United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 18-557 C

Filed: August 9, 2018

Reissued: September 6, 20181

DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant

and

JPATS LOGISTICS SERVICES,

Defendant-Intervenor.

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David M. Nadler, Blank Rome LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Eric J. Singley, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for defendant.

J. Alex Ward, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor.

OPINION AND ORDER

SMITH, Senior Judge

This post-award bid protest comes before the Court on the parties’ Cross-Motions for 

Judgment on the Administrative Record. Plaintiff, DynCorp International, LLC (“DynCorp”),

filed its Complaint on April 17, 2018, objecting to the United States Air Force’s (“Air Force” or 

“Agency”) award of the $2.2 billion Solicitation No. FA8617-18-R-6213 (“Solicitation” or 

“RFP”) for the Contractor Operated and Maintained Base Supply (“COMBS”) III contract to 

defendant-intervenor, JPATS Logistics Services, LLC (“JLS”). Administrative Record 

(hereinafter “AR”) at 1. Plaintiff seeks an order (1) awarding equitable relief in the form of an 

injunction against the COMBS III award to JL, and (2) requiring the Air Force to award the 

 

1 An unredacted version of this opinion was issued under seal on August 9, 2018. The parties 

were given an opportunity to propose redactions, and those redactions are reflected herein.
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COMBS III contract to plaintiff, or, in the alternative, obligating the Agency to re-evaluate the 

offers and make a new source selection decision. Complaint (hereinafter “Compl.”) at 1-2. For 

the following reasons, plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record is denied, 

and defendant and defendant-intervenor’s Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative 

Record are granted.

I. Background

On December 9, 2016, the Air Force issued the Solicitation for the COMBS III 

procurement, a follow-on to the COMBS II contract and its successor, the COMBS Bridge 

contract. AR 1. Plaintiff is the incumbent for both the COMBS II and the COMBS Bridge 

contracts. AR 8866. Plaintiff notes that, as a successor contract, the COMBS III contract is

substantially similar to the COMBS II and COMBS Bridge contracts. Compl. at 5. The 

Solicitation calls for an award of a single Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity hybrid contract 

with both Firm Fixed Price and Cost Reimbursable No Fee Contract Line Items. AR at 2450. 

The Solicitation provided that the award would be made according to a best-value 

trade-off analysis, and that determination would be based on an assessment of the following 

three factors: (1) Technical Acceptability, (2) Past Performance, and (3) Price. AR 2491. The 

Agency also declared that a best-value trade-off between past performance and price would be 

made among proposals determined to be technically acceptable, and past performance would be 

significantly more important than price. AR 2491. The Solicitation stated that the Air Force

would assign offerors a past performance rating of “Substantial Confidence, Satisfactory 

Confidence, Limited Confidence, or No Confidence” based on factors of Relevancy and Quality. 

AR 2495. The Agency also determined whether each offeror was responsible, pursuant to 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 9.104-1(a). AR 5740, 5759, 5787, 5805. The Agency 

published its responsibility determinations in the Defense Contracting Management Agency’s

(“DCMA”) Pre-Award Survey (“Survey”) for each offeror. AR 5739-5740, 5759, 5786-5787, 

5804-5805.

On December 21, 2017, DynCorp received notice that its offer was unsuccessful, and that 

the Air Force had awarded the COMBS III contract to JLS. AR 8622. On January 2, 2018, 

DynCorp filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). AR 8866. On 

April 12, 2018, the GAO denied DynCorp’s protest. AR 17933. On April 17, 2018, DynCorp 

filed its Complaint. See generally Compl. In its Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following: (1) 

the Air Force improperly awarded the follow-on the COMBS III contract to JLS; (2) JLS’s bid 

price was so low that it could not have included the basic inventory levels required for successful 

performance, and the Air Force ignored serious indicators that JLS lacked the financial resources 

to complete the contract; and (3) JLS’ proposal was technically deficient under the terms of the 

Solicitation. Id. at 2-4. 

On May 25, 2018, DynCorp filed its Motion for Judgement on the Administrative 

Record. See generally Plaintiff DynCorp International LLC’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Administrative Record (hereinafter “P’s MJAR”). On June 15, 2018, the government filed its 

Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Judgment on the Administrative Record. See generally Defendant’s Cross-Motion for 
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Judgment on the Administrative Record, and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Administrative Record (hereinafter “D’s CMJAR”). On June 15, 2018, defendant-intervenor,

JLS, filed its Response and Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. See 

generally Defendant-Intervenor JPATS Logistics Services, LLC’s Response and Cross-Motion 

for Judgment on the Administrative Record (hereinafter “DI’s CMJAR”). 

On June 26, 2018, DynCorp filed its Response to Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor’s 

Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record and Reply in Support of its Motion 

for Judgment on the Administrative Record. See generally Plaintiff DynCorp International 

LLC’s Response to Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor’s Cross-Motions for Judgment on the 

Administrative Record and Reply in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Administrative 

Record (hereinafter “P’s Reply”). On July 9, 2018 the government filed its Reply to Plaintiff’s 

Response to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. See 

generally Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Judgment 

on the Administrative (hereinafter “D’s Reply”). On July 9, 2018, JLS filed its Reply in Support 

of Its Cross-Motion for Judgement on the Administrative Record. See generally DefendantIntervenor JPATS Logistics Service, LLC’s Reply in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Judgement 

on the Administrative Record (hereinafter “DI’s Reply”). The Court held oral argument on this 

matter on July 17, 2018. The parties’ motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. 

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s jurisdictional grant is found primarily in the Tucker Act, which provides the 

Court of Federal Claims the power “to render any judgment upon any claim against the United 

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 

executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States . . . in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). Although the Tucker Act expressly 

waives the sovereign immunity of the United States against such claims, the act “does not create 

any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.” United States 

v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Rather, in order to fall within the scope of the Tucker Act, 

“a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money 

damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant 

part).

This Court has jurisdiction over bid protest actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b). The 

Court evaluates bid protests under the standard of review for an agency action set forth in the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 

F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). An agency procurement action may be set aside only if it is 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). “The arbitrary and capricious standard 

applicable [in bid protests] is highly deferential.” Advanced Data Concepts v. United States, 216 

F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Agencies, and contracting officers in particular, are “‘entitled 

to exercise discretion upon a broad range of issues confronting them’ in the procurement 

process.” Savantage Fin. Servs v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332).
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When reviewing a motion for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to Rule 

52.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), the Court assesses 

whether the administrative body, given all the disputed and undisputed facts in the record, acted

in a manner that complied with the legal standards governing the decision under review. 

Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 369, 382 (2013) (citing Fort Carson 

Supp. Servs. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 571, 585 (2006); Greene v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 

375, 382 (2005); Arch Chems., Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 380, 388 (2005)). Under RCFC 

52.1, the parties are limited to the Administrative Record, and the Court makes findings of fact 

as if it were conducting a trial on a paper record. See Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1354. Looking to the 

Administrative Record, the Court must determine whether a party has met its burden of proof 

based on the evidence in the record. Id. at 1355.

When a protestor claims that the agency’s decision violates a statute, regulation, or 

procedure, the protestor must show that the violation was “clear and prejudicial.” Impresa, 238 

F.3d at 1333. The Court will “interfere with the government procurement process only in 

extremely limited circumstances.” EP Prods., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 220, 223 (2005) 

(quoting CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “If the court 

finds a reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it 

might, as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to the proper 

administration and application of the procurement regulations.” Honeywell, Inc. v. United 

States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 

1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency, 

even if reasonable minds could reach differing conclusions. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best 

Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). 

Standing in bid protests is framed by 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), which requires the bid 

protest to be brought by an “interested party.” A protestor is an “interested party” if it is

“(1) [an] actual or prospective bidder and (2) possess[es] the requisite direct economic interest.” 

Weeks Marine, Inc., v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Rex Serv. 

Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In a post-award protest, a bidder

has a direct economic interest in a procurement if it can show that “there was a substantial 

chance it would have received the contract award but for the alleged error in the procurement 

process.” Linc Gov’t Servs., LLC. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 672, 694. (2010) (quoting Info. 

Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The nature of the 

protest will dictate the necessary factors for a “direct economic interest.” Sys. Appl. & Techs. v. 

United States, 691 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

III. Discussion

A. Standing

As previously noted, to have standing in a bid protest, a protester must establish that it 

“(1) is an actual or prospective bidder and (2) possesses the requisite direct economic interest.” 

Weeks Marine, Inc., 575 F.3d at 1359. While no party questions whether plaintiff was a bidder, 

defendant argues that plaintiff lacks the direct economic interest required to establish standing. 
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D’s CMJAR at 10. Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff, as the fourth ranked offeror, 

lacked any substantial chance of winning the COMBS III contract, so it fails to qualify as an 

interested party under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Id. at 10-11. 

The Court disagrees. The “allegational prejudice” plaintiff must demonstrate to satisfy 

standing centers on the “impact that the alleged procurement errors had on a plaintiff’s prospect 

for award, taking the allegations as true.” Linc Gov’t Servs., 96 Fed. Cl. at 695. DynCorp 

alleges that, absent the agency’s evaluation errors, the company would have “received the 

highest past performance rating,” and that DynCorp would be in direct contention for the 

COMBS III contract. P’s Reply at 5. That allegation satisfies the substantial chance doctrine. 

See Linc Gov’t Servs., 96 Fed. Cl. at 694. Thus, this Court holds that plaintiff has the requisite 

standing to proceed to a decision on the merits. 

B. Responsibility Determination 

This Court will defer to an agency’s expertise in making procurement decisions, unless 

the agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [issued a 

decision that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 

of agency expertise.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 

(1983)). In its Motion, plaintiff argues that the Agency unreasonably determined that JLS was a 

responsible offeror when the Contracting Officer (“CO”) “reflexively accepted” JLS’s Survey 

“without meaningful review.” P’s MJAR at 12, 14. As plaintiff highlights, defendantintervenor’s initial offer described JLS as a “[joint venture] formed between” IAP Worldwide 

Services (“IAP”) and Kellstrom Defense Aerospace (“KDA”), with IAP serving “as the 

managing partner.” P’s MJAR at 12; AR 5000. JLS’s Survey, meanwhile, described defendantintervenor as a “majority-owned subsidiary” of IAP. AR 5786. 

Plaintiff avers that this discrepancy in the description of the corporate relationship 

between JLS and IAP Worldwide Services (“IAP”) constituted a “fundamental error” in the 

DCMA’s analysis, and that the CO’s failure to “identify this obvious flaw” was unreasonable. 

P’s MJAR at 12. DynCorp further contends that this semantical difference prevented both the 

DCMA and the CO from “properly consider[ing] the risk” that JLS might lack the “financial 

resources to perform the contract, or the ability to obtain them.” P’s MJAR at 13-14; see also

FAR 9.104-1(a). Plaintiff offers DCMA’s Postaward Financial Surveillance on IAP Worldwide 

Services, Inc. (“Post Award Report”) as evidence of JLS’s “dire financial condition,” citing 

IAP’s “2014 restructuring [and] .” P’s MJAR at 14; see also

AR 8421 (referencing IAP’s “debt restructuring” stemming from “financial difficulties”). 

Plaintiff concludes that the Agency’s failure to heed these financial red flags created a 

“fundamental flaw in [JLS’s] financial responsibility evaluation.” P’s MJAR at 17. 

Rather than demonstrating prejudicial error, plaintiff’s efforts serve to highlight the 

reasonableness of the Agency’s actions, particularly given the deference the Court owes to 

agency responsibility determinations. See Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334-35; John C. Grimberg Co., 

Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bowman Transp., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 

at 285-86. Plaintiff attempts to fault the CO for “reflexively accept[ing]” JLS’s Survey results. 
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P’s MJAR at 12. However, the courts have long held that a contracting officer determines 

“what, and how much, information” he or she requires to make the responsibility determination.

John C. Grimberg, 185 F.3d at 1303. Here, the CO took appropriate steps to determine JLS’s 

responsibility, including its financial health, based on the Source Selection Authority’s 

“extensiv[e]” review of “all available documents pertaining to the acquisition,” including IAP’s

status as JLS’s guarantor and IAP’s “financial capacity to support” JLS. E.g. AR 5784, 8419-20,

8618.

DynCorp further argues that the Agency unreasonably ignored JLS’s financial instability, 

which stemmed from IAP’s debt restructuring. P’s MJAR at 14; see also AR 8421 (referencing 

IAP’s “debt restructuring” and “financial difficulties”). However, the record demonstrates that 

the CO did not ignore JLS’s financial instability, but rather reasonably relied on the relevant

Survey’s conclusion that JLS and IAP were not financially unstable. AR 5786, 8420. Indeed,

the DCMA stated in JLS’s Survey that intervenor had or could “obtain adequate financial 

resources . . . necessary for the successful completion” of the COMBS III contract, based in part 

on IAP’s role as a “corporate [g]uarantor.” AR 5783-84, 8420. In its Post Award Report, the 

DCMA took additional steps to review JLS’s ability to execute the COMBS III contract, finding 

that JLS’s financial condition was “satisfactory to support its financial obligations.” AR 8426. 

In evaluating IAP’s potential instability, refinancing does not necessarily impair a 

company’s financial position, but rather, it can improve it. AR 8423. Indeed, the DCMA noted 

an “upward trend in sales, net worth, and cash flow” for IAP after the company’s restructuring. 

Id. Given the steps that the Agency took to reasonably determine JLS’s responsibility, plaintiff 

fails to demonstrate a “clear and prejudicial error” that would warrant ignoring well-established 

principles of judicial deference. Bowman Transp., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 at 285-86; Impresa, 238 

F.3d at 1333.

C. Past Performance 

As previously iterated, this Court will defer to an agency’s expertise in making 

procurement decisions unless the agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 

the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 

agency, or [issued a decision that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 

view or the product of agency expertise.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 586 F.3d 1372 at 1375. The 

Solicitation required the Agency to assign an adjectival rating to each offeror based on the 

“result of the Quality and Relevancy Assessments of the recent contracts evaluated.” AR 2498. 

Here, plaintiff argues that the Agency unreasonably evaluated Past Performance Quality and 

Relevancy subfactors, and that plaintiff was prejudiced by that unfair treatment. P’s MJAR at 

22, 28, 29, 35. 

DynCorp avers that JLS’s past performance was not relevant because the size, 

complexity, and nature of JLS’s assessed contracts were small, simple, and dissimilar to the 

COMBS III contract. P’s MJAR at 22. In light of these alleged deficiencies, DynCorp contends 

that the Air Force “arbitrarily inflated JLS’s Past Performance” rating by assessing JLS’s prior 

experience as “Relevant.” Id. Plaintiff further argues that the Air Force acted irrationally in

assigning L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace (“L3V”) the highest overall past performance 
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rating, despite the DCMA assigning L3V a “Marginal” rating for its Army C-12 contract. Id. at 

29. DynCorp also challenges its own Past Performance rating, arguing that the Agency 

undervalued plaintiff’s “exceptional performance on the COMBS II contract” and “unreasonably 

assessed” plaintiff’s performance on the C-21 contract. Id. at 35, 37. While acknowledging that

a subcontractor used an “unauthorized paint stripper” for plane maintenance on the C-21 

contract, plaintiff emphasizes that this “isolated issue” did not warrant the comparatively lower 

Past Performance rating. P’s MJAR at 37-38. 

 

DynCorp also contends that the Air Force, in other ways, unfairly evaluated offeror past 

performance, thereby prejudicing plaintiff by arbitrarily reducing its rank relative to other 

offerors. See P’s MJAR at 24-29. Plaintiff highlights the disparity between the small numbers

of aircraft JLS serviced in its evaluated contracts compared to plaintiff’s own highly relevant 

experience maintaining more numerous aircraft as the COMBS II incumbent. Id. at 22-23. 

Given this numerical difference, plaintiff concludes that the Air Force unreasonably “inflated 

JLS’s Past Performance” while underrating plaintiff. Id. DynCorp also contrasts its paint 

thinner problems with the “serious Information Technology” issue on JLS’s E-6B CLS contract, 

arguing that the Air Force irrationally penalized plaintiff more than JLS. P’s MJAR at 38; AR 

13245. Finally, plaintiff claims that the Air Force unreasonably rated DynCorp lower than L3V 

for the Supply Chain Management subfactor, despite both offerors receiving a mix of ratings 

throughout their evaluated contracts. P’s MJAR at 31. 

Plaintiff’s past performance arguments are unpersuasive. The Court is mindful that, 

given the subjective nature of past performance evaluations, deference is owed to the Agency. 

Vanguard Recovery Assistance v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 765, 785 (2011); see also Glenn 

Def. Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2013). But even if 

the Court did not defer to the Agency, DynCorp still does not prevail. First, despite plaintiff’s 

arguments to the contrary, the record shows that the Agency took appropriate steps in assessing

offeror past performance, including the Quality subfactor. See e.g. AR 6137-6140, 6141-6142, 

6143-6144, 6145-6146, 6147-6150, 6151-6154, 6155-6158, 6159-6161, 12283-12286, 13338-

13341, 13342-13345, 13346-13347, 13348-13351, 13392-13397.

In particular, DynCorp focuses on the Air Force’s evaluation of L3V’s C-12 contracts, 

stating that transition and “maintenance procedur[e]” problems did not justify L3V’s rating of 

“Substantial Confidence.” P’s MJAR at 29, 31. It is true that the Agency assigned a Marginal

rating for one of L3V’s quality subfactors in its Army C-12 contract. AR 18305. However, out 

of 15 non-redacted, ranked subfactors, L3V received three “Exceptional” ratings (the highest), 

seven “Very Good” ratings, four “Satisfactory” ratings, and only one “Marginal” rating (the 

lowest). Id. It seems reasonable that the Agency could assign an overall rating of “Substantial 

Confidence,” particularly given that the lowest ratings occurred in the Transition period, which 

only accounts for a small percentage of the overall life of the contract. Id.

Plaintiff also questions its own Quality subfactor ranking, arguing that its record on the 

COMBS II contract “warrants a Substantial Confidence rating,” rather than the “Satisfactory 

Confidence” rating the Agency assigned. P’s MJAR at 35; AR 12367. Looking to the totality of 

the 10 non-redacted, ranked subfactors, the Agency assigned three “Very Good” ratings and 

seven “Satisfactory” ratings. AR 12367. Similar to the Agency’s evaluation of L3V, it seems 
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reasonable that the Agency could have assigned the rating that it did, since two-thirds of the 

subfactor ratings mirrored the overall rating. Plaintiff therefore fails to raise valid concerns 

regarding the reasonableness or fairness of the Agency’s Past Performance evaluation process.

Instead, DynCorp seeks to have the Air Force penalize JLS and L3V for their prior

problems, while overlooking plaintiff’s own past challenges. P’s MJAR at 27, 37-38. While 

plaintiff may disagree with the Agency’s assessments, its objections to the Air Force’s Quality 

subfactor determinations are merely a disagreement with the Agency’s evaluations. AR 17943. 

The GAO concluded that the Agency reasonably assessed the quality of offeror past performance 

in accordance with the terms of the Solicitation, and the Court concurs. See AR 17937. 

Similarly, the Agency acted within its reasonable discretion to define “relevancy” when 

analyzing offeror past performance. AR 17942. As the GAO noted, JLS’s numerically smaller 

contracts were relevant because the planes serviced were “significantly more complex” than 

those in the COMBS III contract. AR 17942. The GAO emphasized that the Solicitation “did 

not expressly define” relevancy, “thereby affording the Air Force even greater discretion to 

determine the relevance of offeror’s past performance.” Id. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges agency unfairness but confuses differing assessments with unfair 

treatment. The record shows that the plaintiff’s substandard quality on the C-21 contract resulted 

in its lower, “Satisfactory” rating for Past Performance. AR 12278-12279. Based on the record, 

it seems to this Court that the Agency did not engage in unfair or unequal treatment. AR 12279, 

17947. Instead, the Agency reasonably weighed Relevance against Quality in assigning its 

ratings. 

As the GAO report concluded, these types of qualitative assessments lie at the heart of 

the Agency’s prerogative, “since it is the agency that must bear the burden of any difficulties 

resulting from a defective evaluation, and we will not substitute our judgment for a reasonably 

based past performance rating. Id. (citing PEMCO World Air Servs., B-284240.3 et al., Mar. 27, 

2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 71 at 7). Given the deference courts generally afford to agencies, the 

reasonableness of the CO’s actions, and the prerogative of the Agency, this Court can only 

determine that plaintiff has failed to show “clear and prejudicial error” in the Air Force’s Past 

Performance evaluation. See e.g. Bowman Transp., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 at 285-86; Impresa, 238 

F.3d at 1333.

D. Pricing Proposal and Best-Value Determination

In addition to plaintiff’s previously-discussed, more substantive arguments, DynCorp 

made two additional assertions. P’s MJAR at 17, 40. First, plaintiff alleges that the Agency 

unreasonably evaluated offeror pricing proposals. P’s MJAR at 17. Plaintiff contends that JLS 

and AAR Corp. “improperly shifted the cost” of Contractor Furnished Property (“CFP”) to the 

Agency. Id. Plaintiff argues that the Solicitation requires that materials, including CFP, will be 

“provided by the Contractor,” but plaintiff does not successfully demonstrate that the Solicitation 

barred offerors from including the cost of the CFP in their pricing proposals. Id. at 17 (citing AR 

252). Moreover, as JLS notes, the relevant statute “expressly allowed” offerors to include the 
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cost of materials, such as CFP, in their pricing proposals. DI’s CMJAR at 12 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 

31.205-26). 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant-intervenor’s pricing proposal “cannot support its CFP 

purchase,” which would “intensify” JLS’s alleged “financial difficulties.” P’s MJAR at 20. 

Plaintiff further contends that JLS’s “dramatically low” price “demonstrate[d] a lack of 

understanding” of the Solicitation requirements. Id. at 20-21. This sufficiency argument appears 

to be grounded in plaintiff’s disagreement with the way in which the Agency evaluated price. 

See AR 3371, 3408. 

The Solicitation required the Agency to evaluate price proposals for completeness, and 

plaintiff fails to demonstrate why JLS’s price was incomplete. Id. DynCorp believes defendantintervenor could not perform the COMBS III contract at a price lower than plaintiff’s proposed 

price. P’s MJAR at 20-21. However, the Agency determined that JLS’s price was not 

unreasonably low and accepted it. AR 3371, 3408, 4735-4740, 7637-7642, 5795, 8419. Without 

any hard evidence to the contrary, this decision is well within the Agency’s discretion. As such, 

plaintiff has not shown to the Court that the Agency acted unreasonably. 

Second, plaintiff argues that the Agency’s best-value determination was unreasonable. 

P’s MJAR at 40. Plaintiff alleges that “had the Air Force conducted a proper proposal 

evaluation, it would have determined that [plaintiff] offered the best value.” Id. In keeping with

the previously stated analysis, the Court disagrees. The Court finds the best-value determination 

reasonable, as it was based on real evidence and the Agency’s assessment of JLS’s ability to 

perform, both of which the Court discussed in detail above. 

A best-value determination is in part subjective. As such, it was well within the 

Agency’s discretion to determine that JLS’s offer presented the best value, based upon the 

Agency’s procedures and the factual record. Tech Sys., Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 228, 

262 (2011) (affirming an agency’s discretion in determining best value). Plaintiff posits that 

best-value determinations based on “defective” evaluations should be overturned. P’s MJAR at 

40 (citing Femme Comp Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 704, 757-70 (2008)). Objective 

parameters may indeed constrain agency decisions, but so long as the Agency’s determination 

comports with the parameters of the Solicitation, as it did here, the Court will uphold that 

decision. The Agency’s evaluations were not defective, and, thus, plaintiff’s best-value 

determination argument is unpersuasive. 

Even if this Court disagreed with the Agency’s decision to award the COMBS III 

contract to JLS, there is still a rational basis for the Air Force’s award. It appears to the Court 

that the Air Force’s choice of JLS was reasonable, based upon a record of proper evidentiary 

evaluations. This is not a case in which the Agency “failed to consider an important aspect of 

the problem” or “issued a decision that is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., 586 F.3d 1372 at 

1375. The Administrative Record supports the Air Force’s decision to award the COMBS III 

contract to JLS. As such, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Agency’s decision was 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 
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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s MOTION for Judgment on the Administrative 

Record is DENIED. Defendant’s CROSS-MOTION for Judgment on the Administrative Record 

is GRANTED. Defendant-Intervenor’s CROSS-MOTION for Judgment on the Administrative 

Record is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant and 

defendant-intervenor, consistent with this opinion.2 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Loren A. Smith

Loren A. Smith,

Senior Judge

 

2 This opinion shall be unsealed, as issued, after August 23, 2018, unless the parties identify 

protected and/or privileged materials subject to redaction prior to that date. Said materials shall 

be identified with specificity, both in terms of the language to be redacted and the reasons therefor.