is expected to reside in cities. Adversaries 

are increasingly moving to environments where U.S. advantages in detection, 

standoff, and precision firepower may be constrained. Further, the potential for Army 

involvement within cities may be exacerbated by global challenges including: liberal 

trade and economic coordination; climate change; nuclear proliferation; responsibility 

to protect, and failing states and ungoverned areas. The types of tasks that the Army 

may be required to perform in a megacity or in DUAs include: Non-combatant 

evacuation; humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HADR) missions; raids; deny 

adversary objectives; counter weapons of mass destruction operations; conduct 

military engagement and security cooperation; provide a global stabilizing presence; 

provide support to civil authorities, and counter terrorism/counterinsurgency 

missions. Megacity and DUA environments present a number of challenges that the 

Army must prepare for and address if it will be successful in future missions. 

However, military forces are unprepared for future combat in these environments. 

To address this gap in U.S. military capabilities, TRADOC G-2, in collaboration with 

Arizona State University Research Enterprise (ASURE), Army Capabilities 

Integration Center (ARCIC), and the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE), 

focused on four primary objectives that align to Army Warfighting Challenges 

(AWFCs) as part of a MS Megacities Initiative with the objective that no U.S. Army 

soldier is at a disadvantage in an urban environment. The four primary megacity 

objectives are:

1) Situational Understanding: What emerging concepts and capabilities will 

enable Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB); Intelligence 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; Mission Command 

Systems; electronic warfare (EW), and a human, demographic, and cultural 

understanding within megacities/dense urban areas (AWFC #1)?

2) Freedom of Movement and Protection: What emerging concepts and 

capabilities will enable access and freedom of movement in, above (buildings 

and airspace), below (sub-terrain), and around megacities? What new 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

49

capabilities for Decentralized Urban Logistics can improve sustainment 

efficacy in urban areas? What will protect vehicles and Soldiers, while 

enabling freedom of movement, from multitude of advanced and conventional 

military technologies as well as environmental threats (AWFC #16)?

3) Expeditionary Operations: What emerging concepts and capabilities will 

enable expeditionary maneuver; evolve Army Health Support of Operations; 

enhance the ability to manage or influence large population centers, and offer 

solutions for achieving partner interests and strategic objectives throughout a 

range of military operations (during peace and combat operations; AWFC 

#12)?

4) Future Training Challenges: What emerging technologies and capabilities 

must the Army explore and adopt in order to realistically represent the 

complexities of a megacity to a training audience (home station and Combat 

Training Centers) allowing the development of cohesive teams that thrive in 

ambiguity, austerity, or chaos within the Operational Environment of 2025 and 

Beyond (Human Dimension Strategy Strategic Objective #2; AWFC #8).3

The MS Megacities Initiative provided multiple forums for collaboration and idea 

generation, including the Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond 

Conference, an online MS technology survey, and a call for academic publications 

on megacities and DUAs, to support understanding of the future OE and underlying 

capability and technology needs.

This report provides an overview of the results of this MS Megacities Initiative. Data 

was captured from the MS Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Conference 

presentations and discussions, academic publications, and MS technology survey. 

Material generated through these forums was examined and findings are reported 

below from the perspective of the four primary megacity objectives (Situational 

Understanding, Freedom of Movement and Protection, Expeditionary Operations, 

and Future Training Challenges), highlighting excerpts from MS contributors. 4 This 

report does not provide a comprehensive review of all megacity-related concepts, 

challenges, and needs but instead, provides an overview of the key megacity 

concepts and ideas generated through the MS Megacities Initiative. 

 

Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference

On 21-22 April, 2016, MS cohosted an event with ASURE and ICoE designed to 

examine complexities of future land forces operating in megacities and DUAs. This 

Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference examined how 

future forces will gain situational understanding; obtain freedom of movement and 

 3 Lawton, Joel and Grubbs, Lee, “Information Paper: Mad Scientist Conference: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas.”

4 MS Contributor defined as: Any contributor of insights provided through the MS Megacity Initiative, including 

Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference presenters, authors of academic 

publications submitted in response to the MS call for papers on megacities and DUAs, contributors of ideas to 

the online MS technology survey, and participants discussing megacities and DUAs in the Megacities and 

Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference virtual chat room or Twitter page.
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

50

access; improve the ability to conduct expeditionary operations; and address future 

training challenges. Over 140 participants attended from the military, academia, and 

industry with nearly 40% from outside the Army. The Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Conference also included a virtual component with over 500 individuals 

participating through web streaming, a chat room, and Twitter - #madsci16 (See 

Appendix 2 for list of speakers and presentations). 

Mad Scientist Technology Survey

An online technology survey (available at https://survey.max.gov/818145) was used 

to capture input on capability and technology ideas that could impact the OE and 

U.S. forces. Contributors were asked to provide a title and description of their 

capability/technology idea and to rate their idea across several applicable categories; 

specifically, eight Levels of Effort (LOEs), six Technology Imperatives, 20 Army 

Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs) and four megacities objectives. Contributors 

representing academia, government, and industry submitted 63 capability/technology 

ideas that were applicable to the megacity and dense urban environment topic 

(identified by contributor through a survey question asking if their nominated idea is 

“applicable to megacities/dense urban environments”). 

Megacity and DUA Academic Publications

In 2015, TRADOC G-2 put out a call for papers that address one or more of the four 

primary megacity objectives. 34 academic publications on megacities and DUAs 

submitted in response to this call for papers were reviewed and categorized based 

on the extent to which they addressed one or more of the 4 megacity objectives 

(primarily or somewhat addressed one or more megacity objectives; see Appendix 3: 

Methodology for details). 

The following section presents some general themes and challenges identified from 

insights gathered from the MS Megacities Initiative. These general themes and 

challenges include broad, recurring topics relevant across multiple megacity 

objectives. This section sets the stage for subsequent sections containing a more 

detailed review of insights categorized by the 4 megacity objectives. 
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General Themes and Challenges

A megacity is the un-consumable elephant; the number of bites needed to address 

all of its requirements would far exceed any coalition’s capabilities.5

The likelihood that the U.S. Army will have to operate in megacities and DUAs is 

increasingly probable and these environments present a number of challenges that 

the Army must prepare for and address if it will be successful in future missions.67 

Major cities “grow together” forming regions of dense populations that stretch 

hundreds of kilometers and can encompass over 100 million people. 8 These dense 

urban environments are extremely complex: modern cities are multidimensional 

(subterranean, surface, and vertical); cities are interconnected through 

globalization, social media, and modern methods of communication/information 

dissemination; cities are difficult to control.9 Each megacity will be unique in its 

complexity and numerous characteristics will complicate and differentiate these 

environments (demographics, infrastructure, public health and disease, 

technologies, connectivity and social media, and warfare groups). 

The multitude of forces that will constantly impact the OE in megacities and DUAs 

will be important considerations as the Army develops capabilities to operate in 

these environments. Key megacity and DUA drivers include demographics 

(people), natural resources (water, oil, land), and globalization (interconnectivity).10 

The human factor will remain a crucial element as the military prepares to engage in 

megacities and DUAs, especially as the future becomes increasingly populated by a 

new species defined as “homo sapiens sapiens.net”. This new species will live their 

lives persistently linked to their supercomputer smartphones and connected to a 

global virtual network. How this new species learns, communicates, and is 

influenced will be a key area of focus in the megacities and DUA domain.11 Future 

Army forces will have to conduct missions against state, non-state, and hybrid 

threats surrounded by dense populations of noncombatants. Through the MS 

Megacities Initiative, MS contributors provided insights into a number of additional 

challenges the future Army will face in megacities and DUAs.

Challenges the Army Will Face in Megacities and DUAs Include: 

• Rapid growth in urban areas will produce more demand on the infrastructure 

and flow systems, more waste, and increased urban density.12

 5 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 6 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “An Analytical Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Terrain.” 7 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 8 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 9 Wolfel, Richard, et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

10 Ward, Darryl, “Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army.” 11 Crow, Michael Dr., “Welcome Remarks, Day 1.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 12 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.”
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• A major challenge of megacities is density (data, people, and infrastructure).13

• The lack of a clearly demarcated boundaries for the area of operations will be 

problematic.14 The Army will have to consider the rural and regional areas 

around megacities as well as the world-wide implications of operations within 

megacities.15

• The proliferation of advanced weaponry coupled with the rapid digital spread 

of information and ideology, allows anyone to be a threat, and will lead to 

growing instability in many parts of the world.16 

• Changing infrastructure, subcultures, and places to “hide in plain sight” 

present a particular challenge to data gathering.”17 

• Megacities are more susceptible to natural and manmade disasters when in 

close proximity to large bodies of water. Extreme water events caused by 

floods, hurricanes, typhoons, and tsunamis will exacerbate life threatening 

situations in areas of increased urbanization.18

• Urban vertical and subterranean warfare significantly complicate Army 

operations, freedom of movement, and force protection.1920

• Disease in megacities can result in catastrophic, global outcomes. Infectious 

disease will interface with urbanization, impacting military missions (e.g. 

warfare, humanitarian missions, and force protection). Rapid growth of dense 

urban areas in developing countries will continue to push people into 

environments that put them in greater contact with animal reservoirs of 

disease. Denial, fear, misinformation, decontamination, and disposal are 

among the many factors future military forces may have to contend with.21

The Army is Not Prepared to Operate in Megacities

The complexity and uniqueness of megacities will greatly impact the Army’s thinking 

and future capabilities to operate in these environments.22 Megacities and DUAs 

may pose the most significant security challenge in future decades, one for which the 

U.S. is not well prepared to counter.23 In addition to the inherent complexities of a 

megacity, non-state actors have turned to complex urban terrains to avoid 

confronting superior Western military forces and to compensate for their inferior 

 13 Rose, James “Greg”, “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 14 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

15 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 16 Richmond, Todd, “The Innovation Spectrum - Exploring Left of Boom.” 17 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 18 Ward, Darryl, “Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army.” 19 Prautzch, Frank, “U.S. Army Mega City Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative Technologies.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.

20 Ward, Darryl, “Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army.” 21 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 22 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 23 Kozloski, Robert, “Power Through Stability.”
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military capabilities.24 These adversaries will continue to expand into dense urban 

areas to hide among the population and it will become more difficult to effectively 

fight enemies using conventional military weapons.25 26 27 With Western military 

technology and training designed for more open environments, current military 

operating procedures and perspectives may not be adequate to overcome the 

challenges of megacities. 28 29 The U.S. Army still relies heavily on traditional 

methods of individual (scout, leader observation, etc.) as well as platform (imagery 

and intelligence) observation, two-dimensional mapping, and population surveying 

that may no longer be sufficient.30 

According to Dr. Douglas Ollivant, the U.S may not have been fighting first tier 

opponents for the last 15 years, leaving our military forces unprepared for future 

combat.31 Advanced opponents, known as hybrid warriors, are significantly closing 

the gap between state and non-state forces and they are enabled by technology and 

connectivity. Dr. Douglas Ollivant noted that by 2050, hybrid warrior groups will be 

operating in a megacity and DUA environments.32 However, current models focus 

on non-hybrid warrior-like opponents.33

The expansive area and density of megacities and DUAs are likely to prohibit 

traditional military models of overpowering, isolating, and controlling populations in 

these environments.34 Consequently, U.S. military forces will have to increase their 

emphasis on influencing populations and narratives in megacity and DUA 

environments.

35 Adaptability will also be key in understanding and operating in these 

complex environments. Each megacity is unique and continuously evolving, 

therefore there will not be a single solution for how to understand, operate in, and 

train for a megacity or DUA environment but a number of possible solutions that are 

situationally dependent.36 This complexity will require an interdisciplinary, 

collaborative approach to address the megacities problem.37 Determining routines 

and patterns in megacity systems will necessitate data compilation and analysis 

beyond what is currently available to the Army today.38 Big data analytics will 

become a necessity as new sources of data, including social media, are leveraged to 

enable insights through an examination of aggregate behaviors collective 

 24 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 25 Kozloski, Robert, “Power Through Stability.” 26 Quintas, Leopold BG et al., “Welcome Remarks.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 27 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 28 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

29 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 30 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 31 Ollivant, Douglas Dr., “Hybrid Warfare in Urban Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 32 Ollivant, Douglas Dr., “Hybrid Warfare in Urban Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 33 Ollivant, Douglas Dr., “Hybrid Warfare in Urban Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 34 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 35 Prautzch, Frank, “U.S. Army Mega City Operations - Enduring Principles and Innovative Technologies.” 36 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 37 Kem, John BG, “Welcome Remarks.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 38 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.”
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intelligence.39 A system of systems approach to this analysis was a common theme 

discussed by MS contributors to support situational understanding, for future 

unmanned systems that support military missions, and for biosurveillance for force 

protection and outbreak response.40 41 42 43 44

Shifting Army Doctrine

Megacity and DUA environments are not an entirely new challenge, therefore, the 

Army should avoid creating completely new paradigms and instead, draw on the past 

to innovate instead of invent.45 46 However, these challenging environments will still 

require shifts in Army doctrine and methods. The need for more megacity-specific 

doctrine (discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections) is needed in a number 

of areas, including:47

• Adoption of a city as a system perspective will require adaptation of a 

significant portion of Army doctrine resulting in an urban analytic framework 

tailored to address the operational data layers found within urban centers, 

their environmental dynamism, and their state of connectedness.48

• The dynamic nature of urban environments demands an expansion of 

traditional Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) thinking. IPB 

often fails to gain sight of the dynamics between the components of problems 

within an interactively complex system and is not conducive to an interactively 

complex OE.49 The basic definition of IPB often does not take into account 

how the variables explaining DUAs are increasingly interconnected, offers 

little instruction on how to address a complex, multidimensional environment, 

and provides little operational advice or examples.50

• Megacities research needs to better address the likelihood of more lethal 

competitors. Current mental models are stuck on none-hybrid warrior-like 

opponents.51

 39 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 40 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

41 Kwon, Paul O. LTC, “Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies.”

42 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 43 Fisher, Nathan, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban Environment.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 44 Piekarski, Brett Dr., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” Megacities/DUA

Conference Presentation.

45 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 46 Prautzch, Frank, “U.S. Army Mega City Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative Technologies.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 47 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 48 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “White Paper: An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” 49 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “White Paper: An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” 50 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

51 Ollivant, Douglas Dr., “Hybrid Warfare in Urban Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.
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• Changes in doctrine to enable the development of knowledge experts in 

megacities is needed where personnel are assigned to monitor cities.52 

• Greater emphasis on strategically supporting, manipulating and/or 

undermining the flows, infrastructure, and systems of the megacity as 

opposed to current emphasis on kinetic, military tasks.53

• The Army must change its thinking to focus more on rigorous big datadriven analysis, instead of relying largely on the same reductionist models 

that limit holistic thinking.54

• The Army must change its attitude towards cyberwarfare and innovate new 

ideas and concepts for warfare.55

• A shift in how medical data is defined, stored, captured, visualized, and 

shared is needed for more easily transportable semi-autonomous and 

autonomous Tactical Combat Casualty Care capabilities to support future 

missions. This will require a paradigm shift in the practice of operational 

medicine from an “art” that employs subjective measures to assess and treat, 

to a “science” based on employing objective quantifiable measures.56

• Faster technological iteration and adaptation is needed as opposed to 

large, long-term development, acquisition, and sustainment programs. 

Smaller, faster, and more flexible systems to supplement, or supersede, 

existing weapons and other systems with rapid prototyping, small automated 

production runs, remote software updates, and development and deployment 

to upgrade a soldier’s tools in months or weeks will be needed.57

Frameworks Proposed

In addition to proposing specific technology ideas, a number of MS contributors 

proposed broader frameworks that may help the Army shift its perspective and 

analytic approach towards megacities and DUAs, including:

• Hardware/software/outcomes framework of analysis for urban areas to 

conceptualize the issues in a megacity.58

• Operationalized megacity framework for assessing the integrated system 

quality of each megacity for purposes of projecting the effects of military 

operations in that environment.59

 52 Zenzen, Fran Dr., “Frameworks for Future Challenges: Understanding Dense Urban Terrain.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 53 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

54 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 55 Duggan, Patrick COL et al., “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 56 Berkow, Jan and Poropatich, Ron COL(R), “TRAuma Care in a Rucksack (TRACIR) - A Disruptive Technology 

Concept.”

57 Richmond, Todd, “The Innovation Spectrum - Exploring Left of Boom.” 58 Otto, Gustav and Besik, AJ, “Megacity Madness.” 59 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”
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• Complexity theory and ESA framework to facilitate the rapid understanding 

of complex populations in a way that can be communicated across large 

organizations and leveraged to conduct operations that are more 

effective.60 61

• Urban analytic framework to address the operational data layers found 

within urban centers and the relationships between different parts of the 

environment and understanding the cumulative effects of these interactions. 

This analytic framework supports development of courses of action (COA) for 

operations occurring in dense urban areas.62 63

• An intelligence model to better support unified action involving the U.S. 

Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and associated joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational partners (JIIM) to extend and accelerate 

intelligence in Unified Land Operations (ULO) through more collective network 

engagement practices and joint targeting processes.64

• An operational planning framework for urban operations in relation to 

densely populated urban geography with seven lines of effort.65

• The cyber-enabled Special Warfare (CE-SW) pyramid advances a 

conceptual framework to align technology, tools, and tactics for a new 

contemporary cyber-enabled Special Warfare practice.66

The following section provides a more detailed examination of the insights provided 

by MS Contributors categorized by the four primary megacity objectives. 

 60 Pike, Tom, Long, Nick, and Alexander, Perry, “Understanding Nations: New Ideas to Analyze Foreign States.” 61 Pike, Tom MAJ and Brown, Eddie MAJ, “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of 

Corruption in Afghanistan.”

62 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “White Paper: An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” 63 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “An Analytical Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Terrain.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 64 Morris, Victor R., “Tailoring Intelligence and Analytic Support to Regionally Aligned and Multinational Forces 

- Collective Network Identification and Engagement Requirements for Unified Action Partners.”

65 Demarest, Geoff, “How to Hold or Take a Big City - Seven Lines of Effort.” 66 Duggan, Patrick COL, “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare.”
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Alignment of Contributor Insights to Megacity Objectives 

Situational Understanding 

Overview

The growing complexity of the OE and more lethal opponents enabled by technology 

and connectivity require advanced situational understanding to enable decision 

making. The fundamental role of situational understanding in future Army operations 

is reflected by the results of the MS Megacities Initiative, where this topic was the 

predominant theme. 

• Situational understanding was a major topic of discussion throughout the April 

2016 Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference. 

• 90% of megacity academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS 

technology survey addressed the Situational Understanding megacity 

objective. This megacity objective was addressed the most by academic 

publications and ideas submitted to the MS technology survey.

• 71% of ideas submitted to the MS technology survey addressed AWFC #1: 

Develop Situational Understanding. The was the most addressed AWFC by 

ideas submitted to the MS technology survey. 

• The majority of ideas proposed through the technology survey by contributors 

affiliated with Academia (86%) and Government (87%) addressed the 

Situational Understanding megacity objective. 100% of ideas submitted by 

contributors affiliated with Industry or “Other” addressed Situational 

Understanding.

(See the Qualitative Summary of Data section below for more details about data 

alignment to megacity objectives and AWFCs).

To successfully operate in increasingly dense and complex environments, the Army 

will rely on understanding and modeling interactions between human and physical 

systems. Increased urbanization will create both challenges and opportunities, 

requiring new sources of information and big data analytics that the Army can 

leverage for situational awareness and intelligence operations. The Army will need 

to integrate expert knowledge with collective intelligence that aggregates disparate 

and dense data sources such as cyber-social geography and growing sensor data. 

The Army must explore and leverage new analytic frameworks and innovative 

emerging technologies while applying a system of systems perspective to megacities 

and DUAs for predictive capabilities and rapid decision making. 

What emerging concepts and capabilities will enable Intelligence Preparation of 

the Battlefield (IPB); Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities; Mission Command Systems; electronic warfare (EW), and a human, 

demographic, and cultural understanding within megacities/dense urban areas?
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Challenges and Opportunities

A number of challenges to data gathering and situational understanding were 

highlighted by MS contributors. The dynamic and complex character of megacities 

presents a particular challenge to intelligence operations. Consequently, the Army 

will have to move beyond relying heavily on traditional methods of observation, 

mapping, and population surveying and approaches that emphasize discrete 

problem sets and well-defined regions. 67 68 Although these methods were sufficient, 

understanding how well traditional intelligence methods are suited to provide 

situational understanding in megacities and DUAs will inform the development of 

new processes and technologies.69 70 For example: 

• Dr. Richard Wolfel et al. highlighted that the basic definition of IPB often does 

not take into account how the variables explaining dense urban areas are 

increasingly interconnected, offers little instruction on how to address the 

complex, multidimensional environment, and provides little operational advice 

or examples.71 

• According to CSM (Ret) William “Bill” Hedges, IPB often fails to gain sight of 

the dynamics between the components of problems within an interactively 

complex system and is not conducive to these complex OEs.72

• An expansion of traditional IPB thinking is needed to account for how 

megacity and DUA variables are interconnected in these complex 

systems.73 74

MS contributors highlighted the importance of understanding the human terrain in 

megacities and DUAs. People are a critical factor to consider when analyzing these 

environments, however, an in-depth understanding of populations is not always part 

of military megacity preparation. 75 76 The interaction between infrastructure and the 

human terrain further complicates situational understanding, especially as individuals 

change dimensions from the subterranean through the vertical dimensions of 

megacities.77 Understanding the spatial and temporal patterns of daily life can 

enable modeling and forecasting of population movement, behavior, and reaction 

 67Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 68 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

69 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

70Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 71 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

72 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “White Paper: An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” 73 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”

74 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “White Paper: An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” 75 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

76 Otto, Gustav and Besik, AJ, “Megacity Madness.” 77 Wolfel, Richard PhD et al., “It’s in There: Rethinking(?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.”
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within the megacity environment to facilitate military operations.78 In addition to the 

human terrain, several other considerations important for situational understanding in 

megacities and DUAs were identified by MS contributors including: 

• Infrastructure: Characteristics and quality of infrastructure within a 

megacity.79

• Integration: The degree to which an environment is highly or loosely 

integrated.80

• Invisible geographies: Awareness of “invisible geographies” where seen and 

unseen features (ex: cultural forces, religious systems, old and new 

infrastructure) intersect.81 

• Weather: Megacity and DUAs can be heavily influenced by microscale 

weather conditions that can differ significantly from block to block, especially 

in areas near large bodies of water. Current capabilities cannot accurately 

represent these rapidly changing and complex microclimates. Military 

operations will require comprehensive weather support, including accurate 

information about these microclimates, as well as a better understanding of 

the different ways weather may impact friendly forces, noncombatants, and 

adversaries. Future weather-related research to improve weather prediction 

capabilities should include:82

o Understanding atmospheric processes in megacities and DUAs. 

o Understanding battlefield sensor performance. 

o Advanced development of microscale weather models. 

o New weather related decision aids that include prediction of human 

domain conditions based on weather combined with reactions of a 

population to military operations. 

• Disease and Biosurveillance: Disease in megacities can result in 

catastrophic, global outcomes. It is important to consider the nature of 

disease threats as megacities become more prevalent and how this may 

impact stability, humanitarian needs, military missions, and force protection. 

Surveillance and accurate diagnosis is key to addressing global biosecurity 

threats.83

 78 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

79 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

80 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

81 Fin, Ed Dr., “Stories and Visions for a Better Future.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 82 Knapp, David, Randall, Robb, and Staley, Jim, “Atmospheric Impacts and Effects Predictions and Applications 

for Future Megacity and Dense Urban Area Operations.”

83 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.
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Unique characteristics of megacities and DUAs also offer opportunities the Army can 

leverage to address the Situational Understanding megacity objective.84 85 For 

example, Dr. Russell Glenn noted that a trained and educated population can 

provide situational understanding to increase the chance of early detection (e.g. 

disease events) and interdiction. Larger, dense areas also tend to offer a breadth 

and depth of information that may not be available elsewhere, such as demographic 

and cell phone data useful for tracking events.86 87

Potential Data Sources

Enormous amounts of data about a city and its population is now readily available 

and MS contributors identified a number of potential sources of intelligence as well 

as analytic concepts to support situational understanding of megacities and DUAs, 

including:88 

• Internet of Things (IOT): The Army can leverage the internet of things (IOT) 

for situational understanding in megacities and DUAs. Data obtained from 

connected devices, personal electronic devices, and deployed unmanned 

systems could be combined to create a real-time 3D model of a building, 

including the interior. This information could identify occupants in the building 

to increase force protection and reduce the risk of civilian casualties. 

Additionally, the military can access traffic and security cameras in 

combination with other devices for situational understanding outside buildings 

and throughout a city. This reservoir of data can be collected and analyzed 

and changes in these systems can be observed in real time as data streams 

are updated continuously. Most importantly, this could be accomplished with a 

minimal military presence in the city itself.89 90

• Collective Intelligence: Collective intelligence exploits available information, 

such as social media data, for situational understanding and predictive 

capabilities in complex environments. Individual pieces of information can be 

aggregated into a meaningful whole to provide valuable insight about a 

population’s behaviors.91 Included in this are proxy variables, pieces of 

information that can provide situational understanding about seemingly 

 84 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or

Opportunity?”

85 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 86 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 87 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 88 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 89 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 90 Crane, Alfred and Peeke, Richard LTC, “Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational 

Awareness in Dense Urban Environments and Mega Cities.”

91 Usher, Abe, “Addressing the Challenges of the Human Terrain in 2050.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation.
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unrelated events.92 The convergence of distributed sensor networks with 

social media data will further strengthen the utility of collective 

intelligence.93 94 Human review, intuition, and knowledge in conjunction with 

systems to baseline human biases are needed for effective data 

interpretation.95 

• Cyber-Social Geography: According to Dr. Chris Tucker, the physical terrain 

is only one important dimension of geography in dense urban environments. 

Digital neighborhoods must be overlaid with physical neighborhoods using 

High Resolution 3D mapping to visualize the cyber-social geography of a 

megacity for situational understanding. It is also important to organize all 

data, warfighting functions, and narratives in space and time. 96 

• Science Fiction and Storytelling: Science fiction and storytelling provide a 

shared language for foresight, strengthens resilience, and provides a tool to 

examine and understand complicated challenges. Science fiction and 

storytelling are inexpensive and allow for extrapolation and integration from 

different fields of study to explore a broader space.97

• Biometrics: Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on 

measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics.98 

Biometrics-enabled intelligence can contribute to the discovery of unknown 

potential adversaries and characterize their level of potential threat to U.S. 

interests.99 Integrated intergovernmental production and sharing is required 

for biometric enabled intelligence to accurately identify known or suspected 

adversaries living amongst a larger population.100

• Autonomous Vehicles: Autonomous vehicles can provide rapid situational 

understanding about unfamiliar environments as military forces are deployed 

to these locations.101 Swarms of unmanned ground/air microvehicles could 

be equipped with weather sensors to dramatically improve currently 

 92 Usher, Abe, “Addressing the Challenges of the Human Terrain in 2050.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 93 Usher, Abe, “Addressing the Challenges of the Human Terrain in 2050.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 94 Richmond, Todd, “The Innovation Spectrum - Exploring Left of Boom.” 95 Usher, Abe, “Addressing the Challenges of the Human Terrain in 2050.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 96 Tucker, Chris Dr., “Emerging Geographical Tools to Understand Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 97 Fin, Ed Dr., “Stories and Visions for a Better Future.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 98 Morris, Victor R., “Enhancing Intergovernmental Counter-Terrorism and Identity Discovery Capabilities 

through Identity and Biometric Enabled Intelligence.”

99Morris, Victor R., “Enhancing Intergovernmental Counter-Terrorism and Identity Discovery Capabilities 

through Identity and Biometric Enabled Intelligence.”

100 Morris, Victor R., “Enhancing Intergovernmental Counter-Terrorism and Identity Discovery Capabilities 

through Identity and Biometric Enabled Intelligence.” 101 Piekarski, Brett Dr., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation.
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inadequate local weather condition sensing.102 MS contributors also 

discussed the utility of microdrone “flocks” (large number of self-propelled 

microdrones) for surveilling and collecting information in megacities and 

DUAs.103 Small drones equipped with high resolution cameras and other 

sensors can be used to relay information about buildings, their occupants, and 

human activities.104 105

• Man/Machine Teaming: Man/machine teaming in the future could feature 

adaptive, intelligent data streams that project information forward to military 

forces based on their requests or anticipated needs.106

• Modeling and Simulation (M&S): A critical capability to support Complex 

IPB is the development of a Complex IPB Agent Based Model (ABM) 

application. This application would model the interaction of different groups, 

based on analyst inputs, to see if certain population behaviors are more likely. 

This capability could allow analysts and decision makers to adjust variables to 

assess possible impacts on population behavior, providing a powerful option 

exploration tool.107

Analysis and Decision Making

As noted above, megacities and DUAs produce enormous quantities of data and 

analysts are just beginning to learn how to use that information in innovative ways.108 

Given the amount of readily available data, the Army must develop practical methods 

to exploit this exploit this data.109 However, the Army currently lacks the resources, 

expertise, and approaches to fully investigate and exploit the reservoir of information 

available.110 Big data analytics, knowledge management, and decision-making tools 

will be needed to process these large and diverse data sets.111 Decision makers will 

have to decide how best to use the information produced by these analytic systems, 

therefore, better decision making at all levels is a critical component of big data 

analytics.112 113 Virtual humans may provide one method for improving decision 

making. A virtual human, acting as part of a decision team can increase 

introspection and bring forward a vast quantity of knowledge to inform decision 

 102 Knapp, David, Randall, Robb, and Staley, Jim, “Atmospheric Impacts and Effects Predictions and Applications 

for Future Megacity and Dense Urban Area Operations.” 103 Bitterman, Alex Phd and Carlo, Richard, Prof, “Flocking Phones & Drones: Three-Dimensional, Real-Time, 

Mapping of Dense Urban Environments Using Off-the-Shelf Microdrone, Smartphone, and Point-Cloud 

Technology.” 104 Bitterman, Alex Phd and Carlo, Richard, Prof, “Flocking Phones & Drones: Three-Dimensional, Real-Time, 

Mapping of Dense Urban Environments Using Off-the-Shelf Microdrone, Smartphone, and Point-Cloud 

Technology.” 105 Insights provided by MS contributors. 106 Richmond, Todd, “The Innovation Spectrum - Exploring Left of Boom.” 107 Brown, Eddie MAJ and Pike, Tom MAJ, “Complex IPB.” 108 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 109 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 110 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities,” 111 Crane, Alfred and Peeke, Richard LTC, “Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational 

Awareness in Dense Urban Environments and Mega Cities.”

112 Insights provided by MS contributors. 113 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 
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making.114 115 In the future machines may have the ability to remove humans 

completely from decision making, however, in the near term humans will likely have 

to create policies that control the decision making behavior of machines.116 For 

example, Knowledge Enhanced Electronic Logic (KEEL) technology allows humans 

to package policies to control the behavior of battlespace systems and devices. 

KEEL is an enabling technology that makes it easy to package human judgment and 

reasoning skills (expertise) into machines.117

System of Systems Perspective

Analyzing megacities from a system of systems approach can improve situational 

understanding and enable more robust decision making. This approach was a 

common theme among a number of MS contributors and multiple concepts and 

frameworks to enable analysis and understanding of megacities and DUAs from this 

system of systems perspective were proposed, including: 

• Megacities exist as a system of systems and should be considered as a 

convergence of factors such as people, external influence, and infrastructure. 

How integrated and functional these systems will largely determine the 

success and livability of the environment. Dawn Morrison and Colin Wood 

provided an outline of an operationalized megacity framework useful in 

assessing the integrated system quality of each megacity to better understand 

the future military operational environment. Strategically supporting, 

manipulating and/or undermining the flows, infrastructure and systems of a 

megacity environment as a whole itself may transform what was previously 

viewed as intimidating complexity into a sophisticated, integrated, and 

manageable system of systems. By focusing on the integrated system of 

systems inherent to the megacity and fully understanding the population, 

future U.S. military forces will be more capable of successfully operating in a 

megacity.118 119

• Megacities are highly complex, adaptive, interconnected networks of networks 

that cannot be controlled but can be influenced. It is therefore critical to 

understand how to influence the trajectory of megacities and how to anticipate 

their responses, requiring a sophisticated analysis of the networks embedded 

within and between urban systems. It is useful to focus on resilience to 

shocks, a critical and fundamental attribute of complex systems. Quantifying 

resilience is required for comparative analyses and critical to planning 

interventions, evaluating options, and anticipating responses. Quantifying the 

 114 Swartout, William Dr., “Virtual Humans as Centaurs.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 115 Felix, Kevin COL (ret.), “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 116 Keeley, Tom, “A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) versus ‘Evolution’ - When Machines Are Smart 

Enough.”

117 Keeley, Tom, “A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) versus ‘Evolution’ - When Machines Are Smart 

Enough.”

118 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

119 Insights provided by MS contributors.
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dynamics and features of these networks is key to understanding both their 

resilience and that of the complex systems they govern.120 

• From this system of systems perspective, Gustav Otto and AJ Besik outlined 

a way to think about a megacity like a computer through the combination of 

software, hardware and outcomes. This hardware/software/outcomes 

framework of analysis for megacities can be used to conceptualize the issues 

in a megacity.121

• IPB steps are not conducive to understanding the dynamics between 

interactively complex systems. Therefore, a relevant urban analytic 

framework in support of framing, mapping, and developing courses of action 

(COA) for operations occurring in megacities was proposed. This analytic 

framework is specifically tailored to accommodate a city’s system of diversity 

and provides a structure that incorporates urban operational data layers and 

city as a system context and perspectives. The overarching concept behind 

this framework is alignment with systems thinking, focusing attention on the 

relationships between different parts of the environment and working to 

understand the cumulative effects of these interactions. Adoption of this city 

as a system perspective will require adaptation of a significant portion of Army 

doctrine. This framework involves framing the OE, mapping urban problem 

systems, moving from describing the problem to how to influence it via 

identification of Environment Centers of Gravity (E-COGS), and developing 

and analyzing courses of action (COA) designed to affect the E-COG.122 

• Complex adaptive systems or complexity theory was developed to identify the 

underlying laws governing complex systems and provides an effective lens to 

understand the true nature of a nation, its behavior, and the dynamics that 

can emerge within.123 Incorporating complexity-based components into 

systems analysis can enable the military to analyze and convey the 

complexity of the urban and social environments, improving operational 

understanding, visualization, description, and assessment.124 The Emergent 

States Assessment (ESA) is an analytic tool that leverages complexity theory 

to support decision makers in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations and 

can also be used to understand megacities. The ESA method offers an 

analytic framework that facilitates the rapid understanding of complex 

populations in a way that may be communicated across large organizations 

and leveraged to conduct operations that are more effective. The ESA 

framework defines, analyzes, and assesses a population by the complex 

 120 Shutters, Shade T., Herche, Wes, and King, Erin, “Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks: Using Urban 

Integration and Connectedness to Assess Resilience.”

121 Otto, Gustav and Besik, AJ, “Megacity Madness.” 122 Hedges, William CSM (Ret.), “White Paper: An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas.” 123 Pike, Tom, Long, Nick, and Alexander, Perry, “Understanding Nations: New Ideas to Analyze Foreign States.” 124 Brown, Eddie MAJ, “Conveying the Complex: Updating U.S. Joint Systems Analysis Doctrine with Complexity 

Theory.” 
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adaptive system terms of fitness landscape, agent fitness, agent response 

profile, building blocks, identity tags, and emergent phenomena.125

• Surveillance and accurate diagnosis is key to addressing global biosecurity 

threats. Biosecurity in complex environments will require a systems based 

approach and a complex web of surveillance, education, and interactive 

communications, otherwise known as “network of networks”. 126 127 A series of 

global biosurveillance systems exist but better integration of these systems is 

needed, such as an Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response 

Program, for military planning and operations, and disease response and 

prevention.128 129

 125 Pike, Tom MAJ and Brown, Eddie MAJ, “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems: A Case Study of 

Corruption in Afghanistan.”

126 Kwon, Paul O. LTC, “Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies.”

127 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 128 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 129 Kwon, Paul O. LTC, “Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies.”
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Freedom of Movement and Protection

Overview

The complexity of megacities and DUAs present a number of unique and dynamic 

challenges to military access, freedom of movement, and force protection. MS 

contributors began to address aspects of the Freedom of Movement and Protection 

megacity objective with a focus on technologies to enable access and freedom of 

movement.

• Freedom of Movement and Protection was the second most addressed 

megacity objective by academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS 

technology survey.

• 72% of megacity academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS 

technology survey addressed the Freedom of Movement and Protection 

megacity objective. 

• 24% of ideas submitted to the technology survey addressed AWFC #16: Set 

the Theater, Sustain Operations, and Maintain Freedom of Movement 

(aligned to the Freedom of Movement and Protection megacity objective). 

This was the 9th most addressed AWFC by ideas submitted to the technology 

survey.

• Freedom of Movement and Protection was the second most addressed 

megacity objective by technology survey contributors affiliated with Industry 

(88%) and Government (82%) and the third most addressed by Academia 

(64%). 100% of ideas submitted by contributors affiliated with Industry or 

“Other” addressed this objective. 

(See the Qualitative Summary of Data section below for more details about data 

alignment to megacity objectives and AWFCs).

Factors discussed by MS contributors that complicate freedom of movement and 

force protection include more capable opponents, complex infrastructure (especially 

subterranean and vertical dimensions), and dense populations that will complicate 

humanitarian missions. The Army can leverage the vertical features of these 

environments, lessons learned from domestic emergency response and evacuation 

research, and technology advancements in unmanned systems to address some of 

these challenges. 

What emerging concepts and capabilities will enable access and freedom of 

movement in, above (buildings and airspace), below (sub-terrain), and around 

megacities? What new capabilities for Decentralized Urban Logistics can improve 

sustainment efficacy in urban areas? What will protect vehicles and Soldiers, 

while enabling freedom of movement, from multitude of advanced and 

conventional military technologies as well as environmental threats (e.g., water, 

sanitation, air pollution; etc.)?
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Challenges and Opportunities

As noted previously, the Army will face advanced opponents enabled by technology 

and connectivity in conjunction with complex, dense infrastructure spanning multiple 

dimensions (e.g. subterranean, surface, supersurface, air, cyber) and greater 

exposure to disease and toxic industrial chemicals and materials that will further 

complicate freedom of movement and force protection.130 131 132 For example, 

controlling fires will be difficult due to the presence of buildings, smoke and smog, 

and reflections from building surfaces degrading vision and laser designation and 

opponents will increasingly exploit subterranean domains to avoid detection and 

targeting.133 However, these same challenges may also present opportunities for the 

Army to leverage megacity and DUA infrastructure to its advantage by using the 

vertical space:134

• The greatest advantage resides in exploiting the vertical space inherent in all 

urban centers.

• New technological approaches to securing the vertical space, providing 

greater stand-off from explosives, and options for aerial refit would greatly 

improve military operations in megacities and DUAs.

• Current technological advances in net zero basing systems could be 

developed to ensure a fully contained and controlled environment within a 

skyscraper. 

• Distributed high ground basing throughout the megacity would allow for 

greater command and control of the environment through extended visual 

over watch. 

• Exploiting the vertical space would also entail greater use of unmanned 

systems. 

Unique restrictions imposed by megacities and DUAs on military access and 

movement will require greater use of unmanned systems.135 These systems could be 

a force multiplier and improve the effectiveness and reach of soldiers in complex 

urban environments.136 137 Further, in addition to advancements in personal 

protective gear, unmanned systems could also be used to carry out missions in 

contaminated environments to limit soldier exposure to disease and toxic industrial 

 130 Ollivant, Douglas Dr., “Hybrid Warfare in Urban Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 131 Ippolito, Danielle PhD, “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities.”

132 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 133 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 134 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

135 Fisher, Nathan, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 136 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 137 Insights provided by MS contributors.
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chemicals and materials.

138 Currently, unmanned systems focus is primarily on the 

development of individual system technologies, however, MS contributors 

emphasized the need for a system of systems approach and unmanned/human 

teaming.139 140 141 Highly distributed, collaborative heterogeneous teams of 

unmanned systems integrated with humans, sensor data, and information from 

knowledge bases will provide opportunities for overmatch. The following are some 

key considerations for unmanned systems identified by MS contributors:142 143 144 

• Greater research focus is needed on how to integrate varying levels of 

autonomy and intelligence across spatially and temporally distributed singular 

systems, small teams, and swarm behavior under one robust and adaptable 

command and control architecture.145 

• Future military intelligent systems must make decisions on their own at rates 

beyond which a human can control them. 

• Distributed intelligence, the opportunity of unmanned systems to learn from 

one another, is required.146

• The development and use of numerous individual systems at low price points 

will enable the exploration of behaviors that are prohibitive in more expensive 

systems. Failure of some of these lower cost platforms may benefit the 

collective whole through distributed intelligence.147

• The Army must plan for resiliency when faced with a loss of systems and 

communications. Resiliency is critical for intelligent systems, yet very difficult 

to model, analyze, and put into practice.148 149

• Commercial approaches can inform military unmanned system development 

but will not completely meet military needs because commercial devices are 

 138 Ippolito, Danielle PhD, “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities.”

139 Fisher, Nathan, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 140 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 141 Piekarski, Brett Dr., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 142 Piekarski, Brett Dr., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 143 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 144 Fisher, Nathan, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 145 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 146 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 147 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 148 Piekarski, Brett Dr. et al., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” 149 Insights provided by MS contributors.
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not created for or working in unstructured, austere environments (e.g. rubble, 

underground, hostile environments).150

Lessons learned from domestic emergency response and large-scale urban 

evacuation operations may provide insights that inform operation planning and 

missions to manage and protect large populations. For example:151 

• Evacuation planning ideally requires both multi-modal transportation (multiple 

travel modes) and intermodal transportation (travel involving connections 

between two or more travel modes in a single trip). Multi-modal transportation 

provides travel options to accommodate diverse and uncertain needs, 

including long-distance evacuations with limited road space, vehicles, and 

fuel. 

• Establishing lines of communication between emergency officials and the 

population will be a necessity, however, there are often communication 

barriers (e.g. language, access, locating people, cooperation). 

• It may be possible to recruit the local community to assist with the movement 

of supplies and goods and to conduct evacuations of buildings, 

neighborhoods, districts, cities, or metropolitan regions.

 150 Piekarski, Brett Dr., “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 151 Hess, Daniel Baldwin PhD, “Large-Scale Mass Evacuation in Metropolitan Areas: Improving Coordination for 

Multi-Modal Transport.” 
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Expeditionary Operations

Overview

The expansive area and density of megacities and DUAs are likely to prohibit 

traditional military models of overpowering, isolating, and controlling in these 

environments.152 Although MS contributors began to address methods to engage in 

and influence these environments, there was an emphasis on Army Health Support, 

including medical evacuation and care in the field. 

• Expeditionary Operations was the third most addressed megacity objective by 

academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS technology survey.

• 71% of megacity academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS 

technology survey addressed the Expeditionary Operations megacity 

objective. 

• 24% of ideas submitted to the technology survey addressed AWFC # 12: 

Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations (aligned to the 

Expeditionary Operations megacity objective). This was the 8th most 

addressed AWFC by ideas submitted to the technology survey.

• Expeditionary Operations was the third most addressed objective by 

technology survey contributors affiliated with Academia (50%) and the least 

addressed by Government (66%). 100% of ideas submitted by contributors 

affiliated with Industry or “Other” addressed this objective. 

(See the Qualitative Summary of Data section below for more details about data 

alignment to megacity objectives and AWFCs).

A number of technologies were identified with potential to improve medical 

operations in megacities and DUAs. Additionally, an intelligence model to support 

unified action, an operational planning framework for densely populated urban areas, 

and the use of virtual humans were proposed to enhance situational understanding 

and planning for expeditionary operations and interactions with local populations. 

Challenges and Opportunities 

As a result of the unique restrictions imposed by current and future megacities and 

DUAs, such as pervasive and easily concealed adversaries, limited access and 

freedom of movement, and increased evacuation times, future medical operations 

could be limited or unavailable. 153 MS contributors discussed a number of potential 

 152 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 153 Fisher, Nathan and Gilbert, Gary, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense 

Urban Environments.” 

What emerging concepts and capabilities will enable expeditionary maneuver; 

evolve Army Health Support of Operations; enhance the ability to manage or 

influence large population centers, and offer solutions for achieving partner 

interests and strategic objectives throughout a range of military operations (during 

peace and combat operations)?
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technologies to address limitations in medical support to military forces operating in 

megacity and DUA environments, with an emphasis on a shift to unmanned 

technologies.154 155 For example, in megacity environments, smaller aircraft with 

greater freedom of movement and advanced navigation will be needed for medical 

support.156 

• An emerging capability in future unmanned vehicles is multifunctional systems 

that can be reconfigured to accommodate different payloads. Multifunctional 

unmanned systems can be leveraged to improve medical support to military 

operations, including peacetime humanitarian support missions in megacities 

and DUAs.

157 158 159

• Unmanned vehicles can improve far forward casualty care or can be used for 

rapid medical evacuation.160 161 

• The quality of the interface provided for interactions between medical 

personnel and the unmanned system is an important consideration. It is 

particularly important for a field medic to interact efficiently with unmanned 

systems providing medical support due to the cognitive and physical demands 

of actively caring for a casualty.162

Autonomous and semi-autonomous Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) 

capabilities can also support future expeditionary operations. 163 The “Trauma Care 

in a Rucksack” concept addresses current deficiencies in combat casualty care 

through a novel approach that overcomes the use of subjective physiologic signs 

and symptoms used to assess and treat patients. This subjective practice is also an 

obstacle towards semi-autonomous and autonomous Tactical Combat Casualty Care 

(TCCC) solutions. A set of proposed disruptive technology building blocks create a 

 154 Fisher, Nathan and Gilbert, Gary, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense 

Urban Environments.” 155 Morrison, Dawn A. and Wood, Colin D., “Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacles or 

Opportunity?”

156 Fisher, Nathan and Gilbert, Gary, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense 

Urban Environments.”

157 Fisher, Nathan and Gilbert, Gary, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense 

Urban Environments.”

158 Poste, George Dr., “Health Innovation for Dense Urban Areas.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 159 Insights provided by MS contributors. 160 Fisher, Nathan and Gilbert, Gary, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense 

Urban Environments.”

161 Fisher, Nathan, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environment.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.

162 Fisher, Nathan and Gilbert, Gary, “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense 

Urban Environments.”

163 Berkow, Jan and Poropatich, Ron COL(R), “TRAuma Care in a Rucksack (TRACIR) - A Disruptive Technology 

Concept.”
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paradigm shift in how medical data is defined, stored, captured, visualized, and 

shared to enable more semi-autonomous and autonomous TCCC solutions.164 

Multiple unique considerations must also be taken into account when planning for 

and implementing medical care strategies in Megacities and DUAs to include IPB to 

understand the medical needs of both combatants and civilians.165 As megacities 

and dense urban environments continue to grow in number and population size, 

service members will likely be exposed to a greater number of infectious diseases 

and toxic chemicals and materials. For example, a review and evaluation of recent 

literature identified the top 30 megacity chemical threats. 166

• A literature review indicated that most megacity threats were related to air 

quality, physical injuries, chemical/radiation exposure, water quality, and 

infectious diseases. 

• A review of the top 30 megacity chemical threats identified acute lung injury 

and/or acute respiratory distress syndrome as the most significant threats to 

soldiers in these environments. 

Given these threats, an Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response 

Program of surveillance, education, and interactive communications (a “network of 

networks”) will be particularly important for supporting expeditionary operations and 

Army Health Support of Operations.167 Additionally, far forward diagnostic devices 

for detection of emerging health effects from exposure to chemicals can inform triage 

during exposure events and treatment and return-to-duty decisions.168 However, 

ruggedization and miniaturization of biomarker diagnostic devices pose significant 

challenges and require further research and testing to develop this capability.169

Enabling Expeditionary Operations 

The expansive area and density of megacities and DUAs are likely to prohibit 

traditional military models of overpowering, isolating, and controlling in these 

environments.170 Consequently, U.S. military forces will have to learn to influence 

instead of trying to overwhelm and control megacity and DUA environments.

171 

Moving forward, it will become increasingly important to try to isolate only portions of 

a megacity or DUA depending on what is deemed most important (e.g. based on 

 164 Berkow, Jan and Poropatich, Ron COL(R), “TRAuma Care in a Rucksack (TRACIR) - A Disruptive Technology 

Concept.”

165 Fowler, Marcie PhD and McGhee, Laura MAJ, “Pain Management: Maintaining the Force.” 166 Ippolito, Danielle PhD, “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities.”

167 Kwon, Paul O. LTC, “Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies.”

168 Ippolito, Danielle PhD, “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities.” 169 Ippolito, Danielle PhD, “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities.”

170 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 171 Prautzch, Frank, “U.S. Army Mega City Operations - Enduring Principles and Innovative Technologies.” 
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function, critical infrastructure, or “other-governed” areas).172 It will be critical to 

identify specific communities and formal and informal types of social networks in 

growing populations that offer the greatest promise for supporting or impeding Army 

objectives.173 174 Insight into alternative governance structures and how to interface 

with them will be crucial to effective operations.175 The ability to call upon expert 

knowledge already in place or rapidly acquired in a region of interest, in partnership 

with collective intelligence, can enhance the ability to manage or influence large 

population centers.

176 177 178 

Analytic frameworks and virtual humans were proposed by MS contributors to 

enhance the Army’s ability to manage or influence large population centers. For 

example, a proposed operational planning framework for densely populated urban 

geography includes seven lines of effort (Maintain and improve advantage in 

anonymity; Maintain and improve advantage in competitive distances; Control 

service flows; Control convocation spaces; Progressively reduce enemy sanctuary 

space; Pursue the mens rea; and Punish the enemy) and twelve research categories 

aligned to the seven lines of effort on which to focus for situational understanding of 

large urban areas.179 A proposed intelligence model tailored to support unified action 

involving the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and partners consists of nine 

components which extend intelligence and analytic support through collective 

network engagement and joint targeting processes. All nine components of the 

model correlate to specific parts of the RAF’s mission involving comprehensive 

approaches to understanding areas of responsibility, interoperability training, 

collaborative planning, and execution of regional partnered missions during the initial 

phases of the overall operation planning phases.180 

Additionally, virtual humans can aid in interactions, language translation, and 

interviews with local populations to improve the Army’s ability to leverage local 

knowledge.181 182 183 Virtual humans are able to use verbal and non-verbal 

communication to interact naturally with real people who may feel more comfortable 

 172 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 173 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 174 Krakowka-Richmond, Amy Dr., “Army Panel On Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 175 Insights provided by MS contributors. 176 Zenzen, Fran Dr., “Frameworks for Future Challenges: Understanding Dense Urban Terrain.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.

177 Usher, Abe, “Addressing the Challenges of the Human Terrain in 2050.” Megacities/DUA Conference 

Presentation. 178 Insights provided by MS contributors. 179 Demarest, Geoff, “How to Hold or Take a Big City - Seven Lines of Effort.” 180 Morris, Victor R., “Tailoring Intelligence and Analytic Support to Regionally Aligned and Multinational Forces 

- Collective Network Identification and Engagement Requirements for Unified Action Partners.” 181 Swartout, William Dr., “Virtual Humans as Centaurs.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 182 Swartout, William Dr., “Virtual Humans as Centaurs.” 183 Insights provided by MS contributors.
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and be more willing to reveal sensitive information.184 185 Virtual humans could 

provide critical situational understanding while promoting communication and 

developing relationships with local populations in support of expeditionary 

operations. 

Future Training Challenges

Overview

Training challenges will require the Army to build advanced technical capabilities and 

leverage interdisciplinary collaboration to understand and address complex megacity 

problems.186 MS contributors proposed innovative training methods and curriculums 

with a focus on technologies to realistically represent the complexities of a megacity 

or DUA for training

• Future Training Challenges was the least addressed megacity objective by 

academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS technology survey.

• 63% of megacity academic publications and ideas submitted to the MS 

technology survey addressed the Future Training Challenges megacity 

objective. 

• 37% of ideas submitted to the technology survey addressed AWFC #8: 

Enhance Realistic Training (aligned to the Future Training Challenges 

megacity objective). This was the 2nd most addressed AWFCs by ideas 

submitted to the technology survey. 

• Future Training Challenges was the second most addressed objective by 

technology survey contributors affiliated with Academia (71%) and the least 

addressed by Government (66%). 100% of ideas submitted by contributors 

affiliated with Industry or “Other” addressed this objective. 

(See the Qualitative Summary of Data section below for more details about data 

alignment to megacity objectives and AWFCs).

The Army should continue to explore innovative training methods, new, 

interdisciplinary curriculums, evolving perspectives that embrace complexity, 

flexibility, and originality, and advanced technology solutions that can immerse 

soldiers into a megacity environment for future training. 

 184 Swartout, William Dr., “Virtual Humans as Centaurs.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 185 Swartout, William Dr., “Virtual Humans as Centaurs.” 186 Felix, Kevin COL (ret.), “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.

What emerging technologies and capabilities must the Army explore and adopt in 

order to realistically represent the complexities of a megacity to a training 

audience (home station and Combat Training Centers) allowing the development 

of cohesive teams that thrive in ambiguity, austerity, or chaos within Operational 

Environment of 2025 and Beyond?
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Challenges and Opportunities

A Complex Adaptive Learning System

The Army will have to evolve into a complex adaptive learning system of “Master 

Learners” who embrace complexity and innovation.187 188 189 To start, the Army 

should develop leaders and instructors who are open to new training methods and 

curriculums, understand and mitigate generation gaps in learning styles, and are 

exposed to megacity and DUA environments as often as possible. 190 191

Interdisciplinary curriculums in applicable fields such as urban planning, social 

science, the science of cities, big data analytics, and cyber warfare will accelerate 

institutional learning.192 193 194 195 196 For example, cyberwarfare capabilities can 

vastly improve military success, therefore, the Army’s perspective on cyberwarfare 

must evolve to greater prioritize this topic for training.197 198 COL Patrick Duggan 

proposed the cyber-enabled Special Warfare (CE-SW) pyramid, a conceptual 

framework to align technology, tools, and tactics to strengthen Special Warfare 

capabilities and man-machine teaming to counter future threats. The CE-SE pyramid 

begins at the base with cyber-technology skills, education, and training, which are 

the foundation for this framework.199 200

Modeling and Simulation 

Advanced technologies will play a critical role in training for future OEs.201 Training 

with virtual humans can improve soldier interactions with local populations and 

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) can immerse soldiers into unfamiliar 

environments.202 A key observables from a lecture based pilot course in megacities 

was a need for students to be immersed in a megacity environment for effective 

training.203 However, the Army will be significantly challenged to accurately develop 

a physical megacity or DUA for training given the size and complexity of these 

environments. M&S has the potential to both enhance training and provide 

opportunities for experimentation to evaluate tactical and strategic options, allow for 

iterative training, and determine what parts of an environment are of operational 

 187 Crow, Michael Dr., “Welcome Remarks, Day 1.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 188 Krakowka-Richmond, Amy Dr., “Army Panel On Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 189 Felix, Kevin COL (ret.), “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 190 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 191 Insights provided by MS contributors. 192 Dixon, Robert COL, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities.” 193 Duggan, Patrick COL, “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare.” 194 Insights provided by MS contributors. 195 Iwanski, Jeremy J. SSG, “The U.S. Military and Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.” 196 Glenn, Russell Dr., “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” 197 Iwanski, Jeremy J. SSG, “The U.S. Military and Megacities/Dense Urban Areas.” 198 Duggan, Patrick COL et al., “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 199 Duggan, Patrick COL et al., “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 200 Duggan, Patrick COL, “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare.” 201 Insights provided by MS contributors. 202 Swartout, William Dr., “Virtual Humans as Centaurs.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 203 Castellanos, Dennis CW4, Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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significance.

204 205 206 207 208 For example, Early Synthetic Prototyping (ESP) 

explores ways for end users to test, iterate, and manipulate ideas in a virtual 

prototyping environment.209 ESP can track not only what a user does but also how 

and why.210 This technology has applications for idea generation, M&S 

enhancement, and training evaluation and improvement. However, accurately 

representing megacities and DUAs for M&S is particularly challenging. 211 For 

example: 

• The greatest challenge in modeling dense urban areas is modeling human 

behavior and capabilities and interactions between human and physical 

systems.212 213

• To maintain an accurate representation of the environment, automated 

collection of continuous data sources is needed.214

• Increased urban density compounds the complexity of relationships between

infrastructure components. M&S applications will require a higher density of 

data for megacities.215 

• Megacities are inherently intricate in terms of how people interact with them, 

including complex effects on entities, secondary effects, implied or expected 

behaviors, and multi-dimensional context. Some of these effects must be 

represented in M&S for effective and realistic training.216

• Greater urban density results in an increase in non-specific environment 

features known as “clutter”. Currently, clutter is often minimized in M&S but in 

megacities, clutter will play an important role in operations. These features 

will differ based on location and these unique characteristics must be 

 204 Watkins, Jon, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in Simulations.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 205 Shutters, Shade T., Herche, Wes, and King, Erin, “Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks: Using Urban 

Integration and Connectedness to Assess Resilience.”

206 Otto, Gustav and Besik, AJ, “Megacity Madness.” 207 Zenzen, Fran Dr., “Frameworks for Future Challenges: Understanding Dense Urban Terrain.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.

208 Felix, Kevin COL (ret.), “Army Panel on Megacities.” Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 209 Richmond, Todd, “The Innovation Spectrum - Exploring Left of Boom.” 210 Richmond, Todd, “The Innovation Spectrum - Exploring Left of Boom.” 211 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

212 Zenzen, Fran Dr., “Frameworks for Future Challenges: Understanding Dense Urban Terrain.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation.

213 Insights provided by MS contributors. 214 Zenzen, Fran Dr., “Frameworks for Future Challenges: Understanding Dense Urban Terrain.” 

Megacities/DUA Conference Presentation. 215 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

216 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”
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represented for visual relevancy. This diversity requires increased flexibility in 

how data is represented.217

• Buildings will be large, close together, and will often require both interior and 

subterranean representation. Subterranean environments represent 

particular risks to soldiers due to factors such as collapse, access, and air 

flow. Currently, subterranean environments and building interiors are 

underrepresented in M&S. 218

• Transportation networks will be increasingly complex, requiring representation 

of roadways, railways, water ways, and subways, to include transitioning from 

above to below ground.219

• Weather can greatly impact Army operations, however, Army simulations 

currently have minimal representation and modeling of weather.220

• Currently, M&S technologies cannot address all the details of a complex 

environment, therefore, defining what types of data are important for megacity 

M&S is critical for success.221 222

• To replicate future megacity environments, M&S must accurately reflect 

various types munitions such as stun guns, mood-altering gasses, and other 

temporarily incapacitating capabilities to train for military engagement, 

security cooperation, and deterrence223 

Alternative options proposed by MS contributors to offset some of the challenges of 

accurately representing megacities and DUAs in M&S include conducting exercises 

in real urban terrain environments, leveraging the expertise of movie and video 

production companies with experience in coordinating activities in urban 

environments to create real-life vignettes, and preparing soldiers to be resilient, 

flexible, and skilled in the analytic capabilities to quickly assess and respond in 

unfamiliar environments.224 

Avoiding Megacities and DUAs

 217 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

218 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

219 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

220 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

221 Watkins, Jon and Campbell, Chuck, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in 

Simulation.”

222 Watkins, Jon, “Challenges with Representing the Megacity Environment in Simulations.” Megacities/DUA 

Conference Presentation. 223 Ward, Darryl, “Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army.” 224 Insights provided by MS contributors.
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In addition to addressing topics related to the 4 primary megacity objectives, MS 

contributors also underscored the importance of trying to attain U.S. objectives 

without having to engage in and deploy military forces to a megacity or DUA.225

• According to Robert Kozloski, a non-lethal strategy could allow the U.S. to 

achieve national policy goals without incurring the risks of traditional military 

actions. This could include a broader application of information operations, 

early intervention, non-lethal force and weapons, and directed energy 

systems.226 

• Gustav Otto and AJ Besik suggested a pilot group of professionals to develop 

cross-functional tactics, techniques, and practices to deal with uncertain 

scenarios before they become problems to be more effective at advancing 

non-escalating solutions in a megacity or DUA environment.227

• As noted above, a proposed intelligence model tailored to support unified 

action involving the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and partners can 

enhance steady-state activities and shaping operations to dissuade and deter 

potential adversaries while strengthening relationships with partners and 

allies.228 

 225 Insights provided by MS contributors. 226 Kozloski, Robert, “Power Through Stability.” 227 Otto, Gustav and Besik, AJ, “Megacity Madness.” 228 Morris, Victor R., “Tailoring Intelligence and Analytic Support to Regionally Aligned and Multinational Forces 

- Collective Network Identification and Engagement Requirements for Unified Action Partners.”
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Quantitative Summary of Data 

Technology Survey Data

Data collected from 34 academic publications submitted in response to a 2015 

TRADOC G-2 call for papers and 63 ideas submitted to an online technology survey 

were analyzed to assess how ideas aligned to the 4 primary megacity objectives and 

the 20 AWFCs (see Appendix 4 for further analysis of alignment to eight Levels of 

Effort (LOEs) and six Technology Imperatives). All 4 megacity objectives were 

addressed by submitted academic publications and ideas submitted to the 

technology survey and all 20 AWFCs were addressed by ideas submitted to the 

technology survey. Situational understanding was the predominant topic addressed 

in both academic publications and ideas submitted through the technology survey. 

• The Situational Understanding megacity objective was addressed the most 

out of all 4 objectives by submitted academic publications and ideas 

submitted through the technology survey. 

• The 2 AWFCs addressed the most by ideas submitted through the technology 

survey were aligned with the Situational Understanding and Future Training 

Challenges megacity objectives. 

Alignment to Megacity Objectives

All 4 megacity objectives were addressed by the MS Megacity Initiative. Although 

academic publications and ideas submitted to the technology survey address all 4 

objectives, ideas predominantly addressed the Situational Understanding megacity 

objective. The Future Training Challenges objective was addressed the least. 

Figure 1: Number of academic publications and survey ideas that address one or more of the 4 

megacity objectives. Heat map colors determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) 

values. 

1. Situational 

Understanding

2. Freedom of 

Movement and 

Protection

3. Expeditionary 

Operations

4. Future of 

Training

Total number of academic 

publications (34 papers reviewed) 

and ideas submitted to the 

technology survey (63 ideas) that 

address one or more of the 4 primary 

megacity/DUA objectives (either 

primarily or somewhat address)

88 70 69 61

Primary Megacity/DUA Objectives
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Academic Publication Alignment to Megacity Objectives

34 academic publications were reviewed to determine how they align to one or more 

of the primary megacity objectives and to what extent they address those objectives 

(primarily address, somewhat address, or do not address). When possible, these 

ratings were determined by the publication authors. When authors did not provide 

ratings, an independent reviewer read and rated the paper based on the content of 

the publication. Papers addressed all 4 megacity objectives. Papers predominantly 

addressed the Situational Understanding objective and the Future of Training 

objective was addressed the least. 

Figure 2: Number of academic publications (34 total) that address one or more of the 4 megacity 

objectives. Heat map colors determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values.

Figure 3: Extent academic publications (34 total) addressed one of more of the 4 megacity objectives 

(number of publications that primarily address, somewhat address, or do not address the focus 

areas). Heat map colors determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values.

Alignment of Ideas Submitted to Technology Survey to Megacity Objectives

Contributors submitted 63 capability/technology ideas that were applicable to the 

megacity and DUA topic (identified by idea contributor through a survey question 

asking if their nominated idea is “applicable to Megacities/Dense Urban 

Environments”). Idea contributors were asked to rate the alignment of their idea to 

one or more of the primary megacity objectives and rate to what extent ideas 

1. Situational 

Understanding

2. Freedom of 

Movement and 

Protection

3. Expeditionary 

Operations

4. Future of 

Training

Total number of academic 

publications (34 papers 

reviewed) that address one or 

more of the 4 primary 

megacity/DUA objectives (either 

primarily or somewhat address) 32 20 21 15

Primary Megacity/DUA Objectives

Degree to which academic 

publications (34 papers reviewed) 

address the primary megacity/DUA 

objectives.

1. Situational 

Understanding

2. Freedom of 

Movement and 

Protection

3. Expeditionary 

Operations

4. Future of 

Training

Primarily addresses an objective 20 3 9 4

Somewhat addresses an objective 12 17 12 11

Does not address an objective 2 14 13 19
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address those objectives (primarily address, somewhat address, or do not address). 

Ideas addressed all 4 megacity objectives. Ideas predominantly addressed the 

Situational Understanding objective and the Future of Training objective was 

addressed the least. Idea contributors were also asked to rate how recent their idea 

is (Established, Emerging, New). The majority of ideas were rated as emerging. 

Figure 4: Number of ideas submitted to the technology survey (63 total) that address one or more of 

the 4 megacity objectives. Heat map colors determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest 

(green) values.

Figure 5: Extent ideas submitted to the technology survey (63 total) address one of more of the 4 

megacity objectives (number of ideas that primarily address, somewhat address, or do not address 

the focus areas). Heat map colors determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values.

1. Situational 

Understanding

2. Freedom of 

Movement and 

Protection

3. Expeditionary 

Operations

4. Future of 

Training

Total number of ideas submitted to 

the technology survey (63 ideas) that 

address one or more of the 4 primary 

megacity/DUA objectives (either 

primarily or somewhat address)

56 50 48 46

Primary Megacity/DUA Objectives

Degree to which ideas submitted (63 

ideas) to the technology survey 

address the primary megacity/DUA 

objectives.

1. Situational 

Understanding

2. Freedom of 

Movement and 

Protection

3. Expeditionary 

Operations

4. Future of 

Training

Primarily addresses an objective 41 21 22 22

Somewhat addresses an objective 15 29 26 24

Does not address an objective 7 13 15 17

Primary Megacity/DUA Objectives
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Figure 6: How recent are the ideas submitted to the technology survey (Established, Emerging, New)?

In addition to the 4 megacities objectives, ideas submitted to the technology survey 

were rated based on their alignment to one or more of the 20 AWFCs (See Appendix 

4 for AWFC definitions). Idea contributors were also asked in the survey to provide 

an influence rating for maintaining overmatch for their idea (Ratings: None, Minimal, 

Moderate, Significant, and Extremely valuable; see Appendix 4 for more details on 

influence values and definitions). 

All AWFCs were addressed by the ideas submitted to the technology survey. The 

majority of ideas address AWFC #1: Develop Situational Understanding with 32 of 

those ideas rated as either extremely or significantly valuable. Four AWFCs are 

aligned to the 4 megacity objectives (identified by AWFCs in the grey boxes in the 

table). The majority of submitted ideas that address AWFCs are aligned to the 

Situational Understanding and Future Training Challenges objectives (AWFCs #1 

and #8). Additionally, ideas specific to the megacities/DUA topic addressed AWFCs 

that are not currently aligned to the 4 megacities objectives. For example, 

approximately 37% of ideas submitted addressed AWFC #9: Improve Soldier, 

Leader and Team Performance (3rd highest AWFC addressed) and 35% of ideas 

addressed AWFC #2: Shape the Security Environment (4th highest AWFC 

addressed). 

How recent is the 

capability/technology idea (63 ideas) 

Number of ideas submitted 

to the technology survey

Established:

Existing technologies (i.e. well 

researched; in use through practical 

applications for at least 12 months) that 

will be used in new ways

24

Emerging:

Technology is currently under research 

and/or development, although not yet 

used in practical application

33

New:

Technology was discovered within the 

last 12 months. Although new, it is 

currently used in practical application.

6
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Figure 7: Number of ideas submitted to the technology survey that address one or more of the 20 

AWFCs and alignment to 4 primary megacities objectives (grey boxes). Heat map colors determined 

by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values. AWFCs ordered from highest to lowest 

number of ideas. 

AWFCs

Number of ideas submitted 

to technology survey (63 

total ideas) that address one 

or more AWFCs

Alignment to 

Primary 

Megacities/DUA 

Objectives

1: Develop Situational Understanding

45

Situational 

Understanding

8: Enhance Realistic Training 

23

Future Training

9: Improve Soldier, Leader and Team Performance

23

Future Training

2: Shape the Security Environment

22

10: Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders

19

Future Training

13: Conduct Wide Area Security

17

Force Protection 

and Movement

19: Exercise Mission Command

16

12: Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry 

Operations 15

Expeditionary 

Operations

16: Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, and Maintain 

Freedom of Movement 15

Force Protection 

and Movement

3: Provide Security Force Assistance

14

6: Conduct Homeland Operations

14

4: Adapt the Institutional Army

12

Future Training

5: Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

11

15: Conduct Joint Combined Arms Maneuver

11

Force Protection 

and Movement

14: Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, 

Interorganizational, and Multinational Environment 9

20 Develop Capable Formations

9

Expeditionary 

Operations

11: Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance

8

Situational 

Understanding

18: Deliver Fires

7

7: Conduct Space & Cyber Electromagnetic Operations 

& Maintain Communications 6

17: Integrate Fires

6
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Affiliation of MS Contributors 

Contributors representing academia, government, and industry submitted ideas to 

the technology survey. The majority of ideas were submitted by contributors 

identified as Government, followed by Academia and Industry. Contributors who 

identified as “Other” listed “nonprofit” and “DoD” as their affiliation. 

Figure 8: Number of ideas submitted by contributors affiliated with academia, government, industry, or 

“other”

The number of ideas that address one or more of the 4 megacities objectives by 

each affiliation type were collected from the ratings provided through the technology 

survey. Because total number of ideas submitted differ based on affiliation type, the 

following ratings are reported as the percent of ideas when examining affiliation. 

All affiliations addressed all 4 megacities objectives. The majority of ideas proposed 

by contributors affiliated with Academia (86 % of 14 ideas) and Government (87% of 

38 ideas) addressed the Situational Understanding objective. All Industry ideas 

(100% of ideas) addressed Situational Understanding, Expeditionary Operations, 

and Future Training. Ideas proposed by contributors affiliated with “Other” 

addressed all megacity objectives. 

Affiliation of technology 

survey contributors (63 ideas)

Number of ideas submitted to 

the technology survey

Academic 14

Government 38

Industry 8

Other 3
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Figure 9: The percent of ideas submitted to the technology survey that address one or more of the 4 

megacities objectives by affiliation type. Heat map colors determined by a scale of 0 (yellow) to 100% 

(green). 

A number of AWFCs were also addressed by all affiliations. The majority of ideas 

proposed by contributors affiliated with Academia, Government, and Industry 

addressed AWFC #1: Develop Situational Understanding (aligned to Situational 

Understanding megacity objective). The majority of ideas submitted by the “Other” 

affiliation addressed AWFC #1: Develop Situational Understanding (aligned to 

Situational Understanding megacity objective), AWFC #9: Improve Soldier, Leader 

and Team Performance, and AWFC #13: Conduct Wide Area Security Ideas. 

Out of the 4 AWFCs that align to the 4 megacity objectives (grey boxes in Figure 10), 

only the AWFC aligned to the Expeditionary Operations megacity objective was not 

addressed by all affiliations: ideas submitted by contributors affiliated with Academia 

and an “Other” affiliation did not address AWFC #12: Conduct Joint Expeditionary 

Maneuver and Entry Operations.

Academia focused the most on AWFC #1: Develop Situational Understanding (64% 

of 14 ideas; aligned to Situational Understanding megacity objective), followed by 

AWFC #8: Enhance Realistic Training (50% of 14 ideas; aligned to Future Training 

Challenges megacity objective), and AWFC #9: Improve Soldier, Leader and Team 

Performance (43% of 14 ideas). Several AWFC were not addressed (6 AWFCs), 

including the AWFC aligned to the Expeditionary Operations megacity objective 

(AWFC #12: Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations) and 5 

AWFC were barely addressed (10% or less of ideas).

Government affiliated ideas focused the most on AWFC #1: Develop Situational 

Understanding (74% of 38 ideas; aligned to Situational Understanding megacity 

Affiliation of technology 

survey contributors (63 ideas)

1. Situational 

Understanding

2. Freedom of 

Movement and 

Protection

3. Expeditionary 

Operations

4. Future of 

Training

Academic (14 ideas)

86 64 50 71

Government (38 ideas)

87 82 79 66

Industry (8 ideas)

100 88 100 100

Other (3 ideas)

100 100 100 100

Primary Megacity/DUA Objectives
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objective), AWFC #2: Shape the Security Environment (39% of 38 ideas), and 

AWFC #12: Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations (37% of 38 

ideas; aligned to Expeditionary Operations megacity objective). All AWFC were 

addressed by contributors associated with Government with several AWFCs barely 

addressed (10% or less ideas; 5 AWFCs). Contributors affiliated with Government 

had the highest number of ideas, possibly explaining why more AWFCs were 

addressed by this group. 

Industry-affiliated contributors focused the most on AWFC #1: Situational 

Understanding (75% of 8 ideas; aligned to Situational Understanding megacity 

objective), AWFC #8: Enhance Realistic Training (50% of 8 ideas; aligned to Future 

Training Challenges megacity objective); and AWFC #2: Shape the Security 

Environment (38% of 8 ideas). AWFC #14: Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a 

Joint, Interorganizational, and Multinational Environment was the only AWFC not 

addressed by Industry. 

Contributors identified as an “Other” affiliation focused the most on AWFC #1: 

Situational Understanding (67% of 3 ideas; aligned to Situational Understanding 

megacity objective) as well as on two AWFCs not associated with the 4 megacity 

objectives: AWFC #9: Improve Soldier, Leader and Team Performance (67% of 3 

ideas); and AWFC #13: Conduct Wide Area Security Ideas (67% of 3 ideas). 8 

AWFCs were not addressed by contributors with an “Other” affiliation. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of ideas submitted to the technology survey that address one or more of the 20 

AWFCs by affiliation type. Alignment of AWFCs to 4 primary megacities objectives indicated by the 

grey boxes. Heat map colors determined by a scale of 0 (yellow) to 100% (green). 

In addition to ideas that address one of the 4 megacity objectives or 20 AWFCs, 

additional ideas categorized as “Other” were also submitted by survey contributors, 

including: 

AWFCs Academic (14 

ideas)

Government (38 

ideas) Industry (8 ideas) Other (3 ideas)

1: Develop Situational Understanding

64 74 75 67

2: Shape the Security Environment

21 39 38 33

3: Provide Security Force Assistance

21 21 25 33

4: Adapt the Institutional Army 7 21 25 33

5: Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 14 21 13 0

6: Conduct Homeland Operations

29 24 13 0

7: Conduct Space & Cyber Electromagnetic Operations & 

Maintain Communications 0 11 13 33

8: Enhance Realistic Training 

50 29 50 33

9: Improve Soldier, Leader and Team Performance

43 34 25 67

10: Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders

29 32 25 33

11: Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance 7 16 13 0

12: Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry 

Operations 0 37 13 0

13: Conduct Wide Area Security 14 29 25 67

14: Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, 

Interorganizational, and Multinational Environment 7 18 0 33

15: Conduct Joint Combined Arms Maneuver

0 26 13 0

16: Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, and Maintain Freedom 

of Movement 7 32 13 33

17: Integrate Fires

0 13 13 0

18: Deliver Fires

0 13 13 33

19: Exercise Mission Command

21 26 25 33

20: Develop Capable Formations 7 18 13 0

Affiliation of technology survey contributors (63 ideas)
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Government ideas that contributors identified as addressing topics “other” 

than the 4 megacities objectives:

• Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

• Visualization of region

• Phase 0 operations to prevent deployed forces

• Reconstitution operations

• 3d operations and common operating picture

• Maneuvering within the mega city from the soldier perspective

• Specialty UAVs

• Broadband over Power lines

• Non-Lethal Weapons

• Weapons effect and physics based modeling 

• Agile, compact, layered synthetic environment representation 

• Future training challenges

• Environmental awareness

Industry ideas that contributors identified as addressing topics “other” than 

the megacities objectives:

• Complex urban areas war games

• Experimentation

• Detailed exercises that get into the nuts and bolts of how maneuver intends to 

operate differently in cities

• Human dimension

• Networks

• Mission command systems

• Command and control

• COA development

• Package judgment and reasoning into systems throughout the command and 

control hierarchy

Ideas from “Other” affiliations that contributors identified as addressing topics 

“other” than the megacities objectives:

• Smarter access and egress from urban environments

Virtual Contributors 

The Megacities and DUA conference also included over 500 individuals participating 

virtually through web streaming, a chat room, and Twitter: #madsci16. Chatroom 

and Twitter discussions were captured and an initial analysis of this data was 

conducted using a qualitative data analysis tool to identify the 100 most frequent 

terms used by participants for insight into predominant discussion topics. Based on 
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this analysis, as visualized in the word cloud below, “training”, “human”, “hybrid”, 

“change”, “cultural”, “tech”, and “terrain” are among some of the more frequently 

used terms (See Appendix 4 for separate word clouds for the chat room and Twitter 

discussions) 

Figure 11: 100 most frequent terms from the Megacities/DUA conference chat room and Twitter 

discussions. 
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Conclusion

Ideas for innovative concepts, technologies, data sources, and analytic and training 

methods are beginning to address the unique challenges that megacities and DUAs 

pose to future Army forces. Through the MS Megacities Initiative, all four of the 

primary megacities objectives were addressed by MS contributors from across 

government, academia, and industry. 

The fundamental role of situational understanding in future Army operations is 

reflected by the results of the MS Megacities Initiative where this topic was the 

predominant theme. Advanced situational understanding and a system of systems 

approach is required to enable decision making in increasingly dense and complex 

environments. Understanding and modeling interactions between human and 

physical systems, innovative data sources, big data analytics, new analytic 

frameworks, expert knowledge integrated with collective intelligence, and emerging 

technologies can support situational understanding. The Army can leverage the 

vertical features of megacities and DUAs environments, lessons learned from 

domestic emergency response and evacuation research, and technology 

advancements in unmanned systems to address some challenges to freedom of 

movement and protection. A number of technologies have potential to support 

medical operations in megacity and DUAs, including for medical evacuation and care 

in the field. An intelligence model to support unified action, an operational planning 

framework for densely populated urban areas, and the use of virtual humans may

support expeditionary operations. To address future training challenges, the Army 

will have to continue to explore innovative training methods, new, interdisciplinary 

curriculums, evolving perspectives that embrace complexity, flexibility, and 

originality, and advanced technology solutions that can immerse soldiers into 

megacity environments. In addition to addressing topics related to the 4 primary 

megacity objectives, MS contributors also underscored the importance of trying to 

attain U.S. objectives without having to engage in and deploy military forces to a 

megacity or DUA.

Although a number of concepts and capability/technology ideas were generated 

through the MS Megacities Initiative, this work has only begun to address the 

complexities of megacities and DUAs. A concerted effort to continue to address this 

topic, to include the following steps, will further build on the success of the MS 

Megacities Initiative.

• Ensure Situational Understanding remains incorporated into TRADOC 

Science and Technology (S&T) Needs for the Warfighter. 

• Leverage the TRADOC critical thinking enterprise to focus on megacities and 

DUAs from the system of systems perspective. 

• Leverage experimentation and exercise venues to explore the utility of various 

proposed analytic frameworks for future operational use. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

91

• Continue to focus research, training, and modeling and simulation on the 

human component of megacities and DUAs, including informal social 

networks and governance structures, for situational understanding, freedom of 

movement and force protection, expeditionary operations.

• Initiate pilot programs to leverage diverse megacity data sets and integrate 

them with mission command and intelligence for decision making.

• Explore innovative collaboration methods to continue to engage additional 

interdisciplinary subject matter experts from social sciences, creative arts, 

public policy and administration, data analysis, the arts and humanities, and 

urban planning. 

• Develop concepts and capabilities to attain U.S. objectives without having to 

engage in and deploy military forces to megacities and DUAs when possible. 
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

92

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Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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Appendix 2: List of Mad Scientist Megacities Initiative Contributors 

Table 1: Mad Scientists Contributors

NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

BG LEOPOLD QUINTAS DIRECTOR, CONCEPT 

DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 

DIRECTORATE, TRADOC

WELCOME/OPENING REMARKS CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

BG JOHN S. KEM PROVOST, ARMY UNIVERSITY, 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT, U.S. 

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL 

STAFF COLLEGE

WELCOME/OPENING REMARKS CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. MICHAEL M. CROW PRESIDENT, ARIZONA STATE 

UNIVERSITY

WELCOME/INNOVATION AND EDUCATION CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. GEORGE POSTE CHIEF SCIENTIST AND REGENT’S 

PROFESSOR, ARIZONA STATE 

UNIVERSITY

“HEALTH INNOVATION FOR DENSE URBAN AREAS” CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. ABE USHER CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, 

HUMANGEO GROUP,

“ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF THE HUMAN 

TERRAIN IN 2050”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. DOUGLAS OLLIVANT ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, 

FUTURE OF WAR SENIOR 

FELLOW

“HYBRID WARFARE IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS” CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

COL PATRICK DUGGAN STRATEGIC LANDPOWER TASK 

FORCE, SOCOM

ARMY PANEL ON MEGACITIES CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

COL (RET.), KEVIN FELIX SENIOR CONSULTANT, THE 

ROOSEVELT GROUP

ARMY PANEL ON MEGACITIES CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. AMY KRAKOWKARICHMONDASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF 

GEOGRAPHY, USMA

ARMY PANEL ON MEGACITIES CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

CW4 DENNIS 

CASTELLANOS

COMMANDER’S ACTION GROUP, 

MANEUVER CENTER OF 

EXCELLENCE (MCOE)

ARMY PANEL ON MEGACITIES CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. JAMES “GREG” ROSE DIRECTOR, CAPABILITY

DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATION 

DIRECTORATE (CDID) ICOE

ARMY PANEL ON MEGACITIES (MODERATOR) CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

CSM (RET) WILLIAM “BILL” 

HEDGES 

LNO, INTELLIGENCE & 

INFORMATION WARFARE 

DIRECTORATE & ICOE

“AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATIONS IN

DENSE URBAN AREAS”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. ED FINN FOUNDING DIRECTOR OF THE 

CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND THE 

IMAGINATION AND ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR, ARIZONA STATE 

UNIVERSITY

STORIES AND VISIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. FRAN ZENZEN ASURE CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, ARIZONA STATE 

UNIVERSITY

“FRAMEWORKS FOR FUTURE CHALLENGES: 

UNDERSTANDING DENSE URBAN AREAS”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

DR. RUSSELL GLENN ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE 

STUDIES CENTRE, AUSTRALIAN 

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

“MEGACITIES: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE 

UGLY”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. NATHAN FISHER PROJECT MANAGER, 

MECHANICAL ENGINEER AND 

ROBOTICIST, THE GENEVA 

FOUNDATION

“UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE 

MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN DENSE URBAN 

ENVIRONMENTS”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. WILLIAM SWARTOUT DIRECTOR OF TECHNOLOGY, USC 

INSTITUTE FOR CREATIVE 

TECHNOLOGIES

“VIRTUAL HUMANS AS CENTAURS” CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. FRANK PRAUTZSCH PRESIDENT, VELOCITY 

TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS LLC

“U.S. ARMY MEGA CITY OPERATIONS: ENDURING

PRINCIPLES AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. JON WATKINS FOUNDER AND CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, DIGNITAS 

TECHNOLOGIES LLC

“CHALLENGES WITH REPRESENTING THE 

MEGACITY ENVIRONMENT IN SIMULATIONS”

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. BRETT PIEKARSKI CHIEF OF THE MICRO & NANO 

MATERIALS & DEVICES BRANCH, 

ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY

“RESEARCH AND VISION FOR INTELLIGENT 

SYSTEMS FOR 2025 AND BEYOND"

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. CHRIS TUCKER CHAIRMAN AND CEO, MAP STORY EMERGING GEOGRAPHICAL TOOLS TO 

UNDERSTAND DENSE URBAN AREAS

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. THOMAS GRECO TRADOC DCS G-2 OPENING REMARKS

CONFERNCE SUMMATION

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

MR. GARY PHILLIPS TRADOC G-2 SENIOR 

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR

DAY 1 INSIGHTS CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

DR. KIRA HUTCHINSON TRADOC G-29 ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

COL LEE GRUBBS DEPUTY, TRADOC G-2 DAY 2 INSIGHTS CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

LTG KEVIN MANGUM DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, 

TRADOC

CONFERENCE SUMMATION AND CLOSING 

REMARKS

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

KIRA HUTCHINSON TRADOC G2 COMPLEX IPB; METAL FOAM THAT OBLITERATED

BULLETS; POINT OF DEMAND WATER 

PRODUCTION; DATA DRIVEN DECISION MAKING 

TOOL

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

WILLIAM THEUER AFCEA AK DISTRIBUTED MOBILITY AND TEAMS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

BRIAN SWEENEY PLANETRISK, INC DISCRETE GLOBAL GRID (DDG) ELECTRONIC SURVEY

CARRIE MEZA NAVY EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

RICHARD WOLFEL U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY SOCIAL MEDIA MAPPING ELECTRONIC SURVEY

RICHARD KNAPP USAACE QAO CROWDSOURCING INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC SURVEY

TOM KEELEY COMPSIM LLC KNOWLEDGE ENHANCED ELECTRONIC LOGIC -

KEEL TECHNOLOGY

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

CHRISTOPHER EDWARDS AWG SWARM DRONE MEGACITY MAPPING ELECTRONIC SURVEY
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

DAVID CONNELL DEFENCE RESEARCH & 

DEVELOPMENT CANADA

SOCIAL BOTS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

GEOFF DEMAREST FMSO GENOME ENGINEERING ELECTRONIC SURVEY

SCOTT GORIC ARMY ROBOTICS OPTICS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

SEAN NGIC MACHINE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC SURVEY

RUSS GLENN ANU KEY INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION TOOL ELECTRONIC SURVEY

ANTHONY GARNER ARCIC/CDLD/ FUTURE WARFARE 

DIVISON

MUMT ELECTRONIC SURVEY

CHRISTOPHER EDWARDS AWG TACTICAL VIRTUAL HUMAN ASSISTANT ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JUNE CROWE IIA AGGREGATION OF OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION ELECTRONIC SURVEY

RANDALL HILL USC INSTITUTE FOR CREATIVE 

TECHNOLOGIES

VIRTUAL / AUGMENTED REALITY

VIRTUAL HUMANS

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

BOB DIXON U.S. ARMY THINKING URBAN WARRIOR ELECTRONIC SURVEY

MARK STALZER CALTECH BIOWEAPON

NUCLEAR THREAT

HUMAN INTELLECTUAL THREATS

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

BRIAN GRUCHACZ RDECOM ARDEC RAPID VACCINE FABRICATION AND DEPLOYMENT ELECTRONIC SURVEY

GEOFF DEMAREST FMSO GROUND SHAPING ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JON WATKINS DIGNITAS TECHNOLOGIES CONCEPTUALIZATION & PROTOTYPE THROUGH 

VIRTUAL SIMULATION

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

WILLIAM HEDGES I2WD/ICOE (LNO) AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR DENSE URBAN 

AREAS

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

CHRISTIAN FORTUNATO ASURE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND MODELING ELECTRONIC SURVEY

LLOYD BROWN ASURE MEGACITY INTEGRATED MODEL ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JIM RUSSELL ASURE LEARNING: FROM TRAINING TO EDUCATION ELECTRONIC SURVEY

MARK WALLACE USAICOE CONCEPTS GOVERNMENT CONSULTANT FOR FUTURE 

INTELLIGENCE

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JIM RUSSELL ASURE URBAN OPERATIONS ARE "NORMAL" OPERATIONS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JESSE COOK USMC GRAPHENE ELECTRONIC SURVEY

MARGARET LOPER GEORGIA TECH RESEARCH 

INSTITUTE

MACHINE TO MACHINE TRUST ELECTRONIC SURVEY

ROBERT E SMITH U.S. ARMY TANK AUTOMOTIVE 

RD&E CENTER

MEGACITY "MASTER LEARNER" VIRTUAL WORLD

VERTICAL FIGHTING VEHICLE/ PLATFORM

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JESSE COOK USMC FAO/RAO ANTHROPOLOGIST ELECTRONIC SURVEY
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

FRANK PRAUTZSCH VELOCITY TECHNOLOGY 

PARTNERS LLC

GRAPHENE ELECTRONIC SURVEY

ROBERT MCMURTRIE ICOE/ TRADOC CAPABILITY 

MANAGER- TERRESTRIAL AND 

IDENTITY

IDENTITY BASED TECHNOLOGIES ELECTRONIC SURVEY

WILLIAM GOTHARD U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMMAND

FEMTOSECOND LASER ELECTRONIC SURVEY

LOGAN MATHESEN ASURE LIVEHOODS COMMUNITY IDENTIFIER ELECTRONIC SURVEY

DYLAN FARLEY COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY SUBTERRANEAN MAPPING SYSTEM ELECTRONIC SURVEY

THOMAS MCMURTRIE TRAC-WSMR PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM 

CAPABILITY FOR REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

LTC MELVIN D. JUAN NATIONAL GEOSPATIALINTELLIGENCE AGENCYGEOSPATIAL INFORMATION & SERVICES ELECTRONIC SURVEY

NATHAN FISHER TATRC UNMANNED AIR SYSTEMS FOR MEDICAL 

OPEATIONS

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

RANDALL HILL USC INSTITUTE FOR CREATIVE 

TECHNOLOGIES

SOCIAL SIMULATION ELECTRONIC SURVEY

PETER PALMER GDMS EDGE INNOVATION NETWORK ELECTRONIC SURVEY

BRIAN GRUCHACZ RDECOM- ARDEC INSTANT NEGATIVE TRENDING ALERTS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

DAVID FORDYCE U.S. ARMY RESEARCH 

LABORATORY

URBAN ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERIZATION ELECTRONIC SURVEY

DANIELLE L. IPPOLITO USACEHR FIELDABLE DETECTION CARTRIDGE FOR 

MOLECULAR INDICATORS OF EXPOSURE AND 

ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS; EHARM: ELECTRONIC 

HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 

TOOL FOR ASSESSING PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSE 

TO TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL EXPOSURE

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

ALLISON WIN TRADOC MAD SCIENTIST SME ELECTRONIC SURVEY

JULIO DE LA CRUZ ARL HRED ATSD CHIEF ENGINEER FOR SNE ELECTRONIC SURVEY

FREDERICK SAPP TRADOC SWO AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

CHRISTOPHER TUCKER THE MAPSTORY FOUNDATION MAPSTORY.ORG ELECTRONIC SURVEY

DR. STEVEN FUNK U.S. ARMY AFRICA MACHINE REAL TIME VERBAL TRANSLATOR ELECTRONIC SURVEY

DENNIS CASTELLANOS MCOE LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ELECTRONIC SURVEY

DAVID KNAPP ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY ATMOSPHERIC CHARACTERIZATION AND 

PREDICTION

ELECTRONIC SURVEY

FRAN ZENZEN ASU RESERACH ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED CITY MODELS ELECTRONIC SURVEY

ANGELA HOISTION TRADOC/USAICOE TCMFOUNDATIONVISUAL RESPONSIVE / ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 

INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE

ELECTRONIC SURVEY
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

BRIAN KETTLER LOCKHEED MARTIN ADVANCED 

TECHNOLOGY LABS

EXPEDITIONARY MODELING OF MEGACITIES ELECTRONIC SURVEY

BERKOW, JAN AND 

POROPATICH, RON COL(R)

U.S. ARMY “TRAUMA CARE IN A RUCKSACK (TRACIR) - A 

DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY CONCEPT.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

BITTERMAN, ALEX PHD 

AND CARLO, RICHARD, 

PROF

CENTER FOR ARCHITECTURE & 

REMOTE SENSING, SUNY ALFRED 

STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY

“FLOCKING PHONES & DRONES: THREEDIMENSIONAL, REAL-TIME, MAPPING OF DENSE 

URBAN ENVIRONMENTS USING OFF-THE-SHELF 

MICRODRONE, SMARTPHONE, AND POINT-CLOUD 

TECHNOLOGY.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

BROWN, EDDIE MAJ AND

PIKE, TOM MAJ

U.S. ARMY “COMPLEX IPB.” PAPER SUBMISSION

BROWN, EDDIE MAJ U.S. ARMY “CONVEYING THE COMPLEX: UPDATING U.S. JOINT 

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS DOCTRINE WITH COMPLEXITY 

THEORY.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

CRANE, ALFRED AND 

PEEKE, RICHARD LTC 

U.S. ARMY “USING THE INTERNET OF THINGS TO GAIN AND 

MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN DENSE 

URBAN ENVIRONMENTS AND MEGA CITIES.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

DEMAREST, GEOFF FMSO “HOW TO HOLD OR TAKE A BIG CITY - SEVEN 

LINES OF EFFORT.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

DIXON, ROBERT COL U.S. ARMY “BRINGING BIG DATA TO WAR IN MEGA-CITIES.” PAPER SUBMISSION

DUGGAN, PATRICK COL U.S. ARMY “MAN, COMPUTER, AND SPECIAL WARFARE.” PAPER SUBMISSION

FISHER, NATHAN AND 

GILBERT, GARY

U.S. ARMY “UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE 

MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN DENSE URBAN 

ENVIRONMENTS.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

FOWLER, MARCIE PHD AND 

MCGHEE, LAURA MAJ

U.S. ARMY “PAIN MANAGEMENT: MAINTAINING THE FORCE.” PAPER SUBMISSION

GLENN, RUSSELL DR. AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL 

UNIVERSITY

“MEGACITIES: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE 

UGLY.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

HEDGES, WILLIAM CSM 

(RET.), 

U.S. ARMY “WHITE PAPER: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR 

OPERATIONS IN DENSE URBAN AREAS.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

HESS, DANIEL BALDWIN

PHD

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO, STATE 

UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

“LARGE-SCALE MASS EVACUATION IN 

METROPOLITAN AREAS: IMPROVING 

COORDINATION FOR MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

IPPOLITO, DANIELLE PHD U.S. ARMY “ASSESSING PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO TOXIC 

INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL EXPOSURE IN 

MEGACITIES.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

IWANSKI, JEREMY J. SSG U.S. ARMY “THE U.S. MILITARY AND MEGACITIES/DENSE 

URBAN AREAS.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

KEELEY, TOM COMPSIM “A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA) 

VERSUS ‘EVOLUTION’ - WHEN MACHINES ARE 

SMART ENOUGH.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

KNAPP, DAVID, RANDALL, 

ROBB, AND STALEY, JIM

U.S. ARMY “ATMOSPHERIC IMPACTS AND EFFECTS 

PREDICTIONS AND APPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 

PAPER SUBMISSION
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

Areas Compendium Section 2

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NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

MEGACITY AND DENSE URBAN AREA 

OPERATIONS.”

KOZLOSKI, ROBERT USMC “POWER THROUGH STABILITY.” PAPER SUBMISSION

KWON, PAUL O. LTC U.S. ARMY “INTEGRATED GLOBAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 

AND RESPONSE THROUGH MULTI-SOURCE 

TECHNOLOGIES.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

MORRISON, DAWN A. AND 

WOOD, COLIN D.

U.S. ARMY “MEGACITY AND DENSE URBAN ENVIRONMENTS: 

OBSTACLES OR OPPORTUNITY?”

PAPER SUBMISSION

MORRIS, VICTOR R. U.S. ARMY “ENHANCING INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNTERTERRORISM AND IDENTITY DISCOVERY 

CAPABILITIES THROUGH IDENTITY AND 

BIOMETRIC ENABLED INTELLIGENCE.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

MORRIS, VICTOR R. U.S. ARMY “REVISING ATTACK THE NETWORK (ATN) AND 

DEFEAT THE DEVICE (DTD) C-IED LINES OF 

OPERATION: 21ST CENTURY THREATS AND NATO

INTEROPERABILITY.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

MORRIS, VICTOR R. U.S. ARMY “TAILORING INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYTIC 

SUPPORT TO REGIONALLY ALIGNED AND 

MULTINATIONAL FORCES - COLLECTIVE 

NETWORK IDENTIFICATION AND ENGAGEMENT 

REQUIREMENTS FOR UNIFIED ACTION 

PARTNERS.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

OTTO, GUSTAV AND BESIK, 

AJ

DOD “MEGACITY MADNESS.” PAPER SUBMISSION

PIEKARSKI, BRETT DR. ET 

AL.

U.S. ARMY “RESEARCH AND VISION FOR INTELLIGENT 

SYSTEMS FOR 2025 AND BEYOND.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

PIKE, TOM, LONG, NICK, 

AND ALEXANDER, PERRY

U.S. ARMY “UNDERSTANDING NATIONS: NEW IDEAS TO 

ANALYZE FOREIGN STATES.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

PIKE, TOM MAJ AND 

BROWN, EDDIE MAJ

U.S. ARMY “POPULATIONS AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: 

A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION IN 

AFGHANISTAN.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

PRAUTZCH, FRANK VELOCITY TECHNOLOGY 

PARTNERS LLC

“U.S. ARMY MEGA CITY OPERATIONS - ENDURING

PRINCIPLES AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

RICHMOND, TODD UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN 

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE FOR 

CREATIVE TECHNOLOGIES

“THE INNOVATION SPECTRUM - EXPLORING LEFT 

OF BOOM.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

SHUTTERS, SHADE T., 

HERCHE, WES, AND KING, 

ERIN

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY “ANTICIPATING MEGACITY RESPONSES TO 

SHOCKS: USING URBAN INTEGRATION AND 

CONNECTEDNESS TO ASSESS RESILIENCE.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

SWARTOUT, WILLIAM DR. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN 

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE FOR 

CREATIVE TECHNOLOGIES

“VIRTUAL HUMANS AS CENTAURS.” PAPER SUBMISSION

WARD, DARRYL FMSO “OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IMPLICATIONS OF 

THE MEGACITY TO THE U.S. ARMY.”

PAPER SUBMISSION
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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NAME ORGANIZATION IDEA CONTRIBUTION (S) SOURCE

WATKINS, JON AND 

CAMPBELL, CHUCK

DIGNITAS TECHNOLOGYS AND 

EDGE WISE TECHNOLOGIES

“CHALLENGES WITH REPRESENTING THE 

MEGACITY ENVIRONMENT IN SIMULATION.”

PAPER SUBMISSION

WOLFEL, RICHARD PHD ET 

AL.

USMA “IT’S IN THERE: RETHINKING(?) INTELLIGENCE 

PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN 

MEGACITIES/DENSE URBAN AREAS.”

PAPER SUBMISSION
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban 

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Appendix 3: Methodology

1) Developed a protocol to collect and asses the results of the Mad Scientist (MS) 

Megacities Initiative. 

2) Collected the results of the MS Megacities Initiative

• Collected insights about megacities and DUAs from academic publications 

submitted in response to a 2015 TRADOC G-2 call for papers.

• Collected insights from the April 2016 MS Megacities and Dense Urban Areas 

Conference presentations and discussions, including virtual chat room and 

Twitter discussions.

• Collected data from the online technology survey (ideas; submitter affiliations; 

ratings aligning ideas to the 4 primary megacity objectives, LOEs, AWFCs, 

and Technology Imperatives; ratings about how recent ideas are and level of 

influence of the idea). 

3) Analyzed the results of the MS Megacities Initiative to address extent to which 

proposed megacity capability and technology ideas address the 4 megacity 

objectives. 

• Authors of submitted academic publications and independent reviewers read 

and rated submitted papers based on how well they addressed one or more of 

the 4 megacity objectives. For each of the 4 megacity objectives, a paper 

was given a:

o Score of 2 if the paper primarily addressed a megacity objective (the 

major focus of the paper addresses a megacity objective).

o Score of 1 if the paper somewhat addressed a megacity objective 

(information addressing a megacity objective was not the major focus 

of the paper).

• Attended the Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Conference and collected 

relevant data:

o Collected notes on presentations and discussions. Insights were then 

categorized into the 4 megacity objectives.

o Virtual discussions (chat room and Twitter) we collected, sanitized 

(names and irrelevant information removed) and analyzed using NVivo 

11, a qualitative data analysis tool, to identify the 100 most frequent 

terms (3 letters or more) used in the discussions.

• Performed a quantitative summary of the collected data from the online 

technology survey (ideas; submitter affiliations; ratings aligning ideas to the 4 

primary megacity objectives, LOEs, AWFCs, and Technology Imperatives; 

ratings about how recent ideas are and level of influence of the idea) to 

assess how ideas aligned to megacity objectives, LOEs, AWFCs, and 

Technology Imperatives.

4) Developed a technical report with the results of the MS Megacities and Dense 

Urban Areas Conference, with specific recommendations to the TRADOC plan.
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Appendix 4: Additional Data Analysis Results

Survey Data

Data collected from 63 ideas submitted to an online technology survey were 

analyzed to assess how ideas aligned to eight Levels of Effort (LOEs) and six 

Technology Imperatives.

Figure 12: Number of ideas submitted to the technology survey (63 total) that address one or more of 

the 8 LOEs. Heat map colors determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values.

LOE1: 

Mobile 

Protected 

Platforms 

LOE2: 

Improved 

Lethality and 

Effects

LOE3: 

Logistics 

Optimization

LOE4: 

Aviation 

LOE5: 

Cyber 

Electromagneti

c Activities

LOE6: 

Accelerated 

Data to 

Decision 

LOE7: 

Human 

Performance 

Enhancement 

LOE8: 

Robotics

Number of 

"Other" ideas 

not aligned to 

LOEs 

Number of ideas 

submitted to the 

technology survey (63 

ideas) that address one 

or more of the 8 LOEs 3 5 3 1 1 18 14 5 13

8 Lines of Effort (LOEs) 
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Figure 13: The percent of ideas submitted to the technology survey that address one or more of the 8 

LOEs by affiliation type. Heat map colors determined by a scale of 0 (yellow) to 100% (green). Affiliation of technology survey contributors (63 ideas) LOE1: Mobile Protected Platforms LOE2: Improved Lethality and Effects LOE3: Logistics Optimization LOE4: Aviation LOE5: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities LOE6: Accelerated Data to Decision LOE7: Human Performance Enhancement LOE8: Robotics Other Academic (14 ideas)

0 0 0 0 0 43 29 7 21

Government (38 ideas)

8 11 8 3 3 29 18 11 11

Industry (8 ideas)

0 13 0 0 0 13 13 0 63

Other (3 ideas)

0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0 33

8 LOEs
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8 Lines of Effort (LOEs): 

LOE1: Mobile Protected Platforms: To enable a globally-responsive force that is 

rapidly deployable, through the use of lighter materials, and novel protection 

systems, to protect against kinetic and non-kinetic future threats. These vehicles will 

be augmented by unmanned vehicles and unmanned aerial systems.

LOE2: Improved Lethality and Effects: The Army requires munitions, platforms, and 

mission command systems that enable the detection, identification and engagement 

of threats with precise, scalable and tailorable effects, both kinetic and non-kinetic, in 

a contested environment.

LOE3: Logistics Optimization: In order to have an expeditionary capability to fight in 

a contested environment, the Army must increase logistical efficiencies, increase unit 

self-sufficiency, and decrease demands.

LOE4: Aviation: The future Army requires aviation assets with extended reach, 

increased lethality and increased responsiveness, capable of operating in all 

environments and conditions.

LOE5: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities: Commanders and staffs must integrate and 

synchronize cyberspace operations, electromagnetic spectrum management 

operations and related capabilities in a contested environment.

LOE6: Accelerated Data to Decision: The future demands our Soldiers be 

empowered with situational awareness and understanding to make rapid decisions 

by accelerating the flow of information to the point of need at the speed of war.

LOE7: Human Performance Enhancement: The Army must maximize the return on 

its most critical resource. The future requires that Soldiers who have enhanced 

cognitive, physical and socio-cultural skills in order to be effective in the complex 

environment in which they will operate."

LOE8: Robotics: The Army needs affordable, interoperable, and autonomous 

unmanned systems to engage integrated manned-unmanned teaming and serve as 

force multipliers across all echelons and war fighting functions. Artificial intelligence 

capabilities will be critical to empower unmanned systems and serve as decision 

aids.
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Figure 14: Number of ideas submitted to the technology survey (63 total) that address one or more of 

the Technology Imperatives and the influence ratings for maintaining overmatch. Heat map colors 

determined by a scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values.

Influence Rating for Maintaining Overmatch

• None: Will likely not provide any additional value relative to current capabilities 

in this area. 

• Minimal: Will likely provide minimal (1-25%) improvement over current 

capabilities. Although limited and/or indirectly related, it may provide slight 

contributions to future progress in this area. 

• Moderate: Will likely provide moderate (26-50%) improvement over current 

capabilities. Not critical, but notably relevant; it will have noticeable 

contributions towards future progress in this area. 

• Significant: Will likely provide significant (51-75%) improvement over current 

capabilities. A highly noticeable and important component of future progress in 

this area. 

• Extremely Valuable: Will likely provide game-changing (76-100%) improvement 

over current capabilities. Critical to future progress in this area; it may become 

a dominant and/or transformative technology to this area. 

Technology Imperatives

Number of ideas 

submitted to technology 

survey (63 total ideas) that 

address one or more 

Technology Imperatives

Influence Rating:

Extremely 

valuable

Influence Rating:

Significant 

Influence Rating:

Moderate

Influence Rating:

Minimal

Number of ideas with an 

influence rating of 

extremely valuable or 

significant 

Grow Adaptive Leaders, Optimize 

Human Performance 30 10 11 8 1 21

Maximize Demand Reduction and 

Improve Reliability 4 0 3 1 0 3

 Maintain Overmatch 

26 8 5 13 0 13

Continuous Upgrade, Protect and 

Simplify the Network 10 3 3 3 1 6

Enhance Expeditionary 

Capabilities 27 5 14 7 1 19

Medical Science

7 2 5 0 0 7
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Figure 15: The percent of ideas submitted to the technology survey that address one or more of the 

Technology Imperatives by affiliation type. Heat map colors determined by a scale of 0 (yellow) to 

100% (green). 

Technology Imperatives:

• Grow Adaptive Leaders, Optimize Human Performance: Improve experience, 

judgment, endurance and interaction, and maximize the human potential.

• Maximize Demand Reduction and Improve Reliability: Field technologies that 

extend equipment life cycles, improve reliability, availability, and 

maintainability, while maintaining or increasing performance.

• Maintain Overmatch: Counter emerging threats and challenges in the 

strategic environment, particularly increased adversary investments in, and 

access to knowledge and technology, to retain and improve core Army 

operational advantages, particularly in the areas of mobility, lethality, 

protection, intelligence, and mission command.

• Continuous Upgrade, Protect and Simplify the Network: Improve the 

information environment in which our Soldiers operate, while ensuring 

resilience and reducing the complexity and fragility of the network, to 

empower leaders at the lowest levels with relevant combat information that 

provides a high degree of situational understanding and greater 

interoperability with joint, interagency, and multinational partners and 

capabilities.

• Enhance Expeditionary Capabilities: Retain core Army operational 

advantages, while increasing global, operational, and tactical mobility, overall 

protection, augmented with enhanced survivability, and discriminant lethality, 

Affiliation of 

technology survey 

contributors (63 ideas)

Grow Adaptive 

Leaders, Optimize 

Human 

Performance 

Maximize 

Demand 

Reduction and 

Improve 

Reliability

 Maintain 

Overmatch 

Continuous 

Upgrade, Protect 

and Simplify the 

Network

Enhance 

Expeditionary 

Capabilities

Medical Science

Academic (14 ideas)

57 7 43 21 21 7

Government (38 ideas)

39 8 39 13 50 11

Industry (8 ideas)

50 0 63 25 50 13

Other (3 ideas)

100 0 0 0 33 33

Technology Imperatives
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to improve Army global responsiveness and ability to protect forces, conduct 

forcible and early entry, and transition rapidly to offensive operations to 

ensure access and seize the initiative while offsetting emerging enemy 

capabilities.

• Medical Science: Seeks means to improve soldier resiliency, enable quicker 

physical and mental healing, enable smoother integration of our warriors back 

into society, and improve the quality of life for the Soldier.
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Figure 16: Number of ideas submitted to the technology survey (63 total) that address one or more of 

the 20 AWFCs and the influence ratings for maintaining overmatch. Heat map colors determined by a 

scale of lowest (yellow) to highest (green) values.

AWFCs

Number of ideas 

submitted to 

technology survey (63 

total ideas) that 

address one or more 

AWFCs

Alignment to 

Primary 

Megacities/DU

A Objectives

Influence 

Rating:

Extremely 

valuable

Influence 

Rating:

Significan

t 

Influence 

Rating:

Moderate

Influence 

Rating:

Minimal

Number of ideas 

with an 

influence rating 

of extremely 

valuable or 

significant 

1: Develop Situational Understanding

45

Situational 

Understanding

16 16 12 1 32

8: Enhance Realistic Training 

23

Future Training

7 8 7 1 15

9: Improve Soldier, Leader and Team 

Performance

23

Future Training

7 7 7 2 14

2: Shape the Security Environment

22 6 9 7 0 15

10: Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders

19

Future Training

8 6 5 0 14

13: Conduct Wide Area Security

17

Force Protection and 

Movement

5 5 4 3 10

19: Exercise Mission Command

16 3 7 4 2 10

12: Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver 

and Entry Operations

15

Expeditionary 

Operations

5 4 6 0 9

16: Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, 

and Maintain Freedom of Movement

15

Force Protection and 

Movement

3 6 6 0 9

3: Provide Security Force Assistance

14 4 6 4 0 10

6: Conduct Homeland Operations

14 2 6 5 1 8

4: Adapt the Institutional Army

12

Future Training

3 5 3 1 8

5: Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

11 3 6 2 0 9

15: Conduct Joint Combined Arms 

Maneuver

11

Force Protection and 

Movement

2 4 3 2 6

14: Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a 

Joint, Interorganizational, and Multinational 

Environment 9 2 3 3 1 5

20 Develop Capable Formations

9

Expeditionary 

Operations

2 2 3 2 4

11: Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance

8

Situational 

Understanding

1 4 3 0 5

18: Deliver Fires

7 2 2 3 0 4

7: Conduct Space & Cyber Electromagnetic 

Operations & Maintain Communications

6 1 2 3 0 3

17: Integrate Fires

6 2 1 2 1 3
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20 Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs):

1. Develop Situational Understanding: How to develop and sustain a high degree of 

situational understanding while operating in complex environments against 

determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

2. Shape the Security Environment: How to shape and influence security 

environments, engage key actors, and consolidate gains to achieve sustainable 

security outcomes in support of Geographic and Functional Combatant 

Commands and Joint requirements.

3. Provide Security Force Assistance: How to provide security force assistance to 

support policy goals and increase local, regional, and host nation security force 

capability, capacity, and effectiveness.

4. Adapt the Institutional Army: How to maintain an agile institutional Army that 

ensures combat effectiveness of the total force, supports other services, fulfills 

DoD and other agencies’ requirements, ensures quality of life for Soldiers and 

families, and possesses the capability to surge (mobilize) or expand (strategic 

reserve) the active Army.

5. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction: How to prevent, reduce, eliminate, and 

mitigate the use and effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) 

threats and hazards on friendly forces and civilian populations.

6. Conduct Homeland Operations: How to conduct homeland operations to defend 

the Nation against emerging threats.

7. Conduct Space and Cyber Electromagnetic Operations and Maintain 

Communications: How to assure uninterrupted access to critical communications 

and information links (satellite communications [SATCOM], positioning, 

navigation, and timing [PNT], and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

[ISR]) across a multi-domain architecture when operating in a contested, 

congested, and competitive operating environment.

8. Enhance Realistic Training: How to train Soldiers and leaders to ensure they are 

prepared to accomplish the mission across the range of military operations while 

operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy 

organizations.

9. Improve Soldier, Leader, and Team Performance: How to develop resilient 

Soldiers, adaptive leaders, and cohesive teams committed to the Army 

professional ethic that are capable of accomplishing the mission in environments 

of uncertainty and persistent danger.

10.Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders: How to develop agile, adaptive, and 

innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are 

capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing 

operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.
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11.Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance: How to conduct effective air-ground 

combined arms reconnaissance to develop the situation rapidly in close contact 

with the enemy and civilian populations.

12.Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations: How to project 

forces, conduct forcible and early entry, and transition rapidly to offensive 

operations to ensure access and seize the initiative.

13.Conduct Wide Area Security: How to establish and maintain security across wide 

areas (wide area security) to protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and 

activities necessary to shape security environments, consolidate gains, and set 

conditions for achieving policy goals.

14.Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, Interorganizational, and 

Multinational Environment: How to integrate joint, interorganizational, and 

multinational partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and 

accomplish missions across the range of military operations.

15.Conduct Joint Combined Arms Maneuver: How to conduct combined arms airground maneuver to defeat enemy organizations and accomplish missions in 

complex operational environments.

16.Set the Theater, Sustain Operations, and Maintain Freedom of Movement: How 

to set the theater, provide strategic agility to the joint force, and maintain freedom 

of movement and action during sustained and high tempo operations at the end 

of extended lines of communication in austere environments.

17.Integrate Fires: How to coordinate and integrate Army and JIM fires in combined 

arms, air-ground operations to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of action 

across the range of military operations.

18.Deliver Fires: How to deliver fires to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of 

action across the range of military operations.

19.Exercise Mission Command: How to understand, visualize, describe, and direct 

operations consistent with the philosophy of mission command to seize the 

initiative over the enemy and accomplish the mission across the range of military 

operations.

20.Develop Capable Formations: How to design Army formations capable of rapidly 

deploying and conducting operations for ample duration and in sufficient scale to 

accomplish the mission.

Virtual Contributors

The Megacities and DUA conference also included over 500 individuals participating 

virtually through web streaming, a chat room, and Twitter. Chat room and Twitter 

discussions were captured and an initial analysis of this data was conducted using a 

qualitative data analysis tool to identify the 100 most frequent terms used by 

participants for insight into predominant discussion topics. 
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Figure 17: 100 Most Frequent terms from Twitter (#madsci16) discussion. 
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Figure 18: 100 Most Frequent terms from chat room discussion.
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Appendix 5: Terms of Reference

Term Definition

Air dimension The area above the ground usable by aircraft 

and aerial munitions. In urban areas, airspace 

is broken up by man-made structures of 

different heights and densities in addition to 

the irregularities in natural terrain. This 

produces an “urban canyon” effect that can 

adversely impact operations. Urban canyons 

often cause higher wind speeds with 

unpredictable wind direction and turbulence 

that can cause some munitions to miss their 

targets (increasing risk for both collateral 

damage and friendly fire) and significantly 

increase risks for rotary wing operations near 

the surface. (JP 3-06)

Area of operations An area defined by the commander that is 

large enough to accomplish the mission and 

protect the force. It also identifies the 

operational environment as a composite of 

the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities 

and bear on the decisions of the commander. 

(JP 3-0) The problem in the modern dense 

urban environment is that the Operational 

Environment, including the area of 

operations, often extends much further than 

in the past. (Wolfel, Krakowka Richmond, 

Read, Tansey)

Army Health Support of Operations Related to medical civil-military operations; 

all military health-related activities in support 

of a joint force commander that establish, 

enhance, maintain or influence relations 

between the joint or multinational force and 

host nation, multinational governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and 

authorities, and the civilian populace in order 

to facilitate military operations, achieve 

United States operational objectives, and 

positively impact the health sector. (JP 4-02)

Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs) The Army uses the AWFC analytical 

framework to focus prioritized efforts on firstorder enduring military challenges and as the 

organizing construct to lead future force 

development. AWFCs are enduring first-order 
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problems, the solutions to which improve the 

combat effectiveness of the current and 

future force. The AWFC methodology 

integrates near- (today to 2020), mid- (2020 

to 2030), and far-term (2030 to 2040 and 

beyond) modernization efforts for the Army.

(ARCIC)

Big data analytics The strategy of analyzing large volumes of 

data, or big data. This big data is gathered 

from a wide variety of sources, including 

social networks, videos, digital images, 

sensors, and sales transaction records. The 

aim in analyzing all this data is to uncover 

patterns and connections that might 

otherwise be invisible, and that might provide 

valuable insights about the users who created 

it. Through this insight, businesses may be 

able to gain an edge over their rivals and 

make superior business decisions. 

(Technopedia)

Biosurveillance the process of gathering, integrating, 

interpreting, and communicating essential 

information related to all-hazards threats or 

disease activity affecting human, animal, or 

plant health to achieve early detection and 

warning, contribute to overall situational 

awareness of the health aspects of an 

incident, and to enable better decisionmaking at all levels. (White House: National 

Strategy for Biosurveillance).

Biometrics The process of recognizing an individual 

based on measurable anatomical, 

physiological, and behavioral characteristics.

(JP 2-0)

Biosecurity measures that are taken to stop the spread or 

introduction of harmful organisms to human, 

animal and plant life. The measures taken are 

a combination of processes and systems that 

have been put in place by bioscience 

laboratories, customs agents and agricultural 

managers to prevent the use of dangerous 

pathogens and toxins. (Medicalnet)

Catastrophic Event Any natural or man-made incident, including 

terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels 

of mass casualties, damage, or disruption 

severely affecting the population, 
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infrastructure, environment, economy, 

national morale, and/or government 

functions.(JP 3-28)

Civil Defense All those activities and measures designed or 

undertaken to: a. minimize the effects upon 

the civilian population caused or which would 

be caused by an enemy attack on the United 

States; b. deal with the immediate emergency 

conditions that would be created by any such 

attack; and c. effectuate emergency repairs to, 

or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities 

and facilities destroyed or damaged by any 

such attack. (DOD)

Course of Action (COA) 1. Any sequence of activities that an

individual or unit may follow; 2. A scheme 

developed to accomplish a mission; 3. A 

product of the course-of-action development 

step of the joint operation planning process. 

Also called COA. (JP 5-0)

Cyber/Information dimension Part of cyber space; domain characterized by 

the use of electronics and the 

electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, 

and exchange data via networked systems 

and associated physical infrastructures. (Joint 

Cyberspace Operations Lexicon)

Dense urban areas (DUAs) Represent densely developed territory, 

encompassing residential, commercial, and 

other non-residential urban land uses in 

which social and economic interactions occur. 

(U.S. Census).

Distributed Awareness Infers that the systems perceive the 

environment and gathers information from 

many different sources to provide situational 

awareness for the individual platform as well 

as the collective system. (Piekarski, Sadler, 

Young, and Nothwang)

Distributed Intelligence Infers that the individual and collective system 

can reason about the constantly changing local 

and collective situational awareness and the 

local and overall mission objectives to make 

predictions about future and real-time 

adaptations and decisions to optimize 

operations based on that future. (Piekarski, 

Sadler, Young, and Nothwang)
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Environment Centers of Gravity (E-COGS). E-COGS are those accumulators/nodes and 

flows that appear to play a more central role 

in the viability and functionality of the system. 

E-COGs are the critical elements that truly 

enable the system to function to the degree 

required in order to fulfill its inherent system 

and city objective(s). (William “Bill” Hedges)

Expeditionary The ability to deploy task-organized forces on 

short notice to austere locations, capable of 

conducting operations immediately upon 

arrival. (TP 525-3-1)

Expeditionary Maneuver The rapid deployment of task-organized 

combined arms forces able to transition 

quickly and conduct operations of sufficient 

scale and ample duration to achieve strategic 

objectives. (TP 525-3-1)

Exterior and interior space What is visible from outside buildings or 

subsurface areas, and the significant range of 

people, infrastructure, and activity that 

occurs unseen in the interior of those 

structures. (JP 3-06)

Flock Group of artificially intelligent microdrones 

(defined as the size of an apple or smaller) 

that could provide a constant stream of 

swarm data about a specific building, 

neighborhood, or city. Exhibited by birds, fish, 

bacteria, and insects, flocking is best 

described as the collective motion of a large 

number of self-propelled entities notable 

because it typically does not involve any 

central coordination of the individual player 

entities. (Bitterman and Carlo)

Health Surveillance The regular or repeated collection, analysis, 

archiving, interpretation, and distribution of 

health-related data used for monitoring the 

health of a population or of individuals, and 

for intervening in a timely manner to prevent, 

treat, or control the occurrence of disease or 

injury, which includes occupational and 

environmental health surveillance and medical 

surveillance subcomponents. (JP 4-02)

Human Dimension The cognitive, physical, and social 

components of Soldier, Army Civilians, leader, 

and organizational development and 

performance essential to raise, prepare, and 
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employ the Army in unified land operations. 

(TP 525-3-7)

Human Environment Information about the physical security, 

cultural narratives, economic security, 

ideology and belief systems, authority figures, 

and organizations relevant to major social 

groups in the area under study comprises the 

human environment.

This information may come from open source, 

unclassified collection and is referenced 

geospatially, relationally, and temporally to 

enable the creation of various maps or views 

of the human dynamics in areas where the 

joint force has committed resources.

Information on social groups and their 

interests, beliefs, leaders, and the drivers of 

individual and group behavior is needed to 

conduct effective operations in urban

environments. (JP 3-06)

Human Factors Dimension The physical, cultural, psychological, and 

behavioral attributes of an individual or group 

that influence perceptions, understanding, 

and interactions. (JP 2-0)

Integrated Financial Operations The integration, synchronization, 

prioritization, and targeting of fiscal resources 

and capabilities across United States 

departments and agencies, multinational 

partners, and nongovernmental organizations 

against an adversary and in support of the 

population. (JP 1-06)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) The analytical methodologies employed by 

the Services or joint force component 

commands to reduce uncertainties 

concerning the enemy, environment, time, 

and terrain. (JP 2-01.3)

Internet of Things (IOT) a computing concept that describes a future 

where every day physical objects will be 

connected to the Internet and be able to 

identify themselves to other devices. The 

term is closely identified with RFID as the 

method of communication, although it also 

may include other sensor technologies, 

wireless technologies or QR codes. 

(Technopedia)
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Interorganizational Elements of U.S. government agencies; state, 

territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign 

government agencies; intergovernmental, 

nongovernmental, and commercial 

organizations. (Does not include forces.) (TP 

525-3-1)

Interorganizational Coordination The interaction that occurs among elements 

of the DOD, engaged U.S. government 

agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal 

agencies; foreign military forces and 

government agencies; intergovernmental and 

nongovernmental organizations. (JP 3-08)

Joint Urban Operations Joint operations planned and conducted on, or 

against objectives within a topographical 

complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where 

man-made construction or the density of 

population are the dominant features. Also 

called JUOs. (JP 3-06)

Mad scientist (MS) contributors Any contributor of insights provided 

through the MS Megacity Initiative, 

including, Megacities and DUAs 

Conference presenters, authors of 

academic publications submitted in 

response to the MS Megacities call for 

papers, contributors of ideas to the 

online MS technology survey, and 

participants discussing megacities and 

DUAs in the Megacities and DUAs 

Conference virtual chat room or Twitter

page.

Megacity A metropolitan area whose population 

exceeds 10 million people (United 

Nations; U.S. National Intelligence 

Council).

Military Civic Action Programs and projects managed by United 

States forces but executed primarily by 

indigenous military or security forces that 

contribute to the economic and social 

development of a host nation civil society 

thereby enhancing the legitimacy and social 

standing of the host nation government and its 

military forces. (JP 3-57)

Modeling and Simulation The discipline that comprises the 

development and/or use of models and 

simulations; the use of models, including 
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emulators, prototypes, simulators, and 

stimulators, either statically or over time, to 

develop data as a basis for making managerial 

or technical decisions. The terms "modeling" 

and "simulation" are often used 

interchangeably, but simulation generally 

executes models over time, space, events, or 

other processes. (DOD M&S Glossary)

Multinational Between two or more forces or agencies of 

two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 

5-0)

Operational Adaptability The ability to shape conditions and respond 

effectively to changing threats and situations 

with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions.

(TP 525-3-1)

Operational Environment A composite of the conditions, circumstances, 

and influences that affect the employment of 

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the 

commander. Also called Operational 

Environment. (JP 3-0)

Religious Advisement The practice of informing the commander on 

the impact of religion on joint operations to 

include, but not limited to: worship, rituals, 

customs, and practices of U.S. military 

personnel, international forces, and the 

indigenous population; as well as the impact 

of military operations on the religious and 

humanitarian dynamics in the operational area.

(JP 1-05)

Sociocultural Factors The social, cultural, and behavioral factors 

characterizing the relationships and activities 

of the population of a specific region or 

operational environment. (JP 2-01.3)

Space Dimension The environment corresponding to the space 

domain, where electromagnetic radiation, 

charged particles, and electric and magnetic 

fields are the dominant physical influences, 

and that encompasses the earth's ionosphere 

and magnetosphere, interplanetary space, 

and the solar atmosphere. (JP 3-59)

Special Warfare Execution of activities that involve a 

combination of lethal and nonlethal actions 

taken by a specially trained and educated 

force that has a deep understanding of 
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cultures and foreign language, proficiency in 

small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and

fight alongside indigenous combat formations 

in a permissive, uncertain,

or hostile environment; includes “special 

operations forces conducting combinations of 

unconventional warfare, foreign internal 

defense, and/or counterinsurgency through 

and with indigenous forces or personnel. 

(ADP 3-05)

Stability Mechanism The primary method through which friendly 

forces influence civilians to attain conditions 

that support establishing a lasting, stable 

peace. (ADRP 3-0)

Subsurface dimension Areas below ground level that consist of 

sewer and drainage systems, subway tunnels, 

utility corridors, or other subterranean 

spaces. These areas can be used for cover and 

concealment, movement, and engagement, 

but their use requires intimate knowledge of 

the area. (JP 3-06)

Supersurface dimension Roofs and upper floors of buildings, stadiums, 

towers, or other structures that can be used 

for movement, maneuver, observation, firing 

positions, or other advantage. (JP 3-06)

Surface dimension Include exterior ground-level areas of streets 

and roads, parks and fields, and any other 

exterior space. These surface areas follow the 

natural terrain and are themselves broken up 

by man-made features. (JP 3-06)

System of systems A system-of-interest whose system elements 

are themselves systems; typically, these entail 

large scale inter-disciplinary problems with 

multiple, heterogeneous, distributed systems. 

(INCOSE)

Technology Imperatives Focusing mechanism to ensure U.S. Army S&T 

efforts to align with future capability needs. 

They were the top down element that 

complimented the TRADOC Centers of 

Excellence functional oriented S&T needs. 

We use this as a means to advise materiel 

developers so they can make informed 

decision regarding technology efforts under 
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their care that use Army S&T dollars. 

(TRADOC)

Uncertain Environment Operational environment in which host 

government forces, whether opposed to or 

receptive to operations that a unit intends to 

conduct, do not have totally effective control 

of the territory and population in the intended 

operational area. (JP 3-0)

Urban Triad The three elements that compose the urban 

environment: complex man-made physical 

terrain, a population of significant size and 

density, and an infrastructure. (JP 3-06)

Virtual humans Embodied, autonomous computer agents that 

look and behave like people. They use verbal 

and non-verbal communication to interact 

naturally with real people. Recently, we have 

seen ways in which a virtual human may 

outperform either real people or inanimate 

systems alone People may feel more 

comfortable interacting with a virtual human 

and may feel less judged and more willing to 

reveal more sensitive information to a virtual 

character. At the same time a virtual human 

can use gestures that work at a more 

subliminal level to encourage people to open 

up. (Dr. William Swartout)

Virtual Reality The effect created by generating an 

environment that does not exist in the real 

world. Usually, a stereoscopic display and 

computer-generated three-dimensional 

environment gives the immersion effect. The 

environment is interactive, allowing the 

participant to look and navigate about the 

environment, enhancing the immersion 

effect. Virtual environment and virtual world 

are synonyms for virtual reality; Virtual 

Reality (Wearable) includes a participant 

using a Helmet-Mounted Display to 

experience an immersive representation of a 

computer-generated simulation of a virtual 

world. In this case, the user does not view the 

real world and is connected to the computer 

rendering the scene with a cable, typically 

allowing about 3-4 meters of movement. 

(DOD M&S Glossary)
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Appendix 6: Administrative Survey Results

Responses to a conference feedback survey from Megacity and DUA Conference 

participants (total of 36 responses):

Figure 19: Number of people who participated in the Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Conference 

in person or through the webcast, chat, Twitter, or other (total of 36 responses).

Survey Question: What did you like about the conference?

Conference Content:

Informative, diverse topics; 

good content; good selection of 

experts

• Great briefs

• Great speakers, 

• Distinguished presenters. 

• Wide array of subject matter

• The topics were diverse, well presented and the 

majority were related directly to the topic.

• I thought many of the speakers were compelling 

and interesting. The breadth of participants helped 

reduce some of the parochial Army views of the 

world.

• Wide variety of speakers from different 

organizations provided different perspectives.

• Very informative in decomposing the problem 

space.

• The variety of relevant topics covered under the 

MgC and DUA theme was eye opening. 

• Great selection of presenters with a wide range of 

expertise from technology to strategy and to 

narratives. This is the key part of the Mad 
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Scientists series bringing in real expertise and 

linking experts. 

• Informed speakers. 

• Excellent speakers and a wide variety of experts. 

• Excellent speakers and content. 

• I learned quite a bit about the state of some 

technologies, things about which I had been 

unaware. 

• A great selection of speakers and the ability for me 

to ask questions in chat mode and have a 

discussion on the topic "real time"

• Conference brought together a knowledgeable 

group of researchers and military practitioners to 

discuss the emerging concepts in Dense Urban 

Areas/Megacities. Many of the presenters were 

excellent and provided a fresh perspective on this 

difficult emerging challenge.

• Good overview talks.

• The material presented was relevant to the 

challenges described by existing works and studies 

(i.e. AOC, SSG, RAND) geared at future military 

operations in a Megacity through 2050. The 

primary objectives laid out in the MS info paper 

linked exactly to the themes/presentations 

throughout the two-day event, and ultimately 

proved in the out brief the realistic, clear (and 

necessary) path forward. The "so what" was there! 

• Speakers were interesting.

• Wide variety of speakers and topics. 

• A great lineup of presentations. Enjoyed the online 

presentations leading up to the event as well. 

Great use of supporting IT resources.

• The topics and the speakers

• Some good thinkers presented challenging briefs 

that got me thinking.

• The presenters were well qualified and the talks 

were relevant to the megacity operational 

environment. I came away stimulated by a number 

of different talks and ideas from the conference.

• Great gathering of the top minds addressing DoD 

future Megacity issues

• The topics were very interesting and at a good 

length. 

• I think this MS workshop did a good job of 

highlighting the challenge in the DUA/MC space.

Networking Opportunities –

Great opportunity for 

networking.

• Good opportunity for expanding one's network. 

• Great networking

• Connecting with people who are open and 

interested in new approaches. 

• excellent networking opportunities 
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• The conference provided a great networking 

opportunity within this important and increasingly 

important area of interest.

• Opportunity to meet and talk to some creative 

people face-to-face.

Administration: Well 

organized; good format of 

presentations and Q&A 

sessions; lunches provided; 

helpful pre-conference material; 

helpful and effective virtual 

component.

• Very well organized 

• I enjoyed the presentation format and the ability to 

ask questions of each presenter.

• It was professionally executed in a superb venue. 

Provided lunches were great

• great venue and agenda

• The conference was well organized.

• Great conference and very engaging speakers. I 

liked the open dialog and the variety of 

presentations.

• Excellent facilities and accommodations.

• The venue was well laid out and everything was 

convenient. The luncheons were delicious.

• ASU did a terrific job hosting this and the provided 

lunch was much appreciated. The briefings were, in 

general, interesting. 

• Definitely one of the better conferences I have 

been to in recent years. 

• Good pacing and timing for presentations and Q&A 

sessions. Very glad multi-speaker sessions were 

limited (to one), got more good information from the 

TED talk-style presentations than the single panel 

session. 

• Networking breaks were a great length of time. 

• The organization of the conference was perfect 

from what I could tell. Everything was easy, on 

time, comfortable. I know that having that be the 

case for me means that a number of people had 

been exerting themselves mightily and I appreciate 

it very much. 

• I think the pre-conference preparation with the 

Small Wars Journal articles, the APAN connection 

and the email notices and advice from Joel Lawton 

were all useful and welcome. I've been to a 

conference or two, and this one rates at the top in 

terms of admin painlessness and theme focus. 

• I love the arrangements provided by our host, 

Arizona State University--the hotel 

recommendations and accommodations, ease of 

transportation (walking distance) from hotel to 

conference, excellent conference establishment 

with a comfortable conference room, snacks and 

refreshments, and variety of lunch options, and the 

wonderful staff that put together a well-run 

conference.
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• I have perfect comms from my computer at work. 

easy to use and great platform for getting all the 

data I needed remotely.

• Format was good. 

• Very well run

• Excellent organization and venue. ASU and 

TRADOC personnel were all helpful, gracious, and 

hospitable. The ice breaker was well done. The 

opportunity to ask questions was excellent. 

• The ASURE and ASU team worked well with the 

Army

• The webcast worked well. 

• Overall, the conference was well put together. The 

conference center was a perfect locale. The 

refreshments/lunch provided by ASU were top 

notch and a surprise (given DoD restrictions on 

providing such things). 

• Again, it could not have been better administered, 

and I got much out or it. 

• I loved this conference and hope to participate next 

year. I have several ideas for potential talks from 

my institute -- USC Institute for Creative 

Technologies.

• Phenomenal event! Best one since my assignment 

at ARCIC

Survey Question: What can be improved?

Administration: More 

discussion; collaboration, Q&A 

time needed; timing of 

conference was problematic; 

virtual audience had difficulty 

seeing slides easily.

• Need to be able to zoom the slides - can't see the 

slides and the chat at the same time 

• Conference running late on Friday that requires 

travel is less than ideal. Sessions on Wednesday 

and Thursday would have helped. But this is a 

minor consideration.

• Timing. Start the conference one day earlier so 

that it can be wrapped up by Friday at noon for 

ease of travel.

• Include some small group break out sessions with 

individual presenters for a more informal question 

and answer period.

• It would be great to have a form or forum where 

people can sign up to collaborate on projects. 

Although the networking during breaks was useful, 

having more guided collaboration and joint idea 

sharing would be beneficial. Something as simple 

as a survey where people submit quickly "I can 

help on BLANK project doing etc., my contact info 

is as follows".

• Shorten the agenda; too long for a given day. 

• Scheduling the conference for the middle of the 

week rather than at the end of the week. Significant 
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number of people left at lunch on Friday, which is 

not fair for presenters on Friday afternoon.

• There wasn't enough time for questions of the 

presenters and you could not always get to them 

during breaks and the social periods.

• Also, as a result of the long plenary speakers list, 

the occasions for sitting and exchanging were 

reduced. A couple more round-table chats would 

have been nice. At a conference with such 

interesting folk I think I get more listening to 

conversation over meals than I do listening to a 

podium talk.

• I was a fish in a sea as the only person 

representing my organization. Being new to the 

Mad Scientist conference, BREAKOUT SESSIONS 

would help myself in a less formal setting, talk to 

others about what my organization does, and 

maybe add to the megacites discussion and 

perhaps lead to more "mad" ideas from the 

scientists attending the conference. 

• More interaction with panel and more people 

asking questions to challenge some of premises 

proposed.

• Hard question. I personally have no issues or 

complaints thus far, and would only add that the 

community of interest (with TRADOC G2 as lead) 

not lose momentum, and possibly look at 

establishing a MS OPT type structure to allow 

precise management of follow-on activity and 

traceability to concept/capability development, S&T 

investment influence, and the full JIM (Joint, 

Interagency, multi-national) role and responsibility. 

• So, next time I'd be interested in more discussion 

time perhaps a lot more, than what was afforded 

this time. 

• Calling the meeting a "conference" presents 

significant regulatory restrictions on attendance by 

DAC personnel. I probably will not be able to attend 

the Georgetown MS Conference, because I did not 

receive enough advance notice to begin the 

paperwork (I've been told at least 120 day lead 

time). Suggest calling it a "seminar" or "workshop" 

instead of "conference".

• More time for discussion in small group settings

• The one recommended hotel that I could get into 

with the government rate (Moxie) was 30 minute 

walk away, and no rental car authorized. 

• Shorter presentations to allow for more diversity in 

topics and increase the number of presenters. 

Poster sessions could also address this issue.

• more speakers
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• Need to show the slides for those watching virtually 

longer. There was not enough time to read the 

slides or see what the speaker was referring to. 

Conference was not at an ideal time for those on 

the East coast. 

• Only some of the sessions have been posted on 

YouTube. Would be very helpful if Titles included 

speaker names and contact information. Or 

perhaps include the Agenda with links to the 

published videos on APAN.

• Maybe the remainder of the videos remain to be 

posted. Maybe an email to everyone attending 

with the agenda with links to individual videos.

• Would also be of value to have a list of attendees 

with special interest areas, so direct 

communication could be established.

• Get a bigger venue next year with more speakers 

with varied backgrounds and experiences...

• chat screen inside of "video" screen would be 

better

Conference Content: Greater 

diversity of speakers and 

topics; more speakers; greater 

speaker/audience interaction 

and debate; some content 

redundant and not clearly 

connected to megacities; some 

megacity topics not adequately 

addressed; need more 

discussion on solutions; 

speakers should focus more on 

the future verse current 

capabilities; unclear how 

presentations all tied together.

• Include fast-feedback qualitative analytic methods. 

These are designed specifically for problems that 

the conference speakers identified as difficult or 

impossible with their quantitative models (ill-defined 

contexts, unique contexts, contexts that are 

completely unpredictable except in respect, etc.).

• A few presented topics had little or no specific 

connection to megacities. In the end, all talks were 

stimulating and eye opening, so I believe that is 

fine.

• I was a little disappointed to see who did NOT 

present, especially RDECOM's MATDEV WG. 

This is not TRADOC's fault, of course, but I wonder 

if it might have helped to seek out bigger activities 

like that and try to twist their arm.

• Include presenters, and participants contact 

information and links to presentation slides as an 

end of conference data point or as a follow on 

email link to all participants.

• I would liked to have seen more senior maneuver, 

aviation and fires participation. It was good that 

CW4 Castellanos attended. LTG Mangum was 

good to see on day 2.

• Discussion on implementing or driving decisions 

based on Mad Scientist conferences.

• For this being described as a "megacity" 

conference, there were a number of speakers 

whose content only peripherally related to the 

challenges of operating in, with, and through a 

megacity. The speaker discussing the implications 
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of cyber warfare, for example, addressed cyber in a 

megacity almost as an afterthought. 

• More on solutions being developed

• We need to continue to emphasize to our 

presenters that Mad Scientists is about the future. 

They should address the time period between 

2030-2050. Outlining current research and 

development is great but then the presenter should 

take a leap forward.

• Some of the presentations were not MegaCity 

related and were a little tough to tie into the 

conference topic.

• The megacity challenge and future environment 

was covered in depth, but the "so what" was a bit 

lacking. I would have liked to have seen the AWFC 

linked to capability gaps and requirements.

• There was no military problem statement to focus 

the discussion. The various briefs while interesting 

had little connective tissue. It was clear some are 

using the megacity topic as a convenient topic to 

latch on to for possible funding purposes. 

• The military problem is key to the whole Army 

discussion about this operational challenge. Fact is 

the Army doesn't at present know what the problem 

is so a logical start point might be to revisit the 

SSG conclusions AND get some relevant historical 

input from the Combat Studies Institute and others. 

The SSG was not a definitive end state but rather a 

start point. At the end of the day operations in 

megacities are about combat every other operation 

is a lesser problem. The precise nature of that 

combat is still unknown and THAT needs to be 

better defined before "solutions" are trotted out. 

Also need to do some work to narrow the set of 

megacities we're potentially concerned about - I 

don't much care about western of allied megacities; 

the Army problem will be locations that are 

generally closed and hostile to us and that we don't 

have ready access to in PH 0. That's a big deal for 

the Intel community in trying to help set conditions 

in PH 0 for subsequent joint force operations. 

• Would have liked to have a visual map of some 

sort that tied all of the presentations together to 

address the overall conference theme. 

Additionally, noticed that some critical topics were 

a little light in content, i.e. DOD rebalance to 

Pacific, cyber defense/offense/mitigation, 

operational energy, etc.

• A few too many of the speakers were on the stage 

for cheerleading and spreading wonder dust. 

There was no need for anyone to say the world has 
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cities, is going to have more of them or we should 

do something in response. Also not much of a 

need for anyone to say how great their organization 

is. When you put leadership on the stage that's 

what your going to get. OK, some of that is always 

overhead to get buy-in and pay the bills, but this 

conference exceeded on that score. 

• Realizing that this is an emerging topic, their 

seemed to be a very weak link between some of 

the invited talks and megacities. Given the status of 

the problem (MEGACITIES), I am wondering why 

more emphasis is not being focused on defining 

the simple urban areas cities between 500K and 

9.9M! At this point, research that can inform the 

DUA/MC problem space about indicators, MOEs 

and MOPs to begin the process of understanding 

there applicability to the DUA/MC space and 

provide a baseline for exploring the effects of scale 

and emergent behavior/properties in a DUA/MC. 

• By the end of the second day some of the talks felt 

a bit redundant -- too much time defining what a 

megacity is and what problems are associated with 

one and not enough time suggesting possible 

approaches the Army can take to mitigate the risks 

and deal with the challenges. Other than Swartout 

and the ARL scientist in robotics, it was a little light 

on technology.

• The majority of speakers were from ASU, which I 

understand since they were hosting. However, for 

other academics in the audience, it came across as 

TRADOC is partnered only with ASU and there are 

no opportunities to participate in this research.

• More involvement from other Services.

• Invite foreign attendees. 

• I was looking for more give and take, back and 

forth discussion, debate, etc between the speakers 

and the general audience, and within the general 

audience.

• There needs to be much better problem definition 

and subsequent focus/relevance of presenters. 

Anyone who thinks the Army has this megacity 

problem clearly defined and is on a coherent path 

is sadly mistaken. My take away is that our effort is 

scattershot at best and that until we have a much 

better idea of what we are trying to address - and 

why - this will remain unfocused. It's the difference 

between basic research and applied research. 

• The schedule was filled with a little too much 

lectern and not enough table. To me, if we are 

going to spend the money to physically travel (and 

suffer the admin consequences) then the payoff is 
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in face-to face exchanges. With that in mind, a 

conference schedule might be better designed that 

maximizes small-group and personal conversation 

opportunities and minimizes plenaries. Bottom 

line, though: great event.

• If possible, the focus on viable research 

approaches that would link the research community 

with military practitioners would be a useful followon to this MS workshop. 

• Some of the discussion sessions were abbreviated. 

I think a more robust interactive (with the audience) 

session is needed.

• Most presentations were very interesting. However, 

the modeling and simulation time slot could have 

been better served by paper only, and the 

presentation used for another aspect of megacities/dense urban environments.

Survey Question: Were the discussion sessions sufficient (1-5; 5 is the highest 

rating)?: Average score: 4.0

Survey Question: Do you plan on attending subsequent Mad Scientist 

Conferences?

Yes: 33 

No: 3

• My focus area now is on complex dense urban areas. So, I doubt that I will 

attend future Mad Scientist sessions.

• Absolutely and the community of interest being built out is a critical point of 

departure for Army futurists.

• Future Mad Sci: answer is really "maybe" depending on focus and getting 

beyond show and tell.

• My organization was mainly interested in the megacities/dense urban area 

discussion and how we can contribute to the overall success of it. If there are 

subsequent MS conferences that needs geospatial-intelligence information 

and services, then yes I will participate in the future.
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SECTION 3: Situational Awareness

This section includes published articles from Small Wars Journal that we received 

from the call for papers. The section will explore issues, concepts, and capabilities 

as they relate to future land forces gaining situational understanding in megacities or 

dense urban areas in 2025 and beyond.

 “An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas”

by William Hedges

 “Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks : Using Urban Integration and 

Connectedness to Assess Resilience”

by Shade T. Shutters, Wes Herche and Erin King

 “Atmospheric Impacts and Effects Predictions for Applications for Future 

Megacity and Dense Urban Area Operations”

by David Knapp, Robb Randall and Jim Staley

 “Complex IPB”

by Tom Pike and Eddie Brown

 “Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI) Sharing for Transnational 

Threat Actors”

by Victor R. Morris

 “It’s in There: Rethinking (?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas”

by Richard L. Wolfel, Amy Krakowka Richmond, Mark Read and Colin 

Tansey

 “Megacities and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacle or Opportunity”

by Dawn A. Morrison and Colin D. Wood

 “Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”

by Russell W. Glenn

 “Megacity Madness

by Gustav A. Otto and AJ Besik

 “Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the U.S. Army”

by Darryl Ward
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 “Qualitative Analysis Concept in Support of Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) 

Maneuvers”

by John Hoven and Joel Lawton

 “Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational Awareness in 

Dense Urban Environments and Megacities”

 by Alfred C. Crane and Richard Peeke
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An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas

By William Hedges

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 11 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-analytic-framework-foroperations- in-dense-urban-areas

Introduction

The U.S. Army Operating Concept, (AOC) Win in a Complex World, “provides the 

intellectual foundation and framework for learning and for applying what we learn to 

future force development under Force 2025 and Beyond.[i] The AOC focuses on 

important questions; this paper provides a relevant framework supporting how we go 

about attempting to answer two of the questions presented within the AOC: “what is 

the environment we think Army forces will operate in, and what is the problem we 

are trying to solve?” [ii] Both of these questions and potential resolution thereof are 

key to how we continue to tackle Army Warfighting Challenge #1, developing and 

sustaining a high degree of situational understanding against determined, adaptive 

threats. The AOC provides due consideration to anticipated threats and the future 

operating environment (OE) by outlining five characteristics of the future operating 

environment with likely significant impact on land force operations:

(1)Increased velocity and momentum of human interaction and events;

(2)Potential for overmatch;

(3)Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

(4)Spread of advanced cyberspace and counter-space capabilities;

(5)Demographics and operations among populations, in cities, and in complex 

terrain.[iii]

Though the latter characteristic is the most compelling, it is important to note that the 

other future OE characteristics would indeed be exacerbated by the conditions found 

in dense urban areas (DUA). This paper provides a relevant analytic framework in 

support of framing, mapping, and developing courses of action (COA) for operations 

occurring in DUA today and in the future.
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Background I – Dense Urban Areas

Discussion regarding DUA-oriented environments usually center on the roughly 28 

megacities on the planet today. However, the increasing global pace of urbanization 

is not confined to just a megacities issue or perspective; recent United Nations 

studies portend a 60% population surge in urban areas by 2030. [iv] Despite the 

scale and complexity of the world’s megacities, there are almost 850 cities with 

populations between 500k and 9.9m – in essence, “middleweight” cities[v] that also 

represent interactively complex operating environments. Environments which may 

feature a dense and diverse population mix; further complicated by the potential for 

loose integration[vi], a multitude of networks, and potentially volumes of big data[vii] 

that present noteworthy challenges for information collection, much less its parsing, 

characterization, and understanding.

According to the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative 

Worlds, precipitous changes in world demographics are expected to perpetuate 

significant changes, or megatrends, in the world’s diplomatic, economic, and military 

power.[viii] Such change may undoubtedly lead to a potentially volatile and 

uncertain security environment where US interests and related national security 

concerns are increasingly vulnerable to a variety of actors and a range of threats.[ix] 

In accepting that cities/dense urban areas represent the nexus of the megatrends 

alluded to above, the potential for US forces to operate in DUA is significant today 

and increasingly probable in both the near and far terms. Which presents the 

following questions, how do US forces develop critical situational understanding of 

such environments, and what would constitute a viable analytic framework for 

developing and placing that understanding into relevant and applicable context?

Background II – IPB: A Dated Methodological Approach

For the better part of four decades, Army intelligence has tackled operational 

challenges via an approach known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 

(IPB), which was embedded within the Military Decision-making Process (MDMP). 

Even though the Army has revised a great deal of its doctrine and associated tactics, 

techniques, and procedures in an effort to adapt to an evolving OE landscape, our 

situational understanding largely remains anchored to IPB’s role as a MDMP catalyst 

for all environments. IPB’s orientation is towards linear engagement areas and a 

specific threat methodology and model. It is essentially reductionist and quantitative 

in nature, still supportive of a structurally complex OE; but, often fails to gain sight of 

the dynamics between the components of problems within an interactively complex 

system. The dense urban area problem approach must be qualitatively focused and 

employ diverse heuristics[x] lines of effort rather than the rigidity invoked by the IPB 

analytic framework. [xi]
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The products for each step of IPB are not conducive to an interactively complex OE. 

These products fail to adequately unify the different elements found within the OE 

while seeking alignment to a threat or system of opposition[xii] picture. One pointed 

example associated with the IPB construct, lies with the challenge of incorporating 

religion as an operational data layer specific to an OE. Presently, an analytic team 

focusing on a religious-themed impact – central to operational planning, would focus 

on the operational variables captured within a given city’s OE assessment (note 

though that doctrinally, religion at present is not represented as a “stand-alone” 

variable). Such a religious-themed search (within PMESII- PT[xiii], F-ASCOPE[xiv], 

SWEAT-MSO[xv], DIMEFIL[xvi], and even METT-TC[xvii] analysis) would

potentially yield multiple and disparate religious informational elements, which is to 

be expected. However, the IPB construct does not afford a clear step for tying 

together several “like” elements into a single operational data layer and illustrating or 

modeling the relationship of that system upon other systems (IPB does not 

accommodate “modelling” until step 3 and that step/model is threat-centric).

The relevance of the example above highlights a significant gap within the IPB 

framework/process and the inability to truly support comprehensive mission analysis 

and problem framing, especially for the multitude of data layers found in DUA. 

Though religion is often citied within an OE assessment, there is little conduit via IPB 

to truly discern analytic value. In IPB, there exists the potential for such data to be 

“not considered” since it may be interpreted as having little to no value in either 

describing the threat or the threat COA. This example highlights another IPB-related 

challenge. How the Army doctrinally captures relevant operational variables is 

potentially problematic given that a very relevant operational variable like religion (or 

perhaps even tribal/familia factors) is buried within our PMESII-PT or F- ASCOPE 

snapshots despite the data point that religion continues to emerge as a dominant 

theme for a multitude of current and perhaps future operating environments.[xviii] 

IPB’s role and suitability as a MDMP catalyst, directed towards an interactively 

complex environment focused on a city-system environmental challenge or a hybrid 

warfare[xix]-oriented system of opposition – remains questionable.

An Urban Analytic Framework: City as a System

Dense urban areas represent the higher nexus of interactively complex operating 

environments. The IPB process’ end-state provides an inadequate degree of 

situational understanding for such complex environs given its inherent threatoriented slant versus a city as a system or all-encompassing environmental 

perspective. Adoption of this city as a system perspective will require adaptation of 

a significant portion of our Army doctrine and thus, lead to an urban analytic 

framework tailored to address the operational data layers found within urban 

centers, their environmental dynamism, and their state of connectedness. [xx]
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One such urban analytic structure has been developed by CAERUS Associates, 

championed by the Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO),[xxi] 

and has been applied by elements within the special operations community. The 

overarching concept behind this framework is alignment with systems thinking, 

focusing attention on the relationships between different parts of the environment 

and working to understand the cumulative effects of these interactions.[xxii]

The CTTSO analytic framework certainly offers dividends as well as potential 

shortcomings. “Shoehorning” another analytic framework into IPB should not be the 

first objective. Instead, the Army should be focused on: the capture of the DUA’s 

operational data layers; the display or modeling of those data layers; determination 

and analysis of city system Environmental Centers of Gravity (E-COG); the potential 

impact on friendly or threat/ systems of opposition COA; and the impact or urban 

consequences of friendly/threat COAs upon the city systems. All of these objectives 

should be contained within an analytic framework dedicated to understanding 

interactively complex and adaptive operating environments (i.e. DUA).

Creating a Tailored Urban Analytic Framework

The creation of a tailored urban analytic framework would build upon the merits of 

the CTTSO/CAERUS construct and incorporate additional elements essential to 

both development of a pertinent intelligence- oriented model and relevant support to 

Army staff action planners during the course of MDMP. Such a framework would 

stand-alone; and be the primary analytic process that develops situational 

understanding for DUA.

Such a framework could potentially look much like the following:
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Figure 1. Proposed Urban Analytic Framework Framing the Urban 

Operational Environment

Figure 2. Framing the Urban Operational Environment

This first step is an initial assessment construct of a city’s operational environment. 

It represents an assessment of existing OE conditions developed from both 

operational and mission variable analysis within the commander’s area of 

operations, the area of influence, and the area of interest. This assessment is 
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integral to planning and facilitating friendly force operations. The data visualization 

capture should provide for an initial city/system modeling construct, illustrating 

individual components within each city system, leading to the ability to display a 

layered (system upon system) operational view.

Before we can begin to frame the problem we must first understand the components 

of the potential problem system, therefore it begins with identifying the operational 

data layers associated with a specific urban environment. Note that historical 

application of IPB towards DUA usually resulted in a limited operational data layer 

perspective (i.e. three layers: terrain, weather, and the threat); yet, urban OEs (e.g. 

megacities and “middleweight” cities) will likely involve a multitude of diverse data 

layers.

Characterization or context of how the data applies assists the process of identifying 

relevant urban area data layers. Figure 3 captures the common themes related to 

the dimensions often associated with DUA, [xxiii] and in effect, guides the “fit” of a 

data layer within the urban OE.

Using Figure 3 as a general guide, an initial analysis of population, infrastructure, 

and physical environment variables (described within the CAERUS framework as the 

Urban Triad[xxiv]) would yield critical insight to the operational data layers relevant 

to a given DUA (See Appendix: “Select examples of operational data layers within 

Dense Urban Areas.” The cited examples are reflective of an initial PMESII + 

SWEAT-MSO + PT analysis.)[xxv]

Further maturation of these initially identified data layers will be required in which FASCOPE context, particularly the “flow” or relationship aspect, is geared towards a 

“city as a system” perspective, and thus lay the groundwork for both individual 

system and system-on-system interaction analysis.[xxvi] Each systems’ 
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perspective should continue to evolve, leading to a description of the positive and 

negative effects/impacts of the systems- oriented operational data layers on the OE 

from a holistic standpoint.[xxvii] The overarching objective is to capture the city 

systems’ status currently or from a “steady state” standpoint.[xxviii] The resultant 

capture should include additional descriptors of each systems’ resident capabilities 

which enable achieving or maintaining a degree of resiliency against internal or 

external forces/factors/variables.

This urban OE framing concludes with a transition from our examination of the city 

systems as federated entities, to one in which an analytic team then describes the 

effects/impact of systems-oriented data layers on friendly and threat forces, the latter 

of which may be addressed as systems of opposition[xxix] in order to achieve both 

a conventional and a hybrid warfare context.

Mapping Urban Problem Systems

Figure 4. Mapping Urban Problem Systems

Mapping the urban problem system elaborates on the problem through system map 

visualization. Transferring this knowledge to a map/picture supports the identification 

of key accumulators/nodes and flows integral to the problem system itself and our 

understanding of the system in general. This mapping process assists key input to:

• Friendly forces concept of 

operation;

• Running intelligence estimate;

• Development, evaluation, and refinement of priority intelligence 

requirements; 

• Facilitating the initial scoping of a unit’s intelligence collection plan.

Whereas the initial urban OE framing is largely a strategic and operational 

undertaking (e.g. geographic combatant command aligned to corps and divisions), 

the mapping of the urban problem system step may largely fall to BCTs and below. 

In tactical echelons, F-ASCOPE evaluation and subsequent analysis[xxx] would be 

aligned with the applicable METT-TC variables, dependent upon specific mission, 

operational phase context, and the respective operationally engaged echelon. This 
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mapping step should incorporate data central to understanding complex adaptive 

systems, essentially alluding to global graph[xxxi] utilization; human domain 

mapping; human social culture behavior modeling; and emergent state 

phenomena.[xxxii]

A definitive by-product of framing the urban OE, specifically the analysis of the 

relevant operational data layers and their systems’ orientation, yields select 

identification of those problem systems along with their associated sub-elements (see 

Figure 5[xxxiii]).

Concept Mapping is a key component of problem framing and is linked to TRADOC 

PAM 525-5-500,“Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design,” 200).

As the concept and geospatial mapping functions come together (See Figure 6 on 

following page) the data therein is critical towards enabling an analytic team the 

means to convert system patterns of operations (to include systems of opposition) to 

graphics. This visualization may take on a form similar to elements within the 

present IPB process in which situation and event-like templates are generated; 

thereby illustrating system and city key “terrain,” potential/necessary objectives, 

named areas of interest, target areas of interest, and associated decision points.
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Figure 6 (above) is an example of the Urban OE visualization discussed on the 

previous page. In this figure’s example, significant operational data layer examples 

(culled from the examples presented in the Appendix) were combined and framed in 

a visual array for a select portion of a city in support of a specific event.

In sum, mapping the urban problem system embodies a visual representation of the 

elements of the problem and their relationships. This step is an integral element 

towards truly facilitating and cultivating a deeper understanding of each system’s 

role, impact, and effects. This step illustrates and affords:

• General understanding (and simplification) for how disparate parts of the 

system interconnect and interact to produce emergent phenomena and 

provides a visual means supporting systematic study of system parts.[xxxiv]

• Structural diagramming showing directional flows of resources and the 

connections between accumulators/nodes (based on the initial F-ASCOPE 

analysis). This diagramming technique results in a visual track of resource 

flow(s) through the problem system while building a holistic picture of the 

system(s) within the OE.[xxxv]

• Understanding how the population, infrastructure, and key actors relate to 

the physical terrain. This in turn aids in revealing the territorial logic shaping 

the spectrums of behavior[xxxvi] of the key actors within the urban OE and 

potentially puts a face to each of the city’s operational data layers. [xxxvii]

Fruition of the latter comment above is intrinsic to a maneuver commander’s vision 

and intent as well as the unit’s urban battlespace (or engagement) management. 

Analysis and subsequent data mapping should answer several significant questions 

relevant to friendly force operations, strategies, and objectives – contributing to the 

commander’s understanding of system/city (urban) metabolism.
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Developing & Analyzing Urban COAs

Figure 7. Develop & Analyze Urban COAs

This framework then moves from describing the problem to how to influence 

it[xxxviii] via identification of Environment Centers of Gravity (E-COGS). E-COGS 

are those accumulators/nodes and flows that appear to play a more central role in 

the viability and functionality of the system. E-COGs are the critical elements that 

truly enable the system to function to the degree required in order to fulfill its 

inherent system and city objective(s). E-COG identification may be aided by the 

location of potential E-COG within a city’s overall systems diagram, the potential ECOG’s centrality (degree of accumulators/nodes and flows interaction) and its loop 

positioning (where a closed sequence of causes and effects occurs) [xxxix]

E-COG application extends traditional COG analysis from one that is adversary 

centric to one that embraces a systems-supportive environmental perspective. ECOG analysis resides within the premise that population, infrastructure, and the 

physical environment all provide resources to both friendly forces and systems of 

opposition as well as all those who rely on the city’s systems for well-being, 

sustainment, and progress. There may be multiple E-COGs “in play” at the same 

time within the same DUA, with each or a combination thereof, extremely 

susceptible to change over time.

The key to E-COG application is giving each system found within the population, 

infrastructure, or environment (e.g. water, energy, communications systems, etc.) 

greater context or depth by stating the objective(s) of each of those entities (as 

opposed to a “threat intent” in traditional COG analysis).

Alignment of an objective to a system enables tailored application of current COG or 

critical factors analysis using critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical 

vulnerabilities descriptions, rendering a more refined intelligence portrait of system 

interaction and the impact on the DUA. E-COG identification, partnered with 

relevant critical factors analysis provides an important conceptual link between 

framing the environment, identifying and characterizing the problem systems,[xl] 

and creating a model[xli] that incorporates the elements/systems therein.

E-COG identification within the problem(s) system(s) remains key towards 
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developing tentative courses of action (COA) designed to affect the E-COG and 

thus achieve a friendly force desired end-state.[xlii] Select examples of related 

system/E-COG-related friendly COAs may center around degradation of the ECOG to deny resources to a system of opposition or a clearly defined threat 

entity;[xliii] and reinforcement of an E-COG in order to ensure that that E-COG 

functions and contributes positively to the system users.[xliv]

This framework enhances the operations planning staff’s ability to determine COA 

acceptability criterion specific to DUA through an urban consequences rationale 

developed within MDMP.[xlv] Urban consequences COA considerations may also 

be assisted by using imaginative advanced structure analytic techniques (e.g. 

outside-in thinking and morphological analysis[xlvi]) to forecast how the COA may 

affect other not-yet-analyzed systems.[xlvii] This process may also serve as a 

check against baseline system-on- system effects analysis, in which a relationship 

outcome may not be sufficiently captured or the relationship effects are now 

unfavorable to friendly force operations.

Preparing for the AOC’s Future Operating Environment

DUA require an analytic framework specifically tailored to accommodate a city’s 

system diversity. The analytic framework presented provides a structure that 

incorporates urban operational data layers and city as a system context and 

perspectives. It is a catalyst towards addressing AOC questions like “what is the 

environment we think Army forces will operate in, and what is the problem we are 

trying to solve?” The potential for US forces to operate in DUA remains significant 

today and in the far term given the global pace of urbanization and the world’s 

megatrends involving more complex diplomatic, economic, and military power. 

These trends are largely population-centric, and thus urban centric. As the Army’s 

potential OE landscape continues to evolve, so must the Army’s doctrinal 

framework, processes, and applications evolve as well. This framework is 

representative of our human domain[xlviii] efforts (e.g. data collection and analysis) 

in understanding the human interface resident within DUA; it is an education enabler 

that prepares the Army for the “unknown.”[xlix] It complements the Army’s human 

dimension[l] educational effort as well, guiding both situational understanding and 

the knowledge acquisition necessary for managing and influencing an Army team 

(and those within the human domain) through a potentially challenging and relatively 

unknown problem set. Gaining further insight to the dynamics between the 

components of problems within a decidedly complex urban system and the potential 

for hybrid warfare therein will not be easy; but, it must be a requirement. 

Development of situational understanding for dense urban areas remains a critical 

component of Army planning; such understanding demands relevant context and a 

framework appropriate for content application.
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Appendix

Select operational data layers examples found within Dense Urban Areas. 

The following examples are grouped or nested within an overarching concept (e.g. 

human geography) and shaped initially by the appropriate dense urban area 

dimensional perspective (see Figure 3 on page 9): 

 Human geography of the “cityscape” (Human/Cyber/Information/Surface)

 Ethnicity/Language/Religion

 Social groups and organizations

 Select demographic group patterns of life capture

 Attitudes; social networking near-term sentiment analysis

 Health & medical 

 Significant events

 Relative degree of urbanization & associated demographics 

(Human/Cyber/Information/Surface)

 Geospatial visualization of dense urban core and peri-urban

 Distributions of wealth (wealthy core vs. poor core & poor periphery 

(geospatial graphic representation))

 Familia/tribal pockets; relationships, ideology influencers

 Demographic dependencies on government or armed groups

 Grievances; Identified coping mechanisms; opportunities to create 

resiliency

 Identification of what one knows of the “social state,” group or 

population movement (human condition mapping)

 Analysis of urban inflow & outflows (Human/Cyber/Information/Surface/subsurface)

 Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academia, Trash, Medical, Safety, Food

 Demographic/social movement (Dense urban core to peri-urban areas 

& peri-urban areas to dense urban core)

 Traffic and commuter patterns (Road/rail/pedestrian/maritime/air)

 Wealth and economic distribution patterns, means of economic control 

and infrastructure controls (Define “elite, middle-class, and poor” based 

on present conditions)

 International trade flows into/from city (incl. Air and sea ports/other 

(rail/ground))

 Economics (Human/Cyber/Information)

 Basis and state of financial capital

 Type/flow of commodities and remittance

 Potential for stabilizing effects of illicit economies

 Unemployment; rates, socio-economic aspects of affected divisions 

w/in general population
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 Systems of opposition (Human/Cyber/Information)

 Identification, description, and their core interests

 Opposition methods, span, and degree of control 

 System rivals/allies (active/potential)

 Level of demonstrated or potential access to advanced lethal/military 

technologies available to the system of opposition

 Population’s reliance/dependence on the system (security, aid, conflict 

resolution, social rule, financial assistance) and impact on terms of 

support/acceptance of the system’s authority or influence

 Security controls/overwatch mechanisms (Human/Cyber/Information)

 Government security forces; degree of presence, influence, and control

 Internet and social media penetration; government internet policy

 Identification of political/military influencers

 Population’s reliance/dependency on the city government (admin 

services, property rights, conflict resolution, social welfare/aid, 

education, and health) and impact on terms of support/acceptance of 

the government’s authority or influence 

 Other “Actors” (not identified/discovered above) (Human/Cyber/Information)

 Local administration (governance, military, law enforcement)

 Religious/Business/labor

 Illicit network “leads” or commodities providers

 Hostile actors (not otherwise captured w/in system of opposition; e.g. 

gangs)

End Notes

[i] “The US Army Operating Concept,” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Oct 14), i 

(Foreword).

[ii] Ibid. iii (Preface).

[iii] Ibid. 11-12.

[iv] “The US Army Operating Concept,” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Oct 14), 12.

[v] “Readiness in an Urban Era: Implications for the US Army,” Strategic Initiatives 

Group – Lyceum, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Ft. Leavenworth, KS 

(May 15), i.

[vi] US Army Chief of Staff’ Strategic Studies Group (Megacities), “A Proposed 

Framework for Appreciating Megacities: A US Army Perspective,” Small Wars 

Journal (Apr 2014), 2. System typology often featuring decentralized and informal 

systems, low quality infrastructure, and unregulated flow capacity.

[vii] Luciano Florida, “The Fourth Technological Revolution,” Oxford, UK, Oxford 

University Press (May 2014), 14-15.

[viii] National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds 

(Washington DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2012), ii.

[ix] SAMS, “Readiness in an Urban Era: Implications for the US Army,” 1.
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[x] Heuristics are strategies using readily accessible, though loosely applicable, 

information to control (or steer) problem solving.

[xi] “Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design,” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-

500 (Jan 2008), 6.

[xii] Understanding the Threat as a System of Opposition,” David Pendall, COL, 

USA, White Paper (Jan 2014), 4.

[xiii] Political, Military, Economic, Sociological, Infrastructure, Information – Physical 

Environment & Time. “Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques,” ATP-2-19.4 

(FM 2-19.4) (Feb 2015), 1-3.

[xiv] Flow – Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People & Events. ATP 2-

19.4, B-21.

[xv] Sewage, Water, Energy, Academics, Trash – Medical, Safety, & Other 

Considerations. “Engineer Reconnaissance,” FM 3-34.170 (Mar 2008), 6-14.

[xvi] Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law 

Enforcement. Vulnerability Analysis Workbook, Understanding the Threat, Vol 1, US 

Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Ft. Meade MD (Jun 2008), v.

[xvii] Mission, Enemy, Terrain & Weather, Troops & Support Available – Time 

Available & Civil Considerations. ATP 2-19.4, 1-3.

[xviii] Re-scoping how the Army views and applies applicable operational variables 

to a problem set like dense urban areas, could significantly add data dimensions not 

presently considered for urban-related mission analysis.

[xix] Frank Hoffman, LtCol, USMCR (Ret.), “The Janus choice: Defining today’s 

multifaceted conflict,” Armed Forces Journal (Oct 2009). Combat operations 

characterized by the simultaneous and adaptive employment of a complex 

combination of conventional weapons, irregular warfare, terrorism and criminal 

behavior to achieve political objectives.

[xx] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” Version 1.0, CAERUS Associates and 

the Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Office, Alexandria, VA (Jun 2015), 1.

[xxi] CTTSO was established in 1999 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations/Low- Intensity Conflict. It is charged with providing a forum for 

interagency and international users to discuss mission requirements to combat 

terrorism, prioritize requirements, fund and manage solutions, and deliver 

capabilities.

[xxii] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” 1.

[xxiii] There exists minute differences for representing the dimensions of the urban 

landscape between various DoD entities as part of the dense urban area community 

of interest.

[xxiv] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” 25-26. The CAERUS/CTTSO Urban 

Triad Paradigm conceptually borrows from Joint Publication 3-06, “Joint Urban 

Operations,” and contributes significantly towards defining the unique features of 

urban environments. This paradigm is represented by population (PMESII), 
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infrastructure (SWEAT-MSO), and physical environment and time (as a latter sub-set 

of PMESII-PT application.

[xxv] “Dense Urban Areas & Megacities Challenge,” Brief to US Army Intelligence 

Center of Excellence representatives, Dr. Rolf Halden, Arizona State University 

Research Enterprise (ASURE), Phoenix, AZ (24 Sep 15), slide 19. Multi-variable 

consideration creates multiple lines of information ingest, protects against data gaps, 

and thus better informs follow-on mapping and modeling efforts.

[xxvi] David J. Kilcullen, “The City as a System: Future Conflict and Urban 

Resilience,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, VOL 36:2 (Summer 2012), 36.

[xxvii] Capture and analysis of negative effects/impacts regarding urban operational 

data layers is key to informing friendly COA development. There may be 

circumstances in which the effects of a city-related system are so adverse that an 

environmentally imposed condition like area anti-access/area denial is present.

[xxviii] Comparing/contrasting current city steady-state with a desired future state, 

based on the urban OE’s operational data layers analysis and a Commander’s 

guidance/mission analysis will also require a structured analytic outline (see DIA & 

CIA structured analytics regarding diagnostic techniques, argument mapping, and 

contrarian techniques).

[xxix] Pendall, (Jan 2014), 4.

[xxx] Identification of critical city system flows may not be readily apparent to a 

planning staff via F- ASCOPE regarding a dense urban OE’s effects on operations 

and the implications therein. This contention is reinforced by the CAERUS 

framework’s apt descriptors of accumulators and nodes as related, yet hardly 

interchangeable concepts. These terms may require doctrinal re-visit in light of the 

critical application of F-ASCOPE in support of dense urban terrain analysis.

[xxxi] A global graph is a scalable, operational environment-specific database that 

identifies, stores, and updates the relationships between hundreds of thousands to 

millions of entities. The relationships between entities are stored as fusion triples, 

i.e., as object-predicate-object. Future analytic teams would employ algorithms and 

artificial intelligence means to discover and explore not only those entities and 

relationships that are obviously relevant to their unit's mission; but more important, to 

discover and track those entities which were not previously known to the unit. Global 

graphs are foundational and fundamental to all future analytics, to understanding 

threat and non-threat networks of people, places, procedures, and underlying 

motivations, and perhaps most importantly, to understanding complex operational 

environments as complex adaptive systems.

[xxxii] Tom Pike and Eddie J. Brown, “Populations as Complex Adaptive Systems:

A Case Study of Corruption in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (Aug 2011), 3.

[xxxiii] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” Brief to US Army Intelligence Center 

of Excellence, CAERUS Associates and the Combatting Terrorism Technical Support 

Office, Alexandria, VA (14 Jul 2015), slide 16.
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[xxxiv] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” 30.

[xxxv] Ibid. 30-31.

[xxxvi] “Dense Urban Areas & Megacities Challenge,” Brief, Dr. Rolf Halden, 

ASURE, terminology discussion.

[xxxvii] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” 35.

[xxxviii] Ibid. 37.

[xxxix] Ibid. 39.

[xl] Ibid. 38.

[xli] Comparison between two or more dense urban OEs will likely yield contrasting 

elements or system- specific-interaction differences; therefore, model-linked 

experimentation efforts may require a very specific dense urban OE test subject and 

scenario in order to adequately convey and capture the resultant impact of a critical 

variable upon the other resident systems within the OE.

[xlii] “City as a System, Analytic Framework,” 41.

[xliii] Ibid.

[xliv] Ibid.

[xlv] Ibid. 42. Urban operational consequences are not presently captured within 

MDMP as part of step 4 (COA Analysis – War Game) and step 5 (COA Comparison). 

A planning staff may need to return to the urban OE framing and mapping steps in 

order to re-assess how the friendly/threat COAs will impact the system-specific 

operational data layers.

[xlvi] Richards J. Heur Jr., and Randolph H. Pherson, “Structured Analytic 

Techniques for Intelligence Analysis,” Washington, DC, CQ Press – Division of 

SAGE (2011), 108.

[xlvii] City as a System, Analytic Framework,” 42.

[xlviii] Totality of the physical, cultural, psychological, and social environments that 

influence human behavior to the extent that the success of any military operation or 

campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to 

influence, fight, and win in population-centric conflicts.

[xlix] Thomas E. Ricks, “The Generals,” New York, NY, Penguin Press (2012), 346. 

The author’s context was in relation to “FM 100-5: Operations,” in which that 

document was categorized as “. . . emphasized training, which prepares soldiers for 

the known, far more than education, which prepares them to deal with the unknown.”

[l] Cognitive, physical, and social (CPS) components of Soldier, civilian, leader, and 

organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ 

the Army in unified land operations.
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Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks: Using Urban Integration and 

Connectedness to Assess Resilience

By Shade T. Shutters, Wes Herche and Erin King

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 26 February 2016

Available online: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/anticipating-megacityresponses-to-shocks-using-urban-integration-and-connectedness-to-asse

Introduction

Over half of humanity now lives in cities, a proportion rising to 80% by 2100 [1]. With 

this rapid demographic shift has come a new type of geographical entity – the 

megacity [2]. Typically defined as an urbanized area with at least 10 million 

residents, 28 megacities exist in the world today – almost 10 times as many as the 

three that existed in 1970. And nearly 40 of these massive human agglomerations 

will exist just 10 years from now. In parallel with this trend is a diffusion of world 

power from traditional hegemonic states to networks of diverse types of actors, 

including non-state entities such as megacities [3].

The rapid emergence of these dense urban areas has led to their prominent role in 

recent U.S. operations, with urban warfare being an integral part of allied efforts in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations in Fallujah, Iraq in 2005 were described as, 

"the heaviest urban combat Marines have been involved in since Hue City in 

Vietnam in 1968," [4]. In Afghanistan, a resurgent Taliban has concentrated its 

attacks on dense urban areas, forcing Afghan security forces into an urban warfare 

front for which they are ill- prepared [5]. Indeed, Iraq’s recent announcement that it 

will construct a reinforced wall to surround Baghdad illustrates the ever increasing 

emphasis of megacities and their security.

Given these recent experiences and prevailing trends there is clearly a need for a 

deeper understanding of dense urban environments at this unprecedented scale [6, 

7]. What, if anything, fundamentally differentiates megacities from other cities? How 

does a contemporary military force confront an urban system of such immensity? 

While current military doctrine extends to urban operations, the sheer size of current 

megacities is beyond the scope of that doctrine. A recent report by the Chief of Staff 

of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group [8] summarizes the gaps in our understanding 

of megacities and the potential implications for national security.

The report states that megacities “create a complex security environment which will 

challenge policy makers and military planners” and that megacities will be the 

strategic key in future U.S. military interventions. This presents a paradox for 

strategic planning and operations, framing urban warfare as a “wicked problem” [9-
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11]. By their nature, complex systems such as megacities cannot be controlled in a 

traditional military sense, but they can be influenced [12]. It is critical then to 

understand exactly how to influence the trajectory of these cities and how to 

anticipate their responses to that influence.

Urban Resilience

A primary objective of better understanding of megacities is to enable a proper 

evaluation of alternative tactical and strategic options. It is virtually impossible to 

evaluate a scenario for intervening in a megacity without the ability to anticipate the 

megacity’s response. And the magnitude and nature of a city’s response to 

intervention is intimately related to the city’s resilience.

Thus, we focus in this paper on a critical and fundamental attribute of megacities, 

and indeed of all complex systems – their resilience to shocks [13]. How well can a 

megacity respond to a shock? How long will that response take? What are its 

vulnerabilities and weaknesses? What policy interventions can affect its resilience? 

Quantifying that resilience is a crucial prerequisite for comparative analyses, for 

assessing the impact of policies, and for planning both strategic and tactical options. 

It is also central to anticipating whether a disrupted urban environment will 

eventually recover from a shock or transition into a haven for violent extremists.

Connectedness, integration, and interdependence

Ideally, our understanding of megacities, or any dense urban environment would 

include a theoretically- grounded, quantification of resilience, which many experts 

claim is virtually impossible to create [14, 15]. Analysts are thus forced to derive 

simplistic qualitative notions of resilience. This has led to a prevailing view asserting 

that tightly connected, highly integrated cities are the most resilient to shocks [16, 8, 

17]. Cities such as London and New York, this view claims, will recover from shocks 

much more readily than the likes of Lagos or Dhaka.

This concept of integration or connectedness and its relation to resilience is 

sufficiently accepted so that it was used as the basis for the CSA’s proposed 

megacity typology (Figure 1). As Harris et al [8] conclude: 
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The assertion that higher connectedness of a system increases that system’s 

resilience comes largely from the engineering concepts of robustness and redundancy 

[18-20], where designed networks and engineered systems must be crafted to 

withstand shocks [17]. The rationale is that if one part of a system fails, higher 

connectivity enables the rapid replacement of resources and the uninterrupted flow of 

information through the system.

Figure 1: A typology of megacities defined by the level of a city’s integration (from [8] 

p. 14).

Yet this prevailing view is not the only one. A contrary view, outlined in the seminal 

tome Panarchy [21] and originating in ecology-related fields, asserts that highly 

connected and integrated systems become brittle and susceptible to cascading 

failures [22, 23]. To better illustrate this counter view, we present a simple 

organismic analogy to cities.

Highly integrated systems are characterized by strong formal and informal relationships among its 

component parts. These relationships manifest as highly ordered hierarchical structures with 

formalized procedures and norms, and open communication among its various parts. Highly 

integrated systems are inherently stable, show high degrees of resilience (ability to absorb change) 

and manage growth in a relatively controlled manner.

Loosely integrated systems, on the other hand, lack many of the formal relationships that keep 

highly integrated systems stable. Weak control and communications systems, and lack of consistent 

rules for interaction amongst component parts lead to low resilience and unregulated growth. This 

growth, in turn, contributes more component parts that aren’t formally integrated into the system, 

creating a downward spiral of instability.
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An analogy from biology

Let us consider an illuminating analogy from the animal kingdom. Though this 

vantage point will be new to most readers, it is important to understand that an 

animal is a collection of numerous individual cells: individuals that communicate 

with each other, coordinate activities, carry out diverse functional tasks, change 

their behavior in response to their environment, regulate themselves, and depend 

on one another for survival. In other words, just like a city, an animal is nothing less 

than a complex adaptive social system [24].

Biologists typically place animals along a continuum of internal complexity with 

humans at one end (most complex) and sponges at the other (least complex). The 

human body is made of nearly 200 different types of cells, which form a highly 

integrated hierarchy of interconnected tissues, organs, and dynamic systems. 

These systems and their components show an incredible degree of self-regulation, 

feedback controls, interdependency, redundancy, and defense capabilities. On the 

other hand sponges have no tissues, no organs, no systems at all, and are 

composed of only four types of cells. Thus under virtually any conceived scale of 

integration, connectedness, or interdependency, humans are far above sponges.

But which is more resilient? Consider the shock of discharging a firearm into both 

a human and a sponge. In humans a small area of localized damage can trigger a 

series of cascading system failures culminating in the collapse of the entire system 

and the death of the individual. And the sponge? Some of its cells would die but 

the system overall would be largely unaffected. With minimal integration between 

damaged areas and the rest of the animal, unaffected parts continue to function as 

if nothing had happened. In fact, a sponge can be subjected to chemical or 

mechanical stresses that virtually disintegrate the animal into a mass of 

unconnected cells and those cells will soon reconstitute into a single animal.

Given this example it is difficult to argue that the highly integrated and hierarchical 

society of cells forming a human body is more resilient than a lowly sponge. Can 

the analogous social systems of cities be so different?

Recent empirical evidence

Partly to reconcile this apparent contradiction over the role of connectedness, a 

recent study attempted to craft a quantitative and anticipatory metric of urban 

resilience. Using massive government datasets on the economies of U.S. cities, 

Shutters et al [25] developed a quantitative measure of a city’s “tightness” or level of 

economic integration. Using this metric the authors found that, following the shock 

of the 2007- 2009 “Great Recession,” U.S. cities with tightly integrated economies 

actually had the largest percentage drops in several measures of economic 

performance. In addition, the highly integrated cities took longer to return to their 

pre-shock performance levels. In other words, the most integrated cities were the 
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least resilient to this global economic shock.

Yet the authors of this study caution that resilience is likely very nuanced and 

contextual. Factors such as the type of shock, its geographical extent, its duration, 

etc., will ultimately determine what is and is not a resilient megacity. For instance, a 

disaster befalling a specific U.S. port city may have cascading impacts on the U.S. 

economy, but the nature of this geo-specific shock is likely quite different than the 

global economic shock described above. In any regard, clarifying the impact of 

increasing connectedness is paramount in today’s world of increasing globalization 

and interdependency [26].

The Key to Urban Resilience

Thus far we have established that understanding the resilience of megacities is critical 

to planning interventions, evaluating options, and anticipating responses, but that 

typical thinking about urban resilience is both naïve and conflicted. So what is the 

way forward?

We believe the key to understanding urban resilience can be summarized in one 

word – networks. To appreciate this assertion we must first accept that cities are 

complex adaptive systems. They exhibit emergent properties, evolutionary 

dynamics, and non-linear responses. But more importantly, cities, like all complex 

systems, are composed of a network of interacting parts and subsystems. Complex 

urban systems are virtually defined as a multiplex of interacting complex networks 

[27-29].

Indeed, modern urban centers, and particularly megacities, are no longer isolated 

fortresses, but large, highly complex interconnected networks of networks. Those 

networks include transportation, financial, resource distribution, sewer and water 

infrastructure, electricity, communication and data, economic trade, social networks, 

and others. These networks can best be conceptualized as “Level 2” socio-techno 

systems under the Allenby and Sarewitz [30] framework of technologies and 

emergent technological systems that have co-evolved as integral parts of human 

beings and societies. Networks like traffic conduits and electrical delivery can be 

mapped through physical inspection, including remote sensing. On the other hand, 

financial and social networks, for example, require tools such as social media 

analytics and data mining. Still others, such as economic interdependence 

networks, require careful analysis with tools from information theory and other 

advanced techniques [31].

Quantifying the dynamics and topological features of these networks is key to 

understanding both their resilience and that of the complex systems they govern [31-

33, 25]. This includes analyzing the diversity of networks embedded in dense urban 

systems. Thus the tasks at hand include at least two major agendas:
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(1) determining how the different networks comprising a city are affected by various 

shocks, and (2) generating the high quality data needed to inform models of urban 

resilience for developing nation megacities, where current data availability is limited.

Conclusion

Given current global trends in population growth, urbanization, and power dynamics, 

megacities and other dense urban environments will continue to grow in strategic 

importance . Thus, it is critical that we enhance our understanding these complex 

systems. This understanding will require embracing a complex adaptive systems 

framework focused on the networks that comprise urban systems.

In particular, assessing multiple policy and tactical options requires the ability to 

anticipate how a megacity will respond to intervention or shocks; and those 

responses are a function of the resilience of an urban system. Thus, the imperative 

is to better understand urban resilience, theoretically ground its assertions, and 

rigorously quantify it for enhanced decision making. We assert that the best way to 

accomplish these goals is through sophisticated analysis of the multitude of 

networks embedded within (and existing between) urban systems.

End Notes

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Karaliopoulos, C. Lac, and B. Plattner (2011). Network Resilience: A Systematic 

Approach. Ieee Communications Magazine 49(7):88-97.

20. Krupa, M. B., F. S. C. III, and A. L. Lovecraft (2014). Robustness or 

resilience? Managing the intersection of ecology and engineering in an urban 

Alaskan fishery. Ecology and Society 19(2):17.

21. Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, editors. (2002). Panarchy: 
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understanding transformations in human and natural systems. Island Press, 

Washington, DC.

22. Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection 

in Evolution. Oxford University Press, New York.

23. Dorner, D. (1996). The logic of failure: recognizing and avoiding error in 

complex situations. Metropolitan Books, New York.

24. Maynard Smith, J. and E. Szathmáry (1997). The major transitions in 

evolution. Oxford University Press, New York.

25. Shutters, S. T., R. Muneepeerakul, and J. Lobo (2015). Quantifying 

urban economic resilience through labour force interdependence. Palgrave 

Communications 1(201510):1-7.

26. Ward, D. (2016). Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the 

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27. Craven, P. and B. Wellman (1973). The Network City. Sociological Inquiry 43(3-

4):57-88.

28. Batty, M. (2013). The New Science of Cities. MIT Press, Cambridge, 

Massachusetts.

29. Neal, Z. P. (2013). The connected city: How networks are shaping the modern 

metropolis. Routledge, New York, NY.

30. Allenby, B. and D. Sarewitz (2011). The techno-human condition. 

MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

31. Ulanowicz, R. E., S. J. Goerner, B. Lietaer, and R. Gomez (2009). 

Quantifying sustainability: Resilience, efficiency and the return of 

information theory. Ecological Complexity 6(1):27-36.

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Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. Nature 

464(7291):1025-1028.

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Reducing the Coupling Strength Leads to a Change from a First to Second Order 

Percolation Transition. Physical Review Letters 105(4):048701.
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Atmospheric Impacts and Effects Predictions and Applications for Future 

Megacity and Dense Urban Area Operations

By David Knapp, Robb Randall and Jim Staley

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 22 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/atmospheric-impacts-andeffects-predictions-and-applications-for-future-megacity-and-denseIntroduction

By 2030 it is expected that more than 60% of the world’s population will live in dense 

urban centers and the majority of these Megacity/Dense Urban Areas are/will be in 

complex terrain environments.

Consequently, weather conditions within these dense urban and complex terrain 

(DUCT) environments will influence a greater populace and can negatively influence 

military operations, community services, and overall situational understanding 

needed for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Extreme weather conditions will impact 

DUCT areas often already overstressed by uncontrolled growth and a degraded 

public infrastructure. Unique weather conditions experienced within the DUCT will 

highlight, and even magnify, weather sensitivities affecting threat, civilian 

populations, and DoD weapons systems and operations. Current state-of-thescience atmospheric sensing, characterization, and forecasting capabilities cannot 

accurately represent the rapidly changing and complex atmospheric processes in a 

DUCT environment. Therefore, innovative and disruptive solutions are required to 

revolutionize locally fine-tuned weather support for DUCT operations, information 

critical to IPB and ISR needs. If localized urban and complex terrain domain weather 

conditions can be accurately sensed, characterized, and predicted, such information 

will be a force multiplier for local commanders tasked with leading operations in 

these multifaceted and intricate domains.

Local Duct Weather Concerns Impacting Operations

There are a variety of atmospheric environment concerns that must be addressed to 

improve the potential for success in a Megacity/DUCT battlefield. A few examples of 

topics that must be addressed by current and future atmospheric scientists are below:

- DUCT Winds: The local complex terrain (natural and man-made urban sprawl, 

etc.), can significantly influence near-surface wind patterns across just a few city 

blocks. Unpredicted wind funneling between, around, and over buildings can lead to 
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small unmanned aerial system failure, inaccurate dispersion plume predictions 

(chemical, biological, smoke, etc., coupled with consequence management), and 

many other related environmental impacts and effects issues for warfighters in such 

domains. Significant research and development efforts are needed to determine 

such microscale wind effects within unique DUCT environments.

- Severe weather concerns: Flooding, drought, excess heat/cold, precipitation, and 

wind influences in each particular Megacity can be drastically different from day to 

day, hour to hour, and from one section of the Megacity to another. Questions 

regarding what the populace does during expected severe weather events and how 

best to militarily influence or control civilians during such events must be addressed. 

Equally important are questions regarding how best to address the need for new 

decision support applications to aid military planners through mission execution in 

such extreme weather conditions. Decision tools addressing how the severe 

weather effects food, communications, fuel, and service distribution, for both military 

and civilian operations, can enhance leadership’s decision toolset for planning and 

execution.

- Battlefield sensor performance: The often complex and varied local weather 

conditions within a DUCT domain can wreak havoc on battlefield sensor 

performance. Since sensors are influenced by not only target, but also background 

signatures, the complex and oftentimes densely packed structures of the urban 

environment together with heating and cooling changes, precipitation, and 

atmospheric aerosol concentrations impact infrared and acoustic sensors and 

performance. 

- Scientific work needed: The spatial resolution of fine-scale atmospheric prediction 

models must be continuously improved and validated for accurate predictions in 

difficult DUCT domains. What weather spatial resolution is required to effectively 

address DUCT weather effects? How often should fine-scale DUCT atmospheric 

prediction models be run to adequately depict the environment? This information 

and answers to the questions noted are critical for accurate microscale weather 

prediction model performance. Additionally, specific weather sensing requirements 

within the DUCT need to be addressed, insofar as determining ideal numbers, types, 

placement, etc., to insure weather prediction models are initialized using the most 

recent and accurate local conditions possible. These sensing advances will provide 

data to enhance the understanding of Megacity atmospheric processes critical to 

improving the underlying physics and dynamics of microscale atmospheric models 

tailored to such domains.

Specific Operational Challenges Within Megacity Domains

1. Military units deploying within a DUCT domain are likely to operate in small 

teams conducting short duration missions. These teams will often execute 

different types of missions within city blocks of each other. The DUCT 

environment can be heavily influenced by microscale weather conditions which 

are often significantly different from one block to the next.
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2. Most DUCT environments are located near significant bodies of water (lakes, 

rivers, littoral), which further influence micro-climates associated with these high 

humidity and valley terrain areas.

3. Aviation operations will likely be a preferred method of mission execution. Wind, 

cloud ceiling, visibility, precipitation, buildings, wires, communication towers, and 

urban terrain objects such as large signs and billboards within the DUCT domain 

will significantly influence all aviation operations.

4. Weather conditions within the DUCT domain effect threat operations just as they 

do friendly force operations. Determining the weather impact differences 

between friendly and threat forces can significantly contribute to the DUCT 

battlefield commander’s IPB knowledge base. Other related challenges relate to 

weather’s impact on concealment of operations for both friendly and threat 

forces.

5. Weather sensing and atmospheric characterization capabilities are lacking within 

DUCT environments. Reliable weather forecasting capabilities (weather forecast 

models) require local weather observations as input to accurately characterize 

current/initial atmospheric conditions. Sufficient numbers of weather observations 

enable meaningful mission watch. Mission watch provides operational 

commanders a real-time weather picture of the Area of Operations (AO) during 

mission execution. Effective weather “mission watch” provides atmospheric 

monitoring of choke points, avenues of approach and even military objectives 

within the AO.

6. Lastly, addressing environmental intelligence for autonomous systems in 

Megacities, swarms of unmanned ground/air micro-vehicles could be equipped 

with weather sensors to dramatically improve currently inadequate local weather 

condition sensing and thus improve the accuracy of local DUCT atmospheric 

prediction models.

Needed Solutions: Weather Technologies to Change Warfare for Decision 

Makers at All Echelons

Looking ahead at the Megacity/DUCT battlefields of 2030 and beyond, there is an 

overwhelming need to revolutionize the science of atmospheric sensing, 

characterizing, and predicting local conditions in DUCT environments. The 

Battlefield Environment Division at Army Research Laboratory (ARL), in conjunction 

with research partners across the DoD, academia, and civilian public and private 

arenas, will be using a combination of existing very fine-scale resolution (microscale) 

meteorological tower arrays, unmanned system-hosted existing/emerging sensor 

technologies, and optimized sensor placement strategies to include crowdsourcing 

techniques to sense and characterize DUCT atmospheric domains. Applying sensor 
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data and characterization improvements (separately and combined) to novel, 

forward-deployed microscale Nowcasting ("pocket modeling") technology hosted on 

computationally complex but extremely efficient General Purpose Graphics 

Processing Units (GPGPU) and smaller portable devices such as warfighter-hosted 

communications platforms is the way of the future for DUCT operational weather 

forecasting.

Observed data must be used to verify/validate the atmospheric modeling weather 

forecast improvements as related to value-added to the DUCT warfighter, showing 

how improved localized weather forecasts significantly enhance warfighter 

operations. Applying all such fine-scale technology improvement lessons learned to 

advanced automated state-of-the-science decision tools focused on predicting 

attrition rates from operations in adverse DUCT weather conditions will be one 

critical result this long-term effort. Thus, Megacity battlefield commanders will be 

provided with a full picture of predicted atmospheric effects and impacts on local 

operations, including expected losses due to hazardous weather. Pocket modeling 

(focused local atmospheric prediction technology hosted on personal 

communications devices), crowdsourcing sensed data, and GPGPU advances for 

atmospheric prediction computing are just a few of the disruptive technologies to be 

used as the capability to run a complex terrain atmospheric model is pushed to the 

lowest echelons in the battlefield which will positively affect current DoD processes. 

Development of deployable hardware and software system prototypes for weather 

effects intelligence and decision tools for DUCT environments is the planned 

culmination of ARL’s work on meteorological sensor arrays, microscale atmospheric 

prediction systems, and unmanned system and atmospheric sensing platform 

resources to reach these technological goals.

There are a number of critical steps being addressed to move the science forward 

as the needed technological advances are developed:

• Perform research to understand atmospheric processes in DUCT 

environments. Effective weather sensing and atmospheric characterization of 

the AO will optimize mission execution by providing essential input to weather 

forecast models. This improves forecast accuracy and therefore confidence 

in planning and execution of all military operations; forecast accuracy 

improvements mean a safer operating environment for military and civilian 

personnel, with few, if any, weather surprises. Weather sensing in DUCT 

domains also provides critical, real-time situational awareness supporting 

current operations. A comprehensive understanding of current atmospheric 

conditions enables the commander’s full utilization of the AO, in both time and 

space, allowing for the selection of tactics, weapons, and targets based, at 

least in part, on atmospheric conditions. Accurate and timely weather 

observations are a true force multiplier, protecting military and civilian 
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operations from the uncertainty of mission-limiting weather conditions.

• Advanced development of microscale models. Develop DUCT fine-scale 

operational local atmospheric modeling capabilities suitable for forecast 

center and forward-deployed implementation on the smallest computational 

platforms possible. Such capabilities will support both operational theater 

forecast centers as well as the lowest battlefield echelons with on-scene local 

atmospheric predictions. These forecasts will have the capability to ingest the 

most current, locally-sensed atmospheric data. Local forward-deployed 

atmospheric modeling capabilities will ensure timely weather forecast updates 

to Megacity commanders and decision-makers down to actionable Soldier 

levels. Today, precise prediction of local weather events is limited by the 

resolution of currently fielded weather forecast modeling capabilities and the 

availability of weather observations.Improving the resolution of weather 

predictions, especially in the complex terrain of a Megacity, requires a 

significant increase in the number of weather observations and optimized 

placement of weather sensors in the domain to initialize the weather 

predictions. Research will consider the value of remotely-sensed 

observations (e.g. satellite, radar, etc) as input to these improved forecast 

model capabilities. Weather sensing capabilities, combined with better model 

physics, will significantly improve the weather forecast accuracies within an 

urban environment. Additionally, developing forward-deployed and frequently 

updated small “pocket” computer platform atmospheric modeling capabilities, 

providing data to on-board weather decision tools will significantly enhance 

the local timeliness and accuracy of microscale DUCT weather predictions.

• New weather related decision aids include sensor performance tools for 

multiple modalities, including acoustic, infrared, radar, and seismic. Urban 

routing tools must account for manned and unmanned ground and aerial 

vehicles. Decision aid development must include applications supporting a 

prediction of human domain conditions based on weather and climate 

combined with and including populace reactions to military operations. 

DUCT-focused ensemble probabilistic predictions will produce forecast 

confidence output for decision support tools of high interest and use by 

military commanders and decision makers within the Megacity.

Summary

Weather conditions significantly influence military operations within Megacity DUCT 

operational domains. Confident execution of military operations demand 

comprehensive weather support at spatial and temporal resolutions that accurately 

depict microclimates found in every DUCT environment. These weather conditions 

effect all aspects of the geospatial environment within the Megacity.
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Increased resolution and accuracy of deployed weather support products is crucial, 

especially so in the DUCT environment. Effective weather sensing, atmospheric 

characterization and prediction will optimize mission execution by providing critical, 

real-time situational awareness supporting future operations as well as providing 

essential input to weather forecast models and decision support tools. This 

improves forecast accuracy and confidence in planning and execution of all military 

operations. Forecast accuracy improvements mean a safer operating environment 

for military and civilian personnel.

This disruptive-based approach ensures DoD DUCT battlefield Commanders will 

have a full picture of predicted atmospheric effects and impacts on DUCT 

operations, including expected losses due to hazardous weather. The work 

highlighted in this paper will optimize our understanding and application of crucial 

weather conditions within the Megacity operations as future urban operating 

environments become the norm.
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Complex IPB

By Tom Pike and Eddie Brown

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 24 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/complex-ipb

The last 15 years of conflict have shown the difficulty in understanding the internal 

dynamics of a foreign population. Understanding these internal dynamics, however, 

is essential to implementing policies and taking action to influence the foreign 

population’s behavior in pursuit of U.S. goals. The U.S. Government must improve 

its capability to rapidly analyze foreign populations and the need for this capability 

will only increase as megacities, with their incredibly complex population systems 

become more numerous. Unfortunately, the challenge is not only finding effective 

approaches to understand foreign populations but also finding approaches that can 

integrate assessments from a Battalion Intelligence Officer all the way to a strategic 

level agency. This integration is necessary to synchronize the efforts of the large 

and likewise complex U.S. Government. Acknowledging these daunting challenges 

demands the U.S., and in particular Army intelligence, work to find and apply 

improved analytic frameworks for foreign population analysis.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) provides a strong nucleus to develop 

new frameworks, but must evolve past its force on force focus to an approach that 

analyzes multiple groups competing within a population. The integration of new 

concepts from complex adaptive system theory provides rigorously tested concepts 

many of which have already been incorporated into common analytic software—

such as Analyst Notebook, Palantir, and others—to cope with the problems of 

Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Complexity based approaches have 

also been the core of strategic assessments which have influenced the highest 

levels of government. The challenge is to operationalize these approaches so 

intelligence analysts, at all levels, can gain an understanding that leads to 

synergistic policy and action. A critical capability to support this evolution of IPB is 

the development and integration of Agent Based Models. Agent based Models, a 

The right perspective makes hard problems easy while the wrong perspective makes easy problems 

hard.

-- Scott Page
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proven tool of complex adaptive systems, can provide staffs and decision makers an 

option exploration tool to help them visualize possible effects of their policies and 

actions.

Using IPB as the nucleus and integrating concepts from complex adaptive systems 

theory generates Complex IPB. Complex IPB is the next generation of IPB and has 

the potential to dramatically improve foreign population analysis as well as improve 

U.S. ability to influence foreign populations.

The strength of IPB is its underlying logic. A reasonable prediction of threat 

behavior can be made by analyzing the situation combined with an assessment of 

the threat’s capability. This logic is evident by reviewing the four steps of IPB. Step 

one is to define the operational environment. This is a description of the area of 

operations’ significant characteristics that can influence friendly or threat courses of 

action. Step two is to describe the environmental effects on operations, for example 

a densely forested swamp would be severely restricted or no-go terrain. Together, 

these two steps are the constants, which the threat has little ability to change. Step 

three is evaluate the threat.[1] This is the threat’s capability, through the context of 

IPB

Define the Area of Operations 

Describe environmental effects 

Evaluate the threat

Evaluate threat courses of action

Complex IPB

Define the Area of Operations 

Describe fitness landscape effects 

Evaluate the major groups

Evaluate major groups’ courses of action 

Asses the groups interaction 

Evaluate population behavior
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the terrain and weather effect. What is the range of the threat’s weapons and what is 

the threat’s vehicles ability to negotiate the terrain accounting for the weather? What 

knowledge does the threat have in constructing IEDs? How easily is the threat able

to move through the population without interdiction by local authorities? The 

conventional threat must choose different courses of action in a desert than in a 

jungle, while the insurgent threat must alter how it plants IEDs based on how freely it 

can move and its capacity to construct them. This is the simple elegance of IPB. 

The given situation and the threat’s capability limits what they can and cannot do. 

This situation leads to the fourth step, evaluate threat courses of action, a 

reasonable prediction of what actions the threat can take reduced by the 

environmental and capability constraints.[2] These courses of action or hypotheses 

are then confirmed or denied through the implementation of a collection plan. The 

predictions of threat behavior allows friendly forces to maximize the limited capability 

of their limited collection assets to determine what course of action the threat 

adopted and how they are adapting. This logic can be applied not only to threat 

forces but also to groups in foreign populations. To understand how to do this it is 

useful to first examine the decision making of an individual.

The choices of an individual sitting within a population socio-cultural-politicalecosystem (fitness landscape for short) are constrained by the same general logic 

which IPB uses to analyze a threat force. When a person wakes up they will make 

decisions to generally maximize their situation. This individual confronts a fitness 

landscape which has an impact on what action the individual may take. This is 

similar to the terrain analysis and effects in IPB but with the added layers- politics, 

economics, social, information, infrastructure, environment and possibly more. The 

individual also has a capability (or fitness function) such as a profession, education, 

ethnic group, savings or family connections. A person survives or thrives based on 

their fitness function and its ability to extract resources from the fitness landscape. 

This simple dynamic is prevalent across time and space. In the 1980s, while the 

country faced a horrific insurgency from the Shining Path, a group from the Institute 

of Liberty and Democracy wanted to see how long it would take a person to set up a 

two-person sewing machine shop in a shanty town of Lima, Peru. It took more than 

1800 hours, which when accounting for access to the government offices was more 

than 300 days and cost 32 times the monthly minimum wage.[3] When similar 

studies where done in Peru on everything from marriage licenses to property 

transfers the results were the same staggering obstacles.[4] The implications were 

clear, Peruvians in Lima’s shanty towns were not joining the legal economy because 

the bureaucracy was such a daunting obstacle, severe no-go terrain, that it was 

impossible for them to do so. The government began to reform this situation and 

these reforms were seen as a crucial in defeating the Shining Path insurgency. In a 

lecture at the National Defense University, Dr. David Kilcullen described the choice 
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for many Afghans working to find resolution to a dispute. If they went to the local 

Afghan Government official they would be beaten up and no action would be taken. 

If they went to the Taliban they could expect at least some sort of predictable, albeit 

harsh justice.[5] Many individuals therefore choose to ask the Taliban for justice, 

since at least there was a chance of resolution of their issue. The dynamic is the 

same as a threat commander making decisions in IPB, an individual has a capability 

to face the situation and from this develops courses of action.

The challenge then becomes analyzing hundreds to millions of people and their 

decisions instead of one threat unit. At first glance, this challenge seems 

overwhelming. Fortunately, complex adaptive systems have a property called 

emergence. Just as a threat unit is made up of a number of individuals but can be 

viewed as a single entity due to the military structure, emergence has a similar effect 

without the requirement of a centralized command structure.[6] Large groups of 

people will make the same decision without a centralized decision making process. 

This phenomenon is evident in the recent conflicts, where different tribes, ethnic 

groups and individuals decided to support either the insurgency or the government. 

Although each group or individual may have had different motives for their decision 

when these micro- decisions aggregated together the result was either the 

strengthening or weakening of the insurgency.

Thanks to the property of emergence analysts, can look at groups of people and 

view them as a cohesive whole. Analysts do not need to understand each person, 

instead they can identify the key groups within a population and use the same IPB 

logic to try and predict these groups’ courses of action by analyzing their situation 

and capability. Unlike IPB where the terrain is a constant, however, groups can 

actively shape the fitness landscape they are negotiating. 

Arguably, the reason a fitness landscape of cultural, economic, social and other 

dynamics even exists is because it is the result of the interaction of lots of individuals 

and groups, who are negotiating it each day. The idea that each group contributes to 

the shape of the fitness landscape means different groups may be able to radically 

alter it. This is a significant difference from IPB as the threat, cannot turn a desert 

into a jungle, turn a machine gun into a tank, or make a secure radio suddenly 

compatible with a newly arrived foreign partner. Coalition actions in Iraq clearly 

demonstrate how a group can significantly change the fitness landscape of a 

population. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of 2003, being a Ba’athist in the Iraqi fitness 

landscape provided an avenue of approach to jobs and security. After the invasion 

the coalition made contentious decisions to bar Ba’athist members[7] which 

immediately and dramatically altered this terrain. Instead of having an avenue of 

approach, Ba’athist’s now faced no-go terrain when trying to get government jobs or 

security. Unfortunately, these same individuals, were the people in the country who 
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had many critical capabilities from technical knowledge of the infrastructure to 

organizational understanding of the government. This decision had cascading 

effects throughout the rest of the coalition’s time in theater, with many arguing this 

decision drove key Iraqi leaders to the insurgency.[8] The Coalition dramatically 

reshaped the fitness landscape, but at the same time they had to negotiate the new 

landscape they created. Groups within a population have the ability to influence the 

fitness landscape which shapes the situation of the population every day and 

subsequently influences decisions. Evaluating group courses of action uses the 

same reasoning underlying IPB, however, the groups being analyzed have greater 

ability to shape the situation.

Evaluating group courses of action then leads to the next step of Complex IPB, 

assessing the groups’ interaction. This step is effectively wargaming from the Military 

Decision Making Process (MDMP). Each group will be making decisions to 

maximize their situation and outcompete any perceived rivals. They will adjust their 

courses of action based on what their rivals are doing. Having multiple groups 

increases the complexity of what one is analyzing. For example, if there is an 

insurgency, with a government group, an insurgent group, and three more major 

groups (a total of five groups) in the population each with the three possible courses 

of action, there are 125 possible combinations. This challenge can be simplified as 

the possible behavior of concern will likely only have a few categories. Despite this 

large number of different combinations the effect of these combinations will still fall 

into four broad categories. The insurgency may be (1) expanding and gaining 

legitimacy (groups supporting the insurgents), (2) contracting and losing legitimacy 

(groups supporting the government), (3) is in a stalemate with neither the 

government nor insurgency gaining ground, or (4) an alternate group is rising up to 

take power from the government and insurgency. In addition, most of the 

combinations may fall into only one or two categories. This allows analysts to 

generalize the combinations and focus on those combinations leading to or away 

from US objectives.

The interaction of the groups and the courses of action they pursue leads to the 

population’s behavior. This statement is significant because it fundamentally defies 

the Westphalian tradition, and the default view, of viewing foreign states as a single 

entity. Instead, foreign populations are more like ecosystems, where the various 

groups are in a delicate equilibrium and the government is only one part, albeit an 

important part, of the functioning of that ecosystem. Evaluating the population 

behavior is an assessment of the interaction of major groups within that population 

as they pursue courses of action. These interactions may result in an unstable state, 

a dictatorial regime, or an emerging democracy. Critically, this dynamic is scalable, 

whether the population is a village, a province, a nation, or a region of the world. 

Allowing analysts at all levels to use a common approach to understand the 
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population of concern. The behavior of the population is a result of the interactions 

of the groups within it at all levels. This assessment of the population’s behavior is 

also the culmination of Complex IPB. Applying the Complex IPB framework will 

provide decisions makers a better understanding of the internal dynamics which are 

driving the populations’ behavior; this understanding should allow leaders to take 

more effective action and better synergize the instruments of power to achieve U.S. 

Objectives.

Applying the Complex IPB framework to population analysis will improve the 

situational understanding of any population in any environment, this understanding 

can be further enhanced through the development and integration of Agent Based 

Modeling tools into the analytic and decision making processes. The primary tool to 

model complex adaptive systems is Agent Based Models (ABM) As Agent Based 

Models are unfamiliar to many readers please see the embedded graphic or if you 

would prefer a video please follow this link. The model the graphic below portrays 

is very relevant to Dense Urban Areas as it is a model of slum formation. On the left 

of the picture are the input parameters, which allows users to manipulate variables 

and see the impact of adjusting these variables. The output parameters are different

ways of measuring the models behavior to provide insight into what is happening.

Graphic One: “Slums provide shelter for nearly one third of the world’s urban 

population, most of them in the developing world. Slumulation represents an agent-
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based model which explores questions such as i) how slums come into existence, 

expand or disappear ii) where and when they emerge in a city and iii) which 

processes may improve housing conditions for urban poor.[9]

ABMs have already proven effective in analyzing and informing policy on everything 

from foreign population behavior to the US electric grid to leadership in 

organizations.[10] ABMs are proven tools which takes the perspective of the agents. 

An agent is a discrete entity with its own behavior and own goals. In the context of 

the Complex IPB framework, agents would represent the major groups and their 

internal variations. These agents then interact with each other. The fitness 

landscape is the terrain in which they interact. These interactions then produce a

possible emergent behavior of the population. This emergent behavior is the U.S. 

objective. Are the groups supporting the insurgency or the government? Does the 

fitness function of one group allow it to gain dominance over the system undermining 

the democratic institutions? ABMs allow for the adjustment of variables within a 

group’s fitness function or a manipulation of the fitness landscape. In the application, 

the action of the analyst may be to adjust the size of the money variable for a 

group’s fitness function or adjust a variable of the fitness landscape to represent a 

change in the government process which may result in restrictive terrain becoming 

an avenue of approach for a previously excluded group. As the adjustments are 

made the analysts, staffs and decision makers would be able to see how multiple 

changes at different points in the system may affect the interaction of the groups and 

the subsequent behavior of the population. From this course of action development 

they then may adjust how money is dispersed to influence the power of competing 

fitness functions, help pass new laws to provide access to previously excluded 

groups, and/or focus on attacking a different part of the insurgent network. A 

Complex IPB agent based model application will provide analysts, staffs and 

decision makers an option exploration tools that gives them insights into how the 

different groups may react to U.S. policy and actions.

ABM and its integration into decision making processes does face hurdles for 

implementation. The first hurdle is “can a generic model be created that any analyst 

can set specifically enough to analyze the local problem set or will an Army element 

need to be created to build models specific to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and 

their particular problem?” In other words, can a universal application be created that 

is both effective and user-friendly enough that analysts can apply it to their local 

situation whether in humanitarian missions in Africa or active insurgencies in South 

Asia. Or, will a group of experts need to do the coding and formulas necessary for a 

realistic model to be created that analysts can further adjust to the specific situation 

of the local area. If a group of experts is needed to support ABM model, it cannot 

be experts working in isolation instead it must be a symbiotic relationship with the 

BCT forward, where the entities are working as a team to further refine and update 
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the model so staffs can employ it to achieve their objectives. The second hurdle is 

these models will only ever give a probabilistic outcome and will have to be run 

multiple times to see what behavior has the highest probability. This is a reflection of 

reality and it often creates some computing challenges. The nature of the model, its 

complexity and the austerity of the environment will determine what is feasible. Even 

if Complex IPB must be completed in analog, it will still provide an improved 

understanding of the situation. ABMs enhance the approach they do not replace it. 

The third hurdle is the need to federate production when conducting a campaign. 

The analysis of a village will have an impact on the analysis of a region, which will 

have an impact on the analysis of the country. From step one, any plan to integrate 

ABM into decision making must look at how to link these ABMs together. National 

action has a local impact and local events can have a national impact. ABM can and 

must serve as a catalyst to help synchronize whole of government efforts when 

influencing the behavior of a foreign population. ABM is a powerful tool which must 

accompany Complex IPB and be integrated into decision making processes whether 

MDMP for a BCT or discussions by the National Security Council.

The foundation of IPB is a strong and powerful logic. Understanding a threat’s 

situation and its capability within the given situation allows for a reasonable 

prediction of that threat’s behavior. This same logic can be applied to most people 

who are fighting each day to maximize their situation. The property of emergence 

allows analysts to focus on the main groups of the population instead of trying to 

understand the millions of people who may be in the area of operations. Complex 

IPB then follows the same initial steps as IPB, but with a focus on groups and an 

incorporation of the more dynamic fitness landscape (the cultural, social, economic, 

information, government terrain): (1) Define the Area of Operations, (2) Describe the 

Fitness Landscape effects, (3) Evaluate the major groups (4) Evaluate major group 

courses of actions. Complex IPB must then add an additional two steps. (5) Assess 

the groups interaction and (6) Evaluate population behavior. These two steps follow 

logically from the base of IPB. Complex IPB can then be enhanced through 

development and application of a Complex IPB Agent Based Model application. 

Although its development and implementation faces some hurdles, ABMs are a 

proven tool, which can provide analysts, staffs and decision makers the ability to 

explore numerous options and combinations of options and visually see the possible 

effects. Complex IPB is the natural evolution of IPB and has the potential to improve 

analysis and influence of foreign populations.

End Notes

[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, (November 2014), 1-1-1-4

[2] Ibid, 1-1-1-4
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[3] Hernando De Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism, (New 

York: Basic Books, 1989), xxi-xxxiv

[4] Ibid

[5]David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency,” (lecture, Afghanistan-Pakistan Foundation 

Course, National Defense University, October 6, 2009)

[6]Understanding Complexity, taught by Scott E. Page, Lecture 6

[7] FRONTLINE: The Lost Year in Iraq, (October 17, 2006)

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/ (accessed May 26th, 2014)

[8] Ibid

[9] Patel, A., Crooks, A.T. and Koizumi, N,. “Slumulation: an Agent-based Modeling 

Approach to Slum Formation”, (2012), 

http://www.css.gmu.edu/Slums/PatelCrooksKoizumi_Slumulation.pdf, 

(accessed 27 February 2016).

[10] Joshua Epstein, Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based 

Computational Modeling, (Princeton Unversity Press, 2007)
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Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI) Sharing for Transnational 

Threat Actors

By Victor R. Morris

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 22 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/identity-and-biometricsenabled-intelligence-bei-sharing-for-transnational-threat-actors

Global Terrorism Trend Summary

According to the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, excluding Turkey, Europe accounted 

for 21 percent of all foreign fighters in 2014. Half of the foreign fighters are from 

neighboring Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) countries and an additional four 

percent are from Turkey 1. Unfortunately, France has the distinction of being 

Europe’s leading exporter of jihadis, nearly 1,600 out of a continental total of over 

5,000, according to government figures. Despite the government’s efforts after the 

Charlie Hebdo attacks in January to block and prevent citizens from leaving for the 

war zone, the pace of departures has remained essentially unchanged 2. 

Furthermore, Belgium has sent more young men and women per capita than 

anywhere in the West and another global terrorism trend asserts that private citizens 

are increasingly the targets of terrorist attacks. Deaths of private citizens increased 

by 172 percent between 2013 and 2014 compared to the total number of deaths 

which rose 80 percent 3. In light of recent events in Europe and the contemporary

operating environment, terrorist activity and associated political violence will 

continue to have direct and indirect effects on European security.

This article outlines initiatives to enhance international identity operations and 

intelligence product sharing, which are the result of compliant biometric data 

capture, transmission and intelligence fusion among intergovernmental law 

enforcement and military organizations to identify threats. The proposed initiatives 

describe what is required within international biometric cycles and frameworks once 

an interoperable and compliant environment has been established. These initiatives 

support threat network pattern and predictive analysis, personality based 

engagement and identity dominance attempts in all of the operational environment’s 

domains and systems; specifically the human domain in population centric conflicts. 

The overall goal of these initiatives is in support of operations involving the 

identification of threat actors from the civilian population.
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Intergovernmental Organizations: INTERPOL, Europol, NATO, OSCE and 

Frontex

First, it is necessary to outline the organizations mentioned above. This article 

focuses on the following organizations and the criticality of sharing identity 

intelligence: International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), European 

Police Office (Europol), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for 

Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and External Borders (Frontex). The United 

States Army European Command (EUCOM) and United States Army Intelligence 

and Security Command (INSCOM) are not discussed in detail, but are integral 

military and national organizations responsible for unified combatant command, 

scientific and technical intelligence (S&T) and general military intelligence. The 

National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Defense Forensics and Biometrics 

Agency (DFBA) and FBI’s Next Generation Identification (NGI) system are also 

currently at the forefront of identity intelligence and interoperability programs and 

operations at the inter-agency and international levels. The NGI organization model 

of bringing relevant parties and databases together serves as an effective real-world 

example of international cooperation involving Identity Intelligence 4. Additionally, 

the Secure Identity and Biometrics Association (SIBA), International Organization for 

Migration (IOM) and United Nations are not discussed in detail, but play a vital role 

in identity management policy and practice. The UN Security Council facilitates 

peacekeeping operations which currently involve biometrics support to humanitarian 

operations involving asylum seekers 5.

First, INTERPOL was established as the International Criminal Police Commission 

(ICPC) in 1923 and is currently an intergovernmental organization facilitating 

international police cooperation headquartered in Lyon, France. As of 2015, it is 

composed of 190 countries and is the second largest political organization after the 

United Nations in terms of international representation. Some of INTERPOL’s work 

involves counter threat financing, money laundering and corruption. This 

international organization also functions as a network of criminal law enforcement 

agencies from different countries, facilitating administrative liaison among the law 

enforcement agencies of the member countries and providing communications and 

database assistance. A new program of activity in development within INTERPOL’s 

Chemical and Explosive Terrorism Prevention Unit is discussed later as an example 

of multi-agency information sharing and international activity.

Next, Europol is the law enforcement agency of the European Union. The agency’s 

origin stems from earlier intergovernmental networks created after several terrorist 

acts, notably the hostage taking and subsequent massacre during the 1972 Olympic 

Games in Munich. Currently, the organization is headquartered in The Hague and 

has a staff of 912 regular police officers and 185 liaison officers, as well as 
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personnel seconded from national law enforcement organizations. EUROPOL’s 

capabilities and requirements are related to INTERPOL with regard to criminal 

intelligence, counterterrorism, counter organized crime operations, cyber-crime, 

security cooperation, and immigration services. The investigative processes are 

enabled by information exchange, intelligence analysis, expertise and training. 

Lastly, EUROPOL is currently adapting and evolving to counter the global terrorism 

threat. Building on existing activities, Europol launched the European Counter 

Terrorist Centre (ECTC) on 1 January 2016 as a platform by which Member States 

can increase information sharing and operational coordination, focusing on foreign 

terrorist fighters, the trafficking of illegal firearms and terrorist financing. Member 

States will provide counter-terrorism experts to the ECTC to form an enhanced 

cross-border investigation support unit, capable of providing quick and 

comprehensive support to the investigation of major terrorist incidents in the 

European Union 6. Additionally, Europol’s Scanning, Analysis and Notification 

(SCAN) Team provides EU national authorities with an additional strategic organized 

crime (OC) product which involves early warning notices of new organized crime 

threats.

Thirdly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) also called the North Atlantic 

Alliance is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty 

signed on 4 April 1949. NATO's main organizational headquarters is in Brussels, 

Belgium where NATO's secretary general also resides. NATO's operational 

headquarters is located in Mons, Belgium where NATO's Supreme Allied 

Commander of the nations also resides. Belgium is one of the 28 member states 

across North America and Europe. An additional 22 countries participate in NATO's 

Partnership for Peace program, with 15 other countries involved in institutionalized 

dialogue programs. Within NATO there are a myriad of concepts, organizations and 

departments which deal solely with counterterrorism. NATO’s military concept for 

defense against terrorism (MC 472) serves as the primary reference for this section 

and identifies four different roles for military operations for Defense Against 

Terrorism (DAT): anti-terrorism defensive measures, consequence management, 

counter terrorism offensive measures, and military cooperation 7. The military 

cooperation Concept states that NATO must harmonize its procedures and efforts 

with civil authorities within nations in order to maximize its effectiveness against 

terrorism. The four roles also support the Programme of Work for Defense Against 

Terrorism which involve: incident management, force protection/survivability, and 

network engagement related biometrics. Additionally, all of the aforementioned 

capabilities and requirements associated with INTERPOL and EUROPOL directly 

integrate and overlap with emerging network identification and engagement 

concepts involving: counter- terrorism/defense against terrorism, counter 

transnational criminal organizations, counter cyber threats, and counter piracy. 
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These concepts addresses threat networks from a regional and transnational 

perspective and simultaneously support strategic activities that enable network 

engagement within a Joint Operational Area (JOA). Lastly, it is important to note, 

that informing processes like NATO Human Network Analysis and Support to 

Targeting (HNAT) and Attack the Networks (AtN) now called Network Engagement 

(NE) are integrated into existing planning processes (OPP, JOPP, MDMP, and 

TLPs) and support systems analysis and engagement of friendly, neutral, unknown 

and threat actors in complicated multi-dimensional operational environments.

Next, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the 

world's largest security- oriented intergovernmental organization. The origins can be 

traced to the 1975 conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held 

in Helsinki, Finland. The OSCE is concerned with early warning, conflict prevention, 

crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and border monitoring. The 

organization includes 57 participating states in Europe, northern and central Asia 

and North America. For the purposes of this article, the focal point for the OSCE 

involves the Politico-Military or first dimension. The OSCE takes a comprehensive 

approach to the politico-military dimension of security and seeks to enhance military 

security by promoting greater openness, transparency and co-operation. Key 

security aspects involve arms control, border management, combating terrorism, 

conflict prevention, military reform, policing and implementation 8. The OSCE also 

looks at human rights issues in relation to counter- terrorism which is an important 

point when it comes to ethical concerns and privacy by design initiatives regarding 

biometric capture, transmission, sharing and storage.

Lastly, Frontex from the French Frontières Extérieures or external borders is an 

agency of the European Union which was established in 2004 to manage the 

cooperation between national border guards securing its external borders. Frontex 

operations aim to detect and stop illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorist 

infiltration which has significant implications for NATO’s interdependent purpose for 

biometrics operations involving threat identification. The agency is currently seated 

in Warsaw, Poland. The official missions and tasks include: promoting, coordinating 

and developing European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights 

charter, which the concept of Integrated Border Management. Activity areas are: 

joint operations, training, risk analysis, research, rapid response capability, 

information systems and information sharing, and cooperation with non-European 

Union countries 9. The most important functions with regard to this assessment 

include intelligence, associated pattern and predictive analysis, and sharing. Risk 

analysis is the starting point for all Frontex activities, from joint operations through 

training to research studies. The agency collates data from member states, EU 

bodies, and all-source intelligence within and beyond Europe’s borders. 

Furthermore, to analyze the data, Frontex has its own risk analysis model called the 
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common integrated risk analysis model or CIRAM. CIRAM enables the assessment 

of the relative risks posed by different threats and was developed in close 

consultation with member states, and is applicable both at EU and national level. 

Lastly, Frontex has established a community called the Frontex Risk Analysis 

Network (FRAN) that links the intelligence networks of individual European countries 

with pan-European organization. This provides the framework for sharing knowledge 

and producing analytical and strategic reports on the current state of play at the 

external borders as well as for the production of the Semi-Annual and Annual Risk 

Analysis documents and other, tailored, risk-analysis products 10. Frontex is 

pioneering controlled personal data processing, interoperability, intelligence and 

information sharing involving patterns and trends in irregular migration and crossborder criminal activities at the external borders. In order to cope with the current 

security environment, this organization must continue to evolve and fuse identity and 

all-source intelligence at existing situation centers, while acting as the central point 

of contact for international organizations like INTERPOL and Europol.

All-source Intelligence Critical Components: Identity and Biometric Enabled 

Intelligence (BEI)

Based on the above discussion, it is apparent there is a significant amount of 

commonality, interoperability, and privacy consideration with regard to decompartmentalizing similar counter-terrorism campaigns. What is not apparent 

involves the importance of the intelligence process and sharing of Identity 

Intelligence as a result of privacy enhancing technological frameworks throughout 

the aforementioned organizations. In order understand the associated capability 

gaps, a concise understanding of biometrics, intelligence products and identity 

intelligence is required. First, biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual 

based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. A 

biometric is a measureable physical characteristic or personal behavioral trait used 

to recognize the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual 11. 

Furthermore, Identity Intelligence is one of the eight categories of intelligence 

products and a vital component of all-source intelligence analysis and fusion. The 

categories overlap and the same intelligence and information can be used in each of 

the categories. From a joint doctrinal perspective, Identity Intelligence or “I2” can be 

defined as: results from the fusion of identity attributes (biologic, biographic, 

behavioral, and reputational information) and other information and intelligence 

associated with those attributes collected across all intelligence disciplines. I2 

utilizes enabling intelligence activities, like biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI), 

forensics enabled intelligence (FEI), cyber enabled intelligence (CEI) and document 

and media exploitation (DOMEX), to discover the existence of unknown potential 

threat actors by connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials, 

analyzing patterns of life, and characterizing their level of potential threats to US 
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interests 12 . BEI is a core complimentary intelligence capability and is the 

information associated with and/or derived from biometric signatures and the 

associated contextual information. A key result of BEI involves the positive 

identification of a specific person and/or matching of an unknown identity to a place, 

activity, device, component or weapon. A broader definition of identity intelligence 

highlights it as a component of NATO’s overall security intelligence 13. This 

definition accurately describes 21st century warfare executed through espionage, 

sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized 

disclosure. Though doctrinally sound, the definitions alone do not capture the 

enrollment, identification or verification functions that begins with tactical level “raw” 

biometric capture, transmission, identification, all-source intelligence fusion, and 

identity intelligence product development. Intelligence sharing drives key leader’s 

decision-making which facilitates international deliberate and dynamic targeting and 

prosecution efforts.

Identity Intelligence Interoperability Assessment, Implications and Way Ahead

The NATO Standardization Agreement 4715: Biometrics Data, Interchange, 

Watchlisting and Reporting was initiated in 2009 and published in 2013, and 

currently accounts for policy and technical gaps involving European Organizations 

with regard to biometric interoperability and encryption. Biometric Encryption (BE) is 

a vital requirement of interoperability programs and involves the employment and 

sharing of “untraceable biometrics” technologies that seek to translate the biometric 

data provided by the user. In this case, a unique biometric template is not created or 

contained. NATO’s Communication and Information (NCI) Agency and associated 

coordination groups are pioneering automated biometric identification systems and 

authoritative sources with “game-changing" privacy by design concepts involving an 

encrypted biometric "ping 'n ring" positively pave the way for regulated biometrics 

data transmission and sharing. In summary, the "ping 'n ring" concept involves 

anonymous biometric data queries which when matched in certain databases yield a 

reference number and point of contact for follow- on bilateral action (user centric 

based on privacy by design principles). With that being said, the greater gap 

involves the deliberate fusion of biometric enabled intelligence, all-source 

intelligence and sharing resulting in an “I know all about you and your associations” 

situation. Another beneficial aspect of this sharing is the mutual trust and 

relationships that are developed, which leads to more proactive dissemination of 

biometric enabled intelligence products and updates on a regular and routine basis 

(proactive not reactive). Homegrown terrorism involving “known and unknown 

wolves” and/or “Lone Mujahid” and “Lone Jihad Legion”14 are the main perpetrators 

of terrorist activity in the West. Seventy per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the 

West since 2006 were by lone wolf terrorists with the rest being unknown or group 
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attacks by more than three attackers 15. Although, Islamic fundamentalism was not 

the main cause of terrorism in the West during the last nine years, the current 

situation involving DAESH 16 will likely shift the statistics for the foreseeable future 

and become the main cause. Another indirect effect of DAESH’s paramilitary 

extremist state operations and terror campaigns involves emboldening humantrafficking and smuggling networks oriented towards refugees fleeing Syria and Iraq 

which are a direct effect of DAESH and an authoritarian regimes. The migrant and 

refugee situation also pose security related concerns for Europe for a variety of 

reasons. The point of this article is not to discuss the migrant crisis, but to highlight 

the importance of tactical multi-modal biometric capture, identification, verification 

and sharing to accurately identify potential threats and violent extremist network 

affiliations through Identity Intelligence. The pre-emptive identification of individual 

cell members may demonstrate non-linear change involving local, connected, 

associated cells and materiel. This involves the disproportional inputs of interdicting 

one cell member which results in exponential (non-linear) outputs involving the 

exploitation of personnel and materiel for intelligence value, tactical and operational 

gain.

Intergovernmental Identity Intelligence Lessons Learned, Best Practices and 

Solutions

In order to capture biometric data, get results from a database(s) (identify-threat, 

verify-friendly or store), and accelerate rule of law proceedings, greater effort needs 

to be placed on BEI fusion and sharing between military and law enforcement 

organizations. Due to the global nature of the threat, law enforcement agencies 

cannot go at this alone and require support from military organizations to track and 

identify threats and vice versa. The aforementioned assessment is evident from 

Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom’s evidence based operations, warrant based 

targeting and rule of law lines of operations and effective governance lines of effort. 

Both operations utilized biometric and forensic enabled intelligence and a robust 

library of biometric signatures to non-lethally remove insurgents from the battlefield 

through prosecution in host nation court. These efforts involved inter-agency 

cooperation and non-lethal engagement of unknown, friendly, neutral and threat 

networks in a dynamic operational environment. The same concepts and 

implications should be applied to on-going operations like Ukraine’s Anti-terrorist 

Operation (ATO) and French led Operation Barkhane in the five-state Sahel region 

(G5 Sahel) for the same mid to long term effects involving current targeting, 

exploitation for prosecution and interdiction of foreign fighters. Currently, Program 

TEAL, whose name is the result of combining blue law enforcement and green 

military, is a new program of activity in development and is associated with 

INTERPOL’s Chemical and Explosive Terrorism Prevention Unit 17. In summary, the 

activities involve multi-agency and cross-jurisdictional CIED teams, coordination of 
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information sharing, and sub-projects targeting people and devices. Project 

Watchmaker is one of the sub-projects and involves identifying, locating and 

prosecuting terrorists involved in the manufacture and use of IEDs and other 

explosives.INTERPOL is also intensifying efforts to support and encourage national, 

regional and international efforts to monitor and prevent Foreign Terrorist Fighters 

(FTFs).

In order to be successful a new project needs to be developed which captures key 

components of intelligence fusion and sharing from all organizations and integrates 

them into one concept or integrated concepts. The concept which is included in all 

operational phases needs to involve the following components: Interagency 

European Biometrics Center of Excellence (CoE), EU Border Assistance Mission 

support, border management and technical intelligence (TECHINT) systems 

integration into ping and ring architecture, dedicated BEI analytical cells in existing 

civil-military fusion centers, access, training and production of Identity Intelligence 

products (immediate, current and strategic), and recurrent vetting. BEI products and 

resources include, but are not limited to: Biometric Match Reports (BMR), Biometric 

Enabled Watch Lists (BEWL), Biometric Intelligence Analytic Report (BIAR), 

Biometric Named Areas of Interest (BX NAI), Single Source Biometric Reports 

(SSBR), tracking intelligence and prosecution support packages. Core tasks 

associated with this concept involve: identifying, locating, and prosecuting terrorists 

affiliated with collective violent extremist organizational (VEO) activities across a 

trans-regional spectrum. The decisive point here involves accurately identifying 

returning foreign fighters at points of entry (coming in) and during criminal or 

miscellaneous encounters with law enforcement (already in) through biometric 

identification and other sources of intelligence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, real world solutions involving intergovernmental production and 

sharing of biometric enabled intelligence as a means to accurately identify dynamic 

and adaptive known or suspected terrorists living amongst the population are 

imperative to collective European security. BEI and I2 are the capabilities and 

means required to strip anonymity from the enemy and must be developed and 

better shared throughout our international military and law enforcement 

organizations. A more integrated intergovernmental framework is required in order to 

facilitate a holistic and visibly controlled approach to Identity and biometric enabled 

intelligence. “The deadliest attackers have a background in jihadi warfare.” 18

References and End Notes

1. The Global Terrorism Index 2015 is the third edition and provides a 

comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over 
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the last 15 years with an emphasis on 2014. It is produced by the Institute for 

Economics and Peace. The GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism 

database which has codified over 140,000 terrorist incidents. In 2014 the total 

number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the 

prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years.

2. thejournal.ie: http://www.thejournal.ie/more-than-1200-europeans-returned-isisislamic-state- 2452426-Nov2015/

3. The Global Terrorism Index 2015.

4. Defense One. Jihadi John and the Future of the Biometrics Terror Hunt. FBIs 

growing collaboration with the Department of Defense. The FBI’s system is called 

the Next Generation Identification, or NGI. It includes photos, aliases, and 

physical characteristics and, of course, fingerprints. Today, it’s completely 

interoperable with the military’s Automated Biometric Identification System, or 

ABIS, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Automated Biometric 

Identification System, or IDENT. The center also works with the State Department 

and allied law enforcement agencies around the world. 

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/jihadi-john-and-future-biometricsterror- hunt/106263/.

5. Tracking Refugees With Biometrics: More Questions Than Answers: 

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/tracking-refugees-with-biometrics-morequestions-than- answers/

6. Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/ministers-commit-reinforcingeuropol%E2%80%99s-counter-terrorism-capabilities

7. MC 472: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69482.htm

8. OSCE What we do: http://www.osce.org/what

9. Frontex, Mission and tasks, intelligence and operations: 

http://frontex.europa.eu/about- frontex/origin/

10.Frontex, Mission and tasks, intelligence and operations: 

http://frontex.europa.eu/about- frontex/origin/

11.ADRP 2-0, 4-65. ADRP 2-0 Unclassified Public Release; unlimited distribution

12.Joint Intelligence (JP 2-0), I-20. Unclassified

13.Allied Joint Publication 2 (AJP 2), 3-13. NATO Unclassified

14.AQAP’s English Language Inspire Magazine 13 (2014) describes economic target 

categories, open front and Lone Jihad Legions. Open Source Jihad (OSJ) is also 

outlined as a resource for “Muslims” to train at home instead of risking dangerous 

travel abroad.

15.The Global Terrorism Index 2015. Terrorism in Western Countries.

16.Term. DA’ISH is the Arabic acronym for “The Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham” 

Al-Sham is the historic region of Syria or Greater Syria. “DAESH” is a play on 

words (Daes) and has a derogatory connotation involving trampling, bigotry and 

discord. The terrorist para-state takes offense to this term which is the reason for 

greater use in the Arab world and West.

17.INTERPOL Chemical and Explosive Terrorism Prevention Unit Programme TEAL 

UN CCW Meeting Geneva 10 April 2015. Project Watchmaker: UNSCR 2178-
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Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) INTERPOL to intensify efforts. Project TIDETechnical Information Data Exchange links to Project Watchmaker.

http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/ 

CD096873D6067394C1257E23007603F2/$file/12+INTER

18.The journal .Petter Nesser, a senior researcher at the Norwegian Defence 

Research Establishment http://www.thejournal.ie/more-than-1200-europeansreturned-isis-islamic-state-2452426- Nov2015/.
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It’s in There: Rethinking (?) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in 

Megacities/Dense Urban Areas

By Richard L. Wolfel, Amy Krakowka Richmond, Mark Read and Colin Tansey

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 2 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/it%E2%80%99s-in-thererethinking- intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield-in-megacities-dense-urb

The complexity of the modern city has been a key conclusion in most Army research 

surrounding military operations in megacities/dense urban areas. This complexity is 

based on three fundamental concepts of the modern city. First, modern cities are 

multidimensional (subterranean, surface and vertical). Second, cities are 

interconnected through globalization, social media and modern methods of 

communication/information dissemination. Third, cities are uncontrollable due to 

increased connectivity, rise of black market/informal economy, ineffective 

government control of slums and the rise of vulnerability in significant portions of the 

city. As the US Army considers the challenges of operating in dense urban areas, 

leadership requires a basic understanding of the operating environment. In such a 

complex environment, understanding the multidimensional, interconnected and 

uncontrollable elements in complex environments using traditional approaches of 

situational awareness, which emphasize discrete problem sets and well-defined 

regions, is problematic at best.

Intelligence sections provide a basic understanding of the operating environment. 

Military intelligence (MI) Concepts, such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 

(IPB), Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events (ASCOPE), 

Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Other 

Considerations (SWEAT-MSO), and Political, Military, Economic, Social, 

Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT), have 

been used extensively within the MI community for decades in order to provide a 

snapshot of the operating environment. Before we go off and try to develop, or find 

the next new “it” concept, or gadget, we need to step back and critically evaluate 

what currently exists. How do traditional intelligence methods help inform situational 

awareness in dense urban environments? Where do these methods fall short? 

These gaps then become areas where new ideas and Science and Technology 

(S&T) developments can fill the void to fill in the picture. We need to avoid the urge 

to throw out what we have. As researchers have contemplated the next new idea, 

the aforementioned intelligence tools have stood the test of time and with a little 

modification, offer a solid approach to understanding and explaining the complexities 

of Megacities/Dense Urban Areas. Military intelligence doctrine provides a solid 
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foundation on which to launch an expedition into identifying and explaining the 

complexity of the megacity that will increase situational awareness.

What is IPB and How is it Evolving in the Dense Urban Environment?

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is the systematic process of 

analyzing the four mission variables (enemy, terrain, weather and civil 

considerations) in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (HQDA, 

2014, ix). This is the foundation of all intelligence gathering exercises, to identify 

and explain these key variables that work to help the commander gain a clear 

situational awareness of the area of operations (AO).

One of the largest issues with this basic definition of IPB is that it often does not take 

into account how the variables explaining dense urban areas are increasingly 

interconnected. Change in urban areas is not a unidirectional process in which the 

individual agent influences change in the area of interest. As a result of interacting 

with the area of interest (AI), the agent is also influenced as a result of social and 

environmental change.

Anthony Giddens refers to this process as the Duality of Structure (Giddens, 1979: 

5). This duality is important in understanding dense urban areas. Often we look 

very directly at the influence of the mission variables, take them as given variables, 

well defined and unchanging, and do not address the recursive nature of society in 

which the enemy, the terrain and civil considerations often change rapidly based on 

the actions of agents in the area. For example, the enemy can shift dimensions and 

move from the surface to subterranean, introduce barriers to the terrain and develop 

a disinformation campaign that will fundamentally shift the societal characteristics of 

the area of operations.

Along with the recursive nature of mission variables, the interaction of variables has 

become almost more important than the variables themselves. For example, we are 

no longer able to extract terrain from the societal milieu and analyze it separate of 

civil considerations. Kilcullen (2013: 54), emphasizes the interaction of mission 

variables in his analysis of the attacks on Mumbai in 2008. The terrorists used the 

interaction of terrain (littoral situation of Mumbai) and civil considerations (the 

unregulated nature of the fishing fleet) to explain how the terrorists were able to gain 

access to the region virtually undetected.

Neither the terrain, nor the civil considerations alone are adequate to explain the 

situation in Mumbai. The complex connection between the two gives one a clearer 

situational awareness of the battlefield.
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What is the Operational Environment?

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (2011) identifies the area of operations as an area defined 

by the commander that is large enough to accomplish the mission and protect the 

force. There is a tendency to treat it as a discrete region that can be circled on a 

map and discussed in a vacuum. It also identifies the operational environment as a 

composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the 

employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The 

problem in the modern dense urban environment is that the OE, including the area 

of operations, often extends much further than in the past. The impact of 

connections and linkages, facilitated by globalization, advances in communication 

technology, and media access challenge the traditional idea of a unique OE that 

can be isolated for analysis by an intelligence team. These connections must be 

addressed as part of the analysis. At an even more fundamental level, is the AO 

the appropriate scale of analysis in a dense urban area/megacity? Should 

intelligence analyses be conducted at the Area of Influence or Area of Interest 

level? How do we define these spheres? How do we isolate regions that cannot be 

isolated from outside influences? These are the challenging questions that face 

intelligence analysts as they conduct IPB and commanders trying to gain an 

awareness of an urban region.

One of the major challenges in defining a discrete Area of Operations, is the 

connectivity and complexity that defines the modern age of globalization. 

Wielhouwer (2005) addresses this complexity through the u rban triad. The triad 

includes: “complex manmade terrain superimposed on natural terrain, a large and 

densely distributed population, and physical and service infrastructures. These 

characteristics interact to make each urban area a complex and dynamic system of 

systems, with a unique physical, political, economic, social, and cultural identity.” 

(Weilhouwer, 2005: 2). Taken a step further, these systems are not static and, 

based on the recursive nature of societal change, always in flux as agents are 

influenced by the system and the system is influenced by the agents. The dynamic 

nature of the modern urban environment demands an expansion of traditional IPB 

thinking where terrain is fixed and generally unchanging. The urban triad helps 

portray a more complex terrain, both in terms of the amount of components that 

make up the terrain and also the continual nature of change on the terrain.

The IPB Manual, ATP 2-01.3 emphasizes the multidimensional nature of the 

operating environment, but offers little instruction on how to address the complex, 

multidimensional environment. Multidimensionality is defined by the IPB Manual 

(HQDA, 2014: 9-1) as “a blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and 

subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation.” 
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Blend is the key word here. Groups utilize various dimensions in an effort to 

increase mobility through the urban region. Historically, our thinking about 

battlespace has been two dimensional. While the IPB Manual does mention and 

define multidimensionality, it provides little in operational advice or examples. 

Technologically, this is a huge gap to fill. Technology developments, including, but 

not limited to, the ability to track people in three-dimensional space and systems to 

promote greater situational awareness, are needed to increase situational 

awareness in three dimensional space, from the subterranean through the vertical 

high rise tower. The need for greater situational awareness is magnified as 

individuals will not stay on one level for an extended period, but rather will change 

dimensions to avoid detection, gain a tactical advantage, increase security or 

facilitate movement.

The traditional concept of the AO and the AI are also challenged by the connectivity 

of the modern urban center. The city is connected globally by many different 

means, including: economics, culture and social media. While the IPB Manual 

does address cross border threats (HQDA, 2014: 7-9), the role of information is 

different than military or paramilitary forces coming across a boarder and 

influencing an AO. The Arab Spring and the Occupy movements have 

demonstrated that the ability to control information in the modern age is limited, at 

best and how virtual communities and shared ideology are created using social 

media and modern communication/information dissemination techniques. These 

movements also demonstrated that as governments attempted to control access to 

social media, that attempt to seize control acted as a unifying force to bring together 

various, disparate, social movements under a common goal. (Castells, 2015: 62).

The other major area of concern highlighted by the IPB manual is the discussion of 

approach and mobility corridors. Table 4-2 (HQDA, 2014: 4-6) identifies the 

minimum distance between terrain features required for avenues of approach. In 

urban settings, the two kilometer requirement for the battalion is not possible. This 

requires a rethinking of our mobility plans and how to control and maneuver through 

significantly narrower avenues of approach and to consider the possibility of 

nonstandard mobility corridors, those subsurface and overhead.

In addition, line of sight analysis will be substantially limited and visibility will be 

influenced by obstructions. For example, Begin Morning Nautical Twilight 

(HQDA, 2014: 4-18) will most likely not occur at 12 degrees below twilight as 

suggested by the IPB Field Manual. Buildings will obstruct view, shortening 

daylight hours in an urban environment as opposed to an open field. These small 

considerations could substantially impact operations in dense urban areas. Both 

mobility corridors and line of sight concerns show how the unique environment of 

dense urban areas challenge many standard conventions of intelligence 
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preparation and situational awareness.

How do the Analytical Tools of Intelligence Inform IPB in Urban Settings?

ASCOPE, PMESII-PT, and SWEAT-MSO are used extensively as the foundational 

analytical tools for intelligence operators to provide information to promote 

situational awareness. While the foundational concepts are very useful in urban 

environments, it is essential to view these as not discrete elements, but as 

interconnected elements that interact with each other, change the environment and 

are changed as a result of interactions with each other and the social environment. 

For example, how do medical conditions interact with political and capabilities? No 

longer are these elements in a vacuum. It is necessary to view the connectivity in a 

complex and changing matrix.

Dense Urban Areas and Insurgency Theory

Along with interconnectivity, another key question is what happens when civil 

capabilities decline, or were never developed in a region? Who steps in to fill the 

void? This is the foundation of the 2006 version of the Army’s counterinsurgency 

doctrine (HQDA, 2006: 1-3). As mentioned in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual 

(HQDA, 2006: 1-2), irregular threats strongly influence insurgencies. Also, due to 

the rise of asymmetrical warfare and increasing number of insurgencies, the nature 

of combat effectiveness has changed in the modern era. External support is critical 

in modern AOs. Often this is requested/provided through social media interactions, 

video uploads, onsite media, elements that are difficult to control. The IPB Manual 

(HQDA, 2014: 5-15) emphasizes that the “effectiveness of unconventional warfare 

depended heavily on support and relationships.” The question is how do we 

measure support and how do we determine the strength of relationships? Social 

media analysis provides a starting point to see how people form social media 

networks, social media clout scores provide examples of an individual’s influence 

on a specific movement/idea.

What causes the decline in civil capabilities? That becomes another key question 

in understanding the uncontrollable nature of dense urban settings. Vulnerability, 

declining environmental security and declining (or non-existent) political capabilities 

are key drivers in the decline of civil control in regions. One example of the decline 

of civil capabilities and the rise of vulnerability is in Kampala, Uganda.

Kampala is Uganda’s capital city with a population of 1.5 million in 2014. Uganda as 

a whole has one of the world’s highest population growth rates and, like many 

African countries, half of its population under 15. During the last two decades, the 

city has expanded in all directions. Growth is primarily concentrated along main 

roads. Between 1989 and 2010 the total built-up area increased exponentially. 

Sprawling, unplanned urban growth often results in slum development. Slums are 
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the primary destination for migrants, and are generally informal settlements. Much 

of this migration is rural-urban, however there is also considerable movement 

between cities. Slums make up at least a quarter of the total city area in Kampala, 

housing roughly 40% of the total city population. The demand for municipal 

infrastructure is far out pacing supply. This creates countless human security 

challenges in the realms of sanitation, clean water availability, and environmental 

degradation.

Davis (2006: 87) also points to an example of loss of civil control in terms of land 

ownership. Often, public land is illegally controlled by various agents who extract 

significant rent from local poor who are forced to live on the periphery of the city. 

Often this land is marginal, vulnerable and is one of the breeding grounds for 

insurgent actions within the city. Thus making them areas of prime interest for 

potential military operations in dense urban environments. The major problem here 

from the perspective of situational awareness is to understand who controls/ “owns” 

the land?

How to Model Overlapping Threats?

Weilhouwer (2005: 6), using the Army’s primary lessons learned document about 

the war in Iraq, On Point, identified two deficiencies from joint urban operations in 

Iraq. First, the primary training facilities for U.S. forces are small towns or villages, 

rather than major metropolitan areas. Second, legacy computer simulations are 

insufficiently realistic to prepare joint force commanders and warfighters for urban 

operations. The first deficiency endures—urban training facilities will always be 

limited in size, and military units are limited in what kinds of training can be 

conducted in real built up areas. The second deficiency may be easier to overcome 

than the first, but simulations that are able to replicate the complexity of dense 

urban areas have yet to be created, and will be very resource intensive. So what 

might be done to better understand and plan for the complexities of operations in 

dense urban areas? Scenario planning offers some solutions.

Scenario planning was developed by military strategists following World War II, and 

has been refined and adopted by others in the intelligence community, business, 

and academia. Most scenario planning exercises seek to satisfy one or more of the 

following objectives: to make sense of a confusing situation, to develop a strategy, 

to anticipate future events, or to facilitate organizational learning. Scenarios are 

especially appropriate for very complex problems that exhibit high uncertainty and 

involve numerous, uncontrollable variables (van der Heijden 2005). Unlike 

forecasts or models, which usually attempt to predict specific outcomes, scenarios 

seek to identify a limited number of plausible outcomes.
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In the context of IPB and planning for operations in dense urban areas, scenario 

planning offers several constructive alternatives to more traditional methods. First, 

scenario planning can be done with limited resources. A scenario planning exercise 

can be conducted with a small group of people (as few as three or four, but scalable 

for much larger groups or staffs), and can last from a few hours to several days, 

depending on time available. Unlike modeling or forecasting, a simple scenario 

exercise requires minimal information-technology support. Second, scenario 

planning facilitates ‘out of the box’ thinking about complex problems. Instead of 

trying to understand and map the interaction of dozens or more variables, scenario 

planning constrains the number of variables considered, and forces participants to 

think about unique ways a few variables may interact over space and time. During 

the scenario planning process, groups develop plausible storylines that describe 

alternative futures. Often, during the development of such storylines, participants 

identify gaps in their understanding of the problem, or find new ways of thinking 

about a situation. Third, scenario planning can be done with groups who have no 

previous scenario planning experience—all that is required is a trained facilitator to 

explain the process, guide dialog, and capture the scenarios as they are developed.

Finally, scenario planning exercises provide excellent forums for networking, team 

building, and learning among participants.

Scenario planning provides a method to come to terms with the complexity of 

dense urban areas. Scenario planning offers a tool to enhance IPB. Since 

scenarios are not predictive in nature, they allow for a number of plausible 

solutions and provide an opportunity to look at the process of working through the 

scenario to determine gaps in our knowledge. The basic concepts used by 

intelligence sections provide a point of departure as we begin to tackle the wicked 

complex problems of dense urban areas. The complexity does not lie in the basic 

concepts, but in the interconnectivity between discrete defining variables in the AO. 

Understanding the interconnectivity of ideas and spaces will be a major step 

forward in starting to grasp the complexity of dense urban environments.

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Megacities and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacle or Opportunity?

By Dawn A. Morrison and Colin D. Wood

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 23 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/megacities-and-dense-urbanenvironments-obstacle-or-opportunity

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) projects that by 2030 there will be more than 41 

megacities, with the majority of them located in Africa and Asia. These 41 cities 

alone will house approximately 9% of the world’s population, as rural life declines.[i] 

Approximately 54% of the world’s people are now urban residents, with 66% 

expected to be urban by 2050.[ii] More alarming, the number of people worldwide 

living in urban slums has increased by 33% since 1990.[iii] As rural to urban 

migration continues to increase, experts expect more frequent requirements for the 

U.S. military to be involved in responding to conflicts and disasters in densely 

populated urban environments. As more of the world population resides in littoral 

cities, natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, health epidemics, and resource 

scarcity could pose significant challenges for military intervention. “While the U.S. 

military continues to protect U.S. national security interests across the globe, it must 

focus on protecting those interests where they are in most jeopardy. The greatest 

potential threats to those interests lie in Asia and the Middle East, and the U.S. 

Army’s role extends to both.”[iv] Of the 41 projected megacities, 25 are located in 

the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. Doctrine further recognizes the potential 

for urban areas to become redoubts for enemy forces and acknowledges that “joint 

operations will require land forces capable of operating in congested and restricted 

urban terrain,”[v] thus indicating U.S. doctrinal intent to operate within megacities 

and dense urban environments. In short, megacities and dense urban environments 

are firmly on the horizon as likely and potential environments for future warfare and 

humanitarian engagements. Are we prepared?

Current military thinking tends to present the megacity and dense urban environment 

as challenging, intimidating, and as a source of anxiety for military commanders who 

contemplate its operational environment. While megacities and dense urban 

environments are challenging and complex, we argue that the unique characteristics 

of these environments offer many opportunities and leveraging points that future 

U.S. military forces can use to their advantage to conduct successful military 

operations. The first step toward this new paradigm requires a solid method for 

understanding the operational environment of megacities and dense urban areas. 

We believe this can be done by operationalizing the megacity framework proposed 
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by the Chief of Staff of the Army's Strategic Studies Group.[vi] Not only does this 

framework allow megacities and dense urban environments to be understood as a 

system of systems akin to a living organism, it also categorizes the level of 

integration between the systems. Operationalizing this framework was 

accomplished in Morrison et.al. (2016)[vii]. Here we discuss how the resulting 

composite index (Table 1) that was generated may be helpful in understanding the 

operational environment of different megacities, including the challenges of 

operating in these environments. By examining these challenges, however, we 

discovered that the framework allowed us to re-conceptualize the megacity not 

solely as an impossible military challenge, but rather as a place of potential 

opportunity offering several leverage points advantageous to future forces if new 

technology, tactics, techniques, and procedures can be adopted. This paper 

presents a brief overview of the operationalized megacity framework and 

demonstrates how it may be used to better understand the future operational 

environment. We consider the challenges presented to the military by the megacity 

and dense urban environment under current military thinking. Lastly, we explore 

several ways in which the military might meet and overcome these challenges by 

leveraging the megacity environment to its advantage, and capitalizing on the 

opportunities afforded by the complex environment.

Defining the Area of Regard (Megacity and Dense Urban Environments)

The megacity concept has a common operating definition: an urban or metropolitan 

area with a population of 10 million people or more.[viii] Less well-defined is the 

concept of dense urban environments. There is currently no standardized, metricbased definition for what constitutes a dense urban environment or for determining 

the point at which an area switches from urban to dense urban. The U.S. Census 

Bureau defines the minimum threshold to be considered urban as an area with 

50,000 or more people with a minimum threshold of 1000 people per square mile, 

but does not define anything beyond the dichotomy of urban/rural.[ix] The fields of 

urban planning and urban design often factor in floor area ratio (FAR) and dwelling 

units per area (DU/Area) along with population density, and then examine the 

persistence of these metrics over scale, ranging from block or developmental parcel 

upwards to neighborhood, then district to city or region.[x] Using these metrics, we

can begin to understand dense urban environments as places where either all three 

metrics—FAR, DU/Area and Population—are high (e.g., high rise districts of Tokyo, 

London or New York), or where DU/Area and Population remain high while FAR 

decreases (e.g., favelas of Rio de Janeiro or the slums of Dhaka). Employing a 

combination of these metrics may help provide a more accurate determination of 

urban density as they normalize population by infrastructure capacity, thereby 

allowing us to better identify and measure dense urban environments for the 

purposes of planning and execution of military operations. These metrics enable 
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planners to understand the spatial distribution of the density and whether it is 

stacked vertically (high FAR, DU/AREA and Population) or concentrated at ground 

level (low FAR, high DU/Area and Population).

SSG Megacity Framework

To better understand megacities and dense urban environments, we implemented 

the megacity framework presented by the SSG.[xi] The SSG megacity framework is 

based on five characteristics—Context, Scale, Density, Connectedness and Flow—

which are used to determine the level of integrated systems—Highly Integrated, 

Moderately Integrated and Loosely Integrated—found in each megacity. Integration, 

in turn, is based on the level of formal versus informal systems, the quality of 

infrastructure, and how regulated is the flow capacity of goods, resources, people, 

and information. Morrison et. al. (2016) operationalized the SSG megacity framework 

by compiling a composite index for each of the U.N.’s projected 41 megacities (Table 

1) based on an extensive data matrix assembled from open sources. Metrics 

collected in the data matrix were selected to cover the five characteristics above, and 

then cross-walked to address the integration areas of system types, infrastructure 

quality and regulated flow capacity. For example, data was collected on such topics 

as governance, rule of law, stability, quality of life, politics, airports, seaports, 

railroads, roads, economic growth and performance, communication, demographics 

and other associated human geography variables.[xii] Much of the data used to 

compile the index is drawn from regularly updated metrics so that the operationalized 

framework has the ability to remain current over time. We believe this index 

adequately represents the level of integrated systems for each megacity and allows 

opportunity to better understand both the positives and negatives of the megacity 

and dense urban environment in terms of military operations and how they will vary 

depending on the level of integration; for example, responding to a natural or manmade disaster in a highly versus loosely integrated megacity.

Morrison et al (2016) further connected the operationalized megacity framework to 

data compiled from the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) and NASA’s 

Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) to assess the level of risk 

associated with conflict and environmental hazards for each projected megacity.[xiii] 

They found that according to the GCRI, more than 70% of the projected megacities 

are situated in countries with a high probability for conflict in the near future. 

Similarly, over half of the projected megacities are at risk for environmental hazards 

(e.g., drought, flood, cyclone, landslide, and earthquake), including both highly 

integrated cities such as Tokyo and Los Angeles, as well as moderately and loosely 

integrated cities such as Kolkata, Bogotá, Lahore and Manila. These findings support 

the June 2014 SSG report which posited that instability and environmental stressors 

are likely to be what leads to U.S. military intervention in a megacity. Since 1980, 

the U.S. military has responded to a wide variety of threats and operations impacting 
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national security, but the majority of these operations have consisted of humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations, both CONUS and OCONUS, rather 

than major combat operations.[xiv] With climate change and sea-level rise, we 

should expect to see drastic change in many of the world’s littoral areas in the 

coming decades, and a U.S. response to follow.

Given this, the U.S. military needs to consider and be prepared for how the type of 

megacity (i.e., loosely, moderately or highly integrated) presents varying orders of 

magnitude to the complexity of operations.

Conducting any type of operation in a highly integrated city such as Tokyo, London 

or Paris, even with host nation cooperation, will still be challenging, but those 

challenges may differ significantly from conducting similar operations in a loosely 

integrated megacity such as Dhaka, Lahore or Lagos. The operationalized megacity 

framework, by looking at and evaluating the level of interconnected systems within, 

throughout and between megacities, characterizes the dense urban environment in 

the narrative of a living organism. As with all living organisms, megacities and dense 

urban environments have strengths, weakness, and leverage points that can be 

identified by understanding the level of formal versus informal systems, the quality of 

infrastructure, and the regulation of the flow capacity of goods, resources, people 

and information.[xv] These circumstances, while perhaps challenging to 

conventional military wisdom, may actually present spaces of opportunity for military 

advantage from a different perspective.

Framework Applied: Regulated Flow Capacity

The operationalized framework is useful for understanding the military operational 

environment of megacities and dense urban environments; knowing whether a place 

is highly or loosely integrated will significantly impact how the U.S. approaches a 

mission, as well as the expected consequences of various military activities. If 

military action affects the flow of a city (e.g., cordoning off the city or parts thereof, 

blocking access points, etc.), the effects could be tremendous. Depending on the 

market importance of the city, world economies could quickly experience adverse 

effects. Looking at various global indices[xvi] that assess urban areas based on 

their business activity, economic status, culture, politics, information exchange, 

human capital, productivity, infrastructure, environment and quality of life metrics, we 

find that the highly integrated megacities (e.g., Tokyo, New York, Paris, London) 

tend to be ranked near the top of each list, as expected. However, we also see cities 

such as Istanbul, Turkey; Chengdu and Shanghai, China; Delhi, Mumbai and 

Kolkata, India; Jakarta, Indonesia; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and Sao Paolo, Brazil 

ranking relatively high on these lists due to their economic importance, even though 

their systems are moderately or loosely integrated.[xvii] These indices also reflect 

the level of difficulty that would be involved with attempting to isolate any of these 
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cities, or subparts therein, and the potential cascading impact on the world’s 

economy that could result. Indeed, even the most loosely integrated megacities 

(e.g., Lahore, Karachi, Dhaka, Ahmadabad, Dar es Salaam), play significant roles in 

the world economy such that isolating them will have ramifications in places far flung. 

For example, Dhaka has a $19 billion/year garment industry which makes up 77% of 

its total merchandise export economy, and is second only to China in the world 

ready-made garment economy; cordoning off any part of Dhaka, and disrupting the 

garment industry would have rippling effects far beyond Bangladesh’s borders.[xviii]

Framework Applied: Infrastructure Quality

Quality of infrastructure within a megacity and dense urban environment is also 

critical to understanding the operational environment and the effects and 

consequences of military action therein. For example, mobility in a megacity and 

dense urban environment will be greatly affected by the integration level of the city. 

Troop movement is dependent upon both built and human environments—the 

densities of people and structures in a megacity can be such that movement is 

slowed, sometimes to a standstill, as roads become impassable. This, in turn, 

impacts security: soldiers attempting to reach their objective may be forced to

dismount from vehicles to cordon and search an area while they wait for a clearing, 

or sit in their stationary vehicles which quickly become targets for small arms, rocket, 

and IED attacks. Intratheater airborne operations may also be hindered due to the 

lack of appropriate ground-based landing zones (LZs), with skyscrapers and shanty 

structures providing additional obstacles that further complicate maneuverability.[xix]

Likewise, Medical evacuations (MEDVAC) may be significantly challenged in a 

megacity due to time and distance constraints imposed by quality and/or density of 

infrastructure and traffic congestion. There are certain time-frames within which 

casualties need to make it to a higher echelon of care (such as the “Golden Hour” 

and the “Platinum Ten”)[xx] to have a greater chance of surviving their injuries. 

While not hard and fast rules, such time-frames are essential to improving mortality 

rates in battle. A more highly integrated megacity may have better infrastructure than 

a more loosely integrated city to accommodate mounted movement, but population 

density often causes extensive travel delays and choking traffic. According to the 

TomTom Worldwide Traffic Index,[xxi] Istanbul, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro and 

Moscow are the top 4 cities with the worst traffic, and 11 of the top 20 most 

congested cities in the world are on our list of megacities.

Intertheater maneuverability—with its reliance on commercial and military air and 

seaports—may also be challenged by the megacity and dense urban environment.

[xxii]. While all of the projected megacities have major commercial airports, 

accessing those airports will not always be straightforward, whether due to disrepair, 

or the inability to accommodate the weight and size of U.S. military aircraft. The 
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placement of the airport within the urban environment and security issues related to 

landing within a dense urban environment immediately surrounded by potential 

enemy forces are cause for additional concern. For example, in September 2014, 

India’s federal government asked Mumbai officials to clear the slums surrounding the 

Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport due to increased concerns over terrorist 

attacks against airports in the region. The effort will involve removing 90,000 

people—the population of a mid- sized American city—from roughly 309 acres of 

land.[xxiii] Even in highly integrated megacities, the use of airports may be restricted 

to U.S. military forces due to congestion by commercial and industrial ventures that, 

if disrupted, could have consequences far flung beyond the area of operations. Port 

access is even further restricted than airports: 10 of the countries containing the 

projected megacities have port facilities with infrastructure quality rated at average or 

above, and only 16 of the cities have a major port, the rest either being landlocked or 

without access to a major body of water to support port facilities.[xxiv]

Framework Applied: Systems

Human settlements, regardless of density or size, exist as a system of systems. How 

integrated and functional these systems are largely determines the success and 

livability of the settlement. As such, the operationalized megacity framework is 

useful in assessing the integrated system quality of each megacity and dense urban 

environment for purposes of projecting the effects of military operations in that 

environment. The need for positioning U.S. forces in such an environment is one 

clear example of the importance of understanding the impact of military operations 

on urban systems. Positioning U.S. forces often requires enough land to house 

personnel, materiel, and necessary facilities. General base camp land use planning 

factors for a Heavy Brigade Combat Team-sized element, for example, call for 

between 1,780 - 2,185 total acres in order to meet requirements.[xxv] In practice, 

contingency bases are often larger than this, such as Camp Diamondback in Mosul, 

Iraq, which was roughly 2,200 to 2,300 acres. [xxvi] Finding that amount of space in 

a megacity or dense urban environment may be difficult, though, with the availability 

of airports and other urban industrial areas, not impossible. Still, population 

displacement will always be an issue under current military convention. Dhaka 

provides an excellent example of the tradeoffs that will need to be made if following 

doctrine for positioning U.S. troops. Areas that provide the requisite space may 

come at a cost to security, access to adequate utilities or expose deployed soldiers 

to environmental hazards, and will likely require significant displacement of the local 

population, in some cases upwards of a quarter million people just to make room for 

a contingency base equivalent to the size of Camp Diamond Back in Iraq. It is 

important to note, however, that loosely integrated cities may have poorly designed 

and inadequate infrastructure to support contingency basing in these environments. 

Moreover, U.S. use of host nation space and infrastructure will tax already limited 
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resources, potentially destabilizing both social and physical infrastructure beyond the 

scope of operations.

Megacity and Dense Urban Environments: Moving on Up!

Are megacity and dense urban environments challenging, complex operating 

spaces? Absolutely! As the above demonstrates, current military operating 

procedures and perspective may not be adequate to overcome these challenges. 

However, these environments also offer significant opportunity for military advantage 

and overmatch if we are willing to think outside of the box and look at the area of 

regard from a different angle. While the problems and obstacles associated with the 

megacity and dense urban environment are numerous and myriad, they create 

opportunities for the military to engage through adaptive technologies and 

methodologies. We believe the most fertile areas for creating military overmatch in 

these environments will be in exploiting the vertical space, leveraging the natural 

flows and patterns of life of the population and through technological advancement 

tailored to the specific challenges of a dense urban environment.

Rather than focus on the density of buildings, infrastructure, and people that may 

choke out traditional military tactics at the ground level, megacity and dense urban 

environments offer a manmade high ground—replete with over watch, standoff 

distance, free from urban canyon bandwidth affects and, with advancing 

technological support, potential for rapid ingress/egress with minimal local population 

engagement. We argue that the greatest advantage and opportunity afforded by 

these environments resides in exploiting the vertical space inherent in all urban 

centers. One of the larger issues of infrastructure often pointed to in a megacity is 

that of the vertical space. Tactically, the military has long known that taking and 

owning the high ground is advantageous. In an urban environment, however, 

“owning” the high ground—skyscrapers—is not only fraught with difficulty, but can 

bring about other issues from a structural/physical security standpoint. New 

technological approaches to securing the space, providing greater stand-off from 

explosives, and options for areal refit (creating add-on LZ’s for vertical lift capability) 

would greatly improve the outlook for a military operating in this environment. 

Current technological advances in net zero basing systems could also be developed 

to ensure a fully contained and controlled environment within the skyscraper for U.S. 

forces that is not reliant on the existing building systems. Further, distributed high 

ground basing throughout the megacity would also allow for greater command and 

control of the environment through extended visual over watch. Exploiting the 

vertical space would also entail greater use of unmanned systems in lieu of groundbased patrols.

The population of the megacity and dense urban environment—rather than being an 

obstacle to military operations—may be the next greatest leverage point of 
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opportunity for future military operations if we are willing and able to change our 

perspective on how to conduct military operations. The local population is an 

organic landscape feature that unlike buildings, ebb and flow through the physical 

environment on dynamic temporal schedules that have daily, weekly, monthly, 

seasonally and yearly variance. In the megacity, and particularly in dense urban 

environments, we argue that the population creates incredible complexity and results 

in novel challenges for military operations. But, better understanding the spatial and 

temporal patterns of daily life will enable high-fidelity modeling and forecasting of 

population movement, behavior and reaction within the dense urban and megacity 

environment. Can we use this understanding to better blend in with the local context 

so as to also hide among the people? Likewise, if we can learn and adapt to the 

social and cultural systems and their associated patterns of life, could we train our 

soldiers to become adept at local “street smarts”? In the same way that Google 

Glasses now offer on the spot place-based information for way finding, could 

technology be developed that provided on-the- spot translation and interpretation of 

language, behavior, dress, and other social and cultural signs, symbols and cues? In 

this way, could we enable our future soldier to use the crowd as camouflage—ergo, 

get lost in the crowd, and not in translation? At the same time, new technological 

advances in analytical capabilities, such as those of IBM’s i2 EIA, [xxvii] will enable 

the future force to quickly identify key players in the crowd, as well as to better 

understand the connectivity among actors and persons of interest.

Understanding the patterns of daily life of the local population would also facilitate 

the ability to go “with the flow” of the dense urban environment rather than against it 

when trying to move large equipment and/or troops? In a megacity, there will always 

be a “flow”, it is just a matter of being able to identify the one most suited to the 

mission set. Moreover, understanding the recurring temporal patterns inherent to 

how the local population moves through and makes use of their urban environment 

would also provide the future force with a built-in barometer for identifying adverse 

activities, sentiment and change that taps into the local knowledge base. For 

example, in Iraq, the noticeable absence of women and children and/or deserted 

areas that are normally busy potentially signaled an impending IED attack, or other 

adversarial action.[xxviii] In the megacity and dense urban environment, particularly 

if we leverage vertical space which would allow the future force to more clearly see 

the ebb and flow of the local population, identifying aberrations in generally recurring 

patterns of life may provide a significant tactical edge.

Leveraging technology is another way that the U.S. can achieve overmatch in the 

megacity and dense urban environment. Future research and development, if 

tailored to the specific context of the megacity operating environment, could result in 

new technologies and techniques that take advantage of the opportunities presented 

by this unique environment. Are there technological solutions, perhaps in the field of 
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robotics that can assist U.S. forces in bridging the gap between (current) required 

force strength ratios given the immense population size of the operating 

environment? Are there ways to leverage and use specific integrated systems or 

certain “flows” to cordon off and control sections of a city without disrupting global 

economic processes? Traditional fortification methods that create significant standoff 

distances between troop positions and the local population may be impractical in a 

megacity or dense urban environment, thus requiring technological solutions to 

compensate. Conversely, are there low-tech options ripe for advancement that 

would bypass the ever-growing reliance on energy and networks that may provide 

future forces with military overmatch in dense urban environments? What will be the 

future equivalent in matching the simplistic elegance of the Navajo Code Talkers?

Summary

It behooves the U.S. military to not only understand the megacity and dense urban 

environment in the context of a living organism wherein all elements are connected 

in an integrated system, but to be able to identify the strong and weak areas of the 

systems that can be used as leverage points to achieve success (ergo, where does 

the U.S. need to focus efforts to strengthen/buttress the system as well as where are 

the pressure points in the system that may trigger a desired end-state tipping point). 

Switching the emphasis from kinetic, human in the loop military tasks that focus on 

person-on-person interaction between our forces and the population of the megacity 

(inclusive of adversaries, neutrals and supporters), to strategically supporting, 

manipulating and/or undermining the flows, infrastructure and systems of the 

megacity and dense urban environment as a whole itself may transform what was 

previously viewed as intimidating complexity with too many moving parts (all those 

millions and millions of people!) into a sophisticated, integrated, and manageable 

system of systems. By focusing on the integrated system of systems inherent to the 

megacity and dense urban environment, by leveraging and taking control of the 

vertical space, by fully understanding the population and—most importantly, by 

bringing to bear our capability for technological overmatch that will enable all of the 

above, we believe future U.S. military forces will have the ability to successfully 

operate in megacity and dense urban environments as they do now in open terrain.
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Tables

Table 1: Projected megacities typology scores (sorted by score); 3 

represents highly integrated, 1 – loosely integrated

End Notes

[i] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 

(2014).

World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/352).

[ii] ibid.

[iii] UN Habitat, State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013 (2013).

[iv] TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 2-1c

[v] TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 2-3.b(5)

[vi] Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group (April 21, 2013). “A Proposed 

Framework for Appreciating Megacities: A US Army Perspective,” Small Wars 

Journal. See also, Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group (June 2014). 
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Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain 

Future.

[vii] Dawn A. Morrison, Colin D. Wood, Timothy K. Perkins, Carey A. Baxter. 2016. 

“Extreme Environment Basing: Contingency Basing in Megacity and Dense Urban 

Environments,” Center for the Advancement of Sustainability Innovations (CASI), 

ERDC/CERL SR-15-DRAFT (Forthcoming March 2016).

[viii] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 

(2014).

World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/352).

[ix] U.S. Census Bureau Online. Geography Reference Section. 

http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html.

[x] For a good explanation of these metrics, see MIT’s Density Atlas project: 

http://www.densityatlas.org/

[xi] See Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group (April 21, 2013; June 

2014).

[xii] Data is available upon request.

[xiii] GCRI. http://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. Website hosted by the Joint 

Research Center of the European Commission; Center for Hazards and Risk 

Research - CHRR - Columbia University, Center for International Earth Science 

Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia University, and International Bank for 

Reconstruction and Development - The World Bank. 2005. Global Multihazard 

Frequency and Distribution. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and 

Applications Center (SEDAC). http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H45718Z5. Website hosted 

by CIESIN at Columbia University.

[xiv] Sukman, Daniel. “The Past as a Prologue: The Future of the U.S. Military in 

One Graphic.” The Strategy Bridge. Dec. 18, 2015. Retrieved from 

http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-bridge/2015/12/20/the-past-as- aprologue-the-future-of-the-us-military-in-one-graphic, Feb. 02, 2016.

[xv] See Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group (April 21, 2013; June 

2014).

[xvi] E.g., City Prosperity Index (CPI), 2012, United Nations Human Settlements 

Programme, Global Urban Indicators Database; Global Power Index (GCPI) 2009, 

http://www.citymayors.com/economics/power-cities.html

;http://www.citymayors.com/economics/power-cities.html Global Cities Index (GCI), 

2014, by AT Kearney; Global Metromonitor, 2014, Brookings Institution, Metropolitan 

Policy Program; Mercer’s 2015 Quality of Living City Rankings, 

https://www.imercer.com/uploads/GM/qol2015/h5478qol2015/index.html.

[xvii] See Morrison et.al. (2016) for a detailed discussion and breakdown of how 

these, and other open source indices, were used to operationalize the megacity 

framework.

[xviii] "Textiles on the WTO Website" 

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm. WTO Secretariat. See also, 

Hildegunn Kyvik Nordas (2004), “The Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the 

Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.” Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade 
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Organization.

[xix] TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, 3-4b

[xx] The “Golden Hour” is the first hour following a trauma injury, which is considered 

the most critical for successful emergency treatment. Likewise, the “Platinum Ten” 

refers to the period in which medical personnel arrive on and assess the scene, initiate 

treatment, and transport for injured personnel.[xx]

[xxi] TomTom Worldwide Traffic Index, 2015, 

http://www.tomtom.com/en_gb/trafficindex/#/list.

[xxii] TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, 3-4a

[xxiii] Anurag Kotoky (September 11, 2014). “Mumbai Airport Slum Removal Sought 

by India Over Terror,” Bloomberg Business.

[xxiv] See Morrison et.al. (2016).

[xxv] EP 1105-3-1, E-4

[xxvi] Area calculations for Camp Diamondback were determined using ESRI GIS 

ArcMap 10.1 and images from Google Earth.

[xxvii] Tucker, Patrick. “Refugee or Terrorist? IBM Thinks Its Software Has the 

Answer.” Defense One, January 27, 2016. Retrieved from: 

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/refugee-orterrorist-ibm-thinks-its-software-has-answer/125484/?oref=d-channelriver, Feb. 02, 

2016.

[xxviii] U.S. Marine Corps, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) B3L4118 Student 

Handout,” Pg8.
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Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

By Russell W. Glenn

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 17 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/megacities-the-good-the-badand-the-ugly

Introduction

Today’s armed forces and those accompanying their security efforts worldwide have 

no more conducted major operations in a megacity – those urban areas in excess of 

ten million population – than have they participated in a nuclear war. Fortunately, 

however – and unlike the case with the officers above – recent experience and 

history’s lessons from undertakings in cities short of the ten million mark have much 

to offer. Much, but those offerings will fall short of the comprehensive. The same is 

true for those in civilian clothes – government and otherwise. Megacities are sure to 

challenge every member of a coalition.[ii] How these urban areas might do so in the 

intelligence realm in the near future is the primary focus of this offering, one that can 

but provide but a brief taste of the sweet, savory, and bitter implications involved. 

[iii]

The facts are well known, some so often repeated as to be all but common 

knowledge. Among them:

• Over half the world now lives in urban areas; nearly a quarter resides in those 

with over one million population.[iv]

• Eighty percent of the world’s population lives within one hundred miles (160 

kilometers) of a shore, most in cities.[v]

• There were 132 cities of population one million or more in 1965. Such urban 

areas numbered 494 in 2015, thirty-four of which were megacities (urban 

areas with populations of ten million or more).[vi]

“When [U.S. military] officers objected that Kahn was ill-equipped to speak on military 

affairs...he’d shoot back, ‘How many thermonuclear wars have you fought recently?’... They 

admitted they had no actual experiences with these weapons. ‘O.K., Kahn would grin, ‘Then we 

start out even.’”[i]

-- Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn
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Though the waters are muddied by varied definitions of “city,” “urban area,” 

“metropolitan area,” and others, it is inescapable that the world increasingly 

urbanizes and its largest cities/urban areas/metropolitan areas tend to swell at an 

even greater rate.[vii] Implications for coalitions are numerous and far-reaching. 

Non-state actors in particular have turned to urban terrain’s density of hides, firing 

positions, and civilians providing sustainment willingly or otherwise to avoid 

confronting superior Western military technology and training, both of which tend to 

be designed for more open environments. Fortunate indeed will be the future military 

leader finding his enemy willing to evacuate a city as did the Iraqi Army Basra in 

2003.[viii]

Were these not challenges enough, the varying definitions conceal social, political, 

and economic implications no less problematic. The city of Los Angeles proper – the 

political entity – is home to a population of but 3.8 million within the greater Los 

Angeles urban area of 15.1 million beings.[ix] (Thus Los Angeles qualifies as a 

megacity.) A coalition operating in such a region would find itself coordinating with 

hundreds of administrative jurisdictions: political, fire, law enforcement, 

transportation, and health to touch on a few, this regardless of whether the mission 

at hand involves armed force or not. Nor would opposing force’s evacuation of an 

urban area guarantee relief. Removal of what might well have been coercive 

authorities too typical of the Third World removes the lid from a simmering pot; 

looting, surging criminality, and latent sectarianism could be only three of the newly 

arrived’s rewards for assuming responsibility.

Yet all is not darkness. Though man has no more conducted major operations in a 

megacity than had those in Herman Kahn’s audiences fought a thermonuclear war, 

we need to remind ourselves that similarities between undertakings in smaller urban 

areas have much to offer coalitions confronting others when a population exceeds 

ten million mark. The remainder of this essay will only sparingly touch on these 

commonalities. Analysis instead seeks to focus on issues particular to megacities. 

As the title suggests, operations and campaigns in these environments will provide 

the good (opportunities), the bad (challenges), and the ugly (especially difficult 

issues).

The Good

A recent chief of the US Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Future Warfare 

Division stated, “Dense urban terrain favors the defender,” a daunting prospect when 

one considers the expanses of tightly packed man-made structures characteristic of 

the world’s largest urban conglomerations.[x] Reality fortunately confounds this 

common belief. Defense of cities, especially the vast expanses that are megacities, 

presents a situation akin to that described by Clausewitz in his contemplations of 
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mountain complex defense:

As in extensive mountainous terrain, the megacity defender will tend to lack the 

manpower, weaponry, and knowledge to prevent circumvention of its defensive 

positions. Further, unlike the Persians at Thermopylae, there will be no need for

reliance on the good fortune of finding the singular individual knowledgeable in this 

regard. Residents familiar with their city and willing to guide a force to surface, 

subterranean, or super-terranean bypasses should not be hard to locate.

A first lesson is therefore to recognize that megacities’ substantial populations, 

geographies, infrastructures, and other features offer benefits in addition to 

difficulties. Existing doctrine, past experience, and theory will all offer points from 

which to adapt. Factors more likely found only in these largest urban areas will 

enhance these opportunities. Larger built-up areas tend to offer a breadth and depth 

of information lacking in less populated environments. The navigation application 

Waze, for example, can be of limited value in infrequently traveled rural regions. 

Relying on user-submitted data, it is of notable value in densely populated areas, 

however. Waze tells users not only how to get from point A to point B but also 

provides real-time status regarding ongoing construction, accidents, roadway debris, 

and (yes) police speed trap and fixed camera locations amongst other information. 

The app employs this input to redirect users from their normal home-to-work and 

other routes to less congested alternatives.

Military units could conceivably adapt such applications, allowing for inclusion of 

secure inputs regarding threat locations, raw material stockpiles of potential 

operational value, and suspicious road conditions (e.g., possible spots where an 

improvised explosive device might have been emplaced), perhaps linking drivers’ 

observations targeting assets. Integrating secure with Waze (or a similar 

application’s) open- source information would at once increase routing efficiency and 

force protection while reducing opportunities for theft of supplies. (Armed robbers in 

Lagos, Nigeria, for example, routinely rob occupants of vehicles trapped in the city’s 

notorious traffic jams.)[xii]

Urban areas are also hives of official and commercial demographic information. 

Robert Dixon’s “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities” discussion regarding the 

types and value of urban databases applies equally to humanitarian response and 

Defensive mountain warfare.... Is it meant to last only a certain time or to the end in definite 

victory? Mountains are eminently suited to defense of the first type.... For the second type, on the 

other hand, they are, except for a few special cases, generally not suited at all.... A small post can 

acquire extraordinary strength in mountainous terrain. [However,] in a decisive battle, 

mountainous terrain is of no help to the defender; on the contrary...it favors the attacker.[xi]
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other contingencies not involving combat.[xiii] Census information, marketing survey 

results, and property records are but a sampling of what military and broader 

coalition authorities would find beneficial for addressing tasks inherent in urban 

undertakings. Cell phone data has especially notable potential to assist a coalition 

during crises. Call data records providing the number, time, and cell tower location of 

use have already been used to track malaria outbreaks in Africa.[xiv] Captured in a 

timely fashion, they could similarly help trace the flow of commuters later found to 

have been contaminated in a biological agent attack. As with an interactive traffic 

application, larger urban populations enhance the potential value of analyzing cell 

phone record data; those in cities are more likely to possess cellphones than others 

in remote rural areas. The sophistication of databases and their potential value may 

surprise. Geo-profiling shows promise for finding terrorists via analysis of where 

incidents occur. Most attacks are within a short distance of perpetrators’ residences 

or materials storage locations, reducing chances of confronting checkpoints when 

moving to targets. Further, extremists may avoid certain neighborhoods due to 

discomfort with activities there, e.g., those in which the sex trade is 

commonplace.[xv] Police records and accompanying analysis software in some US 

cities provide timely color coding regarding risk levels associated with individuals 

and addresses. Dispatched officers receive in-route evaluations after database 

searches regarding information such as whether a resident has a record of weapons 

possession or past violent crimes.[xvi] These capabilities could be used in 

conjunction with local knowledge as possessed by members of Terrorism Early 

Warning Groups (TEWG) such as that found in Los Angeles. TEWGs offer arriving 

coalition members valuable local and broader regional knowledge memberships that 

include representatives from police, fire, coast guard, federal law enforcement, and 

other organizations familiar with both the immediate urban area and more far-flung 

reaches. (Links between various city’s TEWGs or similar organizations can likewise 

be invaluable when an event in one megacity threatens distant locations, e.g., when 

the aforementioned bio-contaminated individual departs for another destination.) 

Knowing how to access, organize, and make good use of these various troves of 

information will take practice. Training with megacity authorities such as those in 

TEWGs would provide insights regarding both the specific urban area represented 

and others more generally applicable to such megalopolises.

Nor should one assume capabilities of this type are restricted to the First World. 

When Liberian Patrick Sawyer collapsed on arrival in the Lagos, Nigeria airport, local 

authorities soon recognized he – and potentially passengers on his plane – posed a 

potential medical disaster. Sawyer had brought the Ebola virus to Africa’s and one of 

the world’s largest megacities, estimated population 30.6 million. Despite the city’s 

doctors being on strike, refusal of the Nigerian Medical Association’s chairman to 

terminate the strike in the face of the threat, and exposure of hundreds to those 

confirmed or possibly infected, actions by working medical personnel, aggressive 
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and successful efforts to trace and get in touch with the 891 individuals possibly or 

actually exposed, and coordination of operations by a Gates Foundation-funded 

clinic converted into an emergency command center precluded wider infection.[xvii] 

The quick reaction included nongovernmental, inter-governmental, commercial, and 

governmental organizations in addition to mobilized volunteers and the United 

States Centers for Disease Control.[xviii] That Lagos was so large an urban area 

increased the likelihood that appropriate medical facilities were on hand. (Two 

laboratories in the megacity were able to test for the Ebola virus.) That Nigeria’s 

capital was also an epicenter of the country’s educated and the expert and veing a 

“wired city” was fundamental to the disease being interdicted with only twenty 

infected and a total of eight deaths. A doctor in the hospital to which Sawyer was 

taken not only recognized the symptoms; she prevented the uncooperative patient 

from forcibly leaving the medical facility and resisted pressures that included those 

from the Liberian embassy.[xix] World megacities are more likely to have similar inplace emergency response procedures and other resources key to effective crisis 

response. Even preparations for dislike events have potential to assist a coalition’s 

urban operations. Provisions for action in the aftermath of a major earthquake, for 

example, will have value during responses to other disasters, e.g., a major terrorist 

attack.

Access to megacity information, authorities, and other key resources will assist not 

only during general planning and conduct of urban area operations. They will 

likewise be invaluable in determining what specific communities within a built-up 

area (or country or region more broadly) offer greatest promise for supporting (or 

impeding) coalition objectives. No force will be large enough to control an entire 

megalopolis. Knowing likely hotspots, identifying centers or gravity and decisive 

points, and locating acceptable base areas from which to conduct operations will do 

much toward making the apparently overwhelming a manageable undertaking.

The Bad

A megacity is the un-consumable elephant; the number of bites needed to address 

all of its requirements would far exceed any coalition’s capabilities. Progress and 

ultimate success is further made difficult in that the armed forces likely to lead such 

ventures have doctrines that go little beyond generalities when it comes to dealing 

with the largest of urban agglomerations. A United States Marine Corps comment 

from over a decade ago holds true both for its specific topic and other functional 

areas during urban operations:
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The need for more urban (and megacity)-specific doctrine is evident to any who 

since 2002 found themselves in Baghdad, Kandahar, Fallujah, or any other of the 

many urban environments in which the men and women of the US and its closest 

partners have served. There will be “other-governed” communities, those ruled by 

less-than-official (but not necessarily less effective) authorities, often with criminal or 

other nefarious intentions, Sadr City in Baghdad being an exemplar. Misnomers, 

misunderstandings, and mistakes left unaddressed in recent guidance pose threats 

to urban operations success; they portend outright disaster when the numbers 

involved grow to double-digit millions. The assumption that provision of aid and 

quality of life improvements is fundamental to gaining and maintaining public support 

is one perhaps resting on dubious foundations. Eric Hoffer’s classic The True 

Believer warns of a conundrum rarely recognized: the destitute are too worried about 

the source of their next meal to have interest in rebellion or resistance. Lifting them 

from this hand-to-mouth existence, however, threatens creating tinder ready to flare 

given expectations of yet further improvement, expectations that may be beyond the 

abilities or intentions of a coalition to meet, particularly one confronting the scope of 

issues inherent in megacity operations.[xxi]

Intelligence implications are clear. Far more than estimates of conventional enemy 

capabilities and intentions will be called for. Those of the many insurgent, criminal,

militia, and other armed threats will be no less important. Identifying key formal and 

informal power brokers in neighborhoods and political jurisdictions and determining 

the most effective means of communicating with both these social nodes and the 

population at large will be fundamental to maintaining even minimal control. The 

larger the urban area, the greater the number of threat groups and the wider the 

regional dependencies linked to the city.

Collection of the information needed to feed what is sure to be a voracious 

intelligence beast will demand manpower and equipment resources in excess of any 

currently available to even the most ambitiously conceived deployed force. The 

sheer extent of megacity operations-related information from human, visual 

technology, acoustic and vibratory sensor, signals collection, and other sources will 

overwhelm today’s analytic capabilities. Add to this quantity the vast expanses of 

line-of-sight terrain and additional influences such as having to separate relevant 

information from the mundane inherent in the habitual “noise,” “hum,” or vibration of 

megacity daily activities and the challenge is further exacerbated.

Formal, written urban combat reconnaissance doctrine—the foundation (at least in theory) for the 

planning and execution of operations and training, the development of organizational structure, and 

the basis for equipment procurement—is essentially nonexistent.[xx]
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The Ugly

Not so fast, general. Let us not fall victim to believing that past activities will 

accurately reflect the nature of those yet to come. The same marines decrying 

doctrine’s lethargy in meeting 21st-century urban reconnaissance demands found 

“controlling fires is difficult for us” urban area’s ubiquitous buildings, the smoke and 

smog degrading both vision and laser designation, and polished surfaces reflection 

of those beams. Hamas and other foes confronted by the Israel Defense Forces 

(IDF) during recent operations increasingly make use of urban subterranean hides, 

headquarters, and passageways to deny observation and targeting. Below ground 

facilities are already inherent physical features of today’s cities, their number and 

dispersion increasing as does population growth and accompanying structural 

spread. Detecting entrances and exits to facilities can be extremely difficult; 

determining their underground route nearly impossible given the depth of some such 

infrastructure and clever concealment of air shafts.[xxiii] Even when detected, 

valuable targets may be left unhindered due to their being positioned under 

proscribed civilian infrastructure. A Hamas command center remained unscathed 

beneath Gaza’s largest hospital during 2014 Operation Protective Edge despite IDF 

leaders knowing its location.[xxiv] Determination of favorable laser designation and 

launch system locations; analysis of rotary-wing flight routes minimizing exposure to 

likely enemy air defense weapons sites; development of algorithms to support such 

analyses in operationally relevant timeframes; and commitment of resources to 

detecting, tracing, and targeting subterranean facilities all pose worthy challenges for 

the intelligence community.

Nor is it only those in uniform who will find megacity challenges overwhelming. 

Demands for capabilities essential to aiding so large an urban area’s recovery may 

exceed what international and coalition governments can bring to bear even for a 

short period. The problem will be more difficult yet should years of assistance be 

necessary, a problem magnified if that assistance be needed beyond the bounds of 

the megacity alone. Difficulties are made worse yet when inappropriately manned 

advance parties and early information collection efforts fail to identify and thereafter 

focus on priority challenges.

Munitions are now delivered reliably from distant launch systems and brought onto target by units 

that can remain hidden.... It means the demise of infantry battalions, tank regiments and armoured 

brigades as they are currently structured for major combat operations.[xxii]

Christopher L. Elliott,

 
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No less ugly are cases in which shortfalls during previous urban campaigns are 

repeated. The commander drawing militarily-typical unit boundaries along physical 

features such as roads, rivers, and the like will find those boundaries become selfinflicted wounds should they not be realigned once combat operations recede. 

Savvy leaders can instead minimize liaison, communications equipment, and other 

demands by realigning boundaries with existing administrative jurisdictions. It is a 

lesson unfortunately repeatedly learned and forgotten, two of the most recent 

instances being during the Los Angeles 1992 riots and in 2003 Baghdad. 

Intelligence personnel’s recognizing the importance of identifying administrative 

delineations, then providing them to operational planners could preclude yet another 

recurrence.

Toward Solutions

To describe megacities as “information rich” environments is an understatement. No 

less than their towering buildings and teaming masses, the information oceans can 

seem an overwhelming flood. Some simple – and logical – first steps can provide a 

means of lending form to the seeming deluge. Regarding these environments in 

terms of underlying terrain, buildings, infrastructures (physical, social, and 

informational), and people creates “bins” to assist in managing collection and 

analysis...given that the bins do not become stovepipes hindering system-wide 

analysis. Likewise, recognizing that megacities’ physical, human, and other 

characteristics can differ from smaller urban areas in terms of familiar concepts such 

as density assists in making the seemingly ungraspable graspable.[xxv]

Innovation will prove an indispensable commodity. Recognizing how lessons from 

previous operations in sub-megacities and during counterinsurgency operations can 

be molded in the service of new challenges would be a significant step forward. 

Modifying proven and well understood concepts will likewise provide payoff. Bringing 

maneuver into the 21st century would be one such re-forging. Previous operations –

both urban and counterinsurgency – demonstrate the value of a comprehensive 

approach during which military, government civilian, and other relevant participants 

cooperate. All the more reason to embed the essence of maneuver’s traditional 

definition:

in a more encompassing conceptualization:

Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to 

achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy[xxvi]
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Similarly, the long-held understanding of a coalition as “an ad hoc arrangement 

between two or more nations for common action”[xxviii] would benefit from 

recognition that the scope of efforts requires synchronization of more than national 

assets alone. A better definition would account for nongovernmental, intergovernmental, private, and other organizations able to offer needed capabilities, 

making a coalition “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more organizations in 

the interest of common action.”[xxix] Conceiving of “intelligence coalitions” along 

similar lines could significantly increase the number of information providers in 

support of megacity events. Much of the information needed to support intelligence 

requirements implied both explicitly and implicitly above is available in open sources. 

Pre-deployment and reach-back employment of interns and others to mine 

databases could dramatically increase the number of assets providing data. Much of 

the information would require revalidation, particularly in cases where physical 

destruction due to natural or man-made disasters is extensive or the numbers of 

displaced persons high, making large numbers of those capable of datamining an 

even greater asset. Manning would have to include sufficient personnel to confirm 

and reconfirm findings. Information sources inevitably conflict; some official sources 

are notoriously little more than fabrications designed to keep in-place authorities in 

power. It is obvious that training data miners should be undertaken before future 

operations the better to identify likely information requirements and minimize 

response times.

On the urban ground itself, the infantryman, pilot, NGO aid provider, truck driver, and 

every other participant becomes a potential source of information and recipient of 

resulting intelligence products (understanding all such participants are not equal 

when it comes to intelligence provision given differences in security clearances). 

Embedded personnel assisting with various government organizations should wear 

multiple hats. Those assisting in building governing capacity should at the same time 

be incorporated into information collection efforts, thereby enhancing understanding 

of megacity key relationships, fault lines, vulnerabilities, emerging requirements, and 

sources of opportunity in the service of coalition objectives. These same individuals 

will ideally be monitors confirming or alerting responsible parties when activities put 

short and longer-term objectives in tension as did one command in Iraq when 

members proposed providing small business startup grants at the same time other 

coalition authorities hoped to establish a program of bank micro-loans.

The far-reaching consequences of getting it right (or wrong) during operations in 

The employment of relevant resources to gain advantage with respect to select individuals or 

groups in the service of achieving specified objectives.[xxvii]
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megacities demands not only innovative thinking, fresh doctrine, and multidisciplinary assessments. Extreme war-gaming must become the norm. The Arizona 

Market outside Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a brilliant initiative, reestablishing as 

it did regional ties with that small city after years of violence had shattered previously 

longstanding economic links. Yet the immediate benefits gave way to the market’s 

becoming a center of black marketing, fencing high-value products from Western 

Europe, and trafficking of women.[xxx] Rigorous and frequent war-gaming of 

possible alternative outcomes linked to intelligence collection regarding market 

activities should have been required the better to identify factors likely to promote 

slippage of the facility into illegitimacy. Such failing to actively monitor and analyze 

events during operations in a megacity could have adverse consequences extending 

well beyond the immediate region. The implications are once again complex. War 

games would require robust computer support given the rapid spiraling of second, 

third, and higher-order effects inherent in any action taken in megacities’ 

innumerable and compacted interrelationships. Those interrelationships (and 

therefore those effects) will undoubtedly have regional, probably nationwide, and 

quite possibly worldwide effects. (Consider the global impact of the 9/11 attacks on 

New York City.) Change may be hard to detect given the constant and varied levels 

of activity in these megalopolises alluded to earlier. This need to war-game the 

status quo – what could happen from the situation as it is now – suggests the 

analysis will have to be nearly continuous. To assume otherwise is to overlook the 

very real possibility that today’s brilliant successes are potentially seeds for 

tomorrow’s disasters. The implications reach into pre-operation preparations: 

backward planning should begin at an end condition well beyond the re-assumption 

of governing responsibility by local authorities.

This monitoring and war-gaming assumes an understanding of a megacity’s routines 

and patterns. Determining these patterns and variations therefrom will necessitate 

data compilation and analysis beyond anything available to coalition leaders today. 

Sophisticated use of the aforementioned big data, overhead monitoring by long onstation systems, and establishment of and reporting by contacts in local 

governments (e.g., police, fire personal, building inspectors, and tax collectors to 

mention only a few) and communities (taxi drivers, delivery personnel, neighborhood 

watch volunteers, and those manning hospitals) will have to be constant. Those in 

coalition militaries will be crucial components of this pattern definition. Logistics 

providers and foot patrols are among those from whom reporting should be frequent 

and for whom debriefings must be thorough, both of which will be enhanced by 

assigning these individuals “beats” similar to those of neighborhood policemen to the 

extent feasible. Those interviewing members of the population will have to be 

schooled in intelligence tradecraft. Anti-gang squads in Los Angeles, for example, 

canvas entire neighborhoods or city blocks in order to conceal the identify of the one 

individual from whom they know information is forthcoming. Robots, security 
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cameras, and other means could provide additional monitoring. Shortages of 

interpreters can to an extent be overcome via reach-back sessions employing 

Skype- or Facetime-like connections with language speakers remote from the city 

itself. Simpler translation needs might be met one or more of the smartphone 

applications or other software currently available.

The challenges inherent in undertaking operations in a megacity will extend well 

beyond the sampling of intelligence-related concerns touched on above, instead 

permeating every military function and many civilian as well. New challenges will be 

commonplace, adapting lessons from those confronted before a routine necessity. 

New yes, but little will qualify as revolutionary. The urban-experienced soldier, sailor, 

marine, and airman will be a valuable asset, as will any who are well-read in the 

ways of urban operations, megacities, and fields with obviously applicable insights 

such as the previously mentioned counterinsurgency. Demanding as future megacity 

contingencies will be, however, innovations and initiative in drawing upon 

professional education and experiences are sure to provide far more of value than 

overzealous claims of having discovered a heretofore never seen form of conflict. 

The observations of both Eran Zohar and General James Mattis provide pertinent 

closing thoughts in this regard:

Wars became hybrid wars.... Being an old tactic practised by armies and guerrilla rebels, the 

“new” idea of an enemy that “disappears” from the battlefield and wages urban warfare is a 

fraud.... That rhetoric characterizes an organization that fails to conserve its memory and learn 

lessons from the past.”[xxxi]

-- Eran Zohar

“Israeli military intelligence’s understanding of the security environment in light of the Arab 

Awakening”

For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of 

war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say... “Not 

really”: Alex the Great would not be in the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right now 

in [2013] Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying 

(studying, vice just reading) the men who have gone before us.[xxxii]

-- General James Mattis
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End Notes

[i] Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of 

Thermonuclear War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, 48-49.

[ii] 21st-century operations and campaigns – those in larger urban areas in particular 

– demand more than a “coalition” as currently defined in US joint doctrine: “an 

arrangement between two or more nations for common action.” [Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 

Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010 as 

amended through January 15, 2016, 34, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed February 3, 2016)] 

A broader conceptualization is called for: “an ad hoc cooperative arrangement 

between two or more organizations in the interest of supporting a common action.” 

[Russell W. Glenn, Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family: A Military Perspective 

on Coalition Challenges During Stability Operations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2011, 41, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG903.html (accessed 

February 3, 2016).]

[iii] That many if not all observations made regarding megacities herein apply to the 

larger of world’s cities with somewhat smaller populations is a given. Westerners’ 

liking for multiples of five and ten should not cause us to limit insights to the 

serendipitous choice of the ten million mark.

[iv] Demographia World Urban Areas, 11th edition, 2015, 2,

http://www.demographia.com/db- worldua.pdf (accessed January 28, 2016).

[v] Jonathan W. Greenert (Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy), “The World is 

Dependent Upon the Oceans...,” presentation hosted by the Strategic and Defence 

Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, January 8, 

2015.

[vi] Statistic for 1965 from Ronan Paddison, ed., Handbook of Urban Studies,

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001, 24. 2015 statistics from Demographia World 

Urban Areas, 11th edition, 2015, 2,

http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf (accessed January 28, 2016).

[vii] Statistics such as those just cited suffer from these sometimes considerable 

differences in definition. I will use the following descriptions for urban-related terms in 

this essay:

“An urban area is best thought of as the ‘urban footprint’ – the lighted area that can 

be observed from an airplane (or satellite) on a clear night. National census 

authorities in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 

Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States designate urban areas. 

Except in Australia, the authorities use a minimum urban density definition of 400 
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persons per square kilometer (or the nearly identical 1,000 per square mile in the 

United States).... Urban Areas Contrasted with Metropolitan Areas: An urban area 

(built-up urban area or urban agglomeration) is fundamentally different from a 

metropolitan area.... A metropolitan area is a labor market and includes substantial 

rural (non-urban) territory or area of discontinuous urban development (beyond the 

developed urban fringe).” Demographia World Urban Areas, 11th edition, 2015, 3-4.

[viii] Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and 

Afghanistan Wars, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 151-152.

[ix] 2015 city of Los Angeles population estimate from ”Suburban Stats: Current Los 

Angeles, California Population, Demographics and stats in 2014 and 2015,” 

https://suburbanstats.org/population/california/how-many-people-live-in-losangeles (accessed February 2, 2016); Los Angeles urban area population estimate

from Demographia World Urban Areas, 11th edition, 2015, 35, 

http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf (accessed January 28, 2016).

[x] William Matthews, “Megacity Warfare: Taking Urban Combat to a Whole New 

Level,” Army (February 12, 2015) 

http://www.armymagazine.org/2015/02/12/megacity-warfare-taking-urbancombat-to-a-whole-new-level (accessed January 3, 2016).

[xi] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 419, 420, and 423. (emphasis in original)

[xii] “Paralysed: Urban traffic,” The Economist (November 7, 2015), 

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21677665-whynigerias-largest-city-even- less-navigable-usual-paralysed (accessed February 

2, 2016).

[xiii] Robert Dixon, “Bringing Big Data to War in Mega-Cities,” War on the Rocks, 

January 19, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/bringing-big-data-tooperations-in-mega-cities/ (accessed January 19, 2016).

[xiv] “Call for help; Ebola and big data,” The Economist 413 (October 25, 2014), 

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21627623-mobile-phone-records-areinvaluable-tool- combat-ebola-they-should-be-made-available (accessed 

February 2, 2016).

[xv] “Shrinking the haystack: Counter-terrorism,” The Economist 418 (January 16, 

2016): 78-79, http://www.economist.com/news/science-andtechnology/21688368-software-helping-search- guerrillas-and-terrorists-safehouses-and (accessed January 24, 2016).

[xvi] Justin Jouvenal, “The new way police are surveilling you: Calculating your 

threat ‘score’,”
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The Washington Post (January 10, 2016), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the- new-way-police-aresurveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-

baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html (accessed January 14, 2016).

[xvii] Michael Bailey and John Via, “Military Medical Implications of Future Megacity 

Operations,” Small Wars Journal (February 13, 2015), 

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/21402 (accessed January 3, 2016); 

Geoffrey York, “Ebola: How Nigeria and Senegal stopped the disease ‘dead in its 

tracks’,” The Globe and Mail (October 19, 2014, updated October 20, 2014), 

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ebola-how-to-stop-the-diseasedead-in-its- tracks/article21159394/ (accessed February 2, 2016); and Akintunde 

Akinleye, “Nigeria isolated Lagos hospital where Ebola victim died,” Reuters, July 25, 

2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health- ebola-nigeriaidUSKBN0FX15420140728 (accessed February 2, 2016)..

[xviii] International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 

“Emergency Plan of Action Final Report-Nigeria: Ebola Virus Disease,” August 31, 

2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MDRNG017FR.pdf 

(accessed February 2, 2016).

[xix] John Tozzi, “How to Avert an Ebola Nightmare: Lessons From Nigeria’s Victory, 

Business Week (October 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-

10-20/ebola-how-nigeria-averted-a- nightmare-in-densely-populated-lagos 

(accessed February 2, 2016); and Will Ross, “Ebola crisis: How Nigeria’s Dr 

Adadevoh fought the virus,” BBC, (October 20, 2014), 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world- africa-29696011 (accessed February 2, 2016).

[xx] Russell W. Glenn, et al., Honing the Keys to the City: Refining the United States 

Marine Corps Reconnaissance Force for Urban Ground Combat Operations, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2003, 11-12.

[xxi] Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, NY: Time, 1963, 29-30.

[xxii] Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq 

and Afghanistan Wars, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 238-39.

[xxiii] During the 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, for example, IDF soldiers 

could not find tunnel exits in buildings despite being aware of the general location of 

the egress points and searching for them extensively, later suffering surprise attacks 

after Gazans emerged behind Israeli positions. Russell

W. Glenn, Short War in a Perpetual Conflict: Implications of Israel’s 2014 Operation 

Protective Edge for the Australian Army (draft), 2015, to be published in 2016, 123.
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[xxiv] Russell W. Glenn, Short War in a Perpetual Conflict: Implications of Israel’s 

2014 Operation Protective Edge for the Australian Army (draft), 2015, to be 

published in 2016, 26.

[xxv] For a further discussion of urban densities and their influence on military 

operations, see Russell W. Glenn, Heavy Matter: Urban Operations Density of 

Challenges, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000.

[xxvi] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

November 8, 2010 as amended through January 15, 2016, 145, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed February 3, 2016).

[xxvii] Definition from Russell W. Glenn, Rethinking Western Approaches to 

Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-colonial Conflict, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 

2015, 270.

[xxviii] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010 as 

amended through January 15, 2016, 34.

[xxix] Russell W. Glenn, Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family? A Military 

Perspective on Coalition Challenges During Stability Operations, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2011, xiv.

[xxx] Dina Francesca Haynes, “Lessons from Bosnia’s Arizona Market: Harm to 

Women in a Neoliberalized Postconflict Reconstruction Process,” University of 

Pennsylvania Law Review 158: 1779, 1781 and 1794-98,

http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=pe

nn_law_review (accessed February 3, 2016).

[xxxi] Eran Zohar, “Israeli military intelligence’s understanding of the security 

environment in light of the Arab Awakening,” Defence Studies 15:3, 216-17 

[complete article 203-234].

[xxxii] Geoffrey Ingersoll, “General James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis Email About Being 

‘Too Busy To Read’ Is A Must-Read,” Business Insider (May 9, 2013), 

http://www.businessinsider.com.au/viral-james-mattis- email-reading-marines2013-5 (accessed January 19, 2016).
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Megacity Madness

By Gustav Otto & AJ Besik

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 8 June 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/megacity-madness

Are you in an urban area? Can you look around without seeing anyone? Try talking 

without being in earshot of someone who can easily overhear your conversation. Try 

walking side to side, front or back without having to watch out for someone or 

something. Now imagine the size and frequency of these events, so vast it takes 

hours to get to a place where you don’t have these experiences at every turn. If 

these all exist you’re probably in a megacity. So what is one? No one really knows, 

and that’s a problem. Trying to define a megacity is hard enough, trying to win a 

decisive action, engage in governance and rule of law, or trying to provide relief? It 

could be maddening. So what is a megacity? US Supreme Court Justice Potter 

Stewart is famous for a remark in 1964 about pornography that he knows it if he 

sees it.1 That mental approach doesn’t suffice when thinking of a megacity. More 

importantly we can’t interact with it based on such a shallow understanding. The 

United Nations arbitrarily defines a megacity as something larger than 10 million 

people. John Wilmoth, Director of the UN’s Department of Economic and Social 

Affairs (DESA) Population Division rightly states, “Managing urban areas has 

become one of the most important development challenges of the 21st century. Our 

success or failure in building sustainable cities will be a major factor in the success 

of the post-2015 UN development agenda.”2 The problem is bigger even than a 

megacity. It is how to consider one. How does the international community analyze 

megacities? Reviewing over 400 documents, website and blogs suggests there’s no 

single analytic, comprehensive tool for analyzing this new phenomenon.3 Arguably 

this is a classic interdisciplinary topic requiring a complex framework for analysis and 

evaluation, and ripe for innovation and creativity (design thinking).

The paper outlines a few ways to think about and analyze a megacity and make 

recommendations to prepare for operations in such an environment. The 

recommendations herein could not all encompassing, and likely never will be. It is 

an introduction by which a person or organization may consider the myriad of issues 

regarding a megacity, that when combined become vexing if not a wicked problem. 

But these problems are not insurmountable, nor impossible to operate in 

successfully.
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Cities are often thought of as systems of systems. Utilizing this framework to 

conceptualize the issues in a megacity then allows the application of previous ideas 

that have been proven.

Problems may arise when the sheer scale of a megacity’s issues come into play. This 

is where design thinking and generating multiple options rapidly allow for these issues 

of scale to be addressed, and thus be useful in the context of a megacity. We have 

lived and worked in some of these megacities, and watch with great interest the 

growing number of megacities around the world. There are a number of trends driving 

and driven by their growth. Among the two greatest are the draw of urbanization and 

the increase in globalization. They are complimentary, not exclusive. They are not 

the only reasons for their growth either. The growth of urbanization is recognized by 

authors as wide ranging as Thomas P. Barnett, author of The Pentagon’s New Map, 

to the Christian Science Monitor or Forbes, to global consultants such Accenture, 

Deloitte and Frost & Sullivan and McKinsey & Company. Each of these has a different 

vantage point, and each is moving towards a more comprehensive consideration of 

this challenging discussion on megacities.

The term megacities itself is problematic. While an accepted benchmark, it fails to 

account for other factors including the sophistication of infrastructure or transient 

populations. Some cities are categorized as a megacity by outside organizations but 

not by their own municipal governments. Some are megacities, no matter what we call 

them, or if there’s disagreement.

They present a rich, urban and dense location filled with endless challenges and 

opportunities for engagement, partnership, and profit. Therefore, accepting definitions 

of a city and a megacity differ is of little import. This paper seeks to look at a megacity 

as one might a computer – the combination of software, hardware and what the 

outcomes are. In the case of a megacity, the hardware may be the physical, the plants 

and facilities, the roads, electric and plumbing, the buildings, trains and tunnels. The 

software is what travels over, to and through the physical, and may include information 

or data, energy, even people. Finally the outcomes, the humanistic realities others will 

have to recognize, deal with, and live by.

The hardware/software/outcomes framework of analysis for these urban areas is 

intentionally oversimplified because it lends itself to a set of parallel measurements 

allowing for improved analysis and evaluation with every iteration. Over the last two 

decades it seems the international community, scholarly and otherwise, settled on the 

number of 10 million. There’s little good argument for this number. Rather it appears 

arbitrary with little rationale tied to it. It is important to recognize 10 million offers no 

additional value other than a fictitious threshold.
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Does a city with 9.5 million behave in much the way one with 14 million? Yes. Size 

matters, but so do issues like population density and scale. 

A recent example might be the impact the Zika virus is playing in and around the 

megacity of Sao Paulo. As we saw the reeling of the community to the sharp incline 

of microcephaly there were questions about its origin, its spread, its containment and 

the human impacts around the region and the globe. Some indicators suggest it was 

visitors to Sao Paulo for the 2014 World Cup games who brought the virus to the 

region, and fears by the International Community it will not be contained in time for the 

2016 Olympics. Treatment of the virus, treatment of the mosquito and its vectors, and 

treatment of its victims vary, and there remains no cure.

Quarantine of Sao Paulo is next to impossible. Full scale assault by the 

International Community, along with armies of aid and health workers wouldn’t solve 

the problem. How can we think of dealing with calamities such as this in a 

megacity?

Any operations normally conducted in a city will obviously occur in a megacity. 

Indeed, many such cities already have effective, established measures to continue 

with the day to day actions that those governments conduct. The likelihood of US 

forces of any type operating in such an environment is very high, including cities 

inside our own borders. According to the National Intelligence Council (NIC), by 

2030 individuals will see a substantial increase in autonomy and prosperity. There’s 

a growing notion that megacities are becoming their own little sovereign nations. The 

growth of the global population, especially in urban areas, will lead to a majority of 

the world’s population residing in cities where more economic and education 

opportunities exist. This urbanization will lead to a middle-class that is the “most 

important social and economic sector in the vast majority of countries around the 

world.” With better access to education, affordable health care, and sources of 

information, the individual will be the driving force behind global change. This 

change may take on the form of renewed economic growth in historically poor 

regions of the world or allow super-empowered people to challenge the security 

apparatus and governmental legitimacy. These areas are then fraught with the 

potential for emergencies, man-made or natural. Situations such as this can be seen 

emerging in some areas of the world.

Situations that appear similar to those the US has previously operated in 

successfully. Urban Combat, Humanitarian Assistance, Stability Operations, all have 

been conducted by US Government agencies within the last decade. Scale however 

rudely interrupts the best-laid plans. These aren’t necessarily new problems, just 
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ones that planners may have believed solved previously. Need to bring water and 

food into a city that has suffered a naturally disaster? This has happened on 

countless occasions around the globe, both with US and international involvement. 

However what if the standard methods of bringing in supplies aren’t feasible due to 

problems of sheer physics? If the normal seaport is closed and supplies must be 

trucked in but there are so many people to accommodate there is not enough 

physical space to park said trucks without clogging the supply routes. Issues that will 

compound when alternative remedies aren’t available or don’t meet the need in 

aggregate. So what kinds of analysis might prove useful in such an area? The list is 

long, and for the purposes of demonstration we offer only a few in the following 

paragraphs.

We’re well served to think about communications and data and their growing 

importance to governance, awareness and human interaction. Consider welldeveloped megacities first. From London, to Seoul to Los Angeles, the physical 

infrastructure is governed by information. On the hardware front, information flows 

over copper wires, the airwaves and fiber-optics to keep things running smoothly. 

On the software front, data drives trains, planes and automobiles. On the outcomes 

front it cools towering high-rises so employees are more productive and computers 

don’t break down, and warms delivery rooms for babies. The importance of the 

human in the loop is greater in developing megacities, but is the primary factor in 

all these systems. The presence of a functional technocracy keeps poor systems 

working. When these fragile systems are compromised the role of the technocrat 

becomes more apparent. Data isn’t just important to the hard systems, they play a 

role in governance, especially during crises. How this data is developed, 

transmitted, consumed, etc, is more critical in a megacity than normal urban 

settings.

Another critical aspect to consider when analyzing any city is the population – as 

mentioned the primary human factor. This seems obvious, yet an in-depth 

understanding of populations is not always part of preparation. It is this fact that 

continues to vex US National Security Strategists in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Syria and beyond. Cities exist to house, employ, and even contain human beings. 

The movement of people; their backgrounds, sociologies, education, ethnicity, 

gender and race; the culture(s) of the people living there; how these people choose 

to associate governance and politics; the work and social patterns of these people; 

the resultant rules and laws that are applied; how those rules and laws are upheld 

(or not); the services required for the people; and finally the tensions that exist, 

naturally, are all to be considered. Each of these could be layered in our 

conceptualization across four dimensions (three physical plus time = 4D = 3D + t). 

Unfortunately, there is little, perhaps no homogeneity or uniformity in these layers. 
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To suggest we could just label each like a sheet of paper, and lay them atop each 

other is naïve and misleading. It is important to stress the way these layers interact 

across and with each other, though not in a linear fashion. The alluded to human 

factor plays out on various stages, from the electromagnetic to the physical. In some 

cases those two above ideas of information and human landscape fuse as observed 

in the proliferation of social media. Decades ago, the Marine Corps had the foresight 

to describe the strategic corporal.4 While not a perfect analog, the idea is well 

founded, that individual actions can reverberate and cause problems far beyond the 

scope of the original intent. When thought of in the nineties the concept brought 

attention to the idea that the action of an individual operating at a low level can be 

perceived various ways when transmitted through modern media and lead to 

unintended strategic consequences. More simply, when attempting to engage one 

person the effects can be felt by millions. Often times this can be negative, as 

perceptions can be manipulated or capitalized on by various factions. This idea 

takes on a new significance when the millions of people that may have acquired a 

negative view of your operations are not found around the globe, but within ten miles 

of your operating space.

These kinds of effects were observed during the Arab Spring in 2011, when social 

media enabled mobilization on a scale that superseded the capabilities of the 

government to react.5 Conversely, this could prove to be positive if leveraged 

properly. Imagine that when responding to a crisis that the local population actually 

becomes some of the best publicity as images of first responders handing out food 

or the removal of a particularly unsavory local character goes viral. This was present 

in nascent form on September 11, 2001 when the first responders of New York’s 

emergency services became instant celebrities and people from Europe to Asia 

bought NYPD or FDNY tee shirts. This reality must be taken into account as 

technology only makes the capability easier. As observed by several police 

departments, anytime an officer stops for any reason, a camera is present, or should 

be assumed to be.6 This must also be present in the preparation military or other 

groups’ conduct prior to operating in such urban sprawls.

So what can the US Government, the US Intelligence Community, and the 

Department of Defense, among others do to enhance the understanding of 

megacities? It must seek to resolve situations before they become problems. To 

accomplish that goal, members of those organizations need to be able to assess 

situations through frameworks that have not been the historical norm for the defense 

or intelligence communities. As with most problems, training and education are 

critical; a different mindset about solution development and employment, and less 

emphasis on fighting wars and more on avoiding them.
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Training must instill an understanding of the challenges that will be encountered. 

Soldiers, intelligence operatives, a new breed of first responders, all should have an 

understanding of the megacity characteristics that may affect their operations. All 

must become comfortable operating in an area where they are likely to interact with 

the local population in any number of ways. Participating in multiple iterations of 

training is the underlying principle. Three broad areas, combining emergent 

technology and principles, come to mind that will enhance proper understanding 

through training.

1. Virtual Reality (VR). The benefits of this technology are often improperly 

communicated. It is not a substitute for live training. It is a platform that can be 

leveraged to conduct iterative training. The US doesn’t have a range or livepractice area where it can employ new concepts for engagement in a megacity. 

Therefore, well-crafted VR offers a way to work at an individual to group size 

level across the four dimensions of a megacity, with an appreciation of the 

hardware/software/outcome framework. Virtual Reality doesn’t have to be cost 

prohibitive, it includes more than the idea of someone wearing goggles 

projecting images directly to their optical sensors. It can also involve systems 

younger operators are intimately familiar with, gaming platforms or computers. 

The base from which ideas for training are culled from must be expanded. 

Utilizing scenarios presented in media formats that would normally be viewed as 

skeptical (e.g. fiction) need to be considered. It is only through thinking in broad 

scope and considering possibilities however unpalatable that personnel will 

push their frameworks for understanding forward, even if the problems remain 

mundane in reality.

2. Specialization. New specialties that deal with the realities of urban infrastructure 

and populations are essential. Perhaps a pilot group of professionals from 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) could work with members of the State 

Department’s Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), and select member 

of the Intelligence Community to develop or cross-functional tactics, techniques 

and practices to deal with uncertain scenarios before they become problems. 

These aren’t normally areas that operators are trained in, certainly not military 

forces. Using new frameworks will allow the military to work better across a 

whole-of-government construct, and in this likely absence be more effective at 

advancing non-escalating solutions in a megacity environment. Further, an 

education component should be developed where select members of the USG 

are trained specifically on these types of situations. These personnel would then 

be tracked while in government service and on stand- by to advise various 

organizations who are confronted or confounded by a particular megacity. The 

education would include living and working in a megacity, deep exploration and 

evaluation of the hardware/software/outcomes framework and the thinking 

therein. These are often called broadening assignments by the military and have 

not yet fully matured. Indeed it can be argued that despite the emphasis placed 
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on them by some senior leaders, they are still not considered advantageous for 

personnel to participate in. This needs to change if there is going to be an 

expectation that defense professionals understand the various systems that may 

be encountered in megacities. It could lead to urban planning education tracks 

as the solutions are tested and approved over the next several decades.

3. Practice. As with any endeavor, practice gives confidence to those that will 

conduct operations. Whether in small teams and coordinated live exercises in 

the future, in VR scenarios, or on tabletop exercises designed for failure, not 

success, practice is essential. The idea is to reinforce the necessity to conduct 

multiple iterations. This could be possible with physical training, either in 

Department of Defense owned bases that are nearly abandoned or in 

economically depressed cities. These costs may prove prohibitive, which is 

where Virtual Reality may prove a better avenue. However it is enabled, multiple 

iterations will force trainees to thinkof different ways to overcome situations. This 

can be said of most any endeavor. The key to training for megacity operations 

will be to emphasize how to think of the various systems present. Easy to 

understand, easy to access templates can be established, notstandards, for 

megacity challenges. Templates that convey understanding, not just lists, that 

explain why industrial or residential areas developed in a certain way in a 

geographic region. While no two cities have identical circumstances, there are 

well researched means of understanding the geographic layout based on history 

and resources. Why not more lists and standards? Standards are too static, and 

fail to allow for the flexibility required in a dynamic setting like a megacity. Part of 

the practice, building from the previous paragraph, would find a select group of 

US Government employees, and possibly service personnel “stationed” in 

megacities, working with the Nation State, the city governance councils, industry 

and the USG to learn more lessons, map out functions and add to the depth of 

understanding available on this complex topic.

Next steps? Do you buy these arguments? Along the way you were thinking, “I’ve 

never been to a megacity, and these guys are crazy”. Maybe you grew up in Delhi, 

Tokyo or New York, and you think “these guys are mad”. You’re right. The thing is, 

megacities are hard, issues and problems compound over things that were solvable 

in other environments. They as difficult a challenge to plan for than anything the US 

Government has tackled previously. Of course, if you believe, as we do, that 

megacities may quickly resemble mini-countries, that you just need to change your 

thinking, you’re also right. What we want to demonstrate is the importance of talking 

about them. The importance of understanding a megacity, and that they are more 

than a scale issue is critical. Our culture and our minds are designed to limit 

choices, and when we’re overwhelmed with data we tend to freeze. The time for this 

analysis paralysis is over, the time for movement and flexibility is here. A 

hardware/software/outcome framework is part of the solution, but it is only a small 

part. A paper ten times this size will start to introduce the many factors each of 
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these three criteria could consider. Even then, much work is left to do. As Andre 

Guide said “There are very few monsters who warrant the fear we have of them.” 

We needn’t fear megacities, we must start working hard to sort them though.

The views expressed in this article are of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect 

the view of the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the U.S. 

Army, or any other agency of the Federal Government.

End Notes

1 Justice Potter Stewart’s concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 

(1964).

2 UN Economic and Social Affairs Press release July 10, 2014. Accessed February 

8, 2016 at esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-PressRelease.pdf

3 Collating the research materials and sources of the US Army Chief of Staff 

Strategic Studies Group white papers “Megacities and the United States Army”, June, 

2014 and “Readiness in an Urban Era,” May 2015.

4 General Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three 

Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999.

5 Taylor Dewey, et al. “The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab 

Spring” (Paper presented at Stanford University, March 20, 2012) 17-91.

6 Author’s Notes from “Readiness in an Urban Era,” US Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies Lyceum White Paper, May 2015.
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Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army

By Darryl Ward

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 9 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/operational-environmentimplications-of-the-megacity-to-the-us-army

Megacity Defined

The United Nations (UN) and the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) 

define the megacity as a metropolitan area whose population exceeds 10 million 

people. While other definitions exist, this is the definition used as the basis for 

understanding future impacts of megacities to US Army operations. Depending on 

the statistical reference, there are between 23 and 30 megacities in the world. 

Statistical numbers vary primarily due to different interpretations of metropolitan 

limits and surrounding areas.

However, regardless of how megacities are quantified, trends within the global 

operational environment (herein referred as the “OE”) indicate that the number of 

urban areas will continue to rise. [i]

Global Drivers and Trends

In order to predict future impacts of megacities to the US Army, the global drivers 

and trends leading to megacity development must be identified. Drivers (as defined 

for this paper) are forces that always exist, such as demographics (people), natural 

resources (water, oil, land), and globalization (interconnectivity). Drivers constantly 

impact the OE.

Drivers are impacted by trends, which have life cycles with associated impacts on 

drivers. Trends are constantly analyzed in terms of their impacts to drivers. This 

article is not all inclusive but highlights some trend-driven impacts on drivers and 

resulting potential for involvement of the US Army across the range of military 

operations.

Demographics

Progressive ideologies; war; youth population bulges; unemployment; climate 

change; and scarcity of food, water, and medicine are among the reasons that 

human migration to urban areas is a trend expected to continue for several decades. 

The UN estimates that approximately 180,000 people move into urban areas every 

day and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that 60 percent of the 

world’s population will live in cities by 2030.[ii] This constant influx of population is 
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certain to stress megacity infrastructures, resulting in the potential for certain 

population groups to perceive disenfranchisement and leading to US Army military 

urban engagement in cooperation with host nation forces.

Demographic trends can greatly affect political decisions in countries striving to 

continue economic growth, maintain a military, generate tax revenue, and maintain 

alliances. Among demographic trends, the NIC estimates that by 2030 the world will 

have contracted from 80 to 50 countries whose populations will have a medium age 

of 25 years or less. Most countries maintaining a youth bulge are located in SubSaharan Africa, the Middle East, and in South and Central Asia.[iii] Those countries 

without a youth bulge in 2039 are located in Eastern Asia, North America, and 

Europe. In fact, the DIA estimates that by 2050 the most prevalent age group in 

Europe will be in the 55-69 year old category.[iv]

Natural Resources

Megacities are susceptible to natural and manmade disasters due to their physical 

proximity to large bodies of water. All of the top ten megacities fall into this 

category and eight of the ten are on a coast. Furthermore, the UN estimates that 

over 50 percent of the world’s population lives within 120 miles of a coast.[v]

Indeed, water near population centers has always been necessary for commerce, 

food, sanitation, etc. However, extreme water events caused by floods, hurricanes, 

typhoons, and tsunamis exacerbate life threatening situations in areas of increased 

urbanization. The US Army is likely to experience an increase in crisis response 

operations requiring foreign humanitarian assistance in large-scale urban 

environments.

Another complication megacities present is vertical growth. This is especially true 

in cities along coastlines, where expansion is naturally inhibited. Design and 

development of high-rise cities could lead to greatly compromised military 

operations in urban settings where the effectiveness of precision guided munitions; 

elevation of weapon systems; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) collection platforms are limited.

Globalization

Globalization as a driver creates OE interconnectivity. As societies become more 

connected, events unfolding in one area of the world are communicated and affect 

other areas. Some examples of potential manifestations of globalization and 

demographic interaction include:

• An increasing influx of Middle Eastern and African youth into Europe. Many 

of these migrants arrive without a formal education and are unemployed.

• Countries such as China wanting to attract migrants from low income 

countries to supplement its declining youthful workforce in order to sustain its 
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economy.

The NIC forecasts that the need to support economic growth combined with the lack 

of opportunities in areas of the world that maintain a youth bulge will create even 

faster demographic shifts than those that occurred in the last quarter of the 20th

century. [vi] A huge migrant influx into megacities and urban areas in general has 

the potential for increased xenophobic feelings and conversely, perceived inequities 

may lead to violence and acts of terrorism as the world has already witnessed in 

megacities such as London and Paris. A question to consider is, at what point do 

states begin to enculturate the character/culture of rapidly increasing ethnic 

minorities?

A PMESII-PT Megacity Analysis

The following is an analysis of some of the trends affecting drivers from the 

perspective of the US Army doctrinal taxonomy of PMESII-PT. It is intended to 

articulate how these trends might affect or involve the US Army, but is not a detailed 

PMESII-PT megacity analysis.

Political: Futurist Thomas Frey notes that democracy could be viewed as an 

inferior form of government by 2030.[vii] In fact, a number of megacities or large 

urban areas are located in democracies with a high risk of failure due to religious 

extremism or other trends. Even in states where democracy is not threatened, it is 

important to consider that disenfranchised populations often harbor feelings of 

deprived rights and may tend to incite violence as a means to force political change. 

For instance, megacity gangs taking this approach could stress already taxed law 

enforcement to the point where the US military would be requested to provide 

foreign security assistance.

Military: An ever-narrowing gap between military capabilities, organization, and 

influence (due in part to globalization) is increasingly blurring distinctions between 

regular and conventional forces, irregular forces, and insurgents. When criminal 

elements are considered, a “hybrid threat” as defined in Army Doctrinal Reference 

Publication 1-02 emerges. While the term “hybrid threat” is relatively new, the 

concept behind it is not. There are many examples in military history of groups with 

military capabilities that unite either formally or informally to achieve a mutually 

desired outcome.

Hybrid threats (threats) seek ways to counter perceived strengths of their adversary.

US Army military strengths such as situational awareness through mission command 

systems and ISR platforms, precision guided munitions (PGM), and 

protection/lethality provided by armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) afford the 

advantage to see, know, and act decisively. Threats study these advantages and 
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deduct their own lessons learned. For instance, drawing US forces into urban areas 

compromises our technological advantages. Megacity congestion limits movement 

and predictable movement corridors will make the US Army susceptible to 

improvised explosive devices (IED), explosive formed projectiles, and an array of 

dual-warhead antitank (AT) missiles and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). A 

recent RAND Corporation study “Comparing US Army Systems with Foreign 

Counterparts” noted the increasing weight in AFVs to protect against IEDs and other 

urban combat threats. Added weight, due to reactive armor, urban survival kits, and 

other protective enhancements affects vehicle dimensions and power train transfer. 

In an urban setting, conditions such as bridge classifications or road widths may 

prohibit where AFVs can travel as well as reduce AFV performance (vehicle power 

requirements vs. weight). The US Army must balance protection requirements while 

maintaining mobility.

Weight issues also apply to urban conflicts involving light infantry. The RAND report 

also noted the increasing loads that infantrymen are required to carry. One hundred 

pounds or more was cited as common practice.[viii]

Threats are subject to some of the same challenges. However, the OE will affect the 

threat much differently than it does the US Army. It is highly possible that initial US 

Army entry into a megacity and/or urban area will be expeditionary in nature and 

opposed by the threat. Operations will be primarily offensive and lines of 

communication (LOCs) will be under development. In addition, LOCs will be under 

the same scrutiny of predictability by the threat and hence subject to interdiction. 

Therefore, US Soldiers will be required to carry additional supplies (ammo, batteries, 

night vision, water, etc.) that at least initially threats will not face the same burden. 

When superior US military forces enter, threats will adapt to defensive operations 

while maintaining limited offensive actions such as raids and ambushes. Therefore, 

while threats still have logistical requirements, they have advantages in that they can 

cache supplies, do not need to carry loads similar to US infantrymen, and enjoy (at 

least initially) more mature LOCs.

Economics: The lure to megacities and urban areas because of employment 

opportunities is a trend that is likely to continue through 2030, especially for 

economies that are developing or want to sustain growth.

The NIC cites not only current economic leaders (e.g., China, Europe, or Japan) but 

also developing economies such as Columbia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and others are 

becoming increasingly important to the global economy. As previously mentioned, a 

number of established economies are challenged because an aging workforce may 

look to migrants from low income countries to replace labor needs. This could lead 

to megaslums if local economies and infrastructures cannot react in concert with the 

rapid influx of migrants. Slums tend to exacerbate disenfranchisement and lead to 
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conflict. Strategist and counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen writes in Out of The 

Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla that it is time to take what we 

have learned from the war in Afghanistan and think how it applies to future conflicts 

consisting of “...urban, networked, guerrilla warfare occurring in megaslums and 

megacities.” [ix]

Social: The UN estimates that 180,000 people migrate to urban areas daily. The 

cities and megacities of Brazil, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, 

Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, and the US are forecasted to 

make up approximately 60 percent of the global urban growth through 2030. [x] 

Diaspora from youth bulging countries bring their cultures, ideologies, and most 

important, expectations. However, increasing migration to urban areas could at 

least, initially result in the expansion of slums and the materialization of acute 

poverty. A rapid increase in minorities could erode social fabric and lead to violent 

friction and the potential for overwhelming state security force capabilities. This 

could lead to generating domestic and international requests for the US Army to 

provide military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

Infrastructure: In addition to employment opportunities, another major contributor 

to urban growth is the need for food, fresh water, housing, and energy. Megacities 

and large urban areas in general have infrastructures to provide these life supporting 

necessities. However, the NIC estimates that the demand for food, water, and 

energy will increase by 35, 40 and 50 percent respectively over the next 40 years 

and that housing demand will equal the entire volume of construction worldwide to 

date.[xi] These figures are staggering and will surely stress infrastructure 

capacities. The effort to meet demands could result in poor construction quality, 

gridlocked transportation networks, and utility service failures. In addition, the fact 

that most megacities are located along coasts restricts horizontal development. 

Vertical development is more vulnerable to natural (earthquakes, tsunamis, 

typhoons, etc.) and man-made disasters. US Army assistance for civil support and 

civil-military operations may be in greater demand than ever before.

Information: Urban areas tend to have the most mature radio, television, and 

cellular networks. Information can be passed by the adversary using a variety of 

means with almost instantaneous results. High rise buildings afford nearly 

unobstructed signals for jamming of US PGM and unmanned ISR platforms 

therefore reducing US military technological advantages.

Physical terrain: Urban settings are dominated by buildings and roads that develop 

predictable man- made mobility corridors. Buildings can both impede and improve 

observation. High rise buildings provide both commanding observation and 

concealment for individually operated anti-tank launchers. They also create elevation 
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issues for AFV weapon systems targeting such threats while serving as obstacles to 

acquiring aerial ISR platforms. Urban settings also have mature sub-surface 

structures such as sewer, drainage, and subway transit systems. Underground 

mobility is an important aspect of urban warfare. The use of existing subterranean 

features and tunneling can create elaborate defensive networks. Hence, megacity 

physical terrains present three-dimensional threat challenges to the US Army in that 

threats may occur simultaneously above, at, and below surface levels.

Time: It is assumed that potential US adversaries have developed operational plans 

that involve adaptive operations within urban settings. The use of urban terrain by 

militarily inferior opponents against superior opponents has been exercised 

throughout military history. Chechen tactics against the Russian military [xii] and 

Hezbollah’s defense[xiii] against the Israeli Defense Force are recent examples of 

how urban terrain is used to engage and prolong conflict while using information 

operations to generate world opinion. Potential adversaries understand that the US 

has transitioned to primarily an expeditionary force, which could at least initially favor 

the adversary. Future adversaries do not need to win; they just need to avoid losing 

to force a stalemate.

Replicating Future Complexities at US Army Training Centers

What emerging technologies and capabilities should the US Army consider 

replicating in live, constructive, and virtual (LVC) training environments in order to 

realistically represent OE complexities?

Physical destruction in urban areas will further degrade the infrastructure and alter 

perception of non- combatants once supportive of US forces. Therefore, we must 

place more emphasis on employment of non-lethal weapons for more affective riot 

control and against military targets. Various types of stun guns, mood-altering 

gasses, and other temporarily incapacitating capabilities are needed to train for 

military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

In addition, constructive and virtual gaming simulations must accurately reflect 

munitions effects ranging from small arms to artillery on different types of buildings 

and also reflect physical properties of how these buildings are constructed. The 

current multi-integrated laser equipment system (MILES) is ill-suited for registering 

effects in urban terrain. We need MILES to reflect partial and catastrophic 

destruction inflicted on buildings by both US and threat weapon systems. We also 

need improved personnel and equipment MILES that factor material used for cover 

in the probability of hit/probability of kill codes.

We must be able to see-through urban environments. We need ultrasound and x-
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ray technology that permits squad level US Soldiers to penetrate walls and below 

the surface in order to acquire adversarial information.

Dual warhead AT missiles and RPGs also pose a real threat to US Army AFVs. 

AFVs need the ability to automatically acquire, track, and launch countermeasures 

to neutralize and/or defeat these weapons.

Urban settings (physical structures, subterranean, population, etc.), reduce US 

stand-off weapon and ISR superiority, requiring close in combat to identify friendly 

vs. foe. Robotic platforms that serve a multitude of functions such as the ability to 

acquire, assimilate, and transmit biometric data and serve as weapon platforms are 

needed to offset the challenges presented by urban environments.

Conclusion

History shows it is difficult to predict with clarity what future conflict will look like.

However, drivers and their trends analyzed through the lens of PMESII-PT lend 

some form of credence as to what future challenges megacities pose to the US 

Army. As such, the US Army must continue to prepare its training centers for 

replicating urban settings by establishing LVC training conditions that include the 

aforementioned emerging technologies and capabilities.

Credits

Out of The Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, Dr. David Kilcullen. 

(Oxford University Press, 2013)

Dramatic Predictions, Mr. Thomas Frey: http://www.wfs.org/blogs/thomasfrey/33-dramatic- predictions-for-2030

DIA: Long Range Futures Brief, Mr. Jesse Fairall (Defense Intelligence Agency, 29 

July 2015)

UN Atlas of the Oceans, Human Settlements on the Coast: 

http://www.oceansatlas.org

RAND Research Report: Comparing US Army Systems with Foreign Counterparts, 

John Gordon IV, John Matsumura, Anthony Atler, Scott Boston, Matthew Boyer, 

Natasha Lander, Todd Nichols (RAND Corporation, 2015)

Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, (National Intelligence Council, December 

2012)

Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars 1994-

2009, Mr. Dodge Billingsley and Mr. Lester Grau. (Combat Films and Research, 

2012)
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CALL Newsletter 11-34 Preparing for Hybrid Threats: Improving Force Preparation 

for Irregular Warfare, Mr. William Fleser (Center for Army Lessons Learned, June 

2011)

End Notes

[i] NIC

[ii] DIA

[iii] NIC

[iv] DIA

[v] UN Atlas

[vi] NIC

[vii]Frey

[viii]RAND 

[ix] Kilcullen 

[x] NIC

[xi] NIC

[xii] Billingsley, Grau

[xiii] Fleser
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Qualitative Analysis Concept in Support of Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025B) 

Maneuvers

By John Hoven and Joel Lawton

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 14 July 2015

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/qualitative-analysis-conceptin-support-of-force-2025-and-beyond-f2025b-maneuvers

The use of qualitative analysis within the Army intelligence community can help 

remedy certain capability gaps in obtaining locally nuanced information. Reliance on 

quantitative driven surveys and methods such as PMESII-PT (Political, Military, 

Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time) and 

ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) 

questionnaires for understanding tactical information works largely from a 

hypothesis-driven approach which can ignore pertinent information (e.g., unknownunknowns). Army Learning Concepts and their associated Army Warfighting 

Challenges (AWfC), used to analyze future requirements, present an opportunity to 

test a new approach for developing localized “situational understanding” (an 

objective of the AWfC framework). This paper will explore how qualitative analysis 

can be used within the AWfC concept framework to support situational 

understanding leading to actionable intelligence.

Army Campaign of Learning

Each year the U.S. Army conducts a Campaign of Learning to help model Army 

concepts that may lead to capabilities or support acquisition efforts corresponding to 

a projected strategic environment (SE), operational environments (OE), and 

subordinate areas of responsibility (AOR). Learning Campaigns include “studies, 

science and technology, seminars, wargames, experiments, and live 

exercises.”[i]US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-

2, the Army’s overarching guide to 2015’s campaign objectives states that its 

purpose is to describe "an Army learning model that meets the All-Volunteer Army’s 

need to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders capable of meeting the 

challenges of operational adaptability in an era of persistent conflict.”[ii] Learning 

Concepts are largely derived from definitions of the SE by national or service 

specific documents that may include: The National Intelligence Council’s Global 

Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, The US Army’s Operating Concept Win in a 

Complex World, and US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) 

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land 

Operations.
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During successive learning campaigns, the Army identifies broad functional areas 

needed to maintain a decisive advantage in the future SE. These functional areas 

are supported and defined by AWfCs and are given a proponent Army Center of 

Excellence or directorate to advance the development of concepts or capabilities 

based on their respective mission or utility. AWfCs are identified gaps in current 

Army capabilities that must be addressed to improve chances of success in future 

conflict. The current AWfCs are modeled to support the generating and operational 

force of 2025 and beyond (or F2025B). The 2015-2016 AWfCs that the Army is 

using to develop concepts include some 20 “first-order problem” areas[iii]: Develop 

Situational Understanding; Shape the Security Environment; Provide Security Force 

Assistance; Adapt the Institutional Army; Counter WMD; Homeland Operations;

Conduct Space and Cyber Electromagnetic Operations and Maintain 

Communications; Enhance Training; Improve Soldier, Leader, and Team 

Performance; Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders; Conduct Air-Ground 

Reconnaissance; Conduct Entry Operations; Conduct Wide Area Security; Ensure 

Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

Multinational Environment; Conduct Combined Arms Maneuver; Set the Theater, 

Sustain Operations, and Maintain Freedom of Movement; Integrate Fires; Deliver 

Fires; Exercise Mission Command, and Develop Capable Formations.[iv]

The use of qualitative analysis within the Army intelligence community may fit 

several of the ascribed AWfCs. The first AWfC, Develop Situational Understanding,

however seems best suited to benefit from the methods and implicit value of 

qualitative analysis. Qualitative methods certainly have application throughout all 

military command echelons, but the relevance of its uses is especially striking for 

gaining tactical (i.e., battalion and below operations) “situational understanding.”

Tactical Qualitative Analysis support to AWfC #1

Warfighting Challenge #1 seeks to develop concepts to mitigate the operational gap 

of: “How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while 

operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy 

organizations.”[v] AWfC #1 is assigned to the Intelligence Center of Excellence 

(ICoE) as the “lead” proponent and Special Operations Center of Excellence 

(SOCoE) and the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s (ARCIC) Human Dimension 

(HD) Task Force as “support” to develop learning demands (i.e., essentials used to 

define and develop the AWfC) or concepts that can mitigate the gap identified.[vi] 

The employment of qualitative analysis for use in the tactical environment can be 

nested within AWfC’s requirement itself: “Develop and sustain a high degree of 

situational understanding.” The unique advantage to qualitative methods is its ability 

to overcome shortfalls in understanding complex environments through causal 

inference in one-of-a-kind situations (sample size of one) and discovering answers 
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to questions we are too clueless to ask.

The ability of the Soldier to garner sensitive, locally-nuanced, and actionable 

information will hinge on the ability to adapt to ever changing environmental and 

social variables. The use of rigid questionnaires, structured interviews, and the 

impractical employment of probability sampling in an austere environment largely 

does not provide accurate or actionable information.

Many factors that military leaders need to address can only be understood by 

seeking “more depth but on a narrower range of issues than people do in normal 

conversations.”[vii] Quantitative methods aided through the use of computer 

processing can analyze massive amounts of data, but key factors are often 

unmeasurable. Current frameworks used by the Joint community, such as PMESIIPT and ASCOPE variables, to define the operational environment have value, but 

largely work from a deductive approach. Inductive reasoning as well as abductive 

reasoning (i.e., causal inference leading to a hypothesis) allow the collector or 

analyst to “think about observations, methods, and theories that nurtures theory 

formation without locking it into predefined conceptual boxes.”[viii]

Qualitative methods can support current frameworks, like those mentioned above, 

but gleam new insights and a deeper understanding of factors that influence people 

or affect stability. In order to accomplish this, intelligence specialists and those 

immersed in a tactical environment must be able to engage populations through 

conversation and develop follow-up questions that probe at new and undiscovered 

topics. Instead of asking questions from a preformatted list, Soldiers will be 

encouraged to ask questions on the spot based on their personal experiences, 

knowledge of the area, non-verbal cues, and environmental and circumstantial 

evidence. Rather than having a hypothesis and testing it through deductive methods, 

Soldiers would be encouraged to discover issues and topics without adhering to 

formatted or standardized question sets. This is not to say that Soldiers will be 

expected to completely engage people impromptu, but will be expected to go 

beyond simply adhering to the narrative of their questions. Current information 

sources such as PMESII-PT can help the collector with starter questions, but the 

collector will have the flexibility and means to branch out from basic fact-finding 

questions to discover new information.

In contrast, Army Field Manual, Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: 

Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection, states, "Ask only basic questions 

as described in this section."[ix] This severely impairs Soldiers’ ability to examine 

and discover locally nuanced information, as the manual intends: "Interaction with 

the local populace enables Soldiers to obtain information of immediate value through 

conversation."[x] A more effective way would be for interviews, conducted by 

Soldiers, to use probing and follow-up questions, and then reassess. After an initial 
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reassessment of information collected during the opening round of questioning, new 

themes may emerge leading to follow-on questions to make causal inferences 

between the interviewee and a topic of interest. Ergo, "This is what we've learned, 

this is what we need to learn next, talk to these kinds of people, here are some 

starter questions to steer the conversation in the right direction." These methods 

allow for the collection of richly detailed, context- specific information rather than 

database variables, and collection and analysis work hand in hand rather than as 

separate endeavors.

Qualitative analysis uniquely supports collection efforts where a problem set may be 

ill-defined or little is known about an AOR. Qualitative analysis starts with unknownunknowns, where there is no hypothesis to test. In contrast, most intelligence 

collection starts with a full set of alternative competing hypotheses. Starting with a 

hypothesis can be exemplified with collection efforts related to priority information 

requirements (PIR). Commanders will establish PIRs as a way to “identify a specific 

fact, event, activity (or absence thereof) which can be collected.”[xi] PIRs support 

understood problem sets and help to identify, articulate, or validate our perceptions 

or concepts of the OE. Alternatively, qualitative analysis, using abductive reasoning, 

expects the unexpected (unknown-unknowns). Thus, if a problem set is not 

understood or poorly defined, the goal of qualitative analysis is to describe the 

problem or present enough information that makes the problem set a knownunknown (where a hypothesis can be tested). Qualitative analysis does not usually 

articulate hypotheses at the start of a collection effort, when so little is known. As 

when our understanding is so frail, one interview is enough (sample size of one) to 

find what we are looking at (i.e., the initial problem set) may be wrong. Progressively 

elaborating on initial question sets, refining your topics, and asking casually related 

follow-on questions discovers answers to questions we are too clueless to ask.

Moreover, the initial use of qualitative analysis to discover new and locally nuanced 

information can be conducted rapidly. This is the case because qualitative analysis 

does not require tedious probability sampling techniques which aggregates into 

statistically significant findings. Also, the use of probability sampling techniques 

prove inadequate for conflict zones. For example an UNICEF report, “Rapid 

Assessment Sampling in Emergency Situations,” notes:

Uncertainty over population figures and demographic information constitutes one of the 

main barriers to conducting accurate assessments. Standard approaches to data collection 

particularly with regard to sampling are typically not well adapted to volatile settings, and 

data collection in a humanitarian response can often lack technical credibility and 

statistical robustness.[xii]
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Given even permissive circumstances, quantitative assessments cannot be 

conducted expeditiously. Fast learning happens when the cycle time between 

evidence-gathering and analysis is very short – even zero, when we ask a follow-up 

question. Qualitative analysis is further codified as a rapid technique to information 

collection as it does not require probability-based sampling techniques.

The core strategy of qualitative analysis is rapid-fire experimentation before, during, 

and after taking action: collect information, formulate hypotheses, collect confirming 

and disconfirming evidence, formulate new hypotheses, and so on: Constantly

Collect-Analyze-Act-Assess. Qualitative analysis is not simply analysis of qualitative 

data. The role of qualitative analysis for actionable intelligence is to collect and 

analyze richly contextual data in a specific, poorly understood context, to understand 

quickly how and why relevant actors, actions, and relationships generate cause and 

effect.

Implementing Qualitative Analysis as a Concept

Improving situational awareness for future forces will require a whole-of-Army 

approach. Concepts will have to be developed to approach both operational (e.g., 

combat ready) and generating forces (e.g., training and developing) throughout the 

Joint Phasing model. The employment of qualitative analysis at the tactical level will 

improve upon general understanding of the AOR and will help the first users to 

derive locally nuanced information that will be the foundation for planning where 

Army forces are deployed and have to interact with local or indigenous populations.

Current efforts to promulgate concepts to enhance situational awareness for 

improving lower command echelons’ situational awareness are being discussed 

within Headquarter (HQ) TRADOC, Fort Eustis and within the capability and concept 

development communities. The ICoE, SOCoE, and HD Task Force collaborate 

continuously to develop AWfC #1 and often seek academic and private sector input. 

The action officers at each of these organizations are likely candidates to present 

this topic to AWfC working groups as a potential solution. However, given the scope 

of the HD Task Force’s mission within ARCIC, and their location at HQ TRADOC, 

they are most optimal change agents. The HD Task Force serves to provide 

concepts and solutions to the Army that “assist in the synchronization and 

integration of personnel-related policies, with ‘training and education, science and 

technology (S&T), medical and social science efforts’ as mechanisms for providing 

the Army with a “dynamic competitive advantage’ in current and future [volatile, 

uncertain, complex, and ambiguous] environments.[xiii] Using their mission and 

proximity to general officer staff at within HQ TRADOC, the HD Task Force may be 

able to publicize concepts and capabilities supported by qualitative analysis.
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For more information on how qualitative methods and analysis can support tactical 

intelligence operations and inform situational awareness, please see capstone 

paper: John Hoven and Joel Lawton. "Locally Nuanced Actionable Intelligence: 

Operational Qualitative Analysis for a Volatile World." (Forthcoming,

American Intelligence Journal https://app.box.com/s/ sl6a56fsgr3ywhvzkopt)

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not represent 

those of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army, or TRADOC.

End Notes

[i] US Army. TODAY'S FOCUS: 2013 Army Campaign of Learning. September 21, 

2012. http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-09-21.

[ii] US Army. "The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015." TRADOC Pam 525-8-2. 

2011, 5. [iii] US Army. Army Warfighting Challenges. Information Paper, ARCIC, 

TRADOC, 2015, 1. [iv] US Army. Army Warfighting Challenges. Information Paper, 

ARCIC, TRADOC, 2015, 5-6. [v] US Army. Army Warfighting Challenges. 

Information Paper, ARCIC, TRADOC, 2015, 5. 

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Rubin, Herbert J. and Irene S. Rubin. Qualitative interviewing: The Art of 

Hearing Data. 2012, 3e. 

http://books.google.com/books?id=T5RDmYuueJAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepag

e&q&f=false

[viii] Tavory, Iddo. Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research. 2015. 

http://www.academia.edu/8745150/Abductive_Analysis_Theorizing_Qualitative_Res

earch (accessed 02 22, 2015).

[ix] Army FM 2-91.6 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Soldier Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection. 2007, 1-16. 

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-91- 6.pdf.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Spinuzzi, MAJ Marc A. “CCIR for Complex and Uncertain Environments.” 05 

January 2007. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470928.

[xii] United Nations. “Rapid Assessment Sampling in Emergency Situations.” United 

Nations Children’s Relief Fund, Asia-Pacific Shared Services Centre, 2010, 2.

http://www.unicef.org/eapro/Rapid_assessment_sampling_booklet.pdf.

[xiii] Nabi, Farzana PhD. "Culture of Learning, Innovation & the Human Dimension." 

Information Paper, ARCIC Human Dimension Task Force, 2014, 2.
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Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational Awareness in 

Dense Urban Environments and Mega Cities

By Alfred C. Crane and Richard Peeke

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 26 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/using-the-internet-of-things-togain-and-maintain-situational-awareness-in-dense-urban-envi

It may prove beneficial to leverage the internet of things (IOT) in order to provide our 

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines the decisive advantage needed to fight and 

win future armed conflicts. It can be anticipated that connected devices such as 

game consoles, “baby monitors” (1) and “that smart meter (that) knows when you’re 

home and what electronics you use when you’re there” (2), for example, will be 

prolific in the future operating environment. With this in mind, the joint force will 

have opportunities to use these devices to gain and maintain situational awareness 

in a mega city or dense urban environment. Before Soldiers enter a building or 

deploy an unmanned system, they may have opportunities to access these existing 

“sensors” to build a picture of the building’s interior. Also, being able to access 

personal electronic devices of the buildings occupants could, coupled with the 

deployment of unmanned systems, give the Warfighter a better picture of what 

awaits behind the next door, wall, room or floor. Not only knowing about the location 

and patterns of life of enemy combatants in the building and the ability to find out 

where non-combatants are would increase protection of the Warfighter, as well as, 

reduce the risk of civilian casualties. The data obtained from these connected 

devices, personal electronic devices and deployed unmanned systems would be 

rapidly stitched together to render a real-time 3D model of the building, as well as, 

show locations of the structure’s occupants. An example of this can be seen in the 

films “Prometheus,” (3) and “The Dark Knight” (4). This would give the Warfighter 

the needed edge to fight and win in complex urban terrain.

In addition to finding out how many occupants there are as well as their location, the 

Soldier will also need to gain and maintain situational awareness outside of buildings 

by being able to access traffic cameras, security cameras and so forth. Building a 

comprehensive, living model of a city or even a city block would enhance situational 

awareness and provide the necessary data for leaders to make rapid decisions and 

increase the protection of the combat element in an operational environment. This 

composited data could also be shared so that the operational commander would 

have a real-time view of the area of operations. Big Data Analytics and knowledge 

management / decision-making tools will be needed in order to filter and make 
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sense of all of the data being obtained.

Of course these connected devices can be used for defensive as well as offensive 

operations. By knowing where allies and noncombatants are as well as movement 

of suspect personnel in an area of operations by target acquisition and tracking of 

personnel using biometric sensors and software will give the Warfighter the needed 

information to be lethal, informed, and protected.

A draw back to this is that without power, access to these connected devices may 

not be possible. Also, if we have the ability to access and use these connected 

devices then it can be anticipated that the enemy will have this ability, as well. 

Counter-measures and technologies to spoof, trick or deny enemy access to these 

devices will also need to be developed.

One of many the challenges in the operational environment is to distinguish between 

enemy combatants, non-combatants and friendly forces. In order to mitigate 

fratricide and collateral damage, transponders would need to be developed, that are 

either worn by the Warfighter or are subcutaneous, which can be picked up by 

friendly forces. These would need to be visible in different spectra and frequencies.

Vignette

In support of ongoing operations, United States forces have been assigned to 

rescue hostages held in a high rise building of a dense metropolitan area.

This is part of ongoing operations to remove hostile forces who are attempting to 

gain control of the capitol building and power grid.

Several hostages have been taken in order to pressure US forces to leave.

Multispectral, visual, as well as audio signals are used to locate the building where 

the hostages are being held.

As the US forces advance to the building they contact their Cyber Support Center 

(CSC) utilizing the cyber support officer (CSO) attached to their unit. As the CSC is 

contacted, unmanned aerial and ground systems that are organic to the unit are 

deployed.

A call for cyber effects is initiated in order to gain access to the city’s security and

traffic cameras. This coupled together with the sensors onboard the unmanned 

systems informs the small unit leader of the best avenue for advance.

Advanced recon to determine patterns of life and develop a target folder are initiated 
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prior to advancement/execution of mission.

Simultaneously, an information campaign to provide a plausible cover story or shape 

public opinion against the hostage takers and delegitimize their insurgent movement 

is launched.

Once the safest route has been determined, the US element advances using visual 

and digital obscurants to cover their movement. A second cyber effect is requested 

to locate and gain access to connected devices and personal electronic devices in 

and around the building.

Swarming nano and small unmanned systems are deployed to map out the buildings 

floor plan and identify location of the occupants. After a few minutes, some cameras 

are accessed that are built in to game systems, security cameras, mobile phones, 

smart TV’s and baby monitors. Access to these help develop a picture of where the 

building occupants are located. Two potential locations where the hostages are held 

are identified based on signals intelligence, cyber effects and the information 

gathered from the connected devices, mobile phones and unmanned systems.

The US forces enter the building and proceed with caution using the appropriate 

tactics, techniques and procedures to the two possible locations. After entering the 

building, US forces talk to a few civilians who have evaded capture and they are 

able to point out the target location.

A further cyber effect is requested and the location of the hostile forces within the 

room are identified through their mobile phones, a smart TV and a camera on an 

office computer. A diversion is created to distract the hostiles and using room 

clearing procedures, the US forces enter the room, eliminate the threat and rescue 

the hostages. Less than lethal/area-denial technologies to incapacitate the hostage 

takers and temporarily neutralize the threat to friendly forces are utilized.

Concluding Thoughts

Gaining and maintaining situational awareness in this age of technology can be 

challenging. If the Warfighter is left to fight and clear buildings in the same manner, 

same methods and same technology as seen in the battles of Stalingrad, Arnhem, 

Nuremburg or Fallujah we have failed.

In conclusion, investments in basic and applied research to develop the necessary 

technologies and software needed to gain and maintain access to personal as well 

as connected devices (to include denying access of these same devices to our 

adversaries) and utilizing elements such as Defense Innovation Unit X in Silicone 
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Valley will be needed to make these concepts a reality.

This paper addresses Army Warfighting Challenge number 1, Develop Situational 

Understanding (5).

The authors would like to extend a special thanks to COL Bryan Denny and Mr. Curtis 

Austin for taking the time to review and provide valuable comments and suggestions 

that enhanced this paper. I am truly grateful for their input.

End Notes

1- DiGangi, C. (2016, January 28) 6 Things in Your Home That Could Get You 

Hacked. Retrieved from http://www.foxbusiness.com

2- Kobie, N. (2015, May 6) What Is The Internet of Things. Retrieved from 

http://www.theguardian.com

3- Costigan, M. (Executive Producer), & Scott, R. (Director). (2012). 

Prometheus. United States: Twentieth Century Fox.

4- De La Noy, K. (Executive Producer), & Nolan C. (Director). 

(2008). The Dark Knight. United States: Warner Brothers.

5- ARCIC Future Warfare Division. (2015, October 7) Army Warfighting 

Challenges Army Operating Concept

6- Burrus, D. (2014, November) The Internet of Things Is Far Bigger Than 

Anyone Realizes. Retrieved from http://www.wired.com

7- Meek, A. (2015, October 16) Body cams, smart guns and tracking darts: 

policing and the internet of things. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com
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SECTION 4: Freedom of Movement and Protection

This section includes published articles from Small Wars Journal that we received 

from the call for papers. The section will explore issues, concepts, and capabilities 

as they relate to future land forces gaining freedom of movement or protection in 

megacities or dense urban areas in 2025 and beyond. 

 “U.S. Army Megacity Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative 

Technologies”

by Frank Prautzsch

 “Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environments”

by Nathan Fisher and Gary R. Gilbert
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U.S. Army Mega City Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative 

Technologies

By Frank Prautzsch

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 22 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/us-army-mega-cityoperations-enduring-principles-and-innovative-technologies

Introduction

By 2050, urbanization will arguably be the most consequential event in the history of 

mankind. Out of every 100 children born at that time, 57 will be Asian, and 22 will be 

African. The majority of those new babies will live in cities. Over the last two 

decades, developing nations have added 3 million new people per week. This is the 

equivalent of adding the city of Seattle to the planet daily. Starting in 2018 the 

world’s global rural population will peak at 3.5 billion and then proceed to fall by 

almost a billion new migratory city citizens. 1

In conjunction with a massive demographic shift to urbanization, there are also shifts 

in wealth and in aging. The developed world is losing its edge over developing 

nations in wealth, while Central and South America bear the brunt of a radically 

aging population.1

For the U.S. Army to conduct future missions, Sun Tsu’s principles may be more 

fitting than ever. While U.S. Army may not always lay siege to a city, the preparation 

for any military urban operation is not a short term event, nor is the planning ad hoc. 

The spectrum of operations spanning non-combat and combat missions in the face 

“...and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if 

it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements 

of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will 

take three months more.

The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming

ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such 

are the disastrous effects of a siege. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops 

without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their 

kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.”

-- Sun Tsu – The Art of War, 500 B.C.
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of natural or adversarial threats, makes this preparation a multi-dimensional problem 

requiring significant attention and forethought. As we proceed to investigate and 

plan for Mega City operations there are a few key points that must be made:

1. Mission success is contingent upon the will of the population, as well as the 

coalitions, governments, religions and tribes in occupancy not purely the 

strategy, tactics and planning of the U.S. Army.

2. The U.S. Army cannot “fight its last war”. Lessons learned from battles such as 

Fallujah, Aleppo, or throughout densely populated Palestine don’t scale well, 

and are miniscule in size and scope compared to a Mega City battle.

3. Mega City warfare is a highly 3 dimensional event. Unlike rural warfare with 

focus upon capturing mountaintops, resources, and roads, urban key terrain 

belongs to the defender and suggests skyscrapers, bridges, tunnels, subway 

systems, energy and water distribution, telecommunications, airports and rail 

stations are the discriminators.

4. Mega Cities with a subterranean network, capable of threat transit (subway, 

water drainage, sewage) will offer a compounded advantage to a defender or 

asymmetric threat. Most subterranean geospatial data is a non-integrated stack 

of reference materials, maps, and overlays. Often these references don’t exist 

or are completely unreferenced or surveyed resulting in C2 and situational 

awareness failures.

5. The U.S. Army must understand that technologies that would be used for 

missions in 2040 Mega Cities don’t exist yet. However, those technologies that 

do exist, may point towards needed future technical capabilities in some form or 

function.

6. The U.S. Army must assume that if specific technologies exist for supporting 

future operations, that an adversary may also have access to a derivative of 

such technology.

7. The value of C4ISR, mobile networks and unmanned/autonomous systems are 

exponentially more significant than today. With this comes an implied task to 

have spectrum supremacy or the above capabilities are useless.

8. The resources of the U.S. Army may be called upon in more non-combat 

missions to protect or sustain life. (Power generation, water purification, water 

pumping, health care, engineer support, air drops, evacuations, psychological 

operations, sanitation, graves operations)

9. A determined adversary or a disgruntled population has time and mass on their 

side.

10. Logistics and energy rule. The “Achilles Heel” for a Mega City involves the 

lines of communication for power, water and food supplies.

Emerging, Enduring, and Endearing Technologies.

The U.S. Army should carefully evaluate, mature and mutate selected commercial 
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technologies that aid Mega City operations. Each of these technologies exists or is 

emerging today and has some value in further research:

1. Broadband over power lines (BPL): Simply stated one key asset that most 

Mega Cities have is a reasonably well defined power grid. Today BPL 

technologies allow for networked and point-to-point transmission of 200-500 

Mbps over simple modems and integrated network control capabilities. This is 

significant to spectrum supremacy, covert operations, remote sensing, and C2. 

Most wireless phone antennas are horizontally polarized and start to lose 

service at altitude above about 600 feet. Thus, communications in the highest 

floors of a skyscraper can be complicated by a lack of wireless quality of service 

which can be somewhat offset by BPL. Many BPL and Network Control 

capabilities can also interface on ad hoc with fiber, terrestrial and satcom 

systems at some designated nodes.

2. Tethered and untethered C4ISR Sensors: In a Mega City environment the need 

for persistent surveillance is paramount. While UAVs are vogue in 2016, the 

need for small positive buoyant gas envelops with sensors and visualization for 

hours-days is of necessity. Numerous systems exist today that are controlled or 

on tether. Additionally, controlled small airships afford the ability to conduct 

sustained observation of a target or area of interest, and also perform such 

functions as bottom side bridge inspection or bomb sniffing.

3. Manned, Unmanned and Autonomous Systems: Such capabilities are not 

limited to urban airspace, but also littoral and harbor areas with USVs, streets, 

tunnels and high risk areas with UGVs, and undersea operations along coastal 

and harbor areas with UUVs. New systems such as VTOL jetpacks, manned 

quad copters and air mules need to be considered for rapid equipment and team 

displacement, remote sensor placement, security and vantage of urban high 

ground, sniper and counter sniper operations, incident response, combat 

evacuation, and search and rescue.

4. Subterranean vehicles: More research is in order at developing capabilities that 

can allow the US Army to more effectively use rail and subway systems within a 

Mega City. This could include a rail gauge-scalable light armor assault and 

recovery vehicle that is both road and rail capable for supporting a squad 

infiltration or an evacuation/recovery of critical area when/if mass transit fails. 

(e.g. towing a metro rail train without power during a mass casualty evacuation)

5. Internet of Things: If there was ever a consideration that plays heavily into 

remote sensing, security, and situational awareness in a future Megacity, it will 

be the Internet of Things. Retail wireless companies already have the option of 

purchasing 15 thousand edge sensor devices smaller than a credit card, and an 

integrated router system that can aggregate all the devices, (one and 2-way), 

and wireless connectivity at up to 2.5 miles in unlicensed spectrum. Such 

COTS capabilities are both an enabler and a threat as they are not ITAR and 

can be implemented across a Mega City in hours.

6. Tunnel and Bridge Emergency Management: By far the biggest choke points 

and symbolic targets for a Mega City relates to bridges, tunnels and ferryboat 

operations. Inflatable plugs and barriers exist for sealing tunnels both to fire and 

to catastrophic breaches in their outer walls. While the Army has a 
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longstanding history and portfolio of expeditionary bridging capabilities, the 

expertise and experience for tunnel operations, advanced bridge security, and 

the security of ferryboat operations is perhaps an important future competency 

needed. In addition, most bridges and tunnels are conduits to Mega Cities for 

power, telecommunications, and in some cases, gas and water lines. Robotic 

and sensor integrity and inspection systems are essential. Failure to control and 

secure bridges and tunnels make any Mega City operation impossible.

7. Non-Lethal Weapons: Many missions in Mega Cities will likely have the 

potential of migrating from a peaceful and organized event, to a limited 

engagement and disorganized chaotic event. Intermediate capabilities to control 

crowds, and incapacitate via non-lethal means can retain the will of the people 

with the U.S. Army whereas casualties, however justified, could instigate 

disastrous consequences. While the Marine Corps continues to research future 

joint non-lethal weapons, much more must be done in non-lethal weapons 

research, breaching and riot systems, IT and PNT denial, micro-area cyber 

operations, localized Marx generation to incapacitate electronics, and non-lethal 

weapons for incapacitating insurgents or riotous masses.

8. Disease, WMD and CBRNE Detection: Mega Cities are both an incubator and a 

target for the worst of all scenarios. Greater sensor and detection systems and 

field response systems are now emerging in the scientific and consumer market. 

Such systems allow for field optical stereoscopy and spectroscopy for 

characterization of substances, DNA sequence analysis and ChemicalBiological Pathogen detection and field vitals and triage in handheld or small 

portable devices.

9. Augmented Reality, Night Vision and Situational Understanding: Electronics 

now exist that introduce affordable augmented reality in high resolution for the 

war fighter. These systems will mature dramatically in form factor, and content 

over the next two decades. It is safe to say that some form of augmented reality 

eyewear or headwear will be normal attire for the war fighter in Mega City 

operations. Current technologies in EO/IR have taken away the “ownership of 

the night” from the U.S. Army. Night vision modules that attach to intelligent 

phones cost less than most of the phones. Innovation in graphene points to 

phase shift single molecular layer carbons that will ultimately introduce a night 

contact lens. Of greater importance than the greatness of gadgetry, is the need 

for integrated understanding of intelligence and sensor feeds. It will not be 

adequate to have situational awareness, but understanding. The motives, 

patterns, behaviors, and predicted next steps of a threat will be the “new normal” 

for missions. In a Mega City, future commanders won’t decide courses of action 

without understanding the motives and intent of the adversary.

10. Illumination: Technology now exists to provide high lumen lighting in an area 

the size of a football field in a hand-carry device. LEDs give us a distinct 

advantage in crisis lighting for subterranean, catastrophic point-of-event, and 

emergency services operations. Such systems are now DC powered and 

operate with up to 400w/45000 lumens in hand carry form factor. Such a 

capability would also be practical for integration on selected autonomous or 

unmanned systems and selected urban terrain vantage points.

11. Through-obstacle detection and characterization: Current systems exist that 
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can detect life under up to 27 feet of rubble by measuring the displacement of 

the lungs and processing respiratory level and pulse rates. While such ultra 

wideband systems are a mercy tool for earthquakes, explosions, and bombings 

it can also be an important tool in determining threats behind closed doors or 

walls. Additionally, such a system can identify elevated heart and respiratory 

rates in a crowd, acting as a physiological marker to a potential threat. In 2016, 

mobile technology to monitor though-walls is smaller than a breadbox. For free 

space monitoring of heart and respiratory rates the entire module is the size of a 

small paperback book.

12. 3D/4D Geospatial Referencing: By 2050, most all image sciences will be 3D 

and also include a fourth dimension of time. Current systems in LIDAR, light 

field camera techniques, 2/3D ortho- recification against point clouds, and 

structure internal GIS mapping and referencing will be the norm for navigation 

and negotiation of Mega City movements and coordination. This will also include 

3D synthetic geospatial night vision mosaics. 3 and 4D systems will not only aid 

the war fighter in understanding context, but also vertical, subterranean, and 

hidden threats. In addition, the geospatial data will be essential to autonomous 

systems operation.

13. Weather and Micro-weather: Weather is not limited to trafficability and 

complications to operations in rural areas. Mega City operations in adverse 

weather introduce unexpected threats, opportunities and consequences. 

Systems exist now to introduce micro-weather prediction by analyzing weather 

formations and road conditions from traffic cameras. One system today has an 

aggregate capacity of over 165K cameras that provide integrated hyper local 

weather and environmental intelligence.

14. Specialty Vehicles: Consideration should be given to vehicles that can 

operate in more than one domain. Platforms exist today that can cover 

transitions between land and water, air and sea, surface and subsurface and air 

and land. These systems are essential in Mega City operations for mission 

agility, selected concepts of operation, surprise, and range extension.

15. Communications: By 2050, the world will have embraced 5 and 6 G wireless 

services and ad-hoc networks between mobile platforms and users will involve 

transmission=s from 5 Gbps-1 Terabyte/second. 5G starts fielding in 2020 and 

should move to consumer acceptance by 2025. Laser high fidelity 

communications are currently under demonstration and testing. LI-FI will soon 

supplement or replace selected WI-FI applications in urban areas. Since LI-FI 

does not consume RF spectrum and operates at significantly higher data rates, 

it will gain acceptance for selected network applications. Basic 5G speeds will 

exceed 4G LTE service by a factor of 65000. 4D Virtual reality, instantaneous 

downloads, mission rehearsals, and multi-intelligence, multi-language machine 

learning systems will be commonplace. With communications and networks our 

ability to rationalize the future is most difficult and we have successfully written 

requirements for capabilities that have been surpassed by technology time and 

time again. Additionally, old technologies in acoustics and older spectrum such 

as HF may have a calling for mission specific support, operations during RF 

spectrum denial, or surprise.

16. Gunshot and Explosive Detection and Characterization: Force protection will 
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always be an issue with Mega Cities. While the need for new and protective 

forms of armor and TALOS-like exoskeletal capabilities are needed, the ability to 

deal with snipers and improvised explosives, and trigger systems can only 

expand exponentially in a gigantic population center. The ability to disguise and 

surprise with asymmetry, calls for improved acoustic geolocation, predictive 

crime models, and new sensors such as graphene trough sensors or piezoelectric cantilever sensors that can detect explosive particle residue at range.

17. Armor and Blast: While the metallurgical and ceramic armor communities 

continue to develop plating solutions, new inventions in flexible body armor from 

spider silk, tight woven hemp, advanced plastics, kevlar, and graphene are 

redefining ballistic protection that is flexible and agile, while still maintaining the 

performance of plating techniques. The use of syntactic foams with tailored 

density resins and tailored size micro-balloon glass particles introduces unique 

blast protection features as the foam distributes energy radially and radically 

from the highest point of an acoustic wave impact and distributes that blast 

energy in effective nullification. Such a capability offers progressive and 

aggressive force blast protection by introducing such capabilities in the 

platforms, building processes, and troop protection. Advanced electro spray 

techniques allow for the development of active armor that has different 

molecular composition at different levels in the armor. Such armor changes the 

Vickers Index properties of the materials from which it is made (e.g. aluminum 

armor) and allows for boutique armor capabilities against different threats using 

heat or shaped charges, higher grade explosives, or high velocity projectiles 

from the blast effect.

18. A New “MacGuyver2” Squad: For each prevailing Mega City, a subject matter 

expert cadre should be passively maintained, that are versed in that Mega City, 

have lived in that Mega City, or have insight on capabilities involving its 

government and its infrastructure. Such a Squad must be able to facilitate host 

nation and Mega City support, telecommunications, emergency shelter, fuel, 

energy, water, and how to operate critical infrastructure, such as transportation, 

with or without city employees. This should include HUMINT and several 

insights on technical, religious, and political intelligence about that Mega City. 

This squad should be “doers” that can improvise anything, and not be totally 

contract/transactional support.

Conclusion

Mission support within Mega Cities, across the continuum, on an objective timeline 

24 years away, requires vision, invention, innovation, technical ingenuity, 

commercial off-the-shelf solutions, host nation support, and legacy systems 

integration. The technology vectors professed in this paper are critical future Mega 

City missions. They will emerge with or without U.S. Army involvement, since in 

various forms, each of these technologies already exists in 2016. It is our charge 

to challenge the “Art of the Possible”, not await or monitor it. The U.S. Army cannot 

simply study or analyze Mega City warfare. Failure to prepare for statistically 

inevitable Mega City peaceful or violent missions is beyond foolhardy. Unlike Sun 

Tsu’s warnings about impatient generals that will not tolerate 6 months of 

preparation to besiege a city, the U.S. Army may not have such luxury of time.
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End Notes

1 Laurence C. Smith, New North: The World in 2050, (London: Dutton

Publishing/Penguin Group, 2010

2 Richard Dean Anderson, MacGuyver. TV Series, ABC TV, Hollywood, CA and 

Vancouver Canada, 1985-1992.
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Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban 

Environments

By Nathan Fisher and Gary R. Gilbert

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 4 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unmanned-systems-in-supportof-future-medical-operations-in-dense-urban-environments

Introduction

The growing planned use of unmanned systems (UMS) and robotics on the future 

battlefield affords both great opportunities and challenges to far future medical 

operations, especially in Dense Urban Areas. The future operational environment in 

decentralized urban environments is likely to cause severe restrictions on the mobility 

of vehicles used for medical missions including both air and ground platforms used for 

medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and medical 

logistics missions, due to area denial challenges. In situations where medical 

resources are already spread thin, e.g. during a mass casualty event or natural 

disaster scenario, mobility of medical resources becomes of paramount importance. 

Unmanned systems could serve as a force multiplier for medical operations in future 

environments as their capabilities continue to evolve and mature to include providing 

medical logistics support (e.g. medical resupply/delivery of blood products), aid in the 

delivery of telehealth/teleconsultation to the point of care, and provide opportunities 

for expedited casualty evacuation.

There is a clear emerging capability in future unmanned vehicle programs to provide 

multi-purpose utility by being reconfigurable to accommodate different mission-related 

payloads. A good example of an emerging Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) that is 

designed to be reconfigurable to support multiple missions is DARPA’s Aerial 

Reconfigurable Embedded System, which specifically includes a conceptual 

detachable mission module for CASEVAC [1]. A more feasible approach than a 

dedicated CASEVAC module might be a multipurpose (cargo hauling, troop carrying, 

potentially ground mobile) module that could also support CASEVAC missions when 

quickly equipped with a lightweight, easily assembled trauma patient care module that 

could support attended, tele-operated or even closed loop autonomous enroute care. 

Having the ability for future UMS to be reconfigurable to support CASEVAC in critical 

operations could be an enabler for the maneuver Commander, who is ultimately 

responsible for the task of clearing wounded from the battle space. Providing future 

UMS with a key secondary utility as a vehicle of opportunity for CASEVAC should 
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effectively increase the overall mobility of units in future operational environments. It’s 

worth noting that CASEVAC using UMS (or perhaps more accurately, pilotless 

systems, whenever casualties or medical attendants are onboard) should only be 

utilized under careful consideration, and only when acting in the best interest of the 

wounded, which may necessitate a medic attendant providing care during 

autonomous flight.

The ability of UMS to provide these benefits to future health support of operations 

depends on the maturation of key enabling technologies in the areas of robotics and 

communications. Advancements in vehicle autonomy systems will likely bring about a 

future in which autonomous vehicle systems will leap ahead of conventionally piloted 

vehicles, at least in some key performance parameters. However, increases in the 

technical performance of robotics technology alone are not enough to fully realize the 

benefits of unmanned systems for future medical missions. Improvements in the 

speed and efficiency in which soldiers are able to interact with unmanned systems, the 

ease of collaboration between different robotic platforms, and the capability of rapid 

dissemination of information to multiple echelons is also required.

Unmanned Aerial Systems for Future Medical Missions

The U.S. Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-2035 [2] states that "Over the next 25 years, 

the Army aviation force mix shifts from being almost entirely manned to consisting of 

mostly unmanned and [optionally- piloted vehicles]." With rapidly increasing levels of 

autonomy, future unmanned systems will transition from filling niche roles to providing 

multi-functional utility, to include tasks such as casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and 

emergency medical resupply, as outlined in the Department of Defenses’ “Unmanned 

Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038” [3]. Already a proven capability for 

remote resupply mission, Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) UAS have the potential 

to be multi-purposed to provide emergency medical resupply and CASEVAC 

capabilities in situations in which traditional manned aircraft cannot be utilized. As 

outlined in the roadmap, the Department of Defense expects unmanned systems to 

play a key role in many of the Tier One Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), and specifically 

mentions the capabilities of unmanned systems to provide medical resupply and 

casualty extraction and evacuation as future systems are enabled through greater 

autonomy with respect to both navigation and manipulation [3].

The path for adoption of UAS capabilities for medical missions will likely start with 

medical resupply to provide support to medics in the field in situations in which 

manned-aircraft are not available or denied access. In the mid-term, UAS capabilities 

will likely mature to the level in which safe troop transport is possible. This will enable 

the possible use of UAS to evacuate casualties with an attending flight medic, or 

casualties that are sufficiently stable to be transported without an attending medic (i.e. 
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the “walking wounded”). In the long-term, with the development of advanced 

autonomous/closed-loop systems for patient monitoring and care, the capability 

envelope of UAS casualty transport could be expanded to include a larger patient 

population, which may become increasingly important as medical resources become 

strained in future combat theaters with large casualty evacuation distances are area 

denial challenges (i.e. Dense Urban Areas). In the future operational environment, 

UAS casualty evacuation is most likely to be employed in circumstances in which 

tradition MEDEVAC is not available or is too high risk, and only when it is in the best 

interest of the patient and the mission. Under these carefully defined circumstances, 

there is clearly a set of patients that rapid UAV evacuation could provide a survival 

benefit.

Novel Medical Uses of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) broadly defined here as aircraft much 

smaller than traditionally piloted vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, have the potential 

to provide some unique capability in providing medical logistics compared to larger 

aircraft due to the increased mobility afforded to their smaller form factor. For 

example, sUAS are able to more easily navigate in congested urban environments 

and require much smaller landing zones (if they even need to land at all). Because of 

the additional mobility afforded by sUAS in dense urban areas, they are likely to be 

widely used for other purposes, e.g. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 

cargo delivery, and communications relay. The operational medicine community 

should be prepared to utilize these multi-functional sUAS platforms to provide 

additionally support for medical operations.

The tradeoff for this increased mobility is a smaller payload capacity and shorter flight 

duration, but in certain circumstances, the payload capacity and range of a sUAS 

could be sufficient in providing life- saving emergency medical resupply in support of 

field medics that are unreachable through more traditional means. Prolonged field 

care situations in which casualties are unable to be evacuated due to area denial 

challenges would particularly benefit from a sUAS capability of medical resupply. In 

addition to the delivery of medical supplies (medical devices, drugs, blood products, 

etc.), the sUAS could potentially deliver a telemedicine system which could provide a 

solider/medic direct audio and video teleconsultation from a medical expert. In the 

operational battle space of the future, it is likely that the time required to evacuate 

casualties will increase not only due to the lack of mobility in dense urban 

environments, but also because of predicted increases in distance between the point 

of injury and the closest medical treatment facility. Therefore, improving the far 

forward casualty care capabilities of medics in the field will become increasingly 

important in future combat. The agile medical resupply capability afforded by sUAS 

could become a catalyst in improving the far-forward field medic’s capabilities by 
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ensuring that they have the required medical resources (consumables, specialty 

tools/devices, and teleconsultation) that they need to provide life-saving casualty care; 

essentially bringing the advanced treatment to the casualty in situations in which the 

casualty cannot be rapidly evacuated to the medical treatment facility. The military 

could potentially leverage the considerable investments currently being made by 

industry to advance research and development efforts in UAS delivery of commercial 

packages [4][5], which share many of the same performance requirements of a future 

UAS conducting an emergency medical supply mission.

Enabling Technologies

Autonomy and Performance

Unmanned Systems (UMS) currently in-use today have very limited autonomy. UMS 

vehicles of today are normally operated under the manual control and close 

supervision of a remote operator (teleoperation). In order to fully realize the potential 

benefits of unmanned systems for medical missions,

the UMS operator (potentially a field medic) needs to interact with the UMS at a 

task/goal level, providing the UMS with high level commands and mission parameters 

and providing only supervisory-level control. In this way, the UMS operator’s cognitive 

burden can be dramatically reduced, allowing him/her to conduct other tasks or control 

more UMS assets. Advancements in vehicle autonomy systems will fully automate 

many of the vehicles functions, including route planning, navigation, obstacle 

avoidance, and landing zone evaluation. Vehicle autonomy systems will likely 

continue to evolve to the point that they will outperform traditional human 

pilots/operators in many areas, for example, operations in extreme weather conditions. 

Even human-piloted military vehicles in the future will be augmented by vehicle 

autonomy technology that will provide the pilot with increased situational awareness 

and safety systems, which is becoming increasingly true in today’s consumer car 

industry.

Much of the capability that is required for a UAS to navigate autonomously in a dense 

urban environment has been demonstrated to some degree in current science and 

technology research programs, to include GPS-denied navigation and landing zone 

evaluation [6] Autonomous systems will continue to evolve to provide increasingly 

sophisticated perception and planning systems through improvements in both 

hardware (sensors and processing) and software. The size, weight, and power 

(SWaP) requirements of autonomous sensor systems is also likely to dramatically 

decrease, allowing even small UAS the ability to carry the sensor systems required for 

sophisticated Sense and Avoid capabilities.. For example, the LIDAR sensors, which 

are heavily relied upon in today’s autonomous vehicles to observe distances to 

physical objects in its surroundings, are likely to become much smaller and 

inexpensive as solid-state LIDAR systems begin to replace current systems with 
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mechanically-directed optics [7].

Teaming, Interoperability, and Human-Robot Interfaces

The US military will not be the only international actor which will have advanced UMS 

assets in the future operational environment. The opportunity for overmatch relies 

heavily on the ability of our manned systems and unmanned systems to effectively 

operate as a highly integrated team. This will require efficient and effective teaming 

not only between manned and unmanned systems, but also between different UMS 

platforms. Today’s command and control systems for disparate UMS platforms have 

limited levels of interoperability, and almost no functionality for UMS to UMS direct 

communication. For future systems, the level of interoperability will need to be 

dramatically increased, and the capability for unmanned systems to effectively 

communicate and share information with each other will need to be developed, 

including cross-platform communications. This will allow for the type of rapid UMS-toUMS communication required for advanced swarm maneuvers, which could provide a 

tactical advantage in future operational environments. DARPA’s “Gremlins” program 

has a shared vision of using small unmanned air systems with coordinated and 

distributed capabilities that would offer U.S. forces improved operational flexibility over 

larger and expensive “all-in-one” platforms [8].

In the near-term, the military could increase UMS interoperability by developing a 

common controller capable of providing command and control to multiple UMS 

platforms. However, the future focus should be on the adoption of common reference 

architecture, like the maturing UAS Control Segment (UCS) [9], which will provide a 

common framework for human operators to interact with UMS and for UMS to rapidly 

communicate and disseminate information to other UMS. A common communications 

framework could enable the development of multiple compatible controllers which 

could take advantage of various form factors, with some form factors being more 

suitable for different mission types.

A key factor in the adoption of UMS technology for medical applications is the quality 

of the interface provided for interacting with the UMS asset. It is particularly important 

for a field medic to interact efficiently with future UAS due to the cognitive and physical 

demands of actively caring for a casualty. The medic is also responsible for the 

difficult task of documenting and transmitting tactical combat casualty care information 

for incorporation into the electronic health record. Given the magnitude of the 

demands on the medic’s time and attention, the medic needs a highly effective 

interface for providing command and control to future UMS.
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Conclusion

Unmanned Aerial Systems are likely to be used ubiquitously in future combat 

operations in dense urban environments due to the increased freedom of movement 

that they afford to a wide range of mission types. These unmanned systems will be 

multi-purpose in nature, and could be called upon in support of critical medical 

missions if certain medical-specific considerations are addressed as these future UMS 

platforms are being developed. Support from unmanned systems could become 

increasing important in other situations in which mobility is restricted, such as during a 

natural disaster or other mass casualty event. The medical application of unmanned 

systems and robotics in future environments has the potential to evolve health support 

of operations throughout the range of military operations, to include peacetime 

humanitarian support missions.

End Notes

[1] DARPA, "Aerial Reconfigurable Embedded System (ARES)", 2016. [Online]. 

Available: http://www.darpa.mil/program/aerial-reconfigurable-embedded-system.

[Accessed: 02- Feb- 2016]. [2] “U.S. Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-2035”, U.S Army

[3] “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038”, Department of Defense

[4] Amazon.com, "Amazon Prime Air", 2016. [Online]. Available:

http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011. [Accessed: 02- Feb- 2016].

[5] A. Madrigal, "Inside Google's Secret Drone-Delivery Program", The Atlantic, 2014. 

[Online]. Available: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/insidegoogles-secret-drone-delivery- program/379306/. [Accessed: 02- Feb- 2016].

[6] Office of Naval Research ,"Autonomous Aerial Cargo Utility System", 2016. 

[Online]. Available: http://www.onr.navy.mil/en/Media-Center/FactSheets/Autonomous-Aerial-Cargo-Utility-System.aspx. [Accessed: 02- Feb- 2016].

[7] E. Ackerman, "Quanergy Announces $250 Solid-State LIDAR for Cars, Robots, 

and More", Spectrum.ieee.org, 2015. [Online]. Available: 

http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that- think/transportation/sensors/quanergy-solid-statelidar. [Accessed: 02- Feb- 2016].

[8] DARPA, "Friendly “Gremlins” Could Enable Cheaper, More Effective, Distributed 

Air Operations", 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2015-08-

28. [Accessed: 02- Feb- 2016].

[9] "Mission and Objectives, UCS Architecture", 2016. [Online]. Available: 

https://ucsarchitecture.org/pages/mission-and-objectives#objectives. [Accessed: 02-

Feb- 2016].
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SECTION 5: Expeditionary Operations

This section includes published articles from Small Wars Journal that we received 

from the call for papers. The section will explore issues, concepts, and capabilities 

as they relate to future land forces conducting expeditionary operations in megacities 

or dense urban areas in 2025 and beyond. 

 “A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) versus “Evolution”: When Machines 

are Smart Enough!”

by Tom Keeley

 “TRAuma Care In a Rucksack (TRACIR), a Disruptive Technology Concept”

by Jan Berkow and Ron Poropatich

 “Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities”

by Danielle L. Ippolito

 “How to Hold or Take a Big City — Seven Lines of Effort”

by Geoff Demarest

 “Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies”

by Paul O. Kwon

 “Pain Management: Maintaining the Force”

by Marcie Fowler and Laura L. McGhee
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A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) versus “Evolution”: When Machines are 

Smart Enough!

By Tom Keeley

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 8 January 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-revolution-in-military-affairsversus-%E2%80%9Cevolution%E2%80%9D-when-machines-are-smart-enough

There is a general perception that the Operational Environment (OE) will “evolve” as 

technology evolves at an incremental rate: smaller, cheaper, faster... The “evolution” 

term is used throughout the Mad Scientist call to action. But there have been 

revolutions or significant paradigm shifts that have transformed the military in the past:

The transition to bows and arrows from clubs allowed engagement away from the 

target. The transition to guns from bows allowed more accuracy and more power. 

The emergence of radar from visual sighting allows early detection. Mobile 

communication extended the reach of command. Airplanes allowed engagement from 

above. Ballistic missiles delivered more destructive power, allowed engagement from 

even further away and kept the missile user out of harm’s way. Remotely piloted 

drones allow the delivery of ordnance into rapidly changing target areas, while still 

keeping warfighters out of harm’s way. The Internet of Things (IoT) suggests the 

potential for more connected devices to be used to more rapidly share information. So 

one could hypothesize a war room where information was coming from everywhere; 

allowing battle space commanders to allocate resources to achieve their goals while 

sitting in the comfort of their bunkers (potentially far from the battle zone). A futurist of 

the past may have suggested pursuing better and better bows and arrows.

This paper suggests that this is an obsolete picture of the future. The previous 

scenario includes humans- in-the-loop. There is still a perception that humans need to 

be making all the critical decisions: When should force be applied? How much force 

should be applied? How much collateral damage is acceptable? ... There is a 

perception that only humans can effectively handle this level of complexity.

The fog of war is perceived to be too complex for any machine to handle. A human 

has approximately 100 billion neurons (brain cells) and 1,000 trillion synaptic 

connections. We are far from packaging that level of computing into a chip. Right?

There are two ways to approach the future:

1. Look at where you are today, and consider how you want to invest your money 

to create a solution for tomorrow (evolution).

2. Pick a point in the future and identify the hurdles that have to be overcome to get 

there. Jump over those hurdles and jump past the evolutionary models.
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So, the future capability that will be explained later in this document is that machines 

will have the ability to remove humans from the real-time decision-making loop. This 

will greatly speed up the decisions (offensive and defensive). And these decisions are 

not just the point decisions: how, what, when, where, and why. They are the adaptive 

command and control decisions: how much, how much over time, how much and 

where over time. This is an adaptive, analog distribution of force over space and 

time.

Before we get to the “new” approach, let’s look at a picture of the battlespace as it 

could be delivered today.

Today’s Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Technology

The hobbyist community has effectively commoditized the drone. While there will be 

enhancements made to the power system that allows for longer flight, remotely piloted 

vehicles can be purchased by anyone. With a small upgrade to the drone controller, 

anyone can use open-source Mission Planner[i] software to plan and execute 

missions for individual drones based on Google Earth / GPS data. These are not 

completely adaptive goal seeking systems, but if all goes well, they can perform their 

human defined mission by moving from point to point and performing selective 

actions. Another example: The self- driving car developers have learned how to 

package more real-time observation skills into their ground systems. Even as 

presently developed, they could be used as weapons.

Another view of Human Intelligence

There may be a perception that since the human brain is so complex, it must be used 

for a machine to accomplish the same tasks. There are researchers that are pursuing 

goals to create a machine with the ability to fully emulate a human; however this is not 

necessarily required for machines of war. A human is an example of a greatly 

adaptive machine that can be challenged with an almost infinite variety of goals. It 

can use almost any tool. It can conceive of, and build, new tools. But if we look at the

creation of war “systems”, they don’t have to be that capable. And even if you looked 

at individual humans and assigned them only a selective set of tasks, then what they 

do is greatly simplified. And if you give up pro- creation responsibilities things get 

even simpler. In fact, one might suggest that during working hours, a human is really 

limited in what he/she can do with the tools and information that are available to them.

Humans are not responsible for all positions and all knowledge in order to make all 

tactical and strategic decisions. A pilot flying an aircraft has only a few controls at 

his/her disposal. The pilot has to decide where to go and what to do, but their options 

are really limited.
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The Conventional Technology Options and Issues (or - Why isn’t everything 

automated today?)

Now that we have explained why the problem is not so big, it is important to 

understand why everything has not already been automated by now. Perhaps it has 

been the technology that has been applied...?.

First there is conventional IF THEN ELSE logic. Whatever programming language 

you might choose, this stuff works. If you ask a programmer if he/she can write a 

program to solve a problem the likely answer is “yes”, if you can explain the problem 

and the solution. It is simply a matter of time and money. And, even for simple 

systems we are asking the machines to interpret complex information sets in order to 

pursue goals on their own. That brings us to the mathematicians that use predicate 

calculus. Here is what predicate calculus provides: a formal way of defining 

functional relationships between information items. But the domain expert is probably 

not a mathematician, or a programmer. So now we have a cost and schedule issue. 

Neither schedules, nor pocketbooks are infinite. In addition, the domain expert is not 

likely to be able to explain the problem (and the desired solution) in a manner that can 

be understood “easily” by the software engineer or the mathematician. Usually every 

time a concept is transferred between one individual and the next, something is lost in 

the translation. Again, this results in long development and debug cycles. This is 

likely why complex problems have not been addressed with conventional 

programming.

Then there are the neural net designers. Using the human brain model they expose 

the neural net to patterns and teach it value systems. The resulting neural net system 

interpolates between what it was taught, and what it sees. Unfortunately, teaching 

neural net systems takes a lot of time. And if the systems are not appropriately 

taught, then just like humans, bad judgmental decisions can be made. In addition, if 

you want to add new sensors (information sources) to the system, the neural net 

system may have to be completely retaught. There are also researchers that want 

systems to learn on their own (just like humans). There are people who are 

concerned that weapon systems might learn on their own how to switch sides 

(because those systems decided on their own that it was the right thing to do at the 

time). Another issue with neural nets is that they cannot easily explain why they did 

what they did. Perhaps we are not quite ready to turn human evolution over to a selflearning machine.

Threats and Opportunities and a Value System

Now back to our problem space. If we expect to automate the battlespace at all 

levels, what would this system look like? Whether it is offense or defense based, one 

is dealing with competing capabilities and competing goals. For any kind of 
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automation, we are dealing with measurable entities (measurable information items). 

These items can be treated as either threats or opportunities. Sometimes they can be 

both threats and opportunities when applied to different parts of the problem space. 

All items are measurable. Example: When humans perform tasks during scheduled 

working hours, the human is constantly balancing opportunities and allocating 

resources at his/her disposal in order to accomplish multiple simultaneous tasks. The 

human is inhaling / exhaling, eating, moving toward/away from obstacles, and 

performing tasks as appropriate. The human is operating alone, or with others (as 

appropriate). The human is collaborating as needed, and when asked. The human’s 

value system (their needs) is used to prioritize tasks and allocate resources. The 

human’s value system changes and adapts to its situation. The human’s history, 

biases, knowledge, and risk tolerance applies a weight (a value) to the different 

factors. What we have just described is an analog system. Now, for our autonomous 

battlespace, we have goals and objectives (offensive and defensive). In the future 

machines may set their own goals and strategies, however, in the near term humans 

will likely retain control. So, in the interim it will be up to humans to create policies that 

control the behavior of machines.

The Paradigm Shift

The paradigm shift that we are describing in this paper is that a new information model 

will be needed to both define and execute information. This model will keep humans 

in control (humans-on-the-loop), while at the same time keeping them out-of-the-realtime-loop. Policies will be created by humans that understand the capabilities of their 

machines and how those capabilities should be deployed. A hierarchy of battlespace 

management will be deployed from individual units (devices) through a loosely 

coupled chain of command. Policies will be created that define how organizations of 

machines can come together and break apart to fulfill the broad objectives of the 

battlespace. Since the policies will be created by humans, the decisions and actions 

of units, teams, and battalions will be traceable to the policies, and then to the humans 

that created the policies. Organizations that control these systems (and systems of 

systems) will be able to monitor their competition and decide how to spend their 

money (offense and defense, small and large, short term and long term).

What if Accomplishing this is Easy?

If we stopped at this point, one could ask: “What is new? We have just continued our 

evolutionary work and automated more ‘stuff’”. However, the technology we are 

describing exists now, and it is simple to use. It is platform and architecture independent 

(so it is not tied to any specific hardware platform or software development 

environment). It occupies a very small memory footprint, which means it can be 

implemented in the small hobbyist drones available today.
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When we say simple, we mean that you can be productive in a week and working on 

complex policies the next week. And, even if you are not a policy expert (defining who 

to shoot and when, or choosing between one tactic or another, or ... it is easy to 

create the policy - and test as you go. You don’t need a team to support the process.

So anyone that wants to build and test a policy that describes how machines want to 

pursue goals can start the process and see results in a very short time. This may not 

be impressive if you are competing with a brick, because the brick will not change its 

tactics or strategies. But in a conflict domain, the tactic that may be working one day 

will have to change the next day to keep up. So the primary paradigm shift comes 

with ease-of-use. The secondary driver is that complex behaviors can be deployed in 

very low cost platforms.

Knowledge Enhanced Electronic Logic (KEEL) Technology[ii]

The technology that allows humans to package policies to control the behavior of our 

battlespace systems and devices is KEEL Technology. It was introduced to NATO in 

an offensive role in 2014[iii]. It was introduced to NATO in a defensive role in 

2015[iv]. KEEL Technology allows domain experts / Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 

to create and test policies and create (auto-generate) conventional code that can be 

handed off to the software engineers for insertion into the target system / device. No 

“calculus” (in the conventional definition) is required. Several years ago a 13 year old 

learned and used KEEL in only a few hours. More recently, a 15 year old created 

adaptive policies for an Arduino (hobbyist) drone. KEEL Technology is supported with 

the KEEL Dynamic Graphical Language which makes it easy to create and test 

policies and to “see the information fusion process” in action. You can “see the 

system think” through a process called language animation.

It’s simple: If you know what a bar graph looks like, and if you understand that a taller 

bar is more important than a shorter bar, then you are on your way to being able to 

create an adaptive KEEL-based policy that can run in a device, in a computer, and 

distributed across the cloud.

Decisions and actions are of three types:

1. Go/No-go (do something, or refrain from doing something)

2. Select the best option

3. Allocate resources (do so much of some number of things)

More complex decisions are combinations of all of the above. These decisions can be 

distributed and shared across the hierarchy of systems and devices. The policies will 

define how and when to share information, and how to operate when information links 

are broken. (Just like policies for human organizations.)
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Summary

Given that humans “in” the battlespace can be replaced by software applications and 

devices, how will the questions posed by the Megacities/Dense Urban Areas theme be 

addressed?

Situational understanding: Information will be collected and abstracted into 

measurable terms. Confidence will be determined and assigned by weighted factors in 

the system. The KEEL-based systems will be answering these questions throughout 

the hierarchy:

• What does it all mean?

• What should I {the element within the battlespace} do about it?

Human created policies will define how the entities should (and are allowed to) adapt. 

They will decide if they can operate on their own. They will decide if they can ask for 

help. They will switch objectives. All of this can be accomplished according to the 

human created policies. This doesn’t mean humans are without responsibility. 

Opposing forces will be continually updated with new tactics and strategies (value 

systems). New sensors will be introduced to provide better and better information. 

With KEEL it is easy to add new information items into the policy, but it is still work for 

humans. Plus there will be after- mission reviews. Is the value system correct? Did 

the system (system of systems) perform as desired? Could it have performed better if 

the policy was adjusted? Was the system tricked? How can this be avoided in the 

future? How has the human population in the battlespace responded? Are the 

political, social, economic impacts appropriately considered in the system policies?

Humans are still in control.

Freedom of movement and protection: Mathematically explicit policies will be created 

and executed. The future will be similar to a chess match because adversaries will 

adjust their tactics and strategies (and acquire devices with different capabilities) to 

probe the weaknesses of the opposition. There will be a transition from training 

humans (starting over with every warfighter) to continual refining of the operational 

policies.

Expeditionary operations: Policies of every type will be developed. They will be 

constantly upgraded and changed. It will be a war of information and disinformation.

Future training challenges: Training individuals in the use of KEEL will be easy. 

Much more emphasis will be on tactics and strategies and information warfare 

(trickery and deceit) where the effort will be to try and convince the opposition to shoot 

itself in the foot. Some of this will be social warfare to teach humans how to interact 

with the machines.

The platforms of conflict: By creating KEEL-based policies for autonomous systems 
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the systems/devices can operate independently, they can automatically decide when a 

group or team would be more/or less effective and self-organize, automatically create 

a command hierarchy, and pursue goals based on mathematically explicit policies. 

They can use a value system understood across the entire spectrum of devices that 

understand and can operate almost immediately to change anywhere in the 

battlespace. Unlike humans, these machines can have self-value determined by their 

owners. Unlike some present organizations where they have to recruit suicide 

bombers, devices can be used (by the “system”) to probe defenses. Their destruction 

will be assumed and be an accepted part of the overall human controlled strategy. 

The result is that one ends up with platforms executing the “best” tactics and the “best” 

strategies as determined by the human chess players.

NOW (For Organizations That Can Accept New Ideas)

KEEL Technology is available now, not 20 years from now. It is possible to create 

these adaptive policies today. In the past, governments have had the luxury of 

fighting wars with individual humans. They trusted that those humans would behave in 

a desired manner. When some humans fail, failure is accepted, because they were 

human. When machines fight the wars, it will not be acceptable to mass produce bad 

behaviors. KEEL allows policies to be created and executed with mathematical 

precision, and those policies are 100% auditable. Organizations that understand the 

potential of KEEL Technology first will have an advantage compared to those “late to 

the table”. This is just like an experienced chess player who competes against a 

novice. Granted, it will take time to automate the behaviors of the entire battlespace 

hierarchy. However, it will take a whole lot more time to do this using conventional 

approaches- if KEEL Technology isn’t used.

The challenge to the US military is this: whether they want to be a leader or a follower 

using KEEL Technology in their autonomous systems. If a new technology is 

available that is so easy to use, and that technology can change how conflicts are 

fought, and determine who wins and who loses, then the balance of power can shift, 

almost over-night. New platforms can be created and deployed in months, rather than 

years. New platforms can cost hundreds of dollars, not billions. An organization with 

what appears to be superior capabilities one day can be following a small terrorist cell 

or individual anarchists the next day. Government “experts” who are paid for their 

knowledge may reject the idea that anything new can be invented that they don’t know 

about, or that they haven’t invented themselves (it’s called “cognitive dissonance”).

KEEL is not “artificial intelligence”. It is an enabling technology that makes it easy to 

package human judgment and reasoning skills (expertise) into machines so the 

machines can behave as if the subject matter experts, operating with their rules of 

engagement, organizational structures, tactics and strategies were deployed in small 

inexpensive disposable devices.
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Are you ready?

End Notes

[i] Mission Planner, http://planner.ardupilot.com/

[ii] Knowledge Enhanced Electronic Logic (KEEL) Technology;

http://compsim.com/Papers2014/About_KEEL.pdf ; 

http://compsim.com/military/index.html

[iii] NATO MCDC Workshop, 

http://www.compsim.com/Papers2014/News%20Release%20-

%20MCDC2014.pdf

[iv] NATO Berlin 2015, http://www.compsim.com/Papers2014/News%20Release%20-

%20KEEL%20Technology%20for%20Counter-UAS11162015.pdf
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“TRAuma Care In a Rucksack” (TRACIR), a Disruptive Technology Concept

By Jan Berkow and Ron Poropatich

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 19 February 2016

Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/%E2%80%9Ctrauma-care-inarucksack%E2%80%9D-tracir-a-disruptive-technology-concept

Introduction

Trauma care in future military environments will require medical technological 

innovations for an integrated force with the attributes and capabilities to mitigate risks 

and maximize clinical effectiveness in an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) insurgency 

scenario. [1] According to the U.S. Army Roadmap for Unmanned Aerial Systems 

2010-2035 [2], the aviation force mix will shift to mostly unmanned and optionally piloted 

vehicles. This necessitates accompanying autonomous and semi-autonomous Tactical 

Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) capabilities to support future UAS missions.

From the Medical Command Operational Order document, the Secretary of the Army 

and Chief of Staff Army (SECARMY)/(CSA) have initiated Force 2025 and Beyond 

(F2025B) - a holistic modernization strategy to develop and deliver Landpower concepts 

and capabilities to the Joint Force and integration into Doctrine, Organizations, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). [3] This strategy 

will field interim solutions to complete Army 2020, develop and field required capabilities 

for Force 2025, and set the conditions for forces in the far term horizon of 2040. The 

Chief of Staff of the Army envisions a future Army that is expeditionary, lethal, 

responsive, engaged and that is capable of shaping the operational environment. This 

vision will shape the future force requirements to include combat casualty care and 
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medical evacuation, utilizing both autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. To 

address the autonomous requirement, it is posited that the practice of TCCC must 

undergo disruptive changes that enable the development of an “intelligent” TCCC 

platform. Applying concepts similar to those employed in robotics, an intelligent system 

is one that “has the ability to recognize objects and events and to represent knowledge 

in a world model”. [4] Further, “it is the integration of knowledge and feedback into a 

sensory-interactive, goal-directed control system that can make plans and generate 

effective, purposeful action directed towards achieving them”. [4]

It is further posited that the starting point to construct an intelligent TCCC platform 

demands the capture of quantifiable biomarkers that enable recognition of a trauma 

event and are supportive of trauma model development. This requires a paradigm shift 

in the practice of operational medicine from an “art” that employs subjective measures 

to assess and treat, to a “science” based on employing objective quantifiable measures. 

This will in turn, provide a fundamental change to the form of medical data that is 

captured, enable a more accurate depiction of poly-trauma model complexities, and an 

accounting of those tactical and operational practices to assess goal-directed 

effectiveness based on data derived actionable knowledge.

This change will also address several military operational needs identified during the 

period of 2001-2013 that include more accurate data collection from point of injury to a 

Role 3 facility as well as dissemination of patient status to enable improved 

telemedicine support and casualty care hand-over through the echelons of care. [5] 

This form of “operationalized “ medical data will also enable the trauma registry to serve 

as a tactical knowledge repository to which analytics can be more effectively applied, 

offering greater opportunity for continuous improvement of TCCC protocols.

Autonomous care also requires the pursuit of challenging critical care interventional 

system advances that can support closed-loop cardio-pulmonary resuscitation and 

robotic-driven imaging technologies to enable more precise patient assessments or 

guide critical care interventions during ground or air transport. The TCCC platform must 

also undergo a significant change in form factor (cube and weight) that is conducive to a 

transportable rapid deployment scenario such that it can fit into a Rucksack. This will 

require miniaturization of these advanced medical tools that can be quickly set up by 

one person near the point of injury. System portability also addresses the versatility 

requirement needed to support the use of any casualty for any “vehicle of opportunity” 

designated for casualty evacuation. These disruptive technology advances to the 

TCCC platform are paramount to address future theatre needs.

Disruptive Technologies

Significant improvement in pre-hospital far forward survival rates have been achieved 
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from previous conflicts by continued analysis of injuries and mortalities that has resulted 

in the refinement of tactical combat care practices. The reduction of Golden Hour en 

route transport times, use of alternative resuscitation blood products, and changes in 

tourniquet practices are examples of evolutionary changes that have been implemented 

and have had a profound impact on survival rates. It is proposed that beginning with a 

new paradigm for those biomarkers used to recognize a disease condition, there are 

several disruptive technologies needed to develop an autonomous small form factor 

medical platform that is envisioned as providing “Trauma Care in a Rucksack”. Each 

technology proposed (Figure 1) serves as a building block to the next to fully address 

future theater requirements. The following is a list of proposed disruptive technologies 

needed to address future dense urban combat casualty theater requirements.

Figure 1: TRACIR's Disruptive Technology Building Blocks

Novel Stress-based Biomarkers

While many improvements to Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) have been made, 

advancements in the fundamental practice of battlefield medicine where the use of 

patient vital signs and symptomatic measures (signs and symptoms) to assess and treat 

the patient have languished. It is posited that this has been the primary impediment 

towards improving TCCC. Similar to civilian trauma care, the practice of TCCC relies 

primarily on training the medic or corpsman in the art of interpreting signs and 

symptoms that are then applied to a complex poly-trauma protocol to guide 

interventions. Practicing this “art of care” approach is extremely challenging even in a 

more controlled domestic emergent care facility without the logistical challenges of 

tactical field care or evacuation care or the threat of performing care under fire.

It is widely accepted that regardless of how miniaturized and portable, the use of vital 

sign sensors such as blood pressure and the capture of symptoms such as the pallor of 

skin or capillary refill, provides poor detection sensitivity offering limited advanced 
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warning to recognize an impending unstable condition.

This is because signs and symptoms occur during latter stages of a response to a 

trauma insult and are more indicative of the degree of compensatory exhaustion. Signs 

and symptoms also provide limited discriminatory accuracies to enable early recognition 

of the different causal poly-trauma states that serve as key decision points to determine 

an optimal intervention from the TCCC guidelines.

A more valuable biomarker reflects an autonomic nervous system (ANS) stress 

response. This is because the ANS response is a patient-specific measure of how the 

cardiovascular (CV) system is adapting to varying forms of stress (e.g. cognitive “fight or 

flight”, physical exertion, environmental such as heat or cold, disease, trauma insults, 

etc.) in order to remain stable. Stability can be defined as the ability to constantly adapt 

circulatory flow to stress related changes in blood flow demand in order to maintain 

adequate oxygen delivery to the tissues and organs. The current use of signs and 

symptoms reflects latter stage measures for how well the CV system is adapting to the 

aggregate effects of stress placed upon it. An abnormal sign or symptom measure is 

evident when CV adaptation is failing. For example, a static blood pressure provides a 

general range for when the CV adaptive mechanisms to maintain stability from the 

stress of hemorrhagic shock have been exhausted offering little to no advanced warning 

for when to act nor any discriminatory value as to cause.

Alternatively, it is possible to capture non-invasive hemodynamic and metabolic 

biomarkers that correlate with the various CV adaptive mechanisms themselves that 

provide an early stage, patient-specific means to characterize a specific stress 

response. For example, a primary adaptive response to stress is small artery vascular 

constriction which causes the transfer of blood to flow to the central circuit. [6] [7] This 

constriction response is activated by a drop in aortic (baroreceptor detected) pressure 

that enables recognition of increased circulatory flow demand that may have been 

triggered by the circulatory stress from hemorrhage, exercise or other causes. Activation 

of small artery vasoconstriction occurs prior towhen changes in vital signs and 

symptoms become evident. Use of a measure of small artery vasoconstriction can serve 

as a broad event indicator to recognize an impending unstable CV condition and 

provide an adequate interventional time window to act prior to when the patient 

decompensates.

Further, if multiple CV adaptive mechanisms (or correlates) inclusive of both 

hemodynamic and metabolic measures are captured, a more precise characterization of 

the type of stress response can be captured. Use of machine learning methods can be 

applied to identify combinations of these novel temporal pattern-based biomarkers with 

the most predictive accuracy to recognize a specific form of poly- trauma stress 

response in the future. Further, these poly-stress responses can be translated into 
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software rule-based events similar to how computers continually monitor data streams 

for software viruses. The use of a poly-trauma event (PT) provides a more precise 

characterization of the patient’s physiologic states that can serve as the primary building 

block needed to build an intelligent TCCC platform.

Intelligent Trauma Registries

Registries are currently used for “strategic” medical purposes to enable determination of 

optimal practices that provide the best outcomes as opposed to having tactical utility. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense/Health Affairs directed the services to implement 

the “Joint Theater Trauma Registry” (JTTR) in December 2004, and more recently 

evolved into the DoD Trauma Registry (DODTR). The DODTR has had a major impact 

in documenting the types of wounds and treatments rendered, resulting in clinical 

process improvements and standardization of provider practice for hospital care. 

However, still lacking is a comprehensive and integrated system for data collection and 

analysis to improve performance at the pre- hospital level of care. Capture of the TCCC 

based casualty cards, after action reports, and unit-based pre- hospital trauma 

registries, linked with novel sensor biomarkers need to be implemented globally and 

linked to the DoD Trauma Registry in a seamless manner that will optimize pre-hospital 

trauma care delivery. [8]

A future value of the data registry is to capture more granular medical data to determine 

the optimal protocol to perform for a specific poly-trauma event. This could be called an 

“Intelligent Registry” where the product is a catalog for event-driven, goal-directed care 

using “operationalized” medical data (captured from point of injury to Role 3 medical 

facilities) across the evacuation continuum and added to the JTTR. Such an “Intelligent 

Registry” would not only include the current critical care data elements (i.e. vital signs, 

treatments rendered) but also include novel biomarkers (i.e. arterial vasoconstriction 

measurements) in a robust data set leading over time with machine learning to 

predictive analytics and improved clinical outcomes.

The first data requirement is the need to capture “context” that includes data to describe 

the patient type. This includes demographics and current physiological state of the 

casualty to further classify the patient. This is another aspect of the “art of care” that 

many take for granted, where a clinician typically assimilates information such as 

ambient temperature and patient age for example, that may be a means to discriminate

PT events from one another. This form of medical data can be acquired physiologically 

or from a medical record such as one stored on a barcode worn by the patient.

The next type of medical data required are those interventions that have been 

performed on the patient. In an OR setting, the anesthesiologist factors in the type of 

anesthetics used for example, to anticipate decreases in blood pressure due to known 
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vasodilatory effects from the anesthetic used. Without determining whether the current 

PT event is resultant of a pharmacological intervention for example, it may be difficult to 

predict how a patient will respond to additional interventions. This suggests that some 

cataloged PT events are poly-trauma stress responses in combination with a 

pharmacologic, blood product or other physiology altering prophylactic. This also implies 

that there must be some kind of methodology to automate the documentation of 

interventions employed. In an automated scenario, this becomes much simpler as 

every intervention is performed by the TCCC device platform and can therefore be 

recorded. Ultimately a taxonomy of PT events can be developed.

Another important component of the “Intelligent Data Registry” is the knowledge-building 

aspect of the registry that focuses on building a predictive capability for the efficacy of 

an intervention performed on a specific patient type exhibiting a specific PT event. This 

requires performing an ongoing retrospective analysis to evaluate or “score” which 

interventional protocol has the optimal near-term response and longer-term outcome. 

Development and sharing of civilian trauma registries with DoD operational medical data 

registries will accelerate the critical mass of evidence-based medical data needed to 

more rapidly refine the discriminatory accuracy of PT events to achieve optimal 

interventional strategies.

Semi-autonomous and Autonomous Resuscitation

Once an intelligent trauma registry structure has been created to capture PT events, 

formalization of the pathophysiological progression of different types and combinations 

of trauma insults can be documented. This offers the potential to construct models 

beginning with animal trauma studies that allow for identification of quantifiable 

detection thresholds and intervention endpoints that can be further refined with ongoing 

human registry data collection.

This evidence-based intelligent trauma registry content can, in turn be used to construct 

an intelligent advisor to guide the corpsman or medic. Alternatively, an autonomous or 

closed-loop resuscitative capability can be developed. Interventions and key data 

inflection points can be translated into upper and lower control limits for a servo-driven 

infusion pump or respirator resuscitation system. Current closed- loop designs provide 

generalized algorithms with broad utility across many patient types and underlying 

trauma etiologies. Autonomous systems that have the benefit of ongoing learning from 

Intelligent Trauma Registry access will be able to continuously refine the evidencebased protocols employed that will ultimately result in improved outcomes and 

strategies to address outliers not currently possible.

Physiologic Data Visualization

Newer physiologic monitoring device interfaces have a dashboard-like appearance that 

allow the user to quickly determine whether the physiology parameters collected are 
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within the acceptable ranges per the current standard of care. Current military training 

relies on visualization of the stop light analogy – i.e. green, yellow, and red indices -

reflective of safe, indeterminate or danger zones, respectively. Future user interfaces 

will appear more like a multi-dimensional 3-D contour plot to reflect the operating ranges 

for each compensatory mechanism (Figure 2). A prominent bounded operating range 

will be constructed from evidence-based upper and lower operating control limits for 

each compensatory dimension contributing to patient stability. By providing a multidimensional process control-like visual, it will be intuitive when patient stability is 

beginning to head outside of optimal operating range and which compensatory 

contribution requires intervention - a minor or major adjustment. Data visualization tools 

constructed in this way will also provide more informative remote patient monitoring data 

to empower telemedicine resources or facilitate improved patient hand-over through the 

en route care continuum.

Figure 2: A Visual of a Multi-dimension Contour Plot

Robotic-Driven Assessment & Intervention

An autonomous system must be capable of performing a more comprehensive patient 

assessment and initiate cardio-pulmonary resuscitation related interventions to support 

prolonged field care for durations of up to two-hours [5]. Lightweight, highly accurate 

robotics such as in the form of a “soft” robotics body-wrap will be required to manipulate 

both the patient and embedded visual arrays with imaging devices to provide a more 

complete assessment of the patient. Likewise, image-guided robotic strategies can be 

employed to identify those physiologic landmarks to perform image-guided needle 

placement to facilitate ventilatory (cricothyrotomy or thoracostomy) or circulatory 

(endovascular aortic balloon placement for non-compressible hemorrhage) 

interventions. These capabilities are perhaps the most “DARPA-hard” of the disruptive 

technologies mentioned. More extensive discussions are required to accommodate all 
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possible use cases and logistical challenges to fully assess the requirements for this 

type of capability.

System Miniaturization

Common to all technologies discussed, a primary consideration must be given to size 

and weight requirements that enable accommodating a “rucksack” form-factor. Given 

the advances made in integrated sensor design, mobile platform computational 

capabilities capable of rapid local signal processing, integrated communications, and 

nominal power requirements, miniaturization is perhaps more evolutionary rather than 

revolutionary and disruptive. However, the clinical utility afforded by a portable ICU 

quality TCCC platform that can be easily transported to the point-of-injury is indeed 

disruptive.

Conclusion

The “Trauma Care in a Rucksack” (TRACIR) concept addresses many of the combat 

casualty care operational deficiencies identified in past conflicts by proposing a novel 

approach to a fundamental technical challenge. This challenge is to overcome the 

pervasive use of subjective physiologic signs and symptoms used as the standard of 

care to triage or assess and treat patients that is also an obstacle towards providing a 

semi-autonomous and autonomous Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) solution. A 

set of disruptive technology building blocks is proposed to create a paradigm shift in 

how medical data is defined, stored, captured, visualized, and shared such that a more 

easily transportable semi-autonomous and autonomous TCCC solution can be 

developed. The proposed TRACIR platform satisfies key operational requirements for 

use by any vehicle of opportunity, during prolonged field care in denied environments, 

and for future Unmanned Aerial Systems’ needs.

References

1. Thomas B, Amouzegar MA, Costello R, Guffey RA, Karode A, Lynch C, Lynch KF, 

Munson K, Ohlandt CJR, Romano DM, Sanchez R, Tripp RS, Vesely JV. Project AIR 

FORCE Modeling Capabilities for Support of Combat Operations in Denied 

Environments. 

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR427/RA

ND_RR427.pdf

; accessed 11 February 2016.

2. U.S. Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-2035.http://www-rucker.army.mil/usaace

/uas/us%20army%20uas%20roadmap%202010%202035.pdf; accessed 11 

February 2016.

3. Force 2025 and Beyond: Preparing to Win in a Complex World. 

http://www.arcic.army.mil/Articles/f2025bd-Force-2025-and-Beyond-PreparingTo-Win-In-A- Complex-World.aspx; accessed 11 February 2016.

4. Meystel AM, Albus JS; Intelligent Systems Architecture, Design, and Control; John 
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Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002; page 3.

5. Combat Trauma Lessons Learned from Military Ops of 2001-2013.Defense Health 

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6. Hall, John. Textbook of Medical Physiology. (12th ed.). Elsevier Science Publishers. 

p. 184. ISBN 9788480868198.

7. Klaubunde, Richard. Cardiovascular physiology concepts. (2nd ed.). Lippincott 

Williams & Wilkins. p. 181. ISBN 9781451113846.

8. Kotwal RS, Butler FK, Montgomery HR, Brunstetter TJ, Diaz GY, Kirkpatrick JW, 

Summers NL, Shackelford SA, Holcomb JB, Bailey JA. The Tactical Combat 

Casualty Care Casualty Card TCCC Guidelines - Proposed Change 1301. J Spec 

Oper Med. 2013 Summer;13(2):82-7.
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Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in 

Megacities

By Danielle L. Ippolito

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 14 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-physiologicalresponse-to-toxic-industrial-chemical-exposure-in-megacities-0

Introduction

Megacities—urban areas with populations of ten million or greater—and other 

dense urban environments are emerging and growing globally, posing new 

challenges for U.S. military operations. The United States (U.S.) military can be 

better positioned for potential future operations within megacities as part of a joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team by increasing its 

understanding of megacity environments (Harris et al., 2014). Chemical exposures 

pose risk to the health and readiness of Service Members operating in these 

environments. The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) prioritized a list of the top 30 

chemicals of concern for global military operations based on physical 

characteristics and available toxicology data (Sutto, 2015). Occupational exposure 

to these chemicals increases risk of developing adverse health effects during 

mission operations or post-deployment. Policy guidelines specifying the use of the 

appropriate personal protective gear constitute the first line of defense to protect 

personnel by limiting exposure in the field. After a confirmed or suspected exposure 

event, far-forward diagnostic tools are needed to quickly and effectively determine 

and manage the risk of adverse health effects post- exposure in order to make 

informed command decisions about return-to-duty and treatment options.

Identifying and quantifying biomolecular indicators in accessible biofluids such as 

blood, saliva, or urine is critically important for evaluating chemically-induced 

disease prognosis (Tawa et al., 2014; Ippolito et al., 2015). Biomarkers of endorgan toxicity can be integrated into a fieldable detection system to rapidly diagnose 

chemical exposure-induced adverse health effects in theater. Noninvasive or 

minimally invasive screening methods could enable early intervention, treatment, 

and informed decision making to optimize force readiness. Mapping biomolecular 

patterns of adverse health effects represents a promising solution to the complex 

problem of assessing health effects after exposure to mixtures of different 

chemicals and

/or pollutants and aggregated exposure effects over time (Silins & Högberg, 2011).

This systematic literature review identifies and assesses the level of evidence for 
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candidate far forward diagnostic technologies and biomarkers that may be used to 

detect emerging health effects from exposure to militarily-relevant chemicals. The 

review emphasizes a subacute exposure window (i.e., days to weeks) best suited to 

the short-term exposure scenarios anticipated in military operations and mission 

scenarios. Biomarker development demands meeting rigorous regulatory and 

clinical standards before adoption in the field, but military investment in this 

research and development process has the potential for significant returns in 

military healthcare during the deployment life cycle. Biomarker-based screening 

technologies can benefit routine health care screening, return-to-duty decisionmaking, triage during mass casualty exposure events, and/or guiding the 

development of diagnostics to inform treatment options. Biomarker- based farforward diagnostic strategies and technologies have the potential to transform 

military healthcare in the changing face of warfare in megacities and dense urban 

operating environments

Methods

The peer-reviewed literature was surveyed to evaluate the weight-of-evidence 

regarding biomarkers for emerging health effects resulting from exposure to 

militarily-relevant chemicals (Table 1). The target list of militarily relevant chemicals 

was based on 30 prioritized megacity chemical hazards outlined in the NRL 

Industrial Chemical Assessment for Hazard, Probability, and Biomarker 

Prioritization (Sutto, 2015). A biomarker was defined as a molecular, cellular, or 

biophysical event linked to an emerging health effect.

Databases searched included PubMed, Web of Knowledge, Google Scholar, 

ClinicalTrials.gov, publicly available Department of Defense (DoD) technical reports 

(e.g., Defense Technical Information Center), non-DoD sources, and the Center for 
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Disease Control Agency for Toxic Substance & Disease Registry and from the U.S. 

Library of Medicine Hazardous Substances Data Bank (“Agency for Toxic 

Substance & Disease Registry - Medical Management Guidelines Home Page,” 

n.d., “U.S. National Library of Medicine - Hazardous Substances Data Bank,” n.d.). 

Search terms were selected to identify studies that examined health effects 

associated with exposure to the high priority chemicals. The search was limited to 

articles published in English from January 2005 to May 2015.

Peer-reviewed articles were excluded if they (1) reported acute responses requiring 

immediate palliative care, (2) reviewed in vitro or computational toxicology sites that 

did not use publically available data sets, and (3) discussed mechanistic biomarkers 

without clear implications for candidate prognostic markers suitable for fieldable 

detection devices.

An objective two-step grading approach based on the U.S. Preventive Services 

Task Force Grade Definitions was used to assess the internal validity of individual 

studies published in peer-reviewed journal articles that met the inclusion criteria. 

The first step in evidence grading methodology identified and ranked the study 

design within a hierarchy of evidence, and the second step assessed the study 

quality (good, fair, poor). Study designs included the following categories: 

preclinical research (e.g., animal models), clinical research (e.g., clinical trials, 

diagnostic studies), epidemiological research (e.g., cohort studies, intervention 

studies), and secondary research (e.g., meta-analysis, systematic reviews). If a 

publication contained both a preclinical study and a clinical study, a separate grade 

was assigned for each study.

Results and Discussion

A review of 57 current papers in the diagnostic device literature identified five 

classes of biomarker detection devices (Figure 1). Most of the devices in 

development are lab-on-a-chip designs and paper- based lab-on-a-chip (LOC 

paper) protoypes. Frequently portable and disposable, these designs may be 

amenable to military field settings (Shafiee et al., 2015). Unique technological 

challenges limit the utility of many prototype diagnostics for use in a far-forward 

operational setting. Further research, clinical trials, and validation are needed to 

advance the devices beyond the prototype stage (Hoenigl et al., 2014). 

Ruggedization and miniaturization of laboratory prototypes are significant 

challenges in fielding these devices (Greenwood et al., 2007).
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Table 2 lists the target organs of adverse health effects following exposure to each 

of the chemicals. Table 3 reports the key acute, subacute, and chronic health 

effects for each target organ. Most of the data summarized in Tables 2 and 3 are 

derived from a scan of public toxicology data repositories (e.g., the Hazardous 

Substances Data Bank and related ToxNet resources). These repositories identify 

relevant studies outside the time frame of the systematic review (i.e., before 2005-

2015).
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Articles meeting the inclusion criteria for adverse health effects were organized into 

eight specificntarget organ categories: lung, central nervous system (CNS), 

peripheral nervous system (PNS), heart, liver, kidney, gastrointestinal, other, and 

multiple (Figure 2). A summary of the literature review by target organ for five key 

target organs (lung, CNS/PNS, heart, liver, and kidney) follows.
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Lung. Several of the 28 lung-related articles identified biomarkers correlating with 

acute lung injury/acute respiratory distress syndrome (ALI/ARDS): RAGE, ICAM-1, 

KL-6, SP-D, vWF, IL-6, IL-8, protein C, PAI-1, TNFR1 and 2, and thrombomodulin 

(Agrawal et al., 2012; Calfee et al., 2008; Calfee et al., 2009; Collard et al., 2010; 

McClintock et al., 2008; Parsons et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2006). Many of these 

biomarkers were associated with clinical outcomes (e.g., ventilator-free days, 

organ-failure-free days, and mortality). Mean levels the proteins PBEF or MIF were 

significantly greater in serum of ALI patients than healthy controls although the 

specificity for ALI remains uncertain (Gao et al., 2007; Ye et al., 2005).

Combining predictive markers improved predictive power. Low levels of protein C 

and high levels of PAI- 1 were independent predictors of mortality, and the two 

markers had a synergistic interaction for the risk of death (Ware et al., 2007). 

Levels of RAGE, PCP III, BNP, ANG-2, IL-8, TNF-?, and IL-10 show potential as a 

diagnostic biomarker panel (Fremont et al., 2010). In two studies, combinations of 

clinical predictors and multiple plasma biomarkers measured in individuals with 

ALI/ARDS improved predictive power for mortality over either approach alone, with 

some evidence that trauma differentially affects odds of mortality (Calfee et al., 

2011; Ware et al., 2010). Exposure to isocyanates (e.g., TDI and MDI) was linked to 

occupational asthma. Biomarkers associated with this clinical outcome included 

VDBP, MMP-9, VEGF, LSP-1, COR1A, HPX, and autoantibodies to tTG, CK18, and 

CK19 (Kim et al., 2011; Hur et al., 2008; Ye et al., 2006; Haenen et al., 2012). F2-

IsoP in plasma and lung tissue and SOD1 and COX2 in lung tissue may be 

associated with respiratory exposure to cadmium or silica nanoparticles (Coccini et 

al., 2012). Pulmonary fluid proteins and/or bronchial lavage proteins are biomarker 

candidates for lung injury, including ferritin, transferrin, CC16, ICAM-1, and PBEF 

(Hur et al, 2008; Kropski et al., 2009; Ye et al., 2005). Biomarkers in exhaled breath 

present an attractive alternative for accessibility in field settings (eNO and eCO2 

after exposure to chlorine and phosgene) or cytokines such as IL-4 after exposure 

to NO2; Luo et al., 2014; Nath and Januszkiewicz, 2008).

Central and peripheral nervous system (CNS/PNS). The 18 articles associated 

with CNS/PNS injury included serum biomarkers associated with neurological 

sequelae, mostly associated with organophosphate pesticide (OP) exposure. These 

biomarkers of OP exposure and effect included a panel of autoantibodies (e.g., 

antibodies to NFP, TAU, MAP-2, MBP, GFAP, S100B), blood ChE/AChE, creatinine 

kinase, AST, LysoPC hydrolase in erythrocytes, SOD activity and/or LPO 

concentration after exposure to organophosphate pesticides (Abou-Donia et al., 

2013; Rohlman et al., 2011; Bayrami et al., 2012; Vose et al., 2007; Colak et al., 

2014; Aygun et al., 2007). Biomarkers to non-OP-related chemical exposures 
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included GRIA 1 and glial S100B after exposure to mercury (Park et al., 2012) and 

serum S100B after acute CO poisoning (Abou-Donia, 2013).

Heart.A combination of biophysical and serum biomarkers were identified for the 

heart. Isoforms of troponin and cardiac natriuretic proteins released into the serum 

were associated with myocardial injury. Hydrogen sulfide poisoning resulted in 

cardiac proteins TNI and CPK-MB increased over time in conjunction with ECG 

data (Hirakawa et al., 2013). OP poisonings were associated with elevated TNI 

detecting acute early phase of cardiac injury (e.g., within the first 48 hours) (Cha, 

Cha et al., 2014). There is strong evidence for the emerging utility of cardiac 

troponins in stratifying toxicity risk (Dolci et al., 2008). Biophysical biomarkers 

included ECG measurements to determine risk of myocardial injury and arrhythmias 

(e.g., transmyocardial repolarization parameters to myocardial injury, left ventricle 

ejection fraction), especially after CO poisoning and OP exposure (Akilli et al., 

2013). An emerging literature identifies micro-ribonucleic acids (miRNAs) in the 

prediction, detection, assessment, or treatment of myocardial damage and cardiac 

dysfunction (Sandhu & Maddock, 2014).

Liver.Four articles identified liver biomarkers in serum, including miRNAs (serum 

miR-125a-5p, miR- 192 and miRNA-122; Zheng et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2010). 

Changes in miRNA levels assessed in liver tissue implicate miRNAs such as miR34a as promising new candidates in serum or urine (Koufaris et al., 2012). Liver 

injury diagnosis is routinely made in conjunction with clinical chemistry data, 

including alanine amino transferase (ALT). A panel of plasma or serum biomarkers 

diagnosed liver fibrosis in animal models (fibrinogen precursor, ceruloplasmin 

isoform 1, insulin like growth factor binding protein, alpha-2-macroglobulin, and 

vitronectin) (Ippolito et al., 2015).

Kidney.The 17 kidney-related articles identified biomarkers in serum and urine. 

Acute kidney injury markers in serum included LG3, cathepsin L, NGAL, IL-6, 

soluble TNFR1 and 2, and PAI-1 as potential candidates (Haase et al, 2014; Liu et 

al., 2007). Clinical studies have identified promising urinary biomarkers of acute 

kidney injury and/or nephrotoxicity, including KIM-1 protein after TCE exposure 

(Vermeulen et al., 2012). Urinary panels include Alb, NAG and ?1-MG as indicators 

of fluoride and arsenic-induced glomerular and tubular injury (Zeng et al., 2014). 

KIM-1 predicted kidney injury earlier than the traditional biomarkers, such as 

creatinine, BUN, and/or NGAL (Rached et al., 2008; Vaidya et al., 2010; 

Wunnapuk, Gobe, et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2008). Many of the preclinical studies 

examined urinary biomarkers of kidney injury other than KIM-1 (e.g., Cal, Clu, 

KIM?1, Lcn2, the three-branched chain amino acids [leucine, isoleucine, and 

valine], OPN, TTF3) and provide important foundational information (Boudonck et 

al., 2009; Fuchs et al., 2014; Hoffmann et al., 2010; Wunnapuk, Liu, et al., 2014; Yu 

et al., 2010).
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Other health effects. Other health effects with biomarker candidates included 

gastrointestinal, reproductive, cancer progression, blood, bone, and lymphatics (see 

Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 2).

Conclusions

As megacities and dense urban environments continue to grow in number and 

population size, there is an unmet need to understand the health threats of service 

members exposed to toxic chemicals and environmental hazards unique to the 

megacity operational environment. Properly validated biomarkers of exposure and 

effect can integrate with current biomonitoring systems throughout the soldier 

deployment life cycle to inform medical decisions during and after exposure events, 

especially in polluted megacity operational environments with increased risk of nonagent chemical exposure. Further research is needed to ensure the fieldability of 

ruggedized detection systems in the megacity environment.

Acknowledgements: This manuscript is based on a DTIC report submitted by Booz 

Allen Hamilton entitled “Biomarkers for Health Effects of Industrial Chemical 

Exposure Literature Review”, submitted to USACEHR on behalf of USAMRMCMOMRP on 26 June 2015. We gratefully acknowledge COL Thomas C. Timmes, 

USA, Commander of USACEHR, for programmatic support.

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author 

and should not be construed as official Department of the Army position, policy, or 

decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

Acronyms and Abbreviations 

AChE Acetylcholinesterase 

Alb Albumin

ALI Acute Lung Injury 

ALP Alkaline Phosphatase

ALT Alanine Aminotransferase 

ANG-2 Angiopoitetin-2

ARDS Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome 

AST Aspartate Aminotransferase

BNP B-type Natriuretic Protein 
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BUN Blood Urea Concentration 

Cal Calbindin-D28

CC16 Clara Cell 16

ChAT Choline Acetyltransferase 

ChE Cholinesterase

CI Confidence Interval 

CK Cytokeratin

Clu Clusterin

CNS Central Nervous System 

CO Carbon Monoxide 

COR1A Coronin 1A

COX2 Cyclooxygenase Type 2 

CPK Creatine Kinase

DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid

ECG Electrocardiogram

eCO2 Exhaled Carbon Dioxide 

eNO Exhaled Nitric Oxide

F2-IsoP F2-Isoprostanes

GFAP Glial Fibrillary Acidic Protein 

GRIA 1 Glutamate Receptor 1

HPX Hemopexin

HSA Human Serum Albumin

ICAM-1 Intercellular Adhesion Molecule-1 

IL Interleukin
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KIM-1 Kidney Injury Molecule-1 

Lcn2 Lipocalin 2

LG3 Prelecan C-terminal Fragment LG3 

LPO Lipid Peroxidation

LSP-1 Lymphocyte Specific Protein-1

LysoPC Lysophosphatidylcholine 

MBP Myelin Basic Protein

MDI Methylene Diphenyl Diisocyanate 

MIF Migration Inhibitory Factor 

miRNA micro-Ribonucleic Acid

MMP-9 Matrix Metalloproteinase-9 

MPO Myeloperoxidase

NAG N-Acetyl-?-D Glucosaminidase 

NFP Neurofilament Triplet Proteins

NGAL Neutrophil Gelatinase-associated Lipocalin 

NMP22 Nuclear Matrix Protein-22

NO2 Nitrogen Dioxide 

OP Organophosphate

PAI-1 Plasminogen Activator Inhibitor-1 

PBEF Pre-B-Cell Colony-Enhancing Factor 

PCP III Procollagen Peptide III

PNS Peripheral Nervous System

RAGE Receptor for Advanced Glycation Endproducts 

S100B S100 Calcium-Binding Protein B

SOD Superoxide Dismutase

SP Surfactant Protein 
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TCE Trichloroethylene

TDI Toulene-2,4-Diisocynate

TFF3 Trefoil Factor 3

TIC Toxic industrial chemical

TIM Toxic industrial material

TNFR Tumor Necrosis Factor Receptor 

TNI Troponin I

Tp-e Tpeak-Tend

U.S. United States

USACEHR United States Army Center for Environmental Health Research

VDBP Vitamin-D-Binding Protein

VEGF Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor 

vWF Willebrand Factor

?1-MG ?-1-microglobulin

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How to Hold or Take a Big City -- Seven Lines of Effort

By Geoff Demarest

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 18 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-to-hold-or-take-a-big-citysevenlines-of-effort-0

This essay proposes adoption of a specific planning framework for urban 

operations.[1] An American armed force smaller than, say, that used in Sadr City, 

Baghdad might well achieve victory in a future urban environment.[2] The imagined 

geographical context for the presentation of this planning framework is that of a large 

city, and the situation one that features active opposition by at least one well- armed 

organization of significant organizational and communications capacity. How large a 

city and how powerful an opposing force are of course consequential questions. 

Cities considerably smaller than what are generally taken as megacities still present 

significant, unique military challenges.[3] The armed opposition imagined here does 

not include the committed military of a large country that might assign significant 

national resources to either taking or holding the city with regular formations. The 

imagined opposing force might nevertheless be able to move several thousand armed 

fighters and employ a range of sophisticated weapons and surveillance systems to 

include those mounted on aerial drones. Regardless of the size and sophistication of 

the opposing force, the lines of effort for success in taking or holding a city can be 

placed in basically the same seven proposed categories. The reader is invited to 

assume that opposition entities (there likely being more than one) will not share with 

us the same scruples or social and political delimitations regarding how they will apply 

coercive violence. That is to say, as to any dissimilarity in the mixes of resources 

available to the contenders, moral asymmetry may be the most pronounced and 

consequential.

We can measure victory (our own or that of any of the competing entities) 

cartographically. The physical geographic space within which a contender can 

effectively punish its opponents, plus the geographic space in which a contender can 

remain impune from that punishment (sanctuary) will constitute the definitive map.[4] 

If throughout the city one of the parties to the contest were able to apply concepts and 

processes of justice as it sees fit, and can simultaneously protect individuals it 

chooses to protect from punishment by others, that party is eo ipso the complete 

victor. Perhaps total control of the whole urban place never becomes a practicable 

goal for any contender. Nevertheless, if the cartographic extent (within which whole or 

partial impunity is achieved) exceeds an entity’s goals, one can fairly argue that it 
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succeeds exactly to that extent. As to an American force overseas, at least a partial 

victory reasonably could be claimed if the US force could be withdrawn without the 

balances of impunity changing unfavorably, that is, without there being a change in the 

boundaries of sanctuaries.

Not contemplated here as part of the definition of victory is the attainment of any 

particular conditions of material life such as electoral suffrage, infant mortality, 

showers taken, calories consumed or political legitimacy. While perhaps rightfully 

interested in the improvement of material wellbeing, or justified in pursuit of such 

progress for its own sake, material improvement may have insignificant if any 

measurable, timely influence on the outcome of an armed competition as to who 

dominates whom.[5] In some areas and to some degree, the conditions of human 

suffering and injustice (or, perhaps, how a populace sees how the parties addresses 

such conditions) can have a recognizable effect on relative competitive prospects. 

Sociocultural conditions are not to be ignored, but they are best understood as 

potential influences on, and not conflated with measures of military success. Impunity 

can be gained or lost almost irrespective of socioeconomic conditions.

We can assume that a conflict may end in some sort of settlement, the result perhaps 

of a formal negotiation. Such a settlement would be the price of real or perceived 

relative weakness, however. In other words, ignorant of the situational details, we 

cannot claim that any contending party would necessarily have enough strength to 

dominate totally. It probably will not. The degree to which party A might have to settle 

is a fair measure of the extent to which it did not win, since negotiated settlement 

would mean that its opponents enjoy some degree of impunity from A’s coercion, or 

perhaps that they retain some capacity to impose punishment on A. Experiences 

indicate that some areas of a city may be hotly contested while other areas are fully 

controlled by one party or another, and these variously controlled locales may or may 

not be contiguous. Contestants may have to either take or hold according to a 

patchwork of urban sectors. There are likely to be more than two major contestant 

organizations, not simply a government versus an anti-government resistance or 

defiance. In addition, urban areas are intertwined with surrounding geographies we 

might prefer to categorize as suburban or rural or sea or hinterland.[6] With all the 

caveats in mind, however, seven lines of effort provide a reasonable starting template 

for planning.

They are as follows:

1. Maintain and improve advantage in anonymity

2. Maintain and improve advantage in competitive distances
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3. Control the disruption of service flows

4. Control convocation spaces

5. Progressively reduce enemy sanctuary space

6. Pursue the mens rea

7. Punish the enemy

*Measure the physical geography of all of the above*

*Ultimate goal: Dominate the granting of impunity*

1. Maintain and improve advantage in anonymity.[7] Implement specific actions 

and programs whose immediate goal is to tip the balance of anonymity, that is, 

encourage and enable the reporting of information, especially regarding the 

whereabouts of elements of the enemy’s armed members and leadership. These 

actions can include construction of reporting websites and phone numbers, or 

designing offices wherein a citizen can report without being seen doing so by an agent 

of an opposing force. The side currently able to openly occupy space can more easily 

flood public places with closed circuit cameras, for instance, but some use of cameras 

will be available to the other side as well. Include here also a number of 

considerations for the preservation of secrets, such as polygraphing, background 

investigations, oaths and the like. Those implementing siege of urban territory or the 

take-over of buildings have less opportunity for actual, physical presence by which to 

instill a ‘rule of silence.’ For them, the creation of psychological presence is made 

more difficult, but hardly impossible.

2. Maintain and improve advantage in competitive distances.[8] One of the most 

significant lines of effort is the building of walls, doors and bridges.[9] This is best 

done in an overall urban plan that considers travel distances among police stations, 

public convocation sites, likely sites of opponent perpetrations and government 

enforcement initiatives. Conversely, for the siege, approach distances to service 

nodes, convocation areas, and other valuable terrain need to be prepared.[10] 

Especially this initiative needs to anticipate withdrawals or escapes. Tunnels are a 

classic siege preparation, but way- stations made from the offices of front 

organizations, or the coopting of transportation networks are now typical. In Bogota, 

the FARC had briefly converted the immense garbage disposal network into a back 
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alley taxi service.

3. Control the disruption of service flows.[11] As cities grow they tend to change 

in step fashion. That is, urban phenomena may appear fairly rapidly to bring the city 

to a new stage or status that has direct bearing on prospects in armed competition. 

For instance, a small city might overnight be home to a radio controlled taxi network 

while a megalopolis might finally gain a third major airport, bringing a closer 

coordination of airspace control and all but sealing out some classes of aircraft. Also 

among the effects of scale may be a tendency toward single contract or single network 

consolidation of some services, for instance, sewage removal. As a service provision 

becomes monopolized or centrally regulated, it also acquires a vulnerability in that the 

geography of the reins of control may become centralized or present very specific 

nodes or constrictions. These need to be physically protected, as do the executives or 

key technicians who wield control. Because large cities often find economic 

advantage in consolidated service systems, the nodes and constrictions in these 

systems present geographically specific targets, targets that can not only be physically 

occupied, but the occupation of which can be defended for sufficient time to make 

power concessions appear economically and politically attractive.

4. Control convocation spaces.[12] Convocation (causing crowds to form) is hardly 

a new tactic, but social media has augmented their practicability. Rules of operational 

art still apply, however, to actions based on the massing of people, including protests, 

demonstrations, or marches. Regardless of the speed of instruction, coordination, and 

movement of such aggrupation, the characteristics of the spaces to which people can 

go to accumulate count for a great deal when it comes to how consequential or 

dangerous a crowd might be to the survival of an established governmental or 

economic structure. Some cities, because of ancient land use planning, have open 

areas that straddle important lines of communication or threaten significant economic 

nodes. If, on the other hand, a formation of large crowds can be diverted to open 

spaces that present little threat to principle transportation links or other pieces of 

economic terrain, the ability of resistance leadership to extort concessions from 

government is greatly reduced. For the government planner, in other words, it is 

smart to orchestrate the architectural, spatial relationship of constrictions and access 

points to open spaces such that, whatever the speed of social media, there is a 

lessoned potential for economic threat resulting from the fact of a crowd itself.

5. Progressively reduce enemy sanctuary space.[13] A sanctuary is that space 

within which a contestant cannot be punished by their opponent. Sanctuary may be 

attained through anonymity, legalities, moral and electoral risk, and physical distance.

Sanctuary is in any case a physical material place. One either enjoys a place wherein 

they are safe from the punishments that their foes can be impose upon them, or they 

are not. As such, the sanctuary space can be mapped, and while the cartographic 

delineations of sanctuary space will be hypothetical, it is that hypothesis exactly that 
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can guide the application of competitive resources in order to shrink the sanctuary 

space of one’s competitors and to increase one’s own. In addition, every attempt 

should be made to map the likely routes to and from sanctuary spaces.

6. Physically pursue of the mens rea.[14] The challenge posed here is more than 

just a ‘small fries’ versus ‘big fish’ distinction. The locus of dangerous intent is the 

human mind, and while it may profit us to work intellectually against those ideas and 

messages that we find in some way dangerous, sending our opponents a stark 

physical message can be ultimately influential. To the extent it is apparent to our 

opponents that we can and will bring dire physical consequences upon those who lead 

others to act in ways we cannot abide, our goal of holding or taking the city will be 

more economically achieved. A competitor is most likely to be effective who can 

mount constant, physical pursuit of the human initiative of what aggravates him. It is 

leaders’ corporeal impunity from punishments (and in turn the impunity they can grant 

to others) that must be challenged and dismantled. If there exists a single imperative 

for any durable victory, it is that we definitively disprove any suggestion that our 

opponent can bestow physical impunity to his followers. If the good guys are not 

capable of physically pursuing the bad guys within whom resides the mens rea, it is 

unlikely that the good guys are making progress in the direction of durable victory.

7. Punish the enemy.[15] This to an extent is a repetition of line of effort 6 above. 

Pursuit of the mens rea is valuable in itself in that a vigorous pursuit keeps the 

opponent off balance, makes it difficult for him to take initiative, and whittles at his 

moral. However, the act of pursuit is not a goal. Punishment alone is proof of the 

absence of impunity. The punishments might include no more than the stripping of 

wealth or of public authority, but to be absolutely effective the punishment of the mens 

rea probably has to be corporeal, that is, confinement or death. The operant 

psychology is one of visibly extending punishments to the enemies’ mens rea. This 

may mean capturing or sniping leaders. To the extent it becomes clear that ‘we’ have 

a monopoly of punishment over ‘them’, that is, we can punish them, but they cannot 

punish us, we win and can negotiate from strength in view to the future. If on the other 

hand, they can close our sanctuary space, that is, they can occupy and use the 

mayor’s office, the court building or the police station, etc., or they can kidnap our 

daughters at the school or theatre, then we are well along the way toward losing. 

Ultimately, for winning (that is, controlling territory, that is, effective/efficient/sufficient 

influence, that is, controlling impunity, that is, ‘we dominate them’), we must be 

capable of punishing them and they not capable of punishing us.

How to Organize the Study of a Big City to Support the Seven Lines of Effort

This section proffers a separate list, suitable for research or intelligence, of 

phenomena on which to focus in order to make an explanatory description of a large 

urban area. I propose twelve research categories. All are relevant to resourcing and 
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implementing the seven lines of effort, although some of the twelve more clearly 

allude to a specific line of effort.

1.Constriction points in the lines of supply into the city (water, power, food, and 

telecommunications)

a. Practical distance to and from (‘practical’ meaning cost or friction distances 

from a party’s start points or bases, i.e., time, fuel, money etc.)

b.What organizations control

-- Headquarters locations

-- Practical distance to and from

2.Constriction points in the lines of waste in and going out of the city (garbage, 

sewage, hazmat, death and medical)

a. Practical distances to and from

b.What organizations control

-- Headquarters locations

-- Practical distance to and from

3.Key control points for city services within city (vulnerable nodes) (transportation, 

convocation, comfort)

a. Practical distances to and from

b.What organizations control

-- Headquarters locations

-- Practical distance to and from

4.Most commercially valuable terrain (banks, by the way, are valuable. That’s where 

the money is)
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a. Practical distances to and from

b.What organizations control

-- Headquarters locations

-- Practical distance to and from

5.Key events times, locations, movement and normal participations (both recurring 

and special events)

a. Practical distances to and from

b.What organizations control

-- Headquarters locations

-- Practical distance to and from

6.Key recreation (especially sinful recreation) locations, times, normal 

participations (for a party’s own members as well as for opponents’, but especially 

for opponent parties’ leadership)

a. Practical distances to and from

b.What organizations control

-- Headquarters locations

-- Practical distance to and from

7.Collective identities of note (political, ethnic, gang affiliation, etc.)

a. Physical locus, scale and range

b.Representation (agents, especially exclusive agents)
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-- Physical locus, extent, density and movements

-- Means of wielding influence

-- Capacities for physical coercion

8.Exclusive agents (those who set themselves up as representatives of others 

and are jealous of that representation – like lawyers, politicians, union bosses, 

priests, etc.)[16]

a. Physical locus and movements

-- Practical distance to and from

b.Means of influence

c.Instruments of physical coercion

d.Available resources

e. Known vulnerabilities and locations in time

-- What they love

-- Practical distance to and from

f. Level of will (ruthlessness, courage, etc.)

e. What nodes, constrictions, and key locations they control or occupy; which they 

do not control but are attempting to control, and which should they logically want to 

control.

9.Grievances of note

a. Associations of grievances with namable collective identities

b.Representation, especially exclusive representation of the grievance
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Resolution possibilities and physical locus and range of resolution mechanism (i.e. 

jurisdictions)

10. Symbols of note (flags, songs, historical and literary figures, etc.)

a. Physical locations where found, density or duration of occurrence

b. Depth and extension of awareness and affectation regarding symbols

c. Psychological, affective and political correlations

11. Known relevant attitudes (regarding us, allies, enemies, etc.)

a. Location, density, intensity, range, durability

b. Reflections in symbols, events, communications

All of the categories are inter-related and if for some reason facts asserted within a 

category do not reconcile with those of others, then something is amiss which requires 

a disclaimer, reconsideration of the assertions and probably more field research. A 

competitive objective, for instance, would be to control nodes physically - - the other 

factors (like knowing who exactly controls those nodes, the sources of their power to 

do so, and especially their physical vulnerabilities, feeds into possibilities of physically 

changing control the node, or alternatively, to protect the status quo.

Once nodes, etc. are identified along with their respective ‘ownership’, we can begin to 

measure how much strength it would take for other competitors to hold or to take, and 

to remain. If we correctly identify the nodes, constrictions and most valuable terrain, 

then the next step would be to understand the cost and risk distances in getting to 

those places and staying there. How far is each in practical terms, what resistance 

could be generated against getting to and staying in each place, as well as the likely 

useable routes of escape and withdrawal from attempts to take or hold the key 

locations -- all this is subject to geographic study.

What may seem as an emphasis on physical locations and their control is not a 

dismissal of the psychological or sociological elements (perhaps the ‘subjective’ 

dimensions and options), but it is intended to seek relative efficiency and 

appropriateness in the short-term use of coercive force.[17]
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily 

represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of 

Defense, or the U.S. government.

End Notes

[1] Meaning the range of armed coercive force available to a city’s government along 

with the forces in play from any of the higher administrative levels to which a city might 

belong (department, nation, region, coalition, etc.). Units might include police military 

paramilitary militia, intelligence etc.

[2] See, regarding urban operations in Iraq see, Chris Bowers, “Future Megacity 

Operations—Lessons from Sadr City.” Military Review, May-June, 2015.

[3] See, on this point, Michael Evans, “The Case against Megacities: The Megacity 

Myth,” The United States Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, Vol 45 No 1 

Spring 2015, pp. 33-43.

[4] The idea of the use of the control of impunity as a proxy for victory is adapted from 

Geoffrey Demarest. Winning Irregular War: Conflict Geography. Ft. Leavenworth, 

Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), 2015, 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Winning-InsurgentWar/WIrW_2015.pdf.

[5] For expansion on this point see, “Section 39, Socioeconomic Causation,” ibid. 155-

158.

[6] To expand on this theme see, “Section 34, Urban or Rural,” ibid. pp. 133-136.

[7] To expand on this theme see, “Section 2, Anonymity,” ibid. pp. 4-5.

[8] To expand on this theme see, “Section 64, Measuring Distance and Comparing 

Power,” ibid. pp. 262- 66; “Section 32, Land-use Planning,” ibid. pp. 126-129.

[9] See, on this point, “Section 32, Heavy Machines,” ibid. pp. 119-120.

[10] To expand on this theme see, “Section 33, Engineers and the Built Environment,” 

ibid. pp. 130-132.

[11] To expand on this theme see, “Section 91, Forts and Walls,” ibid. pp. 366-370; 

“Section 94, Poop,” pp. 379-380; “Section 63, Roadblocks and Checkpoints,” pp. 258-

261.

[12] To expand on this theme see, “Section 27, ‘Nonviolent’ Action,” ibid. pp. 110-115.

[13] To expand on this theme see, “Section 7, Sanctuary,” ibid. pp. 22-27; “Section 23, 

Mens Rea,” pp. 96- 98.

[14] To expand on this theme see, “Section 23, Mens Rea,” ibid. pp. 96-98; “Section 

10, Decisive Battle,” ibid. pp. 36-39.
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[15] For more on this theme see, “Section 1, Impunity,” ibid. pp. 1-3.

[16] For more on the theme of exclusive agency see the index entry of that term in 

Winning Irregular War, ibid.

[17] Pardon a bit of atmospherics, but the terms ‘long-term effect’ and ‘short-term 

effect’ are themselves relative, and it might be vanity to claim long-term goals are 

fundamentally better than short-term goals, or that ‘long-term’ is, without specific 

context, a more strategic notion than ‘short term’.
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Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response through Multi-Source 

Technologies

By Paul O. Kwon

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 7 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/integrated-global-healthsurveillance-and-response-through-multi-source-technologies

Introduction

Since 1980, one to three new human infections have been identified annually. These 

Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs) impact social, political, economic and 

environmental arenas. In response, the International Health Regulations (2005) 

provide a legally binding framework to guide international member states of the 

World Health Organization (WHO) to “detect, assess, and report” potential outbreaks 

and other public health emergencies. More importantly, infectious disease is the one 

of the leading cause of morbidity and mortality around the world impacting 

socioeconomic stability. Globally, the Avian flu pandemic ($3.78 trillion) and Ebola 

outbreak ($32.6 billion) revealed critical shortcomings in mobilizing and leveraging 

public and private sectors that threaten global public health and security. More 

recently, vector borne diseases such as Chikungunya and Zika virus have 

threatened migration towards the southern borders of North America. Thus, 

forecasting outbreaks is crucial in planning for an effective response strategy.

Similarly, the U.S. has also developed key policy milestones for greater interagency 

support for national and global EID efforts (1997 Presidential Directive; 2014 Global 

Health Security Agenda). Interestingly, a common virus such as the seasonal flu has 

a significant annual impact within the U.S. population (up to 5- 20%) and healthcare 

(over 200,000 hospitalizations and 3,000-49,000 deaths with over $87 billion in 

reduced economic output). Understanding the dynamics of disease forecasting is 

therefore essential for prevention and mitigation strategies; however, there must be 

a mobilization towards a multidisciplinary and holistic approach in these proactive 

measures. In the face of budget constraints and limited resourcing, truly there is a 

need for an Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response Program through a 

complex web of surveillance, education, and interactive coordination (“network of 

networks”).

Background

In the past decade, there has been a significant technologic advancement in disease 

surveillance capabilities. Several bioinformatics science and technology enterprises 
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have developed a number of tools that leverage data science and existing open 

source data. With the ubiquitous desire to seek technologic advantages (internet, 

social media, smart phone and apps), the social network provides a wealth of 

information that can enhance the Warfighters’ force health protection and offer 

solutions towards predictable models in reference to EIDs and environmental threats 

to major populations.

Worldwide, six billion persons have mobile phones according to a recent U.N. report 

and there has been a rapid global proliferation of cellular phones in the last three 

decades. According to the PEW Research, more than 90% of all U.S. adults own a 

cell phone and 50% download apps. Trends also include a rise in smart phone 

purchasing (up to 1.45 billion in 2015). Consumers are spending more time on their 

apps than ever before, the abundance of mobile devices has transformed the 

information age, and the Neilson Company reports no signs of slowing. By the Pew 

research, more than half of smart phone users get health information (62%) and 

navigating through apps with worldwide trends up to 4.4 billion by 2017.

Fortunately, this complex web of information (social media, app development, short 

messaging system (SMS) or text messaging, and GPS locators) can assist in 

continuous surveillance, information sharing, education and training, risk 

communication, and modeling to help predict critical nodes for quick response to 

potential emerging threats.

In fact, smart phones assisted disaster relief in the 2010 Haiti Earthquake by SIM 

cards to track population movements during cholera outbreaks. Smart phones were 

also used for emergency reporting systems on mosquito-borne Dengue virus to help 

predict epidemics and model predictors as an “early warning” device. Smart phone 

apps also helped educate and train first responders and clinicians. Social media 

activity predicted and tracked outbreaks of syndromic flu. This same network can be 

used to receive population surveys as well as risk communication to alleviate fearinspired flight of misinformation. In short, leveraging this technology can enable 

enhanced communication, surveillance, intelligence and population management to 

protect health and national security.

Further, there have been recent advances in genetic sequencing, sequence 

analysis, and mathematical epidemiology with the convergence of several 

exponential trends that are cost effective and user friendly improving disease 

surveillance and response. This meaningful use of the bioinformatics analyses can 

also be performed now on web based or local systems. Additionally, DNA 

sequencers can diagnose disease and monitor new outbreaks. The readily available 

use of data collection, analyses and communication have spurred real-time access 

via internet, cell phone, and social media arenas. While capabilities are continually 

maturing, coordinated efforts to readily deploy and train these existing technologies 
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are still in need. Specifically, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed 

tools and applications in each of these areas (genomics, disease outbreak analysis 

and forecasting, and the integration of genomic data into epidemiological analyses).

Empowering the Development of Genomics Expertise (EDGE) is a highly adaptable 

bioinformatics platform that allows laboratories to quickly analyze and interpret 

genomic sequence data (Figure 1). The bioinformatics platform allows users to 

address a wide range of use cases including assay validation and the 

characterization of novel biological threats within clinical and complex environmental 

samples. It is designed to allow users with minimal expertise in bioinformatics to be 

able to conduct a number of sophisticated analyses. It also aligns to real world use 

cases, makes use of open source (free) software tools, and runs analyses on 

relatively inexpensive hardware. It addresses the distinct need for advanced, yet 

user-friendly bioinformatics solutions, and can be provided to foreign country 

partners’ labs to facilitate successful adoption and use of High-Throughput 

Sequencing technologies. This is critical because overseas deployment of 

sequencers allows biological analysis closer to the acquisition point of samples 

increasing efficiency and effectiveness. Particularly, EDGE provides support for bio 

threat rapid identification, detection, and surveillance. Additionally, it can validate 

currently fielded polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays as well as enable rapid 

design of new assays. This capability is a force health multiplier especially in 

Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) and forward deployed 

environments where human resources, space, bandwidth, and time are limited.

Figure 1: EDGE Overview
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Figure 2: EpiEarly User 

Interface

Currently, LANL has two concurrent projects running that are developing tools for 

epidemiologic analysis. A forward looking internally funded project is working to 

integrate data from the Los Alamos genomics group into epidemiologic models that 

address the extensive co-morbidities in malaria holoendemic areas of Western 

Kenya (Siaya). A Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) project is geared 

towards making the necessary diversity of epidemiologic tools available to the 

Analysis, Planning, Operations and Response communities through DTRA’s 

Biosurveillence Ecosystem. This project also addresses the uncertainty 

quantification that is necessary to provide decision support. Five modeling and 

analysis tools and one uncertainty quantification tool are being provided. The first 

three (EpiEarly, EpiRapid, EpiZoo) are available in a useable form currently. Two 

(EpiCast and EpiRapid) are in development. Because there is no “one-size fits all 

model” in mathematical epidemiology, these tools span the range of granularity from 

aggregated case-count data (EpiEarly) to event-driven agent-based models 

(EpiAgent). These tools are designed to look at these issues at different levels and 

to address a range of population sizes, mitigation detail, demographic fidelity, and 

computation effort as well as designed to be available to the individual analyst for 

force protection, operational status planning, and bio-event management and 

mitigation.

EpiEarly is a Bayesian estimator of reproductive number and only requires the user 

to input a time series of cases and the diseases’ serial generation time in order to 

return an estimated reproductive number with certainty (Figure 2). EpiRapid and 

EpiZoo are geographically compartmentalized SIR-type model ( susceptible, 

infected, recovered) with mitigations adapted to human and animals, respectively, 

and allow “what-if planning and analysis scenarios” to be examined (Figures 3 & 4).
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Figure 3: EpiRapid User Interface

Figure 4: EpiZoo User Interface

EpiCast is an agent-based day-night model with stratified mixing groups (SIR-type), 

explicit agent motion, and a concept of places (home, work school, neighborhood, 

census tract, etc.). All motion and infection are modeled at day-night granularity. It 

has detailed model of disease progression to allow fine- grained simulation of 

interventions (e.g. vaccination, school closure, etc.). EpiAgent is fine-grained in time, 

space and allows behavioral simulation (mask use, social distancing), agents with 

definite locations (latitude/longitude type data), and infection in short-time intervals 

(5 min) based on the agent being in a "place." These parameters are adaptable to 
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specific locations. EpiUpdate (in development) addresses the uncertainty within and 

between models providing confidence bounds that will allow analysts to 

appropriately qualify their work product for consideration by decision makers. This 

allows the data to be interpreted by the user with levels of predictability.

All these tools have interfaces that are designed to be easily understood by a user 

and provide sufficient flexibility that many situations of interest can be analyzed 

using analogy that are parallels, but without requiring that every analytic task be a 

research project. Data sharing and expert analysis of incoming information are key 

factors to enhancing situational awareness of an unfolding event. LANL has 

developed an integrated suite of tools to enhance situational awareness for global 

disease surveillance that provide actionable information and knowledge for 

enhanced situational awareness during an unfolding event: Biosurveillance 

Resource Directory (BRD), Biosurveillance Analytics Resource Directory (BARD), 

Surveillance Window App (SWAP), and Epidemiologic Information Collection tool 

(EPIC).

The BRD is a searchable database to facilitate obtaining disease surveillance 

information. It contains information on disease surveillance resources worldwide. All 

resources are described using a comprehensive framework that describes the 

fundamental elements of infectious disease surveillance and contain information on 

how to access the data.

The BARD is a searchable database that catalogs and classifies epidemiologic 

model specific information to allow selection of appropriate models for use in 

disease prediction, monitoring or forecasting. A systematic model characterization 

framework has been developed to allow consistent epidemiologic model description 

and facilitate "apples to apples" comparison for multiple models available for the 

same disease.

EPIC is a data collection and visualization tool for notifiable disease data from 

around the world. The tool uses various scrapers to collect information from national 

health websites and digests it into a database that allows the data to be easily 

visualized, compared and exported (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Epic User Interface

The SWAP is an app developed to provide context and a frame of reference for 

disease surveillance information about an unfolding event through matching of user 

input to a library of global historical disease outbreaks (Figure 6). Each historical 

outbreak is a “case study” and contains information on case counts, location, data 

sources used (from the BRD), disease models used (from the BARD), risk factors, 

mitigation efforts, and other epidemiologic relevant information. The SWAP is 

intended to provide a frame of reference for incoming data for a particular location 

and time during a disease outbreak so that the user is able to understand and qualify 

the situation to facilitate actions to prevent, stop or mitigate the event. It can also 

make a short term forecast for the unfolding disease situation based upon user input 

data.

Figure 6: SWAP User Interface

All these tools described are either online, or shall be quickly available online and 

would require minimal modification to be able to deploy them into the hands of 

analysts and health officials (Table 1).
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Table 1: Summary of Tools

Conclusion

In the face of budget constraints and limited resourcing, there is a need for an 

Integrated Global Health Surveillance and Response Program through a complex 

web (data sharing among veterinarians, entomologists, climatologists, 

microbiologists, clinicians, and public health officials) of surveillance, education, and 

interactive communications, otherwise known as “network of networks.” This is 

particularly important for expeditionary operations and Army Health Support of 

Operations in order to enhance Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities and to 

minimize population disease outbreaks that create geopolitical and socioeconomic 

instability. However, this concept can also affect large populations in times of war 

(WWI, WWII, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria) and peace (natural disasters 

and public health emergencies) based on strategic goals of governmental states 

around the world. Technologies and existing data science platforms such as those 

expressed by LANL provide up to date resources towards a more multi-source 

approach on population health.

Material has been reviewed by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. There 

is no objection to its presentation and/or publication. The opinions or assertions 

contained herein are the private views of the author, and are not to be construed as 

official, or as reflecting true views of the Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. Research was conducted in an AAALACi accredited facility in 

compliance with the Animal Welfare Act and other federal statutes and regulations 

relating to animals and experiments involving animals and adheres to principles 

stated in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, NRC Publication, 

2011 edition.
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Pain Management: Maintaining the Force

By Marcie Fowler and Laura L. McGhee

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 8 March 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pain-management-maintainingthe-force

Introduction

Combat injuries can result in severe acute pain, and options for pain control on the 

battlefield are currently limited. There is a need for improved pain control on the

battlefield, as well as in higher echelons of casualty care. Initial pain control can 

increase patient comfort and aid in evacuation from the point of injury [1-3]. The 

development of novel analgesic agents may identify medications that produce 

decreased side effects as compared to morphine, which can result in respiratory 

depression, immunosuppression, hemodynamic effects, and cognitive deficits [4, 5]. 

The ultimate goal of Force Health Protection (FHP) is to preserve the fighting force [6-

8], and pain is the ultimate performance degrader for Service Members.

The implementation of more effective pain control on the battlefield will affect not only 

individual Service Members but also overall mission accomplishment. Additionally, 

effective initial pain control can decrease the incidence of chronic pain development, 

which could affect return to duty rates, and can also reduce patient care and 

rehabilitation expenses.

Current State of Pain Management from the Battlefield to the Hospital

The foremost barrier to effective pain management on the battlefield is the fact that 

pain management immediately following combat trauma is often deprioritized in favor 

of resuscitation and stabilization for rapid transport [9]. The situation can be further 

complicated by the potential detrimental effects of pain therapeutics on respiration and 

blood pressure. Logistic concerns and supply quantity requirements must also be 

considered when planning for medical care for both combatants and noncombatants, 

particularly in densely populated urban areas in asymmetrical warfare [8].

When a Service Member is injured on the battlefield, the first medical attention 

received, known as level I care, consists of self-aid, buddy-aid, or care administered 

by the combat medic. Once removed from the fight, the Service Member may be 

resuscitated and stabilized for transport to a level II care facility, which is staffed by a 

Forward Surgical Team, or a level III Combat Support Hospital [9]. If deemed unlikely 

to immediately return to duty, the injured service member is then air evacuated to a 

definitive care facility [3]. The care available at each of these levels is discussed 

below.
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Level I-II: First-Responder Pain Management on the Battlefield

An individual Service Member may carry a combat pill pack, which includes NSAIDs, 

that are generally effective for mild pain and allow the Service Member to remain in 

the fight. A combat medic has access to additional analgesics, potentially including 

both opioid and non-opioid analgesics, to be given if the service member can no 

longer remain in combat. In the past, if intravenous (IV) or intraosseous (IO) access is 

not obtainable or is not required, the medic could administer intramuscular (IM) 

morphine via an autoinjector mechanism. Other analgesic possibilities include 

fentanyl or ketamine [10].

However, opioid-induced respiratory depression and decreased cardiovascular 

function limit opioid usage in wounded Service Members who are bleeding. Due to 

the nature of combat injuries sustained in asymmetrical warfare, this includes a 

significant percentage of casualties, creating a major challenge for pain management 

on the battlefield. In addition, the analgesic efficacy of morphine and other drugs 

given IM is also significantly reduced during hypovolemic shock, as blood is shunted 

away from the limbs to maintain organ function, preventing IM administered drugs 

from entering circulation efficiently. The lack of pain relief may then lead the medic to 

administer additional doses of a medication, resulting in the simultaneous central 

nervous system availability of a large amount of analgesic following resuscitation.

This may lead to additional side effects and requiring the use of additional medications 

to counteract these effects.

Finally, the nature of the battlefield poses unique concerns with the use of narcotics 

for pain management. Specifically, the cognitive and motor function effects, which are 

manageable in a traditional hospital setting, can be especially detrimental on the 

battlefield. If the injured Service Member experiences these effects, they may require 

assistance and monitoring from additional Service Members, thus further reducing 

combat numbers and further risking mission accomplishment. These effects can also 

make the evacuation of the casualty to a higher level of care more difficult because 

they are unable to participate actively in their own evacuation.

A recent study reported that only 39% of combat casualties in Afghanistan received 

analgesics at POI, whereas 92% received analgesics during tactical evacuation 

(TACEVAC) [10]. It is unclear why most casualties did not receive analgesia at POI; it 

could be due to lack of availability, prioritization of other life-saving interventions, or 

lack of self-reported pain. However, it is clear that better pain control is needed on the 

battlefield. In order to treat pain immediately on the battlefield, during evacuation, and 

in other austere environments, unique considerations must be taken into account. 

Pain therapeutics must be easy for a combat medic to carry among many other items, 

have minimal abuse potential to discourage illegal use, be easy to quickly administer 

in an austere and dangerous environment, and have limited effects on Service 
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Member cognition and motor function to allow for evacuation. For severely injured 

trauma patients, pain therapeutics cannot interfere with life-saving measures and 

resuscitation; therefore, a pain therapeutic with limited side effects, including lack of 

respiratory depression and hypotension, should be selected. Current Tactical Combat 

Casualty (TCCC) guidelines recommend that, for severe pain when IV/IO access is 

not required for other purposes, OTFC or IM ketamine be administered. If IV/IO 

access is obtained, the recommendations are IV morphine or IV/IO ketamine. Opioids 

are not recommended if the casualty exhibits decreased consciousness, respiratory 

distress, or shock [11].

Level III-IV: Theater and Stateside Hospital Pain Management

Combat casualties evacuated from theater are treated and stabilized at tertiary 

hospitals associated with the US Department of Defense, with a full complement of 

medical and surgical services, comparable to any civilian tertiary hospital. Pain 

management at these facilities encompasses all varieties and etiologies of pain. Still, 

systemic opioids and NSAIDs are the most frequently administered drugs due to their 

ease of dosing and relative efficacy. In hospital patients at Landstuhl Regional Army 

Medical Center or the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 56% of casualties injured in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) received NSAIDs, 49% were prescribed opioids and 

41% received an anticonvulsant or antidepressant [12]. While advanced pain 

management options, including interventions such as nerve blocks, are available at 

this level of care, the nature of injuries sustained in asymmetrical warfare are often 

severe and offer significant challenges to successful pain management. For example, 

a Soldier injured by an improvised explosive device (IED) while on foot patrol would 

likely present with polytrauma, potentially including multiple amputations, fractures, 

shrapnel wounds, burns, and/or traumatic brain injury (TBI). The pain resulting from 

such widespread physical injuries may be exacerbated by psychological sequelae, 

such as post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), resulting from combat experiences. 

Taken together, such patients require the implementation of multimodal pain 

management strategies because their injuries and the resulting pain are too complex 

to effectively treat with a single medication or intervention.

Level V: Pain Management During Stateside Hospitalization and Rehabilitation

Pain management for these polytrauma patients during hospitalization and the 

transition to rehabilitative care remains complex. These patients have often 

developed opioid tolerance, and it important to ensure that appropriate pain 

management is achieved using a combination of medications, interventions, and 

treatments. These combinations may include not only short and long-acting opioids, 

but also NSAIDs, anticonvulsants, antidepressants, or other medications Additionally, 

interventions, including nerve blocks and surgeries, as well as device implants can be 
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performed in a pain clinic as necessary. Finally, interdisciplinary care, including 

cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), acupuncture, medical message, movement 

therapy, physical therapy, and occupational therapy may also be employed in the pain 

management plan for patients during rehabilitation and return to duty/function.

Challenges Specific to Densely Populated Urban Operations Environments and 

Asymmetrical Warfare

Multiple unique considerations must be taken into account when planning for and 

implementing pain management strategies in densely populated urban operations 

environments [8]. For example, when conducting Intelligence Preparation for the 

Battlefield (IPB) is such environments, it is important to take into consideration the 

medical needs of both combatants and civilians. This concept becomes increasingly 

important when considering operations, whether war-related, humanitarian, or other, 

in densely populated urban areas or megacities. Pain itself will affect each civilian as 

well as each Service Member at some point; however, enough medications would 

likely not be available in the event of the use of a weapon of mass destruction, such 

as a thermonuclear device, in a megacity. Thus further research into novel, potent 

pain medications, as well as triage techniques and prioritization guidelines, is 

warranted. Additionally, because pain is a disease of perception that is mediated 

centrally, it is uniquely linked to psychosocial factors that can affect response to 

treatments as well as outcomes. Awareness of these issues is required for the 

preparation of an effective plan for pain management on a large scale during 

asymmetrical warfare.

Future Directions for Pain Management on the Battlefield

Current research efforts are geared towards developing fast acting, novel analgesics 

with limited side effects for use in forward operating environments. The ideal drugs 

will have decreased side effects, particularly in regard to hemodynamic, respiratory, 

and cognitive effects. These drugs will need to be easy to administer and exhibit 

limited monitoring requirements. Additionally, they should lack addictive or diversion 

potential. The candidate analgesics should also have a quick onset of action as well 

as a lengthy duration of action, to limit redosing requirements. A pharmacological 

solution for pain management fitting this profile will allow for the effective management 

of pain in densely populated urban areas and megacities during operations, as well as 

improve pain management strategies and patient outcomes in all environments.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the United States Army Medical Research and Materiel 

Command Combat Casualty Care Research and the Clinical and Rehabilitative 

Medicine Research programs.
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The authors report no conflicts of interest. The opinions or assertions contained herein 

are the private views of the author and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting 

the views of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

End Notes

1. Buckenmaier, C.C., et al., Pain following battlefield injury and evacuation: A survey 

of 110 casualties from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pain Medicine, 2009. 10(8): 

p. 1487-1496.

2. Clark, M.E., et al., Assessment and treatment of pain associated with combatrelated polytrauma. Pain Med, 2009. 10(3): p. 456-69.

3. Clifford, J.L., et al., State of the science review: Advances in pain management in 

wounded service members over a decade at war. J Trauma Acute Care Surg, 2014.

77(3 Suppl 2): p. S228- 36.

4. Passik, S. and K. Kirsh, The need to identify predictors of aberrant drug-related 

behavior and addiction in patients being treated with opioids for pain. Pain Medicine, 

2003: p. 186-189.

5. Pergolizzi, J., et al., Opioids and the management of chronic severe pain in the 

elderly: consensus statement of an International Expert Panel with focus on the six 

clinically most often used World Health Organization Step III opioids (buprenorphine, 

fentanyl, hydromorphone, methadone, morphine, oxycodone). Pain Pract, 2008. 8(4): 

p. 287-313.

6. Chapman, P.L., et al., Training, deployment preparation, and combat experiences 

of deployed health care personnel: key findings from deployed U.S. Army combat 

medics assigned to line units. Military Medicine, 2012. 177(3): p. 270-277.

7. Patel, T.H., et al., A U.S. Army Forward Surgical Team's experience in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. J Trauma, 2004. 57(2): p. 201-7.

8. Command, A.T.a.D., Urban Operations, in FM 3-06, D.o. Army, Editor. 2006: 

https://rdl.train.marmy.mil/catalog.

9. Lenhart, M.K., Savitsky, E. and Eastridge, B. Eds., Combat Casualty Care: 

Lessons Learned from OEF and OIF. 2012, Fort Detrick, MD: Office of the Surgeon 

General. 719.

10.Shackelford, S.A., et al., Prehospital pain medication use by U.S. Forces in 

Afghanistan. Mil Med, 2015. 180(3): p. 304-9.

11.Butler, F.K., Jr., et al., A triple-option analgesia plan for tactical combat casualty 

care: tccc guidelines change 13-04. Journal of Special Operations Medicine, 2014. 

14(1): p. 13-25.
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12.Cohen, S.P., et al., Presentation, diagnoses, mechanisms of injury, and treatment 

of soldiers injured in Operation Iraqi Freedom: an epidemiological study conducted at 

two military pain management centers. Anesth Analg, 2005. 101(4): p. 1098-103, table 

of contents.
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SECTION 6: Future of Training

This section includes published articles from Small Wars Journal that we received 

from the call for papers. The section will explore issues, concepts, and capabilities 

as they relate to future land forces training for or in megacities or dense urban areas

in 2025 and beyond. 

 “Man, Computer, and Special Warfare”

by Patrick Duggan

 “Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond”

by Brett Piekarski, Brian Sadler, Stuart Young, William Nothwang and 

Raghuveer Rao

 “Technical Challenges for Simulation and Training in Megacities”

by Jon Watkins and Chuck Campbell
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Man, Computer, and Special Warfare

By Patrick Duggan

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 4 January 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/man-computer-and-specialwarfare

Man-machine teaming is inexorable and Special Warfare[2] needs a blueprint to 

transform along with it. With every passing day, our hyper-connected landscape 

spawns a new class of threats more technologically evolved than the last. These 

‘hybrid-threats’ confound establishment-thinking seemingly more preoccupied with 

conflict typology, than the innovation of new organizational concepts to counter them. 

Success in warfare is not derived by labeling its assembled parts, it is achieved by 

correctly assembling emerging technology and new capabilities into trusted fields of 

practice. U.S. military culture must increasingly confront technology’s permutation of 

conflict, as great powers have contended since the ‘dawn of machines’ during the 

Crimean War. This paper serves as one step in a larger man-machine journey, and 

advances a conceptual framework to align technology, tools, and tactics for a new 

contemporary cyber-enabled Special Warfare practice. If successfully developed, this 

framework provides a mission-specific blueprint for the convergence of computers and 

man, and amplifies Special Warfare’s capabilities to counter future hybrid-threats and 

deny them growing technological advantage.

Hybrid-Hype

Hybrid-warfare has been complicated with umbrella labels ranging everything under 

the sun. It has been defined as a “combination of conventional, irregular, and 

asymmetric means, including the persistent manipulation of political and ideological 

conflict, and can include the combination of special operations and conventional 

military forces; intelligence agents; political provocateurs; media representatives; 

economic intimidation; cyber-attacks; and proxies and surrogates, para-militaries, 

terrorist, and criminal elements.”[3] The examination of hybrid-warfare has fueled 

“The confounded telegraph has ruined everything.”[1]

1855 Crimea--General Sir James Simpson
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spirited debate and spurred numerous papers over its characteristics, purpose, and 

parts; and no doubt, will continue for some time.

However, the truth is, hybrid-warfare is nothing new. It has, and always will be, a 

hodgepodge of previously labeled conflicts fused together by technology in 

unexpected ways. Hybrid-warfare is an asymmetric grab-bag of tricks that converges 

old and new technology and tactics to open new ‘attack surfaces’ against an 

adversary. Simply put, “the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best 

characterized by convergence.”[4] Hybrid-warfare’s phenomena has only seemed to 

surge as a result of the tightening interaction between humans, the physical world, 

and cyberspace, whose connections produce a new class of threats increasingly 

adept in merging man and machine in a ‘cybered’ world. Powered by the steady 

proliferation, sophistication, and affordability of technology, hybrid-warfare is a useful 

means to inflict disproportionate harm against an opponent, relative to the size, 

resources, or geography of an adversary. Today, every country, non-state actor, or 

super-empowered individual can increasingly harness hybrid-warfare as a means to 

pursue their goals.

The most daunting challenge to hybrid-warfare is keeping pace for how fast adaptive 

adversaries are using the explosion of technology, information proliferation, and 

network connectivity for warfare. Their blistering speed in merging man and machine 

threaten US military advantages, and in some cases, outstrip our own innovation.[5] 

With an almost organic property to it, hybrid-warfare is in a state of perpetual change; 

and so long as technology continues to constrict the space between humans, the 

world, and cyber, its velocity will increasingly outpace a man’s ability to process, 

respond, and counter on his own.

Unfortunately, technology does not lift the fog and friction of war, technology clutters it. 

Technology does not lead to more antiseptic conflicts, but instead, to messier, more 

complex, and ambiguous ones. Technology provides adversaries more lethality and 

precision, and empowers them with new innovative ways to obfuscate, circumvent, 

and obviate previous limitations for doing it. Simply put, “technology does not make 

war more clinical; it makes it more deadly.”[6] Furthermore, US cutting-edge 

technology is used by adaptive adversaries to open new ‘attack surfaces’ against US 

vulnerabilities and push the limits of warfare norms and accepted conventions. 

Ironically, America may find itself a double victim of its own advanced technology; first, 

by failing to innovate sufficient new concepts for technology in conflict, and second, by 

failing to deny adaptive adversaries new technological advantages.

Human-Machine Teaming

The Department of Defense (DoD) is urgently exploring the future of human-machine 

teaming to spur new thinking and research on the changing character of warfare and 
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the “types of new systems, organizations, and operational concepts needed to 

conduct it.”[7] The over-arching goal of DoD’s efforts is to create new paradigms, 

where machines and humans are “joined at the hip in a symbiotic relationship where 

each brings what it does best.” [8] Activities range from the experimentation of new 

technology, to rethinking organizational and operational force structures and tactical 

application. The “Third Offset Strategy is designed to create new advantages” over 

evolving-threats and explores promising technology like; advanced computers, bigdata, robotics, artificial intelligence, semi/autonomous systems, and other cutting-edge 

technologies.[9] Ultimately, the Third Offset strategy is all about staying ahead of 

‘hybrid- threats’ bent on the frustrating exchange of technology, tools, and tactics.

Each military service is exploring their own options for human-machine teaming and 

are questioning their own combat methods for fusing human-based strategic-thought 

with computer based tactical-acuity.[10] Ideally, the services must combine the 

precision and reliability of computers with the creativity and flexibility of humans.[11] 

Computer assisted human operations require the development of a common language 

which ties humans and technology to service specific lexicon, and must be 

accomplished in a simple way, using clear terms bound to missions and activities that 

resonate with commanders. Merging man with computers is not a technology thing, 

but rather cultural and organizational issues, which are vastly more challenging than 

just implementing things.[12] Excelling in the challenge requires each service to 

individually tailor organizational concepts that are true to their culture and amplify their 

specific missions.

Fortunately for the US, although adaptive threats may reverse engineer American 

technology, they can’t easily copy its greatest strength, its people and creativity. As 

recently expressed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, “The human 

element is the secret sauce—the element that foreign powers can’t copy as easily as 

they can our software.”[13] When it comes to the race to merge man and machine, 

the competition depends upon harnessing the US’s two key advantages, its people 

and ingenuity, to assemble “the pieces of future military power better and faster than 

our rivals.”[14] Unfortunately for the US, there is an overall lack of man-machine 

concepts to merge technology in conflict, and this is a significant barrier for remaining 

competitive against adaptive adversaries.[15] More mission-specific concepts are 

needed across DoD, to include specialized missions like, Special Warfare, Irregular 

warfare, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency, which “must also be updated to 

account for adversaries armed with advanced weaponry.”[16]

So the question for Special Warfare is, how do we assemble “the pieces of future 

military power”[17] into a framework that provides a culturally compatible missionspecific blueprint for computers and man? And then, how does Special Warfare use a 

growing-array of cyber-technologies like; wearable electronics, the Internet, social 
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media, cyber-tools, and digital devices, to create new vulnerabilities and advantages 

against an adaptive enemy?

Crimean War--Dawn of Machines

Considered the first ‘Modern or Industrial War,’ the Crimean War (1854-1856) was 

allegedly fought by Britain and France to check Russian expansion into the Ottoman 

Empire. Less historically debatable, but perhaps more meaningful, the Crimean War 

also served as the backdrop for numerous wartime ‘firsts’ for machines invented 

during the Industrial Revolution era. The Industrial Revolution had produced more 

machines with wartime application than armies of the day “knew what to do with”[18] 

and included; steam powered trains and iron clad ships, breech loading and rifled 

canons, ‘minie’ bullets for rifled

muskets, cameras, the telegraph, and many more. The new technology, coupled with 

industrial scale mass- production, impacted great and small Armies alike. Simply put, 

post-Napoleonic era militaries found themselves awash during the dawn of machines 

with a deficit of new wartime concepts, not unlike today.

An ancestor to modern-day computers, the telegraph’s first use in combat was during 

the Crimean War; [19] and today, is remembered more for its war-journalism impacts 

than any tactical benefit. Bemused by the novelty, commanders had not anticipated or 

adequately prepared for the telegraph’s military potential. Labor intensive and 

problematic, the British telegraph’s “gutta-percha insulated lines” had to be laid by 

plow when ground and weather permitted, and were frequently and easily broken.[20] 

Lacking telegraphy concepts or specialized military forces prior to the war, the British 

Army relied on private sector expertise for battlefield training.[21] By the end of the 

war, the British had still not fully embraced the telegraph’s potential for revolutionizing 

tactical communications, as they organizationally grew from zero to only one 

Telegraph Detachment and eight Field Stations,[22]and culturally, Commanders still 

preferred couriers for a primary means of communication. Even the 300 miles of 

cable which ran from Varna Bulgaria to Balaclava Crimea to connect the war to 

European circuits wasn’t submerged until April 1855, only after private industry 

convinced British and French government and military officials to submerge the 

telegraph cables.[23] It wouldn’t be until 1863, until the British Army standardized its 

telegraph equipment and tactics.[24]

Much to military commanders’ dismay, the telegraph’s most auspicious use was to 

connect the front to European audiences,[25] where bureaucrats and politicians 

micromanaged their field Armies with incessant questions, suggestions, and orders 

from afar.[26] “This was a substantial change in military strategy, and many tacticians 

lamented how the battlefield had become prone to interference by armchair warriors 

back at home.”[27] Frustrated by the lack of perceived constructive use, other than 

“constant pestering from London,” the British Commander-in-Chief General Sir James 
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Simpson famously quipped “the confounded telegraph has ruined everything.”[28]

Fueling commanders’ frustrations, newspaper war-correspondents used the Victorian 

Internet[29] to turn the Crimean War into “the first war in history to be the subject of 

daily reports from the fighting front.” [30] The telegraph’s rapid affront to military 

culture was a result of its natural tendency to centralize the conduct of the war, and 

resulted in a rift between military commanders on one hand and the “politicians, the 

war correspondent, and public opinion” on the other.[31] This growing divide led to 

another British Officer, Sir William Simpson, famous for painting the Charge of the 

Light Brigade, to deride wartime journalists as “the curse of modern armies.”[32] In 

short, the telegraph was more of a nuisance to the Armies of the day than a benefit.

“The Industrial Revolution was itself an information revolution,” and during the 

Crimean War, military organizations struggled to conform, adapt, and manipulate this 

new warfare environment, “just as militaries are striving to do today.”[33] A key lesson 

as history moves forward, is that “those militaries that took best advantage of the new 

technologies of the industrial age were not those that acquired the machines or 

weapons first, but those that recognized the broader informational implications and 

strove to organize themselves accordingly.”[34] Meaning, the dawn of machines in 

Crimea still symbolizes the cultural and organizational difficulties nations experience 

when new technologies are introduced in battle, but also urge the US to vigorously 

adapt, if it’s to succeed in today’s man-machine competition.
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The Cyber-Enabled Special Warfare Pyramid

Figure 1. Cyber-Enabled Special Warfare Pyramid

What is it?

The cyber-enabled Special Warfare (CE-SW) pyramid is a conceptual construct that 

organizes reinforcing blocks of capability into three levels that are aligned to the three 

core missions of Special Warfare; Unconventional Warfare[35],

Counterinsurgency[36], and Foreign Internal Defense.[37] The pyramid integrates 

technology, tools, and tactics into increasingly more advanced capabilities that 

support the three concepts of cloud-powered FID, Counter-network COIN, and UW 

Cyber-Pilot Teams.[38] The CE-SW pyramid aids “in identifying the new core tactical 

competencies, operational and organizational constructs and combat systems needed 

to survive and thrive in a cyber-environment”[39]and organizes capabilities in a 

manner to exploit closed and wireless computer networks with cyber electro-magnetic 

activities.[40]

Analogous to computer programming or ‘chunking,’ the CE-SW pyramid breaks down 

information (or training) into chunks, then arranges the chunks into blocks of 

capabilities which enable a specific function (or mission). The CE-SE pyramid begins 

at the base with cyber-technology skills, education, and training, which are the 

foundation for building higher levels.
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Theory

The fundamental theory underpinning all cyber-enabled Special Operations is about 

leveraging cyber- technology’s asymmetry to amplify the elemental aspects of what 

makes a special operation, special. Meaning, if correctly applied, cyber-technology 

amplifies a Direct Action mission’s lethality, precision, and discreet nature; while in 

Unconventional Warfare’s case, cyber-technology would amplify its ambiguity, 

deception, and resiliency. The “human element” is the glue that holds the pyramid’s 

capabilities together and is the guiding principle for any man-machine arrangements.

To be successful, the pyramid must be applied in manner that exemplifies the first 

SOF truth, “Humans are more important than hardware.”[41]

Form

There are three levels to the pyramid which correspond to the three major missions of 

CE-SW; cyber- enabled Unconventional Warfare (CE-UW), cyber-enabled 

Counterinsurgency (CE-COIN), and cyber- enabled Foreign Internal Defense (CEFID).

The CE-FID level primarily focuses on education and training for all practitioners and 

serves as the foundation for all CE-SW missions. This level’s capabilities are divided 

into three major categories; the Basics, Force-Protection, and Open Source 

Intelligence. Each major category is further subdivided into sub-categories. The 

Basics has two sub-categories; Cyber, Computer, and Communication Hygiene, and 

Non-Standard Communications. In the middle, Force Protection is divided into three 

sub-categories; Identity Management Skills, the Information Environment, and Clouds. 

On the right, Open Source Intelligence is divided into two sub-categories; Advanced 

Searches, and Messaging/Social Media Fundamentals. Within each subcategory, 

there are numerous tools, technology, and skills which are sequenced to build 

reinforcing blocks of capability to support all other missions.

As an example, CE-FID would train practitioners on cheap, low-visibility, and 

indigenous devices which could be employed across the globe to help monitor “weak 

signals of social change” and “provide early indicators of danger or unrest.”[42] CEFID would educate practitioners on using simple commercial devices, like a RasberryPi, to run a wide-array of communication, command and control, mapping, and 

meshed devices to network partners ‘off the grid,’ where there’s little or no electricity, 

services, or power, as well as, the employment of non-standard devices to build 

mutual trust and interoperability through habitual ‘telepresence’ activities. Finally, CEFID would train practitioners on methods for reacting to those “early indications of 

danger or unrest” so that they could enable foreign partners via remote virtual access 

kits in activities or locations where US involvement is problematic.

CE-COIN is more heavily focused on experimentation and conflict application for 
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select SW practitioners. This level is divided into two major categories; Humans, and 

the Physical World. On the left, the Humans category is further divided into three subcategories; Individuals, Groups, and Populations. On the right, the Physical World 

category is divided into three sub-categories: Virtual Systems and Open Networks, 

Closed Systems and Networks, and Preparation of the Environment Activities. Within 

each subcategory, there are tools, technology, and experimentation efforts 

deliberately sequenced to build reinforcing blocks of capability that support CE-COIN 

and CE-UW missions.

As an example, CE-COIN would train practitioners on how to employ UAVs to monitor, 

engage, and disperse crowds as part of cyber-enhanced population control measures. 

It would also educate practitioners on how to build and leverage crowdsourced, geotagged, and non-standard databases for micro-security operations.

Finally, CE-UW is more heavily focused on select units and clandestine operations. 

This level is the highest level of cyber-enabled capability and is divided into two major 

categories; Surrogate and Proxy operations, and Unilateral operations. Within each 

category there are several subcategories which bring together all earlier tools, 

technology, and training into the penultimate of strategic SW capability.

As an example, CE-UW would train SW practitioners on how to leverage 3-D 

technology and additive manufacturing to support resistance movements for a whole 

host of activities. The CE-UW level would educate practitioners on how to utilize 3-D 

prints like; computers, weapons, munitions, engines, UAVs, and IEDs, as well as, 

other possibilities being unlocked every day.

New Practice

The CE-SW pyramid borrows under-utilized tactics, capabilities, and tools from 

previously labeled conflicts, and unexpectedly fuses them together to open new 

‘attack surfaces’ against an adversary. The new opportunities target humans, 

networks, and narratives in decentralized and disaggregated operations and uses a 

mix of both virtual and physical practice. Some examples follow:

Humans: CE-SW can target the life-blood of an adversary and erode human means 

for survival by disrupting financial sectors, private enterprises, government-backed 

corporations, and illicit economies. CE-SW can be used to slowly degrade the 

adversary’s quality of life through long-term, low-grade, and persistent “financialinsurgency” tactics “rather than quick, high-profile battles with decisive results.”[43]

CE-SW can manipulate critical good prices, employ preclusive purchasing, [44] and 

combine other economic warfare tactics to disrupt an adversary’s every-day life.

Narratives: CE-SW can use information and psychological means as a coercive tactic 

to change, modify, and punish an adversary’s behavior. Whether coordinating sit-ins, 

directing “swarm stream attacks,”[45] or spreading social media whisper campaigns, 
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CE-SW can use “cyber-smash mouth tactics”[46] to amplify its physical and virtual 

activities. CE-SW can vet and leverage sympathetic ‘privateers’, vigilante, crowdsourced, as well as, employ false flag efforts to “create believable deceptions in cyberspace over a protracted period of time.”[47]

Networks: CE-SW can employ human, informational, physical, and intelligence 

networks to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an adversary’s 

networks. CE-SW can access open network systems with suites of cyber-tools and 

penetrate closed network systems, like precision guided military weapons platforms. 

CE-SW can actively monitor private sector advancements to improve cybertechnology UW concepts, and deny adaptive adversaries technological advantage 

through counter-UW constructs.

Conclusion

This is a hyper-connected world producing increasingly adaptive and technologicallysavvy ‘hybrid- threats.’ To remain competitive, the US must vigorously pursue new 

concepts which correctly assemble emerging technology and new capabilities into 

trusted fields of practice. As the telegraph’s use during Crimea signals, the integration 

of technology into conflict requires forethought about culturally compatible military 

concepts to organize around. The CE-SW pyramid serves as one step in that larger 

man-machine journey, and advances a conceptual framework to align technology, 

tools, and tactics for a new contemporary cyber-enabled Special Warfare practice. If 

successfully developed, this framework provides a mission-specific blueprint for the 

convergence of computers and man, and amplifies Special Warfare’s capabilities to 

counter future hybrid-threats and deny them growing technological advantage.

End Notes

[1] National Army Museum, “Field telegraph wire used during the Crimean War, 1855 

(c).”

http://www.nam.ac.uk/online-collection/detail.php?acc=1965-10-202-4 (accessed

December 25, 2015)

[2] Special Warfare is a broad term that doctrinally covers a range and combination of 

Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency operations. 

Special Warfare activities involve both lethal and nonlethal actions executed by a 

specially selected force steeped in regional understanding that is trained to fight 

alongside indigenous elements in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments.

U.S. Department of the Army, Special Operations, Army Desk Publication 3-05 

(Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of the Army, August, 2012), 9

[3] Robert A. Newsome, “Why the US Needs a Strategy to Counter Hybrid Warfare,” 

DefenseOne.com, October 23, 2014, 
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http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/10/why-us-needs-strategy-counterhybridwarfare/97259/ (accessed December 25, 2015)

[4] Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52, 

(1st Quarter 2009):

34. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-52.pdf (accessed 

December 25, 2015)

[5] Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age 

(Center for a New American Security: CNAS Publications, January, 2014), 20. 

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publicationspdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.pdf (accessed December 25, 2015)

[6] Ibid., 9.

[7] Ibid., 9.

[8] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Centaur Army: Bob Work, Robotics, & the Third Offset 

Strategy,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2015, 

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/centaur-army-bob-work-roboticsthe-third-offset-strategy/ (accessed December 25, 2015)

[9] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Will US Pursue ‘Enhanced Human Ops?’ DepSecDef 

Wonders,” Breaking Defense, December 14, 2015, 

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/will-us-pursue-enhanced-humanops-depsecdef-wonders/ (accessed December 25, 2015)

[10] Cheryl Pellerin, “Work: Human-Machine Teaming Represents Defense 

Technology Future,” DOD News, October 8, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/NewsArticle-View/Article/628154/work-humanmachine-teaming-represents-defense-technology-future (accessed December 25,

2015)

[11] “Centaur Army: Bob Work, Robotics, & the Third Offset Strategy,” 1.

[12] Mark Pomerleau, “For the military, the Internet of Things isn’t about things,” 

Defense Systems,November 12, 2015, 

https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/11/12/internet-of-things-dod-cartwightcsis.aspx?m=1 (accessed December 25, 2015)

[13] “Centaur Army: Bob Work, Robotics, & the Third Offset Strategy,” 1.

[14] Ibid., 1.
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[15] Bryan Clark and Mark Gunzinger, Winning the Airwaves, Regaining America’s 

Dominance in the Electromagnetic Spectrum, (Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments: CSBA Publications, 2015),

39. http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/12/winning-the-airwaves-sustainingamericas-advantage- in-the-electronic-spectrum/ (accessed December 25, 2015)

[16] 20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, 21.

[17] “Centaur Army: Bob Work, Robotics, & the Third Offset Strategy,” 1.

[18] Patrick Murphy, “The Effect of Industrialization and Technology on Warfare: 

1854-1878,” MilitaryHistoryOnline.com,1. 

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/general/articles/effectofindustrialization.as

px (accessed December 25, 2015)

[19]Christopher Sterling, Military Communications, From Ancient Times to the 21st

Century (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 441.

[20] Steven Roberts, “Telegraph at War 1854-1868,” Distant Writing, A History of the 

Telegraph Companies in Britain between 1838-1868, 2012, 

http://distantwriting.co.uk/telegraphwar.html (accessed December 25, 2015)

[21] Ibid., 1.

[22] Ibid., 1.

[23] Walter Peterson, “The Queen’s Messenger: An Underwater Telegraph to 

Balaclava,” History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications, July 14, 2015, 

1. http://atlantic- cable.com/Cables/1855Crimea/ (accessed December 25, 2015)

[24] Ibid., 1.

[25] “Telegraph at War 1854-1868,” 1.

[26] Military Communications, From Ancient Times to the 21st Century, 441.

[27] Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire, Media, 

Markets, and Globilazation 1860-1930, (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 2007) 

26.

[28] Emily O. Goldman, Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs, (New York, 

NY: Routledge, 2005), 61.

[29] Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2009), 1.

[30] George F. Botjer, Samuel F.B. Morse and the Dawn of the Age of Electricity, 

(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 52.

[31] Communication and Empire, Media, Markets, and Globilazation 1860-1930, 26.
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[32] Mitchel P. Roth, Historical Dictionary of War Journalism, (Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Publishing, 1997), 72.

[33] Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs, 72.

[34] Ibid., 73.

[35] Army doctrine defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance 

movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 

power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 

denied area.” U.S. Department of the Army, Special Operations, Army Desk 

Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August, 2012), 9.

[36] Joint doctrine defines COIN as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken 

to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, November 22, 2013), I-2.

[37] Joint doctrine defines FID as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 

1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 15, 2014), 103.

[38] Patrick Duggan, “Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyperspace,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly 79, (4th Quarter 2015): 49-52. 

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/62112

3/jfq-79-strategic- development-of-special-warfare-in-cyberspace.aspx 

(accessed December 25, 2015)

[39] 20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, 20.

[40] Winning the Airwaves, Regaining America’s Dominance in the Electromagnetic 

Spectrum, 3.

[41] United States Army Special Operations Command,

http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/SOFTruths.html (accessed December 25, 2015)

[42] Patrick Tucker, “These are the Decisions the Pentagon wants to Leave to 

Robots,”DefenseOne.com, December 14, 2015, 

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/12/these-are-decisions-pentagonwants-leave-robots/124480/ (accessed December 25, 2015)

[43] Hudson Institute, Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare: An Evolving 

Challenge (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2015), 98.
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https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/2015.08CyberEnabled

EconomicWarfareAnEvolvingC

(accessed, December 25, 2015)

[44] Ibid., 52-53.

[45] Patrick Duggan, “Harnessing Cyber-technology’s Human 

Potential,” Special Warfare 28, no.4 (October-December 2015), 15. 

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%2020

15%20Special%20Warfare.pdf (accessed December 25, 2015)

[46] Ibid., 15.

[47] Robert Schultz, “Countering Extremist Groups in Cyberspace,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly 79, (4th Quarter 2015): 55. 

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Ar

ticle/621124/jfq-79-countering- extremist-groups-incyberspace.aspx (accessed December 25, 2015)
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Research and Vision for Intelligent Systems for 2025 and Beyond

By Brett Piekarski, Brian Sadler, Stuart Young, William Nothwang and 

Raghuveer Rao

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 7 April 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/research-and-vision-forintelligent-systems-for-2025-and-beyond

The current Army Operating Concept document, “Win in a Complex World,” lays out a 

future vision for Intelligent Systems out to 2040 as a force multiplier for improving the 

effectiveness and reach of Soldiers and units in complex worlds [1]. It indicates that 

these systems could be autonomous, semi-autonomous, have the ability to learn, 

reduce the cognitive burden of the Soldier, and assist in making rapid decisions [1]. 

Also, through their increased intelligence and autonomy they could perform tasks such 

as teaming of unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 

to conduct adaptive and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) in areas inaccessible by human operators, operate dispersed over wide areas 

while possessing the mobility to concentrate rapidly, and develop situational 

understanding through action [1]. All of these concepts will play a significant role and 

impact the strategy and operational concepts for 2025 and Beyond in complex 

environments such as Megacities and Dense Urban Environments. But if we put on 

our Mad Scientist hats, this vision probably stops short of how far we could really push 

technology and a vision for 2025 and beyond. This paper examines the research 

challenges and ways we can augment that vision to enable even more capable 

systems and a larger impact on future operations through collective heterogeneous 

systems that exhibit distributed awareness, intelligence, adaptable and resilient 

controls and behaviors, and operational complexity.

Current roadmaps for UAS and UGV focus primarily on individual systems and multirobot coordination is a future goal [2,3]. For the individual system they state that 

autonomous mission performance may demand the ability to integrate sensing, 

perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision making, and executing to 

achieve mission goals and adapt to changes as well as predict what will happen next 

by integrating cognitive behaviors [2]. But, most current unmanned robotic systems 

still rely heavily on teleoperation or have limited autonomy using GPS waypoint 

navigation. There is basic research ongoing within the DoD laboratories and academia 

to increase the levels of autonomy for both air and ground systems, increase the level 

of interactions with humans to create robotic teammates, and also demonstrate large 

numbers of collaborative systems. Commercial advancements are happening fast in 

driverless cars, large scale cooperation for logistics robots, small drones are becoming 
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ubiquitous around the world, and advancements in Artificial Intelligence are happening 

for applications like IBM Watson. The vision put forth here builds off many of these 

advancements to integrate large numbers of heterogeneous systems to include; 

Soldiers integrated into the control architecture and as sensor nodes, large and small 

UAS and UGV, data from distributed unattended sensors, and information from 

knowledge bases into one large distributed and collaborative intelligent system. This 

vision is not so much about a singular system or technology but how to integrate 

varying levels of autonomy and intelligence across spatially and temporally distributed 

singular systems, small teams, and even swarm behavior under one robust and 

adaptable command and control architecture while augmenting the capability of the 

collective beyond that of any one component within it.

Many commercial networked technologies, such as computers and smart phones, and 

large commercial robotic system implementations, have moved towards homogeneity 

in design rather than heterogeneity. This is highly desirable from a modular design, 

manufacturing, and potentially cost viewpoint. However, it remains an open question 

for future Army systems as to the degree and mix of homo- and heterogeneity to 

balance cost, logistics tails, and broad applicability and adaptability of the overall 

system. It is not at all obvious what is the right mix of heterogeneity in sensing, 

computation, platforms, levels of autonomy, and human/robot teams; or what is the 

best or even a good ontology. Robotic ontology’s exist, but are missing coupling with 

reasoning, cognition, and task allocation. What is clear is that, for future Army 

systems, there will be some, potentially high, level of heterogeneity. It is important to 

note, that as part of this heterogeneous system, there needs to be an effort in creating 

individual systems that have low price points, especially for small attritable systems. 

This vision for highly distributed and collaborative intelligent systems will drive new 

advances and system attributes such as Distributed Awareness, Distributed 

Intelligence, Adaptable and Resilient Controls, and Operational and Experimental 

Complexity, all of which are only starting to be realizable.

Distributed Awareness infers that the systems perceives the environment and gathers 

information from many different sources to provide situational awareness for the 

individual platform as well as the collective system. One aspect of this is distributed 

mapping and perception. As the Soldiers and intelligent agents disperse themselves 

through the environment, information will be collected across the collective and shared 

to augment missing, incomplete, or stale information to provide for example; multiple 

views and improved object recognition, 3-D scene generation, images and maps of 

areas not accessible by other systems, and understanding of population dynamics. 

How and what information to share given potential bandwidth limitations and how to 

represent this common model of the world across heterogeneous systems with 

varying levels of processing power, memory, or ability to act on the information is not a 
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solved problem. While research is underway to extend this to much larger teams, 

distributed autonomous mapping and exploration has only been accomplished with a 

few air and ground platforms [4]. Research is also underway to fuse information from 

intelligent agents and humans [5,6]. Sharing maps, threat, and other information 

across a collective of soldiers and robots will greatly enhance the Soldier’s, and 

robots, situational awareness in complex environments.

Access and utilization of the cloud, big data, social media, real world complex 

simulation models running on high performance computing platforms (e.g., weather, 

natural disaster evolution), and other knowledge bases should be included and 

leveraged to support functions such as intelligent/semantic routing of valuable 

information, or answering critical real-time questions as they arise. Future knowledge 

bases will be highly distributed and evolving. While knowledge bases provide rapid 

answers to queries, they are associative and rely on similarity, and typically provide 

many possible answers, some of which may be dramatically incorrect. Thus, 

mechanisms are needed for interactive querying and information push and pull. Even 

more fundamentally, a science and analytical framework is needed to bridge control 

and signal processing on the one hand, and associative knowledge bases on the 

other.

If we can incorporate deep learning methods and leverage distributed computing, the 

adaptability of the systems would be enriched. As an example, the deep learning 

methods employed by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, IBM and others [7,8] could be 

brought to bear on the perception challenges currently encountered by military robots. 

While our data sources are not as voluminous, and our opportunities for crowdsourcing are restricted, the approaches should be brought into the current robot 

architectures.

Further, as events unfold in a region and are discussed on social media and from 

other data sources, this information could be utilized by the Soldiers and the robots to 

do a better job of reasoning about the activities they may encounter. This is especially 

important if we want the robots to adapt to their environments. Without this 

connectivity, the robot architecture will have no means to reason on data that may 

explain their environment. If this connectivity to distributed computing and intelligence 

sources is not tapped, the behaviors of the robots will be construed as brittle and not 

adaptable.

Distributed Intelligence infers that the individual and collective system can reason 

about the constantly changing local and collective situational awareness and the local 

and overall mission objectives to make predictions about future and perform real-time 

adaptations and decisions to optimize operations based on that future. A key element 

of future military intelligent systems is that they must make decisions on their own, 
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likely at speeds beyond human operational tempo. However, this should not be 

misunderstood to infer that the robots will act unsupervised, or exhibit free will. Future 

robots must make decisions on their own to accomplish their mission, and this will 

have to be done at rates beyond which a human can control them. As an example, it 

is conceivable for a human operator to deploy and control a few UAS to engage with 

an enemy threat; however, this does not scale and what if he needs to deploy 

hundreds of systems.

The human will need to interact at a much higher level, for example with a high-level 

tasking using natural language, such as, “Deploy UAS robots to engage all incoming 

threats.” A distributed collective of agents should make group decisions that are 

acceptable based on the cost/benefit preferences of the mission commander, yet we 

are far from a satisfactory means to achieve this reliably today. Foundations and 

methods need to be devised to provide distributed control and decision making that is 

responsive to human intent, interactive to changes in that intent, and function in 

complex environments with high degrees of a priori uncertainty.

When communication between agents is limited or even completely disrupted, the only 

way to counter such an adversary situation is to perform reasoning and prediction to 

predict the situation and future movements and decisions of allies and adversaries. 

Collective and distributed reasoning and prediction are critical when missions and 

objectives are not clear or change rapidly in dynamic and complex environments. 

Agents must preserve mission intent at operational tempo, and may be required to 

predict human courses of action. In addition, the intelligent system may face 

adversarial disruptions, requiring reasoning and prediction to enable appropriate realtime response at a pace that is far beyond what can be achieved with human 

interaction. Reasoning and prediction may also enable the determination and 

dissemination of critical and timely information. There are numerous challenges to 

achieving this level of collective intelligence, including knowledge representation, and 

real-time simulations and models and methods for understanding intent and its 

prediction. Research is underway to enable the teaming of autonomous air and 

ground robots with Soldiers. The current approaches include onboard computation, 

perception, and are beginning to incorporate reasoning to extract soldier intent from 

natural language commands and other cues for the robots to then execute [9,10]. 

However, if we extend this concept to incorporate distributed intelligence and 

awareness from broader sources of information, the progress we can make will be far 

greater.

Another important consideration of Distributed Intelligence is the opportunity of the 

robots to learn from one another. Over the last decade, we have been exposed to 

expensive robots, and because of their costs, we have not pursued some behaviors 
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that might be pursued with less costly platforms. For example, instead of deploying 1-

$100,000 robot, what if we deploy 100-$1000 robots, or even 1000-$100 robots. This 

scaling opens up many opportunities to distribute intelligence across many platforms 

and enable sharing of learning by all robots. By having many robots, behaviors that 

may result in failure of some platforms may actually benefit the collective whole. This 

is how humans learn. We learn from our own mistakes, and from the mistakes of 

others. If our robots are never allowed to fail, then we are significantly constraining 

their opportunity to learn, and thus improve their performance. Multi-agent learning is 

a potentially attractive alternative to directly coding teams or swarms of agents or 

robots. It is very challenging problem to provide the micro-level behaviors necessary 

to achieve a given macro-level phenomenon and more research is needed to find 

approaches to teach large numbers of heterogeneous agents how to do nontrivial 

collective tasks in real-time and in the physical world.

We posit that there are two fundamental shifts that have occurred in the past decade 

that will substantially alter how Soldiers will interact with autonomy moving forward. 

First, we have moved into a far more personal relationship with our autonomous 

systems, and secondly, and perhaps more importantly we have shifted from a mode 

where a task is no longer done by an autonomous agent OR a human but increasingly 

to a mode where it is done by an autonomous agent AND a human. Some examples 

of this include direct integration where we have begun to cede control to intelligent 

agents, and humans are no longer the sole arbiter of decision making. Intelligent 

agents within our automobiles that act as driver assistance tools, applying anti-lock 

brakes automatically when an obstacle is observed, parking for us, and maintaining 

lane position would be a few examples, but even these examples are just humans 

ceding control of sub- tasks, and the human still has the possibility to over-ride these 

intelligent agents. There has been a trend within DoD to invest in human “within the 

control loop” tasks, where humans AND intelligent agents are performing largely the 

same tasks, and the individual output of each agent, human and intelligent system, is 

fused together into a joint decision [5,6]. There have been a number of fundamental 

scientific studies examining how to enable this and how to properly assess, 

instrument, and monitor the agents [5,6]. What these studies have shown, though, is 

that when decisions are performed in this manner, substantial improvements in 

performance and accuracy are observed and errors minimized [5,6]. To accomplish 

this, means that humans have had to cede control of decision making to these 

intelligent agents, when those intelligent agents are performing better. To date, most 

of the tasks that have been examined have been fairly benign (e.g., image 

classification), but increasingly we, as a research community, are investigating how 

consequence, trust, confidence and accountability impact these decision paradigms. 

Technology has shown that these capabilities are real, if still nascent. To fully realize 

these capabilities, there are several investments in fundamental research that need to 
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be addressed. An intelligent agent that has been imbued with a commander’s desired 

outcome should be able to independently, or as part of a larger group, move through 

an environment, navigate unforeseen obstacles and accomplish the intent of the 

human. This implies many technologies that do not yet exist: the ability to quantify, 

codify human intent; adaptive group behaviors; the ability to fuse disparate inputs from 

distributed agents to develop a comprehensive understanding of the world. Research 

to enable augmented human capabilities has a key role to play to enable this 

transformation.

Adaptable and Resilient Controls that enable adaptable and assured individual and 

collective mission plans based on changing situational awareness are clearly 

desirable system traits. Finding optimal, or even good enough, plans for autonomous 

agents is computationally difficult, especially for systems in complex environments. 

For most military operations real-time operational tempo is needed, and plans must be 

dynamically adapted during execution. This problem grows combinatorially with large 

heterogeneous multi-agent systems, where planning must be coordinated across 

many heterogeneous sub- systems with varying mission objectives, where individual 

agents may or may not have the same goals, where some agents may not be able to 

complete their tasks due to failures, and there exist non-cooperative players or 

adversaries. Research is needed in sub-optimal planning and exploration of the 

tradeoffs in speed of planning versus the accuracy and optimality of the plan.

Resilience, the ability to recover after something bad happens, is critical for intelligent 

systems, yet very difficult to model, analyze, and put into practice. Resiliency of large 

multi-agent Army systems needs to be considered based on realistic networking, and 

uncertainties in localization, mapping, sensing, and the state of other agents. Wireless 

networking instabilities, time variation, bandwidth, and security have not been 

sufficiently accounted for in distributed control. Information representation must be 

optimized in the context of the system tasks, and random information loss must be 

accounted for. Coupling control with autonomous networking may provide new control 

paradigms that simultaneously support the setup and healing of networks, dynamic 

network reconfiguration, the ability to withstand and overcome severe electronic warfare 

threats, all while supporting the War Fighter objectives such as autonomous exploration 

or seeking and sensing threats. Morphing, reconfigurable, and adaptable platforms and 

systems performance are ways to offer increased resiliency. For these to be effective, 

behavior synthesis should be rapid and scalable (via “online behavior synthesis”). 

Learning methods could be applied to reduce needed synthesis, but both of these are 

complicated by the potential use of many small platforms with low capability.

What is the best organizational structure to offer a balance between resiliency and 

operational efficiency and how can we reconfigure teams in the middle of a mission 
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using a distributed architecture? Complex missions may require multiple teams to 

simultaneously carry out multiple tasks. Agents may need to play multiple roles that 

may span across teams. As contingency situations arise, rapid reconfigurations in 

teams, both locally and globally, will be needed across the distributed architecture. 

Dealing with intelligent adversaries will force the team into unforeseen situations. The 

ability to generate new behaviors on-line are likely critical to deal with contingencies 

and for the system to exhibit resilient behavior. On- line behavior synthesis is a 

challenging problem even when using a central architecture. Performing on- line 

synthesis of behaviors in a distributed fast paced mission is beyond the state of the 

art. There is no general framework or design for large numbers of distributed 

heterogeneous agents. Flocking is reasonably well understood with respect to 

coordinated group movement, but this is a small piece of the distributed intelligence 

problem. More research is needed in new sophisticated hybrid control architectures for 

large heterogeneous teams that may include both global and localized control of 

single agents, spatially and temporally distributed small and large teams, and localized 

swarm behavior. A key issue is the abstraction of localized behaviors and local 

controls to enable global control. The control architecture must incorporate 

autonomous networking, with its many limitations and tradeoffs. For large 

heterogeneous teaming, it can be assumed that not all communications will be bidirectional and must be understood in the context of abstraction, roles, and 

heterogeneity.

Networking is obviously critical for distributed system operation, while simultaneously 

autonomous agents can dynamically adapt to create, support, and heal networks to 

match the environment and the desired state of the collective. To achieve this, an 

entirely new theoretical foundation is needed as the number of agents and their ability 

to network and operate autonomously grows. Wireless networking instabilities, time 

variation, bandwidth, and security have not been sufficiently accounted for in 

distributed control. Information representation must be optimized in the context of the 

system task(s), and random information loss must be accounted for. Coupling control 

with autonomous networking may provide new control paradigms that simultaneously 

support the setup and healing of networks, dynamic network reconfiguration, the 

ability to withstand and overcome severe electronic warfare threats, all while 

supporting the warfighter objectives such as autonomous exploration or seeking and 

sensing threats. Efforts in autonomous networking must proceed in a tightly coupled 

research spiral with intelligent system design. This must include pervasive 

consideration of security and electronic warfare threats from adversarial intelligent 

systems. The emerging paradigms of cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access 

may be critical to achieving the desired networking capabilities. Critical to this is the 

creation and exploitation of massive diversity, through the use of multiple wavelengths 

in both radio and optical domains. Mobility control will be utilized to dynamically 
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maintain and heal the network as desired. Low frequency operation, for example in 

the lower VHF, can be harnessed to provide persistent links in complex terrain such 

as mega-cities, due to the physics of penetration at longer wavelengths. Miniature 

antennas and cooperative arrays may be utilized to achieve robustness to 

interference, and multi-user technology, including full duplex operation and coding, will 

provide dramatic increases in the spectrum utilization.

Operational and experiment-driven research is critical to explore and discover the 

brittle connections and interdependencies between perception systems, interactions 

with external data sources, efficient data sharing and processing methods, intelligence 

and decision making algorithms, multi-agent navigation and collaborative behaviors, 

and the collective performing spatially and temporally relevant missions. There have 

been recent examples of operating singular fully autonomous systems in complex 

environments, small heterogeneous teams with moderate complexity and interactions, 

and large numbers of homogeneous agents/swarms in simple environments and with 

limited autonomy. In order to make these demonstrations tractable and fit within 

today’s technology, researchers typically reduce the complexity along several axes: 1) 

number of agents; 2) degree of heterogeneity among the agents; 3) agent behavior 

complexity, autonomy, and adaptability; 4) the degree of interactions and 

communication among the agents; 5) speed of operation; and 6) the complexity of the 

environment and available infrastructure (e.g., GPS). Large scale experiments rely on 

readily available technology and so are limited in their ability to simultaneously push 

along these axes. Research in ways to simultaneously push the complexity along 

each of these axes is needed. A lack of design methods and models for such systems 

is a remaining critical issue, and foundations in this area may lead to new component 

technology that enables leap-ahead experimentation, as well as reduce the time cycle 

for technology development and costs related to iterative field testing of large complex 

systems. As the degree of heterogeneity increases, so does the design and task 

allocation complexity. Metrics and roles for heterogeneous elements must be 

understood.

Summary

There are many challenges to meeting the technical objectives laid out in this paper 

but it is envisioned that research in these areas will have a significant impact in 

shaping the future of Army intelligent systems and operational concepts in complex 

environments. These concepts for highly distributed and collaborative systems will 

change how intelligent systems interact with each other and the soldiers they are 

interacting with, the physical environment around them, and the cyber world to include 

access to knowledge bases and other sources of information. They will use this 

distributed and collaborative approach to develop a much greater understanding and 

awareness of the environment and the threats within than is capable with any one or 
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even a few systems. Based on this continuing evolution and awareness, the collective 

will be able to exhibit complex autonomous behavior at the individual, team and 

swarm level to reason, predict, and adapt and respond to local stimuli while 

maintaining resiliency in the overall mission objectives. This will result in significantly 

increased capabilities for extended ISR reach in complex Megacity, dense urban 

environments, or areas with restricted or denied access. This approach will also 

enable flexibility on the battlefield and provide a capability to respond to changing 

social and population dynamics with varying levels of autonomy, intelligence, and 

even swarm behaviors for increased awareness or delivery of payloads; could provide 

real time resupply to dismounts and small squads in dynamic threat environments; 

enable robots to be used as a diversions or support fires and targeting; to be used as 

additional protection and to mask dismounted movements; and to collectively perform 

missions that otherwise would be unachievable, such as persistent surveillance of a 

particular region that exceeds the endurance of a single platform to ensure future 

tactical advantage.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge all the participants at the FY16 Army Science 

Planning Meeting: “Distributed and Collaborative Intelligent Systems,” their 

discussions contributed significantly to the ideas captured in this paper.

References

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2. DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

3. Unmanned Ground Systems Roadmap, Robotic Systems Joint Project Office, 2011

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Multi-Robot Exploration and Mapping,” The International Journal of Robotics 

Research, 2014.

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Metcalfe, “Confidence metrics improve human-autonomy integration.” Proceedings 

of the 2014 ACM/IEEE international conference on Human-robot interaction, 240-

241, 2014/3/3.

6. Ryan M Robinson, Hyungtae Lee, Michael J McCourt, Amar R Marathe, Heesung 

Kwon, Chau Ton, William D Nothwang, “Human-autonomy sensor fusion for rapid 

object detection.” Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 2015 IEEE/RSJ 

International Conference on, 305-312, 2015/9/28.

7. Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, “Deep Learning,” Nature, 

Volume: 521, Pages: 436–444, 28 May 2015.

8. Nicola Jones, “The Learning Machines: Using massive amounts of data to 

recognize photos and speech, deep-learning computers are taking a big step 

towards true artificial intelligence,” NATURE, VOL 505, Pages: 146–148, 2014

9. D Summers-Stay, T Cassidy, CR Voss, “Joint Navigation in Commander/Robot 

Teams: Dialog & Task Performance When Vision is Bandwidth-Limited,” V&L Net 
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2014.

10. CR Voss, T Cassidy, D Summers-Stay, “Collaborative Exploration in Human-Robot 

Teams: What’s in Their Corpora of Dialog, Video, & LIDAR Messages?” 

Proceedings of the Workshop on Dialogue in Motion (DM), 14th Conference of the 

European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 2014
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Technical Challenges for Simulation and Training in Megacities

By Jon Watkins and Chuck Campbell

Originally published in Small Wars Journal on 12 February 2016

Available online at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/technical-challenges-forsimulation-and-training-in-megacities

Introduction

Megacities, urban areas with populations over 10 million people, are of growing 

importance to the military, and thus are of growing importance to training. Training 

needs vary widely based upon maneuver or fighting in open desert, urban 

environments on the streets, and building interiors (room clearing). Training 

applications span aggregate commander and staff constructive trainers to individual 

combatant virtual simulation. It is critical for Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 

applications to represent those environments and situations which are inherently 

unusual or difficult to train live. An example of this is urban areas, which are difficult 

to recreate realistically for training. It is impractical to impossible to fully recreate 

megacities (like we do with MOUT sites) or to get access to real-world cities for live 

training. As a result, simulation becomes critical for both training and analysis use 

cases (i.e. analysis to assess if a particular weapons system or offensive plan might 

work better than another).

Figure 1: (L) Metro entrance in Canada, showing an example of the layers of 

features and activity at a single location; (R) Underground Mall in Taipei, showing 

the importance of advanced underground modeling.

As the threats to the U.S. change, megacities become increasingly relevant and 

important for preparing for the future. Violent extremist groups regularly innovate in 

their approaches to terrorism, creating new threats to U.S. troops. They operate out 

of a wide variety of locales around the world, to include large urban areas and 

megacities. In addition, a conventional war with a major power like China, North 

Korea, or Russia would inevitably involve urban environments. Modeling and 
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simulation must be able to represent these megacities so that U.S. forces can more 

efficiently prepare to combat threats arising within the megacities of our world. 

Accurately representing megacities and dense urban environments provide 

particular challenges to the simulation and training community. This paper 

discusses those challenges from a Synthetic Natural Environment (SNE) standpoint.

Within modeling and simulation systems, higher level models operate on, around, 

and within the synthetic natural environment. The SNE is the foundation of M&S 

capabilities, and must be designed and developed to meet new and far-reaching 

requirements. If the SNE representation lacks a critical data element required for a 

model to function, then training may be impeded. For example, if the material 

characteristics of walls are critical for calculating damage, building collapse, 

mouseholes, or weapon penetration, then the SNE must contain that data or a 

reasonable approximation of it. Current SNE capabilities can be applied to the 

challenges with representing megacities in limited ways, but must advance 

exponentially to meet 2025+ challenges.

The two major challenge focus areas presented here are data representation and 

the environment model. While data collection and processing is a major concern for 

simulation of megacities, we do not focus on these issues here, since collection and 

processing is also an issue for operational situations as well, and thus is not unique 

to simulation and training. We do, however, reference collection and processing 

where we see M&S-specific issues.

Background

The authors have practical, real-world experience with SNE as it is designed, 

produced, and used in M&S today, and we are familiar with both strengths and 

weaknesses of the current state of the art. We have a long standing history of 

pushing SNE technology towards the future, having contributed to the design and 

development of the SNEs on many of the Army’s simulation and training systems 

over the past 20 years, including WARSIM, CCTT, OneSAF, SE Core, and others. 

The authors are currently leading research efforts for the M&S community looking at 

complex urban environments, including megacities in general and underground 

representations in particular. This work is being conducted primarily for the U.S. 

Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) Army 

Research Lab (ARL) Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) 

Advanced Training & Simulation Division (ATSD).

While the overarching scope of our work is to investigate the future direction of SNE 

for simulation in general, we are looking at megacities as a key area requiring 

improvement. This paper summarizes the high level concerns with megacity 
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representation as we see it (relative to today’s state of the art in fielded M&S 

systems).

Challenges

Inevitably, SNE requirements for the future must be driven by functional needs, 

since ultimately any SNE implementation exists to provide the context and 

surrounding environment for a larger system. For example, one training use case 

may consider it critical to represent power outages if power lines are damaged while 

others may consider this irrelevant. However, we can still extract several larger 

themes of concern with accurate portrayal of megacities, given the inevitable desire 

for increased fidelity and realism.

Data Representation

A new approach is needed for data representation. Current data representation 

approaches do not scale to the extent needed for the ultra-dense urban 

environment, as is seen with a megacity. Megacities will naturally require a wider 

breadth and higher density of data than is currently used in M&S applications.

In addition, to keep up with the increasing availability of new data and notifications of 

changes to existing data, mechanisms are needed to quickly update and modify data. 

Technology advancements enable rapid, continuous bursts of new information from 

the field, which should be integrated into the data to improve the representation of the 

environment within simulation. Several challenges arise when considering megacities.

Increased density. In terms of the environment, this means an increase in nonspecific environment features such as clutter; items like benches, trash, signs, etc. 

Buildings will be large, close together, and will often require both interior and subsubterranean representation. Transportation networks will be increasingly complex, 

requiring representation of roadways, railways, water ways, and subways, many of 

these transitioning frequently from above ground to below ground.

Figure 2: (L) A simple roadway interchange; basic traffic laws are obeyed by 

simulated vehicles;

(R) A complex highway interchange in Boston, MA; will require advanced 

representation and models (Google Maps).
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Increased flexibility. Megacities have many characteristics in common, but training 

in one city is not directly applicable to training in another city. Simulations must be 

able to represent the key characteristics of various megacities so that training can 

occur in geo-specific locations around the globe. This diversity requires increased 

flexibility in how SNE data is represented. Every mission brings new and unfamiliar 

challenges. Just as the military must adapt quickly to overcome adversity, training 

simulation must respond accordingly to remain effective. Megacity representation 

requires a fluid SNE specification able to rapidly change to provide training for 

future, often unpredictable threats.

Vast relational challenge. Increases in urban density compound the complexity of 

relationships between infrastructure components. Critical infrastructure such as 

transportation networks become progressively complex as the interactions between 

environment features (roads, tunnels, railways, traffic signals, etc.) and moving 

actors (vehicles, pedestrians, etc.) become more frequent, with a greater number of 

variables and possible outcomes. Other infrastructure representations are in their 

infancy, such as computer and cellular networks, and challenges must be overcome 

to accurately represent these as well.

Streaming information at appropriate levels. Given the ubiquity of sensors and 

sensing platforms, live, up to the minute data is often available, and should be 

leveraged to maintain the environment representation accurately. This challenge 

has not yet been tackled in the modeling and simulation community to a level that is 

applicable for megacities. Data filtering becomes increasingly important with the rise 

of augmented reality systems.

Multiresolution representation. Megacity training objectives will be wide and varied. 

Some applications will need very detailed information while others will only need an 

abstract representation. For example, one trainer may need to simulate disabled 

power to a section of the city, whereas another may need to disable the power to a 

particular building. The effects of urban modeling should correlate at every level. In 

the power disruption example, the power grid is represented by power being 

distributed from power plants, across lines, through substations, transformers and 

other equipment. While this example focuses on electricity, the concepts apply to 

many SNE representational areas, including transportation/supply lines (including 

shipping and air), potable water, structural materials, communication, medical 

facilities, shelters, weather, and more. The SNE must be equipped to be able to 

manage the timely provision of high-resolution data in specific areas when it is 

required.

Environment Model
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Megacities are inherently intricate in terms of how people interact with them, 

including complex effects on entities, secondary effects (such as damage to power 

lines causing lights to go off), implied or expected behaviors (such as traffic lanes or 

areas where civilians are likely to congregate), and multi-dimensional context (such 

as airport versus hospital/school versus police station). At least some of these 

complex effects must be captured in simulation in order for training to be effective 

and realistic.

Improved fidelity. In order to accurately portray the increasing complexity discussed 

above in relation to infrastructure, flexibility, and increasingly available data, 

environment models need to be more advanced, more capable, and of a higher 

fidelity. For example, models must take into account the difference between types of 

clutter. Clutter may create obstacles and change line of sight, but higher fidelity 

models should distinguish between a movable, non-blocking obstacle (trash bag) 

and a stationary, blocking obstacle (dumpster). As another example, advanced 

vehicle models will be able to use road lane and traffic signal data, and obey basic 

traffic laws of the city in which they are operating.

Cascading effects. Many environment models in M&S today effectively simulate the 

single function for which they are designed. As interactions between various models 

within the simulation increase, so do possible outcomes, issues, effects, etc. 

Infrastructure failure such as a water main break is one example of a cascading 

effect in an urban environment. Often what follows are flooded streets and subways, 

localized loss of electricity, increased vehicle traffic, etc. In addition, political, 

economic, and social models will need to be incorporated in order to support training 

for combating terrorist activities.

Weather realism. While weather is not specific to megacities, Army simulations 

currently have minimal representation and modeling of weather. Weather affects 

real world operations, and similarly should affect training, but it has not yet been a 

focus of Army simulations. Two critical components are required to achieve weather 

realism in modeling and simulation: accurate and complete weather models, and 

usage of the resulting weather data by other models in the simulation. Accurate 

weather models and weather data are available, although not often leveraged in 

M&S, and other models rarely consider weather conditions. Weather affects much 

of what happens in the real world (fog, haze, smog, precipitation, etc. all effect 

movement, visibility, etc.), and weather realism in simulation is a complex challenge. 

Localized weather effects can induce the need for immediate deployment of first 

responders to help those in need and quarantine unsafe areas. Considerations for 

weather in megacities are often unique, and may require additional data and models 

(e.g. the uncharacteristically high amount of snow in Boston, MA in 2015 presented 

new challenges with snow removal - there was nowhere to dispose of the excess 

snow from plowed roadways).
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Figure 3: Rain is accumulating in the dug hole, and changing the composition of the 

soil. Dignitas added weather modeling and effects to a Construction Equipment 

Virtual Trainer (CEVT).

Current State of the Art

While the simulation and training community has made great strides in some areas 

related to dense urban environments, the community lacks the current capability to 

represent megacities at a sufficient level.

Current SNE capabilities exist in some key areas, which can be applied and 

leveraged to represent dense urban environments. For instance, high fidelity 

representation of building interiors has been achieved and applied in simulation 

training for tasks such as room clearing or attacks within a building. In addition, 

advances have been seen in visualization technologies, where visualizing urban and 

high density environments is no longer a struggle, and specialized, expensive 

hardware is no longer a necessity.

Computers have gotten faster, smaller, and more capable over the years, while 

visualization algorithms have improved, making it possible to visualize complex 3D 

scenes on inexpensive hardware. Representation of high density features has been 

achieved in support of computer generated forces as well. Simulation systems such 

as OneSAF, Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), and JCATS offer support for 

limited urban areas and building interiors. Although some strides have been made, 

many key elements of urban environments are notably missing from modern 

simulation systems.

The authors see the modeling and simulation community as largely unprepared to 

accurately represent the physical environment in a simulation context. Innovation to 
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address this challenge must come through targeted research to provide a foundation 

on which programs of record can base future requirements.

Visual systems required for virtual simulation are generally in a better position to 

represent complex urban environments, although much work remains in the detailed 

geometry, topology, and physical modeling of the environment required to provide 

supporting services.

Figure 4: The Dignitas Veritas 2D/3D Viewer is used by LVC-IA and SE Core and 

runs on inexpensive laptops or desktop computers, with no specialized hardware 

requirements.

Below we discuss a selection of the issues that exist with the current state of the art.

Specialized Attribution Requirements. The modern battlefield is characterized by 

unparalleled access to data from a wide range of sensors. Open environments, such 

as those seen from air or space or easily observed from the ground, can be 

visualized and sensed in real-time. However, obtaining realistic and geospecific data 

for megacities is more complicated. Techniques that scan environments can be 

hindered by physical blockages (such as visibility into buildings or underground), as 

well as lack the ability to capture the intricacies of the man-made environment (such 

as such as material characteristics, access points, mobility information, etc.).

Accurate simulation of a megacity synthetic environment will require access to these 

types of information or the ability to realistically infer or derive such data. These 

content requirements, of course, will be driven by training and functional 

requirements. If a training use case requires accurate representation of 

underground fire or smoke propagation, then issues like airflow, venting, etc., 

become important. If structural collapse or simulation of mouseholes is important, 

then structural attribution becomes more important.
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Leveraging Commercial Data and Technology. In times of limited budgets, it is 

critical that the Army adapt to development of systems and technology that can more 

readily leverage commercial solutions. Current Army M&S solutions are stove-piped, 

built through specialized development with only limited reuse of open and 

commercial solutions. While specialized development may remain necessary in 

many areas, reuse can be increased.

Traffic and Crowd Modeling. The density and variety of human activity is a critical 

component in urban operations. Even in wartime situations, there may be civilians 

hiding out in cities, fleeing the hot zones, or congregating in the city’s outskirts. 

When there is little warning of impending conflict, civilians may be the critical factor 

in operations. Military operations may need to be carried out with regular civilian 

activities occurring, as in Baghdad. Simulation of civilians requires specialized data 

in SNE, including things like traffic information (lanes, stop lights), designation of 

areas of heavy traffic (e.g. transportation hubs or malls would have more civilian 

traffic than a warehouse), etc. Public gathering locations such as stadiums, parks, 

hospitals, and churches can serve as terrorist targets or opportunities for civil unrest.

Underground and Interiors. While the Army has extensive recent experience in 

urban environments and building clearing, regional differences can make a 

tremendous difference. Clearing a high rise building requires different approaches 

than clearing a small building in a walled compound. Similarly, underground 

environments represent special risks due to factors such as collapse, access, and 

even air flow (for fires or smoke propagation).

Civilian Infrastructure. Megacities will have complex and widely varying types of 

civilian infrastructure including power networks, lights, water lines, specialized 

buildings (hospital, power plant), etc. This infrastructure can matter in physical ways 

(damage to gas pipes could be physically dangerous, knocking out power will disable 

lights) as well as in conceptual ways (approaches will vary for a hospital versus 

school versus police station). Large, open areas such as stadiums, playgrounds, and 

parking lots can have military significance in providing locations for displaced 

civilians, holding areas for detainees, or logistics support.

Physics Effects and Interactions. Complex physical interactions will be critical in 

representing urban environments, including structural collapse, weapon penetration 

of walls, cratering of roads, collapse of tunnels, etc. In more open, rural 

environments, these effects could often be minimized or avoided except at key 

chokepoints. Megacities are large aggregations of critical chokepoints.

Urban Clutter. In most Army simulations, the training environment is largely sterile 

and lacks dense clutter like dumpsters, parked cars, street side market stalls, utility 
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poles, etc. Urban clutter is especially important for high-fidelity training where 

objects can reduce visibility, provide cover and concealment, and hamper 

movement.

Figure 5: Complex civilian infrastructure must be modeled and considered in 

megacity operations. Emerging Technology

Keeping an eye on emerging technologies across the industry ensures re-use 

candidates can be identified and used as appropriate.

There is an emerging trend of crowd-sourced data and increased timeliness of 

geospatial and infrastructure data available from multiple sources. For example, 

navigational data on smart phones and GPS systems is updated frequently with up 

to date traffic data to indicate whether traffic is flowing smoothly or is backed up. 

Some navigational apps also include crowd sourced data, allowing users to input 

accidents, road hazards, and detours. However, such data sources must be 

carefully considered since they could easily provide a pathway for misinformation to 

enter into military systems. Critical areas and categories of data will remain difficult 

to obtain trust-worthy sources for, especially in foreign countries or network denied 

areas.
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Figure 6: Google maps and GPS systems show live traffic status via colored lines 

(red for heavy traffic, green for clear) and icons for construction zones and accidents.

Game engines continue to evolve, but their focus is often in areas that are not 

important in military applications. Game engines often excel at providing highly

realistic visual environments and compelling physical interactions, but the focus is 

generally on visual effect and gameplay rather than realism.

Realistic effects are of utmost importance to military simulations to avoid negative 

training. Similarly, realistic-looking effects in game engines are often achieved 

through extensive manual effort from artists and scenario developers. This approach 

is cost-prohibitive if representing large areas or when rapid turnaround is needed 

from source to training.

Figure 7: Realistic video game visuals require extensive manual designs and 

illustrations.

Cloud-based, thin-client solutions are a growing trend that could help facilitate 

training at point of need. As a download repository, cloud technology has no impact 

on SNE representation. But the notion of streaming SNE database information adds 

an additional layer of complexity to the solutions needed for megacity 

representation. To help combat delays caused by network latency, a number of 

techniques are available, including optimized data structures, compression, 

composition (configure what data is needed per application), predictive caching, and 

procedural generation of SNE features. Investigation and experimentation is needed 

to determine which technique or combination of techniques deliver best “bang for the 

buck” results.

Future Focus of Science and Technology Investments

We believe concentrated investment in government development is needed to meet 

military needs. Crowd- source and commercial technology is widely available, but 

doesn’t fully meet military needs and is susceptible to injection of misinformation. 

We also need pathways to connect simulation and training applications over to 
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classified data or networks, and operational data to enhance training and realism.

The authors’ current research efforts are investigating methods to represent 

geometry and topology in separate ways, yet providing some assurance of 

correlation between them. Megacities will require complex geometries which will 

make it extremely difficult to automatically derive key behavioral aspects needed for 

automated opponents, such as logical firing and over watch positions. Current Army 

simulation systems have structured yet comparatively simplistic SNE data to reason 

on, often making broad assumptions (such as not worrying about overhead 

clearances). In megacities, these assumptions will not hold up. Our research will 

also consider how to use a mixture of automation, machine learning, and very 

targeted human in the loop attribution (for heavily used training areas) to support 

behavioral aspects.

Defining what types of data are needed for megacity simulation is critical for 

success. This will include not just obvious information...such as locations of 

buildings, bridges, and roads...but potentially far more complex data such as 

material characteristics, support structures (load bearing walls for collapse), 

topological information (turn lanes, stop lights, paths where civilians often travel on 

foot), and more.

Since elements of this data will be difficult to collect from standard sources (e.g. 

interiors and below ground geometry), it will be important for such information to be 

derivable in geotypical, realistic ways. Our research will focus on what is needed for 

runtime functional needs rather than considering methods for collection.

Megacity simulation will require different data and services for various training use 

cases. For example, an immersive simulation for individual soldiers will require a 

different type of detail and information than a strategic bombing simulation. 

However, to ensure communications and interoperability between simulations, these 

varying representations would ideally be derived from and relate back to a common 

overarching representation which can handle multiple resolutions or levels of detail. 

Our research will investigate techniques for how to represent varying levels of detail 

in a correlated and realistic fashion, while also supporting highly selective data use 

wherein a given simulation system only loads data that is relevant and useful to its 

use case.

The authors believe it important that future simulations support just in time data 

delivery and flexible paradigms for computing platforms and environments. A 

simulation run one day in the cloud, might be run on network denied devices the 

next. In addition, we expect frequent updates to geospatial, topological, and human 

behavioral data from a wide range of sources in the future. This concept requires the 

ability to distribute the latest data rapidly, consistently, and selectively so as to get 
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maximum benefit out of limited bandwidth for edge devices. Just in time data 

processing and delivery will enable different data use cases, such as cloud-based 

simulation using data centers or highly select data sets for resource- and bandwidthlimited devices.

As data sources, content, and updates increase in complexity, the mechanisms and 

processes for verifying consistency, relationships, and interdependencies must 

grow. Seemingly simple changes in basic geometry for feature data can have 

complex secondary effects on other data. For example, if data becomes available 

for changing the function of a building (from office building to embassy, for example), 

it can impact secondary data, including crowd modeling flows, behavioral cues, and 

more. As we build up content requirements and update mechanisms in early years, 

the later years of our research will look at ways to reconcile all of this data and 

maintain consistency where it matters.

Work is needed even in areas where the Army simulation community has extensive 

previous experience, such as calculation of cover, conceal, or hide locations, basic 

movement planning, and line of sight. These algorithms will require a different level 

of complexity with different tradeoffs when working in complex megacity 

environments.

Conclusion

As the U.S. military adapts to operating in megacities, it will be critical to enable 

realistic training through simulation so that warfighters are able to refine and practice 

their procedures. This is necessary not just for training and experience, but also to 

assess effectiveness of new weapons systems and platforms. The simulation and 

training community faces a wide range of challenges to enabling this training, 

especially with regards to realistic representation of dense urban environments. The 

authors believe focused investment is needed to ensure the simulation and training 

community can meet the technical challenges required to enable analysis and 

training in megacities. We welcome feedback from and collaboration with other 

Army agencies and contractors working in this domain.
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SECTION 7: About the Authors

This section includes the biographies or bylines of contributing authors for all content 

within the compendium. 

 ̈ Berkow, Jan

 ̈ Besik, AJ

 ̈ Brown, Eddie

 ̈ Crane, Alfred C.

 ̈ Crites, Michael

 ̈ Demarest, Geoffrey

 ̈ Fisher, Nathan

 ̈ Fowler, Marcie

 ̈ Gilbert, Gary R.

 ̈ Glenn, Russell W.

 ̈ Hedges, William

 ̈ Herche, Wes

 ̈ Hoven, John

 ̈ Ippolito, Danielle L.

 ̈ Keeley, Tom

 ̈ King, Erin

 ̈ Knapp, David

 ̈ Krakowka Richmond, Amy 

 ̈ Kwon, Paul O.

 ̈ Lawton, Joel

 ̈ McGhee, Laura L.

 ̈ Morris, Victor R.

 ̈ Morrison, Dawn A.

 ̈ Otto, Gustav A.

 ̈ Peeke, Richard

 ̈ Pike, Tom

 ̈ Poropatich, Ron

 ̈ Prautzsch, Frank

 ̈ Randall, Robb

 ̈ Read, Mark

 ̈ Santaspirt, Matthew

 ̈ Shields, Lori

 ̈ Shutters, Shade T.

 ̈ Staley, Jim

 ̈ Tansey, Colin

 ̈ Ward, Darryl

 ̈ Wolfel, Richard

 ̈ Wood, Colin D.
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Jan Berkow

Jan Berkow is a medical device industry consultant and serves as a contractor to the 

Center for Military Medicine Research at the University of Pittsburgh as the TRACIR 

Program Manager. He has extensive domain expertise in the field of non- invasive

cardiovascular hemodynamic monitoring and related sensor technologies. He was 

previously the Chief Technology Officer, co-founder, and inventor of Intelomed's 

CVInsight, a non-invasive cardiovascular patient monitoring platform that has been 

commercialized in the hemodialysis market to aid in providing treatment optimization. 

Prior to his current healthcare "treat-to-order" healthcare focus, he was an industrial 

process consultant focusing on "make-to-order" industry solutions where he focused 

on improving asset utilization, throughput, and production efficiencies. While 

performing in this role, he served as the principle investigator and prime contractor 

for a DoE sponsored R&D project that 'smelter- centric" intelligent process control for 

a large domestic aluminum producer.

AJ Besik

Mr. AJ Besik is an Armor officer in the U.S. Army Reserves and assigned as the

secretary of the General Staff for the 100th Division. He is a veteran of deployments 

to Iraq and Afghanistan and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff 

College's School of Advanced Military Studies. He is currently attending the 

University of Louisville's Brandeis Law School.

Eddie Brown

MAJ Eddie Brown is a Military Intelligence officer in the US Army. He is a SAMS

graduate and has served as an intelligence planner for multiple tactical and 

operational military units.

Alfred C. Crane

Alfred C. Crane III currently works at the Army Capabilities Integration Center, 

Concepts and Learning Directorate, Science & Technology, Research and 

Accelerated Capabilities Development Division as a Spiral Developments Analyst. 

Mr. Crane has worked for the Army as a civilian since April of 1997. He has served 
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as an Instructional Systems Specialist for the US Army Military Police School, 

Military Analyst for the Army Training Support Center and Army Futures Center, and 

Spiral Developments Analyst for the Army Capabilities Integration Center. Mr. Crane 

also served in the United States Marine Corps Reserve from 1990 – 1996. He holds 

a Master’s Degree in Education (Teaching History) from Jacksonville State 

University and a Bachelor’s Degree in History from Christopher Newport University. 

His hobbies include wargaming, painting miniatures, historical re- enacting, collecting 

toys and militaria, as well as historical and science - fiction books and movies. He 

also created and manages two Facebook forums (The Video Alternative and The 

Video Alternative Part 2) devoted to movies, books, music and gaming.

Michael Crites

Michael Crites works as a senior military analyst in TRADOC G-2. Crites retired after 

30 years in the Marine Corps with tours in 2009 as a lessons learned analyst in Iraq 

recording the largest retrograde of equipment and Marines in the Corps' history; as 

the component commander's representative and senior Marine in Africa; and 

Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, Marine Forces Pacific, 2003-2005, 

with oversight of counter-terrorism operations in the Philippines and the tsunami 

relief effort in Japan.

Geoffrey Demarest

Geoffrey Demarest is a researcher in the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office

at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a JD and a PhD in International Studies from 

the University of Denver, and a PhD in Geography from the University of Kansas. He 

is a graduate of the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and of 

the School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia. Demarest's latest book is titled 

Winning Insurgent War.

Nathan Fisher

Nathan Fisher is a Project Manager, Mechanical Engineer, and Roboticist working

for The Geneva Foundation as a support contractor for the US Army Medical 

Research and Materiel Command's (USAMRMC) Telemedicine and Advanced 
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Technology Research Center (TATRC) since 2014. Prior to this role, Nathan worked 

for eight years as a Mechanical Engineer supporting the design and manufacturing 

of various vehicle systems, including military combat vehicles and commercial 

aircraft systems. Nathan's current professional focus is in the adaptation of emerging 

robotics technologies to provide future capabilities for combat medics in far-forward 

operational environments. Nathan holds a M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering 

from Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from 

the University of Maryland.

Marcie Fowler

Marcie Fowler, Ph.D., is a research physiologist at the United States Army Institute 

of Surgical Research (USAISR). Since 2009, Dr. Fowler has conducted both clinical 

and preclinical research for the Battlefield Pain Management and the Burn Injuries 

Task Areas at USAISR. Her research focus has included the characterization of 

analgesic administration both in the hospital and in theater, as well as the 

development of novel animal models of pain and the analyses of efficacy and 

mechanisms of novel analgesics. Dr. Fowler holds a Ph.D. in Biochemistry and 

Molecular Biology from Louisiana State University Health Sciences CenterShreveport and a B.S. degree in Biology from Louisiana Tech University

Gary R. Gilbert

After receiving advanced degrees in Agriculture, Dairy Science, and Management of

Information Technology, from Cornell, Penn State and American University, Dr. 

Gilbert served in the U.S. Army as a Medical Service Corps Commander and Staff 

officer, which included service as a Special Forces Operational "A" Detachment 

Commander and Medical Plans, Operations, and Training Officer. Also while in the 

Army, he received a Ph.D. in Business with specialization in Artificial Intelligence and 

Medical Informatics from the University of Pittsburgh. He has served as Director of 

Information Systems (CIO) at Walter Reed and Tripler Army Medical Centers in 

Washington, DC, and Honolulu, HI; CIO of the Army Medical Research and Materiel 

Command (MRMC) and Director of the Army's Telemedicine and Advanced 

Technology Research Center (TATRC) at Fort Detrick, MD. He was instrumental in 
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developing and implementing numerous Department of Defense medical information 

systems, initiating a variety of military medical informatics projects, and creating the 

Army's telemedicine program. After retirement from the Army, he became Associate 

Director of Advanced Technology and International Health at Rush-Presbyterian-St. 

Luke's Medical Center in Chicago before receiving appointments as a Research 

Associate Professor at the University of Pittsburgh and as an Intergovernmental 

Personnel Act (IPA) research manager at the Army Telemedicine and Advanced 

Technologies Research Center (TATRC), Fort Detrick, MD.

Russell W. Glenn

Dr. Russell W. Glenn is an associate professor with the Strategic and Defence 

Studies Centre, The Australian National University. He is a graduate of the United 

States Military Academy, thereafter completing a military career that included a 

combat tour during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn 

was a senior analyst with RAND (1997-2009) and A-T Solutions (2009-2013).

Past research includes published studies on counterinsurgency, urban operations, 

military and police training, and intelligence operations. He has a Bachelor of 

Science degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters degrees from 

the University of Southern California (MS, Systems Management), Stanford 

University (MS, Civil Engineering and MS, Operations Research), and the School of 

Advanced Military Studies (Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his PhD in 

American history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military 

history and political science. Military education includes airborne, Ranger, and 

pathfinder qualifications. Dr. Glenn is the author of over fifty books or book length 

reports in addition to many articles. His most recent book, Rethinking Western 

Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-colonial Conflict, was 

published in April 2015. He is author/editor of Trust and Leadership: The Australian 

Army Approach to Mission Command, forthcoming as part of the Association of the 

United States Army book program.

William Hedges
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William (Bill) Hedges, Command Sergeant Major (Ret), USA, is a liaison officer for

the Intelligence & Information Warfare Directorate and the US Army's Intelligence 

Center of Excellence (ICoE), and additionally serves as a Science & Technology 

analyst for ICoE's Requirements Determination Directorate. A career intelligence 

analyst, Mr. Hedges has been posted to multiple senior intelligence analyst positions 

to include stints with: Field Station Berlin; the Central American Joint Intelligence 

Team (CAJIT-DIA); the Multi-national Force and Observers (Sinai); the Defense 

Intelligence Agency/CJCS-J-2; Task Force 134, Camp Cropper (Iraq); and the 501st 

Military Intelligence Brigade, INSCOM (South Korea). In his final assignment, he 

served as the Command Sergeant Major and Commandant of the Army's 

Intelligence Center's Noncommissioned Officer Academy. Prior to his present 

position, Mr.

Hedges served as the program manager, course manager, and master instructor for 

ICoE's Analytic Tradecraft program. His primary research areas are human domainhuman dimension convergence, as a primary nexus towards producing future 

generations of master intelligence analysts. Mr. Hedges holds a B.S. degree in 

Political Science and is also a graduate of the Defense Intelligence Agency's 

National Intelligence University.

Wes Herche

Wes Herche is a research scientist with the Global Security Initiative at Arizona 

State University, with an additional appointment of senior sustainability scientist in 

the Global Institute of Sustainability. He holds a bachelor’s in geography from 

Southern Illinois University, an MBA from Thunderbird School of Global

Management, and is currently completing a doctorate in sustainability science. His 

research focuses on energy security and policy. Wes was previously an intelligence 

analyst with the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

John Hoven

John Hoven <jhoven@gmail.com> (www.linkedin.com/in/johnhoven) is an innovation 

broker between those who do qualitative analysis and those who need its 

capabilities for operations and assessment. He recently completed a 40-year stint 
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analyzing complex, dynamic relationships in merger investigations, as a qualitative 

microeconomist in the U.S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Dr. Hoven 

earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, an M.S. 

in physics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a B.A. in mathematics 

and physics from the University of Montana at Missoula.

Danielle L. Ippolito

Danielle L. Ippolito, Ph.D., is a Research Physiologist and Task Area Manager for 

the US Army Center for Environmental Health Research (USACEHR). She is a 

biomedical researcher with nearly 10 years of Army experience in clinical and 

laboratory research environments at Fort Detrick and Madigan Army Medical Center 

(Joint-Base Lewis McChord). She uses an integrative systems biology approach to 

develop medical diagnostics and decision aids that protect Warfighters from 

chemical threats in hostile operational environments.

Tom Keeley

Tom Keeley has over thirty years of experience in corporate life with General

Electric and Rockwell Automation after graduating from Bradley University with an 

engineering degree During those years he held various development engineering, 

engineering management, technology transfer management, and corporate staff 

positions related to the development of US Navy Polaris / Poseidon program-inertial 

guidance and fire control systems, mini-computer design, computer aided 

dispatching systems for police and fire, cellular radio / cellular telephone, industrial 

robotics, intelligent sensors, RFID, vision systems, industrial automation 

communications systems, and industrial automation system architectures. He 

started Compsim in 1999 to provide a knowledge capture product. That product 

evolved to include a decision-making model that would "make soft decisions" faced 

by today's corporations and autonomous devices (and make the decisions 

explainable, auditable, and re-useable). With the ability for a computer to make 

"soft" decisions, Compsim transformed itself from a software product company to a 

"technology provider". KEEL ("Knowledge Enhanced Electronic Logic" Technology 

was created and patented.
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Erin King

Erin King is a staff member of the Global Security Initiative at Arizona State 

University where she is completing a bachelor’s in sociology and a certification in 

homeland security. Her research interests include a broad spectrum of security 

issues. Erin previously served as a counterterrorism intelligence intern in Israel with 

TAM-C Solutions.

David Knapp

Mr. David Knapp is the Associate Division Chief for Science and Technology in the 

Battlefield Environment Division at Army Research Laboratory (ARL). He supports 

the laboratory’s new Atmospheric Science Center by leading efforts to develop new 

and strengthen current research collaborations in the areas of atmospheric sensing, 

characterization, and modeling for the Army’s future battlefield needs. He recently 

completed a 10-year stint as chief of the Division’s Atmospheric Modeling Branch, 

providing technical leadership to scientists and engineers focused on developing, 

validating, and fielding innovative atmospheric prediction capabilities tailored for all 

Army battlefield operational scales. Mr. Knapp has been with ARL for over 20 years 

in different research capacities related to battlefield weather forecasting. He retired 

from the Air Force Reserves in 2003 after serving a combined 22 years of active and 

reserve duty as a weather officer in a variety of operational forecasting, research, 

and leadership positions. He has extensive experience focused on applied research 

addressing specific Army weather capability gaps, with additional expertise in 

aviation weather research topics. Mr. Knapp received his B.S. in Meteorology from 

the University of Utah in 1981 and his M.S. in Meteorology in 1988 from North 

Carolina State University.

Amy Krakowka Richmond

Amy Krakowka Richmond is an associate professor of Geography in the Department 

of Geography and Environmental Engineering at the United States Military Academy 

at West Point NY. She applies her skills to understanding the interactions between 

environmental resources and human populations. Her current research on Sub-
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Saharan Africa develops an interdisciplinary framework to investigate the 

relationship between environmental processes and human wellbeing that can be 

adapted to any geographic location.

Paul O. Kwon

LTC Paul Kwon is currently the Branch Director of Preventive Medicine at the Walter 

Reed Army Institute of Research located at Silver Spring, Maryland. His leadership 

roles include Chief of Pediatrics and Interim Chief of Behavioral Health at Fort Irwin, 

CA; Chief Medical Officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom; and Chief of Preventive 

and Occupational Medicine at Fort Wainwright, AK. Current research efforts in 

development, design and diplomacy of leveraging existing technologies to enhance 

Force Health Protection; Medical Accession Standards; training and development of 

future Public Health leaders; and threat reduction through training and education are 

currently underway within Preventive Medicine.

Joel Lawton

Joel Lawton <joel.b.lawton@gmail.com> (www.linkedin.com/in/joellawton0125) is a 

former member of the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS). His work with HTS 

included working in the U.S. and two tours to Afghanistan, where he conducted 

socio-cultural research management, collection, and support; as well as opensource intelligence analysis and qualitative data collection and analysis. Joel served 

in the USMC, deploying to southern Helmand Province in 2009 in support of combat 

operations. Further, Joel is an advocate of qualitative analysis and its use in military 

intelligence collection efforts. He currently works as an intelligence analyst for the 

Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Laura L. McGhee

MAJ Laura L. McGhee, Ph.D., is currently the Executive Officer at the United States 

Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM). Prior to this 

assignment, MAJ McGhee served as the Scientific Director of the Defense and 

Veterans’ Center for Integrative Pain Management (DVCIPM), where she directed 

research on pain, analgesia, anesthesia, and patient/provider education. She is also 
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the former task area manager for the Battlefield Pain Management Task Area at 

USAISR. In this assignment, she conducted preclinical pain outcomes research 

and also initiated the preclinical pain research program at USAISR. MAJ McGhee 

holds a Ph.D. in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology from Louisiana State University 

Health Sciences Center-Shreveport and a B.S. degree in Biology from the University 

of Tennessee-Knoxville.

Victor R. Morris

Victor R. Morris is a civilian instructor at the U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational 

Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany. The views expressed in this article are those 

of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of any mentioned 

intergovernmental organizations, JMRC, Booz Allen Hamilton, United States 

Government or NATO. Follow on Twitter @vicrasta3030

Dawn A. Morrison

Dawn Morrison is a researcher working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer 

(USACE), Engineer Research and Development Center, Construction Engineering 

Research Laboratory (ERDC-CERL) in Champaign, Illinois. Her research focuses on 

analyzing and modeling how human populations interact with the built environment. 

She earned both a M.A. and Ph.D. in Human Geography from the University of 

Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and a B.A. in History and Geography from the 

University of Chicago, The College.

Gustav A. Otto

Mr. Gustav A. Otto is the Distinguished Chair of Defense Intelligence, and DIA

Representative to the Army Combined Arms Center & Army University. A career 

human and counterintelligence officer and veteran of eight deployments in and out of 

uniform. A graduate of National War College, Gus instructs and advises faculty, and 

students on issues spanning intelligence, national security and leadership, across 

government, academic and industry.

Richard Peeke
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LTC Richard "Scot" Peeke serves as the Chief, Innovation Branch at HQ TRADOC, 

US Army Capabilities Integration Center, Science & Technology, Research and 

Accelerated Capabilities Division. His recent assignments include Graduate 

Research Student as part of the US Army Advanced Civil Schooling Program at The 

College of William & Mary Materials Science & Engineering - Nanomaterials & 

Imaging Lab; Special Operations Liaison Officer / Embedded Planner with the 

NSOCC / Special Operations Joint Task Force deployed to Afghanistan; Chief, 

Incident Analysis Branch, US Army, Joint Task Force-Civil Support Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Operations; and Deputy Commander 

North Carolina Army National Guard, 42nd Civil Support Team North Carolina Area 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Operations. LTC Peeke holds a Master of 

Science, Applied Science - Materials Science and Engineering from the College of 

William and Mary and a Bachelor of Science in Biology/Biological Sciences, General 

from the US Air Force Academy.

Tom Pike

MAJ Tom Pike is a Strategic Intelligence officer in the US Army. He has studied

Complex Adaptive System applications to analysis for the past 8 years, initiated and 

contributed to Inter-Agency Agent Based Modelling efforts, and served as a 

representative to the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council.

Ron Poropatich

COL (Ret.) Ron Poropatich, MD retired from the US Army in 2012 after serving more 

than 30 years as a Pulmonary/Critical Care Medicine physician. His last assignment 

was at the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort Detrick, MD 

serving as the Deputy Director of the Telemedicine and Advanced Technology 

Research Center where he managed large medical research programs and 

coordinated telemedicine deployment for the US Army for both US based and 

overseas locations. He currently serves as the Executive Director for the Center for 

Military Medicine Research, Health Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh. He is a 

Professor of Medicine in the Division of Pulmonary, Allergy, and Critical Care 

Medicine at the University of Pittsburgh and is also a Senior Advisor for 
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Telemedicine for the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. Dr. Poropatich is an 

Adjunct Professor of Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health 

Sciences in Bethesda, MD, and serves as an Associate Editor for the "Telemedicine 

and e-Health Journal". He is the former Chair of the NATO Telemedicine Expert 

Team (2000-2012), former President (2002-2003) and Board Member (1996-2004) 

of the American Telemedicine Association and a former practicing Pulmonary/Critical 

Care Medicine physician at the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, 

Bethesda, MD.

Frank Prautzsch

In his current role as President of Velocity Technology Partners LLC, Mr. Prautzsch 

(LTC, Ret. Signal Corps) is recognized as a technology and business leader known 

for exposing or crafting innovative technology solutions for the DoD, SOF, DHS and 

Intelligence community. His focus is upon innovation and not invention. His waking 

moments are spent in the process of identifying and contriving use cases for global 

commercial technologies that the government is unaware of, or at best has yet to 

assume a use case for that could support their needs. Prior to his own consulting 

program, Mr. Prautzsch served as the Sr. VP for Government Programs for 

ORBCOMM, the Director of the Raytheon Rapid Initiatives Group (RIG), and 

Director of Army Requirements for Hughes Space and Communications Company.

While on active duty in the US Army, Mr. Prautzsch held a variety of Command, 

Staff, and Engineering positions. He served on numerous Joint Task Force, Army, 

and contingency missions across all operational environments and was instrumental 

in defining many of the Army's MILSATCOM concepts of operations and doctrine 

used today. He was the Secretary of the Army's selection to Lead the DoD 

MILSATCOM Architecture under the DoD Space Architect. During this process, he 

was instrumental in formulating a $42B investment plan for wideband, protected and 

narrowband communications for the Nation.

Mr. Prautzsch holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States 

Military Academy at West Point, is a distinguished graduate of the Marine Corps 

Signal Advanced Course, Army Airborne School, Ranger School, and Command and 
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General Staff College. He attended Raytheon's University of Chicago Business 

Development School, and is Six Sigma qualified. He also holds a Master of Science 

Degree from Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California with a degree in 

Systems Technology (C3) and Space.

Robb Randall

Dr. Robb Randall leads the Army Research Laboratory’s (ARL) Atmospheric 

Science Center, the Battlefield Environment Division’s entity managing and 

coordinating ARL’s open campus initiative, bringing together government, industry, 

and academia for the mission of advancing atmospheric science and its application 

to critical defense technologies through a collaborative, innovative research 

ecosystem. He is also Chief (A) of the Atmospheric Dynamics Branch. Dr. Randall 

recently retired from the Air Force after 28+ years. During his career he serve in 

Special Operations, Operational Weather Squadron, as a FOA Military Deputy 

Director and Division Chief, Advisor to the Iraqi Air Force, and Air Force Institute of 

Technology Professor. Before his retirement he served as the Commander, 16th

Weather Squadron. The 16th Weather Squadron functions as the Air Force’s center 

of excellence for atmospheric model development, implementation, and 

visualization.

As Commander, he executed a worldwide weather support mission that delivered 

advanced terrestrial and space environmental intelligence tools to Joint warfighters, 

national agencies, and allied nations for planning and execution of full-spectrum 

military operations in addition to providing meteorological support to DoD research 

and development, acquisition, testing and sustainment. Dr. Randall received a B.S. 

in Meteorology from the University of Oklahoma in 1995, M.S in Meteorology from 

the Air Force Institute of Technology in 2002 and PhD from the University of Arizona 

in 2007.

Mark Read

Mark Read is a Colonel in the U.S. Army, and serves as the Deputy Head of the

Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering at the U.S. Military 
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Academy, West Point. A career infantry officer, Mark has served in a wide variety of 

assignments in the U.S, Europe, and the Middle East. He holds a BS in 

Environmental Engineering from West Point, and a MS and PhD in Geography from 

The Pennsylvania State University.

Matthew Santaspirt

Matthew Santaspirt is an intelligence representative from the US Army Armament 

Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 

He is currently assigned to the TRADOC G-2 office with a specific focus on Strategic 

Foresight. Before his work with TRADOC, he was an Army Materiel Command 

(AMC) Fellow and worked in the ARDEC Intelligence and Technology Protection 

Office. 

Lori J. Shields

Ms. Lori Shields currently serves as the Strategic Communications Director and as a 

Financial Management Analyst for the Naval Expeditionary Warfare Division, OPNAV 

N95. Ms. Shields left Active Duty in 2010 and continues to serve in the Army Reserve 

as an Engineer and holds the rank of Major.

Shade T. Shutters

Shade T. Shutters is a research scientist with the Global Security Initiative at Arizona 

State University, with additional faculty appointments in the Center of Social 

Dynamics and Complexity, Center on the Future of War, and the Center for Policy 

Informatics. He holds a bachelor’s in finance from Indiana University, a doctorate in 

theoretical ecology from Arizona State University, and completed a post-doc in 

applied economics at the University of Vigo, Spain. His research is focused on the 

dynamics of urban systems and the networks both within and between cities.

Jim Staley

Mr. Jim Staley leads the Army Weather Proponent Office (AWPO) at the U.S. Army

Intelligence Center of Excellence, Ft Huachuca AZ. Since inception in 2008, the 

AWPO is responsible for investigating and processing Army-unique weather support 
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requirements utilizing the DoD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System (JCIDS). The AWPO also identifies and disseminates Army weather 

support doctrine. Additionally, the AWPO interfaces with the Army-wide weather 

Research and Development community to incorporate Army weather requirements 

into collective R&D efforts. Mr. Staley has extensive experience focused on tactical 

Army and Special Operations weather support to world-wide DoD missions. During 

his career he led weather support to Joint Special Operations forces, conventional 

Army units at multiple levels, and to the Air Force Special Operations Command. In 

2007 Mr. Staley retired from the U.S. Air Force after 23 years of service. Mr. Staley 

received his B.S. in Geophysics from Boise State University in 1984, and his M.S. in 

Atmospheric Science from Colorado State University in 1990.

Colin Tansey

Colin Tansey is a Major in the U.S. Army, and serves as the assistant course director

for Physical Geography (EV203) in the Department of Geography and Environmental 

Engineering at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. A career military intelligence 

officer, Colin has served in a wide variety of assignments in the U.S, Europe, and the

Middle East. He holds a BA in Anthropology from California State University, San 

Bernardino, and a MA in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia) from the Naval 

Postgraduate School.

Darryl Ward

Darryl Ward has 30 combined years of experience in Military Intelligence with the

U.S. Army, civil service, and as a government contractor. He is retired from the U.S. 

Army and currently serving as an MCR contractor within the TRADOC G27 OPFOR 

Program Management Directorate supporting the U.S. Army Quality Assurance 

Program. He holds a BS in Education from the University of Arkansas and an MA in 

Health Business Administration from Webster University.

Richard Wolfel

Richard Wolfel is an associate professor of Geography and the Chair of Cross 

Cultural Competence in the Center for Languages, Cultures and Regional Studies at 
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the US Military Academy, West Point. Rick is a social and political geography with 

strong research interests in urban geography, nationalism, social movements and 

migration with a regional interest in Post-Soviet Landscapes. He holds a BSED in 

American History and Geography from West Chester University, a MA in Urban 

Geography from the University of Cincinnati and a PhD in Geography from Indiana 

University.

Colin D. Wood

Colin Wood has 6 years of military service as a U.S. Army Combat Medic with an 

infantry battalion, and served in Iraq. He is currently a Federal Pathways Intern 

conducting research for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Engineer 

Research and Development Center, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory 

(ERDC-CERL), and an Atlantic Council, Veterans Take Point Initiative Fellow. His 

research interests center around insurgency, terrorism, and military intervention. He 

holds a B.A. in International Studies from the University of North Texas, is a former 

National Science Foundation Research Experience for Undergraduates (NSF-REU) 

Fellow, and a Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Science, 

Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (DHS, HS-STEM) Intern.