Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2010 / Notices 69711 

protection of CR–3 in lieu of the new 

requirements in 10 CFR part 73. 

Therefore, the extension of the 

implementation date for four elements 

of the new requirements of 10 CFR part 

73 to December 15, 2011, and March 15, 

2012, would not have any significant 

environmental impacts. 

The NRC staff’s safety evaluation will 

be provided in the exemption that will 

be issued as part of the letter to the 

licensee approving the exemption to the 

regulation, if granted. 

Environmental Impacts of the 

Alternatives to the Proposed Action 

As an alternative to the proposed 

actions, the NRC staff considered denial 

of the proposed action (i.e., the ‘‘noaction’’ alternative). Denial of the 

exemption request would result in no 

change in current environmental 

impacts. If the proposed action was 

denied, the licensee would have to 

comply with the existing 

implementation deadline for those 

specific items of November 15, and 

December 15, 2010, as extended by the 

exemption granted on March 25, 2010. 

The environmental impacts of the 

proposed exemption and the ‘‘no-action’’ 

alternative are similar. 

Alternative Use of Resources 

The action does not involve the use of 

any different resources than those 

previously considered in the Final 

Environmental Statement for CR–3, 

dated May 1973. 

Agencies and Persons Consulted 

In accordance with its stated policy, 

on November 4, 2010, the NRC staff 

consulted with the Florida State official, 

Mr. William A. Passeti of the Florida 

Department of Health, Bureau of 

Radiation Control regarding the 

environmental impact of the proposed 

action. The State official had no 

comments. 

Finding of No Significant Impact 

On the basis of the environmental 

assessment, the NRC concludes that the 

proposed action will not have a 

significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment. Accordingly, the 

NRC has determined not to prepare an 

environmental impact statement for the 

proposed action. 

For further details with respect to the 

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter 

dated September 8, 2010. Portions of the 

September 8, 2010, submittal contains 

security-related information and, 

accordingly, a redacted version of this 

letter is available for public review in 

the Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS), 

Accession No. ML102530129. This 

document may be examined, and/or 

copied for a fee, at the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR), located at One 

White Flint North, Public File Area O– 

1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 

Rockville, Maryland 20852. Publicly 

available records will be accessible 

electronically from the ADAMS Public 

Electronic Reading Room on the Internet 

at the NRC Web site: http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 

Persons who do not have access to 

ADAMS or who encounter problems in 

accessing the documents located in 

ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR 

Reference staff by telephone at 1–800– 

397–4209 or 301–415–4737, or send an 

e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on 

November 5, 2010. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Christopher Gratton, 

Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing 

Branch II–2, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2010–28633 Filed 11–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 52–012 and 52–013; NRC– 

2010–0343] 

STP Nuclear Operating Company, 

South Texas Project Nuclear Power 

Plant, Units 3 and 4; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

By letters dated February 2, 2010 

(Agency wide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession Number ML100350219), 

March 23, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 

Number ML100880055) and July 21, 

2010 (ADAMS Accession Number 

ML102070274), STP Nuclear Operating 

Company (STPNOC) submitted a 

request for an exemption from Title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR) part 50, section 50.10: License 

required; limited work authorization. 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the NRC staff) has 

reviewed this request for exemption, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, as it relates 

to STPNOC’s application for combined 

licenses (COLs) for South Texas Project 

(STP) Units 3 and 4, which is currently 

under review by the NRC staff. This 

exemption would authorize STPNOC to 

install two crane foundation retaining 

walls (CFRWs) prior to issuance of the 

COLs. Granting this exemption would 

not constitute a commitment by the 

NRC to issue COLs for STP Units 3 and 

4. STPNOC would install the CFRWs 

assuming the risk that its COL 

application may later be denied. 

2.0 Request/Action 

The proposed action, as described in 

STPNOC’s request for an exemption to 

10 CFR 50.10, would allow STPNOC to 

install two CFRWs (one for Unit 3 and 

one for Unit 4), prior to issuance of 

COLs. According to STPNOC, the 

CFRWs are non-safety related, and have 

no adverse interactions with any 

structures, systems, or components as 

identified in 50.10. STPNOC states that 

the CFRWs are required to facilitate 

excavation activities by retaining soil 

next to the excavations of the Reactor 

Building, Control Building and Turbine 

Building Foundations, while allowing 

the crane areas to be at grade and near 

the buildings. Installation of the CFRWs 

would include the following activities: 

• Performing a full-depth and widthslurry excavation; 

• Placing of reinforcement in the 

slurry trench; 

• Displacing the slurry with concrete 

from the bottom up; and 

• Installing tiebacks and whalers to 

stabilize the CFRWs, as excavation for 

permanent plant structures proceeds. 

As construction of the permanent 

plant structures proceeds, the CFRWs 

would be abandoned in place following 

crane use. After abandonment, the 

CFRWs would have no function during 

operation of STP Units 3 and 4. 

In its exemption request, STPNOC 

stated that the proposed exemption is 

needed because installation of the 

CFRWs must occur before excavation for 

permanent plant structures, and 

compliance with the requirements for a 

limited work authorization as indicated 

in 10 CFR 50.10 would result in undue 

hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated during the development 

of 10 CFR 50.10. According to the 

exemption request, installation of the 

CFRWs is needed to allow STPNOC to 

complete certain on-site activities in 

parallel with the licensing process, so 

that it can begin construction promptly 

upon issuance of COLs. 

3.0 Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a) the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.10 when (1) 

the exemption authorized by law, will 

not present an undue risk to public 

health or safety, and are consistent with 

the common defense and security; and 

(2) when special circumstances are 

present. 


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69712 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2010 / Notices 

Authorized by Law 

This exemption would authorize the 

applicant to install two CFRWs (one for 

Unit 3 and one for Unit 4) prior to 

issuance of COLs. As stated above, 10 

CFR 50.12(a) allows the NRC to grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.10. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

applicant’s proposed exemption will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

Commission’s regulations. Therefore, 

the exemption is authorized by law. 

No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.10 is to define clearly the licensing 

requirements for a limited work 

authorization (LWA). In determining 

that the proposed exemption would not 

pose an undue risk to public health and 

safety and that the applicant could be 

exempted from the LWA, for the limited 

purpose of the installation of the 

CFRWs, the NRC staff evaluated the 

exemption in the areas of Geotechnical 

Engineering, Structural Engineering and 

Hydrology. 

Geotechnical Engineering 

The NRC staff evaluated STPNOC’s 

exemption request using the criteria in 

NUREG–0800, Standard Review Plan 

(SRP), Chapter 2.5.4, ‘‘Stability of 

Subsurface Materials and Foundations’’. 

The specific criteria that apply 

include: 

1. RG 1.132, ‘‘Site Investigations for 

Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants.’’ 

2. RG 1.138 ‘‘Laboratory Investigations 

of Soils and Rocks for Engineering 

Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power 

Plants.’’ 

In this exemption request, the 

applicant addressed the above criteria. 

The applicant evaluated the static and 

dynamic effects the CFRWs could have 

on safety-related structures, systems, or 

components (SSC’s) identified by 10 

CFR 50.10(a)(1)(i) through (vii). These 

SSCs included: (1) Reactor Building, (2) 

Control Building, (3) Ultimate Heat Sink 

and Reactor Service Water Pump House, 

(4) Turbine Building, (4) Service 

Building, (5) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 

Storage Vault and Tunnel, (6) Reactor 

Service Water Piping Tunnel, and (7) 

Fire Protection Pump House. This 

evaluation included soil-structure 

interaction (SSI) analysis for SSCs. In 

addition, the applicant’s stability 

evaluation included a static a dynamic 

bearing capacity and settlement 

analysis. The applicant concluded that 

the construction of the CFRWs has no 

adverse influence on the static and 

dynamic stability of any of the SSCs 

listed above. 

The staff evaluated the applicant’s 

static and seismic stability analysis of 

the SSCs identified in 10 CFR 

50.10(a)(1). Specifically, the staff 

evaluated the applicant’s SSI analysis as 

well as the settlement, bearing capacity 

and dynamic lateral earth pressure 

effects the CFRWs could have on the 

aforementioned SSCs. The staff’s 

detailed evaluation is provided below. 

Dynamic Lateral Earth Pressures 

The staff reviewed the soil properties, 

presented in Revision 3 of the Final 

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 

Appendix 3H, Table 3H6.2, used as 

input for the SSI analysis. The applicant 

assumed a mean, upper and lower 

bound for the shear and compression 

wave velocities, and a constant value for 

unit weight. Poisson’s ratio is assumed 

to vary above and below the water table. 

The accuracy of these assumed values 

will be verified in future testing, but the 

NRC staff concludes that because of the 

significant margin in the computed 

lateral earth pressures shown in Figure 

2.5 of the attachment, Appendix A, 

‘‘Crane Foundation Retaining Wall 

Evaluation Summary’’, the staff has 

reasonable assurance that variations in 

the soil properties of soil backfill 

properly compacted to 95 percent 

modified Proctor would not be 

significant enough to cause exceedence 

of the lateral pressures assumed in the 

design of the wall. Hence, the staff 

concludes that, the resulting static and 

dynamic earth pressures will be 

bounded by the lateral earth pressures 

used in design. 

Bearing Capacity 

The applicant stated that the presence 

of the wall will not affect the static 

bearing capacity. The staff concludes 

that the presence of the CFRWs and the 

retained natural ground behind the wall 

will provide additional resistance to a 

bearing capacity failure in the direction 

of the wall due to the surcharge 

provided by the natural ground behind 

the wall, and the strength of the 

reinforced concrete wall. The applicant 

stated that dynamic bearing capacity is 

not affected by the presence of the wall 

once the backfill is in place, and the 

staff concurs with this assessment. 

Settlement 

The applicant considers the 

settlement due to the wall and retained 

natural soils to be insignificant. The 

staff concludes that the weight of the 

wall versus the weight of the natural 

soil that it is replacing is minor and the 

stresses induced by the additional 

weight of the wall and any additional 

downward force caused by the battered 

anchors is minor due to the 3 foot width 

of the footing. Stresses induced by the 

linear wall footing can be ignored for 

the following reasons: (1) The 

foundations soils below the wall are 

over-consolidated and any settlement 

will occur rapidly, prior to the 

construction of adjacent structures, and 

(2) the additional vertical stresses due to 

the 3 ft. wide footing would contribute 

insignificant additional stress within the 

zone of influence created by structures 

placed in close proximity to the wall. 

Regarding the change in the pattern of 

stress distribution on the East side of the 

Reactor Building due to the presence of 

the wall, the applicant stated that those 

stresses would be increased, but the 

settlement due to those increased 

stresses would be offset by the reduction 

in stress due to backfill placement above 

the foundation level due to friction 

between the wall and the backfill. The 

staff believes that the presence of the 

wall will also minimize heave during 

excavation, and that will therefore 

reduce the magnitude of re-settlement 

upon reloading. Additional settlement 

that may be caused by additional 

loading due to the pattern of stress 

distribution on the east side of the 

Reactor Building due to the presence of 

the wall will be offset by reduced 

vertical stresses as indicated by the 

applicant, and also due to reduced resettlement that results from less heave 

because of the presence of the wall. The 

staff therefore concludes that settlement 

caused by the presence of the wall is not 

significant. 

Structural Engineering 

In 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, 

General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 

requires that the design basis shall 

reflect appropriate considerations of the 

most severe earthquakes that have been 

historically reported for a site and the 

surrounding area. 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix S further delineates the 

earthquake engineering criteria for 

seismic evaluation of nuclear power 

plants. Pursuant to Appendix S, the 

evaluation of SSCs required to 

withstand the effects of the safeshutdown earthquake (SSE) ground 

motion must take into account soilstructure interaction (SSI) effects. Using 

the guidance of SRP Section 3.7.2 in 

part, the NRC staff performed a review 

of the applicant’s exemption request to 

ensure that leaving the CFRWs in place 

after the plant is constructed does not 

adversely affect the seismic design basis 

of safety related structures required to 

withstand effects of the SSE in the 

vicinity of the CFRWs. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2010 / Notices 69713 

In this exemption request, the 

applicant has addressed the above 

regulations as to the potential effect of 

the CFRWs on seismic response of the 

applicable SSCs. The applicant 

evaluated the potential dynamic effects 

of the CFRWs on SSC’s, which are 

identified by 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1)(i) 

through (vii). These SSCs included: (1) 

Reactor Building, (2) Control Building, 

(3) Ultimate Heat Sink and Reactor 

Service Water Pump House, (4) Turbine 

Building, (4) Service Building, (5) Diesel 

Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault and 

Tunnel, (6) Reactor Service water Piping 

Tunnel, and (7) Fire Protection Pump 

House. The CFRWs occupies a very 

small volume relative to the overall soil 

mass and represents a small increase in 

overall weight as compared to the 

replaced soil. As such, the applicant 

stated that the CFRWs are expected to 

have negligible interaction on the other 

nearby heavy structures such as Reactor 

Building (RB) or Control Building (CB). 

In order to demonstrate that there is 

no adverse seismic interaction of the 

CFRWs on SSCs, the applicant 

performed a SSI analysis of the Reactor 

and Control Buildings for the STP Units 

3 and 4 site-specific conditions, 

including site-specific SSE and the soil 

parameters described in Revision 3 of 

the STP Units 3 and 4 Combined 

License Final Safety Analysis Report 

(FSAR) Section 3.7.1 and Appendices 

3A and 3C, except that a 2D model was 

used instead of a 3D model. The SSI 

analyses were performed with and 

without the CFRWs using the computer 

program SASSI2000 as described in 

FSAR Appendix 3C.8. Based on the 

analyses results and an assessment of 

the configuration and locations of the 

SSCs (listed above) as compared to the 

location of the CFRWs, the applicant 

concluded that the construction of the 

CFRWs has no adverse interactions with 

SSC’s listed above. 

The staff evaluated the applicant’s SSI 

analysis of the Reactor and Control 

Buildings with and without the CFRWs 

as well as the applicant’s engineering 

evaluation for the other SSCs for any 

potential effects of the CFRWs on SSCs. 

The staff based its review on the 

applicable regulations and SRP 

guidance for SSI analysis as well as the 

following engineering principles: (1) 

Much lighter CFRWs will not 

significantly affect the dynamic 

response of nearby massive buildings 

(such as RB, CB, TB, etc.), (b) the 

influence of a heavy structure on the 

SSE input of the other nearby lighter 

structure exceeds any influence from 

much lighter CFRWs, and (c) CFRWs 

will not influence the dynamic response 

of heavy or light structures located at a 

significant distance away from the 

CFRWs. The seismic input response 

spectrum used in the RB and CB SSI 

analysis envelops the site specific 

Foundation Input Response Spectra 

(FIRS). The input response spectrum 

also envelops a broad band spectrum 

anchored at 0.1g in the horizontal 

direction as required by Appendix S to 

10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Earthquake 

Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power 

Plants.’’ In addition, the staff verified 

consistency of the analytical model and 

the site soil parameters used in the 

exemption request and the COL 

application. The staff’s detailed 

evaluation is provided below. 

Reactor Building and Control Building 

The RB and CB are part of the 

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor 

(ABWR) design certification. The 

CFRWs are located approximately 15 

feet from the exterior wall of the RB and 

about 80 feet from the exterior wall of 

the CB. The applicant performed 2–D 

SSI analyses of the RB and CB, with and 

without the CFRWs, to assess the 

potential impact of the crane wall 

installation on the seismic response of 

the RB and CB for the site-specific 

conditions, including site-specific SSE 

and soil properties. The staff needed 

more information about the analytical 

models to conclude that impact of the 

seismic interaction of CFRWs has been 

appropriately accounted for in SSI 

analysis of RB and CB. The staff, in a 

request for additional information (RAI 

1) dated May 24, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession Number ML101400240), 

asked the applicant to provide this 

needed information. 

In response to the staff’s request for 

additional information, RAI 1, the 

applicant stated that there were some 

inconsistencies in the mass and stiffness 

properties of the 2–D SSI analytical 

models used in the analysis described in 

the response to the RAI 03.07.01–24 

(U7–C–STP–NRC–100083) and the 

original exemption request of March 23, 

2010. However, the conclusions of these 

analyses remain the same. In the revised 

exemption request of July 21, 2010 (U7– 

C–STP–NRC–100147), the applicant 

described the updated analytical models 

used in the reanalysis. The results 

including the dynamic lateral soil 

pressure obtained from the SSI analysis 

for the RB and CB, with and without 

CFRWs for the mean in-situ soil 

parameters are reported in Appendices 

A and B of the exemption request (U7– 

C–STP–NRC–100143) which concluded 

that CFRWs does not have significant 

effect on the response of the RB and CB. 

The staff reviewed the analytical 

model and comparative analysis results 

with and without the CFRWs as 

described in Appendix A and B of the 

exemption request of July 21, 2010. The 

comparison of in-structure response 

spectra (ISRS) is provided in Figures 2.1 

through 2.4 for the RB and in Figures 

2.6 through 2.7 for the CB. For the RB, 

the ISRS with and without the CFRWs 

were compared at four locations: Bottom 

of base mat, reactor pressure vessel/ 

main steam nozzle, top of the reinforced 

concrete containment vessel, and top of 

the RB. For the CB, the ISRS with and 

without the CFRWs were compared at 

the top of the base mat and the top of 

the CB. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of the July 21, 

2010 exemption request compare the 

maximum forces and moments at the 

above four for the RB and two locations 

for the CB, respectively, for the RB and 

CB with and without the CFRWs. These 

comparisons demonstrate that the 

CFRWs do not have a significant effect 

on the seismic response, ISRS, and 

maximum forces for the RB and the CB. 

This determination is also consistent 

with the expectation that lighter nearby 

structures like the CFRWs will have a 

minimal influence on the seismic 

response of nearby heavy structures like 

RB, CB, and TB. 

While the inertia of the CFRWs are 

not expected to affect the seismic 

response of the nearby heavy structures, 

the stiff CFRWs can act as a barrier to 

reflect the seismic waves and could 

affect seismic lateral soil pressure on the 

adjacent building walls. The applicant 

addressed this issue by comparing the 

lateral soil pressures on the RB and CB 

walls obtained from the site-specific SSI 

analysis, with and without the CFRWs 

as shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.8. As 

expected, the lateral seismic soil 

pressure increased due to the presence 

of the CFRWs. However, the increase 

was not significant enough to affect the 

design pressures for the RB and CB 

walls. The RB and CB exterior walls are 

designed for the larger of: (1) the 

pressure provided in the ABWR Design 

Control Document (DCD) Tier 2 Figure 

3H.1–11 and (2) the pressure obtained 

from the alternate modified Ostadan 

method described in the COLA Part 2, 

Tier 2, Section 2.5S.4.10.5.2. Therefore, 

the staff agrees with the applicant’s 

conclusion that the increase in soil 

pressure due to the presence of CFRWs 

will be bounded by the design seismic 

soil pressure. 

Ultimate Heat Sink and Reactor Service 

Water Pump House 

The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) and 

Reactor Service Water Pump House 

(RSWPH) are large Category I structures. 

Its smallest separation distance from the 

CFRWs is 60 feet. Based upon the 


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results of the RB and CB SSI analysis, 

the applicant stated that the CFRWs do 

not have a significant effect on the 

response of the UHS and RSWPH. The 

staff reviewed the configuration of the 

UHS and RSWPH as well as the STP 

Units 3 & 4 site layout in reference to 

the CFRWs. Staff noted that these 

structures are massive and are not 

located in close proximity of the 

CFRWs. Therefore, based on the review 

of these structures, their locations in 

relation to the CFRWs, and the 

comparative SSI analysis performed in 

support of the RB and CB, the staff 

agrees with the applicant’s conclusion 

that CFRWs do not have a significant 

effect on the seismic design of the UHS 

and RSWPH. 

Turbine Building 

The Turbine Building (TB) is a large 

structure. The CFRWs are installed 

approximately 15 feet from the exterior 

wall of the TB. The applicant stated that 

because CFRWs are a much smaller 

structure, its influence on the seismic 

response of large TB is expected to be 

insignificant. The staff reviewed the 

configuration of the TB as well as their 

site layout in reference to the CFRWs. 

The staff noted that similarly to the RB, 

the TB is also a heavy structure as 

compared to the CFRWs. Therefore, the 

staff concludes that the installation of 

CFRWs does not have a significant effect 

on the seismic response of the TB. 

Service Building 

The Service Building (SB) is a nonSeismic Category I structure designed 

for the SSE, and meets the Seismic 

Category II/I interaction requirements. 

The horizontal separation distance of 

the SB from the CFRWs is 

approximately 15 feet. The SSE input 

for the II/I evaluation is determined 

based on the influence of the CB (which 

is a heavy structure near the SB) on the 

lighter nearby SB structure. The 

influence of the CB on the SSE input 

and design of the SB far exceeds any 

influence from the much lighter CFRWs 

structure. 

The applicant stated that the 

influence of the nearby heavier CB 

structure is considered for determining 

the SSE input for the SB. Based on the 

configuration of the CB and the CFRWs, 

the staff agrees with the applicant that 

influence of the nearby CB on the SSE 

input and design of the SB will be much 

more significant than any influence on 

the seismic response of the SB from the 

much lighter CFRWs. 

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault 

and Tunnel 

The applicant stated that the Diesel 

Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault and 

Tunnel are designed for the SSE input 

considering the influence of a heavy 

structure (i.e., RB) on the lighter nearby 

structures (Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 

Storage Vault and Tunnel). The 

influence of the RB on the SSE input 

and design of the Diesel generator Fuel 

Oil Storage Vault and Tunnel far 

exceeds any influence from much 

lighter CFRWs. As such, the applicant 

stated that the presence of the CFRWs 

has no influence on the design of the 

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault 

and Tunnel. 

The design calls for three Diesel 

Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vaults and 

the associated tunnels per unit 

surrounded by the RB and RSWPH. 

Based on the configuration of the RB, 

RSWPH, and the CFRWs, the staff agrees 

with the applicant that influence of the 

nearby massive RB on the SSE input 

and design of the Diesel Generator Fuel 

Oil Storage Vault and Tunnel will be 

much more significant than any 

influence from the much lighter CFRWs. 

Reactor Service Water Piping Tunnel 

The applicant stated that the Reactor 

Service Water (RSW) Piping Tunnel is 

located more than 250 feet away from 

the CFRWs. At this location, the 

applicant stated that the CFRWs have no 

effect on the RSW Piping Tunnel. 

The staff reviewed the site layout of 

the RSW Piping Tunnel and determined 

that there will be no seismic interaction 

from the CFRWs to influence the 

seismic input to RSW Piping Tunnel. 

Fire Protection Pump House 

The Fire Protection Pump House is 

located more than 300 feet away from 

the CFRWs. At this location, the 

applicant stated that the CFRWs have no 

effect on the Fire Protection Pump 

House. Because of sufficient separation 

distance (more than 300 feet), the staff 

agrees with the applicant’s conclusion 

that the seismic input for the Fire 

Protection Pump House is not affected 

by the CFRWs. 

The staff concludes that leaving the 

CFRWs in place after the plant is 

constructed does not adversely affect 

the seismic design basis of safety related 

structures required to withstand the 

effects of the SSE in the vicinity of the 

CFRWs. This conclusion is based on the 

analysis and engineering evaluation 

performed by the applicant and the 

review performed by the staff as 

discussed in this report on the above 

SSCs as defined in 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1). 

The staff also concludes that 

applicant has met the relevant 

requirements of GDC 2 and 10 CFR Part 

50, Appendix S by appropriately 

considering the most severe earthquake 

and site parameters as seismic input in 

performing the comparative SSI analysis 

with and without the CFRWs. 

Hydrology 

STPNOC stated that the CFRWs will 

not affect the safe operation of STP 

Units 3 and 4 or have a reasonable 

nexus to safety. NRC staff reviewed the 

impacts of proposed action on safetyrelated groundwater issues as they relate 

to the SSCs as defined in 10 CFR 50.10 

(a)(1). 

First, in regard to groundwater use, 

the STPNOC COLA proposed a Deep 

Aquifer well to provide make up water 

for the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). 

However, the make-up water for the 

UHS is not safety-related and thus there 

are no safety-related impacts. 

Second, ABWR DC requires a 

maximum groundwater level of two feet 

below the plant grade. The applicant 

stated in FSAR 2.4.12 that the estimated 

maximum groundwater level is about 28 

feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). STPNOC is 

now re-evaluating the maximum 

groundwater level using a detailed 

groundwater model. However, NRC staff 

expects that the maximum groundwater 

level with the CFRWs will remain 

significantly below the plant grade of 34 

ft MSL. 

Third, in terms of the groundwater 

contamination, STPNOC is now reevaluating the impacts of CFRWs on the 

groundwater pathways. However, NRC 

staff expects that the CFRWs will create 

a longer pathway and travel time that 

will result in less severe radiological 

consequences. 

Finally, the CFRWs will not have an 

adverse impact on the safety-related 

groundwater issues at STP Units 1 and 

2 because there is a sufficient separation 

distance between the proposed and 

existing units. 

The staff concludes that the 

installation of the CFRWs for Units 3 

and 4 will not affect the safe operation 

of STP Units 3 and 4 or have a 

reasonable nexus to safety related to 

groundwater at the STP site. 

Consistent With Common Defense and 

Security 

The proposed exemption would allow 

the applicant to install CFRWs as a 

preconstruction activity without the 

authorization provided in a construction 

permit, combined license or a Limited 

Work Authorization (LWA). This 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.10 is for the 

sole purpose of the installation the 


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1Notice of United States Postal Service of Filing 

Five Functionally Equivalent Global Expedited 

Package Services 3 Negotiated Service Agreements 

and Application For Non-Public Treatment of 

Materials Filed Under Seal, November 5, 2010 

(Notice). 

CFRWs and has no relation to security 

issues. Therefore, the common defense 

and security is not impacted by this 

exemption. 

Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) is present 

whenever ‘‘compliance would result in 

undue hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation as 

adopted, or that are significantly in 

excess of those incurred by others 

similarly situated.’’ The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.10 is to define 

clearly the licensing requirements for a 

LWA. The applicant has demonstrated 

and the NRC staff has confirmed that the 

influence of the CFRWs on interactions 

with the SSCs will have a negligible 

nexus to safety. The applicant also cites 

undue hardship or other costs as a 

special circumstance that would 

warrant granting this exemption. The 

applicant has provided two potentially 

viable alternate construction plans to 

avoid delay in their schedule: (1) 

Redesign the CFRWs to make it more 

practical to remove prior to fuel load 

and (2) increase the size of the 

excavation and locate the crane in the 

excavation. STPNOC states that both 

options will increase the construction 

cost by $22 million and $260 million 

respectively. Therefore, since the 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.10 is 

still being achieved concerning the 

safety of the SSCs during construction 

activities and the applicant has 

demonstrated an undue hardship, the 

special circumstance required by 10 

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) for the granting of an 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.10 exists. 

The applicant has also provided 

information on this proposed action 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(b) which 

states any person may request an 

exemption permitting the conduct of 

activities prior to the issuance of the 

construction permit prohibited by 10 

CFR 50.10. The balancing factors for 

granting such an exemption are 

evaluated in the environmental 

assessment (EA) that is attached to this 

package. The ADAMS Accession 

number for this associated EA is 

ML101580541. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a) and 10 CFR 50.12(b), the 

exemption is authorized by law, will not 

present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety, and is consistent with 

the common defense and security. Also, 

special circumstances are present. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants South Texas Project Nuclear 

Operating Company an exemption from 

the requirements in 10 CFR 50.10 for the 

installation of the CFRWs for Units 3 

and 4. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (75 FR 67784). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland on November 

5, 2010. 

For the Commission. 

David B. Matthews, 

Director, Division of New Reactor Licensing, 

Office of New Reactors. 

[FR Doc. 2010–28638 Filed 11–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 

MANAGEMENT 

Privacy Act of 1974: New System of 

Records 

AGENCY: U.S. Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM). 

ACTION: Notice to extend comment 

period for a new system of records. 

SUMMARY: OPM is extending the 

comment period for a new system of 

records, OPM/Central-15, Health Claims 

Data Warehouse, until December 15, 

2010. The initial notice for this system 

was published on October 5, 2010, and 

provided a comment period deadline of 

November 15, 2010. Based on the 

comments we have received since we 

published the initial notice, OPM is 

considering revisions to the systems 

notice to, among other things, provide 

greater specificity regarding the 

authorities for maintaining the system, 

clarify its intent to significantly limit 

the circumstances under which 

personally identifiable records may be 

released, and provide a more detailed 

explanation of how the records in this 

system will be protected and secured. If 

OPM publishes a revised systems 

notice, the public will have the 

opportunity to comment on the revised 

notice before OPM begins operating the 

system. In the meantime, OPM is 

extending the opportunity for interested 

persons, organizations, and agencies to 

review and provide comments pursuant 

to the October 5, 2010 system notice. 

DATES: The comment period is extended 

until December 15, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Send written comments to 

the Office of Personnel Management, 

Attn: Gary A. Lukowski, Ph.D., 

Manager, Data Analysis, U. S. Office of 

Personnel Management, 1900 E Street, 

NW., Room 7439, Washington, DC 

20415 or to gary.lukowski@opm.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary 

A. Lukowski, Ph.D., Manager, Data 

Analysis, at 202–606–1449. 

U.S. Office of Personnel Management. 

John Berry, 

Director. 

[FR Doc. 2010–28834 Filed 11–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6325–46–P 

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. MC2010–28 and CP2011–28 

Through 32; Order No. 582] 

New Postal Product 

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing a 

recently-filed Postal Service request to 

add five additional Global Expedited 

Package Services 3 (GEPS 3) contracts to 

the competitive product list. This 

document describes the Postal Service’s 

filing, including its interest in and 

rationale for including the contracts 

within the existing GEPS 3 product, and 

addresses several related procedural 

matters. These include an opportunity 

for public comment. 

DATES: Comment deadline: November 

16, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments 

electronically using the Commission’s 

Filing Online system at 

http.www.prc.gov. Those who cannot 

submit comments electronically should 

call the person identified in the FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section 

for advice on alternatives. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Stephen L. Sharfman, General Counsel, 

at 202–789–6824 or 

stephen.sharfman@prc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction 

II. Notice of Filing 

III. Ordering Paragraphs 

I. Introduction 

On November 5, 2010, the Postal 

Service filed a notice announcing that it 

has entered into five additional Global 

Expedited package Services 3 (GEPS 3) 

contracts.1 The Postal Service believes 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES