GOING TO WAR WITH THE ALLIES YOU HAVE:

ALLIES, COUNTERINSURGENCY, 

AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Daniel Byman

November 2005

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iii

FOREWORD

 The United States has long faced numerous problems when 

fighting insurgencies. Many of these concern the performance of 

local allies, who typically play a leading role in counterinsurgency.

 In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems 

common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may 

soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida. He argues that these 

problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime’s 

perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped 

economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit 

the allied armed forces’ effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. 

Various U.S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, 

at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program 

to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies’ 

weaknesses.

 This monograph was written under the Strategic Studies Institute’s External Research Associates Program (ERAP). It is intended 

to stimulate debate on the role of policy in the exercise of war.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DANIEL BYMAN is Associate Professor and Director of the Security 

Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies at 

Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign 

Service. He is also a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center 

for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Byman 

has served as a Professional Staff Member with both the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (“The 9-11 

Commission”) and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and 

Senate Intelligence Committees. He has also worked as the Research 

Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND 

Corporation and as an analyst of the Middle East for the U.S. 

intelligence community. Dr. Byman has written widely on a range 

of topics related to terrorism, international security, and the Middle 

East. His latest book is Deadly Dynamics: States that Sponsor Terrorism 

(Cambridge University Press, 2005).
v

SUMMARY

 Potential U.S. allies in counterinsurgencies linked to al-Qa’ida 

frequently suffer from four categories of structural problems: 

illegitimate (and often repressive) regimes; civil-military tension 

manifested by fears of a coup; economic backwardness; and 

discriminatory societies. Because of these problems, allies often 

stray far from the counterinsurgency (COIN) ideal, both militarily 

and politically. Their security service culture often is characterized 

by poor intelligence; a lack of initiative; little integration of forces 

across units; soldiers who do not want to fight; bad leadership; and 

problems with training, learning, and creativity. In addition, the 

structural weaknesses have a direct political effect that can aid an 

insurgency by hindering the development and implementation of a 

national strategy, fostering poor relations with outside powers that 

might otherwise assist the COIN effort (such as the United States), 

encouraging widespread corruption, alienating the security forces 

from the overall population, and offering the insurgents opportunities 

to penetrate the security forces. 

 Washington must recognize that its allies, including those in the 

security forces, are often the source of the problem as well as the 

heart of any solution. The author argues that the ally’s structural 

problems and distinct interests have daunting implications for 

successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of regimes 

and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often 

hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and 

thus becomes complicit in the host-nation’s self-defeating behavior. 

Unfortunately, U.S. influence often is limited as the allies recognize 

that America’s vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qa’ida-linked 

groups are likely to outweigh any temporary disgust or anger at an 

ally’s brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-tomilitary contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape 

their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be 

limited at best.

1

GOING TO WAR WITH THE ALLIES YOU HAVE:

ALLIES, COUNTERINSURGENCY, 

AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1980s, the United States poured money into 

El Salvador to check communist expansion in Central America. 

Although at that time the Salvador conflict was the costliest U.S. 

military effort since Vietnam, at the end of the decade the United 

States found itself spinning its wheels. Despite almost a decade 

of training, aid, and high-level pushes for reform, the Salvadoran 

security forces still suffered basic flaws such as a mediocre and 

disengaged officer corps, widespread corruption, a poor promotion 

system, and conscripts who did not want to fight. These weaknesses 

were only part of a broader problem. The security forces perpetrated 

or supported blatant and brutal oppression such as the killing of 

moderate political opponents and human rights organization and 

church officials, including priests and nuns. The security forces also 

were strong voices against much-needed economic, political, and 

social reforms that, had they been implemented, would have hindered 

the insurgents’ ability to recruit and operate. Not surprisingly, as 

the decade ended, U.S. military officials concluded that an outright 

military victory over the communist insurgents was unlikely and 

that a political settlement was required.

 In his landmark study of El Salvador, Benjamin Schwartz found 

that the problem was not that the United States was fighting the 

wrong war or otherwise repeating Vietnam-era mistakes of using 

conventional military power to fight an unconventional war. Rather, 

Schwartz found the United States did not understand its own allies. 

El Salvador’s military mirrored the country as a whole, complete 

with the same fractures, weaknesses, and pathologies. Indeed, U.S. 

attempts to initiate reform often failed because they relied on the 

Salvadoran military and government even though they had interests 

quite distinct from the U.S. agenda.1

 The El Salvador experience should be of interest to policymakers 

today as well as to historians, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
2

attacks on the United States not only ushered in a new era of 

counterterrorism, they also forced the return of the counterinsurgency 

era.2 The global effort against al-Qa’ida has meant, in part, invading 

Afghanistan and wrapping up cells around the globe. However, it 

also has required closer ties with a number of governments involved 

in fighting Islamist insurgents that, to different degrees, have ties 

to al-Qa’ida. Since the attacks, the United States has forged closer 

relations with Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries 

fighting insurgent groups that have relations with the global Sunni 

jihad that al-Qa’ida champions.

 This shift toward counterinsurgency is a concern, as the U.S. 

record on fighting insurgencies in a third country historically has 

been poor. The Philippines appears to have been a real but difficult 

success, and operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban 

have gone better than many anticipated. Nevertheless, the overall 

track record of the United States is better characterized by frustration 

than by victory.3

 Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) relies heavily on allies’ 

paramilitary, military, intelligence, and other security forces.4

In different countries these forces comprise a startling range of 

capabilities and sizes. The particular force-type mix varies by the 

country in question, the level of the insurgency, and the regime’s 

level of trust in the various bodies in question. This monograph 

focuses heavily on military and paramilitary forces, as intelligence 

and police units typically (though not always) take the lead before 

the insurgency is full-blown. The term “security forces” is used as a 

broad term to encompass a range of units that fight insurgents.

 According to various works on counterinsurgency, in theory

security forces play several key roles. First, they establish government 

control and eliminate insurgent combatants. Second, they secure 

an area so political and other reforms can be carried out.5 Allies’ 

security forces are also vital in part for political reasons at home. 

The American people naturally prefer that others fight and die in 

their stead, particularly when the conflict so obviously involves a 

third country’s vital interests.6

 Equally important, allies should be 

better able to carry out most aspects of counterinsurgency. Their 

forces speak the language and know the culture, so they are better 

able to gather intelligence and avoid actions that gratuitously offend 
3

the population.7 Even the best-behaved foreigners may generate a 

nationalistic backlash among local citizens who otherwise feel little 

sympathy for the insurgents.8 Finally, perhaps the greatest factor 

affecting the insurgents’ success or failure is the response of a regime: 

a clumsy or foolish response can be the insurgents’ greatest source of 

recruits.9

 Despite these advantages, thinking and scholarship on COIN 

tends to ignore the role of allies. Analyses are typically bifurcated 

into two players: the insurgents on one hand, and the COIN forces on 

the other. Even the recently issued U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine 

mentions the role of the host nation only in passing, without any 

serious discussion given to problems that may be encountered.10

 In reality, even though both the ally and the United States want 

to defeat the insurgents, their interests differ considerably. An ally’s 

politics, society, and economy affect both the overall culture of its 

security forces and the political profile they present to their people: 

effects that shape the ally’s COIN strengths and weaknesses. 

 The U.S. COIN allies (with regard to al-Qa’ida) reviewed in 

this monograph—Algeria, Afghanistan, India, Chechnya, Pakistan, 

Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and Egypt—have (to 

different degrees) four categories of structural problems: illegitimate 

(and often repressive) regimes; civil-military tension manifested by 

fears of a coup; economic backwardness; and discriminatory societies. 

Because of these problems, allies often stray far from the COIN 

ideal, both militarily and politically. Their security service culture 

often is characterized by poor intelligence; a lack of initiative; little 

integration of forces across units; soldiers who do not want to fight; 

bad leadership; and problems with training, learning, and creativity. 

In addition, their structural weaknesses have a direct political effect 

that can aid an insurgency by hindering the development and 

implementation of a national strategy, fostering poor relations with 

outside powers that might otherwise assist the COIN effort (such as 

the United States), encouraging widespread corruption, alienating 

the security forces from the overall population, and offering the 

insurgents opportunities to penetrate the security forces. 

 The implications of these weaknesses go beyond the ability (or 

lack thereof) of local forces to fight the insurgents and shape the 

relationship between the regime and the United States. Washington 
4

must recognize that its allies, including those in the security forces, 

are often the source of the problem as well as the heart of any 

solution. The ally’s structural problems and distinct interests have 

daunting implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. 

The nature of regimes and societies themselves feeds an insurgency, 

but the United States is often hostage to its narrow goals with regard 

to counterinsurgency and thus becomes complicit in the hostnation’s self-defeating behavior. U.S. COIN doctrine, no matter how 

well thought out, cannot succeed without the appropriate political 

and other reforms from the host nation, but these regimes are likely 

to subvert the reforms that threaten the existing power structure. 

Unfortunately, U.S. influence is often limited, as the allies recognize 

that America’s vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qa’ida-linked 

groups are likely to outweigh any temporary disgust or anger at an 

ally’s brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-tomilitary contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape 

their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be 

limited at best.

 This monograph has five remaining sections. In the second section, 

the overlap between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

is discussed. Section three offers an “ideal type” COIN force and 

then assesses how allied militaries involved in the struggle against 

al-Qa’ida fare by these criteria. In section four, several of the more 

structural causes that shape allies’ security forces’ cultures and their 

political profiles as they are relevant to COIN are discussed. Section 

five details how these general structural problems affect the politics 

of counterinsurgency and the military cultures of the countries in 

question. The final section examines the implications for the United 

States.

II. THE OVERLAP BETWEEN COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

This monograph uses the definition of insurgencies provided in 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pamphlet, Guide to the Analysis 

of Insurgency: 

Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward 

completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through 
5

the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. 

Insurgent activity—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political 

mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert 

party organization, and international activity—is designed to weaken 

government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control 

and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups 

is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates 

insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives 

do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of 

controlling a given area or country.11

 As the above definition suggests, insurgents’ primary methods 

involve three related activities: guerrilla war, political mobilization, 

and terrorism, which I define as politically-motivated violence 

against noncombatants designed to influence a broader audience. 

Terrorism offers insurgents another method of weakening a state 

beyond guerrilla warfare and political mobilization. For example, 

killing civilians may lead a rival ethnic group to flee a contested 

area, demonstrate that the government cannot impose order and 

protect its people, and convince officials and the populace as a whole 

to collaborate out of fear.12 Because the manpower needed to wage 

guerrilla war and create rival political organizations is greater than 

that to use terrorist actions, insurgencies are larger than groups that 

only use terrorism.

 The relationship between terrorism and insurgency is not new—

there is no clear dividing line, and, in fact, tremendous overlap exists. 

Although the exact percentage depends heavily on coding decisions, 

in my judgment approximately half of the groups listed by the U.S. 

Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2004 are 

insurgencies as well as terrorist groups. Even more importantly, 

the majority of the most worrisome terrorist groups in the world 

are also insurgencies. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam; the Kurdish Workers’ Party of Turkey; Lashkar-e-Taiba, an 

insurgent group fighting in Kashmir; the Lebanese Hizballah;13 and 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia all use guerrilla war as 

a major component in their struggles, just as the Palestine Liberation 

Organization (PLO) attempted to do in the 1960s and 1970s. All 

of these groups rely heavily on guerrilla warfare and engage in 

extensive political mobilization efforts, as well as conducting attacks 

on noncombatants. 
6

 Terrorism and insurgency overlap as concepts but are not identical. 

A group that can only use terrorism and not guerrilla warfare and 

political mobilization can rightly be called a terrorist group but not 

an insurgency. For example, the Red Army Faction did not engage in 

any guerrilla warfare and did, at most, limited political mobilization. 

When the targets are primarily military and the means employed is 

guerrilla war, the group in question can better be characterized as an 

insurgency that may at times use terrorism. On the other hand, if the 

targets are primarily civilian and the methods include assassinations, 

car bombs, or other indiscriminate means, the group is better 

characterized as a terrorist group. A second distinction is the size of 

the group (small terrorist groups are at best proto-insurgencies).14

 Al-Qa’ida recognizes the importance of insurgencies. Guerrilla 

war and political mobilization are at the core of the organization, 

dwarfing the amount of money and energy the organization’s 

leadership spends on terrorist activities. One leading counterterrorism 

expert argues Bin Ladin has promoted (and at times directed) a 

“worldwide, religiously inspired, and professionally-guided Islamist 

insurgency.”15 Support for insurgencies in Chechnya, Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and elsewhere has long been a priority in terms of rhetoric, 

recruitment, and spending.16

 Insurgencies serve several vital organizational functions for alQa’ida. Insurgent veterans are often at the core of the organization. 

The long struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, of course, 

was a uniting experience for much of the al-Qa’ida leadership. Many 

members also came together and were vetted in struggles in the 

Balkans, Chechnya, Kashmir, and now Iraq.17 Because al-Qa’ida 

can tap into these insurgency networks for recruits and its logistics 

network, it is able to conduct operations far beyond where its narrow 

core is located and can replenish cadre as they are lost.18 Insurgencies 

also add legitimacy to al-Qa’ida. Muslims around the world also 

endorse many of these struggles, even though they might otherwise 

oppose al-Qa’ida’s ideological agenda and use of terrorism. 

 Al-Qa’ida has maintained links to several insurgencies and 

proto-insurgencies worldwide. Insurgent fighters in Algeria (the 

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat [GSPC]), Iraq (the Zarqawi 

network), Afghanistan (ex-Taliban), India (groups fighting in Kashmir 

such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba), Chechnya, Pakistan (ex-Taliban and their 
7

sympathizers among Pakistani domestic groups), and Uzbekistan 

(the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU]) all have or had varying 

degrees of links to al-Qa’ida. As noted above, size is a key criteria for 

an insurgency, and several groups examined in this monograph are 

not yet strong enough to be truly deemed insurgencies (they rarely 

control territory, have dozens or low hundreds of members, and 

do not use guerrilla warfare or use it rarely compared with attacks 

on civilians), but they are examined because they may move in that 

direction. These groups include the anti-Saudi al-Qa’ida on the 

Arabian Peninsula (QAP), the Jemaah Islamiyya in Southeast Asia, 

the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, and the Islamic Group and 

Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Egypt.19

 For purposes of this monograph, all of these countries are 

examined as it is conceivable that they could become U.S. partners 

should their terrorism groups become full-blown insurgencies. 

Because this monograph is not focused on al-Qa’ida per se, but rather 

on the strengths and weaknesses of potential partners for the U.S. 

military, it takes a broad look to identify a more comprehensive list 

of issues the U.S. Army may face. Thus it includes countries where 

the insurgency has not yet developed, as well as some where the 

insurgency appears in retreat or even defeated at this time.

 To be clear, none of these insurgencies are “caused” by al-Qa’ida, 

and in almost all the cases the insurgents have their own agendas that 

are in many ways distinct from al-Qa’ida. Nevertheless, individuals 

affiliated with these groups are often members of al-Qa’ida, and the 

terrorist organization in turn exploits these groups’ networks and 

personnel for its own purposes. It is thus plausible that a “war on 

terrorism” might lead to greater involvement with these countries, 

and in most cases it already has.20 As Steven Metz and Raymond 

Millen note, “the United States is more likely to assist regimes 

threatened by insurgents linked to al Qaeda or its affiliates.”21

III. COUNTERINSURGENCY IDEALS AND REALITIES 

Counterinsurgency is difficult for even the best security forces. It 

requires not only remarkable military skill, but also a deft political 

touch. The soldier on patrol must be a fighter, a policeman, an 

intelligence officer, a diplomat, and an aid worker. Not surprisingly, 
8

even well-trained, well-led, and well-funded security forces such as 

the Americans, the British, and the Israelis have foundered when 

confronting insurgent movements. 

 The problems for many security forces facing al-Qa’ida fall into 

two categories. First, at a tactical and organizational level, they 

often are not prepared for counterinsurgency operations. Second, 

as political entities, the security forces often contribute to popular 

anger or other problems that aid the insurgent cause.

Tactical and Organizational Concerns.

The characteristics of ideal COIN forces at a tactical and 

organizational level are vast,22 but several of the most important 

include: a high level of initiative, excellent intelligence, integration 

across units and services, leadership, motivated soldiers, and learning 

and creativity. The reality for many forces involved in fighting alQa’ida-linked insurgencies, however, is often far from the ideal.

Initiative. 

 Counterinsurgency fighting rarely involves a set-piece battle, 

which outgunned and outmanned insurgents typically shun. In the 

countryside, soldiers and paramilitary often take the lead in trying 

to flush out hidden insurgents and defeat them through aggressive 

patrolling and ambushes; while police, intelligence, and select 

paramilitary units seek them out in urban environments. Fighting 

occurs either because the insurgents choose to engage or ideally when 

government forces leave them no choice. In either case, planning 

is difficult: the terrain can vary, the number of forces involved is 

hard to predict, and so on. Much of the effort is done at the small 

unit level, as larger units are far easier for insurgents to avoid. To 

be successful, COIN forces also must operate out of garrison and 

at nighttime. Insurgents will exploit the absence of COIN forces to 

intimidate locals and sow fear. Thus, part of the job of security forces 

is to convince the population they will be protected.23

 Many developing world security forces, particularly the 

militaries, however, are garrison forces that fight, when they do, 

from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. They often operate poorly as small units, 

with junior officers and NCOs reluctant to exercise initiative. In 
9

Uzbekistan, insurgents “own the night.”24 In Algeria, units often 

feared to leave their garrison and patrol in dangerous parts of cities 

where insurgents enjoyed sympathy. The Egyptian and Saudi armed 

forces historically exercised little initiative, a problem that is more 

profound as you work down the command chain. Even the smallest 

details had to be spelled out in advance.25 COIN suffered as a result 

in all these cases.

Intelligence. 

 Intelligence is the sina qua non of counterinsurgency. The 

insurgents’ primary advantage is their stealth: if they can be 

found, they can usually be killed or captured. A corollary is that 

the insurgents’ advantage is their superior knowledge of the local 

population and conditions: denying or minimizing this advantage 

is also vital.26 To be useful, intelligence must not only be collected 

but also analyzed, disseminated, and integrated into the overall 

strategy.27

 Unfortunately, many U.S. allies collect, analyze, and disseminate 

information poorly. Intelligence analysis benefits from superb 

information sharing and from the proper storage and dissemination 

of data—general weaknesses in developing societies. Interviews 

with U.S. Government officials indicate that, while many allied 

intelligence services do a fine job collecting information, they often 

do not integrate it well and have, at best, a limited picture of their 

adversary.28 The major intelligence operations in the Philippines 

often do not share information and do not coordinate their activities. 

Indeed, intelligence money often is paid directly to officials as a 

form of graft.29 In Egypt, key information is compartmented, and 

failures are not brought to the attention of senior officials.30 Often, 

information is not shared because commanders and units do not 

trust each other. In the Punjab insurgency, Indian units often did 

not share information with local security units because they were 

perceived as sympathetic to (and penetrated by) Sikh insurgents.31

The International Crisis Group reports that Indonesian intelligence 

is “marked by blurred lines of authority, interagency rivalry, lack of 

coordination, unnecessary duplication, lack of adequate oversight, 

and the legacy of an authoritarian past.”32
10

Integration across Units and Services. 

 All operations benefit from synergies, and this holds true for 

counterinsurgency as well. At a most basic level, units must work 

together to ensure proper coverage of a territory and that insurgents 

simply do not slip between the seams of different units. Also, if 

unexpectedly heavy resistance is found, units must reinforce their 

beleaguered comrades, particularly when forces operate as small 

units as many paramilitary and police units do. 

 Information-sharing and coordination across services and 

bureaucracies often are exceptionally poor for allies fighting alQa’ida-linked insurgencies. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, commanders 

of different services and units often do not talk to each other. In 

Afghanistan, the United States has worked not only with the Afghan 

National Army, but also with numerous regional warlords, several 

of whom owe little loyalty to the central government.33 At times, 

security forces may have multiple groups within them vying for 

power. In Algeria, the army has numerous divisions based on region 

and tribe.34 The division of labor between the police and military 

is not clear in Indonesia, and the military’s own coordination with 

regard to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is poor.35

Leadership at All Levels. 

 Senior officials must be creative, take the initiative, inspire the 

soldiers who follow them, and perform other essential functions. 

In addition, officers doing COIN must also play a major role in 

ensuring intelligence gathering and reassuring the population—

both difficult tasks and ones that go beyond traditional training for 

conventional military operations or standard police duties. Because 

much counterinsurgency is done by small units, having strong 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or junior officials is also vital.

 Leadership in many countries fighting al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, 

however, is quite poor. In most Arab militaries and paramilitaries, 

junior officers and NCOs are given little responsibility. In Egypt, for 

example, colonels do what U.S. captains would do.36 In Uzbekistan, 

officers often have performed poorly when facing insurgents.37

Afghan army leaders appear better than most of those discussed in 

this monograph, but even here the NCOs are not given appropriate 

responsibility.38
11

Motivated Soldiers and Low-ranking Personnel. 

 Soldiers and police officers who believe in their government and 

their officers are more likely to brave the hazards of COIN warfare. 

They will confront rather than flee from the enemy and take the 

necessary initiative to ensure victory.

 Many developing world countries facing al-Qa’ida, however, 

have poorly motivated soldiers and low-ranking personnel. Afghan 

recruits in both the police and army often prefer to work for local 

warlords than for the national government, and many trainees 

and recent recruits desert. As one Afghan sergeant commented, 

“Everyone wants to run away.”39 Uzbek soldiers suffer from low 

morale, and mass desertions are common.40 In Egypt, many soldiers 

do not embrace their profession.41 In India, the emphasis on caste 

creates problems for cohesion as soldiers often speak different 

languages, and the caste system creates a hierarchy among them.42 

Training, Learning, and Creativity.

 Counterinsurgency requires a high degree of skill and constant 

refinement of practices. In addition, successful security forces must 

learn from their mistakes and be able to go beyond their standard 

procedures when confronted with a new situation. Moreover, both 

successful and unsuccessful insurgencies go through stages, and 

the mix of conventional and unconventional operations needed to 

defeat them will vary as a result.43 COIN is also more art than science: 

creativity is vital. Helping this process is the free flow of information 

and an institutional culture of honest criticism.44

 Many countries do not emphasize COIN training for a variety 

of reasons. Most important, training for regular military forces still 

focuses on conventional military operations: the traditional focus 

of most militaries. In Uzbekistan, the military was structured from 

Soviet-era forces intended to fight conventional wars. Although 

Uzbek leaders have initiated some reforms, Roger McDermott notes 

these are only a “modest beginning” and are focused on a few elite 

forces.45 (Indeed, as a sign of how bad training is, an individual who 

was picked to lead Uzbek Special Forces teams had not had basic 

infantry training.)46 Some of the paramilitary forces involved in 

COIN are expected to only be around temporarily, leaving officials 

reluctant to invest in long-term training.47 In Egypt, the size of the 
12

military forces is huge, making it hard to do more than rudimentary 

training for many of the forces. Live-fire exercises or other forms of 

realistic training often are rare.48

 Many of these countries’ security forces do not learn from 

mistakes. The Egyptian security forces have institutionalized some 

practices that U.S. trainers see as disastrous, in part because changing 

them would require an embarrassing admission of failure.49 U.S. 

trainers spent years working with the Saudi air force, only to watch 

it steadily decline. In part, this problem occurs because professional 

education is weak for military services and often nonexistent for 

other security forces, and what institutions that do exist focus on 

perpetuating existing doctrine rather than actively seeking to correct 

mistakes in current operations.

Political Concerns.

In counterinsurgency, the security forces are political actors 

as well as fighting units. Thus, they must be judged by more than 

simply how they perform in combat against insurgents. Several 

other more political criteria include proper civil-military integration, 

a good rapport with outside patrons, a lack of corruption, a lack of 

insurgent penetration, and a sense that the army can win over the 

population.

Civil-Military Integration. 

 Defeating an insurgent movement is as much, if not more, 

a political effort than a military one. A national approach that 

incorporates all dimensions of power is essential. If political and 

military leaders are in harmony, political and military measures to 

defeat the insurgents are more likely to be as well.50 The two cannot 

be done in isolation: the security methods used affect the overall 

perception of the government, and the perception of the regime 

affects the ability of the security forces to operate. 

 In many of the countries in question, however, relations between 

civilian officials and security forces are poor. In India, civilian leaders 

historically saw the military as a vestige of the British imperial 

mentality and at odds with their nationalistic (and more socialist) 

vision of the country. In Algeria and Pakistan, military leaders have 
13

seized power from civilian officials; while in the Philippines and 

Indonesia, civilian leaders have feared military and security force 

interference in their control of the country. In Egypt, the government 

has long been unsure of the reliability of the security forces to protect 

the regime: a well-founded perception, given that Islamist militants 

penetrated the military to kill Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 

in 1981 and there were mass riots involving 17,000 conscripts in 

1986.51

 In some countries, the government is divided on issues related 

to counterinsurgency, making it exceptionally difficult to produce a 

coherent strategy. The Algerian regime was long split between the 

“conciliators” and the “eradicators,” leading to a policy that was 

at times incoherent, with olive branches suddenly withdrawn and 

attempts to intimidate offset by surprising concessions.52

Rapport with Outside Patrons. 

 If the security forces have a favorable view of the foreign powers 

trying to aid them, they will be far more amenable to the foreigners’ 

suggestions, advice, and so on. In putting down the insurgency in 

the Philippines in the early 1950s, for example, the United States 

worked exceptionally closely with the local government, and this 

did not spark widespread hostility from the public at large. 

 Such closeness is often lacking in counterinsurgency.53 The 

Philippines recently canceled an operation with the United States 

against the Abu Sayyaf Group after a public outcry.54 In Egypt, the 

government works closely with the United States, but anti-U.S. 

sentiment is widespread well beyond Islamist circles and is growing 

among nationalists, including secular nationalists in the Egyptian 

security forces. U.S. efforts tied to counterterrorism, in particular, 

are suspect.55 The security forces of Algeria, Indonesia, and India 

also have many officers who are suspicious of the United States.56

Honesty and Corruption.

 The security forces are more likely to gain the respect of the 

population if they are not corrupt or otherwise engaged in illicit 

activities. A lack of corruption sends the message that the security 

forces are indeed fighting for the country, not just for the personal 

interests of a few individuals. This, in turn, inspires soldiers to fight 
14

harder and makes it more difficult for the insurgents to penetrate the 

COIN forces.

 Corruption is rampant in many of the countries in question, and 

the security forces are no exception. Of the countries surveyed in 

this report, all are in the lower half of Transparency International’s 

“Corruption Perception Index,” with the exception of Saudi Arabia 

which scored in the middle. Indonesia and Pakistan were among the 

most corrupt countries in the world.57 Uzbekistan’s military leaders 

often will exempt an individual from military service for the right 

price.58 The Abu Sayyaf Group buys weapons and immunity freely 

from government officials, and several leading terrorists simply 

walked out of the heavy “secured” national police headquarters in 

Manila with the aid of local officers.59 In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it 

is assumed that senior military and intelligence leaders will have 

a “take” from many contracts: an assumption that is duplicated in 

lesser ways down the chain of command. In Algeria, the different 

paramilitary and military leaders often do not cooperate because 

of business rivalries.60 In Indonesia, corruption is rampant in the 

buying of equipment and other supplies.61 All these examples only 

scratch the surface of the myriad ways corruption undermines COIN 

effectiveness.

Insurgent Penetration.

Ensuring the security forces remain free from insurgent 

penetration is vital. Successful penetration allows the insurgents to 

avoid regime attempts to arrest or kill insurgent cadre. In addition, 

it gives the insurgents inside information that greatly increases their 

effectiveness in planning attacks. 

 Many regimes fighting al-Qa’ida are penetrated by the insurgents. 

In Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, al-Qa’ida has made a conscious 

effort to cultivate military and government officials.62 U.S. officials 

working with the Afghan National Army are prohibited from sharing 

intelligence, as they fear it will fall into the hands of ex-Taliban.63 In 

Algeria, many of the early insurgent successes involved members of 

the security forces who collaborated with them, and the regime often 

hesitated to use the army because it feared that many soldiers would 

desert.64
15

Military Support from the Population.

Famously, counterinsurgency involves winning the “hearts and 

minds” of the population at large and denying such support to the 

guerrillas. As the security forces plan and conduct operations against 

insurgents, they must also think about how to win over the general 

population, as one of its most important roles is to “serve as the 

shield for carrying out reform.”65 The security forces need the active 

support of the population to gain information—a disadvantage, as 

mere passivity often allows insurgents to operate effectively without 

being vulnerable to government intelligence efforts.66 Beyond 

intelligence, popular support allows the guerrillas more access to 

recruits and “taxes.” To gain active support, it is helpful if the security 

forces are fighting for a system that offers political, economic, and 

other opportunities to all concerned: something that is often beyond 

their control. In addition, security forces are more likely to win over 

the population in general if they are seen as fighting for more than 

just a political or social clique. If the security forces are viewed as 

representing all the diverse communities of any state, they are more 

likely to be viewed as trustworthy and will not provoke any negative 

backlash. Finally, successful COIN is characterized by restraint as 

well as by violence. Too much destruction can alienate a population 

rather than reassure it and unwittingly create disincentives to fight 

for and cooperate with the government.67

 Such benign characteristics often are lacking for security forces 

fighting al-Qa’ida-linked groups, making it harder for them to 

capture popular support. In India, for example, the army’s outlook is 

more akin to the British imperial army. As a result, it sees itself more 

as occupier than as part of the local population, with the result that 

relations often are poor.68 When suppressing the Punjab insurgency, 

the Indian security forces saw themselves as protecting the local 

Hindu population from Sikh militants, and, as a result, it alienated 

local services that sought to balance Sikh and Hindu concerns.69

Indonesian soldiers often take sides in local disputes according to 

whether the soldiers are Muslim or Christian.70

 Brutality is a particular problem. The Algerian security forces 

are notorious for atrocities against civilians. In Uzbekistan torture 

is widespread,71 and in June 2005, the military fired on a peaceful 

political opposition rally. The Indonesian military and intelligence 
16

services were linked to numerous human rights abuses in Aceh, 

Papua, Central Sulawesi, and Maluku.72 Such actions create 

sympathy for the guerrillas, particularly when the government 

control is weak, and people have an option of siding against it with 

less risk.73

 As the above discussion suggests, most potential U.S. allies 

against al-Qa’ida-linked insurgencies do not do well according to 

these criteria. Indeed, it is no exaggeration for several that they 

range from poor to abysmal. Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview 

of security forces fighting al-Qa’ida-linked insurgencies, using the 

above criteria to indicate problems they have. 

 Saudi

Afghanistan Algeria Egypt India Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Arabia Uzbekistan

Poor Intelligence XX XX XX XX

Poor integration XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 

 across units

Garrison mentality/

 low level initiative XX XX XX XX XX XX

Soldiers who don’t XX XX XX XX XX XX

 want to fight 

Bad officers or XX XX XX XX XX

 senior personnel

Bad junior personnel XX XX XX XX XX XX

Training, Learning, XX XX XX XX XX XX

 and Creativity 

 Problems

Table 1. Allied Security Forces and COIN: 

Tactical and Organizational Characteristics.

 Saudi

Afghanistan Algeria Egypt India Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Arabia Uzbekistan

Poor relations XX XX XX XX XX XX 

 with civilian 

 officials 

Bad rapport with XX XX XX XX XX 

 outside patrons 

 (US, etc.)

Corruption XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 

Security forces not XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX

 fighting for a 

 system that can win 

 over population

Vulnerable to XX XX XX XX XX XX

 insurgent penetration

Table 2. Allied Security Forces and COIN: Political Characteristics.
17

IV. STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF TACTICAL, 

ORGANIZATIONAL, AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

A look at the countries in question indicates that they suffer from 

several structural problems: illegitimate and repressive regimes 

and poor relations with civilian officials, particularly with regard to 

suspicions of a coup, economic backwardness, and social exclusion. 

Even the democracies among the lot suffer from several of these 

issues. Table 3 displays the extent of this problem. These problems, 

of course, are not universal and, as discussed further below; the 

military culture and broader political problems of counterinsurgency 

vary accordingly.

 Saudi

Afghanistan Algeria Egypt India Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Arabia Uzbekistan

Illegitimate XX XX XX XX

 Regimes

Coup Suspicions XX XX XX XX 

Economic XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX

 Backwardness

Social Exclusion XX XX XX XX XX XX

Table 3. Structural Problems of Counterinsurgency Allies.

 These structural problems should in no way be surprising. 

Although the causes of insurgency can be vast, common ones include 

a weak and dysfunctional government, a lack of popular legitimacy 

caused by an exclusive government, discrimination, and economic 

discontent.75 Thus, at times the very causes of insurgency also create 

problems for the security services that fight it.

Illegitimate and Repressive Regimes.

Many, if not most, of the regimes facing al-Qa’ida-linked 

insurgencies have a legitimacy problem. Of the countries surveyed, 

only India, the Philippines, and, to a lesser degree, Afghanistan 

and Indonesia qualify as democracies. Freedom House reports that 

Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan are “not 

free,” and these countries scored sixes and sevens on their scale, 

with seven being the least free.76 Algeria’s military government took 
18

power in order to overturn elections that Islamists were poised to 

win peacefully. President Musharraf of Pakistan also took power 

in a military coup. The coup had considerable support at the time, 

but he subsequently has alienated middle class Pakistanis, while 

many Islamists view him with suspicion. Uzbekistan has a brutal 

dictatorship, where all opposition political activity is banned.77

Egypt’s leader has held power for a quarter-century, with only the 

trapping of democracy. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that has some 

legitimacy, but the regime’s corruption and exclusiveness have bred 

considerable cynicism.78

 An illegitimate and repressive regime has several pernicious 

effects on tactical and organizational aspects of counterinsurgency. 

The flow of information in authoritarian states is limited, particularly 

if the information may be perceived as critical of the regime. In such 

an environment, information is compartmented deliberately. Nor 

are mistakes critically examined or even identified. In Uzbekistan, 

the regime has resisted intelligence reform that would enhance the 

information gained by the security forces, as it wants to ensure that 

intelligence is concentrated in the hands of regime loyalists.79

 Military regimes like those in Algeria and Pakistan face particular 

problems. If militaries are accountable to their publics through 

democratic officials, they are more likely to change their procedures 

and methods in the event of problems.80 Military regimes, in 

contrast, lack such a means of imposing change. Corruption is also 

a problem, as military figures in power use their positions to enrich 

themselves at the public’s expense, even if it hinders overall military 

effectiveness.

 The political problems dwarf the tactical and organizational 

ones. At the most basic level, the lack of regime legitimacy makes 

it difficult for the security forces to portray themselves as fighting 

for a system that its citizens should embrace. The population is less 

likely to provide intelligence, offer willing recruits or otherwise 

support the security forces, and many soldiers or junior officials 

may be sympathetic to the rebels. The regime may rely primarily 

on repression to stay in power as it does in Uzbekistan, leading 

the security forces to become involved in human rights abuses. In 

Algeria, this process reached its acme, as the regime there regularly 

used the security forces to commit atrocities. Security forces’ leaders 
19

may also oppose reforms because they are instruments of the regime 

and thus they stand to lose power, opportunities for graft, or other 

benefits. In Algeria, the military feared an Islamist victory at the 

polls would lead them to lose their power in the country and their 

financial influence—a fear that led them to disrupt elections through 

a coup.81

 The lack of legitimacy also poses a difficulty for cooperation with 

a foreign power. Close cooperation with a foreign government can 

inflame nationalism and lead to questions about a government’s 

competence: a particular problem if the government lacks broad 

support. The widespread unpopularity of the United States in the 

world today worsens this problem.82

Suspicion of a Coup.

 In many developing world countries, the security forces are viewed 

as a threat as well as a pillar of a regime. As a result, governments 

go to great lengths to “coup-proof” their regimes, emasculating the 

military, paramilitary, and intelligence forces in a variety of ways 

to ensure their political loyalty.83 Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 

the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan have taken steps to 

control their security forces, even at the cost of their effectiveness in 

fighting insurgents.84

 Coup-proofing shapes the culture of security forces in several 

negative ways. Most important, the senior officers are chosen 

primarily for their loyalty to the regime, not for their competence. 

In Saudi Arabia, for example, many senior officers are royal family 

members, while others have close ties by marriage and other 

relationships. As a result, many important skills such as leadership, 

creativity, and knowledge of military affairs are in short supply. 

Indeed, in some security forces, particularly militaries, charismatic 

and capable leaders are viewed as a threat to the regime rather than 

as an asset. Finally, governments also use corruption as a way to 

placate leaders of the security forces.85

 Coup-proofing also inhibits the flow of information. Some regimes 

discourage leaders from communicating with one another, an 

effective means of preventing anti-regime plotting, but one that also 

inhibits coordination and learning best practices. Training can also 
20

suffer. In Egypt, for example, troops are given little independence (or 

ammunition!) when doing training, and exercises are unrealistic—in 

part to prevent a training mission from turning into an attempt to 

topple the regime. 

Economic Backwardness.

 Many of the countries fighting al-Qa’ida-linked insurgencies are 

poor, while others are, at best, in the middle income range. Algeria, 

Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, 

and Uzbekistan suffer a range of economic problems, including 

relatively low per-capita gross domestic product (GDP), high 

unemployment, poor infrastructure, and stagnant growth. Again, 

such backwardness is not surprising: poorer countries are more 

likely to suffer insurgencies than wealthy ones, and the insurgency 

itself is a barrier to economic development. 

 The impact of a poor economy is relatively straightforward. 

Corruption, of course, is more tempting when overall wages are 

low (and, indeed, corruption may be particularly common as it 

is often a source of poor economic growth). A poor economy can 

also limit the budget of a country, making it difficult to pay recruits 

well, buy better equipment for the force, and expand the size of 

the security forces.86 At times, the army may be huge despite a 

poor economy, placing particularly heavy strains on the budget. In 

Egypt, the internal security forces have very low pay and recruiting 

standards—lower than the regular forces.87 One observer noted that 

young Uzbeks joined former IMU leader Juma Namangani’s forces 

over the government’s, “because at least he pays them.”88

 Not surprisingly, the quality of personnel may also suffer, 

as the poor pay and limited resources make other opportunities 

more attractive.89 In Egypt, for example, a large number of enlisted 

personnel are illiterate, and even fewer have a technical education.90

In Uzbekistan, the armed forces have had difficulty assimilating U.S. 

military aid because they lack the technical expertise to maintain and 

repair the equipment.91

 Even Saudi Arabia—by reputation, a wealthy state—has more 

than its share of economic problems. Despite its oil riches, overall 

economic development has been limited, and skyrocketing popu-
21

lation growth puts serious strains on the country. The quality 

of education is poor by Western standards. Moreover, income 

distribution is heavily skewed, favoring the royal family and those 

connected to it.92

Social Exclusion and Divisions.

In many countries, power in all its forms is held by a relatively 

small group of people, who in turn exclude or actively inhibit the 

rise of other groups. In India, remnants of the caste system have 

preserved a division between the “work of the hands” and “work 

of the minds,” while several ethnicities are particularly prevalent in 

the military by tradition. Caste and subcaste often define regiments 

and battalions.93 Even many Hindu-Muslim divisions are really 

about caste differences.94 As a result, individuals are cut off from one 

another. Clan and region also are important in Uzbekistan, while in 

Pakistan there is a bias against the Shi’a minority in education and 

state services.95 Saudi Arabia, of course, is dominated by the al Saud 

family, and many of its security positions are in the hands of specific 

tribes, particularly individuals from the Najd region. Some of its 

paramilitary forces are drawn almost exclusively from particular 

tribes and regions.

 Such domination has several pernicious effects on the military 

culture. The officer corps may actively disdain much of the rank-andfile if soldiers are of a different, less-regarded, group. Promotions 

and rewards may also be skewed with individuals from certain 

groups receiving a preference, while others have a formal or informal 

ceiling on their rise. In addition, the quality of personnel may suffer 

as certain groups may deem the security forces to be unwelcoming. 

Even without hostility, ethnic differences create more mundane 

problems. In Afghanistan, training has suffered due to the problem 

of coordinating across multiple languages.

 The direct political consequences of exclusion and social divisions 

relevant to counterinsurgency also are considerable. Politically, the 

security forces may be seen as an agent of the ruling clique, not of 

the nation as a whole. In addition, the security forces may oppose 

political and social reforms that disadvantage their members’ 

privileged position.
22

 In some countries, the security forces may represent the majority 

population but are seen as alien by segments linked to the insurgents. 

The Philippines’ military, for example, includes much of the 

population, but is not seen as representative by the Muslim minority 

in areas where the Abu Sayyaf Group was active.96

 Four types of structural problems have both a direct and an indirect 

impact on government COIN efforts. These issues directly shape the 

insurgency’s appeal and the military’s ability to fight it, particularly 

with regard to being able to present itself as an instrument of a 

legitimate, honest, and efficient government. Indirectly, these factors 

create the security forces’ culture—one that is often dysfunctional 

and leads to numerous COIN problems. Figure 1 illustrates this 

relationship:

Security Forces’ 

Culture

COIN 

(In)effectiveness

Political Problems 

for the Security 

Forces

Political, civilmilitary, social, 

and economic 

structure and 

problems

Figure 1. Structure, Military Culture, Political Problems, 

and COIN Effectiveness.

V. THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURE

The four structural problems have a range of pernicious effects. 

Conceptually, these can be separated into two areas: the direct 

political impact on counterinsurgency, and the way they shape the 

culture of a country’s security forces which, in turn, has a range of 

implications for counterinsurgency.
23

Structure and the Politics of Counterinsurgency.

The broader structural problems common to countries facing alQa’ida-linked insurgencies create a host of problems for the security 

forces in their role as a political actor. One of the most pernicious is 

that the security forces lack popular support, either because they are 

agents of a repressive and illegitimate regime or because they promote 

a discriminatory society. In such cases, basic counterinsurgency 

functions such as gathering intelligence and denying information to 

the insurgents are more difficult. In addition, the lack of popular 

support makes it easier for the insurgents to gain recruits and 

resources. 

 Common problems for authoritarian regimes include security 

forces that are easier to penetrate and are involved directly in human 

rights abuses. Authoritarian regimes often encourage human rights 

abuses as a way of intimidating the population. In addition, members 

of the rank and file may be more sympathetic to insurgents if they 

feel the government they are fighting is illegitimate.

 Another difficult issue is that the security forces often are 

opposed to reforms that would take the wind out of the insurgency’s 

sails, such as land reform, greater democracy and accountability, or 

the ending of discriminatory policies. The security forces’ leadership 

may see such reforms as a threat to their political and social position 

and thus not worth the potential benefits against the insurgents. 

The Culture of the Security Forces 

and Counterinsurgency Effectiveness.

In addition to the grave political impact, the culture produced 

by these structural factors has many negative effects on counterinsurgency. 

Bad Promotion System.

The structural problems create a promotion system that rewards 

officers and senior officials who are not skilled in fighting insurgents 

or military affairs: a problem particularly common due to coupproofing and societal discrimination. In India, promotion in some 
24

units depends on preserving caste ratios: if a particular regiment 

that is home to one caste has no vacancies for more senior positions, 

soldiers from that unit will not be promoted.97 As a result, basic 

military tasks are more likely to be performed poorly. Initiative will 

suffer, and a garrison mentality is more likely as officers will not 

motivate the soldiers. In such a system, one of the hardest tasks—

integration across units and among services—is less likely to be 

rewarded. More generally, loyalty to the regime or membership 

in the right group will count for more than creativity and military 

excellence.

Officer Contempt for NCOs, Soldiers, and Other Junior Officials.

Some officers or senior leaders may even hold their subordinates 

in contempt, a particularly common problem when the officers are 

from a particular clique that looks down on rival groups. In such 

circumstances, lower levels of the security forces are less likely to 

take the initiative, as their officers often believe they are not capable 

of acting on their own. This contempt may also inhibit creative 

solutions developed at the lowest levels from making their way up 

the chain of command. Soldiers, not surprisingly, are less inspired 

by officers who do not respect them. 

Low Quality Personnel.

 The overall quality of personnel in the security forces under 

examination may be low, which has a detrimental impact on COIN 

in a variety of ways. Perhaps 70 percent of the trainees in the Afghan 

army are illiterate,98 and illiteracy is also a problem in India as the 

emphasis on caste for recruitment means that there are not enough 

literate recruits to fill out some regiments.99 Intelligence officials often 

are far better educated than are military forces, but paramilitaries are 

at times drawn from tribes or groups chosen for their loyalty, with 

some regimes being particularly suspicious of social groups that are 

better educated. Personnel who are less educated and less motivated 

are less able to gather and process intelligence effectively. The 

challenge of integration often is particularly difficult. If the overall 

quality of personnel is low, both the officers and their subordinates 

will suffer accordingly.
25

Corruption.

Corruption stemming from a high level of poverty, deliberate 

regime attempts to buy off security force leaders, and the officers’ 

use of their political clout to enrich themselves also has numerous 

negative effects on military culture. Corruption, of course, makes it 

more likely that bad officers will rise through the ranks, and that 

officers in general will neglect the military arts. Insurgents are better 

able to penetrate the security forces, both because they can bribe their 

way into key positions and because overall disaffection in the ranks 

makes penetration easier. Training may even be inhibited, as officers 

are reluctant to have subordinates leave their control because they 

are skimming off their pay and supply requisitions. 

 Corrupt security forces also are less popular. Subordinates will 

not be inspired by their officers, and the people in general will see 

the security forces more as a parasite than as a savior. Uzbekistan’s 

soldiers oppose service, in part because corruption is widespread 

which enables many to buy their way out of serving.100 Not 

surprisingly, officers enriching themselves through their military 

positions are likely to resist any reforms that increase accountability 

and oversight or otherwise hinder opportunities for graft.

Poor Training and Learning.

 The poor training and learning structures that can stem from 

coup-proofing measures and a political system where information 

is guarded have a severe impact on COIN effectiveness. Integration 

will suffer if units cannot train for it. Without training for COIN 

in particular, it may prove particularly hard for soldiers given 

standard training for conventional operations to operate in small 

groups, exercise low-level initiative, be discriminate in their use of 

firepower, or otherwise carry out tasks that differ from conventional 

operations. Many officers and NCOs will lack the skills they need 

to fight insurgents properly. Without institutions to disseminate 

knowledge on the best techniques (and to appraise critically what is 

going wrong), the security forces will be less likely to adapt new and 

creative solutions to the problems that are encountered.

 Security forces that are not accountable to elected leaders and 

the public in general are less likely to correct mistakes or undertake 

bureaucratically painful changes. Particular problems may include 
26

poor integration across units and services, and a lack of creativity 

when standard procedures fail or when new situations arrive. 

Politically, such security forces may be more prone to human rights 

abuses, as they can cover up any problems and not risk broader 

censure.

Low Budget.

The effects of a low budget are relatively straightforward. Soldiers 

often are poorly paid, and as a result are not eager to make sacrifices. 

Training may also suffer, as a sophisticated training program is 

expensive and requires more troops, as some must remain actively 

engaged while others are being trained. In Uzbekistan, the regime 

cannot afford to modernize its old equipment, making many reform 

proposals dead on arrival.101

Deliberately Compartmented Information.

Fears of a coup and a political system that relies on repression often 

lead to the stifling of information flows and a lack of communication 

in general. As a result, the overall quality of intelligence is poor, 

either because intelligence officers lack all the necessary information 

or because many plausible findings (e.g., that people are rebelling 

because the regime is brutal and illegitimate) are suppressed 

because they are unwelcome at senior levels. Without the flow of 

information, integrating forces becomes far harder, as does designing 

or redesigning procedures in a creative way to handle persistent 

problems.

 Figure 2 illustrates the linkages between structural problems, the 

resulting security force culture, and COIN effectiveness.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

The implications of these many problems and their underlying 

sources are profound for U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

operations. At the most obvious level, solving many of the various 

military problems requires changing the broader society, economy, 

and political system: a daunting challenge that requires massive 

resources to tackle. 
27

Repressive

Political Syatem

Fears of Coup

Discriminatory

Society

Developing World

Economy

Officer contempt for NCOs, soldiers,

and low-level officials

Bad promotion system

Corruption

Poor training/

learning structures

Low budget

Low quality personnel

Uncreative and

non-adaptive

military

Bad NCOs

Bad officers

Soldiers who

don't want to fight

Garrison mentality

lack of initiative

Bad integration

Bad intelligence

Deliberately compartmented

information

Figure 2. Tactical and Operational Problems Stemming

from Military Culture.

 Compounding this challenge is that our instrument of change is 

often the very regime and security forces that are part of the structural 

problem in the first place. The United States cannot by itself foster 

economic development in Algeria or political reform in Uzbekistan. 

Such measures require local regimes to take action. For many local 

interlocutors, reform is more threatening than the insurgency: 

Political reform would throw them out of power, military reform 

might increase the chances of a coup, economic reform would lessen 

opportunities for corruption, and social reform would hinder their 

group’s hold on power. Not surprisingly, foreign leaders often turn 

the United States down when it presses for reform. At times, they 

may half-heartedly embrace reform, going through the motions (and 

taking U.S. money and resources) but perverting the outcome to 

ensure the stability of the status quo. 
28

 The United States also suffers from several “moral hazards” as it 

seeks to exert influence. U.S. support of a government often makes 

it less necessary for the regime to undertake the reforms required to 

gain popular support. U.S. backing comes with a degree of legitimacy 

as well as with financial and other resources. Thus empowered, 

governments can put off land reform, stop reining in corruption, 

and avoid other changes that would hurt the insurgent cause.102

In Uzbekistan, for example, the regime used the U.S. embrace to 

enhance its legitimacy, even as it cracked down on dissent at home.103

Ironically, the United States may be tarred with the brush of a brutal 

ally, even if it is urging that ally to reform.104

 Similarly, U.S. support for security forces makes it less necessary 

that the security forces in question change leaders and revise their 

doctrine, organization, and procedures to better fight the insurgency. 

Change often comes at the point of a knife: If the United States is 

doing the fighting for or even with locals, they may believe they can 

carry on with inefficient practices without losing. 

 In the most extreme circumstances, the local security forces and 

regime may not want to completely defeat the insurgents for financial 

reasons. Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev, for example, 

declared the U.S. presence to be a “gold mine,” a comment that 

suggests just how beneficial a U.S. military presence can be to poor 

areas.105 Even without U.S. aid, war is often financially beneficial to 

local leaders. In Algeria, elements of the security forces wanted to 

keep the war going with the insurgents indefinitely because of these 

financial benefits.106

 To increase its chances of success, the United States must 

recognize that it is not always on the side of the government. Rather, 

Washington should at times act as third party, helping fight the 

insurgency but also demanding reforms. Aid and other assistance 

should be contingent on improvements when possible.

 Playing such a role will be difficult politically for the United 

States. The repeated declarations on the U.S. part that fighting alQa’ida is a “vital interest” (and linking this to the country in question, 

which is often necessary to get a program underway for political and 

bureaucratic reasons at home) make it difficult for the United States 

to threaten to cut support.107 Moreover, such declarations provide 

locals an incentive to exaggerate their insurgents’ links to al-Qa’ida.108
29

The government of Uzbekistan even has stressed the dangers to U.S. 

military personnel as a way of pushing the United States to support 

the government more.109

 Just as the United States will face difficulty exerting political 

influence, efforts to change the security forces directly will also 

suffer problems. Peacetime engagement activities like training, 

military education programs, and military-to-military contacts can 

help change a military culture. U.S. officials argue that the Georgian 

military did not interfere in the recent process of democratic change in 

part due to the influence of U.S. training and education programs.110

However, the new perspectives and skills that are learned in these 

programs often atrophy or are overwhelmed by the powerful 

cultural, political, and economic forces that created the dysfunctional 

military culture in the first place. Uzbekistan, for example, has been 

a member of the “Partnership for Peace” since 1994, yet its military 

culture remains brutal and corrupt. 

 As a result of these barriers, realistic expectations are necessary. 

Diplomatic pressure and peacetime military engagement activities 

can help improve a government’s effort against insurgencies, but 

their track record is likely to be spotty at best. Moreover, these efforts 

may take years or even generations. Recognizing the difficulties in 

this process and the likely limits will help in designing programs 

that are more realistic and have the proper expectations. 

ENDNOTES

 1. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El 

Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 1991, for a superb overview of the U.S. counterinsurgency program 

and its many problems. Another valuable study of the U.S. problems in El Salvador 

with regard to reform is A. J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White, and 

Thomas F. Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, 

Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988.

 2. For a general overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency issues, 

see D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency 

Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988; Douglas Blaufarb, 

The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, New York: Free 

Press, 1977; George K. Tanham and Dennis J. Duncanson, “Some Dilemmas of 

Counterinsurgency,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, January 1970, pp. 113-122; William 

Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients 
30

and Insurgents, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992; Harry Eckstein, ed., 

Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York: Free Press, 1964; Nathan Leites 

and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 

Conflicts, Chicago: Markham, 1970; Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and 

Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750, New York: Routledge, 

2003; Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary 

Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991; and 

Tom Marks, “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism,” Journal of Counterterrorism & 

Homeland Security International, Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 2005, electronic version.

 3. See Blaufarb, Counterinsurgency Era, for a review.

 4. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the regular army is excluded from many 

sensitive duties linked to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with the Saudi 

Arabian National Guard playing the key role. The Special Security Forces and the 

Special Emergency Forces play particularly important roles in the effort against alQa’ida. See Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Internal Security: 

A Risk Assessment,” May 30, 2004, working draft, p. 18. In Algeria, initial failures 

led to the formation of elite COIN units that over time became quite large. Luis 

Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998, Jonathan Derrick, trans., New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 149. India has numerous forces involved in 

fighting insurgents in Kashmir, including the regular and special police, village 

defense committees, the central reserve police force, the Indian reserve police 

force, the Central Industrial Security Force, and the Border Security Force, among 

other units. For a review, see Tom Marks, “At the Frontlines of the GWOT: State 

Response to Insurgency in Jammu,” Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security 

International, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall 2003, electronic version. In many countries, 

the paramilitary forces are as large or larger than the regular army forces. In 

Uzbekistan, the paramilitary forces number approximately 20,000, and those in 

the regular army and Air Force account for another 55,000. Roger N. McDermott, 

“The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan 1992-2002: Threats, Influence, 

and Reform,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2003, p. 29.

 5. Marks, “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism.”

 6. Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflicts, New 

York: Crane Russak & Company, 1987, p. 128. 

 7. U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency Operations, FMI 3-07.22, October 2004, section 

1-10.

 8. For a discussion on the nationalistic backlash that outside occupiers face, 

see David Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed 

or Fail,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 49-91; and Bard E. 

O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Dulles, VA: 

Brassey’s Inc., 1990, p. 137.

 9. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 125. Some experts argue this has 

happened already in Uzbekistan. See “Prepared Statement of Martha Brill Olcott,” 
31

as reprinted in “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional 

Instability,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central 

Asia of the House Committee on International Relations, October 29, 2003, p. 57.

 10. U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency Operations, section 2-16, notes that the United 

States seeks to improve host nation security forces, but it does not discuss their 

common problems and weaknesses.

 11. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, n.d., p. 2. The 

pamphlet was published in the 1980s. For an alternative definition that emphasizes 

the importance of guerrilla war and the spirit of peasant rebellion, see Raj Desai 

and Harry Eckstein, “Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion,” 

World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1990, p. 442. Fearon and Laitin define insurgency as 

involving guerrilla warfare from rural base areas, while the U.S. Army definition 

emphasizes that “political power is the central issue in an insurgency.” U.S. Army, 

Counterinsurgency Operations, section 1-1. 

 12. See Daniel Byman, “The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and 

Terrorism, Vol. 21, No. 2, April-June 1998, pp. 149-169.

 13. Hizballah’s primary operations against Israel are largely characterized 

by the Israelis as guerrilla attacks, and the organization spends a tremendous 

amount of time on mobilizing its cadre and supporters. The movement still 

supports terrorism by Palestinian groups and at times does its own operations, 

but the vast majority of attacks fit the guerrilla war description. For works that 

characterize Hizballah as an insurgency, see Sami G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, 

National Liberation, or Menace? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, August 2002, p. 17, available at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.

mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB184.pdf; and Retired Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel of the 

Israeli Defense Forces, “Counterguerrilla Warfare in South Lebanon,” Marine 

Corps Gazette, Vol. 81, No. 7, pp. 40-45. Regarding Kashmir, see Thomas A. Marks, 

“India: State Response to Insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir – the Jammu Case,” 

Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p. 137.

 14. These contrasting definitions are meant to clarify insurgencies and 

terrorism as analytic concepts, not to make judgments on the legitimacy of the 

tactics. In my judgment, the moral distinction is that terrorists deliberately target 

noncombatants, while an insurgent group in theory (though seldom in practice, as 

the LTTE, PKK, and FARC examples suggest) could focus its attacks on military 

targets.

 15. See Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 

2002, pp. xviii. 

 16. Ibid., p. 207. 

 17. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 

Commission Report, New York: W. W. Norton, 2004, pp. 47-70; and Marc Sageman, 

Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 

2004. 
32

 18. The ability to recruit and replace lost cadre is vital for successful terrorist 

organizations. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An 

Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2003, pp. 34-36. 

 19. Iraq is excluded from this monograph because the focus is on allied 

militaries and their relations to their societies, which in Iraq is complicated by the 

U.S. occupation and heavy role in the post-occupation government. Using preliberation forces, however, would skew the data as well. For a superb review of 

the Iraqi military performance through the 1991 Gulf War, see Kenneth Pollack’s 

Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln: University of Nebraska 

Press, 2002, pp. 155-266. 

 20. Bruce Hoffman notes that the United States repeatedly fails to detect the 

development of insurgencies until it is too late. Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and 

Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” RAND Occasional Paper, June 2004, pp. 1-4.

 21. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 

21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004, p. 18.

 22. For one good list, see Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of 

Insurgency, p. 13.

 23. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 130; Central Intelligence Agency, Guide 

to the Analysis of Insurgency, p. 10.

 24 McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” p. 32.

 25. Author’s interviews; and Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Sphinx and the Eagle,” 

Chapter 4: “Conventional Military Capabilities,” unpublished, 1998.

 26. See Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”

 27. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 144; Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer 

Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, p. 9.

 28. Author’s interviews with U.S. Government officials. For a more complete 

overview of this problem, see Kenneth Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on 

Arab Military Effectiveness,” unpublished dissertation, 1996, pp. 564-566.

 29. Emil P. Jurado, “Need for Coordinated Intelligence Network,” Manila 

Standard, February 23, 2005; and Fe. V. Maragay, “Safeguarding the Spy Fund,” 

Manila Standard, January 31, 2005.

 30. Pollack, “The Sphinx and the Eagle.”

 31. C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri 

Lanka, India, and Pakistan, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004, p. 94.

 32. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security 

Strategy,” Asia Report No. 90, December 20, 2004, p. 13.
33

 33. Raymond A. Millen, Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 3.

 34. International Crisis Group, “The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet,” October 

20, 2000, p. 12. 

 35. International Crisis Group: Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security 

Strategy,” p. 5.

 36. Pollack, “The Sphinx and the Eagle.”

 37. Farkhad Tolipov and Roger N. McDermott, “Uzbekistan and the US: 

Partners against Terrorism,” Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer 

2003, p. 2.

 38. Charles DiLeonardo, “Training the Afghan National Army,” Infantry, Vol. 

94, No. 2, March/April 2005, p. 32.

 39. Tom Coghlan, “Toughing it in the Afghan Army,” BBCNEWS.com, June 15, 

2005.

 40. Ahmed Rashid, “A Long, Hot Summer Ahead,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, April 19, 2001, p. 29.

 41. Many Egyptian Air Force officers, for example, do not enjoy flying. Pollack, 

“The Sphinx and the Eagle.”

 42. Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies, Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 243.

 43. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 131; Metz and Millen, Insurgency and 

Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 25.

 44. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning 

to Eat Soup with a Knife, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, pp. 191-226.

 45. McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” p. 30.

 46. Tolipov and McDermott, “Uzbekistan and the US,” p. 14.

 47. Sunil Dasgupta, “Rise of Paramilitary Forces: Military Reorganization in 

Developing Societies,” draft, p. 23. 

 48. See Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Sphinx and the Eagle.” 

 49. Ibid.

 50. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, p. 146; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic 

Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, p. v. 

 51. Lawrence E. Kline, “Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies: A Comparison,” 

Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1998, p. 127. 

 52. Kline, “Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies,” p. 129.

 53. This monograph focuses on attitudes toward the United States, but many 

of the countries involved work with other states. Algeria and France long have 

cooperated closely against terrorists. Uzbekistan’s military receives aid from 
34

Germany, Turkey, and, of course, Russia, as well as the United States. Tolipov and 

McDermott, “Uzbekistan and the US,” p. 11.

 54. Steven Rogers, “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1, 

January/February 2004, pp. 15-20.

 55. International Crisis Group, “The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after 

the Iraq War,” September 30, 2003, p. 8.

 56. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Resuming US-Indonesia Military 

Ties,” May 21, 2002, p. 2.

 57. Transparency International did not code Afghanistan, but numerous 

anecdotal reports indicate corruption is widespread. See Transparency 

International, 2004 Annual Report: The Coalition against Corruption, pp. 10-11, 

available at http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/annual_rep/ar_2004/TI%20Annual

%20Report%202004.pdf.

 58. McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” p. 36.

 59. Rogers, “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf,” pp. 15-20.

 60. International Crisis Group, “The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet,” p. 12. 

 61. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform,” p. 

13.

 62. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, p. 22.

 63. DiLeonardo, “Training the Afghan National Army,” p. 38.

 64. Willes, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, p. 295; Martinez, The Algerian Civil 

War, p. 161; Kline, “Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies,” p. 129.

 65. Marks, “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism,” electronic version.

 66. Christopher M. Ford, “Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality 

to Defeat an Insurgency,” Parameters, Summer 2005, p. 53. T. E. Lawrence noted 

that the guerrillas only needed a limited amount of active support, but that much 

of the population must be passive or inactive backers. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies 

and Counterinsurgencies, p. 20. See also Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the 

Analysis of Insurgency, p. 8. For an alternative view, see Chalmers Johnson, “Civilian 

Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict,” World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4, July 1962, pp. 646-

661.

 67. For an assessment of how incentives affect the success of rebellion, see Mark 

I. Lichback, “What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, 

and Irony in Peasant Collective Action,” World Politics, Vol. 46, April 1994, pp. 

383-418; and Jeffrey Berejikian, “Revolutionary Collective Action and the AgentStructure Problem,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, September 

1992, pp. 647-657.

 68. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 241.

 69. Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, p. 90.
35

 70. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia,” p. 4.

 71. Nichol, “Uzbekistan,” p. 6.

 72. Aleksius Jemadu, “Intelligence agencies must be held to account,” The 

Jakarta Post, June 20, 2005.

 73. See Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority.

 74. The Indian security forces historically did not integrate well across services 

in their counterinsurgency operations. However, in recent years the police, military, 

and paramilitary forces have worked better together. See Fair, Urban Battle Fields of 

South Asia, p. 70.

 75. James Fearon and David Laitin believe factors that indicate a country is 

vulnerable to insurgency include poverty, which suggests states that are poor and 

bureaucratically weak; instability; inaccessible terrain; and a large population. 

See “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” In such circumstances, the military 

becomes vital. As Morris Janowitz notes, “the absence of or the failure to develop 

more effective patterns of political and social control leads military regimes or 

military-based regimes to rely more heavily on internal police control.” Morros 

Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 7.

 76. “Table of Independent Countries Comparative Measures of Freedom,” 

Freedom in the World 2005, Freedom House, available at http://www.freedomhouse.

org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf. 

 77. Jim Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests,” 

Congressional Research Report, April 21, 2004, p. 5. 

 78. A lack of democracy does not inherently make a regime illegitimate in 

the eyes of its people. The Al Saud, for example, have long enjoyed legitimacy, 

though some argue this is fading due to their provision of economic goods, 

conquest of rivals, and efforts to uphold their religious credentials. For purposes 

of this monograph, Saudi Arabia is coded as a legitimate regime, though it is a 

borderline case. See Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New 

York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001; and F. Gregory Gause III, “Be Careful What You 

Wish For: The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2002, 

pp. 37-50.

 79. McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” pp. 36-

37.

 80. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 

Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984, pp. 53-54, 225-226.

 81. Michael Willes, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History, New 

York: New York University Press, 1997, p. 245.

 82. In none of the Arab countries surveyed by the Pew Foundation in July 

2005 did the United States have a majority view it as “favorable,” though the poll 

did show an increase in U.S. popularity from past rock-bottom levels. See Pew 
36

Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and 

Western Publics,” July 14, 2005, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.

php?PageID=811.

 83. Risa Brooks, “Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” in Nora Bensahel 

and Daniel Byman, eds., The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, RAND, 

2003, pp. 129-162; and James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and 

Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall 1999, 

pp. 131-165.

 84. In India, many state parties fear a strong army and oppose a heavy role 

for it, fearing it would be used to curtail states’ autonomy. At the federal level, 

however, there historically was both disdain and suspicion from civilian leaders. 

Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Brookings, 2001, p. 110; Rosen, Societies 

and Military Power, p. 208. In the Philippines, corruption and politics both shape 

promotion. See “Yet another coup in the Philippines?” Jane’s Foreign Report, June 

23, 2005.

 85. Brooks, “Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East.”

 86. For example, much of the Indonesia air force is not operational due to 

funding shortages. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Next Steps in Military 

Reform,” p. 12.

 87. Kline, “Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies,” p. 127.

 88. Rashid, “A Long, Hot Summer Ahead,” p. 29.

 89. Of course, if unemployment is high, skilled individuals may seek out the 

military simply because it offers gainful employment. In Iraq today, many Iraqis 

appear to be joining the security services for financial reasons, despite the great 

personal risk it involves.

 90. Pollack, “The Sphinx and the Eagle.”

 91. McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” p. 32.

 92. Alan Richards, “Economic Reform in the Middle East,” in The Future 

Security Environment in the Middle East, pp. 107-117.

 93. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, pp. 203-209. For a broader look at the 

persistence of caste attitudes on India, see Myron Weiner, The Child and State in 

India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

 94. Cohen, India, p. 114.

 95. International Crisis Group, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” April 

18, 2005, p. i. 

 96. The United States has taken steps to offset the dominance of Tajiks in the 

Afghan military by recruiting more Pashtuns for a range of positions. Joshua 

Kucera, “Afghanistan Looks to Army Expansion,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 

13, 2004; and Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security 

and U.S. Policy,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, May 19, 2005, 

p. 30.
37

 97. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 212.

 98. Mitch Frank, Brian Bennett, Anthony Davis, and Michael Ware, “Army on 

a Shoestring,” Time Europe, August 26, 2002, pp. 30-36.

 99. Rosen, Societies and Military Power, p. 209.

 100. McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” p. 36.

 101. Ibid., p. 38.

 102. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, 

p. 19.

 103. “Prepared Statement of Fiona Hill,” as reprinted in “Central Asia: 

Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Instability,” Hearing before the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House Committee on 

International Relations, October 29, 2003.

 104. “Prepared Statement of Stephen Blank,” as reprinted in “Central Asia: 

Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Instability,” Hearing before the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House Committee on 

International Relations, October 29, 2003, p. 53.

 105. As quoted in Richard Weitz, “Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 

27, 2004, p. 519.

 106. Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, p. 232.

 107. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, 

p. 19.

 108. Author’s interview with General Directorate of External Security (DGSE) 

officials, Paris, France, May 2005.

 109. Weitz, “Storm Clouds over Central Asia.”

 110. Thom Shanker and C. J. Chivers, “Crackdown in Uzbekistan Reopens 

Longstanding Debate on U.S. Military Aid,” New York Times, July 13, 2005, 

electronic version.