alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Firoose Farahmand, Appellant, v Tova D. Farahmand, Respondent.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties had been awarded a dual divorce and the defendant wife had been awarded custody of the infant issue of the marriage, the plaintiff husband appeals (1) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 6, 1979, as (a) denied his motion to change custody and (b) granted his motion for a downward modification of child support only to the extent of reducing the payments from $250 per week to $150 per week, (2) as limited by his brief, from so much of a second order of the same court, dated April 11,1979, as denied his motion for reargument of the order of March 6, 1979, and (3) from a third order of the same court, dated April 3, 1979, which confirmed a Referee’s report and ordered payment of an escrow fund in accordance with said Referee’s determination. Appeal from order dated April 11, 1979 dismissed. No appeal lies from an order denying a motion for reargument. Order dated March 6, 1979 affirmed insofar as appealed from *609and order dated April 3, 1979 affirmed. Defendant is awarded one bill of $50 costs and disbursements to cover all appeals. As to the order dated March 6, 1979, we find the downward modification of child support from $250 per week to $150 per week to be fair and adequate. Plaintiffs change of circumstances since the date of the divorce decree warrants a reduction in his support obligation only to that extent. The Referee’s report was properly confirmed in the order dated April 3, 1979. We do not find that the contemplated vacatur of the judgment of divorce and entry of a judgment of separation were necessary conditions precedent to the efficacy of the entire stipulation entered into by the parties. As such, Special Term correctly gave effect to the provisions which called for the disposition of the escrow account to the defendant. We see no reason to overturn the findings of the Referee which were made following an impartial on-site hearing at the plaintiffs residence. (See *Ferguson v Ferguson,*271 App Div 976.) In any event, had the agreement been declared a nullity, the provisions of the original decree of divorce would apply, said provisions calling for disposition of the money in question to the defendant. Mangano, J. P., Gulotta, Cohalan and Gibbons, JJ., concur.
#### §§ 1737.12-1737.19 [Reserved]
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 11, 2022.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 11, 2022

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A22I0141. MALCOLM SIDNEY MOORE, JR. v. DIANA HUMBLE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of 

this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record 

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

SUCV2019000410
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© 2021 Google LLC
Exhibit 10.47


 


Second Amendment to the License Agreement
Between the Regents of the University of California and 

General Fiber, Inc. License Agreement Control No. 2006-04-0026 Effective
January 3, 2007 


 


This Second Amendment (the “Second Amendment”) dated
January 3, 2007 is made by and between The Regents of the University of California and General Fiber,
Inc.


 


RECITALS


 


WHEREAS, The Regents has entered into an Exclusive License with
dated July 11, 2005, and a First Amendment to the License November 8. 2005 to various inventions entitled, "Estriol for the
treatment of autoimmune diseases & the use of estnol and other and f'ci-rr.rrpn actlVe in the treatment of & other autoimmune
diseases" 1998-531 & UCLA Case No. 2004-1 at The Regents (the "License Agreement’)


 


WHEREAS, Licensee desires to amend and the License with The


 


NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises and
the mutual promises, covenants, and agreements hereinafter set forth, all parties to this Second Amendment mutually agree to amend
the License Agreement as follows:


 


1  In Paragraph 1.1 ("Regents' Patent Rights"), any reference to "UC Case No. 2004101-3" 1S amended to
exclude this case number (UC Case No. 2004-JOl-3). The remainder of the case numbers shall remain as part of the license.


 


2  Appendix
A Patent is hereby amended to remove any reference to UC Case No. 2004-101 and LLS. Patent Application No.1 entitled. "The
Use of Estriol and Other Estranes. Estrogen and Estrogen Active Compositions in the treatment of Psoriasis:, filed November 8,
2004, invented by Drs. Rhonda Voskuhl, Gerald D. Weinstein and Jenny E. Murase and to the


 


The remainder of the patents listed on A will remain of the
license.


 


3. Under Section 6.3
of the License Agreement, section 6.3e shall be deleted.


 


4. In consideration for this Second Amendment, Licensee will
pay to the a two thousand dollar ($2,000) amendment fee within thirty (30) of the Effective Date of this amendment.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Second Amendment
to the License by their duly authorized for and valuable consideration.


 


 





	GENERAL FIBER, INC. 	  THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
	 	 
	By: /s/ Nicholas Stergis            	By: /s/ Emily W. Loughran             
	Name: Nicholas Stergis	Name: Emily W. Loughran
	Title: Chief Operating Officer	Title: Director of Licensing
Exhibit 12.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Richard Coglon, President and Secretary of Bradner Ventures Ltd., certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Bradner Ventures Ltd.;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The company's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:

(a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's auditors and the audit committee of the company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the company's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: May 12, 2005

"Richard Coglon"		Richard Coglon 
President and Secretary 
(Principal Executive Officer)
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**AFFINITYGROUP HOLDING, INC.**

 

**STATEMENTPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

 

I,Michael A. Schneider, President and Chief Executive Officer of Affinity GroupHolding, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), hereby certify asfollows:

 

1.                                       This statement is provided pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350 in connection with the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2007 (the “Periodic Report”);

 

2.                                       The Periodic Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended; and

 

3.                                       The information contained in the PeriodicReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company as of dates and for the periods indicatedtherein.

 

 
| Date:  November 14, 2007 |                                   |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|
|                     |                                   |
|                     | /s/  Michael A. Schneider              |   |
|                     | Michael  A. Schneider                  |
|                     | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906, or suchother document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thewritten statement as required by Section 906, has been provided to AffinityGroup Holding, Inc. and will be retained by Affinity Group Holding, Inc. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

1

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7830

EUGENE JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

CHUCK FALCONE,

Plaintiff,

versus

GEORGE TRENT, Warden, Mt. Olive Correctional

Complex; NICHOLAS HUN, Commissioner of Division of Corrections; TEREAS WAID, Associate

Warden of Treatment; TONY LEMASTERS, Chief of

Security; TEREAS AMICK, Correctional Officer

I; MIKE OHM, Jobs Coordinator,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, District

Judge. (CA-97-430-5)

Submitted: May 14, 1998 Decided: May 26, 1998

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Eugene Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Leslie K.

Kiser, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston,

West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order declining to

reconsider the dismissal of one of Appellant's two constitutional

claims in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). We dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders,

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here

appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory

or collateral order.

We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 32.01**

 

**OFFICER CERTIFICATION**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of NSP-Minnesota on Form 10-K for2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(Form 10-K), each of the undersigned officers of the NSP-Minnesota certifies,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such officer’s knowledge:

 

(1)          The Form 10-K fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(2)          The information contained in the Form 10-Kfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of NSP-Minnesota as of the dates and for the periods expressed inthe Form 10-K.

 

Date: March 3, 2005

 
|   | /s/ WAYNE H. BRUNETTI                      |   |
|--------|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Wayne H. Brunetti                          |
|   | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer       |
|   |                                       |
|   | /s/ BENJAMIN G.S. FOWKE III                |   |
|   | Benjamin G.S. Fowke III                    |
|   | Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 andis not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

 

A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906, or other documentauthenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appearsin typed form within the electronic version of this written statement requiredby Section 906, has been provided to NSP-Minnesota and will be retained byNSP-Minnesota and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

1

----
Page 1 ofDepartment of Defense Comments on theDraft External Peer Review Charge for PAH IRIS AssessmentComments submitted by: Office of theSecretary of Defense Chemical andMaterial Risk Management DirectorateOrganization: Department of DefenseDate Submitted: 28 October 2009*Comment categories: Science or methods (S); Editorial, grammar/spelling, clarifications needed (E);or Other (O). Also please indicate if Major i.e. affects theoutcome, conclusions or implementation of the assessment.CommentNo.SectionPage &Paragraph(enter“Global” ifreportsection-wide)CommentSuggested Action, Revisionand References (if necessary)Category*1Chapter 2.Rationale forRecommending an RPFApproachPg. 1Edits to Question 5:Does the text adequately describe and evaluate thecurrent weight of evidence supporting theassumption that PAHs as a chemical class have asimilar mode of actionaccording to EPA’s 2005cancer guidelines? Does the document adequatelydiscuss the degree to which this hypothesis andother data support the assumption ofresponseadditivity that is a key component of a RPFapproach?Please consider bolded edits.E2Chapter 4.Evaluation oftheCarcinogenicity ofIndividualPAHsPg. 2Edits to Question 8The methodology for the derivation of RPFsincludes only studies where at least one PAH wastested at the same time as B[a]P. There are otherstudies available where a PAH was tested withoutconcurrent testing of B[a]P, but where comparableB[a]P data are available from the same laboratoryand test system,especially for in vivo studies.Should these data be used to estimate RPFs? Pleasediscuss any advantages or disadvantages ofexcluding these data.Please consider bolded edits.E/SPage 2 ofDepartment of Defense Comments on theDraft External Peer Review Charge for PAH IRIS AssessmentComments submitted by: Office of theSecretary of Defense Chemical andMaterial Risk Management DirectorateOrganization: Department of DefenseDate Submitted: 28 October 2009*Comment categories: Science or methods (S); Editorial, grammar/spelling, clarifications needed (E);or Other (O). Also please indicate if Major i.e. affects theoutcome, conclusions or implementation of the assessment.CommentNo.SectionPage &Paragraph(enter“Global” ifreportsection-wide)CommentSuggested Action, Revisionand References (if necessary)Category*3Chapter 4.Evaluation oftheCarcinogenicity ofIndividualPAHsPg. 2Edits to Question 10;Do the sections describing different study types(e.g., 4.3.1-4.3.3) adequately explain the varietyofmethods usedand the uncertainties from usingmore than one method?Please consider bolded edits.E/S4Chapter 7:Derivation ofSummaryRPFs forselectedPAHsPg. 4Edits for Question 24:Please comment on whether the scientific rationalefor consideration of bioassay data versus cancerendpoint data has been adequately described. Pleasecommentseparately on both, the use of tumormultiplicity data in the weight of evidenceevaluations andalso fordetermination of the RPFs.Please consider bolded edits.E/S
#### In the Matter of Patrick L. Celli, and In the Matter of David G. Lahrs, Persons Adjudicated Juvenile Delinquents.— Matter of Celli:

Order unanimously reversed and new trial granted. Memorandum: Appellant has been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and committed to an institution. Pertinent here is the legislative declaration “ that counsel is often indispensible to a practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition” (Family Ct. Act, § 241). Appellant (a 15-year-old youth) and his parents were advised by the court of the right to counsel. The father expressed a desire therefor and a law guardian should have been named without further ado. Instead, the court in substance pressured the father into waiving counsel for his son. Among other things the court stated: “ Mr. Celli, you may get a lawyer, if you wish, but I will tell you frankly, that a lawyer will not change my mind. When I find *703out about .the ease I will make m3' own decision.” This the court did with celerity. After adjudging appellant a juvenile delinquent the court stated that it would have a probation investigation. Immediately thereafter, however, the boy was committed to Industry for not more than 18 months. The court was correct in its first ruling and upon the facts here presented should have awaited a probation report before proceeding with the so-called dispositional hearing. (Family Ct. Act, §§ 746, 749.) The new trial should be held before another Judge of Brie County Family Court. Matter of Lahrs: Order unanimously reversed and new trial granted. Memorandum: In the interests of justice a new trial is required, (See Memorandum in *Matter of*Celli, decided herewith.) (Appeal by respondents from orders of Brie Family Court adjudging the respondents juvenile delinquents.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Henry, Del Vecchio and Marsh, JJ.
#### § 15.82 Notice of hearing and response thereto.

A notice of hearing shall fix a date not less than 30 days from the date of service of the notice of a hearing on matters alleged in the notice. If the applicant or recipient does not desire a hearing, he should so state in writing, in which case the applicant or recipient shall have the right to submit written information and argument for the record, and the additional right to further participate in the proceeding. Failure to appear at the time set for a hearing, without good cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the right to a hearing under section 602 of the Act and the regulations in this part and consent to the making of a decision on such information as is available which may be presented for the record.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent ,

v.

MARCUS D. NELSON , Petitioner

. N o . 1 CA

- CR 18

- 0 788 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2002

- 093846 The Honorable Ronda R. Fisk , Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELI EF DENIED

COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney’s Office , Phoenix By Diane Meloche Counsel for Respondent
Marcus D. Nelson, Florence Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Judge Maria Elena Cruz, and Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court. FILED 4-4-2019S TATE v. NELSON Decision of the Court

2 PER CURIAM:
¶1 Petitioner Marcus D. Nelson seeks review of the superior court’s order denying his petition for post

- conviction relief, filed pursuant to Arizona Ru le of Criminal Procedure 3 2.1. Thi s is petitioner’s third successive petition. ¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post

- conviction reli ef. State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post

- conviction relief. See State v. Poblete , 227 Ariz. 537, 538, ¶ 1 (App. 2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review). ¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order denying the petition for post

- conviction relief, and the petition for review. We find that petitione r has not established an abuse of discretion. ¶4 We grant review but deny relief.
FILED

November 14, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

RICK HOLLOWAY, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Maury Circuit

) No. 7188

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9704-CV-00153

JOHN R. COLLIER, JR., )

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the court’s opinion on the ground that Mr. Holloway’s

circumstantial evidence concerning Mr. Collier’s actions does not amount to material

evidence sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Mr. Collier acted

intentionally and without justification. Proof of this sort of motivation is an essential

element of a claim for interference with an employment relationship, see Forrester

v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tenn. 1994), and without it Mr. Holloway’s case

should never have gone to the jury.

_____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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You havereached the Federal Depository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC)Archive. This archive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC.Access to publications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of catalogingand locator services, including the Catalog of U.S. GovernmentPublications.  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the eventthat publications are no longer available from the original publishing agencysite. (Historical purposes)
**Title:****Materialspresented at the MU-SPIN ... annual Users Conference.**** 
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