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iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

FROM ASSISTANCE TO PARTNERSHIP:

MOROCCO AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY 

IN WEST AFRICA

Mohammed El-Katiri

November 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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vi

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ISBN 1-58487-711-1
vii

FOREWORD

Morocco is seeking to position itself as a regional 

security provider in West Africa. Over recent years, 

Morocco has emerged as a key partner for the development of variety of sectors in different West African 

countries, but it also aspires to contribute to peace and 

stability of this African sub-region that continues to 

face important challenges and significant threats. In 

particular, a range of initiatives is under way to combat religious extremism, terrorism, and transnational 

organized crime including illicit drug trafficking, 

which remains a major threat to peace and security in 

the region. 

At a time of deepening budget constraints, bilateral 

cooperation with reliable and moderate regional partners offers a potential means of reducing costs while 

still maintaining regional reach in order to pursue U.S. 

security objectives. Morocco’s new efforts and initiative offer synergies with U.S. priorities for the region. 

Morocco, with its geographic location, political stability, and close cultural ties with Sub-Saharan Africa, 

offers itself as a potential partner to the U.S. defense 

community to maintain U.S. influence in the region 

and address shared security concerns.

In this monograph, Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri focuses on the geopolitical, security, and economic drivers of the renewed Moroccan interest in Sub-Saharan 

Africa. He highlights Morocco’s contribution to counterextremism in West Africa and the Sahel region 

through initiatives promoting moderate Islam, and 

concludes with a number of recommendations on 
how Morocco could be supported by the United States 

in tackling some key common challenges arising from 

these sub-regions of Africa.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI is a Director of MENA Insight, a political risk consultancy that focuses on the 

Middle East and North Africa, and a Senior Research 

Analyst at the United Kingdom’s (UK) Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC). Before joining CSRC, Dr. 

El-Katiri was a Research Fellow at the UK Defence 

Academy, and later served as a Political Risk Analyst 

at Eurasia Group and as a senior researcher at the 

Hague Institute for Global Justice. With more than 

10 years of regional experience, his research interests 

include political and economic security in North Africa and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, 

as well as North African relations with the European 

Union (EU), and security policies around the Mediterranean. Dr. El-Katiri has published numerous internal 

and external UK Defence Academy reports, including 

reference papers on national and regional security issues in the GCC and the Mediterranean, and a monograph on the Algerian national oil and gas company 

Sonatrach. In addition, his publications include commentaries and research papers in a range of languages 

for research organizations in the UK and Europe, as 

well as various newspaper articles in and about the region. Dr. El-Katiri is a frequent commentator in media 

including the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), 

the Financial Times, and Al-Jazeera.

xi

SUMMARY

Moroccan foreign policy is currently emphasizing 

its presence and relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 

in particular West Africa. The wide range of cooperative projects undertaken in recent years extends to 

security relations, with Morocco seeking to position 

itself as a regional security provider. 

Morocco’s renewed interest in sub-Saharan Africa 

is driven to a large extent by the remarkable economic 

performance of a variety of African economies over 

the last decade, and the potential for continued growth 

over coming decades. Several African countries have 

been seeing much greater—and increasing—economic activity, particularly those rich in natural resources 

such as, but not limited to, copper, gold, oil, and gas.

But shared security has also emerged as an important aspect of Morocco’s relations with a range of Sahel 

and West African countries. Moroccan decisionmakers see that peace and stability in the Sahel is not only 

a basic requirement for their own economic development but, thanks to shared security concerns, is also of 

prime importance to the stability of Morocco. Over the 

last decade, Morocco has showed intense interest in 

supporting peace and security in the region, through 

regional and broader multilateral forums such as the 

United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union.

Morocco is leveraging a range of factors—including historic ties, domestic political stability, unique 

economic and institutional development experience, 

its strategically important geographic location, and relations with Western countries—to strengthen its position in West Africa. Morocco also aspires to position 

itself as a partner of choice for the United States and 
other organizations seeking to develop their interests 

in Sub-Saharan Africa. This therefore provides opportunities for the United States to leverage common 

interests in security and stability in the region.

xii
1

FROM ASSISTANCE TO PARTNERSHIP:

MOROCCO AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY 

IN WEST AFRICA

Mohammed El-Katiri

Introduction. 

Morocco has been deepening and accelerating its 

engagement with Western African countries since the 

ascendance to the throne of the current King, Mohammed VI, in July 1999. This is evidenced by the numerous visits paid by the Moroccan King to a variety of 

West and Central African countries since 2000, and 

the number of commercial and cooperation agreements signed over the last decade. Some of the Moroccan monarch’s tours lasted for weeks, signaling not 

only the importance that the Moroccan state gives to 

sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular, the West Africa 

region, but also indicating the King’s personal fondness for these African countries. 

The desire to diversify economic partners remains 

Morocco’s main driver for strengthening and expanding its ties with West African countries. The strong 

economic growth achieved over the last 2 decades in a 

number of these states has drawn the attention of Morocco’s political and economic elites to the region. Several Western African countries, such as Cote d’Ivoire, 

Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone, and Equatorial Guinea, have rich endowments of mineral resources like 

ores and petroleum. Their economies have benefited 

from the surge in international prices for commodities and the emergence of growing middle classes. 

Moroccan interest in Africa is also driven by the necessity to gather political support among sub-Saharan 
2

African countries for Morocco’s claims to the Western 

Sahara territory. 

Morocco leverages its political connections with 

a variety of Western African rulers to facilitate business opportunities for its private investors and stateowned commercial institutions. Though Morocco has 

not been a member of the African Union since 1984, its 

relations with sub-Saharan countries and involvement 

in the continent’s security and development matters 

have never ceased. Morocco has long-standing and 

excellent relations with a number of West African 

countries such as Gabon, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire. 

Successive Moroccan Monarchs have persisted in efforts to maintain and establish new co-operative and 

productive relationships. Furthermore, unlike European and, in general, Western countries, Morocco 

benefits along with Western African countries from 

not carrying any colonial baggage. On the contrary, 

against the background of Morocco’s own struggles 

for full political sovereignty from the French during 

the 1950s, Morocco has managed to gain a reputation 

among Western African political leaders as a trusted 

ally, proactive in addressing African development 

and security challenges. 

Morocco’s current engagement in West Africa is 

multifaceted; it focuses on security cooperation, economic development, strengthening cultural ties, and 

capacity building. Moroccan authorities consider a 

more comprehensive approach will be necessary; one 

that embraces a sustained, and long-term investment 

in the region’s security and economic and human 

development. 

Seen from Morocco, this comprehensive strategy 

entails the exchange of experiences and expertise in 

institutional capacity building in a variety of key 
3

sectors that are of importance to the socio-economic 

development of West African societies. What characterizes the current strategy is the significant involvement of the Moroccan private sector. This involvement is unlike previous cooperation and engagement 

efforts that were limited to ministries and publicly 

owned institutions. 

Security assistance forms an essential component 

of Morocco’s pivot to West African countries. Without security and stability in these African countries, 

Morocco cannot achieve its economic and commercial 

objectives, since its own security is directly affected. 

Moroccan officials consider these regions to be Morocco’s hinterland, given their geographical proximity 

and strong commercial and cultural ties, but also because some of the security menaces are cross–border 

in nature, including the trafficking of drugs, weapons, 

and people. 

This monograph focuses on the geopolitical and 

economic drivers for the renewed Morrocan interest in West Africa. It also examines how Morocco is 

conducting its foreign and security policy in a variety 

of Western African countries. It highlights Morocco’s 

contribution to counterextremism in the West Africa and Sahel regions by training African Mosques’ 

imams and preachers. It concludes with recommendations on how Morocco could be supported by the U.S. 

defense community in tackling some of the key security challenges that are facing these sub-regions of Africa for the mutual benefit of both countries. Given the 

common interest between the United States and Morocco in preserving peace and stability in Morocco’s 

surrounding region, Rabat’s growing assertiveness 

in West Africa presents an opportunity, rather than 

a challenge, for U.S. interests. Morocco’s geographic 
4

location, political stability, and deep and long-standing cultural ties with sub-Saharan states provide a 

potential bridgehead for U.S. efforts to promote its security objectives in Africa. At a time of severe defense 

budget constraints, bilateral cooperation with reliable 

and moderate regional partners can provide an effective multiplier and augment the U.S. reach into otherwise challenging regions.

A History of Strong Ties with West Africa. 

Morocco’s bilateral relations with Western African 

countries are not of recent origin. These relations date 

back centuries to the time of different ruling dynasties 

that governed Morocco, such as the Almoravids and 

Almohads, as well as the current Alawi dynasty that 

has ruled since 1666. These previous rulers traded with 

sub-Saharan African countries and maintained close 

social and religious links. Relations continued despite 

challenges posed by a variety of political events, including the French protectorate and later decolonization debates.

After independence from the French and Spanish 

colonial rule in 1956, Morocco continued its relations 

with African countries. Moroccan engagement initially was driven by a desire to help colonized countries to achieve their independence through providing support to liberation movements and supporting 

their cause in international circles. Morocco was a 

key founding member of the Organization of African 

Unity (OAU, now called the African Union [AU]), an 

organization that initially was established to support 

African territories and peoples to gain their freedom 

and independence.1
5

In the 1970s, cultivating the support of sub-Saharan African countries for Morocco’s claims on Western 

Sahara became an important factor, one that continues 

to drive Moroccan foreign policy until today. Moroccan diplomacy became very active in attempts to deny 

the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD) any 

new recognition, and pursue African countries that 

had recognized RASD to withdraw their recognition. 

The effectiveness of Morocco’s African foreign policy 

was evident from the failure of the Nineteenth Annual 

Summit of the OAU in August 1982 in Tripoli, Libya, 

to achieve its two-thirds quorum, after a large number 

of African countries supporting Morocco boycotted 

the summit in protest at the admission of RASD as 

a member of the organization.2 The later acceptance 

of RASD as a member of the OAU, in turn, led Morocco to withdraw its membership in this pan-African 

organization, a situation which persists today.3

The unresolved Western Sahara issue continues to 

dominate Morocco’s foreign policy towards African 

countries and the AU. In June 2014, the appointment 

of former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano 

by the AU as a special envoy for Western Sahara revived Morocco’s tensions with the organization, but 

also highlighted how pervasive this territorial dispute 

still is in Morocco’s relations with African countries. 

Morocco objected to this appointment or any specific 

AU role, stressing that handling of this issue remains 

the exclusive domain of the United Nations (UN) 

Security Council and the Secretary-General.4

However, the withdrawal of Morocco from the 

AU in 1984 did not interrupt Morocco’s bilateral relations with many African countries and engagement 

with the continent’s development and security issues. 

Morocco has participated in many conferences and 
6

meetings concerning the African continent at UN, European Union (EU), and African levels. For example, 

Morocco played an active role in initiating a dialogue 

between African countries and the EU on migration 

and development in 2006, known as the Rabat Process. The main objective of this initiative was to bring 

together countries of origin, transit, and destination in 

Europe to discuss the migration phenomenon not only 

from a strictly security angle, but also from a development perspective.5

 Morocco initiated or joined other 

pan-African organizations to promote regional cooperation on a variety of issues, such as the Ministerial 

Conference on Fisheries Cooperation among African 

States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean that has its secretariat based in the Moroccan capital, Rabat; and the 

Community of Sahel-Sahara states (CEN-SAD) that 

Morocco joined in February 2001.6

Despite Morocco’s limited financial resources and 

position as a major recipient of international aid for 

the past 30 years, the country has continued to provide humanitarian and technical assistance to African 

countries in order to maintain its influence and signal 

its solidarity and commitment to the African continent’s causes. Over recent decades, Morocco has set 

up military hospitals and sent food and medical aid 

on a variety of occasions when Western African countries suffered from conflicts or natural disasters. The 

most recent humanitarian initiative was the setting 

up of a surgical field military hospital by the Moroccan armed forces in the Malian capital of Bamako, in 

September 2013,7 and in Guinea-Conakry in February 

2014.8 Morocco has also supported the development 

of a variety of key sectors in some West African countries by sharing its knowledge and expertise. It granted scholarships to hundreds of students and provided 

training to cadres from these countries. 
7

On the bilateral level, Morocco has particularly 

close relations with a number of West African leaders. For instance, Congo is one of its closest allies in 

Africa. The late King Hassan II of Morocco and the 

late Gabonese President Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba 

forged a cordial relationship which translated into 

closer ties between their two countries. The Gabonese 

president was one of the key supporters of Morocco’s 

sovereignty claim over Western Sahara. Both leaders 

jointly staged diplomatic interventions to end crises 

among African countries. The close relations between 

the two leaders continue under their successors, King 

Mohammed VI, and President Ali Bongo Ondimba. 

Equally, Morocco’s relations with Equatorial Guinea 

have been continuously friendly since the 1970s. 

Changing Opportunities in View of West Africa’s 

Economic Growth.

The past decade has witnessed a remarkable socioeconomic development trajectory in the economies of 

Sub-Saharan Africa. These economic achievements 

and their potential have gradually changed the perception of the region among the Moroccan political and 

business elite. Despite glaring differences in economic 

structures, rates of economic growth, and political 

stability across sub-Saharan countries, the region as 

a whole has realistic future economic potential. Since 

2003, Sub-Saharan Africa has had average annual 

growth of 5 percent. This is a significant achievement 

particularly at a time when many developed economies are struggling to grow. According to International Monetary Fund, some Western African countries are 

expected to grow at 6 percent per annum.9 These are 

Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic 
8

of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, and Sierra Leone. 

Africa’s economic progress has been driven mainly by 

the increase of international prices for commodities, 

the expansion of middle class population, and urbanization. It is also these three trends that will continue 

to make sub-Saharan Africa one of the fastest growing 

regional economies over the coming decades. 

Economic growth, particularly the last 15 years, has 

benefited from the surge in global oil and commodities 

prices in major oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria. Several West African countries are resource-abundant, such as Gabon, Republic of Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. West 

Africa’s natural resources are not limited to hydrocarbons, but also include other minerals such as iron ore, 

precious metals, and agricultural commodities. However, sub-Saharan Africa’s economic progress has 

also been derived from other diverse sources such as 

tourism and manufacturing. Demographic trends and 

urbanization have also contributed to growth. Africa’s 

population is rising rapidly at a time when population 

growth is slowing in other global regions. With a population of 924.7 million in 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa is 

the world’s second most populous region after Asia. 

The population is expected to more than double by 

2050 to reach about two billion. This high growth rate 

is driven largely by high fertility rates, on average 5.2 

children per woman (compared to a world average of 

2.5). Sub-Saharan Africa is also by far the most rapidly 

urbanizing continent. In 2014, 37 percent of the population (345.6 million people) lived in urban areas. By 

2050, about 1.1 billion will be living in cities. By 2035, 

about half of the population will be urban.10

Domestic demand has constituted an important 

part of this growth story. Africa’s middle class—
9

including North Africa—has expanded greatly over 

the last 2 decades. According to a report by the African Development Bank, the middle class doubled in 

size between 1990 and 2010, from 157 million to 326 

million.11 This effectively includes individuals earning between US$2 to US$20 per day. The middle class 

is projected to continue to grow and reach 1.1 billion 

(42 percent of the population) by 2060. The more affluent lifestyle associated with the middle class has contributed to increased domestic consumption in many 

African countries. 

Another driver pushing Moroccan political and 

economic elites to diversify the country’s economic 

relations by strengthening ties with faster-growing 

countries is uncertainty over the duration of the economic crisis in Europe, and its potential ramifications 

for Morocco and other traditional North African trade 

partners in Europe. The negative impact of the economic crisis in the EU on the Moroccan economy, whose 

main trading partner is the EU, has already been felt in 

a drop in foreign investment, the return of Moroccan 

immigrants, and a fall in some exports.

Morocco’s external economic ambitions are also a 

response to the realization by African leaders of the 

need for external assistance and foreign investment in 

order to achieve the economic development required 

to meet the rising expectations of their people. Western African governments are keen to modernize their 

economies by strengthening their competitiveness and 

economic diversity in order to make those economies 

more resilient to commodities price fluctuations. Moroccan political and business elites see in this expansion of public investment in West Africa, and in the rise 

of the middle class, a variety of business opportunities, which has encouraged them to set up production 
10

plants and distribution channels for consumer goods 

as well as engaging in the building of infrastructure 

projects. This is discernible in investment projects announced by Moroccan public and private entities over 

the last 5 years. A good example of this trend is the 

investment of the Moroccan property developer, Addoha, in building affordable housing in Mali, CongoBrazzaville, and Cameroon; as well as cement factories 

in Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry, Gabon, 

Burkina Faso, and Congo-Brazzaville.12

What characterizes the current Moroccan foreign 

policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, compared to previous engagements, is that it is a coherent and wellorchestrated strategy with a strong backing from the 

Moroccan palace. The dossier of rapprochement with 

African countries is handled at Palace level; it is in the 

hands of the King and his entourage. The Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs and other ministries play a minor 

role in developing this emerging relationship. Their 

role is limited to executing what is assigned to them 

and implementing the previously agreed cooperation 

agreement.

Morocco’s current African strategy is proactive. 

Moroccan institutions have analyzed market potentials and gone on to pursue them. This is different 

from what characterized Morocco’s relations with Africa under the late King Hassan II, which were mainly 

conducted on an ad hoc basis with the single goal of 

securing African states’ diplomatic support on the 

Western Sahara issue. However, this does not argue 

that the current rapprochement does not achieve such 

diplomatic influence. It certainly does, but also in full 

alignment with other socio-economic and security 

objectives. 
11

The formulation of Morocco’s grand strategy towards Africa has been based, to a large extent, on the 

investment experience of the country’s financial institutions in French-speaking Africa. Morocco’s three 

leading banks—Attijariwafa Bank, Banque marocaine 

du commerce extérieur (BMCE), and Banque Centrale 

Populaire (BCP)—have boosted their retail banking 

presence in several sub-Saharan African countries 

since 2005. Moroccan lenders are now occupying leading positions within the African banking landscape in 

terms of assets and regional network coverage.13 Attijariwafa bank has 414 branches in 11 West and Central 

African countries.14 BCP, after taking control of the 

Ivorian Banque Atlantique in 2012 to add to its earlier 

acquisitions of Banque populaire Morocco-Centrafricaine and Banque populaire Marocco-Guineenne, has a 

presence in seven countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. BMCE Bank with its 72.6 

percent stake in Bank of Africa has an extensive geographical coverage. In 2014, BMCE was present in 16 

countries with a total of 461 branches.15 BMCE is the 

only Moroccan bank that operates not only in Frenchspeaking Africa, but also has a presence and a plan 

to expand into English-speaking African countries in 

Central and East Africa. 

The remarkable experience of Moroccan banks’ 

expansion in Western and Central African countries 

has inspired other Moroccan companies to seek opportunities in a variety of sectors. The systematic 

insights and contacts that such institutions have aggregated from these African countries have contributed to the formulation of the new Moroccan foreign 

policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The dominance of 

economic elements in Morocco’s ongoing engagement 

with sub-Saharan African countries, and the nature 
12

of investment and economic partnership agreements 

inked so far, are an indication of the contribution of 

Morocco’s early banking investments. Those charged 

with the formulation of Moroccan policy and strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa have benefited from 

detailed insights on business opportunities in these 

African countries. 

What is different now? Morocco has aggregated 

immense expertise in a variety of fields that are needed for the development of African countries. Morocco, 

during the 15 years rule of King Mohammed VI, has 

launched major economic, social, and security projects that have given Moroccan private and public 

institutions significant experience and relevant skill 

sets. Moroccan companies in variety of sectors—from 

banking, agriculture, real estate, and pharmaceutical to physical infrastructure development—have 

accumulated extensive industry knowledge, experience, and financial wealth that allow them to expand 

internationally. 

A few leading Moroccan conglomerates, such as 

Addoha, Cooper Pharma Maroc, and the National Office of Electricity, have made accessing sub-Saharan 

African markets an important part of their internationalization strategies. Several of these companies 

have inked contracts to build overseas manufacturing 

units during the last 3 years. 

The expansion of the Moroccan state-owned Office Chérien des Phosphates (OCP) into Africa exemplifies Morocco’s new economic strategy towards Africa. 

With its rising population and agriculture production 

potential, sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly becoming an important growth market for the OCP, a world 

leading phosphate fertilizers producer. 
13

OCP has set up a new production unit in Jarf Lasfar, a Moroccan industrial park and port south of 

Casablanca that exports its entire production to SubSaharan Africa. OCP has even developed specific fertilizing products that are suitable for West Africa soils, 

such as the Teractive fertilizer that is designed for 

local crops, including: cotton, cocoa, and corn. Ivory 

Coast is by far the largest cocoa producer in the world 

followed by Ghana. Adding Nigeria and Cameroon, 

the combined share is around 70 percent of global 

production.16

In March 2014, OCP and Gabon’s state-owned 

mining company, Société Équatoriale des Mines, 

signed a partnership agreement to develop a fertilizer 

manufacturing industry involving both countries and 

dedicated entirely to meeting demand in Sub-Saharan 

Africa. The logic behind this joint venture is to exploit 

synergies between the phosphate and natural gas resources of both countries. The partnership agreement 

stipulates building an ammonia plant in Gabon that 

uses natural gas feedstock, and a phosphate fertilizers production unit. Morocco undertakes to build two 

phosphoric acid facilities and a unit to produce phosphate-based fertilizers in Morocco. OCP’s partnership 

with Gabon is driven both by the desire to tap into 

new growing markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, and by 

a need to access natural gas resources that constitute 

an important input to produce fertilizers. This project 

symbolizes the kind of partnerships by Moroccan private and public institutions that are willing to pursue 

the creation of wealth and achieve economic development across the continent. 
14

Gateway to Africa. 

The strengthening of the presence of Moroccan 

companies in sub-Saharan Africa is one pillar of Morocco’s new economic strategy. A second pillar focuses 

on positioning Morocco as both a hub and foothold for 

international companies with an interest in expanding 

across the African continent. BMCE bank was the first 

Moroccan bank to see an opportunity in becoming a 

hub for Africa by capitalizing on Morocco’s linguistic, 

political, and cultural connections with a number of 

African countries. In 2007, BMCE set up an investment 

bank in London (MediCapital Bank, since 2010 renamed BMCE Bank International Plc), with a business 

mandate to harness international partnership opportunities with interest in sub-Sahara Africa, particularly 

French-speaking Africa.17 Leveraging its expertise and 

experience in working in sub-Saharan Africa, BMCE 

has hoped to encourage international investment into 

Africa and Morocco itself. Though BMCE’s experience 

in London was not a great success, the idea of Morocco serving as a gateway for international investors 

to expand into to North and West-African countries 

was adopted by Moroccan decisionmakers, and the 

launch of the Casablanca Financial City project in 2010 

reflects this adoption. 

Casablanca Financial City is meant to become a financial hub for the French-speaking African market. 

Many of the major multinational manufacturers that 

have set up production units in Morocco have been 

attracted by the possibilities of accessing African markets. The most recent example is the decision by the 

French-based automaker, PSA Peugeot Citroën, to 

build a manufacturing facility in Morocco, with plans 

to produce 200,000 cars and 200,000 motorcycles annually. One of the main factors driving this investment, 
15

in addition to the availability of affordable skilled 

labor, is the potential for accessing sub-Saharan and 

Middle-Eastern markets18 by taking advantage of 

Morocco’s network of free trade agreements and 

excellent political ties across these two regions. 

Solidarity and Crisis Management Help. 

Morocco’s reconnection with West Africa is not 

limited only to business contracts and official visits; 

many of Morocco’s economic initiatives over the last 

few years have been launched with an important social dimension in mind. Over the last 3 years in particular, Morocco has adopted several initiatives to show 

solidarity with Western African countries. 

In 2014, Morocco launched its first program to legalize immigrants from a variety of African countries 

who had lived in Morocco for years, waiting for an 

opportunity to immigrate to Europe. The change of official attitude in Morocco towards illegal immigrants 

is not driven by the need for workers, as used to be the 

case in many European countries up until a few years 

ago. Morocco is a country with a young population 

that is larger than the current economy can provide 

with adequate job opportunities. Nor is Morocco prosperous enough to provide thousands of immigrants 

with basic socio-economic services such as education 

and heath care. 

Morocco’s tolerance of African illegal immigration 

has two other explanations. First, this is an attempt by 

the Moroccan government to refute media reporting 

alleging racist and inhumane treatment of illegal African immigrants. Second, this tolerance is an attempt to 

show Morocco's solidarity with other African peoples: 

this is a move to win the hearts and minds of Africans 
16

and demonstrate a difference from the approaches 

adopted by many European countries. 

Morocco showed its solidarity again during the 

2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which is considered to be one of the most severe, prolonged, and 

complicated outbreaks to have affected the region in 

decades, with 22,859 infection cases and a total of 9,162 

deaths, according to statistics published in February 

2015.19 When most international air carriers were suspending their flights to Western African airports over 

fear of virus contagion, Morocco’s air carrier, Royal 

Air Maroc (RAM), continued flights, including to the 

areas most affected by the Ebola epidemic; Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea.20 The continuation of RAM 

flights in and out of Western African airports allowed 

international medical aid workers to arrive at the affected areas, and Western African citizens to stay connected with the world. Maintaining scheduled flights 

was also a clear message of solidarity with Western 

African countries. 

This gesture was well-received by the political 

leadership in Western African capitals. During the 

High-Level International Conference on Ebola organized in Brussels in March 2015, Alpha Conde, the president of Guinea, praised Morocco’s stance for keeping 

its borders open, allowing the free movement of people.21 These initiatives are designed in senior Moroccan 

political circles to boost the country’s status as a reliable ally and partner for African countries. The strategy 

appears to be bearing fruit. The Moroccan monarch 

seems to have won the sympathy of West African societies and leaders, as indicated by the number of popular receptions given to the King during his June tour 

of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon.

22
17

Security Cooperation. 

Morocco has now, more than ever, vested interests in seeing Sub-Saharan Africa, and West Africa in 

particular, politically stable, secure, and prosperous. 

Increased Moroccan economic presence in West African economies will posit an important Moroccan role 

in the security of the region. In the event of political 

instability and chaos, it is Morocco which would suffer most directly, being West Africa’s main gateway 

for illegal trafficking into Europe. Having fought a 

long-standing, and so far relatively successful, battle 

against both Arab Spring-style popular protest movements on the one hand, and radical Islamist terrorism on the other, Morocco has a strong incentive to 

prevent the creation of political flash points near its 

hard to control southern borders, or of safe havens 

for international terrorist cells, whether religious in 

nature or not. Furthermore, substantial Moroccan investment projects include manufacturing plants and 

infrastructure projects that require stability to continue production. Prolonged disruptions of business operations due to any political or social instability would 

adversely affect these Moroccan investments. Without security and stability in these African countries, 

Morocco cannot achieve its economic and commercial 

objectives.

For example, the political and military crisis in 

Cote d’Ivoire that began in 2002, and particularly 

the serious post-election crisis that followed the announcement of the results of the second round of the 

presidential election on November 28, 2010, resulted 

in large-scale economic disruption that adversely 

impacted Moroccan investment and diaspora remittances.23 Attijariwafa Bank, through its subsidiary the 
18

Ivorian Society Bank, incurred a drop in its revenues, 

as it had to close down its operations for months during the height of the 2011 crisis.24 Banque populaire 

Morocco-Centrafricaine is another Moroccan-owned 

financial institution that has been adversely affected 

by deep political, security, and economic crises in Central African Republic.25 The economic disruptions as a 

result of this conflict negatively impacted the bank’s 

performance.26 For the Moroccan ruling circle, this is 

also a matter that affects personal wealth since many 

of its members hold shares, board memberships, and 

commercial roles in these companies.

Although the worst political and criminal violence 

across the region appears to be over, the security situation across West Africa, as is the case in several other 

sub-Saharan regions, remains particularly volatile. 

Decades of political turmoil and armed conflicts have 

left the region’s state authorities weak and unable to 

control nonstate armed groups or the illicit traffic of 

drugs and people in their respective territories, or to 

set up an effective regional security force.27 Since 2011, 

the flood of weapons from the Libyan conflict has also 

added to insecurity throughout West Africa, as rebels, 

terrorist groups, and criminal organizations benefit 

from the movement of arms and fighters. The rapid 

economic growth experienced in some countries has 

not benefited all citizens and provinces evenly. This 

fragile security and political situations has undoubtedly been a serious challenge to West African governments and their international partners. 

Morocco’s concerns about security challenges in 

West Africa preceded its renewed economic interest 

in this African sub-region. Given their international 

nature, the rise of terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, and illicit traffick-
19

ing of drugs and humans in West African countries 

have always been perceived as direct threats to Morocco. Given Morocco’s geographic location, criminal 

groups based in West Africa are tempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point to smuggle migrants, 

cocaine, or other narcotics to Europe. In fact, Morocco 

has become a major transit hub for the trafficking of 

migrants. Also, over the last decade, there have been 

many stories in the Moroccan press about seizures 

of cocaine proceeding from West African countries 

through Moroccan ports and airports.28 In particular, 

the nexus between organized crime and terrorism 

remains the most alarming to Moroccan security authorities. There is concern about the use of financial 

proceeds from drug and human trafficking by terrorist organizations within Morocco or at its borders to 

carry out systematic attacks within the country. 

Against this background, it is not surprising that 

Morocco has shown interest in playing an important 

role in helping West Africa and Sahel countries tackle 

their significant and complex security challenges over 

the last decade, and particularly after the events of the 

Arab Spring in 2011. Moroccan diplomacy has been 

continuously active and supportive of a variety of 

initiatives and debates in African, European, and UN 

forums, calling for structural solutions to West Africa and Sahel security problems. For instance, King 

Mohammed VI, in a speech addressed to the 69th 

session of the UN General Assembly, called on developed countries to change their attitude towards African development matters and treat African countries 

with fairness and objectivity. He asserted that “Africa 

does not need humanitarian aid as much as it needs 

mutually beneficial partnerships.”29
20

Moroccan officials argue that their engagement in 

support of peace and stability in West Africa is not 

a novelty. Morocco’s armed forces have participated 

in numerous peace missions in Africa since independence in 1956, and have provided military assistance 

to West African nations either under the umbrella of 

the UN or bilaterally to its allies since the 1960s. For 

instance, Morocco contributed to the stability of Zaire 

(now the DRC) in 1977 by sending a large Moroccan 

military contingent. The mission of Moroccan troops, 

leading a pan-African force, was to assist President 

Mobutu Sese Seko to restore control and stability in 

Shaba, a mineral-rich province, after the withdrawal 

of a Franco-Belgian force which had repulsed attacks 

by an Angola-based rebel group.30 Another Western 

African country that benefited from Moroccan military assistance is Equatorial Guinea. In September 

1979, Morocco sent 100 military officers to the then 

newly appointed President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, 

after a military coup that deposed Francisco Macias 

Nguema on August 3, 1979.31 Morocco maintained its 

security assistance to Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who 

still rules Equatorial Guinea today. Morocco has also 

contributed to UN peacekeeping forces in several 

West African countries including the Congo in 1960, 

the DRC in 1999 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004.32 Furthermore, Morocco has offered hundreds of military 

officers from West African armies opportunities to 

receive education and training in Moroccan military 

academies alongside Moroccan officers. 

Since 2012, Morocco has assumed a more assertive 

role in its foreign policy towards the West Africa and 

Sahel regions. The changes and challenges brought by 

the Arab spring in North Africa have created a new 

geopolitical environment for Morocco. The killing of 
21

Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 gave Morocco an opportunity to play an active role in one of 

the already existing pan-African economic and security cooperation organizations and initiatives. During 

his rule, Qadhafi had had an assertive foreign policy 

in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, using Libya’s 

financial resources and his unity ideology to gain 

influence.33 Morocco’s foreign policy attitude at that 

time was to avoid any competition and potential confrontation with Qadhafi for a leadership role in these 

African regions, and to opt instead for a more subtle 

approach working on a bilateral basis with West 

African countries.

Another significant change in North Africa’s geopolitical environment is the perception in Rabat and in 

Western capitals of Algeria’s shift away from playing 

an active role in the Sahel. The rapid deterioration of 

security environment along almost all Algerian borders in addition to the country’s acute internal social 

problems have forced the Algerian leadership to take 

a defensive position, and show little interest in playing a major role in the security of the region. Algeria’s refusal to participate in any Western-led military 

intervention in northern Mali, and its preference for 

a diplomatic solution has been widely interpreted as 

a withdrawal from the Sahel.34 It is beyond the scope 

of this monograph to discuss in details the motives of 

Algerian stances on the Libya and Mali security situations, but this is interpreted as a tactical retreat, allowing Algerian military strategists to adapt to the 

new complex geopolitical scene next to their borders. 

Algerian political and military elites have resisted being drawn into any exhausting war in the region with 

little prospect of resolution but have, similarly to Morocco, been affected negatively by the trafficking of 
22

weapons, people, and radical ideas pushing through 

its southern and eastern frontiers. 

In this context, the Moroccan authorities saw an opportunity to expand Morocco’s influence and assume 

a hegemonic role in the region. Morocco organized a 

series of conferences and meetings to discuss ways 

and means to fight transnational organized crime and 

terrorism, including illicit drug trafficking, which remains a major threat to peace and security in the Sahel 

and West Africa regions. In November 2013, Morocco 

held the Second Regional Ministerial Conference on 

border security between Sahel and Maghreb States 

that brought senior officials from the region together 

with representatives from the United States, France, 

and EU. Morocco offered to host the headquarters of a 

regional border security management training center 

that was agreed at the conference.35

The establishment of this center was a response to 

an acute security problem that affects many countries 

in the region. Many governments are unable or unwilling to exercise full control of their own borders, or 

coordinate with their neighboring countries on joint 

surveillance operations, a weakness that is exploited 

by terrorists and traffickers. Terrorists in particular 

find it straightforward to carry out attack operations 

and then flee to another country, seeking sanctuary. 

Once established, the center will provide training to 

officers with responsibility for border security management in the states of the region, as well as allow 

for sharing of expertise and best practices—in terms 

of institutions, policies, laws and procedures—from 

other leading international partners.

Since early-2012, Morocco has been leading efforts 

to revive and restructure the Community of SahelSaharan States (CEN-SAD), an intergovernmental 
23

organization with 28 members that was closely associated with the late Libyan ruler, Qadhafi.36 Morocco 

advocates the need for strengthening CEN-SAD in 

order to tackle the region’s precarious security situation. Since a January 2012 meeting in Addis Ababa, 

Ethiopia, Morocco has hosted several meetings to 

discuss the issue of reorganizing the organization to 

tackle security challenges through a comprehensive 

approach placed at the center of each meeting agenda. 

The drive to reshape the organization and allow it to 

build a collective security mechanism is a response to 

the failures and inability of Sahel and West African 

countries to coordinate responses to recent crises in 

Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Central African Republic; as 

well as their inability to enhance border controls and 

fight terrorism.

Morocco appears to allocate great importance to 

these meetings and efforts, as is evident from the involvement and support of the highest decisionmaking figures within Morocco. For instance, during the 

October 2013 CEN-SAD meeting in Rabat, Moroccan 

Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar highlighted 

the importance of amending the policies of the SaheloSaharian Investment and Commerce Bank, a subsidiary organ of CEN-SAD, to allow it to play a bigger 

role in the socio-economic development of its member 

countries.37

Morocco’s hegemonic ambitions in the Maghreb 

and Sahel regions also remain a driving force behind 

its active role in strengthening and playing a leading 

role in CEN-SAD. A strong organization with efficient 

political and economic organs, and clear security objectives will undermine Algeria’s main security initiative 

in the Sahel, Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint

(CEMOC). CEMOC was launched by Algeria in April 
24

2010 with the aim of coordinating counterterrorism 

efforts and conducting joint patrols and cross-border 

operations between Algerian, Nigerien, Mauritanian, 

and Malian forces.38

Counterterrorism through the Training 

of Religious Preachers. 

Perhaps the most visible indication of Morocco’s 

distinctive influence in West Africa and Sahel regions 

is its contribution to counterterrorism, primarily 

through counterextremism, by training religious personnel in the Moroccan experience of reforming religious affairs. In recent years, there has been growing 

interest in receiving Moroccan assistance in this field 

from West Africa and Sahel countries. During King 

Mohammed VI’s visit to Mali in September 2013, the 

Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs agreed to provide training to 500 Malian imams. 

The purpose of this 2-year training is to ensure that religious leaders preach moderate messages to the public, and that they are prepared to engage in theological 

debates to challenge extremist views.39

Other countries, such as Guinea-Conakry, Cote 

d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Libya have approached 

Morocco for the same training for their Imams and 

preachers in order to benefit from Moroccan experience in tackling extremism through dialogue and 

communication. To respond to the surge in demand 

for training of religious personnel, Morocco established the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of 

Imams, Morchidines, and Morchidates (female Islamic preachers) in March 2015, with capacity to train up 

to 1,000 candidates.40 A few months later, in July 2015, 

the Moroccan King inaugurated another pan-African 
25

religious institution, the Mohammed VI Foundation 

for African Ulama (Muslim religious scholars).41 According to Royal Decree (Dahir) No.1.15.75, from its 

headquarters in Rabat, the foundation aims to coordinate African Muslim scholars’ efforts to generate and 

disseminate ideas of tolerance on the basis of Islamic 

values, revitalize the common Islamic cultural heritage, undertake scientific research in Islamic studies, 

and organize events.42 Though the foundation’s competencies do not include issuance of fatwas, this initiative is likely to further strengthen Moroccan influence 

across Muslim communities in Africa. 

Morocco’s successful reform of religious affairs 

initiated after the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks 

has positioned the country as a leading example in the 

Muslim world by subtly but determinedly counteracting religious radicalism and terrorism. The reshaping 

of religious institutions and affairs has constituted an 

important part of the Moroccan government strategy 

to combat terrorism.43 It is arguably not only one of 

the most comprehensive reform packages of religion 

and religious institutions in Morocco, but also in the 

Muslim world.

Some of the principal aspects of this reform 

include: 

• Training and educating religious personnel, including not only those who lead worship (known as Imams), but also male and 

female preachers (known as Murchidin and 

Murchidat).

• The launch of television and radio stations 

whose sole purpose is to counterbalance the 

influence of hardline preachers, and the influence of religious satellite channels from the 

Middle East and Iran that spread radical Islam 
26

or Shi’ism. The ultimate aim is to achieve a high 

level of religious homogeneity among Moroccan Muslims and avoid the emergence of any 

sectarian divide in the country.

• The stipulation that only qualified scholars approved by the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs are allowed to issue 

fatwas (religious legal opinion), thus preventing the involvement of unauthorized scholars 

and radical preachers. The only institutions authorized to issue fatwas are the High Council of 

Ulama (religious scholars) and Regional Ulama 

Councils.44

A further important factor that has led to official 

requests for Morocco’s assistance in religious affairs 

from Western African governments is backing from 

important religious groups in societies that have maintained strong religious ties with Morocco. Moroccan 

Sufi orders have many followers in a range of African 

countries, and maintain strong ties with West African 

Sufi orders that date back centuries. 

In being perceived to be moderate and flexible in 

terms of the diversity and nature of sources available to 

the Ulama to practice Ijtihad—reinterpreting the principles of Islam to provide legal answers to contemporary issues facing Muslims and Muslim societies—the 

Maliki madhab (Islamic legal school) that is officially 

adopted by Morocco aims to provide answers to contemporary issues that have not been dealt with in the 

fundamental texts (the Qura’an and Sunnah—Prophet 

Muhammad’s known sayings and deeds). The Maliki 

madhab is praised for consulting more sources than 

the other remaining three Sunni Schools. More importantly, it accommodates local traditions and reconciles 

them with the teachings of fundamental texts. 
27

Cooperation with Regional and 

International Partners.

Despite willingness to contribute to the promotion 

of peace and security in the region, Moroccan officials 

in Rabat are aware of their own limitations. There is 

a recognition that the security needs of West Africa 

are multiple and complex, and beyond the technical, 

human, and financial capabilities of Morocco acting 

alone. The proliferation of militant groups in the region, many of which have ties to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) or other international terrorist organizations, remains a main challenge facing the region. It is 

one which requires well-trained and equipped armed 

forces, not only in one country but across the Sahel 

and West Africa region, given the transborder nature 

of the threats. For example, Boko Haram is a major 

threat for all of western Africa with proven links to 

AQIM and other terrorist organizations.45 The existing 

military capabilities, with minimal communication 

networks and limited manpower resources, are not 

suited for effective surveillance and control over vast 

terrains on the edge of the Sahara desert. Furthermore,

many West African militaries are not structured and 

trained to face the challenges with which their countries have been presented in recent years.

Morocco recognizes that it is effectively impossible 

for individual countries to tackle today’s international 

security challenges on their own, and therefore acknowledges the necessity of working with regional 

and international partners to be able to deal systematically with cross-border security challenges. Cooperation will allow also pooling of knowledge, expertise 

and resources to tackle some of these security menaces that are destabilizing West Africa. 
28

The reform of armed forces in West African countries will entail a considerable training effort in order 

to enable these militaries to play a more effective role 

in meeting current and future security challenges facing their own societies and states. As a result, security sector reform is becoming a priority policy area 

in order to maintain stability and achieve economic 

growth across the West Africa region. West Africa’s 

armed forces and security agencies have been debilitated or deprived of opportunities to professionalize, including by decades of instability as a result of 

frequent regime changes and coups, which have precipitated frequent rearranging of security policies and 

institutions. 

Morocco could play an important role with other 

international partners in delivering military assistance to West African countries. Morocco can leverage 

its linguistic access, and its understanding of military 

cultures, its political ties, and growing economic presence to become a hub for international donors and 

nongovernmental organizations that are interested in 

professionalizing armed forces and providing security sector reform assistance to West African countries. 

Strengthening the security sector requires understanding how local institutions function and building 

relationships with key local stakeholders, including 

civil society actors. With these factors in mind, Morocco is well-positioned with partnership and support 

from leading international associates to provide tailored training and capacity building assistance that 

meet the specific needs of each individual armed force 

across the region.
29

Conclusion.

Deepening the engagement with Sub-Saharan 

Africa, particularly with West African countries, is 

what distinguishes Morocco’s foreign policy under 

the rule of the current King, Mohammed VI. West 

African economies and markets are increasingly gaining importance in Morocco’s ambition to diversify 

its export markets and seek new sources of growth 

for its companies. Over the last decade, sub-Saharan 

Africa, including West Africa, has emerged as one of 

the world’s fastest growing regional economies. This 

growth momentum looks set to be maintained in the 

coming years. 

Morocco is keen to leverage its linguistic, political, and cultural ties with West African societies and 

leaders in order to seek new economic development 

opportunities. This can be seen from the number of bilateral agreements signed during numerous visits by 

the Moroccan monarch to African countries, and initiatives launched in Morocco over the last few years. 

Though one could argue that there is nothing new 

in signing training, commercial, and sectorial cooperation agreements between Morocco and sub-Saharan African countries (as there have been many such 

agreements signed since the 1970s and 1980s), what 

distinguishes Morocco’s current engagement in Western Africa is the substantial involvement of private 

investors in a variety of sectors and countries across 

the continent. The experience and expertise gained by 

Morocco public and private sector investors over the 

last 15 years in a variety of fields have positioned the 

country as a model of socio-economic development 

and a desired partner for many sub-Saharan countries. 
30

Morocco has a vital interest in preventing the deterioration of West Africa’s security. It is well understood in Moroccan political circles that harnessing economic growth opportunities in Western Africa cannot 

be achieved without peace and security. Despite some 

progress in political and economic stability over recent years, the security situation remains particularly 

volatile, given the weak state of security institutions 

and the existence of large number of armed groups 

that are competing with some West African states for 

control of resources. 

An important Moroccan contribution to the security of West Africa and the Sahel is in the realm of 

fighting religious extremism, through the sharing of 

the country’s expertise and experience gained from 

the implementation of multifaceted reform of religious affairs, particularly the training and education 

of clerics. Morocco perceives the training of imams as 

an approach to preventing and countering radicalization. Fostering moderate imams will contribute to the 

resilience of individuals and communities against the 

appeal of violent extremism.

But there is appetite in Rabat to play a greater role 

in facilitating comprehensive solutions to West Africa 

security problems in cooperation with African and Sahel countries as well as with other international allies.

To increase its influence, Morocco plays an increasingly active role in regional institutions, including CENSAD, particularly contributing to ongoing efforts to 

revitalize the role of this pan-African organization’s 

mission, and orient its mission towards cooperation 

on tackling regional security problems. 

Morocco’s renewed interest in contributing to the 

security of the West Africa region, primarily through 

capability-building, is opening new opportunities for 

cooperation beyond the region to include other inter-
31

national partners with similar policy objectives. It also 

suggests new opportunities for the United States and 

Morocco to further strengthen their bilateral strategic 

dialogue by collaborating on regional matters. 

Implications and Recommendations.

Morocco’s new policy of engagement is an important factor in the evolving security and counterterrorism dynamic in the region. The emergence of a 

relatively powerful new player in security provision 

in Africa is a matter of immediate relevance to the U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM), to the U.S. Army more 

broadly, and to the U.S. Department of State (DoS). 

Following and understanding the developing regional power balance in West Africa, and the redrawing 

of new alliances within the region, are vital not only 

to fostering regional security, but also to an understanding of developments in the continent overall.

Morocco’s clear incentive to enhance its own 

national security by acting as a regional security 

provider offers substantial opportunities for cooperation. Several of the problems facing Morocco lie at 

the root of security challenges confronting close U.S. 

allies in Europe: resolution of those problems calls for 

stronger cooperation at the state level, both in the subregion and internationally. Regional and international 

threats emanating from West Africa and Sahel cannot 

be tackled effectively without pursuing innovative 

partnerships and better exploitation of synergies offered by different countries. Thus, with appropriate 

support, Morocco’s niche capabilities can be exploited 

to deliver professionalization programs for West African militaries, as well as other security sector reform 
32

initiatives aimed at reducing the incidence of uncontrolled migration, terrorism, trafficking in narcotics 

and humans, and other cross-border challenges. 

This potential for collaboration has already been 

partially recognized, by initiatives which can now be 

built on. In 2004, Morocco was designated a “major 

non-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] U.S. 

ally” by President George W. Bush, as a response to 

the country’s support and cooperation in the war on 

terror.46 In practical terms, this status has allowed 

the Moroccan security community to benefit from 

U.S. military assistance and intelligence cooperation. Morocco hosts a yearly joint military exercise, 

Africa Lion, the largest U.S. exercise on the African 

continent, intended to enhance interoperability and 

mutual understanding. In addition, several hundred 

Moroccan officers have benefited from International 

Military Education and Training, a program funded 

by the DoS to enable foreign officers to attend military 

education at U.S. establishments.47

Further vectors for cooperation are provided by 

Morocco’s relatively close relationship with NATO, 

as a founding member of Mediterranean Dialogue in 

1994. Morocco’s NATO partnership framework was 

renewed in 2013, with a focus on counterterrorism 

and interoperability.48 This is augmented by Moroccan participation in NATO operations, and ongoing 

exercises and cooperation between NATO and Moroccan naval forces including U.S. Navy vessels.49

With its unique mix of geographical location, cultural, religious and linguistic ties, Morocco could become the international partner of choice for the U.S. 

defense and development communities to facilitate 

and jointly provide security assistance programs. 
33

Morocco can capitalize on the same assets that have 

been used for its investment strategies towards Africa 

in order to tailor and deliver effective security assistance and security sector reforms. Moroccan military 

personnel and institutions are familiar with West African military officers and cultures. Morocco has sent 

several military contingents and provided military 

education and training to hundreds of West African 

officers. Morocco’s political stability and the professionalism of its military institutions are advantageous, 

both for cooperation with U.S. counterparts and for 

effective delivery of security assistance to recipient 

countries. 

Morocco’s long-term and continuing political 

stability is a further significant factor that should encourage the United States to strengthen its security 

cooperation and collaboration with Rabat. In a region that has experienced sustained political turmoil, 

Morocco today remains one of the few continuously 

stable countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 

Instead, the country’s leadership has been adept in negotiating and resolving political and economic challenges. If this trend continues, it removes a number 

of the risks and challenges inherent in closer security 

relationships with Middle Eastern and North African 

states. 

Morocco’s ongoing Western Sahara territorial dispute in particular does not pose a challenge to the stability of the country, or to its external relationships. 

Morocco continues to favor a political settlement of 

the dispute, and eschews use of military force. As a 

result, the existence of the dispute has not prevented 

Morocco from developing close security cooperation 

with a variety of European countries, including Spain, 

the former colonial power in Western Sahara.
34

The Morocco-based training center for border security in Sahel and West Africa should be supported and enhanced. The U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) should not limit its support to establishing the 

training center for border security officers from West 

Africa and Sahel agreed in Rabat in November 2013, 

but it also should encourage the extension of these 

activities. The Center could provide a wide range of 

other training courses that can contribute to building 

the military and security capabilities of West African 

armed forces. Several counterterrorism training programs offered by AFRICOM through the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership could be delivered 

through this center, and thus benefit from funding assistance offered by the Counterterrorism Partnerships 

Fund. This regional training center could serve as a 

specialized think tank to support needs assessments 

undertaken by member countries, as well as providing strategic advice and guidance. 

Morocco’s extension of its counter-radicalism 

strategy to sub-Saharan Africa should be supported 

and encouraged. The U.S. defense community and 

DoS should support at arm’s length Morocco’s efforts 

to counter violent extremism through the training of 

religious personnel and institutionalising of religious 

affairs in West Africa and Sahel countries. The Moroccan experience of religious affairs reform, with 

proven success in counter-radicalization, should be 

studied closely. Lessons learned could be of help in 

providing similar solutions in other areas where the 

United States is involved in stabilization and counterterrorism operations, as well as for counter-radicalization efforts domestically and within the United 

States and its allies. In particular, there are substantial 
35

synergies between Morocco’s counterextremism experience and expertise, and U.S. Government strategic 

communications initiatives across broad parts of the 

Muslim world; these synergies should be leveraged 

and exploited.

ENDNOTES 

1. Organization of African Unity, “Resolution Adopted by the 

First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 to 25 May 1963,” 

CIAS/PLEN.2/REV.2, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Organization 

of African Unity, available from www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/

ASSEMBLY_EN_22_25_MAY_1963_ASSEMBLY_HEADS_

STATE_GOVERNMENT_FIRST_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf.

2. Jay Post, “Rifts Over Qadhafi, Sahara Jeopardize the Unity 

of Africa,” The Washington Post, August 11, 1982, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/08/11/rifts-overqaddafi-sahara-jeopardize-the-unity-of-africa/0e0818b6-

d9ee-4d64-bc3c-0cd678907f93/.

3. Morocco is the only African country that is not a member 

of the African Union. Morocco’s decision to end its membership 

in the African Union (called then Organization of African Unity) 

came as response to the admission of a delegation claiming to 

represent an independent state in Western Sahara, the Sahrawi 

Arab Democratic Republic in 1982. For further information, see 

Clifford D. May, “Morocco Quits O.A.U Over Polisario,” The 

New York Times, November 13, 1984, available from www.nytimes.

com/1984/11/13/world/morocco-quits-oau-over-polisario.html.

4. “PSC scaling up efforts to resolve the crisis in Western Sahara,” Peace and Security Council Report, Pretoria, South Africa: 

Institute for Security Studies, April 10, 2015, available from www.

issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-insights/psc-scaling-up-efforts-to-resolvethe-crisis-in-western-sahara.

5. Michael Collyer, “Euro-African Relations in the Field of 

Migration, 2008,” Panorama: The Mediterranean Year, Barcelona, 

Spain: The European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2009, available from www.iemed.org/anuari/2009/aarticles/a281.pdf.
36

6. Pan-African News Agency, “Moroccan Prime Minister to 

attend CEN SAD summit,” Pan-African News Agency, March 4, 

2002, available from www.panapress.com/Moroccan-Prime-Ministerto-attend-CEN-SAD-summit--13-455383-18-lang2-index.html.

7. “HM the king, accompanied by Malian president, visits 

Moroccan field hospital in Bamako,” Maghreb Arab Press, September 20, 2013, available from www.mapnews.ma/en/activitesroyales/hm-king-accompanied-malian-president-visits-moroccan-fieldhospital-bamako.

8. Nouhou Baldé, “Coopération Guinée-Maroc: encore deux 

semaines pour l’hôpital marocain à Conakry,” (“Guinea-Morocco 

Cooperation: another two weeks for the Moroccan hospital in 

Conakry”), Guinee News, May 14, 2014, available from guineenews.

org/cooperation-guinee-maroc-encore-deux-semaines-pour-lhopitalmarocain-a-conakry/.

9. African Development Bank Group, “Tracking Africa’s 

Progress in Figures,” Tunisia: African Development Bank, 2014, 

available from www.afdb-org.jp/file/news-and-pressrelease/Tracking_

Africafs_Progress_in_Figures-3.pdf. For further information, see 

International Monetary Fund Reports, “Regional Economic Outlook: sub-Sahara Africa,” over period from 2003 to 2014, Bretton 

Woods, NH: International Monetary Fund, available from www.

imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/afr/eng/sreo1014.htm.

10. “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision,” New 

York: United Nations, Department Economic and Social Affairs, 

2014, available from esa.un.org/unpd/wup/FinalReport/WUP2014-

Report.pdf.

11. Africa Development Bank, “The Middle of the Pyramid: 

Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa,” Market Brief, April 

20, 2011, available from www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/

Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_

The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf.

12. Amin Rbob, “Addoha investit le logement social à Bamako,” (“Addoha Invests in affordabale Housing in Bamako”), 

L’ Economiste, Edition No. 4219, February 24, 2014, available from 

www.leconomiste.com/article/917169-addoha-investit-le-logementsocial-bamako#sthash.0eSKLyTM.dpuf.
37

13. “Pan-African Banks: Opportunities and Challenges for 

Cross-Border Oversight,” IMF Policy Papers, Bretton Woods, NH: 

International Monetary Fund, December 18, 2014, available from 

www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/121814.pdf.

14. “Report,” Casablanca, Morocco: Attijariwafa Bank, February 2015, available from www.attijariwafabank.com/ESPACEFINANCIER/Documents/1_AB_PLAQUETTE_DG-Dec.%202014-V.

Angl.pdf.

15. “Annual Report 2014,” Casablanca, Morocco: BMCE 

Bank, 2014, available from www.bmcebank.ma/UploadFiles/publications/2180/V000002/Web%20RAPPORT%20ABREGE%20ANG%20

XG.pdf.

16. “Middle Africa Cocoa Outlook: 2015, Ecobank Research, 

Lomé, Togo: Ecobank, February 26, 2015, available from www.ecobank.com/upload/2015030309195944089MuBJ5zzSFJ.pdf.

17. “Annual Report 2012,” Casablanca, Morocco: BMCE 

Bank, 2012, available from www.bmcebank.ma/UploadFiles/publications/2023/V000003/RA%20P1%20BMCE%20ANG.pdf.

18. Mehdi Michbal, “Automobile: tout savoir sur l’usine 

marocaine de PSA Peugeot Citroën,” (“Automotive: everything 

about the Moroccan factory of PSA Peugeot Citroën”), Jeune Afrique, June 21, 2015, available from www.jeuneafrique.com/238250/

economie/automobile-tout-savoir-sur-lusine-marocaine-de-psa-peugeotcitroen/. 

19. “Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West 

African Countries: A Call for National and Regional Containment, 

Recovery and Prevention,” New York: United Nations Development Group-Western Central Africa, February 2015, available 

from www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-westafrica.pdf.

20. Rod Mac Johnson, “Ebola Zone Countries Isolated as Airlines Stop Flights,” Agence France Presse, October 27, 2014, available from www.businessinsider.com/afp-ebola-zone-countries-isolatedas-airlines-stop-flights-2014-8.
38

21. “Pays touchés par Ebola: Les chefs d’Etat saluent le 

soutien du Maroc,” (“Countries affected by Ebola: Heads of States 

Applaud Morocco’s support”), Le Matin, March 3, 2015, available 

from www.lematin.ma/express/2015/pays-touches-par-ebola-_les-chefsd-etat-saluent-le-soutien-du-maroc/218937.html#sthash.TQuo9ijH.

dpuf.

22. “King Mohammed VI Concludes Four-Country West 

and Central Africa Tour,” Reuters, June 15, 2015, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/15/idUSnMKWNwLWva+1ec+M

KW20150615.

23. The post-election crisis, which lasted from November 2010 

until April 2011, severely disrupted the political, economic, and 

social fabric of the country. It sparked a displacement of a million of people within the country and also over the border into 

neighboring countries. The crisis triggered violence and a loss 

of security, a 3-month shutdown of most banks, the imposition 

of economic sanctions, heavy weapons combat, and disruption 

of medications and foodstuffs supplies. For further reading, see 

Nicolas Cook, “Côte d’Ivoire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery,” 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 3, 2011, 

available from fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/164273.pdf.

24. “Côte d’Ivoire: La filiale d’Attijariwafa bank ferme ses 

agencies” (Cote d’Ivoire: Atttijarywafa Bank subsidiary closes 

its Branches”), Aujourd’hui le Maroc, April 4, 2011, available from 

www.aujourdhui.ma/une/aufildesjours/cote-d-ivoire-la-filiale-d-attijariwafa-bank-ferme-ses-agences-76469#.VZubIMuJiUk.

25. The crisis started with the December 2012 formation of a 

coalition of rebel groups known as Seleka that launched an offensive against the government. The crisis escalated in March 2013 

with the ousting of President Francois Bozizé and capture of Bangui. For further information, see “The Central African Republic: 

from Predation to Stabilization,” Africa Report No. 219, Washington, DC: International Crisis Group, June 17, 2014, available 

from www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/centralafrican-republic/219-la-crise-centrafricaine-de-la-predation-a-la-stabilisation-english.pdf.
39

26. “Annual Report 2013,” Angers, France: Banque Populaire, available from www.gbp.ma/InformationFinanciere/Documents/

InformationsFinancieresDoc/2013/RA-VAng-2013.pdf.

27. “Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the 

United Nations Office for West Africa,” S/2015/472, New York: 

United Nations Security Council, June 24, 2015, available from 

www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_472.pdf.

28. Benjamin Roger, “Maroc : saisie record de 226 kg de cocaïne pure” (“Morocco: record seizure of 226 kg of Pure Cocaine”), 

Jeune Afrique, September 9, 2014, available from www.jeuneafrique.

com/44993/politique/maroc-saisie-record-de-226-kg-de-cocaene-pure/.

29. “King Mohammed VI’s Speech to 69th Session of UN General Assembly,” General Debate, available from www.un.org/en/

ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/MA_en.pdf.

30. “Hassan Gives Dinner in Honour of Mobuto,” Maghreb 

Arab Press, June 21, 1977. 

31. Rafael Fraguas, “Sorpresa en Guinea Ecuatorial por la 

presencia de un contingente militar marroquí,” (“Surprise in 

Equatorial Guinea by the presence of a Moroccan military contingent”), El Pais, September 23, 1979, available from elpais.com/

diario/1979/09/23/internacional/306885608_850215.html.

32. Mountaga Diagne, “Fiche D’Information de L’Etat: Maroc,” (“Country Information Sheet: Morocco”), Reseau de Recherche sur leas operations de paix, available from www.operationspaix.

net/115-fiche-d-information-de-l-etat-maroc.html.

33. Amirah Ibrahim, “Libya: A Critical Review of Tripoli’s 

Sub-Saharan African Policies,” Situation Report, Pretoria, South 

Africa: Institute for Security Studies, November 23, 2009, available from dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31021/

1/23NOV09LIBYA.pdf?1. See also Ray Takeyh, “Libya and Africa,” Policy Analysis, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 

July 22, 1999, available from www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/libya-and-africa.
40

34. E.g., Anne Gearan, “U.S. pushes Algeria to support military intervention in Mali,” The Washington Post, October 29, 2012, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-pushes-algeria-tosupport-military-intervention-in-mali/2012/10/29/fee8df44-21a3-11e2-

92f8-7f9c4daf276a_story.html.

35. Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat, “Sahel and 

Maghreb Countries move to strengthen co-operation on security,” 

SWAC News No-142, November 11-17, 2013, available from www.

westafricagateway.org/files/142revuedepresse11-17nov2013_en.pdf.

36. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) is an 

organization that was established in 1999 in Libya, and to which 

Morocco has been a member since 2001. The General Secretariat is 

based in Tripoli and its operations have been entirely supported 

by Libya. The main purpose of CEN-SAD has been to facilitate 

cooperation among its members, and to achieve economic development, stability and prosperity of member countries. The organization consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, 

Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, 

Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia. For more 

information, see “CEN-SAD-The Community of Sahel-Saharan 

States,” New York: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, available from www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-communitysahel-saharan-states.

37. “Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens: Les questions 

de la sécurité, de la gouvernance et du développement au centre 

de la réunion de Rabat,” (“Community of Sahel-Saharan States: 

Issues of Security, Governance and Development at the Center of 

the Rabat Meeting”), Le Matin, October 29, 2013, available from 

www.lematin.ma/journal/2013/communaute-des-etats-sahelo-sahariens_les-questions-de-la-securite-de-la-gouvernance-et-du-developpement-au-centre-de-la-reunion-de-rabat/190260.html#sthash.UF5XvBxy.dpuf.

38. Yahia Zoubir, “Algeria and the Sahelian Imbroglio: Preventing War and Fighting Terrorism,” Report, Wadi Al Sail, 

Qatar: Aljazeera Centre for Studies, November 25, 2012, available from archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Algeria_and_the_Sahelian_

Imbroglio_.pdf.
41

39. Jihane Gattioui, “500 imams maliens seront bientôt formés 

par le Maroc,” (“500 Malian imams will soon be formed by Morocco”), Le Matin, Febrauary 19, 2014, available from www.lematin.

ma/journal/2014/champ-religieux_500-imams-maliens-seront-bientotformes-par-le-maroc/197137.html#sthash.sWCJmCrI.dpuf.

40. “Le Souverain inaugure l’Institut Mohammed VI de formation des imams, morchidines et morchidates dans le cadre 

des valeurs de l’Islam du juste milieu, pratiqué de tout temps 

au Maroc,” (“The King Inaugurates Mohammed VI Institute for 

the Training of Imams, Morchidins and Morchidates within the 

framework of Islamic values of balance that have been always 

practiced in Morocco”), Le Matin, March 27, 2015, available from 

www.lematin.ma/journal/2015/le-souverain-inaugure-l-institutmohammed-vi-de-formation-des-imams-morchidines--et-morchidatesdans-le-cadre-des-valeurs-de-l-islam-du-juste-milieu-pratique-de-touttemps-au-maroc/220603.html#sthash.nmA1zfSH.dpuf.

41. “HM the King, Commander of the Faithful, Chairs 

Announcement Ceremony of Creation of Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulemas,” Maghreb Arab Press, July 13, 2015, 

available from www.mapnews.ma/en/activites-royales/hm-king-commander-faithful-chairs-announcement-ceremony-creation-mohammedvi-found.

42. Royal Decree No 1.15.75, Official Gazette N° 6372, June 

25, 2015, available from www.sgg.gov.ma/Portals/0/BO/bulletin/

FR/2015/BO_6374_Fr.pdf.

43. Mohammed El-Katiri, “The Institutionalisation of Religious Affairs: Religious Reform in Morocco,” The Journal of North 

African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2013.

44. Ibid. 

45. “Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the 

United Nations Office for West Africa.” 

46. “US rewards Morocco for terror aid,” BBC News, June 4, 

2004, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3776413.stm. 
42

47. “International Military Education and Training: Foreign 

Military Financing: Peacekeeping Operations,” Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of State, undated document, available from 

www.state.gov/documents/organization/60649.pdf.

48. “NATO: Morocco, a Strategic Partner, Mediterranean 

Dialogue Driving Force,” Morocco World News, March 12, 2015, 

available from www.moroccoworldnews.com/2015/03/153787/natomorocco-strategic-partner-mediterranean-dialogue-driving-force/.

49. “SNMG2 trains with Royal Moroccan Navy,” Northwood, 

Middlesex, UK: NATO Allied Maritime Command, April 7, 2015, 

available from www.aco.nato.int/snmg2-trains-with-royal-moroccannavy.aspx.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil