RUSSIAN PRIVATE 

MILITARY COMPANIES

APRIL 2020

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Their use and 

how to consider 

them in operations, 

competition, and 

conflict
DISCLAIMER: The information contained herein is not current U.S. 

doctrine or policy and is not meant to supersede doctrine, commander’s 

guidance or established unit standard operating procedures. Examine and 

use the information in light of your mission, the operational environment, 

the Law of Armed Conflict and other situational factors. This document 

does not constitute the provision of additional information or the approval 

of additional information upon request.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; 

distribution unlimited.
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Contents

FOREWORD ................................................................................................ VII

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................................IX

Key Findings ........................................................................................... ix

Operational Challenges and Considerations Presented 

by Russian PMCs .................................................................................... x

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 1

Definitional Note ..................................................................................... 3

Data Limitations, Gaps, and Scoping .................................................. 4

RUSSIAN PMCS: THEIR ORIGINS AND USE .......................................... 7

Background and Origins ........................................................................ 8

Uses..........................................................................................................12

Equipment, Training, and Personnel...................................................15

Coordination with the Russian Federation and Others.................. 17

Legal Enablers and Parameters ..........................................................18

ANALYTICAL MODEL ................................................................................ 23

The Conflict Continuum and ROMO................................................... 24

Four Thought Experiments.................................................................. 25

Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix ..................................... 26

EXPERIMENT 1: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE............................... 29

Step One: Describe Type of Operation.............................................. 29

Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix....................................................... 32

Step Three: Identify Insights .............................................................. 35

EXPERIMENT 2: NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION..... 37

Step One: Describe Type of Operation.............................................. 37

Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix....................................................... 40

Step Three: Identify Insights .............................................................. 43
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EXPERIMENT 3: PEACE OPERATIONS.................................................. 45

Step One: Describe Type of Operation.............................................. 45

Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix....................................................... 47

Step Three: Identify Insights .............................................................. 49

EXPERIMENT 4: LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS.................. 51

Step One: Describe Type of Operation.............................................. 51

Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix....................................................... 54

Step Three: Identify Insights .............................................................. 55

CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................... 57

The Vulnerabilities of Russian PMCs ................................................ 57

The Relevance of Russian PMCs to U.S. Forces and Missions.... 59

APPENDIX: CONTEMPORARY CASES OF RUSSIAN PMC USE ....... 61

Syria ........................................................................................................ 62

Ukraine.................................................................................................... 76

Central African Republic ..................................................................... 80

Sudan....................................................................................................... 85

Libya ........................................................................................................ 88

Nigeria..................................................................................................... 90

Yemen...................................................................................................... 91

Venezuela ............................................................................................... 92

Other Countries ..................................................................................... 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 95
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Figures

Figure 1. The Conflict Continuum............................................................. 25

Figure 2. Sample Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix............ 27

Figure 3. Abbreviated Example of Model............................................... 28

Figure 4. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominantly Military .......

 Activities ..................................................................................... 52

Figure 5. Notional Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability

 Activities ..................................................................................... 53
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Tables

Table 1. The Uses of Russian PMCs........................................................ 13

Table 2: SFA Goals...................................................................................... 30

Table 3: SFA Tasks ..................................................................................... 31

Table 4: SFA Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis ... 32

Table 5: NEO Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis .. 40

Table 6: PKO Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis... 47

Table 7: Large-Scale Combat Operations Permissiveness/State 

 Involvement Matrix Analysis..................................................... 54
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Foreword

Fellow Professionals,

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) serves as the United States 

Army’s global scouts. We leverage direct observations of the operational 

environment, emerging threat capabilities, and friendly gaps to advise the 

operational force. Our observations inform doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities, and policy solutions. 

Since our establishment in 2006, part of our mission has been anticipating 

asymmetric threats and “seeing over the next hilltop.” One of the threats 

we see on the horizon is that posed by Private Military Companies (PMCs). 

PMCs are proliferating worldwide and play an increasingly important 

role in competition and conflict. Specifically, PMCs based in the Russian 

Federation have been active in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. They 

are of increasing concern to commanders worldwide, from the tactical to the 

strategic level.

After observing the growth of PMC activity, AWG requested the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory conduct an in-depth study into 

available open sources of information on PMCs, and analyze differences 

between PMCs and conventional armed forces. The resulting report complements AWG’s work observing threats in the operational environment, and 

is also extremely valuable for others who may have to counter PMCs in the 

future. As this report demonstrates, PMCs pose unique dilemmas, but they 

also have unique vulnerabilities due to their informal nature and ambiguous 

status as illegal armed forces.

We are publicly releasing this report, which is based largely on academic 

and press sources, so that it is widely available to the force, our Allies, and 

our global partners. We hope this product proves valuable to you and broadens understanding of this important topic.

Think. Adapt. Anticipate.

Col. Scott A. Shaw

Commander, Asymmetric Warfare Group

Fort Meade, MD

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Executive Summary

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) sponsored the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) to analyze the phenomenon 

of Russian private military companies (PMCs), the scenarios under which 

they would matter to U.S. Army maneuver commanders, and whether they 

constitute a unique threat to U.S. and partner forces. 

The primary audience for this analysis is U.S. Army maneuver commanders 

and their staffs, but the findings and insights should also be useful for anyone in the U.S. national security and defense communities concerned with 

asymmetric operations of the Russian Federation around the world.

First, this analysis presents key findings from deep-dive research and analysis on Russian PMCs presented in the appendix. It addresses their uses, 

equipment, training, personnel, state involvement, legal issues, and other 

related topics. Second, these findings are used to inform an analytical model 

to explore the operational challenges and considerations Russian PMCs 

could present to U.S. Army maneuver commanders.

Key Findings 

Bottom Line Up Front: Russian PMCs are used as a force multiplier to 

achieve objectives for both government and Russia-aligned private interests 

while minimizing both political and military costs. While Moscow continues to see the use of Russian PMCs as beneficial, their use also presents 

several vulnerabilities that present both operational and strategic risks to 

Russian Federation objectives.

Friendly Regime Support: Russian lawmakers view Russian PMCs as an 

instrument to prop up friendly regimes under threat of collapse or ouster. 

Russian PMCs operate:

• Alongside and embedded with friendly state militaries.

• With non-state armed groups in offensive combat operations.

Offensive Role: While also used for support tasks more typical of military 

and security contractors, Russian PMCs have had a pronounced role in 

offensive combat operations.
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Shifting Control: The command and control (C2) of Russian PMCs is not 

consistent in all operational contexts. 

• Sometimes Russian PMCs fall under the C2 of the Russian 

Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Russian intelligence agencies.

• At other times, PMCs fall under the C2 of partner governments or 

aligned private interests.

Inconsistent Capabilities: The quality of personnel and materiel enabling 

Russian PMCs is inconsistent. Russian PMC capabilities in personnel, 

training, and equipment appear to be greater when a PMC is closely aligned 

with state support from the Russian MoD. 

Informal by Design: Despite legislative efforts to legalize PMCs, Russian 

law continues to formally outlaw their creation and bars individuals from 

joining them under anti-mercenary laws. However, Russian leaders use this 

legal prohibition to strictly control some PMCs (e.g., the selective arrest of 

PMCs who might present domestic security or political risks), not to prevent 

PMCs from operating.

Vulnerabilities: The use of Russian PMCs presents new operational and 

strategic risks to Moscow. Morale in Russian PMC units in high-risk missions appears delicate. Although their use provides political protection from 

the optics of high Russian MoD casualties, both Russian PMC casualties 

and their return home create novel political and domestic security risks. 

Their use also complicates internal regime politics in Moscow, creating 

competition between the MoD and private equities that can jeopardize 

operations (see the appendix: Syria). Finally, the ambiguity of operational 

control and decision making over Russian PMCs opens Moscow up to the 

risk of being held responsible by the international community for actions 

taken by Russian PMCs under the command of other interests.

Operational Challenges and Considerations 

Presented by Russian PMCs

Bottom Line Up Front: Russian PMCs do not pose a unique tactical 

threat—other state and non-state actors are similarly capable. However: 

• PMCs can operate across the conflict continuum and present the 

United States with dilemmas at all levels of war.

• Challenges Russian PMCs could pose in noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and peacekeeping operations (PKOs) 

deserve careful consideration.
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Most Dangerous Scenario: The most dangerous scenario involving a Russian PMC is one where a U.S. Army brigade could encounter a state-supported, battalion tactical group (BTG)-like entity with advanced weapons, 

cutting-edge enabler technologies, and expertise: 

• With a high level of Russian state support, a Russian PMC in 

Syria was able to function as a quasi-BTG; it conducted basic 

combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. 

• With the aid of Russian support and forces, separatists in eastern 

Ukraine conducted combined arms operations and was highly 

proficient at enabling integration, particularly information 

operations (IO), electronic warfare (EW), and unmanned aerial 

systems (UAS). 

Most Likely Scenarios: Russian state-supported PMC operations aimed 

at disrupting U.S. operations during crisis response or limited contingency 

operations. PMCs might execute the following: 

• Occupy potential evacuation sites or other key terrain during a 

NEO. 

• Ally with local actors in PKO to provide weapons and training to 

groups opposed to U.S. actions.

• Provide other forms of support, including intelligence and 

maintaining influence in a given area.

Other Potential Scenarios: Less severe scenarios exist where Russian 

PMCs could seek to compete with and undermine U.S. influence with local 

authorities and civilians. 

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Introduction

I believe that such companies are a way of implementing 

national interests without the direct involvement of the 

state...Yes, I think we could consider this option.1

– President-elect Vladimir Putin, 2012

No private military companies exist in our country by 

law. Everyone is talking about some private military company, something called Wagner... [The President cannot] 

comment on what does not exist.2

– Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 2018 

The increasingly assertive posture of the Russian Federation between 2007 

and 2019 in Eastern Europe and beyond presented U.S. service members 

and maneuver commanders with unfamiliar challenges. After decades of 

training, equipping, and deploying to fight terrorism, the U.S. National 

Defense Strategy now presents “the reemergence of long-term, strategic 

competition... by revisionist powers” as the leading challenge of the new 

strategic environment3 and such competition with China and Russia as “the 

principal priorities of the Department.”4 Russia’s revisionist strategy not 

only “aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our 

allies and partners,”5 but also to erode and ultimately destroy the “resilient, 

but weakening, post-WWII international order.”6 In its place, Russia seeks 

to establish an international order in which it exercises “veto authority over 

nations on its periphery”7 across an exclusive sphere of influence, so that 

Moscow might reassert itself as a great power in the twenty-first century.

8

One of the many instruments of power Russia leveraged to pursue this revisionist strategy has been increasing use of Russian private military companies (PMCs) in military operations and other areas of strategic competition 

and conflict. Since the invasion and prolonged conflict in Ukraine, and the 

Russian intervention on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria, the Russian 

PMC has been a fast growing subject of analysis and open-source reporting 

around Russian operations. There is significant study and a growing literature on questions around Russian PMCs: the motivations behind and nature 

of their use; their equipment, training, and personnel; their relationship 

and coordination with the Russian Federation or other adversaries; their vulnerabilities; their legal enablers or parameters; and whether or not their use 

affords Russia significant advantages. However, what remains unaddressed 

in the literature is how these issues impact the work of U.S. Army maneuver 

commanders and service members. 
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The goal of this analysis is to equip U.S. Army maneuver commanders and 

other service members pre-deployment with two things: First, a grounded 

understanding of Russian PMCs—what they are, how they tend to operate, 

how Russia has employed them—and second, clarity on how U.S. forces 

could encounter them across the continuum of conflict and range of military 

operations (ROMO). 

One of the many reasons why Russia utilizes such groups is to undermine 

the ability of its adversaries to make clear and quick decisions through 

deception. In an interview with The Inquiry on BBC, Dr. Kimberly Marten—professor of Political Science at Columbia University—said Russian 

PMCs are: 

an element in an information warfare campaign where... 

credible people can say ‘oh, it’s so confusing; it’s just a 

cloud; we can’t possibly make any determination about 

anything,’ and so we all just give up and go home... 

Putin’s goal is to try to confuse things and leave... his 

opponents, including the U.S. military, unsure about how 

to react to what’s going on because it’s just very unclear 

who is who.9

Clarity is important because U.S. Army maneuver commanders do not have 

the luxury of observing Russian PMCs from afar as a compelling subject 

of study. If such actors are present in their area of responsibility (AOR), 

they must be knowledgeable and ready to make quick and consequential 

decisions about how to proceed. While not prescriptive in terms of providing courses of action (COAs) for any given scenario, this analysis offers a 

grounded discussion of Russian PMCs in the context of U.S. doctrine and 

examines the operational implications Russian PMCs might present to a maneuver commander in their AOR. 

The analysis presented here answers two questions: 1. How does Russia 

leverage Russian PMCs and 2. Does their use pose a unique threat to U.S. 

forces? To answer these questions, this analysis first explores the capabilities and operational impacts of Russian PMCs in contemporary areas of 

operation (AOs) (see the appendix) through a deep dive into how they were 

used, their equipment, training, personnel, coordination with the Russian 

Federation and other actors, vulnerabilities, and any legal enablers or 

parameters. Second, utilizing data in notional experiments—where Russian 

PMCs are encountered with varying degrees of both permissiveness of the 

environment and level of Russian state involvement—the analysis demonstrates how Russian PMCs could challenge the performance of U.S. Army 

brigade operations and whether any significant challenges emerge.
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Definitional Note

The Russian Federation and its predecessors used a wide variety of privatized force to achieve national military or domestic security objectives, all 

of which inform the contemporary use of Russian PMCs. These include foreign mercenaries during the Tsarist era, Cossack associations, “volunteers,” 

and private security companies (PSCs),a both at home and abroad. While 

this analysis exclusively concerns “Russian PMCs,” it recognizes that there 

is significant overlap between Russian PMCs and other forms of private 

forces used by the Russian Federation and will discuss these other elements 

as necessary to inform the discussion and analysis of Russian PMCs.

Defining Russian PMCs is an ongoing debate in the growing literature on 

these organizations. Russian law recognizes PSCs, which primarily perform 

domestic civilian security tasks, but not PMCs, which remain technically 

illegal in Russia. Although the law prohibiting Russian PMCs specifically 

concerns “mercenary activities,” simply referring to them as “mercenaries” 

is also less than ideal. International law provides a formal definition for 

mercenaries, and the role of nationalism in the motives of recruits and other 

factors around Russian PMCs complicates use of the label (see the section 

on Legal Enablers and Parameters). The debate is even further complicated 

by the already contested definitions of private military and security companies (PMSCs) writ large, and because Russian PMCs do not consistently fit 

within any of the existing categories, they operate in a markedly different 

manner than their Western counterparts.b

Åse Gilje Østensen and Tor Bukkvoll at the Norwegian Defence Research 

Establishment (FFI) argued in 2018 that there is more clarity to be found 

in categorizing services “rather than the companies themselves.”10 Notably, 

this approach appears to reflect how such companies are discussed in Rusa PSCs are here considered to be those companies regulated under Russian law as 

such and participating in exclusively PSC-associated functions. There are some exceptions where groups formally recognized as PSCs participate in military services 

functions abroad or are involved in the formation and deployment of PMCs. For an 

example of this, see Early PMC Involvement – Moran’s ‘Slavonic Corps’ in the appendix, which describes the role of the Moran Security Group (a registered Russian 

PSC) in the creation and operation of Slavonic Corps—an ill-fated Russian PMC that 

briefly operated in Syria.

b For a thorough survey of the competing definitions from the wider literature on 

mercenaries and other forms of privatized force, and the complications in applying 

them to Russian PMCs, see Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security 

forces: the case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs, March 26, 2019, pp. 3-4. 

For a survey on how Russian PMCs significantly differ from Western PMCs, see Åse 

Gilje Østensen and Tor Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies – the implications for European and Norwegian Security, Norwegian Defence 

Research Establishment, FFI-RAPPORT 18/01300, September 11, 2018, pp. 8-13.
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sian sources. According to Russian expert Sergey Sukhankin, the Russian 

literature (leaning on observations of the West) distinguishes between four 

types of companies, defining each according to the services they typically provide:

Military provider companies... which offer their clients 

tactical support during military operations (including 

direct participation in hostilities); 

Military consulting companies... which consult clients 

on questions related to strategic planning and the reform 

of military forces, directly help with training of military 

personnel, as well as provide guidance on working with 

new types of weaponry;

Military support companies... which provide auxiliary 

functions (including services in IT and military spheres);

Private security companies [PSCs]... which deal with 

crisis management, risk assessment, security consulting, 

de-mining, or training of local law enforcement.11

Even then, the reality of these groups complicates clean definitions. Several 

companies defined as PSCs under Russian law have participated in PMC 

work, and Russian PMCs are not precluded from providing services typically associated with PSCs. Armed groups also exist that straddle the definition between Russian PMCs and nationalist militias in their functions and 

activities. For this reason, to avoid exclusion of relevant data, any definition 

of Russian PMCs will have to account for their informal nature. 

For the purposes of this analysis, “Russian PMCs” refer to companies 

operated by or composed primarily of Russian persons, the bulk of whose 

activities on behalf of clients (the Russian Federation, other governments, 

or private clients) consist of tactical support during military operations 

(including combat), the direct training of military personnel, and other 

military support services.

Data Limitations, Gaps, and Scoping

Due to the nature of Russian PMCs as informal, deniable, and covert, as 

well as the fog of war and incomplete open-source coverage of their operations, available information on such organizations and their operations 

is limited, imperfect, and at times unreliable. It is important to caveat that 

some sources cited or quoted in the research informing this analysis may 
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confuse Russian PMCs with Russian PSCs or use the moniker “Wagner” (a 

specific organization) as shorthand for Russian PMCs more generally. While 

this is not an intelligence product, the research informing this analysis 

sought to ensure that information is presented transparently, completely, and 

with due consideration of uncertainty. 

This report has been reviewed by the TRADOC G2 and is consistent with 

the Army’s Operational Environment assessments.

The scope of this analysis is the use of Russian PMCs by the Russian Federation to accomplish their strategic and operational goals and the scenarios 

in which Russian PMCs would matter or constitute a threat to U.S. and 

partner forces. 

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Russian PMCs: Their Origins 

and Use

I have some experience with these groups and specifically 

the Wagner Group from my time in Syria... I think they 

concern me greatly... They’re a quasi-military and as we 

saw play out in Crimea and Ukraine, little green men running around, not necessarily following rules of behavior 

we would expect from proper armies. So I have a pretty 

significant concern for the use of these kinds of forces and 

the way that the Russians are using them on the continent... this is something I’ll certainly be looking into in 

greater detail... they train right alongside Russian armed 

forces... It’ll be an endeavor to try to figure out exactly 

what they’re doing with them... They are using them to 

guard the head of state. They are using them to train some 

of the local armed forces. Some of that could be benign, 

some of that is probably less than benign.12

– Gen. Stephen J. Townsend 

Any analysis of how Russian PMCs should be considered across the continuum of conflict and the ROMO must be informed by a clear picture of the 

role they play in Russian military operations and foreign policy. This section will first provide a brief background on the history of Russia’s market 

for force and its use to achieve military objectives, leading up to the advent 

of Russian PMCs. Second, it will summarize the operational, strategic, and 

political uses of Russian PMCs. Third, it will review the varying quality and 

means of how Russian PMCs are equipped, trained, and staffed. Fourth, it 

will review how Russian PMCs coordinated and worked alongside elements of the Russian Federation and other actors. Fifth, it will summarize 

legal enablers and parameters on the operation and use of Russian PMCs. 

Finally, these assessments will inform a brief discussion of exposed Russian 

vulnerabilities through using Russian PMCs. Informing these assessments is 

in-depth research on recent cases of Russian PMC deployments, which can 

be found in the appendix.
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Background and Origins

Private Security Companies

Russian PMCs emerged from a private market for force that existed in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the vast reduction in size 

of the post-Soviet Russian military after 1991, former soldiers found work 

with firms at home and abroad. PSCs were legitimized in 1992 to operate 

domestically when President Boris Yeltsin passed the Federal Law No 2487-

I “On Private Detective and Security Activity in the Federation of Russia” 

and played an important role in protecting private businesses and individuals during the breakdown in the rule of law during the 1990s and early 

2000s. As of this writing, PSCs, large and small, employ at least a million 

people in Russia.13

In spite of this legitimacy, the PSC market remained effectively ungoverned 

throughout the 1990s. As one analyst noted, “The market [for force] has 

been shaped by the lack of domestic regulation or state control in...Russia... [and the] privatization of security and law enforcement in the region 

was driven mostly by ad hoc initiatives and short-term political and other 

considerations.”14 The market for force in Russia was and remains characterized by its reliance on informal networks of military and intelligence 

contacts. While primarily focused at home, PSCs in different configurations 

acted as contractors abroad. Thousands of demobilized Soviet soldiers, 

primarily from newly independent Russian Federation and Ukraine, worked 

abroad as private contractors in Africa in the 1990s and 2000s, primarily 

in former Soviet client states, states under sanctions, and states with few 

relations with the West, including Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan.15

Cossacks

Another set of non-state groups Russia used in PMC-like functions are the 

Cossack community and volunteer forces. Cossack paramilitary formations 

played an important role in Russian imperial expansion and consolidation in 

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the Bolsheviks repressed 

the Cossack community through the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1994, 

Russian President Boris Yeltsin adopted the “State Policy Concept regarding 

the Cossacks,” re-establishing the legal rights of the Cossack community. 

Because Cossacks had been repressed for over sixty years, the re-emerged 
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community was more heavily shaped and controlled by the state than its 

historic predecessors, known for their independence.16

President Putin introduced the law “On the State Service of the Russian 

Cossacks” in 2005. Since then, the primary role of Cossack formations has 

been the “patriotic and Orthodox education of young people” in Russia.17

However, their role as a domestic security auxiliary and paramilitary force 

also expanded. They engaged in everything from border security and 

firefighting to counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya. Excluding the 

conflict in eastern Ukraine, the Cossacks are primarily used outside of Russia for Russian soft-power influence, rather than in a PMC role, and almost 

exclusively in Slavic countries. Reorganized in 2014 to make them easier 

to control, the Cossacks participated in cultural and political events with 

Serbian nationalists in Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

and Montenegro.18

Since the 2000s, the Cossacks also acted as auxiliaries for Russian military activity. The Cossacks participated in a 2004 special operation in the 

ethnically Georgian-settled Gali region of Abkhazia and then again in the 

Georgia-Russia war in 2008.19 During the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the 

volunteer forces of the Cossack National Guard of the Almighty Don Army, 

which formed specifically to support the Russian war against Ukraine in the 

Donbas, occupied several towns.20

Volunteers

Volunteers are another type of non-state auxiliary force provider in Russia’s 

near abroad, referring to the former Soviet states bordering the country. The 

early-1990s disintegration of the USSR led to numerous ethnic and civil 

conflicts in the newly independent republics. Various forces (and sometimes 

forces on both sides) received direct or indirect support from the Russian 

military. In Russia’s near abroad, demobilized and still active duty Russian 

troops sometimes acted as mercenaries in emergent conflicts. For example, 

newly independent Armenia recruited recently demobilized Russian troops 

to drive tanks and engage in combat missions against Azerbaijan during the 

conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.21 Genuine volunteers, some for ideological 

and nationalist reasons, also traveled to and participated in local conflicts, 

such as Transnistria (Moldova) and Abkhazia (Georgia) in 1992 and 1993. 

Along with individuals from other Orthodox countries, such as Greece, 

Ukraine, and Romania,22 hundreds of Russian volunteers participated in the 

conflict in Yugoslavia in support of the Serbian government of Slobodan 

Milosevic. Some arriving as early as September 1992, Russians were in at 
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least five different units of foreign volunteers, such as the “White Wolves.”23

In 1999, Russian volunteers fought alongside the Milosevic government in 

Kosovo, participating in battles just weeks prior to the arrival of an official 

Russian military contingent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO)-led Kosovo Force.24 The volunteer trend continued during the conflict in eastern Ukraine. At least 3,000 Russian volunteers fought alongside 

separatist forces, playing an important role in providing manpower during 

an early phase of the conflict against the Ukrainian military.25

While some see volunteers as a result of “Russia’s aim... to restore its 

influence throughout the region, on all sides, in every conflict,”26 others 

noted it is difficult to discern “who is participating in the conflict because 

of genuine zeal and who is there on secret orders.”27 However, as noted by 

Mark Galeotti, “These mercenaries, nationalists and adventurers are often 

of questionable military value but considerable enthusiasm, and also useful 

political-propaganda tools, demonstrating alleged popular support.”28

Volunteers in Ukraine were not remunerated for their participation in the 

conflict, even if they were left with life-long grievous injuries. This is 

possibly for legal reasons, protecting them from Russia’s strict law on 

mercenaries. As one scholar noted, “If a person’s intent [when participating 

in a foreign conflict] to receive remuneration is absent, such actions are not 

criminal” under Russia’s mercenary laws.29

Emergence of Russian PMCs 

As Russian political stability improved, the private security sector became 

“less freewheeling and more regulated” throughout the 2000s and into the 

2010s.30 During this time, PSCs were legalized for use abroad and utilized 

to protect Russian state-owned infrastructure, perform anti-piracy missions, 

perform demining missions, and provide security services in Iraq.31

As Russian companies styled themselves after American and other Western contractors, it became a larger topic of discussion in Russian military 

circles, wary of ceding control over the use of force. The majority of 

discussion around PMCs in Russian military analysis communities focused 

on three aspects: 1) the threat posed to Russia by American PMCs and their 

alleged involvement in “color revolutions” in Syria, Libya, and Russia’s 

near abroad; 2) the money to be made if Russia was more competitive in the 

market; and 3) the use of PMCs as a means of furthering Russian national interests. 
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In 2012, a retired Russian military intelligence officer, Aleksandr Kanchukov, noted: 

The main advantages of the PMCs appear to be their 

operational skill, responsibility, effectiveness, professionalism and undeniable financial advantage. PMCs are an 

alternative [for former soldiers] to the state and to crime; 

guarantees insurance in zones of instability; quick resolutions to problems; and effective administration of risks. 

It is far more profitable to sign a contract with a private 

company for a concrete task than to send the security 

company affiliated with a giant oil or gas company, or 

send troops and maintain a garrison. On the other hand, if 

the state does not want to be affiliated with their participation in any conflict or project, or they want to shift 

other dirty business in a war to others, then PMCs will be 

excellent performers for these purposes.32

These views were later reiterated at higher levels. In 2012, member of parliament (MP) Aleksei Mitrofanov asked President Putin if he would support 

the creation and legalization of such companies: “Americans pay nearly 

350 billion USD for these services. PMCs which protect foreign property 

and train foreign personnel, guard infrastructure, provide a huge quantity of 

services in Iraq and other countries. Doesn’t it seem to you that we should 

also be represented in this business?”33 Putin replied, saying “I consider 

that [PMCs] certainly appear to be an instrument of realizations of national 

interests without direct participation of the state. We should think about and 

examine this topic.”34 Russian PSCs profited greatly from security activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere. Nevertheless, despite 

Russian PMC proliferation, legalization efforts stalled despite numerous 

legislative attempts (see the section on Legal Enablers and Parameters). 

Contemporary Russian PMCs

As of the completion of this report, there are a number of well-established 

Russian PSCs and PMCs operating abroad. Some PSCs continue to fulfill 

normal functions such as demining, close protection, and anti-piracy services. When working abroad, the host country usually contracts with them 

directly to provide services.35 Conversely, Russian PMCs are playing a 

more direct goal in Russian geopolitical activity and the Russian state is the 

primary purchaser of their services. 
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Since approximately 2013, Russian PMCs focused on furthering Russian 

national interests and carrying out high-risk missions that, if performed by 

regular troops, could be politically unpopular. These include groups like 

the Moran Security Group and Wagner. These groups are involved more 

directly in combat operations in coordination and often with the support of 

the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) itself even 

operates a company now, known as Patriot, which is reportedly mostly 

involved in close personal protection of very important persons.36 According 

to a source in the Russian MoD speaking to the press, an unnamed Russian PMC protects the construction of a Russian military base in Burundi 

in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Security 

Service (FSB).37

Despite the lack of domestic legalization, Russian PMCs will continue to be 

used as tools of Russian foreign policy. Russian PMCs will be operating in 

widely dispersed AOs where low-cost options are needed, and U.S. forces 

are likely to encounter them in contested environments.

Uses

Russian PMCs are leveraged by the Russian Federation, its allies, and financial interests to perform a wide variety of functions—most notably offensive 

combat missions—to achieve objectives as a force multiplier while minimizing both political and military costs. As observed in Syria, the political 

costs inherent in the deployment of regular volunteer troops to missions and 

wars abroad are comparatively avoided in the use of PMCs. Likewise, the 

use of Russian PMCs in the most dangerous roles and missions on the battlefield minimize official military casualty numbers.38 Allowing the Russian 

MoD to publish low official casualty counts and prevent headlines about 

service deaths appears to insulate the Kremlin politically,39 (e.g., popular 

Russian enthusiasm for official, “boots on the ground” support to the Assad 

regime in Syria was at only 19% as early as October 2015).40
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Table 1. The Uses of Russian PMCs

Overall: Achieve objectives for the Russian Federation, its allies, 

and financial interests as a force multiplier while minimizing both 

political and military costs 

Strategic:

• Political Insulation

• Regime Stability/ 

Protection

• Deterrence

• Control Grey 

Zones

• Zones of Artificial 

Stability

• Keep Russia 

Involved in 

Conflict w/Low 

Commitment

• Deception

In Combat:

• Infantry (incl. 

Mechanized)

• Forward Advisers

• Sappers

• Coord. Fire and 

Movement

• Forward Air 

Controllers

• Reconnaissance 

in Force

• Mine Clearance

• Armored Troops

• Artillery Units

• Information

Outside of Combat:

Includes uses typical of 

PSCs

• Security Advisers

• Armed Security

• Transport Convoys

• Training (of military, 

law enf.)

• Personal Protection

• Targeted 

Assassination*

• Kidnapping*

• Sabotage*

• Subversion*

• Blackmail*

* Specific to Ukraine; more difficult to verify.

Strategically, Russian PMCs have and can serve several purposes for the 

Russian Federation. They can be utilized as an instrument to stabilize 

friendly regimes seen as under threat of collapse or ouster. This purpose is 

apparent in their deployments (see the appendix: Syria, Sudan, and Venezuela), as well as in the public comments of Russian lawmakers.41 In 2014, 

Duma deputy Gennady Nosovko argued for legalizing Russian PMCs by 

referring to recent events in Ukraine, saying “there would not have been 

this present situation in Ukraine if there in Russia had been relevant PMSCs 

for hire at the time of the crisis for the Yanukovych government.”42 Deterrence of adversary intervention is another strategic use (see on the appendix: Venezuela). Russian PMCs can also be used as a means of deception, 

including as a potential cover for Russian special forces.43 Typically used 

in the earlier, non-kinetic stages of low-intensity conflict,44 Russian PMCs 

played early roles in protecting significant state-owned enterprises abroad 

(Gazprom, Rosatom, Rosneft, Russian Railways).45

Overall, while it did not pass, legislation proposed to legalize Russian 

PMCs (see the section on Legal Enablers and Parameters) contained a list 
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of services the groups would have been authorized to provide under the law. 

According to Interfax, the list included:

participation in peacekeeping operations, personnel 

training, military consulting, maintenance and service of 

military hardware and weaponry, the delivery of military 

equipment, demining, military construction, military 

translation, the protection of a foreign country’s territory... the restoration of constitutional order on its territory... [and] security guard services of various types.46

The uses described in the proposed legislation reflect the conclusions of 

U.S. Department of State (DOS) senior Russian political analyst Nathaniel 

Reynolds, who argues that Moscow could use Russian PMCs like Wagner 

“to launch a limited-objective incursion into a neighboring country, to train 

proxy forces to destabilize a pro-Western government, or to hide a secret 

Russian military presence.”47

In combat situations, Russian PMCs are used for offensive operations. 

While uncommon for Western military contractors, most of the Russian military literature around Russian PMCs views their use in offensive military 

operations as a typical and assumed function.48 In both Ukraine and Syria, 

forward offensive use of Russian PMCs was in an embedded context with 

non-Russian forces (separatist militias, Syrian troops, Iran-backed militias), 

although this did not preclude an official Russian MoD presence or role with 

the unit. Known—though not consistent—Russian PMC roles in offensive 

combat operations include infantry, mechanized infantry, forward advisers, 

sappers,49 coordination of fire and movement, forward air controllers, reconnaissance in force, mine clearance, armored troops, and artillery units (see 

the appendix: Syria, Ukraine, and Libya). Russian PMCs playing any or all 

of these roles alongside Russia-allied forces can also serve a propaganda 

function to bolster the perceived strength and efficacy of forces friendly to 

Russia. Another information role of Russian PMCs is the potential obfuscation of Russian Federation efforts and forces behind what first appear to 

be private business interests and companies. Russian authors also noted 

how this obfuscation is seen as beneficial for both Russia and the United 

States—Russia can deny actions, and the United States can choose to ignore 

and move on without losing face.50

Outside of combat operations, Russian PMC uses can include many services 

typically associated with PSCs, like security advisers, armed security for 

various infrastructure, construction security, transport convoys, training 

of military and law enforcement personnel, personal protection, anti-piracy ship protection, hostage rescue, and cargo retrieval. Russian PMCs 
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also appear to be deployed in conjunction with international arms sales to 

train partner armed forces in the use of Russian-made equipment (see the 

appendix: Sudan and Central African Republic). There is also evidence to 

suggest that Russian PMCs are at times leveraged for use in subversive 

activities, including targeted assassinations (see the appendix: Ukraine), as 

well as “sabotage, blackmail, subversive activities, terrorism, kidnapping” 

and others.51

Finally, an unusual role played by some Russian PMCs or related groups 

has been their use in IO. This includes the promotion of Russian nationalism 

at home and in the “near abroad” through paramilitary youth camps and other activities. While typically carried out by front political organizations in 

partnership with local nationalist groups, a 2018 case in the Balkans highlighted the role of pseudo-Russian PMC organizations in the practice, which 

provoked bans on contact with such groups by the Latvian government.52

While the group in this case (E.N.O.T. Corp) appears to straddle the categories of political paramilitary group and Russian PMC,53 the participation 

of Russian PMCs in the promotion of nationalism through youth programs 

is not new. As far back as 2006, the early Russian PMC Anti-terror-Orel 

(founded in 2003) included “military patriotic upbringing and training of 

the young people for the service in the armed forces” in the list of services 

offered by the group.54 The Russian PMC role in IO also included personnel associated with Wagner leading tactical training courses for civilians 

in western Europe. Open-source reporting released by Ukrainian security 

services shows Wagner personnel providing such courses in Hungary, Italy, 

Germany, and Greece in 2018 through the Volk (Wolf) International Special 

Training Center. It is unclear if this work was conducted on a freelance basis 

or through coordination with Wagner or the Russian government.

55

Equipment, Training, and Personnel

Russian PMCs operating abroad have been inconsistently equipped. While 

some patterns are discernible, planners cannot consider Russian PMCs as 

a set unit of materiel and capability and should instead consider them on a 

case-by-case basis. When participating in Russian MoD-supported offensive 

operations in highly permissive environments, Russian PMCs were well 

equipped. However, the quality of equipment provided to Russian PMCs 

appears to be tied to the identity of the actor or actors that are their patrons 

at any given time (see the appendix: Syria). When the Slavonic Corps flew 

to Syria in 2013 to operate at the behest of local Syrian sponsors, their kit 

was outdated, dysfunctional, and ad hoc. In fall 2015, when the Russian 

Federation directly intervened in the Syrian Civil War to support the Assad 

regime, Russian PMC Wagner received both high qualities and quantities of 
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light arms, ammunition, heavy weapons, and armor. Wagner operatives in 

Syria were also photographed in close proximity to Russian MoD helicopters and airplanes,56 though there is no indication that they were equipped 

with air capabilities. However, despite continued Russian MoD involvement 

in Syria, when Wagner sponsorship and C2 in the region appeared to shift 

from the Russian MoD to Syrian clientele, the quality equipment provided 

to the Russian PMC experienced a marked decline. In Nigeria, contractors 

from the former Soviet Union hired to perform offensive operations against 

Boko Haram were described by a diplomat observer as “an incoherent mix 

of people, helicopters and random kit from all sorts of different sources.”57 In CAR, there are indications that Russian PMCs in the country may 

have been armed using weapons donated by the Russian Federation to the 

government of CAR in cooperation with the United Nations (UN) Security 

Council (see the appendix: Central African Republic).

Recruits into Russian PMCs tend to be male Russian citizens from across 

the country with a military or security background, but they also recruit 

from among fighters participating in ongoing conflicts in their “near abroad” 

(e.g., separatist militias in Donetsk, Ukraine).58 Accounts told by recruits to 

the press describe the use of both active reserve and former intelligence officers as recruiters. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) publicly reports 

that Wagner membership also includes people from Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Serbia, and elsewhere.59 Another Russian PMC called Redut-Antiterror allegedly specializes in recruiting former soldiers and ex-officers of 

both the GRU and the FSB special unit Vympel.60 At times, Russian PMCs 

impose high recruitment standards—when preparing to deploy to Syria, 

Wagner required potential hires to have combat experience, pass physical 

fitness tests, demonstrate weapons handling skills, and pass other hurdles 

according to press reports. However, this is not universal. When recruitment efforts are expanded, at least some Russian PMCs (including Wagner) 

appear willing to widen their recruitment pool by lowering requirements, 

meaning the military experience of Russian PMC members is wide and inconsistent.61

Training of Russian PMC recruits before or during deployment does not 

appear to be consistent. Wagner appears to benefit from either support from 

or cooperation with the GRU, including the use of training grounds on or 

adjacent to the home base for the GRU’s 10th Special Mission Brigade in 

Molkino, Russia—presumably an advantage over other Russian PMCs.62

One way this training was demonstrated was in the organization of Wagner during their operations in Syria, for the most part mirroring a battalion 

battlegroup.63 Wagner’s command structure has been described by analysts 

and the Ukrainian SBU as a commander-in-chief and managing director at 
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the top, followed by a mid-level command consisting of an administrative 

group, general staff, and control group. Coordination of military aspects 

of the group are allegedly managed by Wagner’s Department of Military 

Preparation, which is then composed of several functional subunits (tank 

and vehicle crews, tactical training, firearm training, engineer training, artillery, and anti-air defense).64

Coordination with the Russian Federation 

and Others

Russian PMCs appear to often operate in close coordination with elements 

of Russian intelligence and the military. In Syria, Wagner is described by 

sources speaking to the press as coordinated, tasked, and supervised by the 

FSB, GRU, and allegedly at times even officers from the General Staff’s 

Chief Administration.65 Russian state-owned press outlets also reported 

that Wagner was under GRU supervision,66 and Wagner commanders who 

operated in Syria described their units in combat operations as accompanied 

by “an officer of the Russian military command,” who would coordinate air 

cover during the operation.67 However, operations in Syria in 2017 and 2018 

suggest the Russian MoD may not have maintained C2 over Wagner forces 

in the country, but rather transitioned control to the Assad regime (see the 

appendix: Syria). 

Evidence tying Wagner to the Russian MoD and even GRU has also been 

presented in the form of openly published intelligence on the C2 relationship and support provided to the Russian PMC. These include a phone call 

between the head of Wagner and a GRU staff officer (see the appendix: 

Ukraine), passports issued to Wagner personnel from what appears to be 

the desk used for GRU officers (see the appendix: Central African Republic), the use of allegedly GRU-exclusive materiel, transportation to AOs on 

Russian flagged naval cruisers, and the presentation of military honors to 

Wagner personnel (see the appendix: Syria). Russian expert Alexander Khramchikhin went so far as to describe Wagner as a “pseudo-private” military 

company that takes direction from the Russian army.68 Russian academic 

and military writing on the subject discuss Russian PMCs as entities essentially owned by, and used in service to, the Russian state and its interests.69

Russian PMCs also coordinated with a host of other actors in their operations abroad. When supporting a host government, Russian PMCs will 

typically have a close working relationship with the host nation’s regular 

military. As observed in Syria, Wagner jointly participated in combat operations alongside state forces, or even within state units. According to public 
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reporting, the relationship between the Assad government and Wagner 

included at times near exclusive funding of the PMC, as well as C2. Outside 

of active war zones, Russian PMCs will also participate in regular joint 

non-combat operations with friendly host forces—as observed in CAR—including training, patrols, checkpoints, transportation of materials, security, 

and stability deployments.

Militias and other armed non-state groups also enjoyed close cooperation 

and coordinated operations with Russian PMCs, particularly in offensive 

operations in Ukraine and Syria. Wagner forces played an active offensive 

role in coordination with separatist militias against Ukrainian troops in the 

2015 Battle of Debaltseve, resulting in a separatist victory (see the appendix: Ukraine). Likewise in Syria, Wagner participated in hostilities alongside numerous other groups, including (but not necessarily limited to) the 

Afghan Shia Liwa al-Fatimiyoun, Iraqi Shia militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, 

and Liwa al-Baqir (see the appendix: Syria).

Beyond state cooperation, Russian PMCs also take on private contracts and 

investors in pursuit of economic interests, according to press reports. These 

include private firms with equity in the securing of oil facilities in Syria, 

gold and mining interests in CAR, and others. In several theaters, Russian 

PMCs reportedly take on a mix of state-sponsored and privately sponsored 

tasks. Finally, Russian analysts also speculated that Russian PMCs could 

enter partnerships with other PMCs abroad. Russian military analyst Vladimir Neyelov specifically mentions Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment 

and Protection International (STTEP)—a South African PMC as potential 

future partners for Russian PMCs.70

Legal Enablers and Parameters

Unlike Russian PSCs that are registered and regulated by the Russian 

Federation, Russian PMCs are formally outlawed under Article 359 of the 

Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as mercenary activities, carrying 

a prison sentence of 3 to 7 years.c 71 As of this writing, legislative efforts to 

legalize PMCs in Russia have all failed to pass. However, similar to earlier 

laws around Russian PSCs,72 debates around legalization in Russia concern 

internal political power struggles more than any operational restrictions. 

c Identified into Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, mercenary activities are defined as “((a) recruitment, training, financing or any other material provision of a mercenary, and also the use of a mercenary in an armed conflict 

or hostilities; (b) the same acts, committed by a person through his official position 

or with relation to a minor; (c) participation by a mercenary in an armed conflict or 

hostilities” (Signe Zaharova, 2012, pp. 475-476; Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).
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In fact, rather than restricting the use of Russian PMCs, the illicit status of 

such groups appears to serve as an enabler, allowing the state to maintain 

control over the creation and proliferation of Russian PMCs, as well as 

individual members after they return to Russia. 

The first effort to legalize Russian PMCs began in response to comments 

made by then president-elect Vladimir Putin and then Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in 2012, both appearing to support the proposition. 

In response to a question by a Duma deputy on whether PMCs might be 

utilized as instruments of influence abroad, Putin said “I believe that such 

companies are a way of implementing national interests without the direct 

involvement of the state... Yes, I think we could consider this option.”73

Likewise, Rogozin (who oversaw the Russian defense industry at the time) 

was quoted saying “We will study the usefulness of creating such companies in Russia, and we’ll make a step in that direction.”74

Draft proposals failed to proceed past the defense committee in both November and December 2014. The committee described the measure as “inarticulate,” “useless,” and “irrelevant,” and both the MoD and FSB expressed 

concerns that such a measure could eventually see “tens of thousands of 

uncontrollable Rambos turning their weapons against the government.”75

On the other hand, Ivan Konovalov (director of a Russian think-tank and 

consultant to pro-legalization lawmakers) described the issue as “a question 

of honor; Russians hate the concept of a mercenary because if you pick up a 

weapon you do it to defend the motherland,” and that “The idea of doing it 

for money lies counter to everything we’re taught.”76

Spurred by the release of a video online by ISIS of two members of a 

Russian PMC they captured in Syria, another legislative effort to legalize 

Russian PMCs and provide them greater protections was proposed in early 

2018. The effort was introduced in January 2018 by two opposition MPs: 

Sergei Mironov and Mikhail Yemelyanov.77 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 

expressed support for the effort.78 Speaking of the incident, Lavrov appeared 

to bless legalization, saying “a solid law base should be created to protect 

these people within a legal framework.”79 The measure even appeared to 

gain support from leadership in Putin’s own United Russia party, as well as 

several Senate committee heads, and was expected to pass by a source in the 

MoD who spoke to the Russian press at the time.80 The proposed legislation 

provided for Russian PMCs to be registered and licensed under the MoD 

restricted incumbent public servants from leading PMCs and laid out formal 

definitions and guidance for how their business would be conducted, including allowances for opening branches and subsidiaries abroad.81
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Nevertheless, despite progressing past committee, the legalization effort 

failed when it was presented to the government for review—this time earning rejections from not just the MoD and FSB, but also the foreign, justice, 

and finance ministries, National Guard, Federal Protective Service, Foreign 

Intelligence, and Prosecutor General’s Office—saying the provision was 

not supported and would violate the Russian Constitution.82 Senator Franz 

Klintsevich, Deputy Head of the Defense and Security Committee and 

proponent of legalizing Russian PMCs, described the impasse, saying “we 

have been unable to pass the necessary laws because of a conflict between 

the Defense Ministry and the Federal Security Service over who would 

control such military groups. They have heavy serious weapons... so there 

is a security issue with their regulation.”83

Close observers of Russian PMCs and both efforts to legalize them later 

noted that the status quo was actually more beneficial for both the government and groups like Wagner. A new law would likely see both the number 

and activities of Russian PMCs grow well outside the state’s control, as well 

as limit their utility in subversive operations (see the section on Uses and 

the appendix: Ukraine).84 Additionally, as seen in the cases of the Slavonic Corps and E.N.O.T. Corp. (see the appendix: Syria), maintaining the 

illegality of Russian PMCs provides a means to control such groups and 

their members under the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment. Since 

the failed 2018 effort, Russian lawmakers referenced continued activity on 

the question, including third-party legislation drafting and policy roundtables but describe any formal discussions of PMC legalization too early.85

There has also been discussion of leveraging the Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO) as an alternative legal foundation for Russian PMCs.86

Despite these policy discussions happening in parallel, the Kremlin continued to deny the existence of Russian PMCs.87

Another recent domestic legal change related to PMCs occurred in September 2018, when President Putin signed an order on changes to the law 

on state secrets. The order classified information about individuals who cooperate with Russian foreign intelligence services, but are not members of 

those structures, as state secrets. One former security services member told 

the Russian newspaper Vedomosti that this move was most likely to protect 

Wagner or other PMCs who cooperate with Russian military intelligence because foreigners or other recruited agents are already covered under current 

state secrecy laws.88 This new law will likely reduce the amount of publicly 

available information on Russian PMCs after years of Russian investigative 

journalism, and at least one Russian researcher on PMCs, Vladimir Neelov, 

has been arrested under this new statute.89
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International Law and Russian PMCs

International humanitarian law (IHL) covers private military companies and 

their employees and staffs; it is not a new or novel case to which the law has 

not been applied. However, how IHL will cover a particular PMC is context 

dependent. The status of PMCs under IHL will vary case by case, depending 

on their activities and level of incorporation into the parties of the conflict. 

The primary question is whether PMC staff are combatants or civilians. If 

the PMC staff are incorporated into the armed forces of one of the parties, 

then they are combatants. To be considered integrated in that way requires 

that they be commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, have a 

fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and 

conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.90

If the PMC is accompanying the armed forces of a party and providing 

logistical and welfare support Article 4(4) of the Third Geneva Convention 

would provide that they should be prisoners of war if they are captured 

by the enemy. If the PMC staff are not part of one of the parties, then they 

remain civilians and cannot be targeted or engaged. This protection will be 

removed, however, if the PMC staff engage in the direct participation in 

hostilities.91 In that case, PMC staff are targetable during that participation, 

and if captured they can be tried for that participation.92 Examples of direct 

participation of hostilities that PMCs commonly perform include, guarding 

military bases from attacks, gathering tactical military intelligence, and 

operating weapons during combat.93

A common question regarding PMCs is whether they are simply mercenaries. International law has a specific and onerous definition of mercenaries 

in Article 47(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. It 

contains six elements: (1) specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an 

armed conflict; (2) takes part in the hostilities; (3) is motivated by the desire 

for private gain and its promised material compensation by or on behalf of 

a party to the conflict substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the 

armed forces of that party; (4) is neither a national of a party to the conflict 

nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (5) is not a 

member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (6) has not been 

sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. All six elements of the definition must be satisfied to 

meet the definition. Accordingly, this provision only appears to apply in rare 

cases. Additional Protocol I Article 47(1) also provides that mercenaries do 

not receive combatant or prisoner of war status, and this has become a customary rule of international law, meaning it applies to everyone regardless 

of whether they signed Additional Protocol I. Mercenaries have a right to a 

fair trial if captured and are also targetable.94 
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In regard to international law, PMCs do not stress or challenge the rules of 

engagement, and military legal advisors will have the answers for service 

members about whether and when PMCs can be targeted or engaged.
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Analytical Model

The previous section summarized the deep-dive research of Russian PMCs. 

This section introduces an analytical model in which to examine the relevance of Russian PMCs to U.S. Army maneuver commanders and staffs, 

mainly at the brigade level and below. 

Limitations: The model used here must contend with several principle limitations. First, there has been little interaction between Russian PMCs and 

the U.S. military—too little to establish broad historical trends. Second, the 

pronounced use of Russian PMCs is a recent development. These entities 

existed long enough to attract the attention of the U.S. defense establishment but are sufficiently new that some key questions remain unanswered. 

This relates directly to the third limitation—data. Available open-source 

information is scant, and much of it is of questionable veracity. Finally, 

Russian PMCs lack uniformity. There is variation in terms of missions/activities, organization, leadership, etc. 

Model: To provide a practical model for engagement, the authors created a 

three-step model to study PMC operations in various operational environments:

Step One - Describe the Type of Operation: The model contains 

four thought experiments, each of which samples a type of 

operation from across the conflict continuum. Although the 

model does not examine every type of operation in which a U.S. 

brigade might encounter a Russian PMC, the sampling spans the 

entire spectrum from cooperation to competition to conflict and 

addresses each category within the ROMO. 

Step Two - Evaluate Using Matrix: Using the deep-dive research 

from the previous section and the appendix, as well as doctrinal 

publications, the model evaluates potential PMC operations to 

account for variations in (1) the permissiveness of the OE and (2) 

levels of Russian state support. 

Step Three - Identify Insights: Each experiment produces 

insights that, in aggregate, inform this study’s conclusions. In 

addition, each experiment contains a most dangerous scenario, 

which is the product of two factors. The first is a PMC operating 

at peak performance based on known capabilities and limitations. 

The second is an OE most challenging to U.S. forces. Taken 

together, these two inputs comprise a most dangerous scenario. 
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The experiments, however, do not contain most likely scenarios. Due to the 

extreme variation in potential missions, locations, time, and other factors, 

there is no way to determine which would be most likely. For instance, the 

U.S. occasionally conducts Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) 

to rescue Americans from crises in foreign countries. Such operations are 

irregular and usually arise with little warning—each NEO is very different 

depending on local factors. As such, there is no sound method to identify 

a most likely scenario. The same is true for the other three operation types 

used in these experiments. 

The remainder of this section explains this model’s components in greater 

detail and concludes with an abbreviated example of how the model works.

The Conflict Continuum and ROMO

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, “Joint Operations,” states that the U.S. military 

must be “able to respond to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict 

continuum that spans from peace to war.”95 Spanning this continuum is 

the ROMO—a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities 

situationally and operations in scope and purpose.96 It consists of three categories: 

• Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; 

• Crisis response and limited contingency operations; and 

• Large-scale combat operations.97 

The conflict continuum, depicted in Figure 1,

98 illustrates the relationship 

between the continuum and ROMO. A great deal of military activity occurs 

for the purpose of bolstering allies (cooperation) and deterring potential 

adversaries (competition). Operation Atlantic Resolve, for example, is one 

such operation. U.S. forces deploy and train with NATO allies in seven 

Central and Eastern European nations. This mission is intended both to 

reassure U.S. allies and to deter Russian aggression.99 In the midrange of 

the continuum are crises and limited contingencies “that require military 

operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other 

contingencies and crises as directed by appropriate authority. The level of 

complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances.100 Finally, there are large-scale combat operations. These are complex and typically 

consist of multiple campaigns, each of which a “series of related major 

operations aimed at achieving strategic and objectives within a given time 

and space.”101
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Four Thought Experiments

The red arrows and numbering in Figure 1 identify the types of operations 

used as experiments in this model (explained in greater detail later). The 

first step of each experiment is a brief review of doctrine for the corresponding type of operation, focusing on common tasks and other criteria for 

each operation. 

1. Security Force Assistance (SFA): SFA is a set of Department of 

Defense (DoD) security cooperation activities that contribute to 

unified action by the U.S. government to support the development 

of the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces (FSF) and 

their supporting institutions, whether of a partner nation (PN) or an 

international organization (e.g., regional security organization), in 

support of U.S. objectives.102

2. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO): NEOs are operations 

directed by the DOS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction 

with the DoD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from locations 

within foreign countries to safe havens designated by the DOS when 

their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster.103

3. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): “PKOs consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish 

or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.”104 JP 3-0 

further elaborates that “They are multi-agency and multi-national 

Figure 1. The Conflict Continuum
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operations involving all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the environment 

to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition 

to legitimate governance. For the Armed Forces of the United States, 

[Peace Operations] encompass PKO, predominantly military [Peace 

Enforcement Operations], predominantly diplomatic [Peace Building] actions, [Peacemaking] processes, and conflict prevention.”105

4. Large-Scale Combat Operations: These are complex, joint operations typically consisting of multiple campaigns. This study makes 

use of the notional phasing concept, which allows commanders 

and staffs to “visualize, plan, and execute the entire operation and 

define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and 

purpose.”106 JP 3-0 continues, saying “Actual phases of an operation 

will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according 

to the nature of the operation and the [Joint Force Commander’s] 

decisions. Phases may be conducted or happen sequentially, but some 

activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue 

into subsequent phases.”107 

Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix

The second step of each experiment was to evaluate potential operations 

using a matrix specially designed for this model (see Figure 2). This matrix 

allows each experiment to account for two key variables: 

• Permissiveness of OE: A U.S. brigade might conduct these four 

types of operations in many OEs, ranging from hostile to permissive. Of note, permissiveness refers to the U.S. brigade, not that 

of the PMC or any other actor. 

• Russian State Involvement: The quality and resourcing of 

PMC operations varies depending mostly on degrees of Russian 

state support. 

The y-axis measures permissiveness of the environment (i.e., how freely a 

U.S. brigade could operate in a given OE). For example, NATO allies would 

be very high on this scale because these countries have strong rule of law 

and cooperative security forces. Syria, on the other hand, would represent 

low permissiveness. 
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The African nation, Mali, might represent some middle tier of permissiveness. Definitions of permissiveness are derived from JP 3-0 and are from the 

U.S. perspective:

• Permissive environment: OE in which host-nation military and 

law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and 

capability to assist U.S. operations that a unit intends to conduct.

• Uncertain environment: OE in which host government forces, 

whether opposed to or receptive to U.S. operations that a unit 

intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the 

territory and population in the intended operational area.

• Hostile environment: OE in which host government forces, 

whether opposed to or receptive to U.S. operations that a unit 

intends to conduct, do not have control of the territory and 

population in the intended operational area.108

The x-axis measures degrees of Russian state involvement in PMC operations. Definitions include:

• Low: Little/no Russian state support for PMC operations. PMC 

members receive the same basic consular support Russia provides 

all citizens. Alternatively, the Russian government opposes PMC 

activity outright (i.e., participants face arrest upon return to 

the country). 

Figure 2. Sample Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix
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• Medium: PMC pursues goals generally consistent with those of 

the Russian regime. It receives intermittent support from the state 

but cannot rely solely on the state for sustainment. 

• High: PMC operates as a de facto Russian state element, 

regardless of official proclamations. It possibly co-locates with 

official forces and receives both sustainment and direction from 

the regime. 

The second step of each experiment concluded with a completed matrix 

containing four permutations for each type of operation: low permissiveness/low state involvement (LP/LSI); high permissiveness/low state involvement (HP/LSI); low permissiveness/high state involvement (LP/HSI); 

and high permissiveness/high state involvement (HP/HSI). The last step of 

the experiment was to derive characterizations of PMC operations using 

the matrices and the deep-dive findings. These insights focus on matters 

relevant to a U.S. Army brigade but also include items pertinent to higher 

echelons. Figure 3 illustrates the model’s process. 

Figure 3. Abbreviated Example of Model
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Experiment 1: Security Force 

Assistance

Step One: Describe Type of Operation

Many day-to-day SFA activities occur at the lowest echelons in FSF garrisons and training areas around the globe. Nonetheless, SFA has implications 

at all levels of operations and support broader national goals that Russia 

would likely seek to contest, possibly with PMCs. According to joint doctrine: 

• “Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence help 

assure operational access for crisis response and contingency 

operations despite changing US overseas defense posture and 

the growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. The more a 

[geographic combatant command, or] GCC can promote favorable 

access conditions in advance across the AOR and in potential 

OAs, the better.”109

• “Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater 

shaping activities and critical aspect of communication 

synchronization. GCCs shape their AORs through security 

cooperation and stability activities by continually employing 

military forces to complement and support other instruments of 

national power that typically provide development assistance or 

humanitarian assistance to PNs...Ideally, security cooperation 

activities mitigate the causes of a potential crisis before 

a situation deteriorates and requires US military intervention. Security assistance and security force assistance 

(SFA) normally provide some of the means for security 

cooperation activities.”110

• “SFA is DOD’s contribution to unified action by the USG to 

support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign 

security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions, to achieve 

objectives shared by the USG. SFA is conducted with and 

through FSF.”111

Security cooperation, including SFA, can occur elsewhere across the 

conflict continuum.112 For example, “advising in a hostile environment and 

other activities geared toward assisting a partner nation engaged in conflict—are performed...using resources and authorities specially provided to 

DOD for employment in support of combat operations.”113 However, this 
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experiment intends to measure the left side of the conflict continuum—cooperation and competition. As such, it focuses on SFA that does not take 

place during limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations. 

Field Manual (FM) 3-22 specifies goals and tasks for SFA, listed in Table 2 

and Table 3. 

Table 2: SFA Goals114

U.S. forces strive to develop foreign security forces that are—

Competent Across all levels from ministerial to the individual soldier 

or police officer.

Across all warfighting functions.

Capable and 

sustainable

Appropriately sized and effective enough to accomplish 

missions.

Sustainable over time.

Resourced within partner-nation capabilities.

Committed To security of all the people and survival of the state.

To preservation of the liberties and human rights of the 

citizens.

To peaceful transition of power

Confident In themselves to secure the country

Trusted by the citizens, that their security force will 

provide security and be

professional.

Trusted by the partner-nation government, which is 

confident it has the correct

security force.

Trusted by the international community, which believes 

the nation’s security

force is a force for good. 
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Table 3: SFA Tasks 115

General developmental tasks are organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, 

advise and assist, and assess (known as OTERA-A)

Organize All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal 

principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, 

and personnel management. This may include doctrine 

development, unit and organization design, command and 

staff processes, and recruiting and manning.

Train All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, 

leader development, and education at the individual, 

leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the 

development and execution of programs of instruction, 

training events, and leader development activities.

Equip All activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel 

and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and 

maintenance through life cycle management. This may 

include new equipment fielding, operational readiness 

processes, repair, and recapitalization.

Rebuild All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. 

This may include physical infrastructures such as bases 

and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training 

complexes, and administrative structures.

Advise All activities to provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, 

guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out 

the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising 

occurs under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical 

through strategic levels, and in support of individuals 

or groups.

Assess All activities for determining progress toward accomplishing 

a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective using 

measures of effectiveness and measures of performance to 

evaluate foreign security force capability. Once an objective 

is achieved, the focus should shift to sustaining it. 
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Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix

Table 4 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to 

describe potential PMC operations in four SFA-related scenarios. 

Table 4: SFA Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis

High Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host country military and law enforcement agencies 

have control as well as the intent and capability to 

support U.S. SFA

• No resistance to U.S. assistance or presence is 

expected; operation would require no assembly of 

combat forces in country

• U.S. element focuses on train-advise-equip mission with 

minimal effort and resources devoted to force protection

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence SFA 

using PMCs

• Strong rule of law and host nation security services (1) 

prevent PMC operations outright or (2) restrict them to 

roles non-intrusive to SFA (demining, private security, 

etc.)

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment vary by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support

High Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host country military and law enforcement agencies 

have control as well as the intent and capability to 

support U.S. SFA

• No resistance to U.S. assistance or presence is 

expected; operation would require no assembly of 

combat forces in country

• U.S. element focuses on train-advise-equip mission with 

minimal effort and resources devoted to force protection

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia wishes to disrupt/influence SFA, but strong rule 

of law and host nation security services prevent PMC 

operations outright or restrict them to roles nonintrusive 

to NEO (demining, private security, etc.)

• Russia pursues other avenues of influence (diplomacy, 

propaganda, etc.)
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Low Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host country military and law enforcement agencies lack 

control of all territory 

• Host country military and law enforcement possibly 

engaged in suppression of opposition groups

• Host country engages in SFA with other nations, perhaps 

U.S. competitors and adversaries

• Elements of host country security establishment may not 

support cooperation with United States

• Host country government factional (e.g., MoD supports 

United States but Ministry of Interior supports Russia)

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence SFA 

using PMCs

• Non-state supported PMC operations possible across 

range of PMC capabilities (support, training, logistics, 

combat, etc.)

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment vary by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support
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Low Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host country military and law enforcement agencies lack 

control of all territory 

• Host country military and law enforcement possibly 

engaged in suppression of opposition groups

• Host country engages in SFA with other nations, perhaps 

U.S. competitors and adversaries

• Elements of host country security establishment may not 

support cooperation with United States

• Host country government factional (e.g., MoD supports 

United States but Ministry of Interior supports Russia)

Russian State Involvement

• Russia wishes to disrupt/influence Western-led SFA 

using PMCs to limit official involvement, risk to state 

forces, etc. 

• PMCs contract with host nation forces and/or local actors 

across the range of PMC capabilities (support, training, 

logistics, combat, etc.)

• Russia uses PMCs to influence local actors, stoke 

tensions, impede SFA, possibly provide weapons/

training to local actors; stage false flag attacks on SFA 

force and other local actors 

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment high due to strong 

state support

• PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia

• Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed 

in its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, 

ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)
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Step Three: Identify Insights

Permissiveness: High permissiveness favors the United States in SFA. Low 

permissiveness offers PMCs the most opportunity in SFA:

• PMC occupation of key terrain is a considerable threat to SFA. 

For example, PMC personnel could occupy training areas and 

block lines of communications, precluding or disrupting trainequip-advise activities. 

Russian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most dangerous course of action when paired with low permissiveness in SFA. When 

paired with high permissiveness, however, state involvement is negated. 

• Successful PMC relationships with partner nation forces or 

figures could undermine U.S. influence. Similarly, PMC-caused 

disruptions to U.S. SFA operations could undermine U.S. 

influence.

Conflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the 

cooperation/competition portion of the continuum, including during security 

cooperation. This capability requires low permissiveness and is dependent 

on high state involvement or, less likely, a non-state supported PMC demonstrating heretofore unseen levels of performance and resource. 

• In such operations, the United States is largely dependent on 

partner nations for sustainment, force protection, intelligence, 

and other fundamental needs. The ability of the partner nation 

to provide for such needs, as well as the partner’s threat perception—especially concerning Russia—varies greatly. As such, 

deployed forces may have insufficient means to detect, defend, 

and deter threats such as intelligence collection, IO, and EW. 
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Rules of Engagement

ROE may be such that commanders should be prepared to protect 

personnel (military and evacuees) from a variety of threats without the 

authority to conduct offensive military operations or preempt hostile 

actions by proactive military measures. ROE should provide maximum 

flexibility so as not to unduly restrain the use of force. The JFC is provided tailored ROE from the GCC to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission. ROE must ensure that the military commander has 

the authority to protect civilians while demonstrating restraint and, when 

appropriate, using force proportional to the threat. The JFC should establish ROE well ahead of any NEO in order to work through the process 

of obtaining supplemental measures to the standing ROE. The JFC never 

abrogates the right of self-defense.

(1) Dissemination and use of clearly defined ROE are critical. Although 

the objectives (diplomatic and military) are not to destroy enemy forces 

and armed conflict should be avoided whenever possible, an appropriate 

and proportional use of force may become necessary. ROE must be as 

precise as practical while never denying the use of appropriate self-defense measures.

(2) The JFC will discuss the ROE with the COM as early and as frequently as required. Modifications to the ROE will be made and approved by the appropriate authorities via the supported GCC.

—JP 3-68, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” I-3 to I-4.
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Experiment 2: Noncombatant 

Evacuation Operation

Step One: Describe Type of Operation

This experiment is one of two that examines crisis response and limited 

contingency operations. Such missions are “typically focused in scope and 

scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational-level 

objective in an OA.”116 Crisis response and limited contingency operations 

often require close, ongoing coordination with non-military entities, governmental and otherwise. Two characteristics require special attention. 

First, understanding the U.S. or coalition’s strategic objective helps avoid 

actions that may have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not 

uncommon in some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders 

to make decisions that have significant strategic implications. Second, 

commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational 

situation but also in strategic objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.117

These are often economy of force operations. The complexity of the strategic environment is such that U.S. forces must be prepared to execute multiple simultaneous operations. As such, any single operation might fall to 

“small elements like [special operation forces (SOF)] in coordination with 

allied nations or PNs. Initially, SOF may take the lead of these operations 

as an economy of force measure to enable major operations and campaigns 

with conventional focus to progress more effectively.”118

This experiment focuses specifically on noncombatant evacuation operations. JP 3-68, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” describes such 

operations thusly:

An operation whereby noncombatant evacuees are evacuated from a threatened area abroad, which includes areas 

facing actual or potential danger from natural or manmade 

disaster, civil unrest, imminent or actual terrorist activities, hostilities, and similar circumstances, that is carried 

out with the assistance of the Department of Defense. 

NEOs are conducted by the [DoD] to assist in evacuating US citizens and nationals, [DoD] civilian personnel, 

and designated persons (host nation... and third country 
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nationals...) whose lives are in danger from locations in a 

foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed 

by the [DOS].119

Unlike most other military operations, NEOs have a unique C2 structure in 

which neither the geographic combatant commander or the subordinate joint 

force commander (JFC) is the senior U.S. government authority. Instead, 

this responsibility belongs to the Chief of Mission (COM):

The personal representative of the president to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which 

he or she is accredited and, as such, recommends and 

implements national policy regarding the foreign country 

or IGO and oversees the activities of USG employees in 

the mission. If assigned, the U.S. ambassador will always 

be the COM.120

The decision to order a NEO rests with the COM. The timing of such 

an order may not be based on the tactical situation or other considerations paramount to a military commander. Instead, the order “may be 

delayed until the last possible moment to avoid actions that may be viewed 

as a tacit admission of diplomatic and/or political failure or lack of [U.S. 

Government] confidence in the [Host Nation] government.”121

The primary guiding document for any individual NEO is an emergency 

action plan (EAP), which has a section on military evacuation. The appropriate geographic combatant commander reviews and comments on this 

section. EAP contents include:

• Possible courses of action for different threat environments

• Location of evacuation sites (landing zones, ports, beaches)

• Anticipated number of evacuees (total number by area) categorized by medical status:

– Persons not requiring medical assistance 

– Persons requiring medical assistance prior to evacuation

– Persons requiring medical assistance prior to and 

during evacuation

• Persons requiring emergency medical evacuation

• Location of assembly areas and major supply routes

• Location of command posts
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• Key personnel (name, location, and desired means of 

contacting them)

• Description of the embassy communications system, transportation fleet, and warden system

• Quantity of class I (subsistence) supplies on hand at the embassy

• Quantity of class III (fuel)

• Availability of class VIII (medical supplies)

• Standard map products of the local area, with annotations identifying critical landmarks122

Another important consideration for this experiment is DOS readiness, 

especially given the unique C2 relationship of NEOs and the fact that 

contingency forces would have little or no on-the-ground experience prior 

to an emergency. A 2017 report from the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) found “gaps in its crisis and evacuation preparedness for overseas 

posts.”123 Such gaps included failure to complete annual EAP updates on 

time; incomplete EAPs; a view that EAPs are “lengthy and cumbersome 

documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations;” failure to 

complete required EAP drills, including at “posts rated high or critical in 

political violence or terrorism;” and the complete failure to “transmit an 

after-action report listing lessons learned to State headquarters following 

evacuations.”124 GAO concluded, “the gaps in State’s crisis and evacuation 

preparedness increase the risk that post staff are not sufficiently prepared to 

handle crisis and emergency situations.”125
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Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix

Table 5 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to 

describe potential PMC operations in four NEO-related scenarios. 

Table 5: NEO Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis

High Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host country military and law enforcement agencies 

have control as well as the intent and capability to assist 

operations that a unit intends to conduct126

• No resistance to evacuation operations is expected; 

operation would require little or no assembly of combat 

forces in country127 

• Evacuees may or may not have been processed and 

assembled at designated assembly areas, evacuation 

points, and sites128

• Joint Task Force (JTF) can expect host nation 

concurrence and possible support129

• JTF’s primary concerns may be logistic functions 

involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, 

administrative processing, and coordination with DOS 

and other agencies involved in the evacuation130

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence NEO 

using PMCs

• Strong rule of law and host nation security services 

(1) prevent PMC operations outright or (2) restrict 

them to roles nonintrusive to NEO (demining, private 

security, etc.)

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment varies by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support
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High Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host country military and law enforcement agencies 

have control as well as the intent and capability to assist 

operations that a unit intends to conduct131

• No resistance to evacuation operations is expected; 

operation would require little or no assembly of combat 

forces in country132 

• Evacuees may or may not have been processed and 

assembled at designated assembly areas, evacuation 

points, and sites133

• JTF can expect host nation concurrence and 

possible support134

• JTF’s primary concerns may be logistic functions 

involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, 

administrative processing, and coordination with DOS 

and other agencies involved in the evacuation135

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia wishes to influence NEO, but strong rule of 

law and host nation security services (1) prevent 

PMC operations outright or (2) restrict them to roles 

nonintrusive to NEO (demining, private security, etc.)

• Russia pursues other avenues of influence (diplomacy, 

propaganda, etc.)
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Low Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Noncombatant evacuees and civilians may be evacuated 

under conditions ranging from civil disorder, to terrorist 

action, to full-scale combat136 

• JTF must be prepared for a wide range of 

contingencies137

• JFC may elect to deploy a sizable security element with 

the evacuation force or position a large reaction force, 

either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate 

staging base138

• In addition to normal functions associated with 

noncombatant evacuations (embarkation, transportation, 

medical, and services), the JTF may be required to 

conduct a forcible entry operation, establish defensive 

perimeters, escort convoys, participate in public relations 

operations, and perform the screening of evacuees 

normally accomplished by DOS officials139

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence NEO 

using PMCs

• Non-state supported PMC operations possible across 

range of PMC capabilities (support, training, logistics, 

combat, etc.)

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment varies by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support
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Low Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Noncombatant evacuees and civilians may be evacuated 

under conditions ranging from civil disorder, to terrorist 

action, to full-scale combat140 

• JTF must be prepared for a wide range of 

contingencies141

• JFC may elect to deploy a sizable security element with 

the evacuation force or position a large reaction force, 

either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate 

staging base142

• In addition to normal functions associated with 

noncombatant evacuations (embarkation, transportation, 

medical, and services), the JTF may be required to 

conduct a forcible entry operation, establish defensive 

perimeters, escort convoys, participate in public relations 

operations, and perform the screening of evacuees 

normally accomplished by DOS officials143

Russian State Involvement

• Russia wishes to disrupt/influence NEO using PMCs to 

limit official involvement, risk to state forces, etc.

• Russia supports deployment of PMC with high quality 

personnel, equipment, and training; possibly allows PMC 

to use state infrastructure

• Russia uses PMCs to influence local actors, stoke 

tensions, impede evacuation, possibly provide weapons/

training to local actors; stage false flag attacks on NEO 

force and other local actors 

• PMCs occupy key terrain (e.g., evacuation sites) prior 

to arrival of U.S. forces; United States unable to seize 

terrain necessary for evacuation; ROE prevent engaging 

PMC

• PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia

• Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed 

in its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, 

ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)

Step Three: Identify Insights

Permissiveness: High permissiveness favors the United States in NEOs. 

Low permissiveness offers PMCs the most opportunity in NEOs.

• PMC occupation of key terrain is a considerable threat to NEOs. 

Evacuation sites are critical for gathering, processing, and 
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transporting detainees. Potential evacuation sites are identifiable 

by key characteristics. For instance, PMCs could occupy stadiums 

and other areas suitable for crowds and landing aircraft. PMCs 

need not fire on U.S. forces. Depending on the ROE, U.S. forces 

might not be able to forcibly remove the PMC. 

Russian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most 

dangerous course of action when paired with low permissiveness in NEOs. 

When paired with high permissiveness, however, state involvement is 

negated.

• With a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was 

able to function as a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic 

combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. 

However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to 

determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. 

This is the most dangerous scenario based on current information—a U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, 

BTG-like entity. 

• Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined 

arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at 

enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though 

open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present 

among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should 

it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced 

MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the 

most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the 

scope of state support—a U.S. Army brigade might encounter 

a state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and 

cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise. 

Conflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the 

cooperation/competition portion of the continuum, including during brief 

operations like NEOs. This capability requires low permissiveness and is 

dependent on high state involvement or, less likely, a non-state supported 

PMC demonstrating heretofore unseen levels of performance and resource.
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Experiment 3: Peace Operations

Step One: Describe Type of Operation

This experiment is the second that examines crisis response and limited 

contingency operations. Peace operations fall into this category within the 

ROMO. Peacetime operations include five types of operations. This experiment focuses on one: PKO. 

PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and 

agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring 

organization, and potential force contributing nations. 

Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire is in 

effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to 

the operation. A main function of the PKO force is to 

establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the 

disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace 

process. Agreements often specify which nations’ forces 

are acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each 

will contribute.144

PKOs have three fundamental characteristics:

• Consent. PKOs require an invitation, or at a minimum, consent of 

all the major parties to the conflict.

• Restraint and Minimum Force. In PKOs, minimum force 

imposed by the peacetime operations force along with its inherent 

right to self-defense, govern the non-threatening nature of the 

actions taken.

• Impartiality, Credibility, and Legitimacy. A peacetime 

operations force conducting PKOs does not act in support of a 

government or any party to a dispute; it is entirely impartial. 

Demonstrated impartiality is essential to establish and maintain 

the legitimacy of the PKO. 145

JP 3-07.3, “Peace Operations,” lists the following as PKO ground force 

support capabilities:

• Observing, monitory, and reporting

• Maintaining public order and protecting civilians and public 

officials 
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• Support to elections

• Delivery and protection of humanitarian assistance efforts

• Manning of checkpoints and patrolling

• Force protection

• Health service support

• Limited construction of critical infrastructure

• Supervising truces and cease fires

• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

• Crowd control

• Negotiation and mediation

• Interposition between parties to the conflict

• Demobilization and disarmament

• Personnel recovery

• Inspection of facilities

• Training 146
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Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix

Table 6 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to 

describe potential PMC operations in four PKO-related scenarios. 

Table 6: PKO Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis

High Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Political representatives of warring parties agree to PKO

• Local actors support PKO mandate/force

• No substantial anti-U.S. or anti-Western sentiment

• Demobilization of armed groups ongoing

• Ceasefires hold

• Responsible parties control all heavy weapons; 

small arms/munitions plentiful but buy-back/turn-in 

programs ongoing

Russian State Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence PKO or 

its associated conflict using PMCs

• Non-state supported PMC operations nonexistent due to 

political/local actor support for PKO mandate/force

• Alternatively, independent PMC operations occur with 

effective PKO oversight, limited to actual demining, 

transportation, logistics 

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment varies by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support
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High Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Political representatives of warring parties agree to PKO

• Local actors support PKO mandate/force

• No substantial anti-U.S. or anti-Western sentiment

• Demobilization of armed groups ongoing

• Ceasefires hold

• Responsible parties control all heavy weapons; 

small arms/munitions plentiful but buy-back/turn-in 

programs ongoing

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia wishes to disrupt/influence Western-led PKO, but 

political and local actor support for PKO mandate/force 

is strong, resulting in no opportunity for PMC operations

• Russia pursues other avenues of influence (diplomacy, 

propaganda, etc.) 

Low Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Political representatives of warring parties agree to PKO

• Some local actors do not support PKO mandate/force 

• Potential hostility to U.S./foreign presence

• Demobilization of armed groups not progressing

• Violent territorial disputes and ceasefire 

disruptions persist

• Intermittent heavy weapons use occurs; small arms/

munitions plentiful and non-attributable 

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence PKO or 

its associated conflict using PMCs

• Non-state supported PMC operations possible across 

range of PMC capabilities (support, training, logistics, 

combat, etc.)

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment vary by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support
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Low Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Political representatives of warring parties agree to PKO

• Some local actors do not support PKO mandate/force 

• Potential hostility to U.S./foreign presence

• Demobilization of armed groups not progressing

• Violent territorial disputes and ceasefire 

disruptions persist

• Intermittent heavy weapons use occurs; small arms/

munitions plentiful and non-attributable 

Russian State Involvement

• Russia wishes to disrupt/influence Western-led PKO 

using PMCs to limit official involvement, risk to state 

forces, etc.

• PMCs contract with local actors, ostensibly to provide 

security (area, personal, and/or convoy), mine 

clearance, etc.

• Russia uses PMCs to influence local actors, stoke 

tensions, impede full implementation of mandate, 

possibly provide weapons/training to local actors; stage 

false flag attacks on PKO force and other local actors 

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment high due to strong 

state support

• PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia

• Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed 

in its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, 

ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)

Step Three: Identify Insights

Permissiveness: High permissiveness favors the United States in PKOs. 

Low permissiveness offers PMCs the most opportunity in PKOs.

• PMC occupation of key terrain is a considerable threat to PKOs, 

particularly if the PMC is fulfilling a contractual obligation to 

provide security (area, personal, or convoy). 

Russian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most 

dangerous course of action when paired with low permissiveness in PKOs. 

When paired with high permissiveness, however, state involvement is 

negated.
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• With a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was 

able to function as a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic 

combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. 

However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to 

determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. 

This is the most dangerous scenario based on current information—a U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, 

BTG-like entity. 

• Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined 

arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at 

enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though 

open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present 

among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should 

it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced 

MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is 

the most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in 

the scope of state support—a U.S. brigade might encounter a 

state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and 

cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise. 

Conflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the cooperation/competition portion of the continuum, including during extended 

operations like PKOs. This capability requires low permissiveness and is 

dependent on high state involvement or, less likely, a non-state supported 

PMC demonstrating heretofore unseen high levels of performance and 

resource.

• Russia has a history of perpetuating so-called frozen conflicts 

(e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Transnistria in Moldova, 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia, and the 

Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.) Such behavior enables Russia 

to maintain influence and presence, as well as use the conflict as 

a bargaining chip in other matters. PMCs would be well suited to 

promote Russian interests in such situations. 
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Experiment 4: Large-Scale Combat 

Operations

Step One: Describe Type of Operation

Large-scale combat operations typically occur in two forms:

• Major action: a “series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, 

strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several 

Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or 

operational objectives in an OA.” 147

• Campaign: “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and 

space.”148

The Army supports large-scale combat operations through the application 

of land power, specifically “maneuver, fires, special operations, cyberspace 

operations, EW, space operations, sustainment, and area security.” As such, 

an operation could require a brigade to execute a wide range of tasks—too 

many to address coherently here. Instead, this experiment uses the notional 

phasing concept as a model (see Figure 4149).d 

Each phase is briefly explained:

Phase 0 Shape: “In general, shaping activities help set conditions 

for successful theater operations. Shaping activities include 

long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build 

partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. 

They help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor and 

adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability.”150

Phase 1 Deter: “Once a crisis is defined, these actions may 

include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other predeployment 

activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of intelligence collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, 

intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support 

the JFC’s CONOPS.” 151

Phase 2 Seize Initiative: “In combat, this involves both defensive 

and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the 

d JP 5-0, “Joint Planning,” eliminated the six-phase model but retained the use of phases as 

a planning tool (“Joint Publication 5-0,” 2017).
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enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for 

decisive operations.” 152

Phase 3 Dominate: “These actions focus on breaking the 

enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control the 

OE. Successful domination depends on overmatching enemy 

capabilities at critical times and places. Joint force options include 

attacking weaknesses at the leading edge of the enemy’s defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces back and striking in depth to 

threaten the integrity of the enemy’s A2/AD, offensive weapons 

and force projection capabilities, and defensive systems.” 153

Phase 4 Stabilize: “These actions and activities are typically 

characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities. These operations help reestablish a 

safe and secure environment and provide essential government 

Figure 4. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominantly Military Activities
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services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” 154

Phase 5 Enable Civil Authority: “The purpose is to help the civil 

authority regain its ability to govern and administer the services 

and other needs of the population. The military end state is 

typically reached during this phase, signaling the end of the joint 

operation.” 155

Each phase consists of a balance of offense, defense, and stability activities. 

Figure 5156 depicts this notional balance in each phase. FM 3-0, “Operations,” describes responsibilities at the brigade level and below as “performing offensive and defensive tasks and necessary tactical enabling tasks. 

During large-scale combat operations they perform only those minimal essential stability tasks necessary to comply with the laws of land warfare.”157 

Figure 5. Notional Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability Activities
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Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix

Table 7 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to 

describe potential PMC operations in four large-scale combat operations-related scenarios. 

Table 7: Large-Scale Combat Operations Permissiveness/State Involvement 

Matrix Analysis

High Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

• Not applicable—large-scale combat operations necessarily occur in 

environments not permissive to U.S. forces. 

High Permissiveness/High State Involvement

• Not applicable—large-scale combat operations necessarily occur in 

environments not permissive to U.S. forces. 

Low Permissiveness/Low State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host nation possibly opposes U.S. operation or is U.S. 

adversary in operation

• Territory can fall under control of host nation entirely, 

be divided among various groups, and/or have no 

discernible authority

• Threats to U.S. forces can be manifold, including state 

and non-state actors 

• U.S. might operate as part of a coalition or act alone

• Other nations, possibly not allied with the United 

States, might operate in the area or be allied with 

U.S. adversary

Russian State 

Involvement

• Russia takes no substantive actions to influence U.S. 

operations using PMCs

• Non-state supported PMC operations possible across 

range of PMC capabilities (support, training, logistics, 

combat, etc.)

• Quality of PMC personnel/equipment varies by individual 

company, but possibly low due to lack of state support
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Low Permissiveness/High State Involvement

Permissiveness

• Host nation possibly opposes U.S. operation or is U.S. 

adversary in operation

• Territory can fall under control of host nation entirely, 

be divided among various groups, and/or have no 

discernible authority

• Threats to U.S. forces can be manifold, including state 

and non-state actors 

• United States might operate as part of a coalition or 

act alone

• Other nations, possibly not allied with the United 

States, might operate in the area or be allied with U.S. 

adversary

Russian State Involvement

• Russia wishes to disrupt/influence U.S. operation using 

PMCs to limit official involvement, risk to state forces, 

etc. Alternatively, Russian state forces are committed to 

the conflict and PMCs fight alongside them

• Russia supports deployment of PMC with high quality 

personnel, equipment, and training; possibly allows PMC 

to use state infrastructure

• During earlier/latter phases, Russia uses PMCs to 

influence local actors, stoke tensions, possibly provide 

weapons/training to local actors; stage false flag attacks 

on U.S. force and other local actors 

• PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia

• Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed 

in its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, 

ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)

Step Three: Identify Insights

Permissiveness: Such operations necessarily occur in environments hostile 

to U.S. forces. 

Russian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most dangerous course of action: 

• With a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was 

able to function as a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic 

combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. 
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However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to 

determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. 

This is the most dangerous scenario based on current information—a U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, 

BTG-like entity. 

• Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined 

arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at 

enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though 

open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present 

among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should 

it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced 

MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the 

most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the 

scope of state support—a U.S. Army brigade might encounter 

a state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and 

cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise. 

Conflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the 

conflict portion of the continuum, including during large-scale combat 

operations. However, a U.S. Army brigade would have relative advantages 

across all warfighting functions. As such, PMCs likely would have negligible impact during the middle phases (2-3). PMCs could play an impactful 

role in earlier phases (0-1), as well as latter phase (4-5). 
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Conclusions

Russian PMCs are used as a force multiplier to achieve objectives for both 

government and Russia-aligned private interests while minimizing both political and military costs. While Moscow continues to see the use of Russian 

PMCs as beneficial, their use also presents several vulnerabilities that yield 

both operational and strategic risks to Russian Federation objectives. While 

they can operate across the conflict continuum and present the United States 

with dilemmas at all levels of war, Russian PMCs do not pose a unique 

tactical threat.

The Vulnerabilities of Russian PMCs

The swift proliferation and wide use of Russian PMCs abroad also revealed 

many of the vulnerabilities that such groups have, as well as the risks taken 

on by the Russian Federation when it chooses to use such groups to achieve 

political and military objectives abroad. Russian PMCs appear to present 

both typical and unique vulnerabilities that U.S. commanders and agencies 

should consider and constitute a promising field for future analyses.

Morale/Desertion: The pronounced use of Russian PMCs in particularly 

high-risk combat creates the risk of extremely low morale and even desertion of the assigned mission. Wagner commanders who operated in Syria 

described their high-casualty operations as a “meat grinder” and even speculated that the Russian Federation was purposefully disposing of them.158

However, the risk of desertion is partially mitigated by the ability to selectively prosecute individuals in Russian PMCs for illegal mercenary activity, 

as happened to two leaders of the Slavonic Corps (see the appendix: Syria).

Not Self-Equipped: When without MoD support, PMCs only appear to be 

equipped with what their host or sponsor can provide in country. Given that 

Russian PMC client states appear to include many that often have scant military resources, or even fall under sanctions or embargos (see the appendix: 

Syria, Central 

African 

Republic, and Sudan), a lack of direct Russian state support can lead to a 

significant drop in quality materiel, training, and efficacy.

Political Pressure at Home: The lack of support or benefits for members 

of Russian PMCs who return home, even wounded, carries the potential to 

create domestic political complications. In the Russian press, one Wagner 

fighter injured in Syria described how he could not claim any more help or 

rehabilitation support from the government, fearing he might be jailed for 
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mercenary activities if he pushed the issue. Russian veterans’ groups also 

brought such complaints to the global stage by petitioning the International 

Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Russia’s use of PMCs, calling for protections and benefits.159 Another political pressure group is the Union of the 

Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, which was among the earliest 

groups to openly report the deaths of contract soldiers in Ukraine, raise 

awareness around the death toll of both private and regular forces abroad, 

and protest the lack of benefits available to members of Russian PMCs upon 

their return home.160

Domestic Security: The risks associated with war-hardened, potentially 

hyper-nationalist, and radicalized Russian PMCs returning home is an issue 

of which Russian authorities are already aware. When rejecting the prospect 

of domestically legalizing PMCs, the Russian MoD and FSB pointed to 

concerns of “Rambos,” an assessment informed by the chaotic history of 

Russian PSCs of the post-Soviet 1990s.161 These fears were put into action 

in November 2018, when Russian law enforcement and the FSB moved 

to arrest several members of the pseudo-PMC E.N.O.T. Corp.—paramilitary nationalists who allegedly supported Russian interests in Syria and 

Ukraine.162 The ubiquitous nature of such concerns led Wagner commanders 

and Russian analysts to speculate that the use of Russian PMCs in high-risk 

offensive operations is intended to dispose of individuals who would otherwise return home to become domestic security risks.163

Interagency Politics: The dramatic decline in materiel and training available to Wagner in Syria suggests that the efficacy and performance of 

Russian PMCs are susceptible to disagreements with the Russian MoD (see 

the appendix: Syria). Because Russian PMCs appear dependent on state 

support, the impact of such interruptions or transitions from a well-equipped 

sponsor to a poor one can be significant.

Unforeseen Costs: Both observers and Russian decision makers noted 

the risks associated with Russian PMCs taking on independent contracts, 

specifically in regard to the potential deviation of those private interests 

away from the national interest.164 However, a potential vulnerability in the 

status quo—where the relationship between Russian PMCs and the Russian 

Federation remains blurred—is that Russia could incur diplomatic penalties 

and other political repercussions based on actions taken by Russian PMCs 

on their own behalf or that of a third party.

U.S. Air Superiority: As demonstrated in the February 2018 U.S. action 

against Wagner personnel in Syria (see the appendix: Syria), Russian PMCs 

are vulnerable when not provided with support against U.S. air capabilities.
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Mixed Strategic Messaging and Unintended Escalation: In a situation 

where Russian PMCs are involved, but the level of Russian state involvement or commitment is opaque, misinterpretation by other actors can lead 

to unintended escalation and interstate conflict.165 The presence of Russian 

PMCs performing private contracts could be misinterpreted as aggressive, state-sponsored action. Likewise, the perception of Russian PMCs as 

serving other clients could lead national actors to underestimate Russia’s 

national interests on the ground and unintentionally enter hostilities against 

what are effectively Russian forces. Finally, as noted by observers after 

the February 2018 U.S. action against Wagner personnel in Syria (see the 

appendix: Syria), Russian inaction can result in domestic political pressure 

not to appear weak,166 likewise presenting escalation risks.

The Relevance of Russian PMCs to 

U.S. Forces and Missions

Russian PMCs do not pose a unique tactical threat—other actors, state and 

non-state, are similarly capable. This is not to say Russian PMCs are unproblematic for U.S. forces. PMCs can operate across the conflict continuum and present the U.S. Army with dilemmas at all levels of war. 

Most Dangerous Scenarios: With a high level of state support, a Russian 

PMC in Syria was able to function—more or less—as a BTG. That is, the 

PMC conducted basic combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and 

artillery. However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. This is the most 

dangerous scenario based on current information—a U.S. Army brigade 

might encounter state-supported, BTG-like entity. 

Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at enabling integration, 

particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though open-source reporting has not found 

the same capabilities present among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced 

MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the scope of state support—a 

U.S. Army brigade might encounter a state-supported, BTG-like entity with 

advanced weapons and cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise. 

Either scenario would be highly problematic were the United States to 

encounter it during crisis response or limited contingency operations, such 

as NEOs and PKOs. The U.S. element might lack the sort of joint force necessary to defeat such a threat. An encounter of this sort during large-scale 
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combat operations likely would favor the United States, though the more 

advanced threat described in the second scenario could prove highly problematic. 

Most Likely Scenarios: These scenarios involve smaller-scale PMC operations with more modest goals than the outright defeat of a U.S. formation. 

These scenarios take place during crisis response and limited contingency 

operations in operational environments the United States would deem hostile or uncertain. Success would likely require a high level of Russian state 

support, given the history of poor performance among PMCs without state 

support. Examples include: 

• Occupation of key terrain: PMCs need not attack U.S. formations 

to disrupt U.S. operations. During a NEO, PMCs could identify 

and occupy potential evacuation sites, such as stadiums, schools, 

and airports. This could complicate, and possibly curtail, U.S. 

efforts to gather, process, and transport evacuees out of the 

affected area. This would be especially problematic in an area 

with limited infrastructure suitable to support evacuation. 

Restrictive ROEs and political considerations might preclude the 

forcible removal of the PMC. In such a scenario, a PMC could be 

extraordinarily effective without firing a single shot. 

• Foment unrest: During a PKO, PMCs could ally with local 

actors to provide weapons, training, and other forms of support, 

including intelligence information on peace negotiations. This is 

particularly true in locations where Russia holds some cultural 

affinity with locals. Russia has long perpetuated so-called frozen 

conflicts to maintain presence and influence in a given area. 

PMCs are well suited for this purpose. 

Other Potential Scenarios: Lastly, there are less severe scenarios in which 

PMCs seek to compete with or undermine U.S. influence (during security 

cooperation, for example.) PMCs face limited opportunities in OEs deemed 

permissive for U.S. operations, regardless of the degree of Russian state 

support. Host nation governments welcome U.S. support. However, PMCs 

have much greater opportunity in OEs the United States considers hostile 

or uncertain. 
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Appendix: Contemporary Cases of 

Russian PMC Use

Mercenary captains are either excellent men of arms 

or not: if they are, you cannot trust them because they 

always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing 

you, who are their patron, or by oppressing others contrary to your intention; but if the captain is not virtuous, 

he ruins you in the ordinary way.167

–Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince

Russian PMCs are known, alleged, and suspected of being present and operating in numerous countries across eastern and central Europe, the Middle 

East, Africa, and elsewhere. This appendix details available information 

concerning Russian PMC activities in known or suspected AOs to inform 

the analysis contained in the body of this report. 

Syria, Ukraine, the CAR, and Sudan are discussed in depth, detailing the 

uses and other attributes of Russian PMCs in each AO. Other AOs discussed 

at length are Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Other countries where 

Russian PMCs are alleged to have operated are also mentioned and briefly discussed.
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While the number of actors and competing interests in the Syrian Civil War 

only grew since it began in 2011, the primary goals of the Russian Federation remained fairly consistent. First, maintain and defend the regime 

of Bashar al-Assad from removal and against both terrorist (e.g., Islamic 

State, or IS) and opposition forces. Second, Russia argued that fighting 

jihadist forces abroad in Syria serves a domestic security concern—Russian 

estimates in 2014 and 2015 indicated that between 1,500 and 2,500 Russian 

citizens from the Caucasus and elsewhere were fighting for IS in Syria and 

Iraq, as well as 7,000 nationals from other countries in the Commonwealth 

of Independent States (CIS).168 “There is a threat of their return to us,” President Putin said in a September 28, 2015 interview, “So instead of waiting 

for their return, we are better off helping Assad fight them on Syrian territory.”169 Third, intervention allowed for the solidification of military basing 

for power projection in the region, including the 2017 expansion of the 

naval facility in Tartus,170 the operation of Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia, 

as well as use of Shayrat Air Base in Homs. However, despite these guiding 

interests, Russian intervention in Syria and the Middle East appears to be 

improvised and responsive to shifting international and domestic factors.171

Early PMC Involvement – Moran’s Slavonic Corps

Involvement by Russian PMCs in Syria predated the formal involvement 

of the Russian Federation in 2015. The ill-fated deployment of the Slavonic 

Corps to Syria in 2013 is often cited as among the earliest examples of Russia’s contemporary use of PMCs.172 Press reports of the group’s involvement 

in Syria emerged when jihadists claimed to have killed Russians near Homs, 

publishing photographs of documents identifying the Russian and tying the 

Slavonic Corps (established in Hong Kong, but run out of St. Petersburg) 

to the Moran Security Group (a Russian PSC that provides teams for cargo 

retrieval, hostage rescue,173 convoy security, anti-piracy ship security, transportation of equipment, and other services174). While the Slavonic Corps 

fighter ISIS claimed to kill was alive and home in Russia, he confirmed to 

independent Russian journalists with Fontanka that the documents were 

genuine. The fighter claimed that the Slavonic Corps did not take part in 

any fighting, saying their job was to provide “defense of economic facilities 

of the Syrian Republic... to free the sub-divisions of the Syrian army from 

these duties, so that they could take part in the battle against the bandits.”175
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Uses

Detailed interviews with other members of the Slavonic Corps painted a 

different picture of the group’s role. Recruits were flown to Lebanon and 

traveled by land to Syria under the impression that they would be serving a 

passive and legal security function, contracted by the Syrian government to 

protect “energy facilities,” and that the Russian Federation and FSB “were 

on board and involved in the project.”176 Instead, upon arriving in Damascus, Slavonic Corps recruits discovered they were working for different, 

unnamed Syrian nationals, and that they had to reach, seize, and hold an 

oil industry site more than 500 km away in Deir ez-Zor, where they would 

encounter resistance and even incur casualties.177

Equipment, Training, and Personnel

The Slavonic Corps has been described in press reports as poorly equipped 

and led.178 Members described the force as numbering 267 in total. One 

former member claimed it was divided into two companies—the “Cossack,” and “Slavic,” (but it is unclear if these names reflected the make-up 

of the companies). Some of the former members interviewed had military 

backgrounds and were initially recruited for anti-piracy missions based on 

their military experience. Additionally, with universal conscription, most 

able-bodied Russian men have some basic military and small arms training. Slavonic Corps bosses allegedly claimed they expected the force to 

grow to as many as 2,000 men. There is no indication that Slavonic Corps 

members received any training prior to their deployment, and they were 

only equipped upon arrival in Syria via land crossings from Lebanon. Beyond small arms, they were provided with a variety of heavy weapons and 

equipment of fledgling quality: 1939-model anti-aircraft guns, mortars from 

1943, four T-72 tanks (later taken by Syrians and replaced with T-62s that 

were in poor condition and abandoned), BMP infantry vehicles, and JMC 

jeeps and Hyundai buses with homemade armoring.179

Coordination with Russia and Others

Members from St. Petersburg—former soldiers, riot police, and interior 

officers—were allegedly recruited by the head of the Moran Security Group 

and FSB reserve lieutenant colonel Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, after which 

another recruiter facilitated their paperwork for Syria and ordered passports. 

One fighter identified this process directly with the FSB when describing his 

desire to speak anonymously (“the FSB took our signatures.”).180 There is 

suspicion that the FSB was involved in the creation of the Slavonic Corps,181

but both the FSB and Moran Security Group denied knowledge or affiliation 
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with the group.182 One anonymous press source noted that the ambiguity 

about state involvement with the Slavonic Corps was likely intentional: “It’s 

often hard to tell with military contractors where private interests end and 

government ones begin... That’s kind of the point.”183 Denis Korotkov—a 

Russian journalist covering Russian PMCs—argued that Slavonic Corps 

“could not exist without serious support from high-ranking government 

officials,” a perspective affirmed by RSB Group leader Oleg Krinitsyn.184

The only coordination with actors other than Russia suggested by the testimony of Slavonic Corps members involves Syrian loyalist and potentially 

government elements. The Slavonic Corps was co-stationed with Syrian 

military recruits in Latakia. Unnamed Syrians exerted control over how the 

Corps was equipped (see below). The last combat operation of the Slavonic 

Corps occurred when they were allegedly sent to assist a loyalist Syrian 

militia in the neighboring village of Sukhnah, during which they received 

fire support from a Syrian government self-propelled gun and aircraft. The 

two Slavonic Corps units fled after the opposing militant forces began to 

surround them, leading to a shouting match between their leadership and 

Syrian “employer” afterward—the Corps soon after disarmed and left Syria.185

Legal Enablers and Parameters

Upon the arrival of their chartered planes to Moscow in October, the members of the Slavonic Corps returning from Syria were detained by officers of 

the FSB. Digital media, passports, non-disclosure forms, and tickets were 

confiscated. While most Slavonic Corps members were released, their manager Vadim Gusev (deputy director of Moran) and Evgeny Sidorov (human 

resources) were arrested and charged by the FSB for carrying out mercenary 

activities.186 It is not clear why they were arrested upon return. However, despite this failure, it did not end the PMC careers of all involved. According 

to press reports, one of the commanders of the Slavonic Corps was Dmitry 

Utkin187—a lieutenant colonel in the GRU (2nd Independent Brigade, 700th

Independent Spetsnaz Detachment) until he became a reservist in 2013 to 

work with Moran—who would go on to found Wagner (a.k.a. ChVK Wagner,e

 Vagner).188 A separate group of Russians continued working in Syria 

guarding key locations, albeit signed to a different company (Zeitpplus Consultancy Services, Ltd of Cyprus), but their contracts suggested avoiding 

participation in warfare unless they obtain Syrian citizenship—which would 

avoid violating Russian laws against mercenary activity.189

e “ChVK” is an abbreviation of “Chastnye Voennie Companiy,” which is Russian for 

PMC and sometimes used in publications and commentary instead of the English 

acronym.
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Overt Intervention in Syria

The advent of the Russian Federation’s formal military involvement in 

September 2015 initiated significant growth in the offensive use of Russian PMCs in Syria and shined a brighter light on the operations of Wagner, which served a role in Ukraine up until that point that was harder for 

observers to distinguish from other actors in the conflict. Russian PMCs 

were active in Syria well before Russia’s formal intervention—Wagner 

since fall 2014 or earlier,190 and the Slavonic Corps in 2013. However, 

the formal use of force brought an influx of Russian PMC personnel and 

initiated a period punctuated by several battles where Russian PMCs played 

a significant role—primarily Wagner, at times going by the name “OSM” 

according to some press reports.191 Cossack units also allegedly operated in 

Syria,192 though individual Cossack fighters were identified as participating within Russian PMCs in the region.193 While press reporting seems to 

indicate only Wagner participated in combat operations,194 other Russian 

PMCs are suspected by observers to have participated in the Syrian Civil 

War.195 It is possible that some open-source reporting on the participation of 

other Russian PMCs misidentified them as Wagner (see Introduction, Data 

Limitations and Gaps). Press reports on whether or not the Russian PSC 

RSB Group provided any PMC services in Syria are inconsistent, but they 

most likely did not.196 Erroneous press reports claimed that a Russian PMC 

called Turan—an alleged “Muslims battalion” composed of fighters from 

Central Asia and the North Caucasus—fought alongside Wagner in Syria,197

but subsequent investigative journalistic reports revealed the group to be 

a fabrication.198

Open-source reporting and 

data provide significant detail 

on the participation of Russian 

PMCs in at least four major 

engagements in Syria: 1. The 

liberation of Palmyra from ISIS 

forces by Russian, Syrian, and 

other pro-Assad forces over 

March 13-27, 2016; 2. The 

second liberation of Palmyra 

in spring 2017, after the city 

was recaptured by ISIS in December 2016;199 3. The fall 2017 offensive to 

capture the oil-rich province of Deir el-Zour ahead of and alongside Syrian 

counterparts and with Russian MoD support;200 and 4. The February 2018 

Battle of Khasham in Deir el-Zour, where a mix of Syrian, pro-Assad, and 
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Russian PMC forces advanced on a U.S. and coalition held position, only to 

be defeated with the support of overwhelming U.S. air and artillery strikes.

Uses

Russian PMCs in Syria played prominent roles in offensive operations. 

Speaking to the press, Wagner members claimed to perform the most perilous and arduous tasks on the front lines,201 “often moving out in the first 

wave of an attack and storming population centers and enemy positions.”202

One member referred to Wagner’s role in a battle as “cannon fodder.”203

Russia likely leverages Russian PMCs extensively to fill high-risk roles as 

an element of Russia’s consistent policy to minimize, downplay, and underreport the deaths of official Russian soldiers in Syria204—a policy motivated 

by political sensitivity at home.205 Roles and functions performed by Wagner in combat operations included forward advisers, coordination of fire and 

movement, forward air controllers,206 and shock troops,207 or elite infantry.208

Russian PMCs also allegedly served as trainers for Syrian and loyalist forces209 and even augmented Syrian units established and trained by Russian 

commanders (e.g., Syria’s 5th Volunteer Assault Corps).210 They would also 

take on protection functions around Syrian infrastructure (hydrocarbon extraction, transmission)—though they were allegedly tasked with liberating 

such sites as well.211 Russian PMCs also appear to be leveraged for propaganda purposes as a means to bolster local partners. Speaking to Republic.

ru about the March 2016 recapture of Palmyra, a “contractor complained... 

that in the end, official propaganda attributed all of the PMC’s achievements 

to the Syrian military.”212 This is reinforced by the fact that in 2018—referencing the Battle of Khasham—former Donetsk separatist commander Igor 

Girkin (or “Strelkov”) cited a source close to the group when he described 

Wagner forces during the engagement as “posing as Syrians.”213

As of late March 2019, there appeared to be a newer Russian PMC operating in Syria with pro-government forces called Vegacy Strategic Services 

LTD (a.k.a. Vegacy, Vega). Vegacy has had a pronounced public profile 

in Syria, performing more traditional military contracting work (training, 

facility security) and does not appear to perform frontline combat operations. Some open-source analysis describes Vegacy personnel as composed of both Russians and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian SBU denies this, 

however, and alleges that those personnel identified as Ukrainians left in 

2014 to cooperate with Russian security services and that Vegacy is a front 

for Wagner.214 However, other observers of Russian PMCs have noted the 

pronounced coverage Vegacy has received from pro-Kremlin press and sug-
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gest that the group is little more than an information operation to discredit 

Western coverage of Wagner and other Russian PMCs.215

As of summer 2019, at least one Russian PMC, known as Schit (Shield), 

was identified providing protection services for an oil field north of Palmyra 

owned by the Russian company Stroitransgaz. This came to light in July 

2019 when three Russians were reported killed in Arabic language media 

but not reported by the Russian military at Hmemima. Schit reportedly 

operates under the support of 45th Guards Brigade of the Russian Airborne 

based out of Kubinka. The leadership of Schit reportedly is made up of 

former Airborne veterans. The Russian newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, reported 

one leader may be 45th Brigade veteran, Evgenii Sidorov, who was arrested 

in 2014 for his activities with Moran Security Group in Syria (described 

earlier). Schit reportedly provides security for five sites in Syria, and has 

25-30 people at each site for rotations of 3 months, paying around 120,000 

rubles a month.216

At least two of the Schit PMC fighters killed in July 219 previously fought 

in the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic in 2014-2015, but in separate 

militia battalions (one in Amur and the other in Vityaz). One had also previously been a member of Wagner, starting in September 2015 and switching 

to Schit in fall 2018. The families of two of the dead received death certificates signed by Russian military doctors based in Syria. Unlike Wagner, 

Schit was not able to obtain tanks, artillery, or self-propelled rocket systems. 

In fall 2018, Schit was recruiting for 82mm Vasilek mortar operators, but it 

is unclear if they successfully found candidates.217

Equipment, Training, and Personnel

In the 2015-2016 timeframe, Wagner appeared well trained and well 

equipped, according to open-source reporting. Selection and training for 

Wagner employees before travel to Syria occurred at (or adjacent to) a Russian military base in Molkino, Krasnodar—home of the GRU 10th Special 

Purpose Brigade.218 Press reports indicate Wagner fighters would receive up 

to 2 months of comprehensive training before deploying.219 When in Syria 

at that time, Wagner received effectively unlimited amounts of training 

ammunition and were issued an assortment of heavy weapons: T-72 tanks,f

220 BM-21 Grad launchers, and 122 mm D-30 howitzers.221 Wagner personf Two separate press reports both described members of Wagner as equipped with 

T-90 tanks. (Thomas Grove, 2015; Sergei Khazov-Cassia and Robert Coalson, 2018) 

However, these could be cases of mistaken identity. Later commentary by Russia 

watchers noted how variants of the T-72 can resemble T-90s in battlefield footage. 

(Michael Kofman, 2018; Oriana Pawlyk, 2018)
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nel were photographed next to Russian MoD helicopters and airplanes, and 

allegedly equipped with purportedly GRU-exclusive kit.g 222

Early numbers from Russian officials close to the MoD numbered the group 

at about 1,000 by December 2015.223 However, in mid-2017 and with the 

benefit of hindsight, Wagner members described the organization in Syria 

2015-2016 as numbering from 1,500 to 2,000 at any given time (over 2,300 

total), and composed of “four reconnaissance and assault companies, a 

group command, a tank company, a combined artillery group, reconnaissance and support units.”224 Three Wagner commanders interviewed by the 

press also estimated their numbers in Syria as somewhere around 2,000 as 

of 2018.225 The number of Russian civilians flying to Syria grew exponentially during Russia’s intervention, also corresponding with the patterns of 

Russian PMC involvement in the conflict.h 226 Open-source estimates of 

overall Wagner numbers in Syria range widely—likely due to their ability 

to quickly recruit and field personnel, and their episodic employment for 

specific offensives—but consistently grew over time,i 227 mirroring accounts 

that the group was aggressively recruiting.228 Accounting for rotation of 

forces, the total number of Russian fighters engaged in Syria under Wagner 

likely amounted to between 3,600 and 6,000 (with between 1,000 and 2,500 

active at any given time).229 Whatever the real number, it is important to 

note that the proportion of Wagner fighters operating in Syria at any given 

time to regular Russian troops and airmen on the ground at the height of the 

official intervention (4,000) is considerably high—between one-fourth and 

almost two-thirds.230

g Multi-function engineering explosive –Mine-grenade Vkladysh.

h The number of Russian citizens flying to Syria in 2013 and 2014 reflected a baseline 

of about 1,800 each year. This rate remained steady until it multiplied by five in 

the second half of 2015, and doubled again to stabilize at a new high-water mark: 

almost 22,000 departures in 2016, over 25,000 in 2017, and remaining steady with 

17,000 departures in the first half of 2018. (Maria Tsetkova, 2018) 

i A MoD officer and source close to Wagner estimated the size of the group leading 

up to the liberation of Palmyra (March 2016) as “about 2,500 personnel, including 

as many as 1,600 permanently deployed in the zone of combat.” (Ilya Rozhdestvensky, 2018) Researchers with the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) estimated a total of 

3,000 Wagner employees rotated to Syria between 2015 and 2017. (Owen Matthews, 

2018) Documentation obtained by Republic.ru from a subdivision of the group 

allegedly listing the dog tag numbers of some Wagner employees (issued in ascending order, beginning at 0001) seemed to confirm that as of February 2018, Wagner 

employed at least 3,602 men. (Ilya Rozhdestvensky, 2018) In 2018, an investigative 

journalist in Russia estimated the total number of Wagner fighters having rotated 

through Syria at 6,000, with about 1,500 active at any given time—an estimate that 

an open source report on Russian PMCs out of the Norwegian Defence Research 

Establishment (FFI) assessed “does not seem unreasonable.” (Åse Gilje Østensen 

and Tor Bukkvoll, 2018)
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However, soon after the successful liberation of Palmyra in March 2016 and 

a brief decline in operations through the latter half of 2016, the quality of 

recruits, equipment, training, and support all declined. Upon return to theater in January 2017 and since then, Russian PMCs in Syria “were no longer 

provided air or artillery support, supplies declined [and] they began to be 

equipped with obsolete weapons instead of modern ones.”231 Other opensource reports232 and press interviews with members of Wagner confirm this 

decline, as well as the loss of consistent training. There was now an “inadequate amount of time devoted to preparation for missions in Syria,”233 and 

with the decline in quantity of munitions provided to the group, “regular 

shooting practice was abandoned.”234 A Wagner commander described this 

time, saying “They took away the tanks and the weapons... They took back 

everything they had given earlier. Now the Vagner forces fight with Syrian 

weapons.”235 In the early 2017 effort to retake Palmyra, Wagner personnel 

were allegedly equipped with outmoded and far inferior equipment than 

the last engagement: lower quality small arms, machine guns, and limited 

ammunition;j several SVD rifles and at most two AGS-17s were provided, 

but arrived late; T-62 tanks (four or five); and M-30 howitzers from 1938 

(about 12).236

There are press reports that suggest this decline in quality and loss of significant Russian MoD support was the political fallout of a mid-2016 argument 

between Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Minister of Defense 

Sergei Shoigu (see Coordination with Russia and Others below).237 Another 

potential cause might be the shift of the financial burden for sustaining Wagner from Russia to sponsors in Syria (the Syrian authorities, other private 

interests, or both238), leading to pay discrepancies,k 239 delayed or unreliable 

funding, lower quality recruits, less time for training, and poor equipment.240

The lower quality of recruits was accompanied by broader sourcing internationally.241

Coordination with Russia and Others

Wagner and other Russian PMCs in Syria consistently coordinated with 

other actors aligned with the Assad regime. While Russian Federation and 

j “Upon arrival in Syria at the beginning of 2017, according to the stories of the 

returnees, 20 rounds of ammunition were dispatched to the submachine gun, and 

four magazines and 120 cartridges were used as ammunition. Armament consisted 

of AK-47 automatic weapons of North Korean production, received from the Syrian 

side and several Kalashnikov machine guns PC and PKK. The second company 

received company machine guns of the 1946 model RP-46. In the Soviet Army, these 

weapons in the army were replaced by the PC and the PKK back in the 60s of the 

last century.” (Fontanka, 2017)

k Information on the salaries of Russian PMC employees in Syria is generally inconsistent and contradictory.
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Russian MoD support and coordination appeared significant for a time, the 

nature and extent of coordination with Russian PMCs operating in Syria 

later became blurred, potentially suggesting a shift in C2 away from the 

Russian MoD to the Assad regime. This obscuring or potential change in 

the relationship between Wagner and the MoD seems to have taken place 

between the March 2016 recapture of Palmyra and January 2017—when 

Wagner employees returned to Syria to find a decline in support and materiel (see Equipment, Training, and Personnel above).

Russian PMCs in Syria were allegedly coordinated, tasked, and supervised 

by the FSB, GRU,242 and in some cases the General Staff’s Chief Administration243 in the 2016 timeframe, according to press reports citing sources 

with knowledge of their operations. A state-owned Russian news outlet 

reported that, according to individuals in the FSB and MoD, “the Wagner 

group is supervised by the GRU.”244 Wagner commanders interviewed by 

the press in 2018 described the PMC as operating under Syrian command, 

but nevertheless closely coordinating with the Russian MoD. One commander described how this worked in battle, saying:

Every company has a connection to [Vagner] headquarters 

and there is an officer of the Russian military command 

there... He coordinates the air cover where an operation 

is under way. In general, the coordination is very precise. 

Sometimes it is a thing of beauty to see how perfectly the 

aviation and artillery support works out.245

Wagner took part in the March 2016 battle at Palmyra alongside Russian 

Special Operations Forces and the Syrian Army, with the support of an 

aggressive air campaign246—opening with 41 sorties against 146 targets 

over 24 hours.247 Participating Russian MoD forces included infantry, 

TOS-1 and BM-30 ‘Smerch’ heavy multiple rocket launchers, and Mi-24 

‘Hind’ helicopter gunships. Other Assad-aligned forces that participated in 

the battle include the Afghan Shia Liwa al-Fatimiyoun, Iraqi Shia militias, 

and Lebanese Hezbollah.248 Although ISIS would later recapture the city 

in December 2016,249 necessitating a second offensive early the next year 

(again with Russian PMC participation),250 the recapture of Palmyra was 

a significant victory for Russia at the time—an event celebrated with an 

official state concert in an ancient amphitheater in the city, complete with a 

celebrity conductor and televised address by President Vladimir Putin (see 

the figure on the opposite page).251 Although Wagner’s role in the battle was 

obscured in official propaganda,252 members of the PMC received official 

military honors for their role that year.253
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The close operational relationship between Wagner and the MoD changed in 

January 2017, when support from the MOD all but disappeared. According 

to Russian journalists interviewing direct sources, Wagner was left without 

air or artillery support, evacuation of the wounded, or supplies from the 

MoD.254 These developments coincided with a shift in Wagner’s mission set 

and clientele. Russian firm Euro Polis (or Evro Polis; allegedly owned by 

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as a front for Wagner), with the help 

of Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak, signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) with Syria’s state-owned General Petroleum Corp., 

agreeing to take back Islamic State-controlled oil and gas installations and 

guard them in exchange for a quarter of their output.255 According to Novak, 

the MOU was signed in December 2016,256 and an unauthenticated draft of 

the contract was published by the Associated Press in December 2017.257

In this vein, Russian officials were quoted in 2018 by Russian press saying 

that Wagner was operating for several unnamed “private investors,” and 

that the PMC was funded by the Assad regime since 2017.258 No definitive 

explanation for the breakdown of MoD support for Wagner has been made 

public, but informed speculations have included a personal fallout between 

Prigozhin and Sergei Shoigu,259 Russian PMCs attracting too much public 

attention, lack of MoD confidence in the quality of Wagner’s services,260 an 

institutional MoD resentment for Wagner’s role in the Syrian conflict outside their C2, or efforts by military commanders to force Prigozhin to give 

them a cut of his earnings.261
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Regardless of the cause, while this shift in relationship away from the 

Russian MoD is reflected in a wide range of sources concerning the decline 

in funding, materiel, and support for Wagner in Syria, the loss of MoD 

coordination and support does not appear to have been complete or permanent. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), out of eight 

areas in eastern Syria where “Russian Proxies” were present—as of March 

8, 2019—they were co-located with “Russian Forces” in five (incl. Arima, 

Mayadeen, and Palmyra).262 The Russian military base in Molkino where 

Wagner was trained underwent significant expansions and improvements 

between 2013 and 2017, suggesting a significant investment and coordination of state resources.263 According to open source reporting, as of February 

2018, Molkino remained a focal point for the assembly and training for 

Wagner, but resources available to them have declined.264

The partial shift in coordination is also apparent in the transportation of 

Russian PMC recruits into theater. A former Russian sailor detained and 

questioned by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) testified that, during 

his service on the Russian cruiser Varyag in 2015 until 2017, he witnessed 

the vessel carry Wagner contractors, heavy weapons, and ammunition to 

port in Tartus, Syria. This is denied by the Russian MoD,265 but an earlier 

press report cited a Wagner commander who described a similar scene unloading crates of munitions at the port of Tartus.266 Nevertheless, by January 

2017 and into 2018, Wagner employees were travelling to Syria by chartered flights out of Rostov to Latakia and Damascus on A320s operated by 

Syrian airline Cham Wings. However, one member of Wagner speaking to 

Reuters noted that they would also occasionally travel on Russian military 

aircraft when the contractors do not all fit in the chartered jets.267

Wagner participation in the September-November 2017 battle for Deir ezZor—framed as a strategic, nearly final victory over ISIS, but also against 

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the area268—is the clearest evidence 

that the loss of MoD support in early 2017 did not mean a complete end of 

PMC-MoD cooperation in Syria. However, this does not necessarily mean 

that the Russian MoD had C2 over Wagner in the course of operations; it 

is possible that this cooperation only occurred in the context of the Russian 

MoD supporting the ground offensive of Syrian forces, which operated 

with support from Wagner. Other than the Syrian army, ground forces also 

included Hezbollah and other aligned Shia militias. The support provided by 

the Russian MoD was primarily through strategic bombing (over 150 attack 

sorties per day according to Russian press reports269) and cruise missile 

attacks against ISIS targets.270 Another form of support was Russian sappers 

brought into Syria via An-124 transport jets to install a 210 meter floating 

bridge (PP-2005) across the Euphrates River. This support also presum-
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ably involved Russian ground forces, as two commanders were among the 

casualties.l 271 Up to 100 Wagner fighters died in the operations, and when 

extended lines of communication through the desert were harassed by ISIS, 

two Russians were captured and executed.272 One press report quoted sources with direct knowledge of the battle who described the effectiveness of the 

Russians on the ground as “not that impressive... not many professionals in 

the team and too much blood.”273

However, the most apparently significant and dramatic breakdown in Wagner-MoD coordination occurred in February, 2018, when pro-Assad forces 

supported by Wagner fighters were soundly defeated by U.S. air power. At 

a press briefing soon after the engagement, Pentagon Chief Spokesperson 

Dana W. White described the event:

Syrian pro-regime forces moved in a battalion-sized unit 

formation, supported by artillery, tanks, multiple-launch 

rocket systems and mortars. After 20 to 30 artillery and 

tank rounds landed within 500 meters of the SDF headquarters location, Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by 

the coalition, targeted the aggressors with a combination 

of air and artillery strikes. Coalition advisors were with 

the SDF, and this action was taken in self-defense. Pro-regime vehicles and personnel, who were turned around 

and headed back west, were not targeted. The coalition 

observed a slow buildup of pro-regime forces over the 

past week. Coalition officials alerted Russian officials of 

the SDF presence via the deconfliction line in advance of 

the attack. The deconfliction line -- the deconfliction process served its purpose. Coalition officials were in regular 

communication with Russian counterparts before, during 

and after the attack. Russian officials assured coalition 

officials they would not engage coalition forces in the 

vicinity. One SDF soldier was wounded, and there were 

no coalition casualties. Our forces have the inherent right 

to self-defense.274

Later press accounts revealed more details about the engagement. While 

holding the Conoco plant with SDF and Kurdish forces in support of a separate offensive against ISIS in the region, the U.S. team of about 30 soldiers 

watched the forces assemble along the Euphrates River—and monitored 

transmissions showed some of them were speaking Russian. The position 

l Lieutenant General Valery Asapov of the 5th Army in the Eastern Military District 

and Colonel Velery Fedyanin, commander of the 61st Marines Brigade of the Northern Fleet. (Felgenhauer, 2019)
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was first bombarded with howitzer artillery fire before the assembled forces 

advanced with supporting mortar fire. The attacking forces—300-500 with 

27 vehicles (incl. both T-55 and T-72 main battle tanks, as well as APCs)—

included Wagner (“5th and 2nd sections”275), Syrian government soldiers, and 

militias (allegedly Lebanese Hezbollah276 and detachments from both Liwa 

al-Baqir and Afghan Fatemeyoun277). After calls by U.S. defense officials to 

Russian counterparts failed to stop the attack, a U.S. reaction team, Marine 

artillery, and air strikes defeated the attacking force in about four hours.278

However, this account is contradicted by one press report that alleges Russian PMC forces were stationed in the area, but not part of either formation 

advancing on the coalition-held position.279 Official accounts by the Russian 

and Syrian governments also deviate significantly from that in official DoD 

statements and U.S.-sourced press reports.

U.S. accounts to the press insist that they were in contact with Russia 

through deconfliction lines during, before, and after the attack.280 Moscow, 

however, claims the U.S. only communicated with them after the coalition strikes, despite also maintaining that the pro-Assad forces involved 

had not coordinated with the Russian command.281 Nevertheless, Russia’s 

ambassador to the UN made public that the incident would be brought up 

during closed door consultations at the UN Security Council.282 Then-U.S. 

Secretary of Defense James Mattis described the battle as “a perplexing 

situation,” that he had “no idea why they would attack,” and that “you 

can’t expect somebody to deconflict something they can’t control.”283 A 

Russian press report on the battle bluntly stated “They do not report to the 

Defense Ministry. Therefore, the Defense Ministry bears no responsibility 

for them.”284 This alleged lack of C2 over Wagner and associated pro-Assad forces calls back the question of the shift in Wagner’s relationship 

away from the Russian MoD to local Syrian authorities through the Energy 

Ministry-negotiated contract with Euro Polis (see above). Wagner members 

interviewed by the press expressed suspicions that the MoD had promised 

air support, but then abandoned the Russian PMC in order to embarrass 

Prigozhin.285 However, other press reports alleged the MoD provided for 

the evacuation of injured Wagner fighters to military hospitals in Russia 

(contrary to earlier accounts to the press that this support was lost to Wagner 

in early 2017).286 Casualty estimates ranged from the Russian MoD official 

statement of 25 wounded pro-Syrian volunteers287 (allegedly only 5 Russian 

citizens dead), to over 300 dead or wounded.288

A Kremlin spokesperson denied any knowledge of “other Russians [outside the Russian armed forces] who might be in Syria,”289 and anonymous 

members of the Russian MoD confirmed to journalists the operation was 

not approved by the Russian command in Syria, instead characterizing the 
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assault as a local fight over oil.290 However, there is reason to doubt the 

claims that the Russian Federation did not approve the attack or could not 

have acted to stop it. Press reports suggest that Yevgeny Prigozhin was in 

touch with the Kremlin and Syrian officials both shortly before and after the 

attack, allegedly communicating to senior members of the Assad government that he received approval for the operation from an unnamed Russian 

minister.291 Prigozhin also allegedly had to assure aides at the Kremlin that 

such a mistake would never happen again.292 According to one open source 

assessment, “Russia both supported the attack and simultaneously gave the 

impression of genuine efforts to prevent the attack in order to confuse senior 

U.S. decision makers.”293 After the battle, a Russian press report described 

the decision on Wagner’s continued presence in the region as forthcoming, 

but quoted a source close to MoD as saying “there is no question of disbanding the PMC.”294

As time has passed, the conflict ebbed, and numerous press reported made 

Wagner widely known, the Russian government has been more open about 

PMCs in Syria. In June 2019, during his annual question and answer call in 

show, President Putin finally admitted the presence of PMCs in Syria but 

denied they had any connection to the Russian government. In response to 

a question about the deaths of PMCs, he said, “There seems to be private 

companies, specifically private security companies, under the auspices of 

which the [killed Russians] are acting [in Syria]. This is not the Russian 

state and they are not participants in hostilities, unfortunately or fortunately.” He went on further to describe how they were risking their lives and 

contributing to the fight against terrorism as part of their duties in solving 

“national economic problems” associated with “oil production and the 

development of fields.” However, he underlined, “This is not the Russian 

state, nor the Russian Army, so we are not commenting any further.” This 

description keeps them well outside Russian laws on mercenary activity. 

This followed the themes of a December 2018 press conference where Putin 

was asked about the legality of Wagner and stated, “regarding their activities abroad, if , I repeat again, they do not violate Russian law, they have the 

right to work and push their business interests anywhere in the world.”295

Legal Enablers and Parameters

The friendliness of the Assad regime in Syria and their need for military 

assistance provides the Russian Federation with a highly permissive environment for the use of Russian PMCs in the country.
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In late 2013, Ukraine was expected to sign an association agreement with 

the European Union (EU). However, this would have precluded the country 

from membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), so 

Moscow imposed escalating economic reprisals and threats on Kyiv, to the 

point that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych announced a surprise 

reversal. The announcement sparked the Euromaidan movement—a long 

series of pro-Western, anti-Russian protests and clashes from late 2013 to 

early 2014 in Kyiv and across western Ukraine—which, despite efforts by 

Moscow, removed Yanukovych from office. Russia responded with military 

operations to invade and annex the Crimean Peninsula and support separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.

Alleged Use on the Crimean Peninsula

In late February 2014, Russian special forces personnel in unmarked uniforms appeared in Crimea and took control of certain government, airport, 

and other facilities. Euphemistically referred to as “polite people” or “little 

green men,” these officially unattributed forces operated alongside other 

military formations to immobilize Ukrainian forces and eventually take full 

control of the peninsula.296 Several open source reports allege that Russian 

PMCs participated in the operations leading to the annexation of Crimea 

(specifically an early iteration of Wagner that was at the time an informal 

grouping of Slavonic Corps remnants with locals and others).297 Nevertheless, the extent or veracity of a Russian PMC role in the invasion of Crimea 

is not confirmed, and there appears to be no direct evidence available to 

verify these claims.298 Russian Cossack units, however, played an overt 

role in the occupation as fighting forces, guards at checkpoints, and street 

enforcement to suppress protests.299

Eastern Ukraine (Donbas)

Soon after Russia had annexed the Crimean Peninsula, pro-Russian separatist demonstrations in the Donbas region of southeast Ukraine escalated 

to a military conflict waged by two separatist bodies, one for each oblast 

in Donbas: the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s 

Republic (LPR). The forces supporting the DPR and LPR are a mix of 

their own militias, Russian Cossacks, Serbian volunteers, Chechens, the 

Russian MoD, and Russian PMCs.300 Wagner fought in Ukraine,301 and was 
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specifically sanctioned by the United States for their role in the conflict,302

but there are also unconfirmed open source reports that even more Russian 

PMCs participated in the conflict.303 However, the operational role of Russian PMCs was not overly prominent. At least one other study on the war in 

Ukraine assessed the role of Russian PMCs to be limited, to the point that 

the authors omitted them from their analysis.304

While Wagner did participate in the conflict in Donbas, it appears that it did 

so in an early stage in the PMC’s development. In interviews with journalists, Wagner commanders described 2014 saying the separatists were 

“fighting around Slovyansk and a lot of people wanted to go and help.”305

This soon coalesced into groups of fighters—roughly 250 per group—crossing the border from Russia into Ukraine in June 2014. A Wagner commander described the group at the time as less formalized, saying “They were 

basically company-sized tactical groups... There were no private military 

contractors then, but people were paid on time.”306 Wagner left Ukraine in 

late 2015 before being sent into Syria.307

Uses

Russian PMCs played an actively offensive role in the conflict, participating 

in offensives against Ukrainian government forces, including a strategic victory in the Battle of Debaltseve in January and February 2015.308 Alongside 

separatist militias, Wagner directed artillery barrages and infantry maneuvers that forced Ukrainian forces to fall back. According to the Ukrainian 

SBU, Wagner also conducted anti-air strikes, including the shooting down 

of an Il-76 aircraft at Luhansk International Airport that killed 40 Ukrainian 

paratroopers.309 Sources speaking to the press also described Wagner as 

“protecting factories and pro-Russian rebel leaders.”310 As they would later 

be used in Syria, Wagner in Ukraine participated in high-risk operations—

advancing in the first waves of attacks and storming enemy positions and 

population centers—all of which brought the group high casualties.311 Overall, Wagner in Ukraine was described as ruthless, effective,312 and exhibiting 

a high level of competency that allowed them to perform missions requiring 

significant military proficiency.313

Unique to the conflict in Donbas is the use of Russian PMCs against proxies 

who moved too far outside Moscow’s control. Open source reports indicate 

that such actions included the assassinations and apprehension of separatist 

warlords, disarming of separatist units, and enforcement against Russian 

Cossacks who became independent-minded after efforts to connect occupied 

Crimea with the Donbas region (making ‘Novorossiya’ or ‘New Russia’) stalled.314
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Equipment, Training, and Personnel

Russian proxy forces in Donbas (presumably including the Russian PMCs) 

were significantly dependent on the Russian Armed Forces for support. 

After Wagner’s known participation in the conflict, in February 2017 the 

former defense minister of the DNR Igor Girkin spoke of separatist forces 

as being more “mercenary than militia,” and that they would implode within 

48 hours of losing Russian support.315

Significant open source reporting exists on the weapons and other materiel used by separatist forces in Donbas, but whether or not there is a clear 

distinction between equipment used by Russian PMCs and that used by 

other proxies is not clear. Early analysis of separatist arms and equipment 

published during Wagner’s presence in Donbas concluded that, while the 

illicit provision of weapons by external parties was very likely (including 

armor, heavy weapons systems, guided light weapons, light weapons, and 

small arms), the most significant source of materiel for separatist forces 

were domestic.316 However, more recent open source reporting provides 

some level of granularity on vehicles and armor. Footage purported to depict Wagner participating in the early 2015 Battle of Debaltseve shows the 

PMC operating several armored and military vehicles during the operation, 

including: Ural trucks (6), tanks (5, at least 2 of which were T-72s), MT-LB 

vehicles (2 with anti-air guns), UAZ pickup trucks (2), a KamAZ truck, a 

BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and BPM-97 Vystral mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles. Other local separatist proxies in 

Donbas also received BPM-97 Vystral MRAPs, reinforcing the difficulty in 

differentiating between equipment used by Russian PMCs in Ukraine and 

equipment used by Russian proxies generally.317 Materiel support from Russia into Donbas entered Ukraine through the southwestern Russian Oblast 

of Rostov (also an allegedly significant logistical node for Russian PMCs 

entering Syria; see above).318

The composition of separatist units used by the LPR and DPR to fight 

against the Ukrainian government in Donbas have included Russian PMCs 

(Wagner), Russian intelligence and military personnel, local recruits, 

Russian political groups (nationalists, communists, Cossacks, and others), 

defectors from Ukrainian forces, as well as other civilian and criminal 

organizations (sports hooligans, biker gangs).319 Early recruitment for 

Russian PMC participation in Donbas were ex-Russian servicemen sourced 

primarily from the North Caucasus, according to press reports.320 While 

open-source data on the pay received by recruits vary widely, it was less 

than what similar recruits would later be able to receive in Syria.321 Beyond 

Russian PMCs, other groups used to recruit proxies and volunteers for the 
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fight in Donbas included nationalist and other extreme political groups, 

as well as public and Internet recruiting campaigns.322 Since their time in 

Donbas, Wagner recruited from separatist militias and volunteers in eastern 

Ukraine to fight elsewhere, according to the account of a Donetsk fighter 

recruited to fight in Syria.323

Coordination with Russia and Others

The Russian PMC presence in the varied composition of separatist units 

(see above), alongside coordinated operations against Ukrainian forces, 

indicate a significant level of cooperation with other proxies in the region. 

Beyond coordination with elements of the Russian Federation, a source in 

separatist circles claimed that Wagner in Donbas was “integrated into the 

GRU, but also open for private customers on the side.”324

Open source analysis performed and published by Bellingcat on the role of 

the Russian Federation in Donbas—supported by public interviews given 

by separatist leaders, intelligence published by the Ukrainian SBU, and 

other open-source data—has produced the clearest public demonstration of 

Russian GRU command and control over Russian PMC forces operating 

abroad. GRU staff officer Col. Oleg Ivannikov (aliases Andrey Ivanovich 

and Orion) was deployed to Ukraine in 2014 and early 2015, allegedly 

handling the LPR political leadership, advising on security matters, supervising the procurement and transfer of arms across the Russian border into 

Ukraine, as well as coordinating and supervising the military operations of 

both separatist and Wagner forces. Referring to him by his alias, a former 

separatist commander identified Ivannikov as directly supervising Wagner 

commander Dmitry Utkin, providing funding, protection, and instructions 

to the PMC.325 Additionally, the audio of a phone call intercepted and 

published by the Ukrainian SBU—allegedly between Col. Ivannikov and 

Utkin—suggests that the Wagner leader reported to, and took orders from, 

Col. Ivannikov.326

Legal Enablers and Parameters

Although they were operating in country against the Ukrainian government, 

the effective control of the LPR and DPR over Luhansk and Donetsk meant 

eastern Ukraine amounted to a permissive environment for Russian PMCs. 

The location of these oblasts along the Russian border also facilitated ease 

of access to the operational environment. However, there is at least one 

press report that indicates there were some legal obstacles to some Russian 

PMCs operating in Ukraine. Both Moran Security and RSB Group allegedly 

refrained from participating in the conflict for legal reasons and to protect 
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preexisting foreign contracts.327 Whether or not the legal reasons include 

Moran’s involvement with the ill-fated Slavonic Corps in Syria is not clear.

Dissatisfied with the support his government received from France, Central 

African Republic (CAR) President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in 2017 met 

with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Sochi and appealed for 

assistance in rebuilding the CAR army and loosening the UN arms embargo 

that had been in effect since 2013. According to a Kremlin press release, 

Russia would, in exchange, explore “the possibilities of the mutually 

beneficial development of Central African natural resources.”328 A Western 

diplomat would later describe the situation in CAR, saying “The Russians 

are smart... With France’s withdrawal in recent years, Russia saw their 

chance to make some money and took it. And CAR’s placement in the heart 

of Africa makes the country a gate to the north, south, east and west on the 

rest of the continent.”329

Open source reporting that Russian PMCs would begin working in the CAR 

emerged in January 2018—a month after Moscow had successfully secured 

an arms embargo exemption from the UN Security Council to send shipments of Russian-made weapons (see below). Russia also sought approval 

to train CAR troops in their use. Early assessments attributed the move to 

economic ventures and a means to build political good will with the CAR 

in the UN.330 Such favor is part of a broader effort by Russia. After being 

sanctioned by the West for their actions in Ukraine, the Russian Federation 

signed at least 19 military cooperation deals with countries in Africa—the 

largest voting bloc in the UN General Assembly with 54 members, who 

rotate through three seats on the Security Council.331 Later that year, rumors 

that many of the Russians present there were military contractors linked 

to Wagner became ubiquitous among diplomats and other international 

officials working in CAR.332 CAR also became consistently mentioned by 

Russian veterans groups as an area where Russian PMCs operate,333 and 

subsequent Russian requests to the UN for more arms embargo exemptions 

were blocked.334
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Uses

The uses of Russian PMCs in CAR are various. A CAR presidential spokesman declined to comment to journalists about what activities Russians present in the country were engaged in.335 Most apparent is their use as “civilian 

instructors”336 to train CAR government forces in combat operations and the 

use of Russian-made weapons (see above).337 Press reports indicate that at 

least some of the contractors arrived by plane with the arms themselves.338

The Russian instructors appear to take an active role alongside CAR forces 

filling a security function. As documented in the final report of the UN panel 

of experts on developments in CAR for the UN Security Council, the CAR 

minister of defense was cited as saying that Russian instructors are deployed alongside CAR forces “to ensure that weapons are handled properly 

and that the skills acquired during the training are applied correctly once 

deployed.”339 Russian instructors also participated in transporting construction materials from the Sudan into the territory of CAR, convoys within 

CAR, and provided security to hospitals and hospital personnel.340 Russian 

instructors have also provided training for CAR law enforcement officers 

and gendarmes.341 Russian PMCs in CAR are also serving as military advisers,342 and associated figures are providing senior national security advice to 

the Touadéra government.

Russians have also been seen and photographed providing personal security for CAR President Touadéra—first civilian instructors, followed by 

Russians wearing patches indicating they work for Sewa Security Services. 

According to a media report, Sewa is a part of a subsidiary of what appears 

to be a CAR company, Lobaye Invest (described later).343 The UN panel of 

experts cites representatives of the Russian Embassy as indicating the presence of Russian instructors with the Presidential Guard “was part of a training exercise,” but in April 2018 they were 

replaced by six Russian nationals hired 

by Sewa—armed with exempted weapons by CAR Ministry of Defence request, 

according to the Russian Embassy.344 The 

Russian PSC Moran Security (involved in 

the creation of the Russian PMC Slavonic 

Corps) mentions operations in CAR on 

their company website.345

Another use of Russian PMCs present in 

CAR is the provision of security services 

for mining projects (diamonds, precious 

minerals),346 including in rebel-held 
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areas.347 It was the presence of such forces outside government controlled 

territories that three independent Russian journalists were investigating 

when they were infamously murdered in July 2018 (Russia aggressively 

denies involvement).348 The company Lobaye Invest—a subsidiary of larger 

Russian business interests founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin (Wagner financier 

and close associate of President Putin)—received renewable 3-year exploration rights in six areas of Yawa, Boda Prefecture in southwestern CAR 

for gold and diamonds (June 2018).349 However, control of mineral deposits 

in CAR is contested by armed groups across the country, likely making 

reliable access to such sites contingent upon an end to the civil war (see 

below). Regional observers have described Russia’s use of PMCs in CAR 

to the press as a cost-saving means to pursue both security and economic 

objectives, but that without the necessary peace to ensure consistent access 

to precious minerals, there might not be a return on the investment.350

Coordination with Russia and Others

Beyond the facilitation of civilian instructors in CAR by the Russian Federation, several other factors suggest close coordination between Russian 

PMC forces in the country and the Russian government. First, Valery 

Zakharov—former member of Russian intelligence, and associate alleged 

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin according to press reports351—serves 

as a security adviser to CAR President Touadéra and also lives at the headquarters of Lobaye Invest.352 The Russian MoD has also described plans 

to embed a five-person team with their counterparts in CAR.353 However, 

Zakharov’s role among Touadéra’s other advisers is vague and detached, 

according to press reports citing security sources in the country.354

The arms donation and presence of Russian PMCs appear to have been 

an avenue for the Russian Federation to expand economic and diplomatic 

activities in CAR,355 where Zakharov has played a visible and active role. 

While avoiding details, Zakharov has spoken enthusiastically about possibilities for natural resource extraction in CAR. When asked where he 

sees CAR in 30 years, he replied: “The goal is to create something like the 

United Arab Emirates here. There are many resources. If they are exploited 

to the benefit of this country, it will change everything.”356

Diplomatically, Russia and Zakharov—along with Sudan and with CAR endorsement—have facilitated meetings between several armed groups in the 

region to discuss disarmament and natural resource revenue distribution.357

Both meetings occurred in Khartoum (July and August, 2018), resulting in 

the signing of a general declaration of understanding with the possibility of 

more meetings.358 The meetings were also cited by the UN panel of experts 
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as involving the violation of travel bans against individuals involved in 

the negotiations,359 and sparked concerns that Russia was attempting to 

establish a parallel and competing venue for peace negotiations in CAR.360

Russia has also spearheaded a sizeable cultural diplomacy campaign in 

the country—including a beauty contest, radio station, and youth soccer 

tournament. Funding for many of these efforts came, not from the Russian 

Foreign Ministry, but from Lobaye Invest (see above). Most notably, the 

Lobaye-funded beauty contest was attended by both Zakharov and Russian Ambassador to CAR Sergei Lobanov—but it was Zakharov who took 

precedence at the event, handing the prize to the winner, causing observers 

to wonder whether the Russian Embassy or private Russian interests were in 

the lead.361 In January 2019, Ambassador Lobanov was dismissed by presidential decree and replaced by Vladimir Titorenko, who previously served 

as ambassador to Iraq, Algeria, and Qatar.362

Evidence alleging direct Russian Federation support and coordination with 

Russian PMCs in CAR (as well as Sudan and other African and Middle 

East destinations) was published by the Ukrainian Security Agency (SBU) 

and investigated by open source analysts at Bellingcat. The SBU claimed to 

intercept passenger manifests for planes chartered by the Russian MoD in 

late 2018, which they allege show that Wagner employees on those flights 

were issued passports in sequential sets by a single passport desk located in 

Moscow—allegedly the same desk that issued passports with cover identities to GRU officers.m “[I]f proven true,” observed the Bellingcat Investigation Team, “they would implicate the Russian government in not simply 

tolerating Wagner’s overseas military operations... but in being actively 

involved in the facilitation.”363 Leveraging leaked travel records to analyze 

and validate the data published by the SBU, Bellingcat was able to conclude 

that the persons listed were associated with the Russian PMC Wagner, and 

that some of their passports were issued by Unit 770001—whether that 

alone proved a direct GRU association, rather than the Russian MoD generally, was less clear. “However,” they concluded, “the rest of the available 

evidence... strongly supports the hypothesis that PMC Wagner is indeed a 

proxy and serves at the command of the Ministry of Defense, and in particular the GRU.”364

m Separately reported by Bellingcat in 2018, this desk is referred to as “Central Migration Office Unit 770-001 (‘Unit 770001’),” and was allegedly used for both the two 

GRU officers accused in the 2018 poisoning of Russian defectors in Salisbury, England, as well as two different GRU undercover officers indicted in the alleged 2016 

coup attempt in Montenegro. Unit 770001 was also allegedly used to issue passports 

to Russian civilians linked to the Russian MoD by employment or family, as well as 

very important foreign persons given Russian citizenship. (Bellingcat Investigation 

Team, 2019; Bellingcat Investigation Team, 2018)
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As regards with coordination with actors other than the Russian Federation, as was already noted, Russian PMCs in CAR have allegedly worked 

with mining company Lobaye Invest to guard diamond and gold sites in 

the country (see above). At least one analyst out of Russia has also alleged 

that Russian PMCs in CAR and elsewhere have secured “standalone contracts.”365

Russian PMCs have also been witnessed by UN observers in close coordination with host nation forces in numerous operations.n

 Such operations include joint patrols, jointly manned checkpoints, transportation of 

construction materials from the Sudan into the territory of CAR, convoys 

within CAR, provision of security to hospitals and hospital personnel, and 

deployments to numerous regions of CAR to assert State authority and 

establish a garrison-based army across the country.o According to the UN 

panel of experts, the Committee “stressed the importance of coordination... 

regarding the training of the Central African Republic security forces,” in 

response to which Russian Federation “confirmed that the activities of the... 

instructors would focus solely on assistance to the security forces of the 

Central African Republic in the context of security sector reform”366

Equipment, Training, and Personnel

Evidence indicates that at least some Russian PMCs operating in CAR are 

equipped with the embargo-exempted arms and munitions donated to CAR 

by the Russian Federation.p 367 The UN panel of experts noted that, according to the Russian Embassy, Russians with Sewa Security Services operating with the CAR Presidential Guard were armed with exempted weapons 

by CAR Ministry of Defence request.368 On top of this, the documentation 

of serial numbers from donated weapons was flawed. Detailed inspection of 

the weapons was delayed until after a majority of the weapons had already 

been distributed to CAR forces, so many weapons could only be confirmed 

through weapons distribution lists. Several weapons listed in the documentation provided to the UN Sanctions Committee could not be located at 

all, and several inspected weapons bore serial numbers not on the original 

list.369 These could be honest errors, but could also suggest deliberate obfusn This assumes that “Russian instructors” described by the UN panel of experts can 

properly be described as Russian PMCs. (Romain Esmenjaud et al, 2018)

o CAR deployments alongside Russian instructors include “Bambari, Bangassou, 

Bangui, Berengo, Bouar, Dekoa, Paoua and Sibut.” (Romain Esmenjaud et al, 2018) 

Russian PMCs were not alleged to have been active in any combat operations in 

CAR as of this writing.

p The shipments were enough to equip two battalions—a total of 1,300 men. The 

shipments included 900 pistols (Makarov), 5,200 assault rifles (AKM), 140 sniper 

rifles, 840 Kalashnikov machine guns, 270 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and 20 

anti-aircraft guns. (AFP, 2017; MEMRI, 2018)
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cation in order to arm Russian PMCs with weapons shipped into the country 

with UN Security Council blessing.

Russian PMC personnel are providing training to CAR forces, so Russian 

participation in training can likely be assumed. However, this does not mean 

that Russian PMC employees surreptitiously present in CAR for non-training purposes are receiving sufficient training.

The Russian Federation and Valery Zakharov have publicly commented on 

and provided the UN with official numbers of Russian personnel and instructors in CAR (at times describing them as “reservists” from the Russian 

Ministry of Defense370), but independent estimates vary widely and press 

reports cite Western diplomats as suspecting the numbers are higher than officially acknowledged. The openly acknowledged and official numbers consist of an initial deployment of 175 instructors (170 civilian and 5 military), 

followed by a second of 60 more.371 Estimates quoted by Zakharov to the 

press have been between 250372 and 255, but press reports indicate that these 

numbers do not include an undisclosed increase in military instructors.373 A 

Cossack source associated with Russian PMCs estimated in late 2018 that 

there could be 1,000 such personnel in CAR.374

Legal Enablers and Parameters

The UN mission in CAR and UN Security Council process appears to have 

provided significant means to legitimize and facilitate Russian Federation 

activities in the country with and through Russian PMCs. As was the case 

in Syria, the invitation and friendly reception of the host country provides a 

highly permissive environment for the use of Russian PMCs for the pursuit 

of Russian government and private sector interests. In January 2019, the 

CAR Ministry of Defence expressed openness to the establishment of a permanent Russian military base in CAR.375 According to press reports, Russian trainers are currently based out of the Palais de Berengo, former home 

of Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, approximately 80 km from Bangui.376

A country persistently ravaged by civil wars and ethnic violence, Sudan 

under President Omar al-Bashir—the first sitting head of state ever indicted 

by the ICC—enjoyed close relations with Russia for some time before the 
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arrival of Russian PMCs. While sanctioned by Western powers, Bashir’s 

government secured an approximately $1 billion deal in 2017 to purchase 

4th generation Russian SU-24 fighter jets (plus equipment upgrades and 

training), as well as guarantees to buy 1 million metric tons of Russian grain 

in 2018.377 In November 2017, President Bashir—in defiance of an ICC 

travel ban—traveled to Sochi for a meeting with President Vladimir Putin. 

During the meeting, President Bashir expressed his government’s “need of 

protection from the aggressive acts of the United States,” going on to say 

“We are currently launching a programme to modernise our armed forces and we agreed with the defence minister that Russia will contribute to 

this.”378 Bashir also invited Russia to build a naval base on the Red Sea.379

Bashir had a July 2018 meeting with Putin in Moscow that expressed shared 

commitment to military development, and a tentative military agreement 

with Russia was drafted in January 2019.380

During the writing of this report, President Bashir was removed and arrested 

in a coup d’état, and a military council took control of Sudan.381 Russian 

lawmakers criticized the coup, drawing comparisons with Ukraine, Syria, 

and Venezuela. Chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee 

Leonid Slutsky insisted that the Russian partnership with Sudan would continue: “No matter how the new government is configured, there is no doubt 

that they will seek cooperation with Russia in the near future.”382 Analysts 

have pointed to the removal of Bashir as highlighting weaknesses in Russia’s efforts in Africa,383 and as undermining their claims to provide security 

for friendly national leaders from overthrow.384

Uses

Russian PMCs (allegedly Wagner) were used to train Sudanese military 

personnel, and allegedly special operations forces of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).385 What were said to be Russian PMC 

personnel were also observed in the streets near NISS operations suppressing anti-Bashir protests in Khartoum in late December 2018, but accounts 

that they played an active role in the suppression of protesters are conflicted386 and denied by the Kremlin.387 Russian PMCs have also allegedly acted 

as military advisers in Sudan.388 Armed Russian personnel guard mining 

sites (gold, uranium, and diamond389) for Russian companies with extraction 

rights in Sudan.390 Finally, some witness accounts indicate that Russians 

helped with military construction activities (specifically a sandy area for the 

reception of helicopters in South Darfur391).

Russians with military experience acting as trainers has a long history 

in Sudan, as evidenced by the 2008 death of a Russian MIG-29 pilot in 
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Darfur.392 Russian-speaking individuals were first reported to be performing training tasks in Sudan by open source analysts in December 2017,393

while other press reports estimated the arrival of Russian PMCs in early 

January 2018.394 President Bashir later confirmed the presence of “Russian 

specialists... preparing Sudanese military personnel” during a meeting with 

Putin on July 14, 2018.395 Finally, in response to allegations that Russian 

PMC personnel were involved in the suppression of protests, a Kremlin 

spokesperson confirmed their presence, but denied they participated in any 

suppression of protests, and claimed they had no relationship with the Russian government.396

Equipment, Training, and Personnel

There is little information on how Russian PMCs in Sudan were equipped. 

One of several Russian guards outside a mining site was described as “a 

sniper” by a protester,397 and Russian-speaking personnel in Khartoum were 

photographed in an apparently up-armored Ural-4320 utility truck.398

Estimates of the number of Russian PMC personnel in Sudan in 2018 

have ranged between “about 150 operatives”399 to “about 500” witnessed 

alongside Sudanese forces in South Darfur.400 The Ukrainian SBU allegedly 

exposed the identities of 149 Russian PMC (specifically Wagner) personnel 

operating in Sudan, alleging they “directly partook in suppressing democratic protests.”401 SBU Chief of Staff Ihor Huskov also publicly claimed that 

his agency detected that Wagner was recruiting fighters sent to Sudan from 

occupied Crimea.402 Observers have also speculated that the Russians training soldiers in Sudan may not be Russian PMCs, but either GRU personnel 

or dual-hatted depending on the circumstance or operation.403

Coordination with Russia and Others

While confirming the presence of “private security companies” in Sudan 

to dispute claims that Russians participated in the suppression of protests, 

a Kremlin spokesperson said “Their task... is limited to training staff for 

the military and law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Sudan,” but 

also insisted that they “have nothing to do with Russian state bodies.”404

Nevertheless, Russian PMCs in Sudan appear to have closely coordinated 

relationships with then-Sudanese authorities, Russian mining companies in 

the country, and the Russian Federation. 

Open source reports on the December 2017 meeting with Presidents Bashir 

and Putin suggest the facilitation of a deal where a company owned by 

Yevgeny Prigozhin (M Invest LLC) was given gold mining concessions—
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and the same company allegedly arranged for the deployment of Russian 

PMC personnel. Vladimir Neyelov described this and other similar deals as 

leveraging Russian PMCs in: 

political agreements about ensuring the security and 

physical protection of the central government and state 

authorities, training by the Russian experts of the African 

military personnel (a kind of personnel reserve), and all 

this in exchange for exclusive rights in concessions and 

extraction of mineral resources, as well as other preferences for the work of Russian business.405

The Ukrainian SBU alleges that, although Wagner personnel were flown to 

Sudan on Tu-154Ms with tickets bought by M Invest, the flights themselves 

were conducted by the 223rd Flight Squad of the Russian MoD.406 Documentation and passport details published by the SBU also claim to show that the 

passports issued to Wagner personnel flying to Sudan were facilitated by the 

GRU, or at the very least the Russian MoD (see the appendix: Central 

African Republic).407

Coordination with Sudanese armed forces and law enforcement included 

training408, military construction409, and allegedly response to protests—in 

either a passive or active role—in Khartoum410 as well as at mining sites 

operated by Russian companies (a protester at the scene described “The 

Russian guards... [as] supported by Sudanese police”).411

Legal Enablers and Parameters

The friendliness of the Bashir regime in Sudan and their need for security 

and economic assistance provided the Russian Federation with a highly permissive environment for the use of Russian PMCs in the country. However, 

the overthrow of Bashir in a coup d’état on April 11, 2019 make the future 

of Russian PMC operations in Sudan uncertain as of this writing.

Information concerning the alleged involvement of Russian PMCs in the 

Libyan Civil War is limited, but the geopolitical contexts and indicators are 

similar to other cases where Russian PMCs intervened, and observers have 

noted it as a country of particular interest.412 Libya’s place in Russia’s efforts 
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to contain extremism abroad is similar to Sudan and Syria,413 and Libyan 

National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalif Haftar attended a November 

2018 meeting in Moscow with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and 

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin’s presence at the meeting 

was only revealed due to a video released by the LNA.414 Despite this meeting and allegations of military assistance to Haftar, Moscow maintained 

relations with the widely recognized “government of national accord” 

in Tripoli.415

Russian PMCs and PSCs have attested to limited roles in Libya prior to 

2018. The RSB-Group PSC has engaged in “mine clearance in Libya” 

according to their website,416 and the founder of MAR attested in 2015 that 

his PMC “has been engaged in the evacuation of wounded personnel from 

Libya.”417 However, observers and analysts have noted that Wagner “appears to have fought at the request of the Russian government” in Libya,418

even “possibly” regular Army special forces as of the latter half of 2018 in 

support of Haftar.419 Libya was cited as an area of Russian PMC operations 

by Russian veterans’ organizations, both speaking to journalists420 and in an 

appeal to the ICC to investigate Russia’s use of PMCs.421 Libya is also one 

of several countries where Russian PMCs have allegedly taken on contracts 

to protect “hydrocarbon extraction sites and transmission infrastructure.”422

In October 2018, British intelligence sources were cited in the press as saying Russian PMCs (specifically Wagner) were operating in Libya to support 

Haftar, that “dozens” of GRU and Spetznaz personnel were active in eastern 

Libya at bases in Benghazi and Tobruk as trainers and liaisons, and even 

that Russian Kalibr anti-ship missiles and S-300 air defense systems were 

believed to be in Libya.423 The press report was directly denied by the Russian government. While particulars of that report were not publicly corroborated (i.e., bases, missiles, and air defense), a second press report alleges 

that sources close to the Russian MoD confirmed the presence of Russian 

troops and special forces in eastern Libya, and that a local Libyan government source confirmed “recent military activity” by Russia in the region.424

In March 2019, a British newspaper cited sources in the British government 

as saying that there were 300 Wagner personnel in Benghazi, and that they 

had supplied the Libyan National Army with tanks, artillery, ammunition, 

and drones. 425 A separate source close to the Libyan Russian Oil & Gas 

Joint Company is quoted as saying “lots of Wagner fighters went,” that 

Wagner contractors are “almost interchangeable with the GRU,” and that 

they were present in Libya in order “to secure the deep-water ports of Tobruk and Derna for the Russian fleet” and potentially “control the flow of oil 

to southern Europe.”426 In early 2019, a former Russian diplomat called the 

idea that Moscow was sending Russian PMCs to Libya “impossible” and 
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“disinformation,” saying that “there are no secrets in Libya” and if Russian 

PMCs were actually there “we would already know.”427 If Russian PMCs 

are operating in Libya, they have likely been able to do so because Libya 

is a largely ungoverned space, and due to the blessing of friendly forces 

controlling territory.

Nigeria fits a profile relative to Russia similar to other countries where 

Russian PMCs have been dispatched as an apparent instrument of Russian foreign policy. It is one of several African countries where Russia has 

significant oil and gas interests,428 and with which Russia has signed both 

military-to-military agreements and energy contracts.429 Nevertheless, the 

presence of contractors from the former Soviet Union in the country has, as 

of this writing, remained more characteristic of typical markets for private 

force on the African continent. 

The Russian PSC Moran (who also performed PMC work in Syria through 

the Slavonic Corps; see Syria) has publicly attested to performing past 

missions in Nigeria.430 Most conspicuously was the October 2012 arrest 

of nine Moran maritime personnel in the port of Lagos on illegal weapons 

charges (the men were in possession of 14 AK-47 rifles w/3,643 rounds of 

ammunition and 22 Benelli MR1 rifles w/4,955 rounds of ammunition). 

The men were released in February 2013 and charges were dropped in an 

agreement reached by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the case 

appears consistent with the role of Russian PSCs performing anti-piracy 

activities on behalf of Russian state-owned oil transportation interests.431 A 

now-defunct Russian PSC called RusCorp Group offering security services 

also maintained an office in Nigeria (as well as Iraq, the United States, the 

UK, and elsewhere) as of 2010.432

The most significant involvement of private military forces in Nigeria 

occurred in early 2015 when Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan hired 

contractors to perform offensive operations supporting counterinsurgency 

efforts against Boko Haram (coinciding with the lead up to an election), 

which may have included Russian PMCs. Between March and May 2015, 

men purportedly from Ukraine, Russia, and Israel were sighted working as 

military trainers in Nigeria. The South African firm STTEP was among the 

companies contracted for the effort. One diplomat in the capital referred 

to STTEP, saying the South Africans were backed by “an incoherent mix 
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of people, helicopters and random kit from all sorts of different sources,” 

including the former Soviet Union, numbering in the “low hundreds” and 

paid approximately $400 per day in cash.433While the potential role of Russian PMCs in this effort is not clear, Russian analysts have noted STTEP’s 

effective performance fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, and identified them 

as potential partners in the region.434

Open source analysis and Russian press reports have alleged that members 

of a Russian PMC were deployed to Yemen in September, 2018.435 The 

country was also cited as an area of Russian PMC operations by Russian 

veterans’ organizations, both when speaking to journalists436 and in an 

appeal to the ICC to investigate Russia’s use of PMCs.437 Kirill Semenov—a 

Russian government-affiliated expert on the Middle East—said it’s possible, 

but that he doubts Russian PMCs are operating in Yemen, as it is allegedly 

not a strategic interest of the Kremlin. Instead such involvement would be 

“an example of securing some business interests such as infrastructural projects on Socotra Island, humanitarian missions related to food deliveries, or 

some oil-related initiatives.”438

Data on how Russian PMCs are allegedly being used in Yemen is scarce. 

Non-Russian PMCs were already a large part of the civil war in Yemen well 

before 2018, including the participation of contractors from Australia, the 

United Kingdom (UK), and Colombia.439 However, what sets Russian PMC 

involvement apart from other military contractors in the country is that 

Houthi leader and President of the Supreme Political Council of Yemen—

Mahdi al-Mashat—appealed to Putin for aid in July 2018, saying he should 

“use Russia’s influence and political weight to stop the civil war in Yemen,” 

a request that the Russian Federation did not officially agree to fulfill.440 It is 

possible that the provision of a Russian PMC as support to the embattled regime is a means to provide unofficial—if not wholly deniable—military aid.
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As opposition to the Chavista regime of President Nicolas Maduro escalated in late January 2019, a press report alleged that hundreds of Russian 

PMC personnel were sent to Venezuela in order “to protect Maduro from 

any attempt by opposition sympathizers in his own security forces to detain 

him” during the crisis, according to a source speaking to the press.441 Alleging association with Wagner, the report described the arrival of Russian 

PMC personnel to Venezuela in two waves—first before the election in May 

2018, and then in late January days before the beginning of opposition protests, totaling up to 400 personnel. The report alleges that the Russian PMCs 

were flown to Venezuela via third countries; including two chartered flights 

to Cuba, followed by commercial flights from Cuba to Venezuela. The press 

outlet claims to have independently corroborated the story using public 

flight data, which indicate Russian government-owned aircraft performed 

flights matching those described in the reporting.q 442

There are few details about the Russian PMCs themselves (equipment, C2, 

etc.). However, it appears their presence in Venezuela was part of an overall 

deterrence and security assistance mission supporting the Maduro regime, 

as March 2019 saw the notably overt arrival of official Russian military 

planesr to Caracas—after a stop in Syria—carrying military personnel and 

equipment. Official Russian and diplomatic sources claimed these men and 

materiel were pursuant to longstanding military and technical cooperation 

agreements.443 Press reports in April 2019 indicated that the Russian Federation attempted to fly the same two aircraft from Syria to Venezuela a second 

time.444

As of this writing, the Maduro regime remained in power despite prolonged 

instability and recognition from several regional and Western countries of 

Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela.

q An Ilyushin-96 “owned by a division of the Russian presidential administration” 

that flew to Cuba—as well as a Russian Air Force Antonov-124 heavy cargo aircraft 

and two separate Russian Air Force Ilyushin-76 transport aircraft, all three of which 

flew between Russia and Caracas between December 10-21, 2018. (Maria Tsvetkova, 

2019)

r An Ilyushin-Il-62M passenger plane and an AN-124 Condor heavy transport plane. 

(Joseph Trevithick, 2019)
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There are several other countries where Russian PMCs are purported to be 

present and operating in some capacity. However, information concerning 

their uses, objectives, and other details is scarce. Additionally, differentiating whether such companies are operating as PSCs in the open market 

for force, or if they are fulfilling any Russian Federation foreign policy or 

security objectives, is unclear. 

PMCs have been active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 

according to open source reporting. The death of a Georgian contractor 

in the January 2017 DRC Air Force helicopter crash revealed that foreign 

pilots are active in the country as trainers, in this case in the use of a Russian-made Mi-24 combat helicopter. While private Russian and Ukrainian 

pilots have had an outsized role in the DRC since the early 1990s, the 

presence of military contractors in the DRC appears to have escalated in 

2014—potentially motivated by mining interests and the ineffectiveness of 

the DRC Army (FARDC)—and some information suggests that they may 

play an active role in FARDC military operations.445

One Russian analyst alleges that several Russian PMCs worked in Sierra-Leone, Angola (among the countries visited by Russian Foreign Minister 

Sergei Lavrov446), and Kenya on “standalone contracts.”447 Moran Security 

(see the appendix: Syria) also claims to have performed missions in Kenya.448

According to Russian veterans’ groups who sought to petition the ICC over 

Russia’s use of PMCs, countries where Russian PMCs have operated (other 

than those already described above) include Gabon and South Sudan, as 

well as other unnamed countries.449 Evgeny Shabaev (committee chairman of the Russian Officer Congress, a veterans’ group) in July 2018 cited 

Brunei as a country where Russian PMCs operate, also noting “major talks 

about entering several African countries.”450

Additional countries noted by analyst Sergey Sukhankin as “operational theaters (proven and alleged)” include South Sudan, Serbia, Bosnia, 

Montenegro, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Burundi, Somalia, Mozambique, Gabon, Shri Lanka, Cambodia, Afghanistan, countries of the former 

Yugoslavia, Iraq, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Moldova 

(Transnistria).451

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Notes

1. “Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies,” Sputnik International, April 

13, 2012, archived on September 17, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170917033701/https://

sputniknews.com/analysis/20120413172789099/.

2. “Kremlin: No Private Military Companies Exist in Russia,” TASS, December 21, 2018, http://

tass.com/defense/1037365.

3. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of 

America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of 

Defense, 2018, 2.

4. Ibid., 4.

5. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White 

House, December 2017, 25.

6. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, 2.

7. Ibid.

8. JHU/APL, “Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States – Phase 2: 

Assessing the Threat,” JHU/APL Technical Report NSAD-R-15-036, November 2015, 9-15; 

Nataliya Bugayova, “How We Got Here With Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview,” Institute 

for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project, March 2019, 24-25, http://www.

understandingwar.org/report/how-we-got-here-russia-kremlins-worldview. 

9. Kimberly Marten, “What is the Wagner Group?” interviewed by Kavita Puri, The Inquiry, 

BBC, March 22, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3cswqvs. 

10. Åse Gilje Østensen and Tor Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security 

Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, Norwegian Defence 

Research Establishment, FFI-RAPPORT 18/01300, September 11, 2018, 10.

11. Sergey Sukhankin, “War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors 

Pursue Moscow’s Interests,” in War by Other Means: Russia’s Use of Private Military 

Contractors at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2019), 

https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-militarycontractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.

12. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Hearing to Consider the Nominations of: 

General Tod D. Wolters, USAF for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be 

Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe; 

and General Stephen J. Townsend, USA for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be 

Commander, United States Africa Command,” (Stenographic Transcript), April 2, 2019, 30-31, 

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-31_04-02-19.pdf. 

13. Cindy Hurst, “The Militarization of Gazprom,” Military Review (September-October 2010),

61, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529212.pdf.

14. Olivia Allison, “Informal but Diverse: The Market for Exported Force from Russia and 

Ukraine,” in The Markets for Force: Privatization of Security Across the World Regions, eds. 

Molly Dunigan and Ulrich Petersohn (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 

88.

15. Ibid., 94.

16. International Crisis Group, “Patriotic Mobilisation in Russia,” Europe Report 251 (July 4, 

2018), 17, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/251-patriotic-mobilisation-in-russia.pdf.

17. Jolanta Darczewska, “Putin’s Cossacks: Just Folklore – or Business and Politics?,” OSW Point 

of View 68 (December 2017), 21, http://aei.pitt.edu/92792/.
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18. Jasna Vukicevic and Robert Coalson, “Russia’s Friends Form New ‘Cossack Army’ in 

Balkans,” RFE/RL, October 18, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-russias-friends-formnew-cossack-army/28061110.html.

19. Tomas Baranec, “Russian Cossacks in Service of the Kremlin: Recent Developments and 

Lessons from Ukraine,” Russian Analytical Digest 153, July 25, 2014, 11, http://www.css.ethz.

ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/AD-153-9-12.

pdf.

20. Darczewska, “Putin’s Cossacks: Just Folklore,” 21.

21. General Assembly, “Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding 

the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination,” United Nations, A/49/362, 

September 6, 1994, http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/united_

nations/human_rights_council_and_ga/special_rapporteur/special_rapporteur_a-49-362.pdf.

22. Dzenana Halimov, “Uloga pravoslavnih dobrovoljaca u ratu u BiH,” Radio Slobodna 

Evropa, March 8, 2014, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ruski-i-grcki-dobrovoljci-u-ratu-ubih/25290398.html.

23. Oleg Valetskii, ВОЛКИ БЕЛЫЕ: Сербский дневник русского добровольца 1993–1999

(Moscow: Grifon, 2010), https://www.rulit.me/books/volki-belye-serbskij-dnevnik-russkogodobrovolca-1993-1999-read-164484-1.html.

24. Maggie O’Kane and Martin Kettle, “Russians Accused of Kosovo Atrocities,” Guardian, 

June 22, 1999, https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/23/balkans6.

25. Roger McDermott, “Brother’s Disunited: Russia’s Use of Military Power in Ukraine,” Foreign 

Military Studies Office, 2015, 24, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmsomonographs/197162.

26. Alexandros Petersen, “The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict,” 

Caucasian Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4, Autumn 2008, http://georgica.tsu.edu.ge/

files/05-Security/Petersen-2008.pdf.

27. Mark Galeotti, Political Warfare: Moving Beyond the Hybrid (New York: Routledge, 2019), 

81.

28. Ibid.

29. Signe Zaharova, “Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,” in Multilevel Regulation of Military 

and Security Contractors: The Interplay Between International, European and Domestic 

Norms, eds. Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012), 475.

30. Mark Galeotti, Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces Since 1991 (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2013), 54.

31. Signe Zaharova, “Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,” 473; Igor’ Popov, “На чем и сколько 

зарабатывали русские моряки, обвиненные в Нигерии в контрабанде оружия,” Forbes,

April 2, 2013, https://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/biznes/236622-na-chem-i-skolko-zarabatyvalirusskie-moryaki-obvinennye-v-nigerii-v-kontraba.

32. Sergei Kanchukov, “Частные военные компании России,” АРМЕЙСКИЙ ВЕСТНИК, 

August 30, 2012, https://army-news.ru/2012/08/chastnye-voennye-kompanii-rossii/&xid=17259

,15700023,15700186,15700190,15700248,15700253&usg=ALkJrhiOq18AE1G1nNMlCCe2adT

HYKSQVQ.

33. Andrei Polunin, “Леонид Ивашов: Зачем России воевать под чужим флагом,” Svobodnaya 

Pressa, April 12, 2012, https://svpressa.ru/politic/article/54437/.

34. “Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies.”
RUSSIAN PMCs

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35. Maria Tsvetkova, “Exclusive: Russian Private Security Firm Says It Had Armed Men in 

East Libya,” Reuters, March 10, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-libyacontractors/exclusive-russian-private-security-firm-says-it-had-armed-men-in-east-libyaidUSKBN16H2DM; Lukas Andriukaitis, “#PutinAtWar: More Mercenaries Menace 

Mesopotamia,” Digital Forensic Research Laboratory, Medium, March 25, 2019, https://

medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-more-mercenaries-menace-mesopotamia-6b97877e7927.

36. “Dozhd: In Syria, a Competitor to Wagner Appears Named ‘Patriot’,” Znak.com, July 5, 

2018, https://www.znak.com/2018-07-05/dozhd_u_chvk_vagner_v_sirii_poyavilsya_

konkurent_pod_nazvaniem_patriot.

37. Ibid.

38. Aleksandr Gostev and Robert Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From 

The Shadows,” RFE/RL, December 16, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-paramilitarymercenaries-emerge-from-the-shadows-syria-ukraine/28180321.html.

39. Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries: Wagner, the Elusive Private Military Company, 

has Made Its Way to Africa—with Plenty of Willing Young Russian Volunteers,” Atlantic, 

August 27, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/russianmercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/; Ruslan Leviev, “Families of Russian Mercenaries 

Killed in Syria Left in the Dark about Their Loved Ones’ Fate,” Conflict Intelligence Team, 

December 18, 2017, https://citeam.org/families-of-russian-mercenaries-killed-in-syria-left-inthe-dark-about-their-loved-ones-fate/?lang=en; Oliver Carroll, “Kremlin Distances Itself from 

Captured ‘Russian Soldiers’ Shown in ISIS Propaganda Video,” Independent, October 4, 2017, 

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-russia-video-soldiers-syria-kremlinmercenaries-roman-zabolotny-grigory-tsurkanu-a7983316.html; Østensen and Bukkvoll, 

Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European 

and Norwegian Security, 32.

40. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 37.

41. Ibid., 39.

42. Ibid., 30.

43. Ibid., 37-38; Paul Goble, “Kremlin Talks about ‘Mercenaries’ to Keep Russians from Focusing 

on Syrian Losses and Others from Focusing on Real Role of Russian Army, Pastukhov 

Says,” Window on Eurasia (blog), February 28, 2018, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.

com/2018/02/kremlin-talks-about-mercenaries-to-keep.html.

44. Jānis Bērziņš, “Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare” in Russia’s Military Strategy 

and Doctrine, eds. Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj (Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, 2019), 170.

45. Anna Maria Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 

Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin 64, no. 1135, May 4, 2018, 2.

46. Interfax, “Defense Ministry Would License Private Military Companies, Heads Can’t be Civil 

Servants – Bill,” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, January 23, 2018, http://search.ebscohost.

com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=127495796&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

47. Nathaniel Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and 

the Wagner Group,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 8, 2019, 11, https://

carnegieendowment.org/files/GlobalRussia_NateReynolds_Vagner.pdf.

48. Sukhankin, “War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue 

Moscow’s Interests,” note 21.

49. Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2.

50. Goble, “Kremlin Talks about ‘Mercenaries’ to Keep Russians from Focusing on Syrian Losses 

and Others from Focusing on Real Role of Russian Army, Pastukhov Says.”
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51. Bērziņš, “Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare,” 170.

52. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running ‘Patriotic’ Youth Camps in the 

Balkans (Part One),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 151, October 24, 2018, https://jamestown.

org/program/russian-pmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-the-balkans-partone/; Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running ‘Patriotic’ Youth Camps 

in the Balkans (Part Two),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 155, October 31, 2018, https://

jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-thebalkans-part-two/.

53. Paul Goble, “Russian Nationalist Group, Acting as a Private Military Company, Worries 

Kremlin,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 164, November 15, 2018, https://jamestown.org/

program/russian-nationalist-group-acting-as-a-private-military-company-worries-kremlin/.

54. Administration of the Nongovernmental Educational Establishment – the Center “Anti-terror,” 

“Letter of explanation,” Antiterror-Orel, April 27, 2006, archived February 1, 2009, https://web.

archive.org/web/20090201085915/http:/www.antiterror-orel.ru/eng/index.php.

55. Миротворец, “Джиникашвили Дмитрий Владимирович,” March 28, 2019, https://

myrotvorets.center/criminal/dzhinikashvili-dmitrij-vladimirovich/.

56. Gostev and Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.”

57. Ed Cropley and David Lewis, “Nigeria Drafts in Foreign Mercenaries to Take on Boko 

Haram,” Reuters, March 12, 2015, accessed February 26, 2019, https://af.reuters.com/article/

nigeriaNews/idAFL5N0WB3BR20150312.

58. Owen Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army: Why the Kremlin is Using Mercenaries to Fight 

Its Foreign Wars,” Newsweek Global, January 26, 2018, 33; Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret 

Mercenaries,” 7.

59. Sergey Sukhankin, “Vega Strategic Services: Russian PMCs as Part of Information Warfare?,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 51, April 10, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/vegastrategic-services-russian-pmcs-as-part-of-information-warfare/.

60. Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2.

61. Ilya Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding: How the Wagner Group Functions 

and How Much It Costs,” [complete text] Current Digest of the Russian Press 70, no. 8-9 

(2018): 9-10, originally published in Republic.ru, February 21, 2018, https://republic.ru/po

sts/89612?code=5b7fab5a66290d84fef399d24d5f7fc8; Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret 

Mercenaries,” 11.

62. Sergey Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s 

Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, 2018), https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-ofwagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east. 

63. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 26.

64. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”. 

65. Ibid; Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

66. “Russia’s Wagner Group Fighters Sighted in Syria,” RBC Magazine, August 31, 2016, 

archived October 19, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20171019114422/https://www.rbth.com/

economics/defence/2016/08/31/russias-wagner-group-fighters-sighted-in-syria_625551.

67. Sergei Khazov-Cassia and Robert Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries: Vagner Commanders 

Describe Life Inside The ‘Meat Grinder’,” RFE/RL, March 14, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/

russian-mercenaries-vagner-commanders-syria/29100402.html. 

68. “The Ride of the Mercenaries: How ‘Wagner’ Came to Syria,” Economist, November 2, 2017, 

https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/11/02/how-wagner-came-to-syria.
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69. Sukhankin, “War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue 

Moscow’s Interests.”

70. Vladimir Neyelov, “Who are the Competitors of the ‘Russian PMCs’ on the African Market 

of Military Services,” trans. by MEMRI in “Russia In The World – Russian Private Military 

Companies In The African Market Of Military Services,” Special Dispatch No. 7614, August 

9, 2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-world-%E2%80%93-russian-private-militarycompanies-african-market-military-services.

71. Zaharova, “Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,” 475-476.

72. Hurst, “The Militarization of Gazprom,” 62.

73. “Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies.”

74. “Russian Condottieri,” [complete text] Current Digest of the Russian Press 64, no. 39, 

September 24, 2012, 13-14.

75. Pierre Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors,” War 

is Boring, March 8, 2016, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/believe-it-or-not-russia-dislikesrelying-on-military-contractors-8bad373f4793.

76. Thomas Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say; Incident Shows 

How the Country is Using Private Groups to Avoid Deploying Uniform Troops, They Say,” 

Wall Street Journal (Online), December 18, 2015, https://search.proquest.com/docview/175007

1944?accountid=11752.

77. Interfax, “The Government of the Russian Federation Did Not Support the Bill on Private 

Military Companies,” March 27, 2018, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/605539.

78. Press Center for State Duma Committee on the Legal Support for Development of the 

Organizations of the Military Industrial Complex, “В Госдуме создадут группу по

подготовке закона о частных военных компаниях,” State Duma, January 18, 2018, http://

opk.km.duma.gov.ru/Press-Centr/Novost/item/15431851.

79. Anton Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies,” Al-Monitor, 

July 11, 2018, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/russia-pmc-syria-putin.html; 

Interfax, “A Just Russia Sees No Conflict Between Bill on Private Military Companies, 

Mercenarism Counts in Russian Criminal Code,” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, January 17, 

2018, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=127354951&site=eho

st-live&scope=site.

80. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10; Interfax, “A Just Russia Sees 

No Conflict Between Bill on Private Military Companies, Mercenarism Counts in Russian 

Criminal Code;” Interfax, “Private Military Companies Can Guard Russian Diplomatic 

Sites if Legal Base Created – Slutsky,” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, January 18, 2018, 

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=127397404&site=eho

st-live&scope=site; Paul Goble, “Russian Private Military Companies Rapidly Growing 

Sector, Participants and Experts Say,” Window on Eurasia (blog), February 24, 2018, http://

windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/02/russian-private-military-companies.html.

81. Interfax, “Defense Ministry Would License Private Military Companies, Heads Can’t be Civil 

Servants – Bill.”

82. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies;” Interfax, “Russian 

Government Rejects Just Russia’s PMC Bill,” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, March 27, 

2018.

83. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 34.

84. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors;” Dyner, “The 

Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2; Paul Goble, “Russian 

Private Military Companies a More Toxic Form of Latin American Death Squads, Pastukhov 

Says,” Window on Eurasia (blog), August 8, 2018, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.

com/2018/08/russias-private-military-companies-more.html.
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85. Interfax, “Too Early to Discuss Regulation of Private Military Companies’ Activities - 

Shamanov (Part 2),” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, November 6, 2018, http://search.

ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=132857703&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

86. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.”

87. “Kremlin: No Private Military Companies Exist in Russia,”

88. Aleksei Nikol’skii and Svetlana Bocharova, “Президент засекретил сведения о некадровых разведчиках,” Vedomosti, September 4, 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/

articles/2018/09/04/779931-prezident.

89. “Russia Arrests Another Treason Suspect, This Time an Expert on Private Military 

Companies,” Meduza, November 2, 2018, https://meduza.io/en/news/2018/11/02/russia-arrestsanother-treason-suspect-this-time-an-expert-on-private-military-companies.

90. Third Geneva Convention, Art. 4A(2).

91. ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and Private Military/Security Companies,” December 

10, 2013, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-and-private-military-security-companies-faq.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. ICRC Customary IHL Database, “Rule 108. Mercenaries,” https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/

customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule108#Fn_2751A96E_00021.

95. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Operations,” Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, October 2018, V-1.

96. Ibid., xvii.

97. Ibid., xvii.

98. Ibid., VI-2.

99. U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, “Operation Atlantic Resolve Handbook,” November 

2018.

100. Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Operations,” JP 3-0, xxi.

101. Ibid., xxii.

102. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Security Cooperation,” JP 3-20, May 2017, vii.

103. Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Operations,” JP 3-0, VII-2.

104. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Peace Operations,” JP 3-07.3, August 2012, xi.

105. Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Operations,” JP 3-0, VII-2-VII-3.

106. Ibid., xviii.

107. Ibid., xviii.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid., VI-1.

110. Ibid., VI-3.

111. Ibid., VI-9.

112. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Security Cooperation,” JP 3-20.

113. U.S. Army, “Army Support to Security Operations,” Field Manual (FM) 3-22, January 2013, 

I-10.

114. Ibid., 4-1.

115. Ibid., 4-4.

116. Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Operations,” JP 3-0, VII-1.
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117. Ibid., VII-2.

118. Ibid.

119. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” JP 3-68, ix.

120. Ibid., II-3.

121. Ibid., I-3.

122. Ibid., IV-2.

123. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Embassy Evacuations: State Department Should 

Take Steps to Improve Emergency Preparedness,” GAO-17-714, July 2017.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” JP 3-68, IV-14 - IV-15.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., IV-15.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Peace Operations,” JP 3-07.3, vii.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., II-3.

147. Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Operations,” JP 3-0, V-5.

148. Ibid.

149. Joint Chiefs of Staff “Joint Operations,” JP 3-0, V-13.

150. Ibid., V-9.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid., V-10.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.
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155. Ibid.

156. Ibid., V-16.

157. U.S. Army, “Operations,” FM 3-0, October 2017, 5-4.

158. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”

159. Sergey Sukhankin, “Revolt of the ‘Disgruntled’: Russian Mercenaries Seek Justice in 

International Courts,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 168, November 29, 2018, https://

jamestown.org/program/revolt-of-the-disgruntled-russian-mercenaries-seek-justice-ininternational-courts/.

160. Bulat Mukhamedzhanov, “Hazing, Suicides and Unreported Deaths in the Russian Army,” 

Intersection: Russia/Europe/World, November 2, 2017, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/

security/hazing-suicides-and-unreported-deaths-russian-army; Elena Barysheva and Markian 

Ostapchuk, “The Search for Dead Russian Mercenaries in Syria,” DW, February 21, 2018, 

https://p.dw.com/p/2t6fB; Paul Goble, “Donbas Mercenaries Bringing the War Home to Russia 

with Them,” Euromaidan Press, September 2, 2015, http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/09/02/

donbas-mercenaries-bringing-the-war-home-to-russia-with-them/; Yuriy Lapayev, “Private and 

Armed: Why the Kremlin Needs Private Military Companies,” Ukrainian Week, September 

20, 2017, https://ukrainianweek.com/World/200087; “About 1,500 Russian Soldiers Killed in 

Donbas Since Spring 2014: Russian NGO,” UNIAN, April 28, 2017, https://www.unian.info/

war/1899099-about-1500-russian-soldiers-killed-in-donbas-since-spring-2014-russian-ngo.

html.

161. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.”

162. Goble, “Russian Nationalist Group, Acting as a Private Military Company, Worries 

Kremlin.”

163. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries;” Vladimir Pastukhov, “The Execution 

of the Wagner Group: A Confluence of Circumstances or a War Crime?” Current Digest of the 

Russian Press 70, no. 8-9 (2018): 7-8.

164. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 34.

165. Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,” 12.

166. Paul Goble, “Putin Didn’t Expect US Attack on His Mercenaries in Syria and Now Faces a 

Challenge from the Right, Oreshkin Says,” Window on Eurasia (blog), February 13, 2018, 

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/02/putin-didnt-expect-us-attack-on-his.html.

167. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield, Second Edition (Chicago 

and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 49.

168. Sounak Mukhopadhyay, “Security Service at Moscow Airport Detains Siberian Man 

Suspected to Join ISIS in Syria,” International Business Times, September 24, 2015, https://

www.ibtimes.com/security-service-moscow-airport-detains-siberian-man-suspected-joinisis-syria-2111685; “Around 2,500 Russian Citizens Fighting Alongside Islamic State—Civic 

Chamber,” TASS, September 17, 2015, archived November 10, 2016, https://web.archive.org/

web/20161110081428/tass.com/world/821862.

169. Vladimir Putin, interview by Charlie Rose, CBS News, September 27, 2015, https://www.

cbsnews.com/news/vladimir-putin-russian-president-60-minutes-charlie-rose/.

170. “New Russia-Syria Accord Allows Up to 11 Warships in Tartus Port Simultaneously,” DW, 

January 20, 2017, https://p.dw.com/p/2W8nI.

171. Aron Lund, “Russia in the Middle East,” The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 

February 2019, 45, https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2019/

ui-paper-no.-2-2019.pdf.
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172. James Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” Jane’s 

Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, 2018, 7, https://www.janes.com/images/

assets/018/78018/Private_companies_engage_in_Russias_non-linear_warfare.pdf.

173. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.”

174. Halit Gülşen, “The Role of Private Military Companies in Russia’s Intervention in Syria,” 

ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs 64, July 2017, 11-12.

175. “St. Petersburg Sends Contractors to Syria,” Interpreter, November 15, 2013, http://www.

interpretermag.com/st-petersburg-sends-contractors-to-syria/.

176. “The Last Battle of the ‘Slavonic Corps’,” Interpreter, November 16, 2013, http://www.

interpretermag.com/the-last-battle-of-the-slavonic-corps/.

177. Ibid.

178. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 31.

179. “The Last Battle of the ‘Slavonic Corps’.”

180. Ibid.

181. Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 8.

182. “The Last Battle of the ‘Slavonic Corps’.”

183. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 31.

184. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.”

185. “The Last Battle of the ‘Slavonic Corps’.”

186. Ibid.

187. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 31; Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying 

on Military Contractors.”

188. Pierre Vaux, “Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying for Putin in Syria and 

Ukraine,” Interpreter, March 29, 2016, http://www.interpretermag.com/fontanka-investigatesrussian-mercenaries-dying-for-putin-in-syria-and-ukraine/; Gostev and Coalson, “Russia’s 

Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.”

189. Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the 

Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 11-12, https://doi.org/10.1080/106058

6X.2019.1591142.

190. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 25.

191. Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say.”

192. Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2; Sukhankin, 

“War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s 

Interests.”

193. Associated Press, “The Latest: Russian Captive in Syria Identified as Cossack,” Fox 

News, October 4, 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/world/the-latest-russian-captive-in-syriaidentified-as-cossack; Mikhail Zelensky, “A U.S. Airstrike on Assad’s Supporters in Syria 

Killed an Unknown Number of Russian ‘Volunteers.’ Who were They?” Meduza, trans. by 

Peter Marshall, February 13, 2018, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/02/13/a-u-s-airstrike-onassad-s-supporters-in-syria-killed-an-unknown-number-of-russian-volunteers-who-were-they; 

Yevgeny Shabayev, “Cossack Fighter Laments Russian ‘Utilization’ of Mercenaries in Syria,” 

RFE/RL, February 22, 2018, retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/syria-russian-mercenariescossack-shabayev--interview/29056934.html. 

194. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”
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195. Cody Roche and Vincent Beshara, “Assad Regime Militias and Shi’ite Jihadis in the Syrian 

Civil War,” Bellingcat, November 30, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/11/30/

assad-regime-militias-and-shiite-jihadis-in-the-syrian-civil-war/. 

196. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors;” Sukhankin, 

“War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s 

Interests;” Gülşen, “The Role of Private Military Companies in Russia’s Intervention in Syria,” 

10-11.

197. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 27-28.

198. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 9.

199. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 25; Chris Kozak, “ISIS Recaptures 

Palmyra in Major Blow to Pro-Regime Forces,” Institute for the Study of War, December 13, 

2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-recaptures-palmyra-major-blowpro-regime-forces; figure from Russian Ministry of Defense, “International Mine Action 

Center in Syria,” Photograph, Mil.ru, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, April 7, 

2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:International_Mine_Action_Center_in_Syria_

(2016-04-07)_05.jpg.

200. Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East” in Russia’s Military 

Strategy and Doctrine, eds. Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj (Washington, DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, 2019), 23.

201. Sukhankin, “Revolt of the ‘Disgruntled’.”

202. Gostev and Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.”

203. John Sparks, “Revealed: Russia’s ‘Secret Syria Mercenaries’,” Sky News, August 10, 2016, 

https://news.sky.com/story/revealed-russias-secret-syria-mercenaries-10529248.

204. Maria Tsvetkova, “Russia Underplayed Losses in Recapture of Syria’s Palmyra,” Reuters, 

March 22, 2017, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN16T0S2.

205. Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say;” Dyner, “The Role 

of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2; Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite 

Mercenaries;” Leviev, “Families of Russian Mercenaries Killed in Syria Left in the Dark about 

Their Loved Ones’ Fate;” Carroll, “Kremlin Distances Itself from Captured ‘Russian Soldiers’ 

Shown in ISIS Propaganda Video;” Rinat Sagdiev, Maria Tsetkova, and Olena Vasina, “How a 

Secret Russian Airlift Helps Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, April 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/

investigates/special-report/russia-flights/.

206. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33-34.

207. “The Ride of the Mercenaries.”

208. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 13.

209. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33-34; Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private 

Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 

25.

210. Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?” 

Military Review (March-April 2018): 20.

211. Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2; Fontanka, 

“What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria,” August 22, 2017, trans. by RusLetter, archived 

March 27, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190327090453/http://rusletter.com/articles/

what_losses_pmc_wagner_suffered_in_syria; Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in 

Syria, Experts Say;” Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”; Marten, “Russia’s Use of 

Semi-State Security Forces,” 14-16, 18.

212. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10. 
RUSSIAN PMCs

131

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UNCLASSIFIED

213. Aleksandr Golts, “All-Out War,” [condensed text] The Current Digest of the Russian Press

70, no. 7, 2018: 3-4, originally published in New Times, February 12, 2018.

214. Andriukaitis, “#PutinAtWar;” Ruslan Leviev, “Vega: A New PMC in Syria with Ties to 

Russia and Ukraine,” Conflict Intelligence Team, March 28, 2019, https://citeam.org/russianukrainian-pmc-vega-in-syria/?lang=en.

215. Sukhankin, “Vega Strategic Services.”

216. Denis Korotkov, “Без «Щита», Novaya Gazeta, July 28, 2019, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/

articles/2019/07/28/81406-bez-schita.

217. Ibid.

218. Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 8-9; Fontanka, 

“What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria;” Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33; 

Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

219. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

220. Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say;” Khazov-Cassia 

and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries;” Michael Kofman, “U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC 

Casualties in Syria—Fact vs Fiction,” Russia Military Analysis (blog), February 14, 2018, 

https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/02/14/u-s-strikes-and-russian-pmccasualties-in-syria-fact-vs-fiction/; Oriana Pawlyk, “US MQ-9 Reaper Drone Takes Out 

Russian T-72 Tank in Syria,” Military.com, February 13, 2018, https://www.military.com/dailynews/2018/02/13/us-mq-9-reaper-takes-out-russian-t-72-tank-syria.html; Fontanka, “What 

Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.”

221. Fontanka, “What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.”

222. Gostev and Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.”

223. Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say.”

224. Fontanka, “What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.”

225. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries;” Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret 

Mercenaries,” 6. 

226. Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian Trips to Syria Hit Peak after Putin Ordered Partial Pull-out,” 

Reuters, September 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia/

russian-trips-to-syria-hit-peak-after-putin-ordered-partial-pull-out-idUSKCN1M81ZJ.

227. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33; Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of 

Disbanding,” 9-10; Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security 

Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 26-27.

228. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”; Goble, “Russian Private Military 

Companies Rapidly Growing Sector.”

229. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10; Østensen and Bukkvoll, 

Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European 

and Norwegian Security, 26-27.

230. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33.

231. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10. 

232. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries;” Sukhankin, “Continuing War by 

Other Means”; Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation 

in Syria,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 128, October 12, 2017.

233. Sukhankin, “Revolt of the ‘Disgruntled’.”

234. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

235. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP

132

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

236. Fontanka, “What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.”

237. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries;” Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries.”

238. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

239. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33; Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”; 

Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

240. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

241. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies;” Richard Spencer, 

“Where are the Syrians in Assad’s Syrian Arab Army?” Telegraph, April 9, 2016, https://www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/09/where-are-the-syrians-in-assads-syrian-arab-army/. 

242. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”; Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of 

Disbanding,” 9-10.

243. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10. 

244. “Russia’s Wagner Group Fighters Sighted in Syria.”

245. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”

246. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33; Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of 

Disbanding,” 9-10. 

247. Chris Kozak, “Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra,” Institute for the 

Study of War, March 27, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-syrianiranian-coalition-seizes-isis-held-palmyra; Dominic Evans, “Syrian Army, with Russian Air 

Support, Advances Inside Palmyra,” Reuters, March 25, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/

us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0WR0RA. 

248. Kozak, “Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra.”

249. Kozak, “ISIS Recaptures Palmyra in Major Blow to Pro-Regime Forces.”

250. Tsvetkova, “Russia Underplayed Losses in Recapture of Syria’s Palmyra;” Østensen and 

Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for 

European and Norwegian Security, 25.

251. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33; figure on next page from Russian Ministry of 

Defense, “Official Russian State Concert Celebrating Victory in Palmyra,” Photograph, Mil.ru, 

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, May 5, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/

wiki/File:%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D

1%80%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%A1%D0%9C

%D0%98_%D0%B2_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B5_%D0%9F%

D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5_%D0%B2%D0%BE_%D0

%B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%8F_%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5

%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0_%C2%AB%D0%A1_%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%

D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%BE_%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0

%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%C2%BB_(4).jpg.

252. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

253. Gostev and Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.”

254. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10; Marten, “Russia’s Use of SemiState Security Forces,” 16; Denis Korotkov, interview in Russian by Evgeny Berg, translation 

by Kevin Rothrock, “‘People think it doesn’t affect them. But it affects everyone.’ Meduza 

interviews the reporter who blew the lid on Russian mercenaries fighting in Syria,” Meduza, 

August 30, 2017, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2017/08/30/people-think-it-doesn-t-affect-thembut-it-affects-everyone. 
RUSSIAN PMCs

133

UNCLASSIFIED 

UNCLASSIFIED

255. “The Ride of the Mercenaries;” Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Thousands of Russian Private 

Contractors Fighting in Syria,” Associated Press, December 12, 2017, https://www.apnews.

com/7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873; Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 31; Marten, 

“Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 14-16; Felgenhauer, “Russian Mercenaries 

Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria;” Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of 

Disbanding,” 9-10.

256. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 14.

257. Vasilyeva, “Thousands of Russian Private Contractors Fighting in Syria.” 

258. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10; Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, 

“Russian Mercenaries.”

259. Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries;” Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”

260. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

261. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 16.

262. ISW Research Team, “Disposition of Adversary and Friendly Forces in Eastern Syria,” 

Institute for the Study of War, March 9, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/

disposition-adversary-and-friendly-forces-eastern-syria. 

263. Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 8-9. 

264. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

265. Interfax, “Russian Defense Ministry Denies Kyiv’s Allegation Varyag Cruiser was Used to 

Transport Mercenaries to Syria (Part 2),” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, April 18, 2018, 

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=129120090&site=ehostlive&scope=site.

266. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”

267. Sagdiev, et al., “How a Secret Russian Airlift Helps Syria’s Assad;” Sukhankin, “Continuing 

War by Other Means”.

268. Sana Sekkarie, “Syria Situation Report: September 14 – 27, 2017,” Institute for the Study of 

War and Syria: Direct, September 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/

Syria%20SITREP%2014%20-%2027%20SEP.pdf. 

269. Felgenhauer, “Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria.”

270. Laila Bassam and Angus McDowall, “Syrian Army, Allies, Take Last IS Stronghold in Syria: 

Commander,” Reuters, November 8, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisislamic-state/syrian-army-encircles-last-is-stronghold-in-syria-al-manar-idUSKBN1D81NM. 

271. Felgenhauer, “The Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East,” 23.

272. Felgenhauer, “Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria.”

273. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33-34.

274. Dana W. White, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson 

Dana W. White in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” Transcript, Department of Defense, 

February 8, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1436566/

department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/. 

275. Shabayev, “Cossack Fighter Laments Russian ‘Utilization’ of Mercenaries in Syria.”

276. Bradley Hanlon, “Weak U.S. Response to Russian Proxies Undermines Deterrence in Middle 

East and Eastern Europe,” Institute for the Study of War, February 16, 2018, http://iswresearch.

blogspot.com/2018/02/weak-us-response-to-russian-proxies.html. 

277. Vladimir Frolov, “The Same Plus Israel: A New Round of Escalation in Syria,” [complete 

text] Current Digest of the Russian Press 70, no. 7 (2018): 4-5, originally published in 

Republic.ru, February 13, 2018, https://republic.ru/posts/89484. 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP

134

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

278. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. 

Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.

com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html; 

Sarah El Deeb, “Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort ‘to Support Terrorism’,” Associated Press, 

February 8, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/b5c465ccfa8f4b94b078d9cfaba1a0b4; CBS and 

Associated Press, “Forces Hit by U.S. in Syria Included Russian Mercenaries, Official Says,” 

CBS News, February 8, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/forces-hit-by-u-s-in-syriaincluded-russian-mercenaries-official-says/.

279. Christoph Reuter, “The Truth About the Russian Deaths in Syria,” Der Spiegel, March 

2, 2018, archived January 27, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190127014623/http://

www.spiegel.de/international/world/american-fury-the-truth-about-the-russian-deaths-insyria-a-1196074.html. 

280. Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos 

Unfolded in Syria;” El Deeb, “Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort ‘to Support Terrorism’;” 

CBS/Associated Press, “Forces Hit by U.S. in Syria Included Russian Mercenaries.”

281. Maksim Suchkov, “How Russia and the U.S. have Reached the Brink in Syria,” [condensed 

text] Current Digest of the Russian Press 70, no. 7 (2018): 5-6, originally published in RBC 

Daily, February 14, 2018: 5.

282. El Deeb, “Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort ‘to Support Terrorism’.”

283. CBS/Associated Press, “Forces Hit by U.S. in Syria Included Russian Mercenaries.”

284. Vera Bergengruen, Borzou Daragahi, and Munzer al-Awad, “Here’s What We Know About 

The US Airstrikes That Killed Russian Fighters In Syria,” Buzzfeed News, February 13, 2018, 

updated February 14, 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/verabergengruen/hereswhat-we-know-about-the-us-airstrikes-that-killed. 

285. Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,” 7.

286. Shabayev, “Cossack Fighter Laments Russian ‘Utilization’ of Mercenaries in Syria;”

Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10; Frolov, “The Same Plus Israel,” 

4-5.

287. El Deeb, “Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort ‘to Support Terrorism’.”

288. Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian Toll in Syria Battle was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,” 

Reuters, February 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russiacasualtie/russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was-300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ. 

289. Reuters Staff, “No Information about Reports of Russian Mercenaries Killed in Syria: 

Kremlin,” Reuters, February 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriarussia-kremlin/no-information-about-reports-of-russian-mercenaries-killed-in-syria-kremlinidUSKBN1FX12W.

290. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 34.

291. Ellen Nakashima, Karen DeYoung, and Liz Sly, “Putin Ally Said to Be in Touch with 

Kremlin, Assad Before His Mercenaries Attacked U.S. Troops,” Washington Post, February 

22, 2018, archived on February 23, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180223185656/https://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/putin-ally-said-to-be-in-touch-withkremlin-assad-before-his-mercenaries-attacked-us-troops/2018/02/22/f4ef050c-1781-11e8-

8b08-027a6ccb38eb_story.html?utm_term=.3286c63955b6; Andrew Linder, “Russian Private 

Military Companies in Syria and Beyond,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 16 (Fall 2018): 

17.

292. Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,” 6.

293. Matti Suomenaro, “U.S. Strategy in Syria is Failing,” Institute for the Study of War, February 

10, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/02/us-strategy-in-syria-is-failing.html. 
RUSSIAN PMCs

135

UNCLASSIFIED 

UNCLASSIFIED

294. Rozhdestvensky, “There’s No Question of Disbanding,” 9-10.

295. Interfax, “Путин подтвердил присутствие частных охранных компаний в Сирии,” Mail.

ru, June 20, 2019, https://news.mail.ru/politics/37705595/

296. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Special Operations Forces: Image Versus Substance,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor 16, no. 43, March 27, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-specialoperations-forces-image-versus-substance/; JHU/APL, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on 

Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC), 

55-58, https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/14-02984_LittleGreenMen-UNCLASS-hi-res.pdf; 

JHU/APL, “Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States and Poland – Phase 

1: Understanding the Threat,” JHU/APL Technical Report NSAD-R-14-110, October 2014, 

10-20, 50-62.

297. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 2, 12; Bingham, “Private Companies 

Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 1; Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”; 

Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 28; Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private 

Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 

23, 25, 33; Yurii Butusov, “Mystery of Wagner’s Identity Unfolded: He is Russian Officer and 

Head of Large Private Military Company in Russia, Who Eliminated Mozgovoy, Dremov, and 

Other Terrorist Leaders, and Now is Fighting in Syria,” Censor.net, March 31, 2016, https://

censor.net.ua/en/resonance/381743/mystery_of_wagners_identity_unfolded_he_is_russian_

officer_and_head_of_large_private_military_company.

298. Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 7; Østensen and 

Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for 

European and Norwegian Security, 33.

299. Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2; Østensen 

and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications 

for European and Norwegian Security, 18-19; JHU/APL, “Ambiguous Threats and External 

Influences in the Baltic States and Poland – Phase 1,” 16, 52-53, 60; CCTV America, “Cossacks 

in Crimea,” March 11, 2014, on CGTN America (YouTube), https://youtu.be/CCThuygFs5A. 

300. Simon Shuster, “Meet the Cossack ‘Wolves’ Doing Russia’s Dirty Work in Ukraine,” Time, 

May 12, 2014, http://time.com/95898/wolves-hundred-ukraine-russia-cossack/; Nemanja 

Rujevic, “Serbian Mercenaries Fighting in Eastern Ukraine,” DW, August 14, 2014, https://p.

dw.com/p/1Cv1b; Allison Quinn, “Suspicions Abound as Chechen Fighters Make Mysterious 

Exit from Donbas Battlefield,” Kyiv Post, May 8, 2015, archived May 9, 2015, https://web.

archive.org/web/20150509155417/http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/suspicionsabound-as-chechen-fighters-make-mysterious-exit-from-donbas-battlefield-388012.html. 

301. Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev, “Exclusive: Kremlin-Linked Contractors Help Guard 

Venezuela’s Maduro – Sources,” Reuters, January 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/

us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guardvenezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M. 

302. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Russia/Ukraine-Related Designations and 

Identifications,” June 20, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20170620.aspx. 

303. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 33.

304. Fredrik Westerlund and Johan Norberg, “Military Means for Non-Military Measures: The 

Russian Approach to the Use of Armed Force as Seen in Ukraine,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies 29, no. 4 (2016): 580-581.

305. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries.”

306. Ibid.

307. Russia Monitor, “Russian Mercenaries in Syria,” Warsaw Institute, April 22, 2017, https://

warsawinstitute.org/russian-mercenaries-in-syria/. 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP

136

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

308. Yuri Zoria, “New Footage Shows Russian PMC Wagner Involved in Crucial 2015 Debaltseve 

Battle in Ukraine,” Euromaidan Press, June 22, 2018, http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/06/22/

new-footage-shows-russian-pmc-wagner-involved-in-crucial-2015-debaltseve-battle-inukraine/. 

309. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 31, 33; Interfax - Ukraine, “Hrytsak: SBU Uncovers 

Involvement of Russian ‘Wagner PMC’ in Destroying Il-76 in Donbas, Debaltseve Events,” 

Kyiv Post, October 7, 2017, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/hrytsak-sbu-uncoversinvolvement-russian-wagner-pmc-destroying-il-76-donbas-debaltseve-events.html. 

310. Grove, “Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say.”

311. Gostev and Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.”

312. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 31, 33.

313. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

314. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors;” Sukhankin, 

“Continuing War by Other Means”; Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 12.

315. Franklin Holcomb, “The Kremlin’s Irregular Army: Ukrainian Separatist Order of Battle,” 

Russia and Ukraine Security Report 3, Institute for the Study of War, September 2017, 11, 

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20

Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf. 

316. Jonathan Ferguson and N.R. Jenzen-Jones, “Raising Red Flags: An Examination of Arms 

and Munitions in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine,” Armament Research Services (ARES), 

Research Report No. 3, November 2014, 18, 87, https://www.academia.edu/37600810/Raising_

Red_Flags_An_examination_of_arms_and_munitions_in_the_ongoing_conflict_in_Ukraine. 

317. Zoria, “New Footage Shows Russian PMC Wagner Involved in Crucial 2015 Debaltseve 

Battle in Ukraine.”

318. Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

319. Holcomb, “The Kremlin’s Irregular Army,” 10; Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of 

Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian 

Security, 19.

320. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 28.

321. Felgenhauer, “Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria;” 

Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”.

322. Holcomb, “The Kremlin’s Irregular Army,” 7. 

323. Matthews, “Putin’s (Secret) Army,” 33.

324. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 34.

325. Bellingcat Investigation Team, “MH17 – Russian GRU Commander ‘Orion’ Identified 

as Oleg Ivannikov,” Bellingcat, May 25, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/2018/05/25/mh17-russian-gru-commander-orion-identified-oleg-ivannikov/. 

326. Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports: Validating 

SBU’s Allegation,” Bellingcat, January 30, 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/2019/01/30/wagner-mercenaries-with-gru-issued-passports-validating-sbus-allegation/.

327. Sautreuil, “Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.”
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328. Florian Elabdi, “Putin’s Man in the Central African Republic: Is Valery Zakharov at the 

Heart of Russian Skulduggery?” Daily Beast, December 17, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.

com/putins-man-in-the-central-african-republic-is-valery-zakharov-at-the-heart-of-russianskulduggery; International Crisis Group, “Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic,” 

Africa Report 253, September 28, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/

central-african-republic/253-avoiding-worst-central-african-republic. 

329. Elabdi, “Putin’s Man in the Central African Republic.”

330. Stratfor, “Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground,” Assessments, January 15, 2018, 

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-revisits-old-cold-war-battleground; AFP, “UN 

Gives Green Light on Russia Arms to C Africa,” News24, December 16, 2017, archived 

December 17, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20171216225049/https://www.news24.com/

Africa/News/un-gives-green-light-on-russia-arms-to-c-africa-20171216; MEMRI, “Russia in 

the World – Russia on the African Continent Part I,” Special Dispatch No. 7298, January 25, 

2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-world-%E2%80%93-russia-african-continentpart-i. 

331. Aaron Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa,” Reuters, October 17, 2018, https://

www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-russia-insight/how-russia-moved-into-central-africaidUSKCN1MR0KA. 

332. Patricia Huon and Simon Ostrovsky, “Russia, The New Power in Central Africa,” Coda, 

December 19, 2018, https://codastory.com/ disinformation/russia-new-power-central-africa/.

333. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies;” RFE/RL’s Russian 

Service, “Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow’s Alleged Use of Mercenaries,” RFE/

RL, November 19, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-veterans-appeal-to-icc-over-moscow-salleged-use-of-mercenaries/29609013.html. 

334. Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

335. Ibid.

336. Huon and Ostrovsky, “Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.”

337. Nicolas Haque, “Russia in Africa: Inside a Military Training Centre in CAR,” Al Jazeera 

News, April 14, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2019/04/

russia-africa-military-training-centre-car-190411152658162.html. 

338. Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

339. Romain Esmenjaud, Mélanie De Groof, Paul-Simon Handy, Ilyas Oussedik, and Enrica 

Picco, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended 

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),” UN Security Council, S/2018/1119, 

December 14, 2018, 39-40, para. 176, https://undocs.org/S/2018/1119. 

340. Ibid., 39-40, para. 176. 

341. Ibid., 40, para. 178. 

342. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 3.

343. Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, and Clarissa War, “Putin’s Private Army,” CNN, August 7, 

2019, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/08/africa/putins-private-army-car-intl/.

344. Esmenjaud, et al., “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic 

Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),” 39, para. 175; Huon and 

Ostrovsky, “Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.”
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345. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 23; figure to the right from Confidential 

Source, “Photograph of Sewa Security personnel reinforcing the President’s security,” 

photograph of Russian PMC personnel in CAR published in UN panel of experts report (public 

domain), in Esmenjaud, et al., “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African 

Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),” 162, Annex 9.3.

346. Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

347. Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries;” Alec Luhn, “Russian Journalists Killed in Central 

African Republic While Investigating Mercenaries of ‘Putin’s Chef’,” Telegraph, August 1, 

2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/31/russian-journalists-killed-central-africanrepublic/. 

348. Sasha Ingber, “3 Russian Journalists Killed While Probing Reports of Mercenaries 

in Africa,” NPR, August 2, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/08/02/635046238/3-russianjournalists-killed-while-probing-reports-of-mercenaries-in-africa; Interfax, “Reports 

Connecting Journalist Deaths in CAR to Private Military Companies ‘Drivel’ - Foreign 

Ministry,” Russia & CIS Military Newswire, August 1, 2018, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.

aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=131008019&site=ehost-live&scope=site; Huon and Ostrovsky, 

“Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.”

349. Lister, Shukla, and War, “Putin’s Private Army.”

350. Huon and Ostrovsky, “Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.”

351. Ibid.

352. Lister, Shukla, and Ward, “Putin’s Private Army.”

353. Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

354. Ibid. 

355. Ibid. 

356. Elabdi, “Putin’s Man in the Central African Republic.”

357. Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

358. Esmenjaud, et al., “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic 

Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),” 7-8, para. 15-19.

359. Ibid., 44, para. 199. 

360. Ibid., 8, para. 17.

361. Huon and Ostrovsky, “Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.” 

362. “Putin Replaces Envoy to Central African Republic, Where Russian Reporters Died,” RFE/

RL, January 15, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-replaces-russian-ambassador-to-centralafrican-republic/29711908.html. 

363. Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports;” 

Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Skripal Suspects Confirmed as GRU Operatives: Prior 

European Operations Disclosed,” Bellingcat, September 20, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/

news/uk-and-europe/2018/09/20/skripal-suspects-confirmed-gru-operatives-prior-europeanoperations-disclosed/. 

364. Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports.”

365. Neyelov, “Who are the Competitors of the ‘Russian PMCs’ on the African Market of Military 

Services.”

366. Esmenjaud, et al., “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic 

Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),” 39-41, para. 176, 179. 

367. AFP, “UN Gives Green Light on Russia Arms to C Africa;” MEMRI, “Russia in the World.”
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368. Esmenjaud, et al., “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic 

Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),” 39, para. 175.

369. Ibid., 43, para. 192.

370. Haque, “Russia in Africa.”

371. Reuters, “Russia to Send More Military Trainers, Equipment to Central African Republic,” 

Eyewitness News, October 19, 2018, https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/19/russia-to-send-more-militarytrainers-equipment-to-central-african-republic.

372. Huon and Ostrovsky, “Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.”

373. Elabdi, “Putin’s Man in the Central African Republic.”

374. Ross, “How Russia Moved into Central Africa.”

375. “Central African Republic Open to Russian Military Base,” Moscow Times, January 10, 

2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/10/central-african-republic-open-to-russianmilitary-base-a64091. 

376. Lister, Shukla, and War, “Putin’s Private Army.”

377. Stratfor, “Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.”

378. AFP, “Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ from ‘Aggressive’ US,” France 

24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asksputin-protection-aggressive-us.

379. Stratfor, “Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.”

380. “Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security Service: Sources,” Sudan Tribune, 

January 8, 2019, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article66883; Andrew McGregor, 

“Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, 

no. 15, February 6, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-mercenaries-and-the-survivalof-the-sudanese-regime/.

381. Khalid Abdelaziz, “Sudan’s Bashir Ousted by Military; Protesters Demand Civilian 

Government,” Reuters, April 11, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/

sudans-bashir-forced-to-step-down-sources-say-idUSKCN1RN0AY. 

382. “Russian Lawmakers Criticize Sudan Coup as ‘Unconstitutional’,” Moscow Times, April 11, 

2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/11/russian-lawmakers-criticize-sudan-coupas-unconstitutional-a65190. 

383. Paul Goble, “Sudan Coup Highlights Weaknesses of Putin’s Plan to Create ‘African Empire’ 

for Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 54, April 16, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/

sudan-coup-highlights-weaknesses-of-putins-plan-to-create-african-empire-for-russia/. 

384. Neyelov, “Who are the Competitors of the ‘Russian PMCs’ on the African Market of Military 

Services.”

385. Ruslan Leviev, “From Russia with Wagner: Are Russian Mercenaries Suppressing the Sudan 

Protests?” Conflict Intelligence Team, January 11, 2019, https://citeam.org/are-ru-mercenariessuppressing-the-sudan-protests/?lang=en; McGregor, “Russian Mercenaries and the Survival 

of the Sudanese Regime;” “Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security Service: 

Sources;” Jane Flanagan, “Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests: Sudan,” Times, 

January 10, 2019, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2165597449/fulltext/297E509B051417D

PQ/2?accountid=11752.

386. Leviev, “From Russia with Wagner;” “Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security 

Service: Sources;” Flanagan, “Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests.”

387. Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan, Says Moscow,” 

ed. Andrew Osborn, Reuters, January 23, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russiasudan-contractors/russian-contractors-are-training-the-army-in-sudan-says-moscowidUSKCN1PH23T.
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388. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 3.

389. Daniel Brown, “3 Countries Where Russia’s Shadowy Wagner Group Mercenaries are 

Known to Operate,” Business Insider, April 27, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/russiawagner-group-mercenaries-where-operate-2018-4#2-sudan-2.

390. Mohammed Amin, “Blood and Gold: Now Sudan’s Land Wars Have Spread to Mining,” 

Middle East Eye, April 21, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/blood-and-gold-nowsudans-land-wars-have-spread-mining.

391. “500 Russian Troops on CAR-Darfur Border,” Radio Dabanga, July 31, 2018, https://www.

dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/500-russian-troops-on-car-darfur-border. 

392. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 15.

393. Ibid., 23; Leviev, “From Russia with Wagner.”

394. Brown, “3 Countries Where Russia’s Shadowy Wagner Group Mercenaries are Known to 

Operate.”

395. Leviev, “From Russia with Wagner.” 

396. Tsvetkova, “Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan.”

397. Amin, “Blood and Gold.”

398. Leviev, “From Russia with Wagner;” “Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security 

Service: Sources;” Flanagan, “Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests.”

399. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 33.

400. “500 Russian Troops on CAR-Darfur Border.”

401. “Wagner PMC Part of Russian Military Intel, IDs of ‘Mercenaries’ Confirm – Ukraine 

Security Chief,” UNIAN, January 28, 2019, https://www.unian.info/world/10424754-wagnerpmc-part-of-russian-military-intel-ids-of-mercenaries-confirm-ukraine-security-chief.html.

402. “Mercenaries Recruited to Russia’s Wagner PMC in Occupied Crimea – SBU,” UNIAN, 

February 21, 2019, https://www.unian.info/war/10454832-mercenaries-recruited-to-russia-swagner-pmc-in-occupied-crimea-sbu.html. 

403. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 37-38.

404. Tsvetkova, “Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan.”

405. Neyelov, “Who are the Competitors of the ‘Russian PMCs’ on the African Market of Military 

Services.”

406. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 26; McGregor, “Russian Mercenaries 

and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime;” “Wagner PMC Part of Russian Military Intel.”

407. Bellingcat Investigation Team, “Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports.” 

408. Tsvetkova, “Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan.”

409. “500 Russian Troops on CAR-Darfur Border.”

410. Leviev, “From Russia with Wagner;” “Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security 

Service: Sources;” Flanagan, “Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests.”

411. Amin, “Blood and Gold.”

412. Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,” 12.

413. Stratfor, “Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.”
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414. Paul Goble, “Moscow Laying Groundwork for Deeper Military Involvement in Libya,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 162, November 13, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/

moscow-laying-groundwork-for-deeper-military-involvement-in-libya/.

415. Ibid.

416. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 23.

417. Ibid., 24.

418. Ibid., 25.

419. Goble, “Moscow Laying Groundwork for Deeper Military Involvement in Libya.”

420. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.”

421. RFE/RL’s Russian Service, “Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow’s Alleged Use of 

Mercenaries;” Sukhankin, “Revolt of the ‘Disgruntled’.”

422. Dyner, “The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,” 2.

423. Tom Newton Dunn, “Putin Troops in Libya: Russia Sends Troops and Missiles into Libya 

in Bid to Enforce Stranglehold on the West,” Sun, October 8, 2018, updated October 9, 2018, 

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7448072/russia-missiles-libya-warlord/. 

424. Maxim A. Suchkov, “Analysis: Reports on Russian Troops in Libya Spark Controversy,” AlMonitor, October 12, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/russia-libyatroops-hifter.html.

425. “Russian Mercenaries Help Rebel Libyan Army to Seize Oilfields,” Daily Telegraph, March 

4, 2019, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2187614930?accountid=11752. 

426. Ibid.

427. Emily Sherwin, “Could Libya be Russia’s New Syria?” DW, April 10, 2019, https://www.

dw.com/en/could-libya-be-russias-new-syria/a-48277255. 

428. Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa,” New York 

Times, March 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-militaryafrica.html. 

429. Theodore Karasik, “Russia’s Financial Tactics in the Middle East” in Russia in the Middle 

East, eds. Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 

December 2018), 258; Theodore Karasik and Gorgio Cafiero, “Why Does Vladimir Putin Care 

about Sudan?” New Atlanticist, November 27, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/

new-atlanticist/why-does-vladimir-putin-care-about-sudan; Paul Burkhardt, “Russia Signs 

Agreement with Nigeria for Nuclear Power Plant,” Bloomberg Wire Service, October 31, 2017, 

https://search.proquest.com/docview/2009882702?accountid=11752. 

430. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 23.

431. Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces,” 10; AFP, “Nigeria Drops Charges 

against Russians in Arms Case,” Modern Ghana, October 8, 2013, https://www.modernghana.

com/sports/461731/nigeria-drops-charges-against-russians-in-arms-case.html. 

432. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 21.
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433. Caroline Varin, “Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security 

Companies on Nigeria’s Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram,” African Security Review

27, no. 2 (2018): 150; Cropley and Lewis, “Nigeria Drafts in Foreign Mercenaries to Take on 

Boko Haram;” Chris Stein, “Nigeria’s President: Boko Haram Trained with Islamic State,” 

Voice of America, March 11, 2015, https://www.voanews.com/a/nigerias-president-says-bokoharam-trained-with-islamic-state/2676217.html; John Campbell, “Mercenaries in Nigeria,” 

Council on Foreign Relations (blog), March 12, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/blog/mercenariesnigeria; Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 11.

434. Neyelov, “Who are the Competitors of the ‘Russian PMCs’ on the African Market of Military 

Services.”

435. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in Yemen: Kremlin-Style ‘Security Export’ in Action?,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 144, October 12, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/russianpmcs-in-yemen-kremlin-style-security-export-in-action/; Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State 

Security Forces,” 2-3.

436. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.”

437. RFE/RL’s Russian Service, “Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow’s Alleged Use of 

Mercenaries;” Sukhankin, “Revolt of the ‘Disgruntled’.”

438. Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in Yemen;” Sukhankin, “Continuing War by Other Means”; 

Stephen Blank, “From Sochi to the Sahel: Russia’s Expanding Footprint,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor 14, no. 154, November 29, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/sochi-sahel-russiasexpanding-footprint/. 

439. Bingham, “Private Companies Engage in Russia’s Non-Linear Warfare,” 11; Emily B. Hager 

and Mark Mazzetti, “Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight,” New 

York Times, November 25, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/

emirates-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html.

440. Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in Yemen.”

441. Tsvetkova and Zverev, “Exclusive: Kremlin-Linked Contractors Help Guard Venezuela’s 

Maduro – Sources.”

442. Ibid. 

443. Joseph Trevithick, “Russian Transport Aircraft Deliver Men and Materiel to Venezuela 

Direct from Syria,” Drive, March 25, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27143/

russian-transport-aircraft-deliver-men-and-materiel-to-venezuela-direct-from-syria; Anatoly 

Kurmanaev, “2 Russian Military Planes Land in Venezuela, Exacerbating Political Tension,” 

New York Times, March 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/world/americas/

russian-planes-caracas.html; Giancarlo Fiorella, “Russians in Venezuela: What We Know 

So Far,” Bellingcat, April 4, 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2019/04/04/

russians-in-venezuela-what-we-know-so-far/; Sergey Sukhankin, “Behind the Scenes of 

Russia’s Military Detachment to Venezuela,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 46, April 2, 

2019, https://jamestown.org/program/behind-the-scenes-of-russias-military-detachment-tovenezuela/. 

444. Alberto Nardelli, “Russia is Trying to Fly Military Planes into Venezuela via Syria Again,” 

Buzzfeed News, April 15, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/russiavenezuela-planes-malta-syria. 

445. Alberto Fittarelli, “The Strange Tale of the Georgians in Congo,” Bellingcat, June 26, 2017, 

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/africa/2017/06/26/strange-tale-georgians-congo/. 

446. Paul Goble, “Moscow Quickly Expanding Ties to Africa,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 92, 

June 14, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-quickly-expanding-ties-to-africa/. 

447. Neyelov, “Who are the Competitors of the ‘Russian PMCs’ on the African Market of Military 

Services.”
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448. Østensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The 

Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 23.

449. RFE/RL’s Russian Service, “Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow’s Alleged Use of 

Mercenaries;” Sukhankin, “Revolt of the ‘Disgruntled’;” Paul Goble, “Kremlin Rapidly Losing 

Control of ‘Private Military Company’ Story,” Windows on Eurasia (blog), November 20, 

2018, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/11/kremlin-rapidly-losing-control-of.html.

450. Mardasov, “Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.”

451. Sukhankin, “War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue 

Moscow’s Interests.”
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