United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Statement for the Record to the 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

DOD PERSONNEL 

CLEARANCES 

Funding Challenges and 

Other Impediments Slow 

Clearances for Industry 

Personnel 

Statement for the Record by Derek B. Stewart, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, May 17, 2006

 

GAO-06-747T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 17, 2006

DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES

Funding Challenges and Other 

Impediments Slow Clearances for 

Industry Personnel 

Highlights of GAO-06-747T, a statement 

for the record to the Committee on

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

is responsible for about 2 million 

active personnel security

clearances. About one-third of the

clearances are for industry

personnel working on contracts for

DOD and more than 20 other 

executive agencies. Delays in

determining eligibility for a

clearance can heighten the risk that

classified information will be

disclosed to unauthorized sources

and increase contract costs and 

problems attracting and retaining

qualified personnel. On April 28,

2006, DOD announced it had 

stopped processing security 

clearance applications for industry 

personnel because of an

overwhelming volume of requests 

and funding constraints. GAO has 

reported problems with DOD’s 

security clearance processes since 

1981. In January 2005, GAO 

designated DOD’s program a highrisk area because of longstanding 

delays in completing clearance

requests and an inability to 

accurately estimate and eliminate 

its clearance backlog. 

For this statement GAO addresses: 

(1) key points in the billing dispute

between DOD and OPM and (2)

some of the major impediments 

affecting clearances for industry

personnel. 

The costs underlying a billing dispute between DOD and OPM are 

contributing to further delays in the processing of new security clearance

requests for industry personnel. The dispute stems from the February 2005 

transfer of DOD’s personnel security investigations function to OPM and 

associated costs for which DOD agreed to reimburse OPM. Among other 

things, the two agencies’ memorandum of agreement for the transfer allows 

OPM to charge DOD annual price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium, in 

addition to the rates OPM charges to other federal government agencies. A 

January 20, 2006, memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) questioned the 

continued need for the premiums and requested mediation from OMB. 

According to DOD and OPM, OMB has directed the two agencies to continue 

to work together to resolve the matter. The inspectors general for both DOD 

and OPM are expected to report on the results of their investigations into the 

dispute this summer. 

Other impediments, if not effectively addressed, could negatively affect the 

timeliness of clearance-eligibility determinations for one or more of the 

following employee groups: industry personnel, servicemembers, and 

civilian government employees. All three groups are affected by DOD’s 

longstanding inability to accurately estimate the size of its security clearance 

workload. Inaccurate estimates of the volume of clearances needed make it 

difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. 

Similarly, the July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order 13381, which 

delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to OMB, could 

potentially slow improvements in personnel security clearance processes 

DOD-wide as well as governmentwide. GAO has been encouraged by OMB’s 

high level of commitment to activities such as the development of a 

government plan to improve personnel security clearance processes 

governmentwide but is concerned about whether such progress will 

continue after the executive order expires. In contrast, demand for top 

secret clearances for industry personnel and the lack of reciprocity (the 

acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, 

agency, or military service) are impediments that mainly affect industry 

personnel. A previously identified increase in the demand for top secret 

clearances for industry personnel has workload and budgetary implications 

for DOD and OPM if such requests continue to occur. Finally, the lack of 

reciprocity has a negative effect on employees and employers, and increases

the workload for already overburdened investigative and adjudicative staff. 

Reciprocity problems have occurred despite the issuance of 

governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines in 1997.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-747T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact 

Derek B. Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or 

stewartd@gao.gov. 
Chairman Davis and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for your hearing 

on the challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM) in processing requests for personnel 

security clearances in a timely manner. Two years ago, we testified before

this committee on similar challenges.1

 Before providing our observations 

about the challenges, I would like to provide some background to (1) give 

a general context for understanding clearances and describe the 

importance of industry personnel to our national security, (2) discuss how 

clearance problems can negatively affect national security, and (3) provide 

information about several recent events affecting the overall status of 

DOD’s personnel security clearance program. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, for over two decades, we have reported on 

problems with DOD’s personnel security clearance program as well as the 

financial costs and risks to national security resulting from these problems 

(see Related GAO Reports at the end of this statement). For example, at 

the turn of the century, we documented problems such as incomplete 

investigations, inconsistency in determining eligibility for clearances, and 

a backlog of overdue clearance reinvestigations that exceeded 500,000

cases.2

 More recently in 2004, we identified continuing and new 

impediments hampering DOD’s clearance program and made 

recommendations for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the

Background 

 1

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and

Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel, 

GAO-04-202T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004). 

2

 GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top

Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001); DOD Personnel: 

More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-215 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000); and DOD Personnel: Inadequate 

Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999). 

Page 1 GAO-06-747T 
program.3

 Also in 2004, we testified before this committee on clearancerelated problems faced by industry personnel.4

A critical step in the federal government’s efforts to protect national 

security is to determine whether an individual is eligible for a personnel 

security clearance. Specifically, an individual whose job requires access to

classified information must undergo a background investigation and 

adjudication (determination of eligibility) in order to obtain a clearance. 

As with federal government workers, the demand for personnel security 

clearances for industry personnel has increased during recent years. 

Additional awareness of threats to our national security since September 

11, 2001, and efforts to privatize federal jobs during the last decade are but 

two of the reasons for the greater number of industry personnel needing 

clearances today. As of September 30, 2003, industry personnel held about 

one-third of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued clearances. DOD’s 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has overall 

responsibility for DOD clearances, and its responsibilities also extend 

beyond DOD. Specifically, that office’s responsibilities include obtaining 

background investigations and adjudicating clearance eligibility for 

 3

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs

and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel, 

GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004); and GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD 

Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, 

GAO-04-344 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).

4 GAO-04-202T. 

Page 2 GAO-06-747T 
industry personnel in more than 20 other federal agencies,5

 as well as the 

clearances of staff in the federal government’s legislative branch. 

Problems in the clearance program can negatively affect national security. 

For example, delays reviewing security clearances for personnel who are 

already doing classified work can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of 

classified information. In contrast, delays in providing initial security 

clearances for previously noncleared personnel can result in other 

negative consequences, such as additional costs and delays in completing 

national security-related contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems 

retaining the best qualified personnel.

Longstanding delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance 

requests for servicemembers, federal employees, and industry personnel 

as well as numerous impediments that hinder DOD’s ability to accurately

estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the program 

a high-risk area in January 2005. The 25 areas on our high-risk list at that 

time received their designation because they are major programs and 

operations that need urgent attention and transformation in order to 

ensure that our national government functions in the most economical, 

efficient, and effective manner possible.6

 5

 We identified 22 other agencies in GAO-04-632. Exec. Order No. 10865, Safeguarding 

Classified Information Within Industry, February 20, 1960, which was amended by Exec.

Order No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program, January 6, 1993, authorizes DOD

to reach agreement with other federal departments and agencies to extend its regulations 

concerning authorizations for access to classified information by industry. The agencies

that have entered into agreements with DOD for security services under the National 

Industrial Security Program are the (1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

(2) Department of Commerce, (3) General Services Administration, (4) Department of

State, (5) Small Business Administration, (6) National Science Foundation, (7) Department

of the Treasury, (8) Department of Transportation, (9) Department of the Interior, (10)

Department of Agriculture, (11) Department of Labor, (12) Environmental Protection 

Agency, (13) Department of Justice, (14) Federal Reserve System, (15) U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (formerly U.S. General Accounting Office), (16) U.S. Trade 

Representative, (17) U.S. International Trade Commission, (18) U.S. Agency for 

International Development, (19) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (20) Department of

Health and Human Services, (21) Department of Homeland Security, and (22) Department

of Education. The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency are 

signatories of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual and thus have

reciprocity with DOD under provisions of the manual. Three federal agencies (the 

Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission) also may grant security clearances to industry personnel who work on

national security-related programs. 

6

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-06-747T 
Shortly after we placed DOD’s clearance program on our high-risk list, a 

major change in DOD’s program occurred. In February 2005, DOD 

transferred its personnel security investigations functions and about 1,800 

investigative positions to OPM. Now DOD obtains nearly all of its 

clearance investigations from OPM7

, which is currently responsible for 90 

percent of the personnel security clearance investigations in the federal

government.8

 DOD retained responsibility for adjudication of military 

personnel, DOD civilians, and industry personnel.

Other recent significant events affecting DOD’s clearance program have 

been the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order No. 13381, 

Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to 

Classified National Security Information. The act included milestones for 

reducing the time to complete clearances, general specifications for a 

database on security clearances, and requirements for greater reciprocity 

of clearances (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by 

another department, agency, or military service). Among other things, the 

executive order resulted in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

taking a lead role in preparing a strategic plan to improve personnel 

security clearance processes governmentwide. 

Using this context for understanding the interplay between DOD and OPM 

in DOD’s personnel security clearance processes, my statement addresses 

two objectives in this statement: (1) key points of a billing dispute 

 7

 Currently, the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National 

Reconnaissance Office each have a waiver that allows them to contract for their own

personnel security clearance investigations. 

8

 In GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain

to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation, GAO-05-842T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005), we listed the departments/agencies having statutory or 

delegated authority to conduct background investigations, as identified by the then Deputy

Associate Director of OPM’s Center for Investigations Services. Those 

departments/agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency; Department of State; 

Department of the Treasury; Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Engraving and Printing;

Federal Bureau of Investigation; National Security Agency; U.S. Agency for International 

Development; Department of Homeland Security; Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection; U.S. Secret Service; Small Business Administration; Broadcasting Board of 

Governors; Department of Justice—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; 

U.S. Postal Service; Tennessee Valley Authority; National Reconnaissance Office; and 

Peace Corps. Even though these agencies have authority to conduct their own 

investigations, some of them request that OPM conduct all or part of their investigations. 

Page 4 GAO-06-747T 
between DOD and OPM and (2) some of the major impediments affecting 

clearances for industry personnel. 

As requested by this committee, we have an ongoing examination of the 

timeliness and completeness of the processes used to determine the 

eligibility of industry personnel to receive top secret clearances. We 

expect to present the results of this work in the fall. My statement today, 

however, is based primarily on our completed work and our institutional 

knowledge from our prior reviews of the steps in the clearance processes 

used by DOD and, to a lesser extent, other agencies. In addition, we used 

information from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of

2004; executive orders; and other documents, such as a memorandum of 

agreement between DOD and OPM. We conducted our work in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards in May 2006. 

The additional costs DOD has incurred for its investigations are 

contributing to further delays in the processing of new security clearances 

for industry personnel. Despite an already sizable backlog of security 

clearance applications, DOD stopped processing applications for industry 

personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD attributed the stoppage to a large 

volume of industry clearance requests and funding constraints. The 

funding constraints may be the result of a broader billing dispute that has 

been taking place between DOD and OPM. As part of the agreement that 

transferred DOD’s clearance investigations function to OPM, OPM may 

charge DOD for annual price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium, in 

addition to the rates it normally charges other federal agencies for 

investigations. DOD disputes the continued need for the premium and has 

asked OMB to mediate; however, information from the two agencies 

indicates that OMB has directed DOD and OPM to continue to work 

together to resolve the matter. The inspectors general for both DOD and 

OPM are investigating the billing dispute and are expected to report on the 

results of their investigations this summer. 

Summary 

Some impediments, if not effectively addressed, can hinder the timely 

determination of clearance eligibility for servicemembers, civilian 

government employees, and industry personnel; whereas other 

impediments mainly affect industry personnel. One impediment that could

affect all three employee groups is DOD’s longstanding inability to 

accurately estimate its future clearance requests. In fiscal years 2001 

through 2003, the department incorrectly estimated the number of 

requests by 90,000 to 150,000 cases per year. This impediment makes it 

difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. 

Page 5 GAO-06-747T 
Another impediment for all three employee groups pertains to the July 1,

2006, expiration of Executive Order 13381, which delegated responsibility 

for improving the clearance process to OMB. We have been encouraged by

OMB’s high level of commitment during the development of a plan to 

improve clearance processes governmentwide. Because there has been no

indication that the executive order will be extended, we are concerned 

about whether such progress will continue. In contrast, greater demand 

for top secret clearances for industry personnel and the lack of reciprocity 

would primarily affect industry personnel. Between fiscal years 1995 and

2003, the proportion of security clearance requests for industry personnel 

who required top secret investigations and adjudications increased from 

17 to 27 percent of the workload. A rise in the demand for top secret 

clearances has negative side effects that include the need to renew 

clearances more often (than secret or confidential clearances), 

requirements for more information about applicants, and much higher 

costs. A second impediment that might affect industry personnel more 

than other employee groups is the absence of reciprocity. In addition to 

slowing how quickly contractors can use newly hired employees, this 

impediment increases the workload for already overburdened

investigative and adjudicative staff. Reciprocity problems have occurred 

despite the issuance of governmentwide investigative standards and 

adjudicative guidelines in 1997. 

DOD stopped processing applications for clearance investigations for 

industry personnel on April 28, 2006, despite an already sizeable backlog. 

DOD attributed its actions to an overwhelming volume of requests for 

industry personnel security investigations and funding constraints. We will 

address the issue of workload projections later when we discuss 

impediments that affect industry personnel as well as servicemembers and 

federal employees, but first we would like to talk about the issue of 

funding. 

An important consideration in understanding the funding constraints that 

contributed to the stoppage is a DOD-OPM billing dispute, which has 

resulted in the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence requesting 

OMB mediation. The dispute stems from the February 2005 transfer of 

DOD’s personnel security investigations function to OPM. 

Unexpected Volume 

of Clearance Requests 

and Funding 

Constraints Delay 

Security Clearances 

for Industry 

Personnel Further 

The memorandum of agreement signed by the OPM Director and the DOD 

Deputy Secretary prior to the transfer lists many types of costs that DOD 

may incur for up to 3 years after the transfer of the investigations function 

to OPM. One cost, an adjustment to the rates charged to agencies for 

Page 6 GAO-06-747T 
clearance investigations, provides that “OPM may charge DOD for 

investigations at DOD’s current rates plus annual price adjustments plus a 

25 percent premium to offset potential operating losses. OPM will be able 

to adjust, at any point of time during the first three year period after the 

start of transfer, the premium as necessary to cover estimated future costs 

or operating losses, if any, or offset gains, if any.”

The Under Secretary’s memorandum says that OPM has collected 

approximately $50 million in premiums in addition to approximately $144 

million for other costs associated with the transfer. The OPM Associate 

Director subsequently listed costs that OPM has incurred. To help resolve 

this billing matter, DOD requested mediation from OMB, in accordance 

with the memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM. Information 

from the two agencies indicates that in response to DOD’s request, OMB 

has directed them to continue to work together to resolve the matter. The 

DOD and OPM offices of inspector general are currently investigating all 

of the issues raised in the Under Secretary’s and Associate Director’s 

correspondences and have indicated that they intend to issue reports on 

their reviews this summer. 

Some impediments, if not effectively addressed, could hinder the timely 

determination of clearance eligibility for servicemembers, civilian 

government employees, and industry personnel; whereas other 

impediments would mainly affect industry personnel. The inability to 

accurately estimate the number of future clearance requests and the 

expiration of the previously mentioned executive order that resulted in 

high-level involvement by OMB could adversely affect the timeliness of 

eligibility determinations for all types of employee groups. In contrast, an 

increased demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel and the 

lack of reciprocity would primarily affect industry personnel. 

If Not Effectively 

Addressed, 

Impediments Could 

Continue to Hinder 

Efforts to Provide 

Timely Clearances 

An Existing and a Potential 

New Impediment Could 

Lead to Continuing 

Problems for All Types of 

Employees Seeking 

Clearances 

A major impediment to providing timely clearances is the inaccurate 

projections of the number of requests for security clearances DOD-wide 

and for industry personnel specifically. As we noted in our May 2004 

testimony before this committee, DOD’s longstanding inability to 

accurately project its security clearance workload makes it difficult to 

determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. In fiscal 

year 2001, DOD received 18 percent (about 150,000) fewer requests than it 

expected, and in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, it received 19 and 13 percent 

(about 135,000 and 90,000) more requests than projected, respectively. In

2005, DOD was again uncertain about the number and level of clearances 

Page 7 GAO-06-747T 
that it required, but the department reported plans and efforts to identify 

clearance requirements for servicemembers, civilian employees, and 

contractors. For example, in response to our May 2004 recommendation to 

improve the projection of clearance requests for industry personnel, DOD 

indicated that it was developing a plan and computer software that would

enable the government’s contracting officers to (1) authorize a certain 

number of industry personnel clearance investigations for any given 

contract, depending on the number of clearances required to perform the 

classified work on that contract, and (2) link the clearance investigations

to the contract number. 

Another potential impediment that could slow improvements in personnel 

security clearance processes in DOD—as well as governmentwide—is the 

July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order No. 13381. Among other things, 

this executive order delegated responsibility for improving the clearance 

process to the Director of OMB for about 1 year. We have been 

encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB has demonstrated 

in the development of a governmentwide plan to address clearance-related 

problems. Also, the OMB Deputy Director met with GAO officials to 

discuss OMB’s general strategy for addressing the problems that led to our 

high-risk designation for DOD’s clearance program. Demonstrating strong 

management commitment and top leadership support to address a known 

risk is one of the requirements for removing DOD’s clearance program 

from GAO’s high-risk list. Because there has been no indication that the 

executive order will be extended, we are concerned about whether such 

progress will continue without OMB’s high-level management 

involvement. While OPM has provided some leadership in assisting OMB 

with the development of the governmentwide plan, OPM may not be in a 

position to assume additional high-level commitment for a variety of 

reasons. These reasons include (1) the governmentwide plan lists many 

management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director of its 

investigations unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct overseas 

investigations and adjusting its investigative workforce to the increasing

demand for clearances; (2) adjudication of personnel security clearances 

and determination of which organizational positions require such 

clearances are outside the current emphases for OPM; and (3) agencies’ 

disputes with OPM—such as the current one regarding billing—may 

require a high-level third party to mediate a resolution that is perceived to 

be impartial. 

Page 8 GAO-06-747T 
As we have previously identified, an increase in the demand for top secret 

clearances could have workload and budgetary implications for DOD and

OPM if such requests continue to occur. In our 2004 report, we noted that 

the proportion of requests for top secret clearances for industry personnel 

increased from 17 to 27 percent from fiscal years 1995 through 2003. This

increase has workload implications because top secret clearances (1) 

must be renewed every 5 years, compared to every 10 years for secret 

clearances, and (2) require more information about the applicant than 

secret clearances do. Our 2004 analyses further showed that the 10-year 

cost to the government was 13 times higher for a person with a top secret 

clearance ($4,231) relative to a person with a secret clearance ($328). 

Thus, if clearance requirements for organizational positions are set higher

than needed, the government’s capacity to decrease the clearance backlog 

is reduced while the cost of the clearance program is increased. 

Increased Demand for 

High-level Clearances and 

the Lack of Reciprocity 

Are Previously Identified 

Problems for Industry 

Personnel 

When the reciprocity of clearances or access is not fully utilized, industry 

personnel are prevented from working. In addition to having a negative 

effect on the employee and the employer, the lack of reciprocity has 

adverse effects for the government, including an increased workload for 

the already overburdened staff who investigate and adjudicate security 

clearances. Problems with reciprocity of clearances or access, particularly

for industry personnel, have continued to occur despite the establishment 

in 1997 of governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative

guidelines.9

 The Reciprocity Working Group, which helped to prepare 

information for the governmentwide plan to improve the security 

clearance process, noted that “a lack of reciprocity often arises due to 

reluctance of the gaining activity to inherit accountability for what may be 

an unacceptable risk due to poor quality investigations and/or

adjudications.” Congress enacted reciprocity requirements in the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of December 2004,10 and 

OMB promulgated criteria in December 2005 for federal agencies to follow 

 9

 Reciprocity, as is required by Executive Order No. 12968, is a policy that requires

background investigations and eligibility determinations conducted under the order be

mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies, expect when an agency has substantial 

information indicating that an employee may not satisfy the standards under this order.

Reciprocity also involves the ability to transfer (1) an individual’s existing, valid security 

clearance and (2) access from one department, agency, or military service to another or 

from the federal government to the private sector (and vice versa) when the individual 

changes jobs without having to grant another clearance or access.

10 Pub. L. No. 108-548, § 3001 (d), Reciprocity of Security Clearance and Access

Determinations. 

Page 9 GAO-06-747T 
in determining whether to accept security clearances from other 

government agencies. Because of how recently these changes were made, 

their impact is unknown. 

We will continue to assess and monitor DOD’s personnel security 

clearance program at your request. We are conducting work on the 

timeliness and completeness of investigations and adjudications for top 

secret clearances for industry personnel and we will report that 

information to this committee this fall. Also, our standard steps of 

monitoring programs on our high-risk list require that we evaluate the 

progress that agencies make toward being removed from the list.11 Lastly, 

we monitor our recommendations to agencies to determine whether steps 

are being taken to overcome program deficiencies. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at 

(202)512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions 

to this testimony include Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Jerome 

Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; David Epstein; Sara Hackley; 

James Klein; and Kenneth E. Patton.

Concluding 

Observations 

Staff Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

 11 The general steps required to remove DOD’s personal security clearance program from 

the high-risk list are summarized in GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan

Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain, 

GAO-06-233T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005). 

Page 10 GAO-06-747T 
Page 11 GAO-06-747T 

Related GAO Products

Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of Energy and Defense 

Policies and Oversight Could Be Improved. GAO-06-369. Washington, 

D.C.: March 7, 2006. 

Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their 

Policies and Oversight. GAO-06-531T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

GAO’s High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 

2006. 

Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance 

Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process. 

GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-

233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005. 

Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection 

Issues Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-

71SU. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005. 

DOD’s High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed 

for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 6, 2005. 

Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance 

Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005. 

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors 

under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.: July 

15, 2005. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles 

Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk 

Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform 

DOD Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2005. 
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. 

GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires 

Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005. 

GAO’s 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February 

17, 2005. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 

2005. 

Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 

Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 14, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce 

Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 

Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to 

Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 

Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. 

Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local 

Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its 

Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332. 

Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to 

Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington, 

D.C.: February 9, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 

GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Page 12 GAO-06-747T 
Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual 

Performance and Organizational Success. GAO-03-488. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of 

Systems That Process Intelligence Data. GAO-03-329. Washington D.C.: 

March 31, 2003. 

Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans 

With Budgets and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington D.C.: 

January 4, 2002. 

Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access to Information 

on CIA Programs and Activities. GAO-01-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 

2001. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. 

DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for 

Top Secret Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001. 

DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance 

Reinvestigations Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security 

Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: 

August 24, 2000. 

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of 

Executive Branch Officials. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177. Washington, D.C.: 

July 27, 2000.

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of 

Executive Branch Officials. GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139. Washington, D.C.: July 

11, 2000. 

Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But 

Further Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2000. 

Page 13 GAO-06-747T 
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are 

Being Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose 

National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February

16, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose 

National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 

27, 1999. 

Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to 

Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 7, 1999. 

Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at 

DOE Facilities. GAO/T-RCED-99-159. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999. 

Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences Under the Results Act in 

Linking Plans With Budgets. GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67. Washington, D.C.: 

April 12, 1999. 

Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History 

Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999. 

Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to 

and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. 

Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998. 

Inspectors General: Joint Investigation of Personnel Actions Regarding 

a Former Defense Employee. GAO/AIMD/OSI-97-81R. Washington, D.C.: 

July 10, 1997.

Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996. 

Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R. 

Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996. 

Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive 

Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 

1995. 

Page 14 GAO-06-747T 
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Implementation Issues. GAO/T-GGD-95-

186. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1995. 

Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in 

Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 

14, 1995. 

Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the 

Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.

Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating 

Investigations and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. 

Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. 

Managing DOE: Further Review Needed of Suspensions of Security 

Clearances for Minority Employees. GAO/RCED-95-15. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 1994. 

Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, 

D.C.: March 4, 1994. 

Classified Information: Costs of Protection Are Integrated With Other 

Security Costs. GAO/NSIAD-94-55. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1993. 

Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance 

Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993. 

Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative 

Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 

1993. 

Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security 

Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14. 

Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not 

Provided When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. 

Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by 

Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6,

1992. 

Page 15 GAO-06-747T 
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security 

Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.

Weaknesses in NRC’s Security Clearance Program. GAO/T-RCED-89-14. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1989. 

Nuclear Regulation: NRC’s Security Clearance Program Can Be 

Strengthened. GAO/RCED-89-41. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1988. 

Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance 

Program. GAO/RCED-89-34. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1988. 

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security 

Clearance Program. GAO/RCED-88-28. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 

1987. 

National Security: DOD Clearance Reduction and Related Issues. 

GAO/NSIAD-87-170BR. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1987. 

Oil Reserves: Proposed DOE Legislation for Firearm and Arrest 

Authority Has Merit. GAO/RCED-87-178. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 

1987. 

Embassy Blueprints: Controlling Blueprints and Selecting Contractors 

for Construction Abroad. GAO/NSIAD-87-83. Washington, D.C.: April 14,

1987. 

Security Clearance Reinvestigations of Employees Has Not Been Timely

at the Department of Energy. GAO/T-RCED-87-14. Washington, D.C.: April 

9, 1987. 

Improvements Needed in the Government’s Personnel Security Clearance 

Program. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1985. 

Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy 

Personnel. GAO/GGD-83-66. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1983. 

Effect of National Security Decision Directive 84, Safeguarding 

National Security Information. GAO/NSIAD-84-26. Washington, D.C.: 

October 18, 1983. 

Page 16 GAO-06-747T 
Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could Avoid 

Millions in Losses. GAO/GGD-81-105. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 

1981. 

Page 17 GAO-06-747T (350865) 
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