## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Newton , 2011 IL App (1st) 090683

Appellate Court Caption I n re T HE MARRI AGE OF DAVI D NEWTON, Petitioner-A p p e ll e e , a n d HADL EY NEWTON, Respondent (David J

. Grund, M arvin J

. L eavitt, and Gr und & L eavitt, P.C., Cont emnors-A ppellants).

District & N o. First District, F ourth Division Docke t Nos. 1-09-0683, 1-09- 0684, 1-09-0685 c ons.

Filed J une 30, 2011

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) I n a marria g e dissoluti on action wher e contemnor attorney s wer e disqualified from repr esenting re s p o n d ent pursuant to Rule 1.9 of the I llinois Rules of Professional Conduct based on their prior repr esentation of petitioner and their reta iner agreement was unenfor cea ble under section 508(c) (3) of the I lli n o i s M arriag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act, the tria l court did not err in de nying the attorne y s any attorney fee s

an d t h e fi nding of contempt was upheld on the ground that they had no
g ood-fa ith basis to test t he trial c ourt' s order

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 06-D-5136; the Hon. Edwar d R. J ordan, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Marvin J

. L eavitt and David C. Adams, both of Grund & L eavitt, P.C., of Chicag o, for a

ppellants.

Michae l J

. Be rg er, L eon I

. Finkel, and Rebec ca S. Be rlin, all of Be rg er Schatz, of Chicag o, for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE PUCI NSKI delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Salone and Ster

ba conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Contemnors-appe llants, David Gru n d
, M ar v i n L ea v i t t , and Grund & L eavitt, P.C. (collec tively Grund a

nd L eavitt), appea l the court’s entry of a contempt order ag ainst them based on their ref

usal to comply with the court’s order to step aside following an ear lier court order that disqualified Grund and L eavitt due to a conflict of interest and denied their petition for attorney fee s seeking $250,000 in interim and prospective fees in the di vorce of David Newton ( David) a

nd Hadley

Newton ( Hadley

). ¶ 2 After a full heari n g on David’s motion to disqualify
, the circ uit court deter mined that there was a

conflict of inter est in violation of Rule 1.9 of the I llinois Rules of Professional Conduct (I ll. Rs. of Prof’l Conduct, R. 1.9 (ef f. Aug

. 1, 1990)), and that Grund and the firm of Grund & L eavitt wer e disqualified from repr esenting Hadley

. At a hear ing on the petition for fee s, the court deter

mined Grund and L eavitt wer e not entitled to any fee s based on their disqualification due to the conflict of interest. Grund and L eavitt ref used to comply with the

co u rt ’s order denying them fee s and order ing them to step awa y from the bench, an d t h e court found them in contempt and order ed Grund to pay $100 to purg e the contempt. Grund and L eavitt appe al only

the contempt orde r. ¶ 3 The issue befor e us is discrete and limit ed: d i d t h e co u rt err in enter ing the contempt order ? We clar ify from the outset that Grund and L eavitt appea l only the contempt order and seek corollar

y revie w of the underly ing denial of their fee petition beca use of the disqualification order
, not their disqualification. A contempt order is f in a l a n d a p p eala ble and
g ener ally also bring s the proprie ty of t he underlying disqualification order and subsequent denial of attorney fee s befor e us. See SK Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.
, 246 I ll. App. 3d 979, 986 (1993). ¶ 4 We find that the circ uit court did not err in finding Grund and L eavitt in contempt base d

on their unwillingness to step aside, thus continuing their unwillingness to comply with Grund’s disqualification due to a conflict of interest and the resulting denial of attorney fee s. Grund and L eavitt violated Rule 1.9, and under section 508(c) (3) of the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act (t h e Act), the reta iner agree ment with Hadley was not enfor cea ble bec ause it wa s in violation of a court rule . 750 I L CS 5/ 508(c) (3) ( West 2008).

-2-Fur ther, as the court corr ectly noted, even without section 508, ordinary contra ct law require s fees only for valid contra cts and here the contra ct with Hadley was void ab initio beca use Grund wa s not allowed by Rule 1.9 to enter into it.

¶ 5 J URI SDI CTI ON ¶ 6 At the time of the instant appea l, Marc h 18, 2009, the underlyi n g divorce proce eding s

wer e still pending and judgme nt was not enter ed until near ly a y ear later, on Marc h 8, 2010. Disqualification orders are not immediately appea lable (

In re Estate of French
, 166 I ll. 2d 95, 100 (1995))
, but Grund an d L eavitt here are not appea ling the disqualification order

. Following the disqualification order the court denied attorney fee s g oing back in time to the first meeting with Hadley

. Grund and L eavitt are not direc tly appea ling the denial of attorney fee s. Grund and L eavitt ar gu e t hat they are entitled to fee s up to the time of their disqualification. The court disag ree d and denied all fee s. Grund and L eavitt are appea ling the contempt o rder and fine of $100 imposed by the court for not stepping aside, there by disreg arding the disqualification order and challeng ing the court’s denial of all fee s from either D avid or Ha dley

. ¶ 7 Contempt judgme nts that impose a penalty are final, appea lable order s. In re Marriage of Gutman , 232 I ll. 2d 145, 153 (2008). See also I ll. S. C t. R. 304(b)(5) ( eff . J an. 1, 2006). ¶ 8 “ ‘ “Wher e an u n ap p ea l ab l e i n t erlocutory order results in a judgme nt of conte mpt i ncluding a fine or i mprisonment, such a judgme nt is a final and appealable judgmen t an d
prese nts to the court for revie w the propriety of the order of the court claimed to ha ve been violated.” ’ ” Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Street
, 163 I ll. App. 3d 654, 657 (1987) (quoting People v . Verdone , 107 I ll. 2d 25, 30 (1985), quoting People ex rel. Scott v. Silve rstein , 87 I ll. 2d 167, 174 (1981))

. Her e, the court imposed a fine of $100, and there fore the contempt

was a final judg ment which wa s immediately appea lable.

¶ 9 STANDARD OF REVI EW ¶ 10 The parties dispute the standard of revie w. Grund and L eav i t t assert the issue must be revie wed de no vo , as i t p re sents a question of law, while David maintains that the proper standard of revie w is abuse of discretion. When the fac ts of a contempt fin ding are not in dispute, their leg al ef

fec t may be a que stion of law, which we r eview de novo

. Busey B ank

v. Salyards
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 214, 217 (1999). See also Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc.

v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
, 116 I ll. App. 3d 1043, 1054 (1983) (this court conducts

an independe nt revie w of questions of law prese nted by the disqualifica t i o n order). “As a g ener al rule, a trial court’s decision to awa rd fee s is a mat t er o f discretion and will not be disturbed on appea l absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Ne sbitt
, 377 I ll. App. 3d 649, 656 (2007) (citing In re Marriage of Schneide r , 214 I ll. 2d 152, 174 (2005))

. Her e, howeve r, the circ uit court indicated its belief that it could not awa rd attorney fee s once Grund and L eavitt wer e disqualified. Meanwhile, Grund and L eavitt argue that, althoug h they wer e disqualified, they are still entitled to their fee s acc rued for work perf ormed for Hadley under section 508 of the Act befor e the disqualification and asser t that nothing in the ethical rules expli citly states that no fee s are allowed if an attorney is disqualifie d. The leg al question is

-3-thus whether the circ uit court proper ly denied a ttorney fee s from the beg inning of Grund’ s repr esentation of Hadley

. Whether a court or administrative age n cy has the authority to

awa rd attorney fee s is a question of law that we re view de novo

. Grate v. Grzetich
, 373 I ll. App. 3d 228, 231 (2007) (citing Alva r a d o v. Industrial Comm’n
, 216 I ll. 2d 547 (2005))

. “F urthermor e, whether a party may rec over attorney fee s and costs pursuant to any specific
act is a question of law.” Grate
, 373 I ll. App. 3d at 231 (citing Johnson v. Thomas
, 342 I ll. App. 3d 382 (2003))

. Thus, since the fac ts of the contempt are not in dispute and since Grund and L eavitt are not appea ling the disqualification, we are prese nted wit h a question of law and we revie w this issue de novo

.

¶ 11 BA CKGROUND ¶ 12 Petitioner, David Ne wton, and respondent, Hadley Newton, we re divorc ed pursua nt to

a judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e enter ed on Marc h 8, 2010. In the underly ing divorce
proce eding s, David filed an emerg ency motion to disqualify Hadley ’s attorney , Grund, and the law firm of Grund & L eavitt, pursuant to Rule 1.9 (I ll. S. Ct. Rs. of Prof. Conduct, R. 1.9 (ef f. Aug

. 1, 1990)), due to Grund’s former repr esentation of David in the same proce eding

. On August 9, 2007, th e circ uit court enter ed a preliminary injunction order prohibiting Grund and L eavitt from re prese nting Hadley while the mot ion to disqualify was pending. Hadley filed h er re s p onse to the motion to disqualify on J uly 27, 2007. A hear ing was held on September 4, 2007. The court hear d testimony by David, Grund, and Hadley

. Howeve r, upon questioning of Grund reg arding his conver sation with David, David ’ s c o u n s e l objected based

on attorney -client privileg e. Although there was an offe r of proof, the circ uit court barr ed Grund’s testimony on the basis of t he attorney -client privileg e. David testified t hat he met alone with Grund in Grund’s office for betwee n 1 1/2 and 2 h o u rs. They discussed information and issues related to his ma r ria g e and impending divorce from Hadley
, including issues reg arding

the childre n and his financ ial situation, and Grund took notes. ¶ 13 Hadley testified, upon questioning by Grund, that she l ea rn ed t h at t here was a conflict with Grund re prese nting her beca use Grund himself told he r there was a conflict whe n she

came in to see him. Howeve r, he enter ed into a reta iner agree ment with her and repr esente d her. The court found that Grund and L eavitt wer e disqualified f rom repr esentingHadley

. ¶ 14 On September 18, 2007, Hadley soug ht interlocutory revie w of the court’s order and filed

a petition for leave to appea l (first appea l) under Supreme Court Rule 306 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 306 (ef f. Sept. 1, 2006)). On October 17, 2007, we g rante d leave to appea l, thus staying
proce eding s below. On J une 13, 2008, we rende red our decision pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 23 (ef f. May 30, 2008)), in which we held that the circ uit court

err ed in barr ing Grund’s testimony at the hear ing on the motion to disqualify

. In re Marriage of Newton
, No. 1-07-2590 (2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Co u rt Ru l e 23). We

reve rsed and rema

nded for a full and fair hearing including Grund’s testimony to resolve the question of whether there was an attorney-client relationship betwee n David and Grund. In

re Marriage of

Newton
, No. 1-07-2590 (2008) (unpub li s h e d o rd e r u n d er Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 15 David filed a

petition f or rehe aring

. On J uly 15, 2008, we enter ed an or der de nying the

-4-petition for rehe aring and further order ed that Arthur Be rman, who had joined Grund &

L eavitt, was allowed to repr esent Hadley while the disqualification motion was pending

. On November 26, 2008, the I llinois Supreme Court denied David’s petition for leave to appea l, and on J anuary 8
, 2 0 0 9
, we returne d the mandate to the circ uit court. David also filed a motion seeking revie w of a cer tified question (sec ond appea l) on J uly 16, 2008, pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 308 (ef f. Feb

. 1
, 1 9 94)). Howeve r, we dismiss ed that appe al. ¶ 16 On J anuar

y 22, 2009, Grund and L eavitt filed a petition fo r at torney fee s on behalf of Hadley pursua n t t o s ec t i o ns 501 and 508 of the Act (750 I L CS 5/501, 508 (West 2008)),

s eeking prospec tive and interim fee s and costs from David in the amount of $ 2 5 0
, 0 0 0
, including amounts incurre d during both appea ls. The court conducte d a hearing as direc ted

on Fe bruar

y 25, 2009, and Grund testified that he told Da vid that r epre sentation would not b egin until David actually signe d a contract, that no attorney-client privilege would attac h during their m eeting
, and that David s h o u l d n o t d isclose any thing to Grund that could not
appea r in answe rs to interrog atories or in the public rec ord. Grund testified that David “volunteer ed some information,” but Grund did not rec all any thing specific ally

. Grund denied takingany

notes. Grund be lieved David never intended to actually

hire him. Grund also denied g iving David a business car d with his private cellular telephone number, but was impeache d by the production by David of Grund’s business car d with his cellular telephone number wr itten on the back of the car d. In rebuttal, David testified that Grund assure d him

ever y thing they discussed wa s confidential. ¶ 17 On Marc h 3, 2009, the circ uit court enter ed its memorandum opinion and order finding that there was an attorney -client relationship betwee n David and Grund and disqualifying Grund and L eavitt from repr esenting Ha d l ey

. The court specific ally found t hat, “[ c]learly
, from Mr. Grund’s own int er ro gat ion of Hadley it is obvious that he believed there to be a conflict and that he so informed Hadley
, yet he knowing ly enter ed into a reta iner agree ment with her.” ¶ 18 The court also specific ally found t hat “Mr. Grund’s credibility *** was dim ini s h ed by his impeachme nt and g ener al demea nor. His attitude on the stand was sarc astic, evasive
, cava lier and a

rgumentative ***.” ¶ 19 On Marc h 10, 2009, the matter was befor e the court on Grund and L eavitt’s fee petition. Since Grund a

nd L eavitt wer e disqualified, the par ties and the c ourt discussed whe ther the petition should be treated as a section 501, 508 or 503(j) petition, bu t u l t imately the court

co ncluded that it could not awa rd attorney fee s in any event beca use of coun s el ’s disqualification. Grund and L eav i t t argued strenuously for fees under section 508, and the

co u rt offe red to find them in contempt so that they could immediately appea l. T h e co u rt asked c ounsel to step awa y from the bench, but counsel did not do so, and the c ourt found them in contempt. In its order, the c ourt stated: “The court informed Grund and L eavitt that it would not and could not hold a hear ing with reg ard to the fee s they incurre d by virtue of th ei r re p re s entation of Hadley Newton and would deny their fee petition. The court also order ed Grund and L eavitt
to step awa

y from the bench. They ref used to d o s o and there fore it is order ed as

-5-follows: 1. The Gr und & L eavitt fe e petition is denied.
2. Mr. Grund and Mr. L eavitt are found to be in direc t contempt of this court for their fa ilure to obey

the cour t’s disqualification orde r. 3. Grund & L eavitt shall pay a fine of $100 to purg e said c ontempt.” ¶ 20 There afte r, Grund and L eavitt appea led both the disqualification order and the contempt order

. On J une 2, 2009, we enter ed an order granting David’s motion to dismiss the appea l

o f t h e d isqualification order
, but denied his motion to dismiss the appea l of the cont em p t order

.

¶ 21 ANALYSI S ¶ 22 David asser

ts that the appea l is moot since the judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e has been e ntere d. Howeve r, there is no authority for David’s proposition that pending attorney fee petitions are re n d er ed moot by the entry of j udg ment of di ssolution. Rather, as section 508(c) (2) provides, aw ar d i n g fee s under a petition is a distinct cause of action from a proce eding for dissoluti on of marria g e. We there fore proce ed to addre ss the issues prese nted in the instant appea l. ¶ 23 We now addre ss David’s argument that Grund and L eavitt’s appea l should be dismiss ed beca use they lack standing

. Acc ording to David, once Grund and L eavitt wer e disqualified, they had no standing to seek attorney fee s incurre d on behalf of Hadley beca use their petition

was broug ht und er s ec t i o n 5 01 of the Act, and section 501 makes provision only for the petitioning party ’s curr ent counsel, and not for m er counsel (750 I L CS 5/501(c-1) (West 2008)). ¶ 24 Howeve r, Hadley ’s petition for an awa rd of attorney fee s fro m Da v i d wa s b ro u gh t pursuant t o b o t h s ec t i on 501 and section 508 of the Act, and not only section 501. At the hear ing on the petition counsel and the c ourt discussed whe ther section 501 or section 508 of the Ac t applied. The c ourt did not feel it would be “appr opriate” to tr eat the fe e petition

as broug ht under section 508, and it wanted i n s t ea d t o treat the petition as broug ht under section 503(j) at the end of the dissoluti on proce eding

. The cour t found that Grund and L eavitt wer e not entitled to any fee s in any event beca use of their disqualification and denied the fee petition. Grund and L eavitt argued befor e the court, and argue now on appea l befor e us, that they

are entitled to fee s under se ction 508. ¶ 25 We clar ify that althoug h t h e parties, including Grund and L eavitt, asser t that Hadley ’s petition filed J anuar

y 22, 2 0 0 9
, soug ht fee s from David only pursuant to section 501, the

rec ord shows the petition soug ht fee s pursuant to section 508 as well. Section 508(a) of the Act provide s the followingas to counsel’ s rig ht to collect fe es under the Act: “The court from time to time, afte r due notice and hearing, and afte r considering the financ ial resour ces of the parties, may order any party to pay a rea sonable amount for h i s own or the other party ’s costs and attorney ’s fee s. Interim attorney ’s fee s an d
costs m ay b e awa

rded from the opposing party , in a pre- judgme nt dissoluti on proce eding in acc ordanc e with subsection (c- 1) of Section 501 [750 I L CS 5/501] and

-6-in any other proc eeding

under this subsection.” 750 I L CS 5/ 508(a) (West 2010). ¶ 26 Her e, the pe tition for attorney fee s was filed on J anuar

y 22, 2009, duringthe pende ncy of the dissoluti on proce eding s, and was still pending at the time the judgme nt for dissoluti on

was e ntere d. Thus, Grund a nd L eavitt have standingto seek fe es under section 508. ¶ 27 Grund and L eavitt also have standing beca use they are appea ling the contempt order

. A contempt order is final and appea lable and g ener ally also bring s the propriety of the underlying disqualification order and denia l of attorney

fee s befor e us. Direc tly on point is SK Ha n dtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.
, 246 I ll. App. 3d 979 (1993), wher e the defe ndant and contemnor appea led a finding of civil contempt, incl u d i n g a $ 1 00 fine, imposed for contemnor’ s failure to obey the trial court’s disqualification order

. SK Handtool Corp.
, 246 I ll. App. 3d at 985. Counse l for both sides of the litigation in SK Handtool indicated that, afte r this court denied leave to appea l and a petition for leave to appea l to the
supreme court was denied, the only avenue to seek revie w of the disqualification order was to find counsel for Dre sser in contempt of that order
, and so the court found counsel in direc t contempt for failing to c omply with the order

. SK H andtool Corp.
, 246 I ll. App. 3d at 985. We held that we had jurisdiction of the contempt finding
, wh i ch b ro u ght the underlying disqualification order before the court. SK Handtool Corp.
, 246 I ll. App. 3 d at 986 (citing Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Street
, 163 I ll. App

. 3 d 654, 657 (1987))

. Her e, simil arly
, a contempt order was enter ed ag ainst Grund and L eavitt, finding them in contempt for failing
to step awa

y from the bench afte r they ref used to comply with the disqualification order and d en i al o f fee s, and thus they have standing to appea l and we have jurisdiction. Grund an d L eavitt’s disqualification did not strip them of standing or divest this court of jurisdiction to revie w the conte mpt order a nd underly

ing disqua lification and re sulting denia l. ¶ 28 Although Grund does not appea l the disqualification order
, it is nece ssary to revie w it to deter mine if the denia l of fee s was prope r, which le d to the findingof conte mpt.

¶ 29 DI SQUAL I FI CATI ON ¶ 30 The trial court’s denial of Grund and L eavitt’s fee s was founded o n t h e trial court’ s d et er m i n at ion that they wer e disqualified due to a conflict of interest with Grund’s prior
repr esentation of David. Rule 1.9(a) of the I llinois Rules of Professional Conduct (I ll. Rs. of Prof’l Conduct, R. 1.9(a) (ef f. Aug . 1, 1990)) pr ovides: “Rule 1.9. Conflict of Intere st: Former Client (a) A l awy er who has former ly repr esente d a client in a matter shall not there afte r: (1) repre sent another person in the s ame or a subst an tially related m atter in which that person’ s interests are materia lly adver se to the interests of the former client, unless the for

mer c lient consents af

ter disclosure ; or (2) use information relating to the represe ntation to the di sadvanta g e of the former client, unless: (A) suc h use is permitted by Rule 1.6; or (B ) the information has become g ener ally known.” I ll. Rs. of Prof’l

-7-Conduct, R. 1.9 (eff . Aug . 1, 1990). ¶ 31 We find the circ uit court’s deter mination corr ect. Grund and L eavitt’s repr esentation of Hadley v i o l at ed Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. The testimony at the hear ing below

es t abli shed that David soug ht leg al advice from Grund and that Grund discussed Da v i d ’s marria g e and divorce with him during his consultation. “An attorney /client relationship can be created at the i nitial interview betwee n th e p ro spective client and the attorney , and it is possible that confide ntial information passed during the interview sufficie nt to disqualify the attorney from repr esenting the opposing party in related litigation.” Nuccio v. Chicago Commodities, Inc.
, 257 I ll. App. 3d 437, 440 (1993) (citing Herbe s v. Graham
, 180 I ll. App. 3d 692 (1989))

. “[T] he relationship ca n come into beingduringthe initial contact betwe en the lay person and the profe ssional and ap p ea rs t o hinge on ‘ “the client’s belief that he is consulting a

lawyer in that capa city

and his manifeste d intention to seek profe ssional leg al advice .” ’ ” Herbe

s , 180 I ll. App. 3d at 699 (quoting W estinghouse Elec tric Corp. v. KerrMcG ee Corp.
, 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978), quoting Edwar d W. Cleary
, McCormick

on Evidence § 88, at 179 (2d ed. 1972)). The testimony at the hear ing below established that David consulted w ith Grund and sought leg al advice reg ardinghis divorce. We agree with the circ uit court’s deter

mination that David’s consultation with Gru n d gave rise to an attorney -client re lationship. ¶ 32 Fur

thermore
, since David and Hadley wer e parties in the identical case , there was clea rly

a substantial relationship betwee n Grund’s repr esentation of Da v i d and Grund’s
repr esentation of Hadley reg arding their divorce

. “ ‘Onc e a substantial relationship is found betwee n the prior and present represe ntations, it is irrebuttably presume d that confide ntial information was disclosed in the ear lier repr esentation.’ ” Franzoni v. Hart Schaffner & Marx
, 312 I ll. App. 3d 394, 403-04 (2000) (qu o t i n g He rbes
, 180 I ll. App. 3d at 700). See also SK Handtool Corp.
, 246 I ll. App. 3d at 990 (“I f such a relationship exis ts, it is presumed that the client disclosed co n fidential information to the attorney during the prior
repr esentation.” (citing Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc.
, 116 I ll. App. 3d at 1055, and Novo Therapeutisk Laboratori um v. Baxter Travenol Laboratori es, Inc.
, 607 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) ( en banc )))

. Thus, there is an irreb u t table presumption that confide ntial information was disclosed during Grund’s consultation with David. There afte r, Grund was prohibited by Rule 1.9 from repr esenting Hadley

. The circ uit court did not err in (1) finding that Grund had not rebutted the presumption; (2) in finding that Grund and L eavit t we re disqualified; and (3) in enteringthe disqualification orde r.

¶ 33 DENIAL OF F EES ¶ 34 A. Under Section 508 of the Ac t ¶ 35 We next deter mine whether the court below was corr ect in its deter mination that Grund and L eavitt’s disqualification barr ed them from rec overing attorney fee s. Section 508(a) of the Act pr ovides:
“T h e co urt *** may order any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own or the other party ’s costs and attorney ’s fee s. Interim attorney ’s fe es and costs may be

awa rded from the opposing party , in a pre- judgme nt dissol u t i o n proce eding in

-8-acc ordanc e with subsection (c- 1) of Section 501 [750 I L CS 5/501] and in any other
proce edingunder this subsection.” 750 I L CS 5/ 508(a) (West 2010). ¶ 36 Section 508(a) further provides, in re levant par

t: “Awa rds may be made in connec tion with the following: (1) The maintenanc e or de fense of any proce edingunder this Act. (2) The enfor ceme nt or modification of any order or judgme nt under this Act. (3) The defe nse of an appea l of any order or judgme n t u n der this Act, including the defe nse of a ppeals of post-judg ment order s. (3.1) The pro s ec u tion of any claim on appea l (if the prosec uting party has substantially

preva iled). (4) The maintenanc e or defe nse of a petiti on broug ht under S ection 2-1401 of the Code of Civil P roce dure [735 I L CS 5/ 2-1401] seeking relief from a final order or judg ment under this Act. (5) The costs and leg al service s of an attorney rende red in prepa ration of the

commence ment of t h e proce eding broug ht under this Act.” 750 I L CS 5/508(a) (West 2008).
I n t h ei r petition on behalf of Hadley
, Grund and L eavitt soug ht fee s from David u n d er section 508 larg ely for thei r wo rk perf ormed on their prosec ution of Hadley ’s appea l and defe nse of David’s appea l under subsections (a) (3) and (a) (3.1). See 750 I L CS 5/508(a)( 3), (a) (3.1) (West 2008). Grund and L eavitt arg ue there is no limit ation to their rig ht to seek fee s under section 508. Howeve r, althoug h Grund and L eavitt perc eive no limit ation to an awa rd of attorney fee s under section 508 which could be based o n t h ei r disqualification due to a conflict of interest, section 50 8 (c )( 3 ) ap plies to Grund and L eavitt’s petiti on for fees, as it seeks fee s for servic es under sections 508(a) (1) through (a) (5). The conditions stated in 1 section 508(c) (3) apply to both petitions for final hear ings for attorney fee s and costs ag ainst

an attorney ’s own client under section 508(c) (3), as well as to an independe nt proce eding for service s within the scope of subdivisions (1) through (5) of section 508(a)

. 750 I L CS 5/508(c)( 3) (West 2008). Section 508(c) (3) specific ally conditions the enfor cea bility of a fee
ag ree ment on meetingapplicable court rule s:

“(3) The deter

mination of rea sonable attorney ’s fe es and c osts either under this

s ubsection (c)
, whether initiated by a counsel or a client, or in an i n d ep en d en t proce eding for service s within the scope of subdivisions (1) throug h (5) of subsection (a)
, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. The court shall first consider the written enga g ement agree ment and, if the court finds that the former client and the filing counsel, pursuant to their written eng ag ement agreem ent, entere d into a contract which mee ts ap p l i ca b le requireme nts of court rules and addre sses all

m ater ial terms, t hen the contra ct s hall be enforce able in acc ordanc e with its t er m s , subject to the further require ments of this subdivision (c) (3).” (Emphasis added.) 750

Grun d and Lea vitt ’s cl ai m for pro spe ct ive fe es was ini ti al ly par t of the ir pet it ion
, but i s 1 ir re le vant no w on a ppe al due to th ei r d is qua li fi cat ion

.
-9-I L CS 5/ 508(c) (3) ( West 2008).

Her e, Grund and L eavitt’s contra ct with Hadley did not meet the applicable require ments of

our cour t rules, as it violated Rule 1.9, and ther efor e the c ontrac t was unenf orce able unde r section 508 of the A ct.

¶ 37 B. G rund and L eavitt’s Contrac t Wi th Hadley Was Void Ab Initio ¶ 38 A second, broade r, basis supporting the circ uit court’s denial of attorney fee s is the fac t that Grund and L eavitt’s fe e agr ee m ent with Hadley is void for violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. Whil e the ethical rules do not expli citly provide for an ipso facto reje ction of attorney fee s when an attorney is disq u al i fi ed due to a conflict of interest,
supreme c ourt rules have the f orce of law a

nd repr esent the public policy of this state. ¶ 39 W h i l e I l l i nois courts strong ly favor the fre edom of contra ct, a court will d ec l ar e a contra ct void if it contravenes the public policy of the state. Fosler v. Midwest Care Center II, Inc.
, 398 I ll. App. 3d 5 63 (2009). A court will not decla re a contra ct illega l unless it expressly contravenes the law or a known public policy of this State. Holstein v. Grossman
, 246 I ll. App. 3d 719, 726 (1993) (c iting Schniede rjon v. Krupa
, 130 I ll. App. 3d 656, 659, 474 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1985))

. I f the subject matter of a contra ct is illega l, that contra ct is void ab initio

. Illinois State Bar Ass’n Mutual Insurance Co. v. C

oregis Insurance Co.
, 355 I ll. App. 3d 156, 1 6 4 (2 0 04). “[A] contra ct that is void ab initio is treated as though it never exis ted; neither party

can c hoose to ratify

the contra ct by simply waiving its rig ht to asser t the defe ct.” Coregis Insurance Co.
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 164. Courts will not enfor ce contra ct terms that violate public policy

. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason
, 181 I ll. 2d 460, 482 (1998) (citing American Fede ration of State, County & Municipal Employe es v. Department of Ce n tral Managem ent Servic es , 173 I ll. 2d 299, 317-18 (1996); Bene fi c ia l D e v e lo

p m e n t Co r

p

. v. City of Highland Park
, 161 I ll. 2d 3 2 1
, 330-31 (1994))

. “The question of whether a contra ct is enfor ce ab l e u nder considerations of public policy is a conclusion of law.” Holstein
, 246 I ll. App. 3d at 726 (citing Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank
, 245 I ll. 180 (1910))

. ¶ 40 Prece dent establishes that our Code of Professional Conduct, part of our Supreme Court Rules, have the f

orce of law and embody the publ ic pol icy of our state. “The I llinois Code of Professional Responsibili ty is a Supreme Court Rule.” Marvin N. Benn & Associates, Ltd.

v. Nelsen Steel & W

ire, Inc.
, 107 I ll. App. 3d 442, 447 (1982). “Supreme court rules have the fo rc e o f law and are indicative of public policy in the are a of attorney conduct.” A l b er t Brooks Friedman, Ltd. v. Malev itis , 304 I ll. App. 3d 979, 984 (1999), appeal denied
, 185 I ll. 2d 617 (1999) (citing Marvin N. Benn & Associates
, 10 7 I l l

. App. 3d at 447). “Supreme Court Rules have the function of law [citation] and thus are another strong indicator of public policy in the are a of at t orney conduct.” Marvin N. Benn & Associates
, 107 I ll. App. 3d at 447. Where attorney conduct is at issue, we look to the Supreme Court Rules for expressions of public policy

. Richards v. SSM Health Care, Inc.
, 311 I ll. App. 3d 560, 564 (2000) (citing Marvin N

. Benn & Associates
, 107 I ll. App. 3d at 447). The I llinois Suprem e C o u rt Ru les should be followed; they are not sug g estions, nor are they aspirational. In re Haley D.
, 403 I ll. App. 3d 370, 375 (2010); Applebaum v. Rush University Medic al Center
, 231 I ll. 2d 429,

-10-447 (2008); People v. Y oung , 387 I ll. App. 3d 1126, 1127 (2009). He re, Rule 1.9 is a clea r prohibition on repr esenting a party with a conflicting in t er est

. Thus, the contract was void ab initio

. 2 ¶ 41 Fur

thermore
, while the supreme court rules do not expli citly state that attorney fee s are barr ed, the judicial de cisions of our state are clea r and long standing that attorney fee s will
not be allowed if counsel is disqualified due to a conflict of inter est. “The public policy of this State is ref

lected in its constitution, its statutes and its judicial decisions.” Holstein
, 246 I ll. App. 3d at 726 (citing O’Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster
, 127 I ll. 2d 333, 341 (1989))

. Prece dent holds that, “[g]ener ally
, an attorney may not rec eive fe es afte r repr esenting ad v er s e, conflicting
, and antag onistic interests in the same litigation.” In re Estate of V

ail
, 309 I ll. App. 3d 435, 441 (1999). See also In re Estate of Kirk
, 292 I ll. App. 3d 914, 923 (1997) (“It has been stated as a g ener al principle that attorney s may not rec over fee s afte r repr esenting adver se, conflicting
, and antag onistic interests in the litigation.” (citing In re Estate of H

alas
, 159 I ll. App. 3d 818, 831 (1987))) ; King v. King , 52 I ll. App. 3d 749, 753 (1977) (“An attorney cannot rec over from the party that he has wrong ed for leg al service s wher e he has repr esente d adver se, conflicting
, and antag onistic interests in the same litigation.”)

. ¶ 42 King
, relied upon by David, involved a divorce case wher e an attorney repr esente d one
spouse afte r he initially consulted with the other spouse, just as in this case , and is prec isely

on point. In King
, t h e husband visited the law office of the attorney to discuss his marital problems and the possibili ty of divorce

. King
, 52 I ll. App. 3d at 751. He consulted with the attorney for less than one-ha lf hour and did not reta in him. Id

. The wife filed a complaint for
separ ate maintenanc e and reta ined the attorney who previously consulted with her husband. Id

. The husband filed a motion to exclude the attorney , but the trial court denied it. Id

. The
court enter ed a decr ee of separ ate maintenanc e and order ed the husband to pay the wife’ s attorney fee s in the amount of $6,000, and the husband appealed. Id . at 752. The a ppellate
court found that an attorney-client relationship exis ted betwee n the attorney and the husband and that it was improper for the attorney to then undertake the repr esentation of the wife. Id

. at 7 53. The court reve rsed the awa rd of attorney fee s. Id

. The court held that “[t] he ru l e [aga inst repr esenting conflicting interests] applies even though the attorney acq u i re d no knowledg e which could operate to the client’s disadvantag e,” and “[i] t makes no differ ence that the client offe red no compensation and the attorney neither made nor expected to make
any char g e for his service s.” King
, 52 I ll. App. 3d at 753. Fur ther, the motives or intentions of the attorney

are irrele vant. King , 52 I ll. App. 3d at 753. ¶ 43 Grund and L eavitt argue that King is inappli ca b l e beca use it was decide d prior to the

enac tment of the Act. Howeve r, the strict bar ag ainst repr esent i ng parties with conflicting interests wa s established as part of the public policy of our state longbefor e the e nactment of the I llinois Code of Professional Responsibili ty (I SBA 1970). See People v. Gerold
, 265 I ll. 448, 477 (1914) (“The rule has long been firmly established that an atto rn ey ca n n o t

We not e tha t al tho ugh the cou rt m ent ion ed quan t u m m e r u i t dur ing a hea ri ng, Grund and 2 Lea vitthave no t r ai sedth is is sue on a ppe al andit is not pr ope rl y befor e us

.
-11-repr esent conflicting interests or undertake to d ischarg e inconsistent duties.”); Strong v.

International Building L o a n & Invest. Union
, 183 I ll. 97, 102 (1899) ( per curiam ) (“ ‘[a] lawyer can, under no conce ivable circ umstances, rec over for service s rende red in the same suit to parties having opposing interests.’ ” (quoting MacD onald v. W agner , 5 Mo. App. 56, 58 (1878)) ). The sa

me re sult as in King

obtains here even a fter the enac tment of the Ac t. ¶ 44 Grund and L eavitt further argue that s ub s eq u en t d ec i s i o ns have either criticized the holding of King or found it inapplicable, citing the I llinois decisions of Nuccio
, and Page v. Hibbard
, 142 I ll. App. 3d 788 (1986), rev’d in part on other grounds
, 119 I ll. 2d 41 (1987). Howeve r, Grund and L eavitt’s attempt to avoid the application of the holding in King is not well-founde d. In Nuccio
, we found King dis ti n g u is h a b le o n ly b e c a

u s e the controve rsy exis ted for more than six y ear s prior to the filing of a motion to disqualify
, and there fore we found that the plaintiff forf

eited any issue with r eg ard to a

ny conflict of interest. See Nuccio
, 257 I ll. App. 3d at 442. We did not criticize the holding of King
, nor did we find it inapplicable. The fac ts in Pag e prese nted no conflict of interest whatsoeve r. Rather, the awa rd of attorney fee s out of funds rec eived by employ ers to lawyers who repr esent employ ees in suits ag ainst third parties was specific ally provided for by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Page
, 142 I ll. App. 3d at 797 (c iting I ll. Rev. St at. 1983, ch. 48, ¶ 138.5(b))

. ¶ 45 Grund and L eavitt never theless also maintain that they are entitled to their fee s beca use the Act permits fee s for g ood-fa ith, unsucce ssful petitions, citing In re Marriage of Pylawka
, 277 I ll. App. 3d 728 (1996), and In re Marriage ofMcCaske y , 167 I ll. App. 3d 860 (1988). Grund and L eavitt claim that if fee s are allowed for unsucce ssful g ood-fa ith petitions, they should be entitled to fee s here beca use they “won” the two prior appea ls on behalf of Hadley

. We note that on Hadley ’s previous appea l, we reve rsed the court’s order of disqualification and remanded for the purpose of conducting a full hear ing and did not make the ultimate deter mination whether G rund and L eavitt wer e disqualified. F urther, it is arguable to what extent Grund and L eavitt’s defe nse of the prior appea ls reg arding their disqualification was

on behalf of Hadley
, as opposed to being in their own interest to stay in the case and collect their fe es. ¶ 46 Also, Grund and L eavitt’s citations are wholly inapposite to the fac ts in the case at bar

. In Pylawka the cause was rema nded and the co u rt was order ed to rec onsider the denial of attorney fee s where t h e ap p ellant s pouse unsuccessfully
, but in g ood faith, argued that the
amount of a tax ref

und constituted a substantial chang e in circ umstances and nece ssitated an adjustment of the other spouse’s net income. In re Marriage of Pylawka
, 277 I ll. App. 3d at 735. In McCaske

y , the spouse soug ht fee s afte r she had proce eded in g ood faith in an action
to set the dissoluti on judgme nt aside on a jurisdictional question. In r e Marriage of McCaske y , 167 I ll. App. 3d at 866. Neither case involved the disqualification of the attorney –only that they did not win on the merits. ¶ 47 Her e, in contra st, Grund and L eavitt repr esente d Hadley despite a clea r, known conflict of i ntere st. Where the ethical rules have been violated and counsel has represented a party with conflicting
, adver se interests, counsel’s purported g ood faith is irrele vant. “An attorney may not undertake employ ment that constitutes a conflict of interest, no matter how honest his motives or i n t enti ons might be.” In re Estate of Kirk
, 292 I ll. App. 3d at 922 (citing In

re LaPinska
, 72 I ll. 2d 461, 469 (1978))

. Grund and L eavitt cite no authority for the

-12-proposition that attorney s repr esenting parties with conflicting interests should be awa rded attorney fee s if they

are succe ssful. ¶ 48 Finally
, Grund and L eavitt argue strenuously that the purpose of section 508 of the Act and, in particula

r, its provision allowing an awa rd of attorney fee s direc tly to the attorney s, was to “leve l the pl aying field” for economi ca l l y disadvantag ed spouses to obtain counsel of their choosing despite intimi dation tactics of wea lthier spouses. Howeve r, counsel cannot simp l y fl o u t the ethical rules. Rule 1.9 provides that repr esentation of a client with conflicting interests adver se to a former client is permitted if counsel first obtains the consent of the former client. I ll. S. Ct. Rs. of Prof. Conduct, R. 1.9(a) (1) (e ff

. Au g. 1, 1990). Howeve r, Grund and L eavitt did not obtain David’s consent. They cannot “leve l the playing field” by rolling ove r the rights of their for mer c lient, David. ¶ 49 We note that the amende d Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, though not in eff ect at the t ime of Grund’s attorney-client relations h ip with David, now help resolve the problem sug g ested by Grund and L ea v i t t. Rule 1.18 provides guidance for attorney s who have an initial consultation with a prospec tive client, but then later desire to repr esent another party with conflicting
, adver se interests. Under Rule 1.18, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospec tive cli en t s h all not repr esent a client with interests materia lly adver se to those of a p ro s pective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer rec eived information from the prospec tive client that could be signific antly harmful
to that person in the matter (I ll. Rs. of Prof’l Conduct, R. 1.18(c) (ef f. J an. 1, 2010)), except if: “(1) both the aff ecte d client and the prospec tiv e cl i ent have g iven informed consent, or (2) the lawyer who rec eived the information took r easona ble measur es to avoid
exposure to more disq ualifying information than was rea sonably nece ssary to deter mine whether to repr esent the prospec tive client; and t h at lawyer is timely

s cr eened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of t h e fe e there from.” I ll. Rs. of P rof’ l Conduct, Rs. 1.18(d)(1), (d) (2) ( eff . J an. 1, 2010). ¶ 50 Commi ttee comment 5 to Rule 1.18 provides how this result can be achie ved: “(5) A l aw y er may condition conver sations with a prospec tive client on the person’ s informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from repr esenting a differ ent client in the mat t er

. ” I ll. Rs. of Prof’l Conduct, R. 1.18, Commi ttee Comment (ef f. Jan. 1, 2010). ¶ 51 This blueprint for repr esenting a spouse afte r having an initial consultation with the other
spouse should discourag e the tactica l “conf licting out” of divorce attorney s b y wealthier spouses that Grund a

nd L eavitt sug g est is a per vasive pra ctice in the a

rea of divorce law. ¶ 52 We emphasize that the Rules of Professional Conduct rec ognize that the prac tice of law is a publi c trust and lawy ers are the trustees of the j udicial s y stem. Horwit z v. Ho labird & Root
, 212 I ll. 2d 1, 16-17 (2004). “A single focus animates our rules of profe ssional conduct and the c ommon law of this state: the client’s be st interest.” Albert Brooks Friedman, Ltd. v. Male vitis , 304 I ll. App. 3d 979, 985- 86 (1999). “[A]ny thing which might tend to de base the lear ned prof essions is at war with the public interest and is ther efor e contr ary to public

-13-policy .” Marvin N. Be nn & Associates
, 107 I ll. App. 3d at 440 (citing In re Miller
, 7 I ll. 2d

443 (1955))

. ¶ 53 Her e, Grund and L eavitt violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, a supreme court rule having the forc e o f law and a clea r expression of the public policy ag ainst attorney s repr esenting clients with conflicting interests. Thus, we have no difficulty in concluding
, as the court did, that their contra ct with Hadley was void ab initio

. Therefo re , t h ere is no contra ct basis upon which to aw ard the m fee s. ¶ 54 Although Grund and L ea v itt argue that they should be entitled to fee s incurre d before they wer e disqualified by the court’s order
, Grund violated Rule 1.9 at the moment he agree d
to meet with Hadley knowing he had a conflict. Grund knew from the initial consultation with Hadley that there was a conflict of interest. The testimony by Hadley at t rial was that Grund told her of the conflict. Notably
, this testimony was unrebutted by Grund and L eavitt. As the court clea

rly stated, it is inexpl icable that Hadley made it past scre ening and that Grund agree d to repr esent her. Grund was clea rly prohibited by Rule 1.9 from enter ing into

a re t ai n er ag ree ment with Hadley

. As noted ear lier in our analy sis, “[a]n attorney /client relationship can be cre ated at the initial in t er v i ew b et wee n the prospec tive client and the attorney .” N

u cc i o v. Chicago Commodities, Inc.
, 257 I ll. App. 3d 437, 440 (1993) (citing Herbe s v. Graham
, 180 I ll. App. 3d 692 (1989))

. There fore
, Grund is barr ed from any ear lier fee s based on either g round we have discussed: (1) the reta iner agree ment was unenfor cea ble under section 508(c) (3) of the Act; or (2) the reta iner agree ment was void ab initio as ag ainst public policy

. ¶ 55 Next we consider the time betwee n the signed re tainer a nd the disqualification. ¶ 56 S ec t i o n 508(c) (3) provides, “[t] he court shall first consider the written e n gage m en t ag ree ment” to find whether “the former client and the fi l i n g co unsel *** entere d into a contra ct which meets applicable require ments of court rules.” (Emphasis added.) 750 I L CS 5/508(c)( 3) (West 2008). The relationship of attorney and client is a contra ctual one and is

cre ated by a reta iner or an offe r to reta in or fee paid. Holstein v. Grossman
, 246 I ll. App. 3d 719, 743 (1993). “A client must manifest his authorization for an attorney to act on his behalf and the attorney must ind i cate his acc eptanc e of the authorization to repr esent the client’s interests.” Kehoe v. Saltarelli
, 337 I ll. App. 3d 669, 676 (2003) (citing Torres v. Divis
, 144 I ll. App. 3d 958, 963 (1986)). ¶ 57 Grund and L eavitt are not entitled to any attorney fees b ef o re t h e co urt enter ed the d i s qu alification order beca use the reta iner agree ment itself was void ab initio as ag ains t public policy due to the clear viol ation of Rule 1.9. At the hea ring on Marc h 10, 2009, the
court cog ently explained to Grund: “You don’t g et any [fees] beca use your disqualification relates to the date of the contra ct and in eff ect voids your contra ct to repr esent.” In the court’s memorandum opinion and order
, i t found that, “[c]learly
, from Mr. Grund’s own interro gat ion of Hadley it is obvious that he believed there to be a conflict and that he so informed Ha dley , yet he knowing ly enter ed into a re tainer a g ree ment with her.” ¶ 58 We ag ree with the co u rt ’s i nsightful and well-re asoned opinion and order
, as it is in

acc ord with both section 508(c) (3) of the Act and Rule 1.9. The conflict of interest was prese nt at the time Grund enter ed into the contra ct with Hadley

. There fore
, Grund’s contra ct

-14-wi t h Hadley is unenfor cea ble under the plain languag e of section 508(c) (3) (750 I L C S 5/508(c)( 3) (West 2008)), as well as void ab initio as ag ains t p ub l i c p olicy due to the violation of Rule 1.9 of the Supreme Court Rules of Prof essional Conduct.

¶ 59 CONTEMPT ORDER ¶ 60 Grund and L eavitt argue the circ uit court erred in enter ing the contempt order bec ause the under lying or der de nying the m attorney fee s was in er

ror. In its order, the c ourt stated:
“T h e co urt informed Grund and L eavitt that it would not and could not hold a hear ing with reg ard to the fee s they incurre d by virtue of thei r re p re s en tation of Hadley Newton and would deny their fee petition. The court also order ed Grund and L eavitt to step awa

y from the bench. They ref used to do so and there fore it is order ed as follows: 1. The Gr und & L eavitt fe e petition is denied.
2. Mr. Grund and Mr. L eavitt are found to be in direc t contempt of this court for their fa ilure to obey

the cour t’s disqualification orde r. 3. Grund & L eavitt shall pay a fine of $100 to purg e said c ontempt.” ¶ 61 We find that the circ uit court did not err in finding Grund and L eavitt in contempt based

on their unwillingness to step aside, thus continuing their unwillingness to comply with the disqualification and r esulting de nial of attorne y fee s. ¶ 62 Contempt of court ca n result from a party ’s failure t o comply with the terms of a

court order

. People v. Coupland
, 387 I ll. App. 3d 774, 777 (2008). Persons subject to the order of

a court having jurisdiction must obey the order until it is reve rsed by a revie wing court or set aside or modified. Busey Bank v. Salyards
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 214, 217 (1999) (citing People

v. Grave s , 74 I ll. 2d 279, 284-85 (1979), quoting Faris v. Faris
, 35 I ll. 2d 305, 309 (1966))

. “[E] x posing oneself ‘to a finding of contempt is an appropr iate method of testing the validity of a court order .’ ” In re Marriage of Rosenbaum- Golden
, 3 8 1 I l l

. Ap p

. 3d 65, 82 (2008) (quoting In re Marriage ofBey er , 324 I ll. App. 3d 305, 321 (2001))

. “ ‘[W ]hether a party is
guilty of contempt is a question of fac t for the trial court, and *** a revie wing court will not disturb the finding unless it is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evi d en ce or the rec ord ref lects an abuse of discretion.’ ” Kill i o n v. C i ty of Centralia
, 381 I ll. App. 3d 711, 715 (2008) ( quoting In re Marriage of Logston , 103 I ll. 2d 266, 286-87 (1984)). ¶ 63 We note the well-establis h ed rule that wher e a “ ‘refusa l to comply with a trial court’s order constitutes a g ood-fa i t h ef fo rt to secur e an interpre tation of [an issue without direc t prec edent], it is appropriate to vacate a contempt citation on appe al.’ ” Mueller I ndustries, Inc. v. Berkm an , 399 I ll. App. 3d 456, 482 (2010) (quotin g Ca n g el osi v. C apasso , 366 I ll. App. 3d 225, 230 (2006))

. Howeve r, under the fa ct s o f t h is case , we find that Grund and L eavitt’s ref

usal to comply with the circ uit court’s order denying them fee s did not constitute

a g ood-fa ith eff

ort to secur e an interpre tation without direc t prec edent. Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is clea r that repr esenting clients with con fl icts of interest is prohibited. Prec ed en t i s clea r that fee s for such prohibited repr esentation are barr ed. I t is unrebutted that Grund knew o f the conflict befor e he agree d to repr esent Hadley and y et

-15-undertook to repr esent her any way , thus paving his own road to the denial of fee s. There fore
, the court’s adjudication of civil contempt wa s we l l founded and not ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evide nce or an abuse of discre tion. ¶ 64 Fu rt h er , we n ote t hat i n this very case Grund had previously been found in direc t civil contempt in an o rd er dated J une 30, 2008, in which the court found: “Gr und’s verba l outbursts obstructed and e mbarra ssed the cour t and constituted a dire ct def iance of a c ourt order befor e a judge in open court and Grund is foun d t o be in direc t contempt of court. I t is order ed that contemnor David Grund will pay to the C lerk of the Circuit Court a fine of $500.00 forthwith. Grund is rema nded to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff and

re lease d upon pay

ment of the fine. Mitti mus stayed 48 hours–10:40 am 7/2/08” s / J u d ge J ordan.” ¶ 65 The fac t that the order states that Grund and L eavitt wer e found in dir ect contempt “for their failure to obey the court’s disqualification order ” indicates that the court was attempting
to coer ce compliance with its order denying Grund and L eavitt’s fee s. The order stated that
paying the fine would purg e the c ontempt. ¶ 66 We note that our distinguished colleagues in the Four th District take a differ ent appr oach. In re Marriage of Samuel
, 394 I ll. App. 3d 398 (2009), is instructive. In In re M arriage of Samuel the circ ui t co urt enter ed a civil contempt order imposing a fine and order ing an apolog y

. T h e ap p el l ate court found that the trial court’s imposit ion of a fine was a punishment for improper behavior

. In re Marr i a g e of Samuel
, 394 I ll. App. 3d at 402. Howeve r, the apolog y “ implie[ d] an admission of past conduct” and was “ea sily construed

as a promise not to eng ag e in simil ar behavior in t h e future,” and to that extent, it was

coer cive and permissible as a sanction for civil contempt. In re Marriage of Samuel
, 394 I ll. App. 3d at 402. ¶ 67 We find that the purg ing provision which would allow Grund and L eavitt an opportunity to pur g e the contempt by pay ing the $100 fine was well within the court’s discretion in the selec tion of a purg ing provision and was rema rkably restra ined, g iven the entire rec ord of this

case

.

¶ 68 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 69 For all the rea sons stated above, we hold that the trial court did not err in deny ing Grund and L eavitt attorney fee s fr o m the first moment they undertook repr esentation of Hadley based on a disqualification due to a c onflict of intere st. G rund and L eavitt’s repr esentation

o f Hadley was a known conflict of interest, in violation of Rule 1.9, and under sectio n 508(c) (3) of the Act the reta iner agree ment was not enfor cea ble. 750 I L CS 5/508(c)( 3) (West 2008). Further, we affirm t he court’s finding of contempt and hold Grund and L eavi t t h ad

no g ood-fa ith basis to draw a contempt judgment to test the validity of the court’s order denying the ir attorney

fee s due to the established c onflict of intere st.

¶ 70 Affir

med.

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