United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate

COMBATING NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING 

Challenges Facing U.S. 

Efforts to Deploy Radiation 

Detection Equipment in 

Other Countries and in the 

United States 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST 

Tuesday, March 28, 2006

 

GAO-06-558T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 28, 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy 

Radiation Detection Equipment in Other 

Countries and in the United States 

Highlights of GAO-06-558T, a testimony 

before the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate 

GAO is releasing two reports today

on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear

smuggling in foreign countries and 

in the United States. Together with

the March 2005 report on the 

Department of Energy’s Megaports 

Initiative, these reports represent 

GAO’s analysis of the U.S. effort to

deploy radiation detection 

equipment worldwide. 

In my testimony, I will discuss (1) 

the progress made and challenges 

faced by the Departments of 

Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and 

State in providing radiation

detection equipment to foreign

countries and (2) the Department

of Homeland Security’s (DHS)

efforts to install radiation detection 

equipment at U.S. ports of entry 

and challenges it faces. 

What GAO Recommends

In the report on U.S. efforts to

combat nuclear smuggling in other 

countries, GAO made five

recommendations to improve, 

among other things, equipment 

maintenance, coordination among 

U.S. programs, and accountability

of equipment. Both DOE and State 

agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations. In the report on

radiation detection at U.S. ports of

entry, GAO made nine

recommendations designed to help

DHS speed up the pace of portal 

monitor deployments, better 

account for schedule delays and 

cost uncertainties, and improve its

ability to interdict illicit nuclear 

materials. DHS agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign 

countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since fiscal 

year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36 countries. For 

example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE’s Second Line of Defense 

program had completed installation of equipment at 83 sites, mostly in 

Russia. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could 

compromise their efforts, including corruption of foreign border security

officials, technical limitations and inadequate maintenance of some 

equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. To 

address these challenges, U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps, 

including combating corruption by installing multitiered communications 

systems that establish redundant layers of accountability for alarm response.

State coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication of effort. 

However, State’s ability to carry out this role has been limited by

deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of a comprehensive 

list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to other countries. 

Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors through

December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation detection 

equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to 

install a total of 3,034 radiation portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2009

at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment 

schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated 

funds to contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and 

uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS 

plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) officers have made progress in using radiation detection 

equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines, but CBP’s 

secondary inspection procedures could be improved. For example, GAO 

recommended that DHS require its officers to open containers and inspect 

them for nuclear and radioactive materials when they cannot make a 

determination from an external inspection and that DHS work with the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute procedures by which 

inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports of entry. 

U.S.-Funded Equipment in Uzbekistan and at a Northern U.S. Port of Entry 

Sources: DOD and GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-558T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. government 

programs to combat nuclear smuggling through the deployment of 

radiation detection equipment at border crossings and other ports of entry 

both in foreign countries and in the United States.1 According to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 

662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological 

materials worldwide. Twenty-one of these cases involved material that 

could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, and over 400 involved 

materials that could be used to produce a device that uses conventional 

explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty bomb”). Especially 

in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened

concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear material or a nuclear 

weapon into the United States. This could happen in several ways: nuclear 

materials could be hidden in a car, train, or ship; sent through the mail; 

carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an 

unprotected border. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the 

consequences could be devastating to our national and economic 

interests. 

In response to these threats, four U.S. agencies, the Departments of 

Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State (State), and Homeland Security 

(DHS), implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign 

countries and in the United States. Regarding U.S. efforts in other 

countries, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during 

the 1990s concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at 

borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. One of the main U.S. 

programs providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments

is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which began installing 

equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. In 2003, DOE began a second 

program, the Megaports Initiative, to combat nuclear smuggling at major 

 1

See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation

Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006) and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, 

Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-06-558T 
foreign seaports.2

 In addition to DOE’s efforts, two DOD programs have 

provided radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, and radiation 

detection training to 8 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 

Europe. Similarly, three State programs have provided radiation detection

equipment and training to 31 countries since fiscal year 1994.

Regarding efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in the United States, DHS 

is responsible for providing radiation detection capabilities at U.S. ports of 

entry. Until April 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

managed this program. However, on April 15, 2005, the President directed

the establishment, within DHS, of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO), whose duties include acquiring and supporting the deployment 

of radiation detection equipment.3

 CBP continues its traditional screening 

function at ports of entry to prevent illegal immigration and interdict 

contraband, including the operation of radiation detection equipment. 

DHS is deploying portal monitors in five phases: international mail and 

express courier facilities; northern border crossings; major seaports; 

southwestern border crossings; and all other categories, including 

international airports and remaining border crossings, seaports, and rail 

crossings. Generally, CBP prioritized these categories according to their 

perceived vulnerability to the threat of nuclear smuggling (rather than 

through a formal risk assessment). 

My testimony summarizes the findings of our two reports being released 

today on U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically, I will 

discuss (1) the progress made by the various federal agencies tasked with 

installing radiation detection equipment at ports of entry in foreign 

countries and the challenges these agencies face and (2) DHS’s efforts to 

install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges

DHS faces in completing its program. 

 2

In addition to the two reports being released today, in March 2005 we reported on DOE’s

Megaports Initiative. For additional information, see GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling:

DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at 

Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). Through 

the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE had spent about $101 million to complete installations at 

four ports in Greece, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and the Bahamas. DOE anticipates 

completing an additional port in Spain in April 2006. DOE has signed agreements to begin 

work at ports in seven other countries (China, Honduras, Israel, Oman, the Philippines, 

Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates). 

3

See National Security Presidential Directive No. 43/Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive No. 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection (Apr. 15, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-558T 
Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign 

countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent a total of about $178 million 

since fiscal year 1994 to provide assistance to 36 countries. For example, 

DOE’s Second Line of Defense program has installed equipment at 83 sites, 

mostly in Russia, at a cost of about $130 million. However, DOE, DOD, and 

State face challenges that could compromise their programs’ effectiveness, 

including (1) corruption of foreign border security officials, (2) technical 

limitations of some equipment at foreign sites, (3) problems with 

maintenance of some handheld equipment, and (4) the lack of

infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites. 

Summary 

• According to officials from several countries we visited, corruption is a 

pervasive problem within border security organizations. DOE, DOD, and 

State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border 

security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded 

radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring 

alarms. To mitigate this threat, DOE and DOD plan to deploy 

communications links between individual border sites and national 

command centers so that alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by

multiple officials. 

• Some portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies previously 

installed at foreign border sites have technical limitations and can only 

detect gamma radiation, which makes them less effective at detecting

weapons-usable nuclear material than equipment with both gamma and 

neutron radiation detection capabilities. Since 2002, DOE has maintained 

this equipment but has only upgraded equipment at one site. Until the 

remaining sites receive equipment with both gamma and neutron detection 

capabilities, they will be vulnerable to certain forms of nuclear smuggling. 

• DOE has not systematically maintained handheld radiation detection 

equipment provided by State and other agencies. As a result, many pieces

of handheld equipment, which are vital for border officials to conduct 

secondary inspections, may not function properly. 

• Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do not 

have access to infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection 

equipment and associated communication systems. Additionally, 

environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can affect 

equipment performance. To mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and State 

have provided generators and other equipment at remote border sites to 

ensure stable electricity supplies and, when appropriate, heat shields or 

other protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection 

equipment. 

Page 3 GAO-06-558T 
In addition, State is the lead interagency coordinator charged with limiting 

overlap and duplication of effort among U.S. programs, but its ability to 

carry out this role has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan for 

interagency coordination and its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. 

radiation detection equipment provided to other countries. 

Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of 

entry, through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 portal 

monitors— about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy—

at U.S. border crossings, seaports, and international mail and express 

courier facilities at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to deploy a 

total of 3,034 portal monitors by 2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. 

However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain

because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, 

difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the 

type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy.

Specifically:

• DHS’s cumbersome review process for providing requested information to 

the Congress has resulted in funds being unavailable until later in the 

fiscal year. This review process involves multiple approvals within DHS 

and the Office of Management and Budget and has held up the release of

program funds, which has delayed the deployment of radiation detection

equipment at U.S. ports of entry. 

• Difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of portal 

monitors and screening of railcars have delayed deployments at U.S. 

seaports. Many seaport operators are concerned that radiation detection

equipment may inhibit the flow of commerce through their ports. In 

addition, seaports are much larger than land border crossings, consist of 

multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits, which may require a 

greater number of portal monitors. 

• DHS’s $1.3 billion cost estimate for completing its domestic radiation 

detection program is uncertain, in part, because DHS would like to deploy

advanced technology portal monitors that will likely cost significantly 

more than current models. However, tests have shown that these new 

advanced technology portal monitors are not demonstrably more effective 

than current models in their core function of identifying the presence of 

radiation. Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new portal 

monitors would be worth the increased cost. 

Page 4 GAO-06-558T 
In addition, CBP officers have made progress in using radiation detection

equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines, but we 

identified ways to improve CBP’s secondary inspection procedures. For 

example, when detection equipment alarms to indicate the presence of 

radioactivity, CBP officers are not expressly required to open containers 

and inspect their interiors, even though, under some circumstances, doing 

so can increase the chances that the source of radioactivity will be 

correctly located and identified. Furthermore, although radiological 

materials shipped into the United States are generally required to have a 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, importers are not required

to present these licenses at U.S. ports of entry, and CBP inspectors are not 

required to verify the authenticity of these licenses and do not have a 

system to do so. My GAO colleague, Mr. Greg Kutz, will be testifying on a 

GAO operation that was conducted to test CBP’s inspection procedures 

and certain NRC licensing procedures. 

In our report on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other 

countries, we made five recommendations. Specifically, we recommended 

that DOE take steps to upgrade U.S.-funded portal monitors in foreign 

countries that do not have both gamma and neutron detection capabilities 

and improve program cost estimates for anticorruption measures. 

Additionally, we recommended that State, working with DOE and DOD, 

ensure maintenance is provided for all handheld radiation detection 

equipment supplied by U.S. programs; strengthen its interagency 

coordination plan by including specific performance measures, overall 

cost estimates, and projected time frames for completion of U.S. efforts; 

and compile, maintain, and share a master list of all U.S. radiation 

detection assistance. Both DOE and State agreed with our 

recommendations. In our report on DHS’s efforts to deploy radiation 

detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry, we made nine 

recommendations, including a series of actions designed to help DHS 

speed up the pace of portal monitor deployments, better account for 

schedule delays and cost uncertainties, make the most efficient use of 

program resources, and improve its ability to interdict illicit nuclear 

materials. DHS agreed with our recommendations and is taking steps to 

implement them. 

Detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear material is complicated because one 

of the materials of greatest concern—highly enriched uranium—has a 

relatively low level of radioactivity and is, therefore, among the most 

difficult to detect. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,

which could be used to construct a dirty bomb, are highly radioactive and, 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-06-558T 
therefore, easier to detect. Although their levels of radioactivity differ, 

uranium and radioactive sources are similar in that they generally emit 

only gamma radiation, which is relatively easily shielded when encased in

high-density material, such as lead. For example, we reported in March 

2005 that a cargo container containing a radioactive source passed 

through radiation detection equipment DOE had installed at a foreign 

seaport without being detected because the source was surrounded by 

large amounts of scrap metal in the container. 

Plutonium, another nuclear material of great concern, emits both gamma 

and neutron radiation. Although most currently fielded radiation detection

equipment has the capability to detect both gamma and neutron radiation, 

shielding neutron radiation can be more difficult than shielding gamma 

radiation. Consequently, plutonium can usually be detected by a neutron 

detector regardless of the amount of shielding from high-density material. 

According to DOE officials, neutron radiation alarms are caused only by

man-made materials, such as plutonium, while gamma radiation alarms are 

caused by a variety of naturally occurring sources, including commercial 

goods such as bananas, ceramic tiles, and fertilizer, as well as by 

dangerous nuclear materials, such as uranium and plutonium. 

Because of the complexities of detecting and identifying nuclear material,

customs officers and border guards who are responsible for operating 

detection equipment must be trained in using handheld radiation detectors

to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identify false alarms, and properly 

respond to cases of nuclear smuggling. The manner in which radiation 

detection equipment is deployed, operated, and maintained can also limit 

its effectiveness. Given the difficulties in detecting certain nuclear 

materials and the inherent limitations of currently deployed radiation 

detection equipment, it is important that the equipment be installed, 

operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes authorities’ ability to 

interdict illicit nuclear materials. 

Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of 

radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not 

and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at U.S. or foreign 

borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear 

warhead from reaching the United States. Recognizing the need for a 

broad approach to the problem, the U.S. government has multiple 

initiatives that are designed to complement each other that provide a

layered defense against nuclear terrorism. For example, DOE works to 

secure nuclear material and warheads at their sources through programs 

that improve the physical security at nuclear facilities in the former Soviet 

Page 6 GAO-06-558T 
Union and in other countries. In addition, DHS has other initiatives to 

identify containers at foreign seaports that are considered high risk for 

containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear and other dangerous 

materials. Supporting all of these programs is intelligence information that 

can give advanced notice of nuclear material smuggling and is a critical 

component to prevent dangerous materials from entering the United 

States. 

One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to 

foreign governments is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which 

began installing equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. According to 

DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2005, the program had spent about 

$130 million to complete installations at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. 

Ultimately, DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of 

about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570 million. 

In addition to DOE’s efforts, other U.S. agencies also have programs that 

provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign

governments. Two programs at DOD—the International 

Counterproliferation Program and Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation Prevention Initiative—have provided equipment and related 

training to eight countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 

at a cost of about $22 million. Similarly, three programs at State—the 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, Georgia Border Security and 

Law Enforcement program, and Export Control and Related Border 

Security program—have spent about $25 million to provide radiation 

detection equipment and training to 31 countries.

However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could 

compromise their programs’ effectiveness, including (1) corruption of 

foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of equipment at 

some foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of handheld equipment, 

and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at 

some border sites. First, according to officials from several recipient 

countries we visited, corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of 

border security organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they 

are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could 

compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection 

equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To mitigate 

this threat, DOE and DOD plan to deploy communications links between 

individual border sites and national command centers so that alarm data

can be simultaneously evaluated by multiple officials, thus establishing 

redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. In addition, DOD 

U.S. Efforts to 

Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment 

to Other Countries 

Face Corruption, 

Maintenance, and 

Coordination 

Challenges 

Page 7 GAO-06-558T 
plans to implement a program in Uzbekistan to combat some of the 

underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic screening of 

border security personnel. 

Second, some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies 

previously installed have technical limitations: they can detect only gamma 

radiation, making them less effective at detecting some nuclear material 

than equipment with both gamma and neutron radiation detection 

capabilities. Through an interagency agreement, DOE assumed 

responsibility for ensuring the long-term sustainability and continued 

operation of radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans equipped with 

radiation detectors that State and other U.S. agencies provided to 23 

countries. Through this agreement, DOE provides spare parts, 

preventative maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through regularly 

scheduled maintenance visits. Since 2002, DOE has maintained this 

equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the exception of at one site 

in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new implementing agreements 

with the appropriate ministries or agencies within the governments of 

each of the countries where the old equipment is located are needed

before DOE can install more sophisticated equipment. 

Third, since 2002, DOE has been responsible for maintaining certain 

radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State and other 

agencies in 23 countries. However, DOE is not responsible for maintaining 

handheld radiation detection equipment provided by these agencies. As a 

result, many pieces of handheld equipment, which are vital for border 

officials to conduct secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians, may 

not function properly. For example, in Georgia, we observed border 

guards performing secondary inspections with a handheld radiation 

detector that had not been calibrated (adjusted to conform with 

measurement standards) since 1997. According to the detector’s 

manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that the detector 

functions properly. 

Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do not 

have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines, and other 

infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment and 

associated communication systems. Additionally, environmental 

conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can affect the performance 

of equipment. To mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and State have 

provided generators and other equipment at remote border sites to ensure 

stable supplies of electricity and, when appropriate, heat shields or other 

protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment. 

Page 8 GAO-06-558T 
We also reported that State’s ability to carry out its role as lead 

interagency coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance 

has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan for interagency

coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation 

detection equipment assistance. In response to a recommendation we 

made in 2002, State led the development of a governmentwide plan to 

coordinate U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas. This 

plan broadly defines a set of interagency goals and outlines the roles and 

responsibilities of participating agencies. However, the plan lacks key 

components, including overall program cost estimates, projected time 

frames for program completion, and specific performance measures. 

Without these elements in the plan, State will be limited in its ability to 

effectively measure U.S. programs’ progress toward achieving the 

interagency goals. 

Additionally, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, State has not 

maintained accurate information on the operational status and location of

all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. While DOE, 

DOD, and State each maintain lists of radiation detection equipment 

provided by their programs, they do not regularly share such information, 

and no comprehensive list of all equipment provided by U.S. programs 

exists. For example, according to information we received from program 

managers at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld 

radiation detection equipment had been provided to 36 foreign countries

through the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of this equipment was 

provided to the same countries by multiple agencies and programs, it is 

difficult to determine the degree to which duplication of effort has 

occurred. Without a coordinated master list of all U.S.-funded equipment, 

program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if 

equipment is operational and being used as intended, determine the 

equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance, or 

detect whether an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative 

equipment. 

Page 9 GAO-06-558T 
Through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal 

monitors nationwide— about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans 

to deploy—at international mail and express courier facilities, land border 

crossings, and seaports in the United States. DHS has completed portal 

monitor deployments at international mail and express courier facilities 

and the first phase of northern border sites—57 and 217 portal monitors, 

respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS had deployed 143 of 495 

portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at southern border sites.4

 As of 

February 2006, CBP estimated that, with these deployments, it has the 

ability to screen about 62 percent of all containerized shipments entering 

the United States (but only 32 percent of all containerized seaborne 

shipments) and roughly 77 percent of all private vehicles. DHS plans to 

deploy 3,034 portal monitors by September 2009 at a cost of $1.3 billion.

However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain

because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, 

difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the 

type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy.

Further, to meet this goal, DHS would have to deploy about 52 portal 

monitors a month for the next 4 years—a rate that far exceeds the 2005 

rate of about 22 per month. 

In particular, several factors have contributed to the delay in the 

deployment schedule. First, DHS provides the Congress with information 

on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any 

funds. However, DHS’s cumbersome review process has consistently 

caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. For example, 

according to the House Appropriations Committee report on DHS’s fiscal 

year 2005 budget, CBP should provide the Congress with an acquisition 

and deployment plan for the portal monitor program prior to funding its

contractors. This plan took many months to finalize, mostly because it 

required multiple approvals within DHS and the Office of Management and 

Budget prior to being submitted to the Congress. The lengthy review 

process delayed the release of funds and, in some cases, disrupted and 

delayed deployment. 

Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of 

portal monitors and screening of railcars have delayed deployments at 

U.S. seaports. Many seaport operators are concerned that radiation 

DHS Has Made 

Progress in Deploying 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment at U.S. 

Ports of Entry, but 

Concerns Remain 

 4

In addition, three portal monitors had been installed at the Nevada Test Site to analyze 

their detection capabilities, and four had been retrofitted at express mail facilities. 

Page 10 GAO-06-558T 
detection equipment may inhibit the flow of commerce through their 

ports. In addition, seaports are much larger than land border crossings, 

consist of multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits, which may 

require a greater number of portal monitors. Further, devising an effective

way to conduct secondary inspections of rail traffic as it departs seaports 

without disrupting commerce has delayed deployments. This problem may 

worsen because the Department of Transportation has forecast that the 

use of rail transit out of seaports will probably increase in the near future.

Finally, DHS’s $1.3 billion estimate for the project is highly uncertain, in 

part, because of uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection

equipment that DHS plans to deploy. The estimate is based on DHS’s plans 

for widespread deployment of advanced technology portal monitors, 

which are currently being developed. However, the prototypes of this 

equipment have not yet been shown to be more effective than the portal 

monitors now in use, and DHS officials say they will not purchase the 

advanced portal monitors unless they are proven to be clearly superior. 

Moreover, when advanced technology portal monitors become 

commercially available, experts estimate that they will cost between about 

$330,000 and $460,000 each, far more than the currently used portal 

monitors whose costs range from about $49,000 to $60,000. Even if future 

test results indicate better detection capabilities, without a detailed 

comparison of the two technologies’ capabilities it would not be clear that

the dramatically higher cost for this new equipment would be worth the 

investment. 

We also identified potential issues with the procedures CBP inspectors use 

to perform secondary inspections that, if addressed, could strengthen the 

nation’s defenses against nuclear smuggling. For example, CBP’s 

procedures require only that officers locate, isolate, and identify 

radiological material. Typically, officers perform an external examination

by scanning the sides of cargo containers with handheld radiation 

detection equipment during secondary inspections. CBP’s guidance does 

not specifically require officers to open containers and inspect their 

interiors, even when their external examination cannot unambiguously 

resolve the alarm. However, under some circumstances, opening 

containers can improve security by increasing the chances that the source

of radioactivity that originally set off the alarm will be correctly located 

and identified. The second potential issue with CBP’s procedures involves

NRC documentation. Individuals and organizations shipping radiological

materials to the United States must generally acquire a NRC license, but 

according to NRC officials, the license does not have to accompany the 

shipment. Although inspectors examine such licenses when these 

Page 11 GAO-06-558T 
shipments arrive at U.S. ports of entry, CBP officers are not required to 

verify that shippers of radiological material actually obtained required 

licenses and to authenticate licenses that accompany shipments. We found

that CBP inspectors lack access to NRC license data that could be used to 

authenticate a license at the border. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to 

any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. R. Stockton Butler, Nancy Crothers, Jim Shafer, and 

Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this statement. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 12 GAO-06-558T 
Page 13 GAO-06-558T 

Related GAO Products 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying 

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns 

Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and 

Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2006. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection 

Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005. 

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New 

Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2002. 

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection 

Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. 

GAO-02-989T Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. 

GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002. 

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