a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2006 COMBATING 

NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING

DHS Has Made 

Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment at U.S. 

Ports-of-Entry, but 

Concerns Remain

GAO-06-389
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

DHS Has Made Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. 

Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain 

Highlights of GAO-06-389, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Preventing radioactive material

from being smuggled into the 

United States is a key national

security objective. To help address 

this threat, in October 2002, DHS 

began deploying radiation 

detection equipment at U.S. portsof-entry. This report reviews recent 

progress DHS has made (1) 

deploying radiation detection

equipment, (2) using radiation 

detection equipment, (3) improving 

the capabilities and testing of this 

equipment, and (4) increasing 

cooperation between DHS and 

other federal agencies in

conducting radiation detection

programs. 

What GAO Recommends

The Secretary of Homeland

Security should work with other 

agencies, as necessary, to (1) 

streamline internal review 

procedures so that spending data 

can be provided to the Congress in

a more timely way; (2) update the 

current deployment plan; (3) 

analyze the benefits and costs of

advanced portals, then revise the 

program’s cost estimates to reflect 

current decisions; (4) develop ways 

to effectively screen rail 

containers; (5) revise agency 

procedures for container 

inspection; and (6) develop a way 

for CBP officers to verify NRC 

licenses. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DHS stated that it agreed 

with, and will implement, our 

recommendations. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in 

deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry, but the 

agency’s program goals are unrealistic and the program cost estimate is 

uncertain. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 portal monitors and 

over 19,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment. However, the 

deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind schedule, making DHS’s 

goal of deploying 3,034 by September 2009 unlikely. In particular, two 

factors have contributed to the schedule delay. First, DHS provides the 

Congress with information on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments 

before releasing any funds. However, DHS’s lengthy review process has 

caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. Second, 

difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of portal 

monitors and how to most efficiently screen rail cars have delayed

deployments at seaports. Regarding the uncertainty of the program’s cost 

estimate, DHS would like to deploy advanced technology portals that will 

likely cost significantly more than the currently deployed portals, but tests 

have not yet shown that these portals are demonstrably more effective than 

the current portals. Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new 

portals would be worth any increased cost to the program. Also, our analysis 

of the program’s costs indicates that DHS may incur a $342 million cost 

overrun. 

DHS has improved in using detection equipment and in following the 

agency’s inspection procedures since 2003, but we identified two potential 

issues in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection procedures. 

First, although radiological materials being transported into the United 

States are generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) license, regulations do not require that the license accompany the 

shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have access to data that could be 

used to verify that shippers have acquired the necessary documentation. 

Second, CBP inspection procedures do not require officers to open 

containers and inspect them, although under some circumstances, doing so 

could improve security. In addition, DHS has sponsored research, 

development, and testing activities to address the inherent limitations of 

currently fielded equipment. However, much work remains to achieve 

consistently better detection capabilities. 

DHS seems to have made progress in coordinating with other agencies to 

conduct radiation detection programs; however, because the DHS office 

created to achieve the coordination is less than 1 year old, its working 

relationships with other agencies are in their early stages of development 

and implementation. In the future, this office plans to develop a “global 

architecture” to integrate several agencies’ radiation detection efforts, 

including several international programs. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-389.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise, 

(202) 512-3841. 
Page i GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 8

DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection 

Equipment, but the Agency’s Program Goals Are Unrealistic and 

the Cost Estimate Is Uncertain 12

CBP Officers Have Made Progress in Using Radiation Detection 

Equipment Correctly and Adhering to Inspection Guidelines, but 

There Are Potential Issues with Agency Procedures 24

DHS Is Working to Improve the Capabilities of Currently-fielded and 

New Radiation Detection Equipment, but Much Work Remains to 

Achieve Better Equipment Performance 32

The Newly Created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Is Structured 

to Improve Coordination of Executive Branch Radiation 

Detection Programs 39

Conclusions 43

Recommendations for Executive Action 45

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 47

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 50

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff knowledgments 53

Related GAO Products 54

Tables Table 1: Status of Portal Monitor Deployments as of December 

2005 14

Table 2: Cooperation with DNDO Brought about by Presidential 

Directive 40

Figures Figure 1: Monthly Cumulative Values of Work Planned but Not 

Finished As Planned 15

Figure 2: Monthly Cumulative Cost Overruns 22

Figure 3: CBP Officers Conducting an External Secondary 

Inspection at a Seaport 28

Figure 4: A CBP Officer Entering a Cargo Container During a 

Secondary Inspection at a Seaport 30
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 5: The “SMARTCART,” a Mobile Portal Monitor Using 

Advanced Detection Technology, Being Tested at the 

CMTB in New York 39

Abbreviations

ANSI American National Standards Institute

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CMTB Counter Measures Test Bed

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

GAO Government Accountability Office

LSS Laboratories and Scientific Services

NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology

NTS Nevada Test Site

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

S&T DHS Science and Technology Directorate

TSA Transportation Security Administration

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

March 22, 2006 Letr

Congressional Requesters

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, combating terrorism has been one 

of the nation’s highest priorities. As part of that effort, preventing 

radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States—perhaps 

to be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or in a radiological dispersal 

device (a “dirty bomb”)—has become a key national security objective. The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing 

radiation detection capabilities at U.S. ports-of-entry.1

 Until April 2005, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) managed this program. However, on 

April 15, 2005, the president directed the establishment, within DHS, of the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), whose duties include 

acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection 

equipment.2

 CBP continues its traditional screening function at ports-ofentry to prevent illegal immigration and to interdict contraband, including 

the operation of radiation detection equipment. The Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory (PNNL), one of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

national laboratories, manages the deployment of radiation detection 

equipment for DHS.3

DHS’s program to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-ofentry has two goals. The first is to use this equipment to screen all cargo, 

vehicles, and individuals coming into the United States. The United States 

has over 380 border sites at which DHS plans to deploy radiation detection 

equipment. The volume of traffic entering the United States also adds to the 

size and complexity of the job. For example, each day, DHS processes 

about 64,000 containers arriving in the United States via ships, trucks, and 

1

The Departments of Energy, Defense, and State are also implementing programs to combat 

nuclear smuggling in other countries by providing radiation detection equipment and 

training to foreign border security personnel. See Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002) Title IV, § 402. 

We recently reported on these programs in Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, 

Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006).

2

See National Security Presidential Directive 43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

14, Domestic Nuclear Detection (April 15, 2005).

3

DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The mission of DOE’s 

22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to design and build atomic weapons, these 

laboratories have since expanded to conduct research in many disciplines—from highenergy physics to advanced computing.
Page 2 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

rail cars; 365,000 vehicles; and more than 1.1 million people. The second 

goal of the program is to screen all of this traffic without delaying its 

movement into the nation. To illustrate the difficulty of achieving this 

second goal, CBP’s port director at the San Ysidro, California, land border 

crossing estimated that prior to initiating radiation screening, the volume 

of traffic through the port-of-entry was so great that, at times, the wait to 

enter the United States from Mexico was about 2.5 hours. He noted that 

had radiation detection screening added a mere 20 seconds to the wait of 

each vehicle, the wait during those peak times could have increased to 

about 3.5 or 4 hours—an unacceptable outcome in his view. DHS’s current 

plans call for completing deployments of radiation detection equipment at 

U.S. ports-of-entry by September 2009. 

To screen commerce for radiation, CBP uses several types of detection 

equipment and a system of standard operating procedures. Current 

detection equipment includes radiation portal monitors, which can detect 

gamma radiation (emitted by all of the materials of greatest concern) and 

neutrons (emitted by only a limited number of materials, including 

plutonium—a material that can be used to make a nuclear weapon). CBP 

officers also carry personal radiation detectors—commonly referred to as 

“pagers”—small handheld devices that detect gamma radiation, but not 

neutrons. For the most part, pagers are meant to be personal safety 

devices, although they are used in some locations to assist with 

inspections. Finally, CBP officers also use radioactive isotope identification 

devices, which are handheld devices designed to determine the identity of 

radioactive material—that is, whether it is a nuclear material used in 

medicine or industry, a naturally occurring source of radiation, or weaponsgrade material. All of these devices have limitations in their ability to detect 

and identify nuclear material.

Generally, CBP’s standard procedures direct vehicles, containers, and 

people coming into the country to pass through portal monitors to screen 

for the presence of radiation. This “primary inspection” serves to alert CBP 

officers that a radioactive threat might be present. All traffic that causes an 

alarm during primary inspection is to undergo a “secondary inspection” 

that consists of screening with another portal monitor to confirm the 

presence of radiation, and includes CBP officers using radiation isotope 

identification devices to determine the source of radiation being emitted, 

(e.g., harmless sources, such as ceramics, or dangerous sources, such as 

weapons-grade nuclear material). If CBP officers identify a nuclear or 

radiological threat during a secondary inspection, or if the officers’ pagers 

register a dangerously high level of radiation, then officers are to establish 
Page 3 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

a safe perimeter around the nuclear material and contact scientists in 

CBP’s Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) for further guidance.4 In 

some cases, CBP identifies incoming sea-bound cargo containers through a 

system that targets some containers for inspection based on their 

perceived level of risk. In these situations, CBP works with seaport 

terminals to have containers moved to an agreed-upon location for 

inspection. These inspections include the use of active imaging, such as an 

x-ray, and passive radiation detection, such as a radiation isotope 

identification device. Typically, if CBP officers find irregularities, physical 

examinations are conducted.

In September 2003, we reported on CBP’s progress in completing domestic 

deployments. In particular, we reported that certain aspects of CBP’s 

installation and use of the equipment diminished its effectiveness and that 

coordination among agencies on long-term research issues was limited. 

Since the issuance of our 2003 report, questions have arisen about the 

efficacy of the detection equipment CBP has deployed—in particular, its 

purported inability to distinguish naturally occurring radioactive materials 

from a nuclear bomb. 

Because of the complexity and importance of these issues, you asked us to 

assess the progress made in (1) deploying radiation detection equipment at 

U.S. ports-of-entry and any problems associated with that deployment, (2) 

using radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry and any 

problems associated with that use, (3) improving the capabilities and 

testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing the level of cooperation 

between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection 

programs. 

To address these objectives, we (1) analyzed CBP’s project plan, including 

the project’s costs and deployment schedules, to deploy radiation detection 

equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry; (2) visited several ports-of-entry, 

including two international mail and express courier facilities, five 

seaports, and three land border crossings; (3) participated in radiation 

detection training for CBP officers; and (4) visited four national 

laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and an Air Force base involved with 

4

Laboratories and Scientific Services coordinates technical and scientific support to all CBP 

trade and border protection activities. These activities include, among other things, 

providing scientific/forensic support, including on-site support, to CBP officers and other 

government agencies with regard to the investigation and interdiction of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. 
Page 4 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

testing and deploying radiation detection equipment. We focused primarily 

on the issues surrounding radiation portal monitors because they are a 

major tool in the federal government’s efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling. 

We also focused on this equipment because its procurement and 

installation cost far exceeds the cost of procuring and deploying other 

radiation detection equipment such as handheld equipment also used at 

U.S. ports-of-entry. We reviewed documentation, such as deployment and 

cost figures, equipment test plans and results, and agency agreements to 

cooperate in detecting radiation. We also interviewed key program officials 

at each of these agencies to discuss the deployment of radiation detection 

equipment, attempts to improve the equipment’s capabilities, and 

cooperation among agencies to protect the United States from nuclear 

terrorism. We performed a data reliability assessment of the data we 

received, and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials on the reliability 

of the data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. More details on our scope and methodology appear 

in appendix I. We conducted our review from March 2005 to February 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief Between October 2000 and October 2005, the United States spent about 

$286 million to deploy radiation detection equipment at domestic ports-ofentry. However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind 

schedule, making DHS’s goal of deploying 3,034 by 2009 unlikely. To meet 

its long-term goal, DHS would have to deploy about 52 portal monitors a 

month for the next 4 years—a rate that far exceeds the 2005 rate of about 

22 per month. Moreover, the program’s estimated total cost of $1.3 billion is 

highly uncertain. Several factors have contributed to the slow pace of 

deployment. First, program officials typically disburse funds to the 

contractor managing the deployment late in the fiscal year. For example, 

the contractor did not receive its fiscal year 2005 allocation until 

September 2005. These delays have caused the contractor to postpone or 

cancel contracts, sometimes delaying deployments. According to the 

House Appropriations Committee report on the CBP portion of DHS’s fiscal 

year 2005 budget, CBP should provide the Congress with an acquisition and 

deployment plan for the portal monitor program prior to funding Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). This plan took many months to 

finalize, mostly because it required multiple approvals within DHS and the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) prior to being submitted to the 

Congress. The lengthy review process delayed the release of funds and, in 

some cases, disrupted and delayed deployment. In fiscal year 2005, this 

process was further delayed by the creation of DNDO, and the uncertainty 
Page 5 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

regarding the new office’s responsibilities. Second, negotiations with 

seaport operators to deploy portal monitors have taken longer than 

anticipated because some operators believe screening for radiation will 

adversely affect the flow of commerce through their ports. DHS has 

adopted a deployment policy designed to achieve cooperation with seaport 

operators because agency officials believe such arrangements are more 

efficient and, in the long term, probably more timely. Third, devising an 

effective way to conduct secondary inspections of rail traffic departing 

seaports without disrupting commerce has delayed deployments. This 

problem may worsen because the Department of Transportation (DOT) has 

forecast that the use of rail transit out of seaports will probably increase in 

the near future. Addressing and solving the problems with screening rail 

transport is critical to the successful completion of the DHS program. 

Regarding the total cost of the project, CBP’s $1.3 billion estimate is highly 

uncertain and overly optimistic. The estimate is based on CBP’s plans for 

widespread deployment of advanced technology portal monitors currently 

being developed. However, the prototypes of this equipment have not yet 

been shown to be more effective than the portal monitors now in use, and 

DHS officials say they will not purchase the advanced portal monitors 

unless they are proven to be superior. Moreover, when the advanced 

technology portal monitors become commercially available, experts 

estimate that they will cost between about $330,000 and $460,000 each—far 

more than the currently-used portal monitors which cost between $49,000 

and $60,000. The installation cost for both types of portal monitor is 

roughly $200,000. Even if future test results indicate better detection 

capabilities, without a detailed comparison of the two technologies’ 

capabilities it is not clear that the dramatically higher cost for this new 

equipment would be worth the investment. Finally, our analysis of CBP’s 

deployment data indicates that the program will probably experience a 

significant cost overrun of between $88 million and $596 million, with a 

$342 million overrun most likely. 

The CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary 

inspections appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and to 

follow inspection procedures. In contrast, in 2003 we reported that CBP 

officers sometimes used radiation detection equipment in ways that 

reduced its effectiveness and sometimes did not follow agency procedures. 

Generally, CBP requires that its officers receive formal training in using 

radiation detection equipment, and many officers have gained experience 

and proficiency in using the equipment since the program’s inception. 

However, we also identified two potential issues in CBP inspection 
Page 6 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

procedures that, if addressed, could strengthen the nation’s defenses 

against nuclear smuggling. For example, individuals and organizations 

shipping radiological materials to the United States generally must acquire 

a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, but regulations do not 

require that the license accompany the shipment. Further, according to 

CBP officials, CBP officers lack access to NRC license data that could be 

used to verify that shippers of radiological material actually obtained 

required licenses, and to authenticate licenses that accompany shipments. 

The second potential issue pertains to CBP’s guidance for conducting 

secondary inspections. Currently, CBP procedures require only that 

officers locate, isolate, and identify radiological material. Typically, officers 

perform an external examination by scanning the sides of cargo containers 

with a radiation isotope identification device during secondary inspections. 

The guidance does not specifically require officers to open containers and 

inspect their interiors, even when an external examination cannot 

unambiguously resolve an alarm. However, at one port-of-entry we visited, 

CBP officers routinely opened and entered commercial truck trailers to 

conduct secondary inspections when an external inspection could not 

locate and identify the radiological source. This approach increases the 

chances that the source of the radioactivity that originally set off the alarm 

will be correctly located and identified. According to senior CBP officials at 

this port-of-entry, this additional procedure has had little negative impact 

on the flow of commerce and has not increased the cost of CBP 

inspections, despite being implemented at one of the busiest commercial 

ports-of-entry in the nation. 

DHS would like to improve the capabilities of currently-fielded radiation 

detection equipment. Today’s equipment lacks a refined capability to 

rapidly determine the type of radioactive materials they detect, which 

means that CBP officers often conduct secondary inspections of containers 

carrying non-threatening material. To address this limitation, DHS has 

sponsored research, development, and testing activities that attempt to 

improve the capabilities of existing radiation portal monitors and to 

produce new, advanced technologies with even greater detection and 

identification enhancements. However, much work remains for the agency 

to achieve consistently better detection capabilities, as the efforts 

undertaken so far have had only mixed results. For example, DHS 

sponsored the development of a software package designed to reduce the 

number of false alarms from portal monitors already in widespread use. 

However, tests of the software have been largely inconclusive. In some test 

scenarios, there was little difference in detection capability between portal 

monitors equipped with—and without—the new software. Experts have 
Page 7 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

recommended further testing to improve the software’s capabilities. 

Further, DHS is testing new, advanced portal monitors that use a 

technology designed to both detect the presence of radiation and identify 

its source. However, in tests performed during 2005, the detection 

capabilities of the advanced technology prototypes demonstrated mixed 

results—in some cases they worked better, but in other cases, they worked 

about the same as already deployed systems. In addition, DHS also 

sponsors a long-range research program aimed at developing innovative 

technologies designed to improve the capabilities of radiation detection 

equipment. For example, DHS is supporting research at two national 

laboratories on a new system designed to better detect radiation sources, 

even when shielded with materials designed to hide their presence. The 

two laboratories have constructed several prototypes, but currently the 

high cost of this technology limits its commercial attractiveness. Finally, 

DHS plans to use its new testing facility being built at the Nevada Test Site 

to improve on existing test capabilities and to support the agency’s 

development, testing, acquisition, and deployment of radiation detection 

technologies. 

Historically, cooperation between agencies conducting radiation detection 

programs has been limited. Currently DHS, largely through DNDO, 

cooperates with DOE, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other 

agencies to coordinate these programs; however, because DNDO was 

created less than 1 year ago, its cooperative efforts—and its working 

relationships with other federal agencies—are in their early stages of 

development and implementation. Currently, other federal agencies are 

providing staff to work directly with DNDO. However, it is too soon to 

determine the overall effectiveness of these efforts. DHS also works with 

other agencies to make current detection efforts more efficient and 

effective. For example, in April 2005, DHS and DOE entered into a 

memorandum of understanding to, among other things, exchange 

information on radiation detection technologies to improve the 

effectiveness of their deployment; the agencies also agreed to share lessons 

learned from operational experiences, and data received from radiation 

detection equipment deployed at U.S. and foreign ports. Also in April 2005, 

DHS entered into an agreement with the Port Authority of New York and 

New Jersey to, among other things, integrate lessons learned from field 

experience into domestic radiation detection efforts. In the future, DNDO 

intends to develop an integrated worldwide system. The resulting “global 

architecture,” as it is being called by DNDO officials, would be a multilayered defense strategy that includes programs that attempt to secure 

nuclear materials and detect their movements overseas, such as DOE’s 
Page 8 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Second Line of Defense program; to develop intelligence information on 

nuclear materials’ trans-shipments and possible movement to the United 

States; and to integrate these elements with domestic radiation detection 

efforts undertaken by governments—federal, state, local, and tribal—and 

the private sector. 

We are recommending a series of actions designed to help DHS speed up 

the pace of portal monitor deployments, better account for schedule delays 

and cost uncertainties, make the most efficient use of program resources, 

and improve its ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. DHS 

stated that it agreed with, and will implement, our recommendations.

Background Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused 

on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the 

first major initiatives concentrated on deploying radiation detection 

equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in 

Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the 

Second Line of Defense program, which, through the end of fiscal year 

2005, had installed equipment at 83 sites mostly in Russia.5

 In 2003, DOE 

implemented a second program, the Megaports Initiative,6 to focus on the 

threat posed by nuclear smuggling overseas by installing radiation

5

We originally reported on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in 2002. See GAO, 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 16, 2002). See also, GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, 

and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection 

Equipment to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006).

6

We recently reported on the Megaports Initiative. See GAO, Preventing Nuclear 

Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection 

Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 

2005).
Page 9 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

detection equipment at major seaports around the world.7 In the United 

States, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with 

portable radiation detection devices in 1998. After September 11, 2001, the 

agency expanded its efforts to include the deployment of portal monitors—

large-scale radiation detectors that can be used to screen vehicles and 

cargo.8

 In March 2003, the U.S. Customs Service was transferred to DHS, 

and the border inspection functions of the Customs Service, including 

radiation detection, became the responsibility of CBP.9

Deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders is part of DHS’s 

strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. 

DHS’s strategy includes: (1) countering proliferation at the source by 

assisting foreign governments in their efforts to detect and interdict 

nuclear and radiological smuggling; (2) controlling the illegal export of 

technology and equipment from the United States that terrorists could use 

to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon; (3) detecting and interdicting 

potential smuggling attempts before they reach the United States; and (4) 

securing U.S. ports-of-entry through multiple technologies that include 

radiation detection and nonintrusive inspections to view images of cargo in 

sea containers. 

CBP plans to deploy radiation portal monitors in five phases, or “categories 

of entry”: (1) international mail and express courier facilities; (2) major 

northern border crossings; (3) major seaports; (4) southwestern border 

crossings; and (5) all other categories, including international airports, 

remaining northern border crossings and seaports, and all rail crossings. In 

this final phase, CBP also plans to replace the currently-fielded portal 

monitors with newer, more advanced technology. Generally, CBP 

7

U.S. radiation detection assistance programs at foreign seaports are coordinated with—and 

complementary to—DHS’s Container Security Initiative (CSI). Under CSI, which began 

operating in January 2002, U.S. Customs officials stationed in foreign ports review the cargo 

manifests of containers bound directly for the United States and attempt to identify 

containers with potentially dangerous cargo, such as explosives or weapons of mass 

destruction. GAO recently reported on CSI. See GAO, Container Security: A Flexible 

Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas 

Targeting and Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).

8

We initially reported on the U. S. Customs Service’s efforts to deploy radiation detection 

equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry in 2002. See GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and 

Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 

2002).

9

See Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002) and DHS Reorganization Plan (Nov. 25, 2002).
Page 10 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

prioritized these categories according to their perceived vulnerability to the 

threat of nuclear smuggling. CBP did not, however, conduct a formal threat 

assessment. International mail and express courier facilities present a 

potential vulnerability because mail and packages arrive with no advance 

notice or screening. Northern border crossings are also vulnerable, 

according to CBP, because of the possible presence of terrorist cells 

operating in Canada. The third category, major seaports, is considered 

vulnerable because sea cargo containers are suitable for smuggling and 

because of the large volume of such cargo. Seaports account for over 95 

percent of the cargo entering the United States. Southwestern borders are 

vulnerable because of the high volume of traffic and because of the 

smuggling that already occurs there. Although airlines can quickly ship and 

deliver air cargo, CBP considers air cargo to be a slightly lesser risk 

because the industry is highly regulated. 

In deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders, CBP identified 

the types of nuclear materials that might be smuggled, and the equipment 

needed to detect its presence. The radiological materials of concern 

include assembled nuclear weapons; nuclear material that could be used in 

a nuclear weapon but that is not actually assembled into a weapon 

(“weapons-grade nuclear material”); radiological disbursal devices, 

commonly called “dirty bombs;” and other illicit radioactive material, such 

as contaminated steel or inappropriately marked or manifested material. 

Detecting actual cases of attempted nuclear smuggling is difficult because 

there are many sources of radiation that are legal and not harmful when 

used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms (known as “nuisance 

alarms”) that are indistinguishable from those alarms that could sound in 

the event of a true case of nuclear smuggling. Nuisance alarms are caused 

by patients who have recently had radiological treatment; a wide range of 

cargo with naturally occurring radiation, such as fertilizer, ceramics, and 

food products; and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use in 

medicine and industry. In addition, detecting highly-enriched uranium, in 

particular, is difficult because of its relatively low level of radioactivity. 

Furthermore, a potential terrorist would likely attempt to shield the 

material to reduce the amount of radiation reaching the detector and 

thereby decrease the probability of detection.

The process of deploying portal monitors begins with a site survey to 

identify the best location at an entry point for installing the equipment. 

While in some cases the choice may be obvious, operational considerations 

at many entry points require analysis to find a location where all or most of 

the cargo and vehicles can pass through the portal monitor without 
Page 11 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

interfering with the flow of commerce. After identifying the best option, 

CBP works with local government and private entities to get their support. 

At many U.S. entry points, the federal government does not own the 

property and therefore collaborates with these entities to deploy the 

equipment. It is CBP’s policy to depend exclusively on such negotiations, 

rather than to use any kind of eminent domain or condemnation 

proceeding. The actual installation of the portal monitors involves a 

number of tasks such as pouring concrete, laying electrical groundwork, 

and hooking up the portal monitors to alarm systems that alert officers 

when radiation is detected. Finally, PNNL tests the equipment and trains 

CBP officers on its operation, including how to respond to alarms. 

To coordinate the national effort to protect the United States from nuclear 

and radiological threats, in April 2005, the president directed the 

establishment of DNDO within DHS. The new office’s mission covers a 

broad spectrum of responsibilities and activities, but is focused primarily 

on providing a single accountable organization to develop a layered 

defense system. This system is intended to integrate the federal 

government’s nuclear detection, notification, and response systems. In 

addition, under the directive, DNDO is to acquire, develop, and support the 

deployment of detection equipment in the United States, as well as to 

coordinate the nation’s nuclear detection research and development 

efforts. For fiscal year 2006, DNDO’s total budget is approximately $318 

million, which includes at least $81 million for research and development 

of advanced nuclear detection technologies and $125 million for portal 

monitor purchase and deployment. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS responsibility for managing 

the research, development, and testing of technologies to improve the U.S. 

capability to detect illicit nuclear material.10 Prior to the creation of DNDO, 

DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) directorate had this responsibility. 

DNDO has assumed these responsibilities and works with S&T’s Counter 

Measures Test Beds (CMTB) to test radiation detection equipment in New 

York and New Jersey. As of January 2006, DNDO has provided $605,000 to 

DOE national laboratories that support this effort. Additional funding for 

fiscal year 2006 from S&T and DNDO to support test and evaluation 

activities at the CMTB is yet to be determined. The Homeland Security Act 

also provided DHS the authority to use DOE national laboratories for 

10Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002).
Page 12 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

research, development, and testing of new technologies to detect nuclear 

material.11

DHS Has Made 

Progress in Deploying 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment, but the 

Agency’s Program 

Goals Are Unrealistic 

and the Cost Estimate 

Is Uncertain 

As of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment of portal monitors 

at two categories of entry—a total of 61 ports-of-entry—and has begun 

work on two other categories; overall, however, progress has been slower 

than planned. According to DHS officials, the slow progress has resulted 

from a late disbursal of funds, and delays in negotiating deployment 

agreements with seaport operators. Further, we believe the expected cost 

of the program is uncertain because DHS’s plans to purchase newer, more 

advanced equipment are not yet finalized; also we project that the 

program’s final cost will be much higher than CBP currently anticipates. 

The Program to Install 

Portal Monitors Has Fallen 

Behind Schedule 

Between October 2000 and October 2005, DHS, mainly through its prime 

contractor PNNL, has spent about $286 million to deploy radiation 

detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. As of December 2005, DHS had 

deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal monitors—about 22 percent of the 

portal monitors DHS plans to deploy.12 The agency has completed portal 

monitor deployments at international mail and express courier facilities 

and the first phase of northern border sites—57 and 217 portal monitors, 

respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS had deployed 143 of 495 

portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at southern borders. In addition, 

three portal monitors had been installed at the Nevada Test Site to analyze 

their detection capabilities and four had been retrofitted at express mail 

facilities. As of February 2006, CBP estimated that with these deployments 

CBP has the ability to screen about 62 percent of all containerized 

shipments entering the United States, and roughly 77 percent of all private 

vehicles (POVs). Within these total percentages, CBP can screen 32 percent 

of all containerized seaborne shipments; 90 percent of commercial trucks 

and 80 percent of private vehicles entering from Canada; and 

11Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 309.

12CBP’s most recent Project Execution Plan (December 2004) calls for deploying a total of 

2,397 portal monitors. However, by December 2005, the scope of the deployments had 

grown to 3,034.
Page 13 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

approximately 88 percent of all commercial trucks and 74 percent of all 

private vehicles entering from Mexico. 

CBP does not maintain a firm schedule for deploying handheld radiation 

detectors, such as pagers and radiation isotope identification devices. This 

is equipment used mainly to help pinpoint and identify sources of radiation 

found during inspections. Instead, according to CBP officials, the agency 

acquires and deploys such equipment each fiscal year as needed. The 

handheld radiation detectors are procured to coincide with portal monitor 

deployments to ensure mission support. Since fiscal year 2001, CBP has 

spent about $24.5 million on pagers, and about $6.6 million on radiation 

isotope identification devices. At present, CBP can field roughly 12,450 

pagers—enough to ensure that all officers conducting primary or 

secondary inspections at a given time have one. The agency intends to 

deploy about 6,500 additional pagers. Similarly, CBP’s 549 radiation isotope 

identification devices are deployed at domestic ports-of-entry. CBP intends 

to acquire another 900 to ensure that all needs are met.

Overall, CBP and PNNL have experienced difficulty meeting the portal 

monitor deployment schedule. None of the planned portal monitor 

deployments has progressed according to schedule, and monthly 

deployments would have to increase by almost 230 percent to meet a 

September 2009 program completion date. For example, in November 2005, 

deployments at land crossings were about 20 months and $1.9 million 

behind schedule, while deployments at the first 22 seaports were about 2 

years and $24 million behind schedule.13 Despite these delays, PNNL 

reported in November 2005 that the overall project schedule should not 

extend beyond its current completion date of September 2009. However, 

our analysis indicates that CBP’s deployment schedule is too optimistic. 

13CBP and PNNL use an earned value management system (EVM) to report the domestic 

portal monitor deployment program’s status against its baseline—scope, schedule, and 

budget. Essentially, an EVM approach compares the value of the work accomplished during 

a given period with the value of the work scheduled to be accomplished during that period. 

Differences from the schedule are measured in both cost and schedule “variances.” For 

example, program activities (such as deploying portal monitors at a specific site) that are 

completed ahead of schedule would be reported as positive variances, while activities that 

are completed behind schedule would be reported as negative variances. Similarly, the EVM 

system tracks whether completed activities are costing more or less than expected. A 

negative cost variance would indicate that activities are costing more than expected, while a 

positive cost variance would mean activities are costing less than expected. We report 

schedule differences in both calendar and EVM terms. Appendix II provides more details on 

the EVM methodology and our analysis.
Page 14 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

In fact, for CBP and PNNL to meet the current deployment schedule, they 

would have to install about 52 portal monitors per month from November 

2005 to September 2009. In our view, this is unlikely because it requires a 

rate of deployment that far exceeds recent experience. For example, during 

calendar year 2005, PNNL deployed portal monitors at the rate of about 22 

per month, and deployments have fallen further and further behind 

schedule. Between February and December 2005, for example, PNNL did 

not meet any of its scheduled monthly deployments, never deploying more 

than 38 portal monitors during any single month. If CBP continues to 

deploy portal monitors at its 2005 pace, the last monitor would not be 

deployed until about December 2014. Table 1 details the status of portal 

monitor deployments, as of December 2005.

Table 1: Status of Portal Monitor Deployments as of December 2005

Sources: PNNL and CBP.

a

Excludes FedEx and UPS, both of whom screen packages overseas as agreed in a memorandum of 

understanding with CBP.

b

“Retrofitting” refers to replacing currently-fielded portal monitors with advanced-technology portal 

monitors. 

c

PNNL plans a “net” increase of 82 portal monitors as a result of retrofits. 

d

“Other sites” refers to portal monitors installed at the Nevada Test Site for testing purposes.

e

“Excess equipment” refers to the older portal monitors being replaced through the retrofit process.

f

The total number of portal monitors planned for deployment is based on December 2005 estimates 

from CBP and PNNL. It represents a recent estimate of CBP’s requirements, and according to CBP, it 

will be used to update the agency’s current deployment plan, which calls for deploying 2,397 portal 

monitors by September 2009.

Portal monitor deployment 

phase

Total portals 

planned Status

International mail and express 

consignment facilitiesa

 (23 facilities)

57 Completed April 2004

4 months late

Land border and rail ports-of-entry 

(205 crossings)

967 20 months late

Seaports (106 terminals) and 

international airports

1,205 24 months late

Retrofitsb 82c Projected September 

2009 completion

Other sitesd 3

Excess equipmente 721

Total 3,035f
Page 15 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Further, we analyzed CBP’s earned value management data as of November 

2005 and determined that, although CBP planned for the deployment 

program to be 20.5 percent complete by that date, the program is only 

about 16 percent complete. In addition, our analysis indicates that since the 

program’s inception, work valued at $48.6 million has fallen behind 

schedule. Moreover, the trend over the past 14 months shows CBP and 

PNNL falling further behind schedule, as seen in figure 1.

Figure 1: Monthly Cumulative Values of Work Planned but Not Finished As Planned

Note: The “zeropoint” on this figure denotes work that was completed at its planned cost. A positive 

number means that all the work completed to that point costs less than planned, while a negative 

number means that all the work completed to that point costs more than planned.

There have been at least three major sources of delay that have affected the 

portal monitor deployment program: funding issues, negotiations with 

seaport terminal operators, and problems in screening rail cars—

particularly in a seaport environment. 

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis based on the PNNL November 2005 Monthly Progress Report.

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

S

Oct-05

Nov-05

ep-05

Aug-05

Jul-05

Oct-04

Nov-04

Dec-04

Jan-05

Feb-05

Mar-05

Apr-05

May-05

Jun-05

Cumulative schedule variance
Page 16 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Funding Issues According to CBP and PNNL officials, recurrent difficulties with the 

project’s funding are the most important explanations of the schedule 

delays. Specifically, according to DHS and PNNL officials, CBP has been 

chronically late in providing appropriated funds to PNNL, thereby 

hindering its ability to meet program deployment goals. For example, 

PNNL did not receive its fiscal year 2005 funding until September 2005. 

According to PNNL officials, because of this delay, some contracting 

activities in all deployment phases had to be delayed or halted, but the 

adverse effects on seaports were especially severe. For example, PNNL 

reported in August 2005 that site preparation work at 13 seaports had to 

cease because the Laboratory had not yet received its fiscal year 2005 

funding allocation. According to senior CBP officials, their agency’s 

inability to provide a timely spending plan to the Congress for the portal 

monitor deployment program is the main reason for these funding delays. 

According to the House Appropriations Committee report on the CBP 

portion of DHS’s fiscal year 2005 budget, CBP should provide the Congress 

an acquisition and deployment plan for the portal monitor program prior to 

funding PNNL.14 However, these plans typically take many months for CBP 

to finalize—in part because CBP requires that the plans undergo several 

levels of review—but also because these plans are reviewed by DHS and 

OMB before being submitted to the Congress. In fiscal year 2005, this 

process was further delayed by the creation of DNDO, uncertainty 

regarding DNDO’s responsibilities, and negotiations regarding the 

expenditure of the fiscal year 2005 appropriations.

CBP has tried to address this problem by reprogramming funds when 

money from other programs is available. In some cases, the amount of 

reprogrammed funds has been fairly large. For example, about 15 percent 

of fiscal year 2005’s funding included money reprogrammed from other 

CBP sources, or almost $14 million. In fiscal year 2004, about $16 million 

was reprogrammed—or about a third of the fiscal year’s total. And in fiscal 

year 2003, the total of reprogrammed money was about $18 million—about 

20 percent. 

Delays in Gaining Agreements 

Have Slowed Seaport 

Deployments

Negotiations with seaport operators have been slow and have also delayed 

the portal monitor deployment program. According to CBP and PNNL 

officials, one of the primary reasons behind the seaport phase’s substantial 

delay in deployments is the difficulty in obtaining contractual agreements 

14H.R. Rep. No. 108-541, at 25-26 (2004).
Page 17 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

with port and terminal operators at seaports. DHS has not attempted to 

impose agreements on seaport operators because, according to officials, 

cooperative arrangements with the port operators are more efficient and, 

in the long term, probably more timely. According to CBP and PNNL 

officials, many operators believe screening for radiation will adversely 

affect the flow of commerce through their ports. In addition, deploying 

portal monitors in major seaports presents several unique challenges. For 

example, seaports are much larger than land border crossings, consist of 

multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits. Because of these multiple 

exits, seaports require a greater number of portal monitors, which may 

entail more negotiations with port and terminal operators. In addition, port 

operators at times have insisted on late-stage design changes, requested 

various studies prior to proceeding with final designs, insisted on 

inefficient construction schedules, and delayed their final review and 

approval of project designs. According to CBP and PNNL, these efforts 

often reflect the port and terminal operators’ uneasiness with portal 

monitor deployments, and their resolve to ensure that the outcome of the 

deployment process maintains their businesses’ competitiveness. For 

example, port officials at one seaport requested several changes late in the 

process, including performing an unscheduled survey for laying cable, 

revising portal monitor locations at two gates, and adding a CBP control 

booth at a third terminal. According to CBP and PNNL officials, the agency 

prefers to accommodate these types of changes, even late in the process 

and even if they slow deployment, because in the long term they believe it 

is more efficient and effective.

Screening Rail Cars in Seaports 

Presents Unique Problems

The difficulty of devising an effective and efficient way to conduct 

secondary inspections of rail traffic departing seaports without disrupting 

commerce has created operational issues that could further delay 

deployments. Four of the five seaports we visited employ rail cars to ship 

significant amounts of cargo. In one seaport, the port director estimated 

that about 80-85 percent of the cargo shipped through his port departs via 

rail. For the other three seaports, the percentages for rail traffic were 5 

percent, 13 percent, and 40 percent respectively. According to port 

officials, these seaports would like to accommodate CBP’s efforts to install 

radiation detection equipment designed to screen rail traffic, but they are 

concerned that the logistics of conducting secondary inspections on trains 

as they prepare to depart the seaport could back up rail traffic within the 

port and disrupt rail schedules throughout the region—potentially costing 

the port tens of thousands of dollars in lost revenue. For example, one 

senior port authority official told us that his port lacked ample space to 

park trains for secondary inspections, or to maneuver trains to decouple 
Page 18 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

the rail car(s) that may have caused a primary inspection alarm. As a result, 

trains that cause a primary alarm would have to wait, in place, for CBP to 

conduct a secondary inspection, blocking any other trains from leaving the 

port. According to this port official, any delay whatsoever with a train 

leaving the port could cause rail problems down the line because track 

switches are geared to train schedules. To avoid these kinds of problems, 

CBP has delayed deploying portal monitors in this seaport until technical 

and operational issues can be overcome. As of December 2005, no portal 

monitors had been deployed at this seaport, although according to PNNL’s 

schedule, 5 of its 11 terminals—a total of 19 portal monitors—should have 

been deployed by October 2005. According to the port director at another 

seaport we visited, a port that actually has a rail portal monitor installed, 

similar operational issues exist. However, in addition to backing up rail 

traffic within the port, trains awaiting secondary inspections at this port 

could block the entrance/exit to a nearby military base. The director of the 

state’s port authority told us that his solution has been to simply turn off 

the portal monitor. According to CBP officials, this was entirely a state 

decision, since this portal monitor is the state’s responsibility and not part 

of CBP’s deployment. However, these officials also noted that they agreed 

with the states and noted that they would not attempt to impose a solution 

or deadline on either port. CBP officials noted that most seaport operators 

seem willing to accommodate portal monitors, but until a better portal 

monitor technology evolves that can help ensure a smooth flow of rail 

traffic out of the port, negotiations with seaport operators will continue to 

be slow.

According to CBP and port officials, they have considered several potential 

solutions. For example, there is widespread agreement that screening sea 

cargo containers before they are placed on rail cars offers the best solution, 

but this option is operationally difficult in many seaports. Mobile portal 

monitors, when commercially available, may also offer a partial solution. In 

addition, CBP is optimistic that advanced portal monitors, when they 

become commercially available, may help solve some of the problems in 

the rail environment by limiting the number of nuisance alarms. However, 

according to the CBP and port officials we contacted, screening rail traffic 

continues to pose a vexing operational problem for seaports.

The concerns that seaport operators and CBP expressed regarding 

screening rail commerce in seaports may increase and intensify in the 

future because rail traffic, in general, is expected to increase substantially 

by 2020. DOT has forecast that by 2020, rail will transport roughly 699 

million tons of international freight—up from 358 million tons carried in 
Page 19 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

1998. Officials at 3 of the 5 seaports we visited expect rail traffic through 

their facilities to increase dramatically during the next 10 to 15 years. As 

the volume of trade increases, so too will the economic stakes for the port 

and terminal operators, while the regulatory burden for CBP is likely to 

increase as well. Delays—for any reason, including radiation detection—

are likely to become more costly, and CBP will likely have ever-increasing 

numbers of rail cars to screen. 

In addition, although CBP is not scheduled to begin deploying portal 

monitors to screen rail shipments at land border crossings until 2007, the 

agency will likely experience operational challenges at land border 

crossing similar to those it is now experiencing at seaports. For example, at 

both land border crossings and seaports, if a rail car alarms as it passes 

through a portal monitor, that car will possibly have to be separated from 

the remaining train—sometimes a mile in length—to undergo a secondary 

inspection. Furthermore, because trains transport numerous types of cargo 

containing large quantities of naturally occurring radioactive material, CBP 

faces the challenge of maintaining a nuisance alarm rate that does not 

adversely affect commerce. CBP and PNNL are currently conducting 

testing of a prototype rail portal monitor to determine the potential impact 

of naturally occurring radioactive material on rail operations at land border 

crossings. 

Other Factors Have Delayed 

Portal Monitor Deployments

Unforeseen design and construction problems have also played a role in 

delaying portal monitor deployments. For example, deployments at six 

southern border sites have been delayed to coincide with the sites’ 

expansion activities. According to CBP officials, there are two approaches 

to accommodating a port-of-entry’s alterations, both of which may delay 

portal monitor deployments. First, CBP and PNNL may decide to delay the 

start of portal monitor projects until the port-of-entry completes its 

alterations, to make certain that portal monitor placements are properly 

located. Second, port-of-entry expansion activities may alter existing traffic 

flows and require that PNNL redesign its portal monitor deployments. The 

portal monitor deployments at three southern border ports-of-entry has 

taken much longer than planned because of the port’s expansion activities. 

According to PNNL, there is now considerable schedule uncertainty 

associated with these deployments, which may ultimately impact the 

completion of the southern land border deployments. 

Portal monitor deployments have also been hampered by poor weather. 

For example, cold weather at several northern sites caused some 

unexpected work stoppages and equipment failures that resulted in 
Page 20 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

construction delays of 2 to 3 months. Finally, one southern border site has 

been delayed because of major flooding problems. The flooding issue must 

be resolved before the deployment can be completed.

DHS’s Portal Monitor 

Deployment Program Cost 

Estimate Is Uncertain and 

Overly Optimistic

DHS’s current estimate to complete the program is $1.3 billion, but this 

estimate is highly uncertain and overly optimistic. First, DHS’s cost 

estimate is based on a plan to deploy advanced-technology portal monitors 

that have so far shown mixed results for detecting radiation compared to 

currently-fielded portal monitors. Since the efficacy of the advanced portal 

monitors has not yet been proven conclusively, there is at least some 

uncertainty over whether—and, if so, how many—of the new portal 

monitors may be deployed. In addition, the final cost of the new portal 

monitors has not been established. Second, our analysis of CBP’s earned 

value data also suggests that the program will likely cost much more than 

planned. 

The current deployment plan calls for installing advanced portal monitors 

at all cargo primary and secondary inspection locations, at all secondary 

inspection locations for private vehicles, and also retrofitting many sites 

with the advanced equipment, when it becomes available. However, 

according to senior officials at DNDO, the advanced technology must meet 

all of DNDO’s performance criteria, and must be proven superior to the 

portal monitors already in use, before DNDO will procure it for use in the 

United States. Recent tests of the new portal monitors indicate that 

DNDO’s criteria have not yet been met. For example, S&T sponsored 

research in 2004 that compared the detection capabilities of currentlyfielded portal monitors with the advanced portal monitors. The results of 

that research suggested that, in some scenarios, the detection abilities of 

the two portal monitor types were nearly equivalent. In other scenarios, the 

new equipment’s detection capability was significantly better. S&T 

concluded that more work remains to be done in optimizing and comparing 

portal monitors so as to understand how they can be used to the greatest 

effect at U.S. ports-of-entry. In 2005, DNDO sponsored additional research 

designed to compare the two types of portal monitor, and determined that 

the advanced portal monitors’ detection capabilities were somewhat better 

than those of the currently-fielded equipment. In addition, in October 2005, 

DNDO completed the first comprehensive tests for these advanced portal 

monitors at the Nevada Test Site. This advanced technology combines the 

ability to detect radiation and identify its source. According to an official 

who helped supervise these tests, the new portal monitors’ performance 

did not meet all of DNDO’s expectations with regard to providing 
Page 21 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

significant detection improvements over currently-fielded equipment in all 

scenarios. CBP and DNDO officials also expressed concerns regarding the 

advanced portal monitors’ detection capabilities in light of the Nevada test 

results. In particular, senior CBP officials questioned whether the advanced 

portal monitors would be worth their considerable extra costs, and 

emphasized finding the right mix of current and advanced-technology 

equipment based on the needs at individual ports-of-entry. According to 

DNDO officials, the potential improvement over currently fielded portal 

monitors in capability to identify radioactive sources, and hence to detect 

actual threats as opposed to simply detecting radiation, has not yet been 

quantified. However, these officials believe that the results to date have 

been promising, and DNDO intends to continue supporting the advanced 

portal monitor’s development and believe the new technology may be ready 

for deployment early in calendar year 2007. 

There is also considerable uncertainty regarding the eventual cost of the 

advanced portal monitors—if they become commercially available, and if 

DNDO opts to use them. Experts we contacted estimated that the new 

portal monitors could cost between $330,000 and $460,000 each. These 

estimates are highly uncertain because advanced portal monitors are not 

yet commercially available. As a point of reference, the portal monitors 

currently in use typically cost between $49,000 and $60,000. These costs 

include only the purchase price of the equipment, not its installation. 

According to CBP and PNNL officials, installation costs vary, but average 

about $200,000 per portal monitor. Even if future test results indicate that 

the new technology exhibits much better detection and identification 

capabilities, it would not be clear that the dramatically higher cost for this 

new equipment would be worth the considerable investment, without the 

agency having first rigorously compared the portal monitors’ capabilities 

taking their costs into account. Currently, DNDO and CBP are working 

together to determine the most appropriate technologies and concepts of 

operation for each port-of-entry site. The two agencies are also trying to 

determine the highest priority sites for advanced-technology portal 

monitors based on the extent to which the new portal monitors show 

improved performance. 

In November 2005, PNNL reported that the portal monitor deployment 

program could experience an overall cost overrun of $36 million. In 

contrast, our analysis of CBP’s earned value data indicates that the agency 

should expect a cost overrun of between $88 million and $596 million. We 

based our cost overrun projections on the rates at which CBP and PNNL 

deployed portal monitors, through November 2005. The more efficient the 
Page 22 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

agency and its contractor are in deploying portal monitors, the smaller the 

cost overruns; conversely, when efficiency declines, cost overruns 

increase.15

In fact, as shown in figure 2, recent cumulative program cost trends have 

been negative, indicating that CBP’s cost overruns are deepening over time.

Figure 2: Monthly Cumulative Cost Overruns

Note: The “zero point” on this figure denotes work that was completed at its planned cost. A positive 

number means that all the work completed to that point costs less than planned, while a negative 

number means that all the work completed to that point costs more than planned.

15We also assessed PNNL’s cost and schedule performance using earned value analysis 

techniques based on data captured in PNNL’s contract performance reports. We also 

developed a forecast of future cost growth. We based the lower end of our forecast range on 

the costs spent to date added to the forecast cost of work remaining. The remaining work 

was forecast using an average of the current cost performance index efficiency factor. For 

the upper end of our cost range, we relied on the actual costs spent to date added to the 

forecast of remaining work with an average monthly cost and schedule performance index.

Dollars in millions

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

S

Oct-05

Nov-05

ep-05

Aug-05

Jul-05

Oct-04

Nov-04

Dec-04

Jan-05

Feb-05

Mar-05

Apr-05

May-05

Jun-05

Cumulative cost variance

Source: GAO analysis based on the PNNL November 2005 Monthly Progress Report.
Page 23 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

PNNL noted that its management reserve of $62 million should cover the 

anticipated overrun. However, we do not agree.16 First, we believe the 

cumulative cost overrun will far exceed PNNL’s estimate of $36 million. We 

believe an overrun of about $342 million, the midpoint of our projected 

overrun range, is more likely. Since 1977, we have analyzed over 700 

acquisition projects on which EVM techniques have been applied. These 

analyses consistently show that once a program is 15 percent complete (as 

is the case with this program), cost performance almost never improves 

and, in most cases, declines. PNNL’s recent cost trend follows this pattern. 

Second, based on these 700-plus studies, our estimate takes a more realistic 

view that the portal monitor deployment program’s cost performance most 

likely will continue to decline; hence the management reserve will be 

consumed over time as the program incurs unexpected expenses. Finally, 

to meet the deployment program’s planned costs, PNNL would have to 

greatly improve its work efficiency. However, our analysis of prior EVMbased projects indicates that productivity rates nearly always decline over 

the course of a project. We determined that PNNL’s efficiency rate for the 

most recent 8 months has averaged about 86 percent—PNNL has been 

delivering about $.86 worth of work for every dollar spent. In order to 

complete the remaining work with available funding, PNNL’s efficiency rate 

would have to climb to around 98 percent, a rate of improvement 

unprecedented in the 700-plus studies we have analyzed. 

CBP Does Not Know If 

PNNL’s Cost and Schedule 

Data Are Reliable

Federal agencies are required by OMB to track the progress of major 

systems acquisitions using a validated EVM system and to conduct an 

integrated baseline review.17 We found that PNNL has an EVM system but 

has not certified it to show that it complies with guidance developed by the 

American National Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance.18

This guidance identifies 32 criteria that reliable EVM systems should meet. 

In addition, we found that PNNL has not conducted an integrated baseline 

review—a necessary step to ensure that the EVM baseline for the portal 

16Management reserves are part of the total program budget intended to be used to fund 

work anticipated but not currently defined. Most programs usually wait until work is almost 

completed before making a judgment that management reserve can be applied to cover cost 

variances.

17See OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 7, “Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of 

Capital Assets,” June 2005.

18American National Standards Institute (ANSI) / Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) EVM 

System Standard (ANSI/EIA-748-98), Chapter 2 (May 19, 1998).
Page 24 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

monitor program represents all work to be completed, and adequate 

resources are available. 

However, although the EVM data have not been independently validated, 

we examined the EVM data and found that they did not show any 

anomalies and were very detailed. Therefore, we used them to analyze the 

portal monitor program status and to make independent projections of the 

program’s final costs at completion.

CBP Officers Have 

Made Progress in Using 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment Correctly 

and Adhering to 

Inspection Guidelines, 

but There Are Potential 

Issues with Agency 

Procedures

CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections

appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and to follow the 

agency’s inspection procedures. In fact, in some cases, CBP officers 

exceeded standard inspection procedure requirements by opening and 

entering containers to better identify radiation sources. In contrast, in 2003, 

when we issued our last report on domestic radiation detection, CBP 

officers sometimes deviated from standard inspection procedures and, at 

times, used detection equipment incorrectly. However, the agency’s 

inspection procedures could be strengthened. 

CBP Officers Appeared to 

Use Equipment Correctly 

and Follow Procedures

During this review, at the 10 ports-of-entry that we visited, the CBP officers 

we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections appeared to 

follow inspection procedures and to use radiation detection equipment 

correctly. The officers’ current proficiency in these areas follows increases 

in training and in CBP’s experience using the detection equipment. In 

contrast, in 2003 we reported that CBP officers sometimes used radiation 

detection equipment in ways that reduced its effectiveness. 

CBP has increased the number of its officers trained to use radiation 

detection equipment; in fact, the agency now requires that officers receive 

training before they operate radiation detection equipment. As of February 

2006, CBP had trained 6,410 officers to use radiation isotope identification 

devices, 8,461 to use portal monitors, and 22,180 to use pagers. Many CBP 

officers received training on more than one piece of equipment and about 

900 have since left the agency. Generally, today CBP officers receive 

radiation detection training from 4 sources: the CBP Academy in Glynco, 

Georgia; the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico; a DOE-
Page 25 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

sponsored 3-day training course for interdicting weapons of mass 

destruction, in Washington state; and on-the-job training at ports-of-entry. 

Training at the Academies in Georgia and New Mexico includes formal 

classroom instruction, as well as hands-on exercises on how to use portal 

monitors, isotope identifiers, and pagers. This training includes simulated 

scenarios in which officers use radiation detection equipment to conduct 

searches for nuclear and radiological materials. On-the-job instruction 

continues at field locations as senior CBP officers, as well as PNNL and 

other DHS contractor staff, work closely with inexperienced officers to 

provide them with practical training on how the radiation detection 

equipment works and how to respond to alarms. According to senior CBP 

officials, all of the instructors that offer training on using radiation 

detection equipment are certified in its use. Trainees must demonstrate 

proficiency in the use of each system prior to assuming full responsibility 

for radiation detection inspections. About 1,600 CBP officers have 

participated in DOE’s 3-day training course designed to acquaint CBP 

officers with detection equipment. CBP is currently developing refresher 

training courses on the use of radiation detection equipment. To further 

enhance officers’ ability to effectively respond to real or potential threats, 

several of the field locations that we visited conduct “table-top exercises” 

that simulate scenarios in which the equipment detects an illicit 

radiological source.

According to several of the CBP field supervisors we contacted, many 

officers have gained proficiency in following procedures and using 

radiation detection equipment through substantial field experience 

responding to alarms. The number of alarms officers typically handle varies 

according to the size of the site, its location, and type. For example, an 

isolated land border site would probably experience fewer alarms than a 

major seaport because of the differences in the volume of traffic. However, 

it was common for several of the locations we visited to experience 15 to 60 

alarms per day. One seaport we visited had 9 terminals, usually with 2 

primary and 1 secondary portal monitors. According to CBP officials, each 

terminal recorded about 8 to 12 alarms per day. The director of port 

security for a major eastern seaport we visited estimated that her facility 

records roughly 150 portal monitor alarms each day. Virtually all have been 

nuisance alarms, but CBP officials still believe they gained valuable 

experience in using the equipment and following procedures. 

All of the primary and secondary inspections we witnessed were nuisance 

alarms. In all of these cases except one, officers followed CBP’s guidance—

as well as local variations meant to address issues unique to the area—and 
Page 26 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

correctly used detection equipment. The lone exception occurred at a site 

whose primary inspection station was staffed by a state port police officer. 

After the station’s portal monitor registered an alarm for a truck departing 

the site, the police officer did not follow CBP’s procedures.19 For example, 

he did not collect any documentation from the driver. At all other sites we 

visited, when a primary portal monitor sounded, CBP officers gathered the 

cargo’s manifest, the vehicle registration, and the driver’s license prior to 

sending the vehicle through secondary inspection. Officers use these 

documents to check the driver and vehicle cargo. The port police officer 

told us that he recognized the driver in this case, and so the officer did not 

believe it was necessary to collect such information. A CBP officer 

performed the secondary inspection in line with agency guidance. In fact, 

after using a radiation isotope identification device to conduct an external 

inspection and determine the source of the alarm—potassium hydroxide—

the officer required that the driver open the back of the truck so she could 

make a visual check of the cargo. From the time of the initial alarm, until 

the truck departed the site boundary, about 35 minutes elapsed. According 

to port and CBP officials, this particular alarm, its resolution, and the 

amount of time it took to resolve are typical of the site. We also discussed 

the site’s radiation detection efforts with the truck driver, in particular the 

delay associated with this alarm. He noted that he considers the delays 

experienced at this site to be relatively minor, and that the delays have not 

had any adverse effects on his business.

We also visited a seaport that experienced a legitimate alarm in which CBP 

officers used the detection equipment correctly and responded according 

to procedures. Uranium hexafluoride, a potentially hazardous chemical 

containing low levels of radioactivity, caused this alarm. A primary portal 

monitor at the seaport sounded as a truck carrying one container 

attempted to exit a terminal. Following standard operating procedures, the 

truck was diverted to a secondary inspection station, where a secondary 

portal monitor also alarmed. A CBP officer then scanned the container and 

cab of the truck with an isotope identifier, which indicated that the 

radiation source was located in the cab within several metal pails. The 

isotope identifier identified two radiation sources, one of which was 

uranium-235—potentially a weapons-usable material. The other source was 

uranium-238. Again following procedures, CBP officers isolated the 

19Since the officer is an employee of the state, he was not required to follow CBP 

procedures. According to the port police supervisor present at the scene, the officer acted 

within the scope of port police guidance.
Page 27 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

sources of radiation and provided LSS scientists with information collected 

by the isotope identifier. Officers also reviewed the driver’s delivery papers; 

used various CBP databases to check the driver, importer, and consignee’s 

history of transporting goods; and contacted the driver’s dispatcher and the 

U.S. consignee to gather information on and assess the legitimacy of the 

shipment. The consignee explained that the pails contained trace amounts 

of uranium hexafluoride that had been sent to the company’s laboratory for 

testing. Following additional investigation, which included an X-ray of the 

pails and a review of DOT requirements regarding radiation-warning 

placard requirements, CBP determined that the event was not a security 

threat and released the driver and conveyance. Senior officials at this 

seaport told us that CBP’s radiation detection guidance served as an 

effective and successful guide to resolving this alarm. 

Potential Issues in CBP’s 

Inspection Procedures 

Could Be Mitigated to 

Improve Detection 

Capabilities

We identified two potential issues in CBP’s national inspection procedures 

that could increase the nation’s vulnerability to nuclear smuggling. The first 

potential issue involves NRC documentation. Generally, NRC requires that 

importers obtain an NRC license for their legitimate shipments of 

radiological materials into the United States.20 However, NRC regulations 

do not require that the license accompany the shipment, although in some 

cases importers choose to voluntarily include the license. According to 

CBP officials, CBP lacks access to NRC license data that could be used to 

verify that importers actually acquired the necessary licenses or to 

authenticate a license at the border. At present, CBP officers employ a 

variety of investigative techniques to try to determine if individuals or 

organizations are authorized to transport a radiological shipment. For 

example, CBP officers review their entry paperwork, such as shipping 

papers. Officers also often interview drivers about the details of the 

delivery and observe their behavior for any suspicious or unusual signs. At 

one land border crossing we visited, officers told us that frequent and 

legitimate shippers of radiological material provide advance notice that a 

radiological shipment will be transported. This can lead to law 

enforcement personnel being called in to escort the shipment through the 

port-of-entry. 

The second potential issue pertains to CBP’s secondary inspection 

guidelines. Generally, CBP’s guidelines require that CBP officers locate, 

20See 10 C.F.R. § 110.5.
Page 28 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

isolate, and identify the radiation source(s) identified during primary 

inspections. Customarily, officers use a radiation isotope identification 

device to perform an external examination of cargo containers in these 

situations. (See fig. 3.) However, the effectiveness of a radiation isotope 

identification device is diminished as its distance from the radioactive 

source increases, and by the thickness of the metal container housing the 

radioactive source. As a result, secondary inspections that rely solely on 

external examinations may not always be able to locate, isolate, and 

identify an illicit shipment of nuclear material. 

Figure 3: CBP Officers Conducting an External Secondary Inspection at a Seaport

Source: GAO.
Page 29 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

The local procedures at some ports-of-entry we visited go beyond the 

requirements established by CBP’s guidelines by having CBP officers open 

and, if necessary, enter containers when conducting secondary inspections. 

(See fig. 4.) For example, at one high-volume seaport we visited, the local 

inspection procedures require officers to open and, if necessary, enter a 

container to locate and identify a radiological source if an external 

examination with an isotope identifier is unable to do so. Under such 

circumstances, the port’s procedures require the officer to open the 

container doors, locate the source, and obtain another reading as close to 

the source as possible. By entering the container, an officer may be able to 

reduce the isotope identifier’s distance from the radioactive source, and 

thus obtain a more accurate reading. If the isotope identifier is unable to 

detect and identify the source after two readings within the container, 

officers must contact LSS for further guidance. Officers at this seaport have 

opened containers in the past when the isotope identifier had been unable 

to detect naturally occurring radioactive material, such as granite or 

ceramic tile, which is low in radioactive emissions. CBP supervisors at this 

seaport said that this occurs infrequently and that it adds a very minimal 

amount of time to the inspection process. In addition, at a land border 

crossing we visited, the local standard operating procedures instruct CBP 

officers to conduct a physical examination on vehicles that alarm for the 

presence of radiation. Officials at this particular port-of-entry said that they 

have entered vehicles with an isotope identifier when the device has been 

unable to detect or identify the radioactive source from vehicles’ exterior. 

During a physical examination, officers are supposed to open the vehicle 

and look for high-density materials, such as lead or steel, which can be 

used to shield gamma radiation and solid objects with large quantities of 

liquid that could be used to shield neutron radiation. Because the majority 

of alarms at this land border crossing are caused by medical isotopes in 

people, CBP officers physically inspect vehicles on an infrequent basis. 
Page 30 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 4: A CBP Officer Entering a Cargo Container During a Secondary Inspection 

at a Seaport

Source: GAO.
Page 31 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Finally, we also visited a land border crossing where CBP officers routinely 

open and enter commercial trucks to conduct secondary inspections, even 

though the site’s local procedures do not require this additional 

examination. Officials at this crossing said that they open up containers to 

verify that the container’s manifest and reading from the isotope identifier 

are consistent with the container’s load. If they are not consistent, CBP 

officers are supposed to contact LSS for further guidance. During our visit, 

we observed a truck that alarmed at primary and secondary portal 

monitors. CBP officers then required the driver to park at a loading dock, 

where officers first used an isotope identifier to screen the truck from the 

outside; the reading from the isotope identifier was inconclusive, however. 

Officers then opened and entered the container with an isotope identifier, 

conducted a second reading of the radioactive source, and determined that 

the material inside the container was a non-threatening radioactive source 

that matched the manifest. A CBP supervisor released the truck. This 

inspection, from the time of the original alarm to the truck’s release took 

about 25 minutes—slightly greater than the 20-minute average for this site. 

According to CBP supervisors, officers at this port-of-entry follow this 

practice routinely, even during the site’s peak hours. This approach enables 

the officers to get closer to the source and obtain a more accurate reading. 

Furthermore, since this practice enables officers to conduct a more 

thorough examination of the containers’ contents, it may increase the 

likelihood that CBP officers will find any illicit radioactive material. 

According to senior CBP officials at this port-of-entry, despite being 

implemented at one of the busiest commercial ports-of-entry in the nation, 

this additional procedure has had little negative impact on the flow of 

commerce and has not increased the cost of CBP inspections. 
Page 32 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

DHS Is Working to 

Improve the 

Capabilities of 

Currently-fielded and 

New Radiation 

Detection Equipment, 

but Much Work 

Remains to Achieve 

Better Equipment 

Performance

DHS has managed research, development, and testing activities that 

attempt to address the inherent limitations of currently-fielded radiation 

detection equipment and to produce new, advanced technologies with even 

greater detection capabilities. DHS is enhancing its ability to test detection 

equipment by building a new test facility at DOE’s Nevada Test Site. In 

addition, DHS tests radiation detection equipment under real-life 

conditions at S&T’s CMTB in New York and New Jersey. However, much 

work remains for the agency to achieve consistently better detection 

capabilities, as the efforts undertaken so far have achieved only mixed 

results. 

Currently-fielded Radiation 

Detection Equipment Has 

Inherent Limitations 

Currently-fielded radiation portal monitors have two main limitations. 

First, they are limited by the physical properties of the radiation they are 

designed to detect, specifically with regard to the range of detection (some 

radioactive material emits more radiation than others). Further, this 

limitation can be exacerbated because sufficient amounts of high-density 

materials, such as lead or steel, can shield radiation emissions to prevent 

their detection. Second, currently-fielded portal monitors cannot 

distinguish between different types of radioactive materials, i.e., they 

cannot differentiate naturally occurring radioactive material from 

radiological threat materials. CBP officers are required to conduct 

secondary inspections on all portal monitor alarms, including nuisance 

alarms. According to the CBP field supervisors with whom we spoke, 

nuisance alarms comprise almost all of the radiation alerts at their ports-ofentry. Port operators noted a concern that nuisance alarms might become 

so numerous that commerce could be impeded, but thus far these alarms 

have not greatly slowed the flow of commerce through their ports-of-entry. 

CBP’s currently-fielded radiation isotope identification devices also have 

inherent limitations. For example, during some secondary inspections, 

radiation isotope identification devices are unable to identify radiological 

material. In these cases, CBP standard procedures require that officers 

consult LSS to conclusively identify the source. According to CBP officers 

at two of the ports we visited, this usually lengthens secondary inspections 

by 20 to 30 minutes, although in some cases an hour or more was needed to 

resolve the alarm. Furthermore, a 2003 Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Page 33 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

evaluation of seven isotope identifiers, including the one deployed by CBP, 

concluded that all devices had difficulty recognizing radioactive material 

and correctly identifying the material they did recognize. The Los Alamos 

finding is consistent with our field observations, as CBP officers at several 

of the ports-of-entry we visited reported similar trouble with their radiation 

isotope identification devices. 

Laboratory testing of currently-fielded radiation detection equipment has 

further demonstrated their limitations in effectively detecting and 

identifying nuclear material. For example, in February 2005, DHS 

sponsored testing of commercially available portal monitors, isotope 

identifiers, and pagers against criteria set out in American National 

Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. The ANSI standards provide 

performance specifications and test methods for testing radiation detection 

equipment, including portal monitors and handheld devices. The actual 

testing was performed by four DOE laboratories, with coordination, 

technical management, and data evaluation provided by the Department of 

Commerce’s National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). The 

laboratories tested a total of 14 portal monitors from 8 manufacturers 

against 29 performance requirements in the ANSI standards. Overall, none 

of the radiation detection equipment, including the portal monitors and 

handheld devices deployed by CBP, met all of the performance 

requirements in this first round of testing. However, according to S&T 

officials, many of the limitations noted in CBP’s equipment were related to 

withstanding environmental conditions—not radiation detection or isotope 

identification. However, in some tests, the portal monitors that CBP 

employs, along with many others, exhibited poor results. For example, in 

tests conducted to evaluate the portal monitors’ response to neutron 

radiation, of which plutonium is a primary source, almost all monitors, 

including a portal monitor fielded by CBP, failed to meet the ANSI 

requirement. However, according to S&T officials, the test was conducted 

using the manufacturer’s standard configuration, rather than the 

configuration CBP uses in its field operations. In another test, one that used 

CBP’s typical field parameters rather than the manufacturer’s, the portal 

monitor passed all the radiation detection performance requirements. S&T 

believes that the portals used by CBP would meet all the radiation 

performance requirements if set up with the parameters and configuration 

as used in the field. In addition, isotope identifiers displayed weaknesses. 

For example, the isotope identifier currently in use by CBP was not able to 

simultaneously identify two different isotopes, as required by the ANSI 

standards. When tested with barium-133 and plutonium-239, the isotope 

identifier was able to recognize the barium but failed to recognize the 
Page 34 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

plutonium—a weapons-grade nuclear material. As this was a first round of 

testing and modifications were made to both the standards and testing 

protocols after the procedures were completed, NIST plans to manage 

testing of the equipment again in early 2006. The results from both rounds 

of testing are intended to provide guidance for federal, state, and local 

officials in evaluating and purchasing radiation detection equipment, and to 

enable manufacturers to improve their equipment’s performance. 

DHS Has Sponsored 

Research and Development 

to Improve the Capabilities 

of Current Technology and 

to Develop New Technology 

but Much Work Remains

DHS has sponsored research efforts designed to improve the detection 

capabilities of the currently-fielded portal monitors and to provide them 

with the ability to distinguish radiological sources. For example, PNNL 

researched, developed, and tested a new software—known as “energy 

windowing”—to address the currently-fielded portal monitors’ inability to 

distinguish between radiological materials. Energy-windowing is supposed 

to identify and screen out material, such as fertilizer or kitty litter, that 

cause nuisance alarms and thereby reduce the number of such alarms at 

cargo screening facilities, while also improving the portal monitor’s 

sensitivity to identify nuclear material of concern. PNNL has activated 

energy-windowing on the 556 portal monitors it has deployed at land 

border crossings and seaports. At a few ports-of-entry that we visited, CBP 

officials said that the software has been effective in significantly reducing 

the number of nuisance alarms. However, tests of the software have shown 

that its effectiveness in reducing nuisance alarms largely depends on the 

types of radiation sources it has been programmed to detect and 

differentiate. In tests involving some common, unshielded radiation 

sources, such as cobalt-57 and barium-153, the new software has shown 

improved detection and discrimination capabilities. However, during 

scenarios that target other common, shielded threat sources—such as 

those that might be used in a shielded radiological dispersal device or 

nuclear weapon—the software has been less able to detect and 

discriminate. Experts have recommended further testing to fully explore 

the software’s capabilities. 

DHS is also sponsoring the development of three new technologies that are 

designed to address the main inherent limitations of currently-fielded 

portal monitors. CBP’s deployment plan currently calls for the widespread 

installation of the first of these technologies, “advanced spectroscopic 

portal monitors.” According to DNDO, the advanced spectroscopic 

technology uses different detection materials that are capable of both 

detecting the presence of radiation and identifying the isotope causing the 

alarm. It is hoped that the spectroscopic portal monitor can more quickly 
Page 35 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

identify the sources of alarms, thereby reducing the number of nuisance 

alarms. This increased operational effectiveness may allow the portal 

monitors to be set at a lower detection threshold, thus allowing for greater 

sensitivity to materials of concern. DHS commissioned PNNL to determine 

whether spectroscopic portal monitors provide improved performance 

capabilities over the currently-fielded monitors. In July 2004 and July 2005, 

PNNL conducted two small-scale preliminary studies to compare the two 

types of portal monitors in side-by-side tests using shielded and unshielded 

radioactive materials. In the first test, PNNL concluded that the relative 

performance of spectroscopic and currently-fielded portal monitors is 

highly dependent on variables such as the radioactive sources being 

targeted and the analytic methods being used. The results of these tests 

were mixed. In some situations, spectroscopic portal monitors 

outperformed the current technology; in other cases, they performed 

equally well. In the second test, PNNL concluded that the spectroscopic 

monitor’s ability to detect the shielded threat sources was equal to, but no 

better than, those of the currently-fielded portal monitors. However, 

because spectroscopic portal monitors have the ability to identify isotopes, 

they produced fewer nuisance alarms than the current portal monitors. 

PNNL noted that because the studies were limited in scope, more testing is 

needed. 

In October 2005, DNDO completed the first round of comprehensive testing 

of spectroscopic portal monitors at its testbed at the Nevada Test Site. 

DNDO tested 10 spectroscopic portal monitors against 3 currently-fielded 

monitors in 7,000 test runs involving the portal monitors’ ability to detect a 

variety of radiological materials under many different cargo configurations. 

According to senior DNDO officials who supervised these tests, 

preliminary analysis of test data indicates that the spectroscopic portal 

monitors’ performance demonstrated somewhat mixed results. 

Spectroscopic portal monitors outperformed currently-fielded equipment 

in detecting numerous small, medium-sized, and threat-like radioactive 

objects, and were able to identify and dismiss most naturally occurring 

radioactive material. However, as the amount of source material declined 

in size, the detection capabilities of both types of portal monitors 

converged. Because the data produced by the test runs is voluminous and 

complex, NIST and another contractor are still in the process of analyzing 

the test data and plan to produce a report summarizing the results of the 

testing in 2006. DNDO received responses to the Advanced Spectroscopic 

Portal Request for Proposal in February 2006, and intends to use the data 

from the Nevada Test Site to help evaluate these responses. In fiscal year 
Page 36 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

2006, DNDO also intends to award contracts to two or three manufacturers 

for further engineering development and production. 

The second new technology is “high-Z detection,” which is designed to 

better detect high atomic number (high-Z) materials—such as Special 

Nuclear Material (SNM)—and shielding materials—such as lead—that 

could be used to shield gamma radiation from portal monitors. The Cargo 

Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program within 

DNDO is intended to develop the technologies necessary for automated 

detection of high-Z material. DNDO envisions using the advanced portal 

monitor technology for the detection of lightly shielded nuclear threats and 

radiological dispersal devices, and using CAARS technology for the 

detection of high-Z materials. 

The third new technology is “active interrogation,” which is designed to 

better detect nuclear material, especially shielded sources, and DNDO 

expects it to play a role further in the future than advanced portal monitors 

and CAARS. DHS and DOE are supporting research at DOE national 

laboratories, such as Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, to develop 

these systems. Active interrogation systems probe or “interrogate” 

containers with neutron or gamma rays to induce additional radiation 

emissions from radioactive material within the container. According to 

DNDO, these systems are too large and costly to consider for current use. 

In addition, because these systems emit radiation, care will have to be 

taken to ensure personnel safety before any deployments are made. 

In addition to these relatively near-term research and development efforts, 

DNDO intends to solicit proposals from private, public, academic, and 

federally funded research centers to pursue radiation detection projects 

with a more long-term orientation. The solicitation identifies five areas of 

research:

• mobile detection systems that can be used to detect potential 

radiological threats that are in transit, at fixed locations, and at special 

events;

• detection systems that can be integrated into ships, trucks, planes, or 

into containers; 

• active detection technologies, including portal monitors and handheld 

devices that can detect and verify the presence of shielded nuclear 

materials; 
Page 37 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

• innovative detector materials that provide improved detection and 

isotope identification capabilities over existing materials, in addition to 

technologies that lead to reductions in the costs to manufacture 

detector materials, increasing the size and choice of the shapes of 

detector materials without a loss in performance; and 

• alternate means to detect and identify nuclear material other than 

through radiation detection such as mass, density, or temperature. 

DHS Sponsors Test 

Facilities in Nevada, New 

York, and New Jersey to 

Support Efforts to Improve 

Detection Capabilities

DHS is testing commercially available portal monitors, advanced portal 

monitors, and handheld devices at its new Radiological and Nuclear 

Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex at the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS). DNDO, with assistance from DOE’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration, began construction of the complex in 2005.21 While 

construction work is under way, an Interim Test Track was built nearby. 

The complex is to support the DNDO’s development, testing, acquisition, 

and support of the deployment of radiation detection technologies. When 

completed, the complex will be comprised of several operating areas 

where testing and evaluation of detection systems will be conducted, such 

as a testing facility to evaluate active interrogation technologies; and a 

large, instrumented outdoor testing area to test mobile detection systems. 

The complex will also have a vehicle choke point where detection systems 

for land border crossings, toll plazas, and entrances to tunnels and bridges 

can be evaluated. According to DNDO officials, an important advantage of 

using NTS is that it provides the necessary facilities to test detection 

system capabilities with special nuclear materials in threat-representative 

configurations. The complex will be open to other organizations within 

DHS, including CBP, S&T, the Transportation Security Administration, and 

the U.S. Coast Guard. It will also be open to DOE national laboratories, 

universities, and private companies conducting radiation detection 

development and production for DHS. The facility is expected to become 

fully operational in January 2007. 

In addition to the Nevada complex, DHS manages CMTB to test radiation 

detection equipment in an operational environment. The CMTB originated 

21The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately organized agency within DOE 

that was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 with 

responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors 

programs. Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999).
Page 38 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

as a DOE funded demonstration project in fiscal year 2003, but transferred 

to DHS in August 2003. The scientific, engineering, and technical staff of 

the CMTB are drawn predominantly from the national laboratories. The 

test bed encompasses various operational settings, such as major seaports, 

airports, roadways, and railways. The CMTB deploys commercially 

available and advanced radiation detection equipment at these venues to 

test and evaluate their performance in real-world situations, to develop 

better standard operating procedures, and to assess the impact the 

equipment has on the flow of commerce. At present, CMTB is testing portal 

monitors at toll crossings of two tunnels and one bridge, two seaport 

terminals, and two air cargo facilities. In addition, CMTB is developing 

several advanced secondary inspection mobile technologies. (See fig. 5.) 

The advanced spectroscopic portal monitors that DNDO is developing will 

likely be evaluated at the CMTB, once testing is completed at the Nevada 

Test Site. 
Page 39 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 5: The “SMARTCART,” a Mobile Portal Monitor Using Advanced Detection 

Technology, Being Tested at the CMTB in New York

The Newly Created 

Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office Is 

Structured to Improve 

Coordination of 

Executive Branch 

Radiation Detection 

Programs 

DHS works with DOE, DOD, and other federal, state, and local agencies, as 

well as the private sector to carry out radiation detection programs. The 

newly established DNDO was set up to serve as DHS’s main instrument for 

coordinating these efforts. Since its creation in April 2005, DNDO has 

entered into working relationships with other agencies and is taking the 

lead in developing what it calls a “global architecture,” an integrated 

approach to detecting and stopping nuclear smuggling. However, because 

DNDO was created so recently, these efforts are in their early stages of 

development and implementation.

Source: GAO.
Page 40 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

DNDO Attempts to Improve 

Cooperation Among Other 

DHS Offices, DOE, DOD, 

and Other Agencies in 

Deploying and Operating 

Equipment 

Historically, cooperation among agencies engaged in domestic radiation 

detection has been limited. In April 2005, however, the president signed a 

joint presidential directive that directed the establishment of DNDO to, 

among other things, improve such cooperation by creating a single 

accountable organization with the responsibility for establishing strong 

linkages across the federal government and with other entities. As 

currently envisioned under the directive, DNDO’s mission covers a broad 

spectrum of radiological and nuclear protective measures, but focuses 

mainly on nuclear detection. The directive includes several provisions 

directing DNDO to coordinate its activities with other entities. For 

example, DNDO is to work with DOE, DOD, the Departments of State and 

Justice, state and local agencies, and the private sector to develop 

programs to thwart illicit movements of nuclear materials. In addition, 

provisions of the directive require consultation between DNDO, law 

enforcement and nonproliferation centers, as well as other related federal 

and state agencies. Table 2 provides a summary of the cooperation brought 

about by the presidential directive.

Table 2: Cooperation with DNDO Brought about by Presidential Directive

Agency Responsibilities

Department of Homeland Security

S&T All radiological/nuclear detection programs and staff subsumed by DNDO.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) USCG and DNDO coordinate on detection and reporting resources, and protocols to 

ensure that USCG equipment is state-of-the-art and that detection events are properly 

reported.

Office of State & Local 

Government Coordination and Preparedness 

(SLGCP)

DNDO works to ensure good communication, coordination, and takes other actions with 

state and local governments. SLGCP personnel help staff DNDO.

Interagency Components

Department of Energy Provide staffing to, and coordinates with, DNDO in equipping National Incident Response 

Teams. DOE also provides DNDO with information from overseas programs. Makes the 

NTS and special nuclear materials available for DNDO testing.

Department of Defense Provide staffing to DNDO. Facilitate coordination between DOD detection programs and 

domestic programs. Coordinate on technical “reachback capabilities.” Integrate any 

domestic detection systems in communities near military bases with DNDO assets.

Department of Justice Provide staffing to DNDO. FBI will coordinate on establishing and executing “reachback 

capabilities.” FBI remains the lead law enforcement agency in terrorist events.

Department of State Provide links and overall coordination between DNDO and non-U.S. organizations 

responsible for radiation detection.
Page 41 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Source: DNDO.

According to senior DNDO officials, although the close cooperation called 

for in DNDO’s mandate has been difficult to achieve, there are two factors 

that may help DNDO succeed in this effort. First, the presidential directive 

is explicit in directing other federal agencies to support DNDO’s efforts. 

The directive transfers primary responsibility for radiation and nuclear 

detection activities in the United States to DNDO, and requires DNDO to 

include personnel from other agencies in its organization. For example, 

under the directive, DOE will provide DNDO with information received 

from overseas programs, including the Megaports Initiative and others, as 

well as information from DOE’s international partners involved with 

radiological and nuclear detection systems. Second, all of the radiological 

and nuclear detection programs and staff of S&T became part of DNDO. 

DOE’s Second Line of Defense program supports DNDO efforts by working 

with the agency to exchange information, data, and lessons learned from 

overseas deployments. According to senior officials at DNDO, the data 

from overseas deployments are needed to help DNDO efforts to develop 

profiles of potential risks to the United States. In addition, the performance 

of these systems, as evidenced by these data, can help improve domestic 

portal monitors’ ability to detect radiation. In addition, DOE provides 

equipment training opportunities for DHS personnel. In April 2005, DOE 

and DHS formalized certain aspects of this cooperation in a memorandum 

of understanding. Specifically, the areas of cooperation include, among 

other things: discussing procedures for the rapid analysis of cargo and for 

operational/emergency responses, training CBP officers, exchanging 

technical and lessons learned information, and providing updates on their 

respective programs’ implementation.

DHS has also entered into formal agreements with state and local 

governments to coordinate their radiation detection efforts. For example, 

in April 2005, just prior to DNDO’s creation, DHS and the Port Authority of 

New York and New Jersey finalized a memorandum of understanding to 

provide services, personnel, and equipment to run the CMTB program. 

Central Intelligence Agency Primary responsibility for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information 

relevant to DNDO operations. The agency will accept collection requirements through 

channels from DNDO.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coordinate detection requirements with DNDO. DNDO shares detection event data with 

NRC, and NRC shares information with DNDO on legal shipments of radiological 

materials.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Agency Responsibilities
Page 42 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Specifically, the program is designed to evaluate and assess the role of 

threat detection technologies, develop and exercise various concepts of 

operation and response tools, integrate lessons learned from field 

experiences, and provide detection and monitoring capabilities for testing 

and evaluation purposes. The agreement spells out each partner’s 

responsibilities, including coordination with other agencies. According to a 

senior DNDO official, DNDO now has responsibility for this and other 

similar agreements under its authority to develop and evaluate new 

radiation detection equipment. 

Finally, DNDO officials also believe that the way the agency has been 

staffed and organized will aid its cooperation efforts. For example, staff 

from DHS, DOD, DOE, the Departments of State and Justice, and other 

agencies, have been detailed to DNDO. All of DNDO’s major organizational 

units are staffed with personnel from multiple agencies. For example, the 

strategic planning staff within the Office of the Director has employees 

from DOE, DOD, CBP, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DHS’s 

Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. 

Significantly, DNDO’s Office of Operations Support, which is designed to 

provide real-time situational data as well as technical support to field units, 

is headed by an FBI executive with senior staff from CBP, DOE, and DHS’s 

Transportation Security Administration providing direct management 

support. According to a senior DNDO official, having this broad range of 

agencies represented in DNDO decision making helps ensure that agencies’ 

views are heard and fully considered, thereby helping to achieve the 

greatest possible consensus even for difficult decisions. Further, agency 

personnel detailed to DNDO have the authority to “bind” their respective 

agencies, i.e., whatever decisions or agreements are reached under the 

auspices of DNDO will bind their agency to comply to the extent permitted 

by law. Finally, according to senior officials in DOE and CBP, the current 

organizational arrangement appears to be working. Officials noted that 

early in DNDO’s history, communication was difficult, but has recently 

improved. For example, CBP and DOE officials told us they had hoped to 

have greater input into DNDO’s early efforts to develop integrated radiation 

detection systems. However, these officials noted that by October 2005, 

DNDO seemed to have heard and acted upon their recommendations. 

However, although these officials were optimistic about future 

collaborations with DNDO, they also noted that DNDO has not yet 

completed a large enough body of work to conclude firmly that its 

coordination efforts will always be similarly successful.
Page 43 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

DNDO Is Cooperating with 

Other Agencies to Develop a 

Global Nuclear Detection 

System 

Among the main purposes in creating the DNDO, according to its Director, 

is to develop a global nuclear detection system that he characterized as a 

“global architecture.” DNDO’s intention in developing such an approach is 

to coordinate other agencies’ efforts, such as the Second Line of Defense 

and Container Security Initiative, with the domestic deployment program 

to create an integrated, worldwide system. The resulting “global 

architecture” would be a multi-layered defense strategy that includes 

programs that attempt to secure nuclear materials and detect their 

movements overseas; to develop intelligence information on nuclear 

materials’ trans-shipments and possible movement to the United States; 

and to integrate these elements with domestic efforts undertaken by 

governments—federal, state, local, and tribal—and the private sector. 

Much of DNDO’s work in terms of acquiring and supporting the deployment 

of radiation detection equipment, as well as in supporting research, 

development, and testing of new detection equipment supports the office’s 

mission to develop the U.S. domestic portion this global architecture. 

In addition, DHS, in conjunction with selected state and local 

organizations, as well as other federal agencies and the private sector, 

began two pilot projects in fiscal year 2003 to demonstrate a layered 

defense system designed to protect the United States against radiological 

and nuclear threats. DHS’s Radiological Pilot Programs Office coordinated 

the projects’ initial efforts, and DNDO assumed responsibility in October 

2005. Field work began in fiscal year 2004 and will be completed in fiscal 

year 2007. The project leaders expect the final report and lessons learned 

to be issued in fiscal year 2007. Both pilot projects featured a broad 

selection of federal, state, and local agencies, including state law 

enforcement, counter-terrorism, emergency management, transportation, 

and port authorities.

Conclusions DHS has made progress deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. 

ports-of-entry; notably, the department achieved these gains without 

greatly impeding the flow of commerce (i.e., the movement of cargo 

containers out of ports-of-entry). However, we believe that DHS will find it 

difficult under current plans and assumptions to meet its current portal 

monitor deployment schedule at U.S. borders because it would have to 

increase its current rate of deployment by 230 percent to meet its 

September 2009 deadline. Our analysis of CBP’s and PNNL’s earned value 

data suggests that millions of dollars worth of work is being deferred each 

month and that the work that is completed is costing millions more than 
Page 44 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

planned. Currently, we estimate that CBP is facing a likely cost overrun of 

about $340 million, and that the last portal monitor may not be installed 

until late 2014. Unless CBP and PNNL make immediate improvements in 

the schedule performance, then additional slippage in the deployment 

schedule is likely.

A key overriding cause for these delays is the late disbursal of funds to DHS 

contractors. This late dispersal disrupts and delays some ongoing 

installation projects. In this regard, DHS approval processes for 

documentation requested by the House Appropriations Committee are 

lengthy and cumbersome. In one case, for example, funds for fiscal year 

2005 were not made available to the DHS contractor until September 2005, 

the last month of the fiscal year. This process is taking too long and needs 

to be shortened. 

Further, the unsure efficacy and uncertain cost associated with the 

advanced portal monitor technology means that DHS cannot determine, 

with confidence, how much the program will eventually cost. In particular, 

even if the advanced portal monitor technology can be shown superior to 

current technology—which currently does not seem certain—DHS does 

not yet know whether the new technology will be worth its considerable 

additional cost. Only after testing of the advanced portal monitors has been 

completed and DHS has rigorously compared currently-fielded and 

advanced portal monitors, taking into account their differences in cost, will 

DHS be able to answer this question. 

CBP has experienced difficulty deploying portal monitors at seaports, at 

least in part because it has been unable to reach agreements with many 

seaport operators, who are concerned that radiation detection efforts may 

delay the flow of commerce through their ports. As a result, the agency has 

fallen 2 years behind its seaport deployment schedule—and seaports 

continue to be vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. Significantly, there is no 

clear solution and no reason to be optimistic that progress can be made 

soon. CBP’s policy of negotiating deployment agreements with seaport 

terminal operators has not yet yielded agreements at many seaports and 

this has caused significant delays in the deployment of portal monitors at 

some seaports. CBP has chosen not to attempt to force terminal operators 

to cooperate. A subset of this issue concerns screening rail traffic leaving 

seaports, which is a particularly difficult problem. The operational 

concerns of performing secondary rail inspections in seaports are 

daunting. Some port operators as well as a national study strongly suggest 

that rail transport will increase over the next 10 years. However, unless an 
Page 45 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

effective and efficient means to screen rail traffic is developed and 

deployed, seaports will likely continue to either avoid installing detection 

equipment altogether, or simply turn it off when its operation might prove 

to be inconvenient. Without more progress on this front, we risk rail cargo 

becoming a burgeoning gap in our defenses against nuclear terrorism. 

CBP appears to have made progress in using radiation detection equipment 

correctly and adhering to inspection procedures. At several ports-of-entry 

we visited, CBP officers physically opened and inspected cargo containers 

to confirm the nature of the radiological source under certain 

circumstances. They did this when they were unable to confirm the type of 

radiological material through current approved procedures. Since the 

currently deployed handheld equipment is limited in its ability to accurately 

identify sources of radiation, opening the container allows CBP officers to 

get closer to the source of the alarm and thereby improve their chances of 

accurately identifying the source. It also enables officers to verify that the 

container’s contents are consistent with the isotope identifier’s initial 

reading and the container’s manifest. Furthermore, since DHS and DOE 

officials have expressed concerns that illicit radiological material could be 

shielded, this practice enables officers to conduct a more thorough 

examination of the containers’ contents—thereby increasing the likelihood 

that CBP officers will find any illicit radioactive material. Importantly, this 

process, according to border security officials, did not impede the progress 

of commerce through any port-of-entry.

On the other hand, because CBP officers do not have access to NRC 

licensing data, it is difficult for them to verify that shippers have obtained 

necessary NRC licenses and to verify the authenticity of any NRC licenses 

that may accompany shipments of radioactive materials. As a result, unless 

nuclear smugglers in possession of faked license documents raised 

suspicions in some other way, CBP officers could follow agency guidelines 

yet unwittingly allow them to enter the country with their illegal nuclear 

cargo. As we see it, this is a significant gap in CBP’s national procedures 

that should be closed.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Since DHS provides the Congress with information concerning the 

acquisition and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS’s procedures 

to obtain internal agreement on this information are lengthy and 

cumbersome—often resulting in delays—we recommend that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO and the 

Commissioner of CBP, review these approval procedures and take actions 
Page 46 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

necessary to ensure that DHS submits information to the Congress early in 

the fiscal year.

In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program, as 

planned, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working 

with the Director of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and PNNL, devise a 

plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and the rate 

needed to complete deployments by September 2009. 

To ensure that DHS’s substantial investment in radiation detection 

technology yields the greatest possible level of detection capability at the 

lowest possible cost, we recommend that once the costs and capabilities of 

advanced technology portal monitors are well understood, and before any 

of the new equipment is purchased, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs of 

deploying advanced portal monitors. This analysis should focus on 

determining whether any additional detection capability provided by the 

advanced equipment is worth its additional cost. After completing this costbenefit analysis, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the 

Director of DNDO, should revise its total program cost estimates to reflect 

current decisions. 

To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail 

deployments proceed on time, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, develop 

procedures for effectively screening rail containers and develop new 

technologies to facilitate inspections. 

To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological material, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the 

Commissioner of CBP, consider modifying the agency’s standard operating 

procedures for secondary inspections to include physically opening cargo 

containers during secondary inspections at all ports-of-entry when the 

external inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological material 

inside. 

To further increase the chances that CBP officers identify illicit radiological 

material, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working 

with the Chairman of NRC, develop a way for CBP border officers to 

determine whether radiological shipments have the necessary NRC 

licenses and to verify the authenticity of NRC licenses that accompany 

such shipments.
Page 47 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct PNNL to have 

its earned value management system validated so that it complies with 

guidance developed by the American National Standards Institute/ 

Electronic Industries Alliance. In addition, we recommend the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an Integrated 

Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data is reliable for 

assessing risk and developing alternatives.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In response, we 

received written comments from DHS officials. DHS noted that the report 

is factually correct. Further, the Department agreed with our 

recommendations and committed to implementing them. DHS officials also 

commented that our review did not completely capture the enormity or 

complexity of the Radiation Portal Monitor program. We agree that this 

program is a massive undertaking, and our original draft reflected this 

perspective in several places. In commenting on our recommendation to 

develop a better means for CBP border officers to verify NRC license 

information, DHS stated that “NRC licenses are required to accompany 

certain legitimate shipments of radiological materials...” However, 

according to senior NRC officials, no requirement that the license 

accompany the shipment exists. Finally, DHS provided some clarifying 

comments that we incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the congressional 

committees with jurisdiction over DHS and its activities; the Secretary of 

Homeland Security; the Director of OMB; and interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies of the report available to others 

upon request. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s home 

page at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 
Page 48 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff 

who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Page 49 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

List of Requesters

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Chairman

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

House of Representatives
Page 50 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To assess the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress in 

deploying radiation detection equipment, including radiation portal 

monitors, radiation isotope identification devices, and pagers at U.S. portsof-entry and any problems associated with that deployment, we reviewed 

documents and interviewed officials from the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). We focused primarily on the 

issues surrounding radiation portal monitors because they are a major tool 

in the federal government’s efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling, and 

because the budget and other resources devoted to these machines far 

exceeds the handheld equipment also used at U.S. ports-of-entry. Further, 

we focused on the use of radiation detection equipment in primary and 

secondary inspections, but we did not examine their use as a part of CBP’s 

targeted inspections. To assess CBP’s current progress in deploying portal 

monitors, we compared PNNL’s December 2004 project execution plan for 

deploying radiation portal monitors—including the project’s schedule and 

estimated cost. We analyzed budget, cost, and deployment data on portal 

monitors to determine differences between PNNL’s plan and its current 

progress. We also assessed PNNL’s cost and schedule performance using 

earned value analysis techniques based on data captured in PNNL’s 

contract performance reports. We also developed a forecast of future cost 

growth. We based the lower end of our forecast range on the sum of costs 

spent to date and the forecast cost of work remaining. The remaining work 

was forecast using an average of the current cost performance index 

efficiency factor. For the upper end of our cost range, we relied on the 

actual costs spent to date added to the forecast of remaining work with an 

average monthly cost and schedule performance index. 

We also visited a nonprobability sample of CBP ports-of-entry, including 

two international mail and express courier facilities, five seaports, and 

three land border crossings.1

 We selected these ports-of-entry by using 

criteria such as the types of ports-of-entry where CBP plans to deploy 

equipment; ports-of-entry with wide geographic coverage; and ports-ofentry where portal monitors have been—or are planned to be—installed. 

During each visit, we spoke with CBP inspectors and local port authority 

officials on the progress made, and any problems experienced in deploying 

the equipment at their locations.

1

Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population, because in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 51 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

To assess CBP officers’ use of radiation detection equipment, and how 

inspection procedures are implemented at U.S. ports-of-entry, and any 

problems associated with the use of the equipment, we reviewed CBP’s 

standard operating procedures for radiation detection; documents on its 

training curriculum; and training materials on how to use the equipment. 

We participated in a 3-day hands-on training course for CBP officers at 

PNNL on how to use radiation detection equipment. We also interviewed 

officials from CBP field and headquarters to discuss problems associated 

with the use of the equipment. During our site visits, we toured the 

facilities, observed the equipment in use, and interviewed CBP officers 

about radiation detection policies and procedures and the deployment of 

equipment at their locations. We discussed with CBP officers how they 

determine the validity of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses 

when legitimate shipments of radioactive material enter the nation. 

To assess DHS’s progress in improving and testing radiation detection 

equipment capabilities, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials 

from CBP, DNDO, Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), DOE, PNNL, 

and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). We 

reviewed S&T’s April 2005 Program Execution Plan; DHS documentation 

on the development of advanced radiation detection technologies; and test 

results and assessments of the performance of both commercially available 

radiation detection equipment and advanced technologies. We visited four 

national laboratories—Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Pacific 

Northwest, and Sandia—that are involved in the research, development, 

and testing of radiation detection technologies. In addition, we visited the 

Counter Measures Test Bed (CMTB) in New York and New Jersey, the 

Nevada Test Site, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) test site at a U.S. 

Air Force base to observe the testing of radiation detection equipment and 

discuss progress in improving and testing radiation detection equipment 

with onsite experts. 

To assess the level of cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies 

in conducting radiation detection programs, we interviewed officials from 

CBP; S&T; the Transportation Security Administration; DOD’s Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration; 

and Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia 

National Laboratories. We discussed the current extent of coordination and 

whether more coordination could result in improvements to DHS’s 

deployment, development, and testing of radiation detection equipment 

and technologies. We reviewed agency agreements to cooperate, including 

a memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOE to exchange 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 52 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

information on radiation detection technologies and deployments, and a 

memorandum of understanding between DHS and the Port Authority of 

New York and New Jersey to integrate lessons learned into domestic 

radiation detection efforts. In addition, we reviewed an organizational 

chart from DNDO as well as our past reports on coordination between 

federal agencies on deployment and testing.

We received training data from CBP, cost and budget data from CBP, and 

deployment data from CBP and PNNL. We obtained responses from key 

database officials to a number of questions focused on data reliability 

covering issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and 

the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our review from March 2005 to February 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 53 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix II

GAO Contact and Staff knowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Jim Shafer; Nancy Crothers; Emily 

Gupta; Brandon Haller; Richard Hung; Winston Le; Greg Marchand; Judy 

Pagano; Karen Richey; Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief Technologist; and 

Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report.
Page 54 GAO-06-389 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Related GAO Products

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and 

Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection 

Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. 

GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2005.

Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment 

Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.

GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection 

Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

(360558)
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