IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

DEEPA HASIJA, M.D., AN 

INDIVIDUAL; AND DEEPA HASIJA 

MD PLLC, A NEVADA PROFESSIONAL 

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

MEDICAL REVENUE SOLUTIONS, 

LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY, 

Res s ondent. 

No. 82212 

FILE 

AUG 0 3 2022 

ELIZABETh A. BROWN 

CLER9t 9UPRENIE COURT 

BY • 

DEPUTY CLERItY 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a 

default judgment under NRCP 60(b) in a contract and torts action. Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton, Judge.' The 

underlying action arises from a billing services agreement between the 

parties. The day a responsive pleading to the underlying complaint was 

due, appellant Deepa Hasija, M.D., filed a pro se document purporting to be 

an affidavit requesting additional time to file her answer. The court's 

electronic filing system (EFS) rejected the document the next day because 

of formatting issues, after which Hasija refiled the document. Neither 

Hasija nor appellant Deepa Hasija MD PLLC answered the complaint, and 

the district court ultimately entered a default judgment against them. The 

district court later denied appellants' motions to set aside the default 

•judgment and this appeal followed. We denied respondent's motion to 

dismiss this appeal, explaining that the issues that may be raised in this 

appeal "are limited to challenges to the order denying the second motion to 

vacate the judgment." Hasija v. Med. Rev. Sols., LLC, Docket No. 82212 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted. 

01-62 -?(-4303 

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(Order Denying Motion and Reinstating Briefing, Jan. 25, 2021). After 

briefing, this court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing to 

address the following: (1) whether Hasija made an appearance that entitled 

her to notice and a hearing on respondent's application for default judgment 

under NRCP 55(b)(2), and (2) whether this issue was raised below or 

forfeited. See id. (Order Directing Supplemental Briefing, Mar. 11, 2022). 

In response to our order directing supplemental briefing, 

respondent argues that this court may not reach the issue of whether 

appellants were entitled to notice and a hearing under NRCP 55(b)(2) and 

EDCR 2.70(b)(2) because they did not raise this issue below; and more 

specifically, did not raise it in their second motion to vacate, to which this 

court has limited the appeal. We agree. 

As noted above, this court's order reinstating briefing limited 

the appellate issues to those raised by appellants in their second motion to 

vacate. Those arguments include whether that the district court should set 

aside the default judgment because their failure to file a timely responsive 

pleading was due to excusable neglect, and whether the district court was 

required to deem Hasija's affidavit as submitted when she attempted to file 

due to a "technical error." Because appellants did not raise the issue of 

whether either appellant made an appearance in the action such that they 

were entitled to notice and a hearing under NRCP 55(b)(2) in their second 

motion to vacate, we decline to address this argument. In so holding, we 

necessarily reject appellants' invitation to adopt the test outlined by the 

First Circuit Court of Appeals in National Association of Social Workers v. 

Harwood, for determining whether to address an issue on appeal which was 

not raised below. 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995). 

Nevertheless, appellants argue that even if we decline to 

address the notice and hearing issue, the district court should have granted 

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their motion for relief from the default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1) 

because it was based on Hasija mistakenly filing an improperly formatted 

document. See NRCP 60(b)(1) (allowing a court to set aside a judgment that 

is based on a mistake or excusable neglect). More specifically, they argue 

that EDCR 8.10(b) required the district court to treat the document as if it 

were filed the day a responsive pleading was due. See EDCR 8.10(b) 

(providing that, if technical problems with the court's electronic filing 

system delay the filing of a document, the court "must" treat the document 

as filed on the day the filer attempted to file it). But for the mistake in 

filing, appellants argue that the court would have granted them additional 

time to answer the complaint rather than entering a default judgment. We 

review the denial of NRCP 60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion, Willard v. 

Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 469, 469 P.3d 176, 179 (2020), but 

review de novo the interpretation of EDCR 8.10, see Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 

260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015) (holding that where a district court's 

decision relies on interpretation of court rules, we review de novo). 

Appellants' argument lacks merit. As counsel for appellants 

conceded below, the EFS rejected the document requesting additional time 

because it was improperly formatted. This does not constitute a technical 

problem under EDCR 8.10, as the plain language of the rule is limited to 

where "technical problems with the EFS preclude the court from accepting 

electronic filings." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if this argument had 

merit, it would not warrant relieving the PLLC from the default judgment. 

Hasija filed the document pro se and the PLLC never sought additional time 

to file an answer.2 See Salrnan v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336, 885 P.2d 

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2Indeed, the PLLC's first appearance in the action was a motion to set 

aside the default judgment. 

3 
607, 608 (1994) (providing that a proper person litigant may represent 

themselves in court, but that only attorneys may represent companies and 

other entities). Because appellants' EDCR 8.10 argument lacks merit, and 

their second motion to vacate was premised on this rule, we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' request 

for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief. See Willard, 136 Nev. at 469, 469 P.3d at 179. 

Additionally, we conclude that appellants did not otherwise 

establish grounds for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief because they did not promptly 

apply to remove the judgment, there was no lack of knowledge of the 

procedural requirements for when a responsive pleading is due, and the 

merits of the case are not at issue because only the extent of damages would 

remain. See id. at 470, 469 P.3d at 179 (quoting Yochum v. Davis, 98 Nev. 

484, 653 P.2d 1215 (1982)) (outlining the relevant factors for determining 

whether grounds for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief exists). Appellants did not 

promptly apply to remove the judgment; they did not challenge the entry of 

default 'and instead waited several months to claim excusable neglect.3

Additionally, because appellants' arguments regarding EDCR 8.10 lack 

merit, and because appellants thus can only challenge the .entry of default 

judgment, the merits of the case are not at issue, only the extent of damages. 

See Est. of Lomastro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 124 Nev. 1060, 1068, 195 P.3d 

339, 345 (2008) ("Entry of default ... generally resolves the issues of 

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3Notably, appellants could have challenged the default on the same 

grounds that they now use to challenge the default judgment. See NRCP 

55(c) (providing that a district court may set aside default upon a showing 

of good cause); Tahoe Vill. Realty v. DeSmet, 95 Nev. 131, 134, 590 P.2d 

1158, 1160 (1979) (holding that "good cause" under NRCP 55(c) 

encompasses the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" 

referred to in Rule 60(b)(1)), abrogated on other grounds by Ace Truck & 

Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132 (1987). 

4 
liability and causation and leaves open only the extent of damages."). And 

appellants fail to demonstrate that there was "a lack of knowledge of 

procedural requirements." To the contrary, the record reflects that Hasija 

understood that she was required to file a responsive pleading, and indeed, 

attempted to file such a document.4 As there was a valid entry of default, 

and appellants fail to demonstrate an NRCP 60(b)(1) ground occurring after 

entry of default that led to the default judgment, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' motion. See 

Willard, 136 Nev. at 469, 469 P.3d at 179. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.5

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge 

Kristine M. Kuzemka, Settlement Judge 

Nicholas R. Shook 

Garg Golden Law Firm 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

4We have reviewed appellants' additional arguments and conclude 

that they lack merit and/or were not raised as part of appellants' second 

motion to vacate the default judgment. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 

97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial 

court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been 

waived and will not be considered on appeal."). 

5The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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Hardesty