THE ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles

March 31, 1995
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the Director of Research by calling

commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.
iii

PREFACE

Two earlier monographs in this series by General Gordon R.

Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st

Century and War in the Information Age, provided a general

concept of what land warfare might portend in the post-Cold War

and post-Information Age environment. This monograph, by General

Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles, brings into

focus several areas where the future will differ most from the

past. They provide insights into three critical areas: the

operational environment; the emergence of simultaneity as a

unifying concept in Information Age warfare; and, changes that

must take place in the planning environment.

When history is at a watershed, people, institutions, and

nations have three choices. One choice is to live in the past;

relishing triumphs, elaborating on myths, and eventually becoming

a part of the past. The second choice is to fight change. Indeed,

all change is not for the better. In times of uncertainty, like

those the Army faces today, individuals, institutions, and

nations are susceptible to what can be facile, transitory, and

faddish. The Army would do well to recall the "pentomic

divisions" plan of 1956. The third alternative is for

individuals, institutions and nations to embrace the future with

all of its uncertainties. It is better to transform rather than

to be transformed by the future.

Uncertainty will be the norm as the Army moves into the 21st

century. During the Cold War, the Army was ready to fight a

particular kind of conflict. Today, when conditions are less

certain and the threats more ambiguous, unpredictable, and in a

sense more likely to be translated into acts of force to achieve

political, economic, or terroristic objectives, the Army must be

structured, trained, equipped, and prepared for maximum

flexibility. The authors suggest that the challenge today is to

determine what array of capabilities may be needed to perform a

broader range of requirements and to decide how much of each

capability Force XXI will need.

The Army has one tremendous resource as it faces the 21st

century: soldiers that can think. They constitute more than a

half million smart weapons in the Army inventory. Each one can

make decisions under adverse conditions, track on multiple
iv

targets, fire and forget, and each one possesses a virtually

unlimited reloading capability. Because each one also can make

moral choices, they are individually more precious than any

number of Comanche helicopters, multiple launch rocket systems,

or counter-battery radars. That is why, as we address the

challenges of the present while articulating a vision for the

21st century, we must be very careful to consult history, the
v

only reliable guide we have for addressing the future for the

wisdom it offers.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR.

Director of Studies

Strategic Studies Institute
vi

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN, Chief of Staff, United States Army,

was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor and awarded a

Bachelor of Arts degree in history from Norwich University in

1959. He holds a Master of Arts degree in political science from

the University of New Hampshire. His military schooling includes

the Armor School, the Command and General Staff College, and the

Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff

positions including four years in joint and allied assignments.

His overseas assignments include four tours in Europe, two in

Vietnam and one in Korea. General Sullivan also served in

assignments on the Army Staff in Washington, DC, including a tour

as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and as the

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. General Sullivan has commanded

at platoon through division level. In United States Army, Europe

he commanded the 4th Battalion, 73d Armor and the 1st Brigade, 3d

Armored Division, followed by an assignment as 3d Armored

Division's Chief of Staff and the VII Corps Operations Officer

(G-3). Subsequently, he served as the Assistant Commandant of the

Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on the NATO staff as the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Support of Central Army Group in

Germany, and as the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General

Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also served as

Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley,

Kansas. In June 1991, General Sullivan became Chief of Staff of

the United States Army. He also serves as a member of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY M. COROALLES currently serves on the

personal staff of the Army Chief of Staff. A former tactics

instructor at the Infantry School, he earned a Bachelor of

Science degree in systems management from the University of

Southern California. He also holds a Master of Military Arts and

Science degree in theater operations from the School of Advanced

Military Studies and has written extensively in military

journals. Lieutenant Colonel Coroalles' operational assignments

have included service with the 82d Airborne Division, the 2d

Ranger Battalion, the 4th Mechanized Division, the 75th Ranger

Regiment, and the 25th Infantry Division. Before assuming his

current position, he commanded the 6th Ranger Training Battalion.
1

THE ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

May you live in interesting times.

Old Chinese Curse

Introduction.

Times of change, times of turbulence, and times of

uncertainty are inherently "interesting" periods. The element

that makes them so is unpredictability. Unpredictability also

compels many people, including military professionals, to fear

and to want to avoid such times. Certainty, stability, and calm

are conditions that we find much easier to deal with in our daily

lives. Given a choice, these are also the conditions that most

nations and institutions would prefer as characteristic of their

strategic environment. Yet neither the Army nor the nation seem

to have a choice in the rapid pace of change that is swirling

around us as the 20th century draws to a close. Indeed we live in

interesting times.

Two powerful conditions define the environment in which the

United States Army operates today: the collapse of the Cold War

strategic environment and the dawning of what futurists Alvin and

Heidi Toffler have described as the "Information Age."1 In

November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and with it tumbled the

central strategic focus of the United States. From the end of the

Second World War until the collapse of communism in Central and

Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, our world view had been

filtered through the lens of the Cold War confrontation between

the United States and the Soviet Union; a stable and certain

strategic focus. From 1948, when American and Allied forces stood

firm during the Soviet blockade of Berlin, and simultaneously

showed their determination over Greece, the United States and the

Soviet Union were locked in a worldwide, political, economic,

military, and ideological struggle; a struggle we correctly

perceived as a life-or-death contest between diametrically

opposed socio-political, economic, and ideological systems. The

U.S. Army went to war in Korea in 1950 and American troops faced

off with Soviet and East German soldiers at Checkpoint Charlie

during the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961. The armed forces

of this nation stood ready for what might have been the final

conflagration as the John F. Kennedy administration stared down
2

Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro during the Cuban Missile

Crisis of October 1962. The Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines

fought a long and bitter war against communist insurgents and

North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina in the 1960s and into

the 1970s.2 In the 1980s, Washington supported resistance forces

in Nicaragua and Afghanistan while standing by our traditional

allies in NATO and our friends in the Middle East. All of this

was done under the rubric of containment with one goal in mind:

to stop the spread of Soviet communism. The Cold War was

America's third most costly war; 100,000 Americans gave their

lives in this effort.

Ultimately, we prevailed. Not only was Soviet communism

contained, but Germany and the countries of Eastern and Central

Europe were freed from the yoke of communism. Today freedom is

growing in these countries and, however delicately and

precariously, growing in a democratic Russia.

Throughout this 40-year conflict, our Army trained and

prepared for global war against the Soviet Union. Army doctrine,

organizations, and equipment reflected this reality. Physically

and psychologically the Army was oriented to our biggest threat–a

Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe. By November of

1989, the Army had 28 Divisions, 18 in the Active Component and

10 in the Reserves. Of these, 24 were committed, in one way or

another, to fighting a war in Europe. The others were apportioned

to the fight in other theaters against the Soviets or their

surrogates and allies. Thus in November of 1989, after years of

preparation for a war that never happened–precisely because we

were prepared for it–we found ourselves the victors in Europe and

the heirs to a new strategic environment which we are just now

beginning to understand.

Today, as we articulate a vision for the Army of the 21st

century, Force XXI, rapid technological developments in

information management and processing are ushering in what many

believe to be the beginning of a post-industrial age; the

Information Age. The microprocessor is revolutionizing the way

that we live our lives as individuals, the way that society

functions, and the way that we are likely to fight our future

wars. Just as coal and steam, and petroleum and electricity made

possible the mass production of goods and the emergence of

industrial society by supplementing muscle power with machine

power, the microprocessor is revolutionizing industrial society
3

today by supplementing brain power with the near instantaneous

power of electronic computation. The results are already

apparent. Electronic banking, barcode scanning, personal

organizers, cellular car phones, telephones and modems on airline

seats, electronic town hall meetings, and teleconferencing are

among the developments that mark new ways in which people work,

govern, transact business, and teach. These powerful developments

are leading society toward an uncertain but interesting future; a

future which it is just beginning to explore. These same forces

acting on society are acting on our Army as well.

As exciting as all this may be, interesting times are

difficult times precisely because, unlike more stable periods,

the very uncertainty and turbulence that makes these periods

interesting also makes planning for the future very difficult.

Assumptions are less secure, objectives less well defined, and

the future utility of current means decidedly less certain. By

themselves, either the collapse of the Cold War strategic

paradigm, or the coming of the Information Age would have

presented the Army with a formidable task. As we contemplate not

only new missions but also new means, these events present us

with both an unprecedented challenge and an unparalleled

opportunity.

The two previous monographs in this series, War in the

Information Age and Land Warfare in the 21st Century, aimed at

identifying in general terms what future war and land combat in

this new environment is likely to portend. We are continuing to

gain insights into the conduct of operations in this new

environment. As we have conducted additional military operations,

continued to think about the challenges facing us, and engaged in

experimentation to test our ideas, several areas where we believe

the future will differ most from the past have come into focus.

This monograph will provide insights into three critical areas:

the operational environment; the emergence of simultaneity as the

unifying concept in Information Age warfare; and, changes in the

planning environment. The intent of this discussion is to further

the dialogue necessary for moving our profession into the 21st

century.

The Operational Environment.

Five trends will define the operational environment in
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Information Age warfare. These are:

• Greater lethality and dispersion.

• Increased volume and precision of fire.

• Better integrative technology leading to increased

efficiency and effectiveness.

• Increasing ability of smaller units to create decisive

results.

• Greater invisibility and increased detectability.3

As these trends take hold, future operations will assume a

much different character than those of the past. To fully

appreciate the significance of this change, one must understand

the relationships underlying these trends as well as the

fundamental building blocks of operational power in this new

environment.

Operational forces generate their power from the interaction

of six elements. In the environment in which Force XXI will

operate, power will derive from the ability of a force to: sense

the enemy, itself and its environment; strike an opponent

decisively; protect itself from the attacks of the opponent; move

freely in the area of operations; exercise control over subelements; and sustain itself.4

 Each of these elements interacts

in dynamic fashion with the other elements to create the total

potential power of the force. For example, consider what is

principally a strike function: operational deep fires. To be

effective, deep fires must be accurate. Accuracy depends on the

ability to sense the target and exercise control over the timing

of the fires. Also, the effectiveness of these fires will depend

on the ability to move the strike means into position, protect

them both while en route and when in place, and to sustain the

strike means with ammunition and other supplies. Thus the

effectiveness of operational fires is a function not only of the

missile or the bomb itself, but also of the operational

commander's ability to sense, control, move, protect, and

sustain.
5

Maneuver is also a function of the same elements. Success

depends on the commander's ability to achieve effective

situational awareness; an accurate sensing of both enemy and

friendly forces in the area of operations. This sensing will lead

to an identification of enemy weakness in relation to friendly

strength, and the identification of areas from which positional

advantage can be attained. Controlled, protected, and sustainable

movement to these areas will then allow the commander to move the

enemy out of position or provide the maneuver forces with a more

favorable position from which to further strike the enemy. As

with operational fires, the success of operational maneuver is a

function of the combined effect of the same fundamental elements.

These fundamental elements are the first order forces at
6

work behind the five trends that are defining the operational

environment. These trends describe what is happening as a result

of the increasing strength of the individual elements of

operational power. For example, the trend towards greater

lethality and dispersion results from the increased power of the

sensing, striking, and controlling functions. Similarly, the

trend toward greater integrative capacity issues from vast

improvements in our ability to sense enemy forces and exercise

control over our operations. These elements are the dimensions of

the Information Age battlefield, blending traditional battlefield

functions and systems in a way that enables commanders to better

understand the complex dynamics required to achieve total

integration in space, time, and effects.

Understanding this interaction helps us to extend our

discussion to the theater level. Called on to compel, deter,

reassure, or support, at the theater level specific mission,

environmental, and situational factors, as well as specific enemy

forces, enter our calculations. At the theater level, we can

balance requirements with the capabilities required to achieve

success–decisive victory. The elements of operational power are a

useful framework within which to balance our ends with our means

under these specific conditions.

The nature of the operation which we are undertaking will

exert the greatest influence on the capabilities that we bring to

bear in the theater. Our aim–whether it is to compel a foe to do

our will, deter that foe from taking certain actions, reassure an

ally, or conduct support operations–will determine the character

of the operation. Once there is a clear understanding of the

mission and the environment, the elements of operational power

can guide our thinking through the development of a balanced

theater structure.

As an example consider planning an operation similar to the

one the Army undertook in Rwanda in the summer of 1994. The first

task would be to determine the nature of the operation. As in

Rwanda, the operation in this instance would be a humanitarian

support effort. The specifics of the environment might vary, but

in our planning the following would be considered: the magnitude

of the effort, size of the geographic area, available

infrastructure, climate and weather, and many other factors.

Based on the operational functions, this assessment would lead to
7

a determination of the joint capabilities required to execute the

operation.

Control: The control capability could take the form of a

Joint Task Force (JTF) formed around a division, corps, or

unified command headquarters with the appropriate means required

to exert control over the forces deployed throughout the area of

operations. Our analysis of control would also extend to

determining the capabilities required to exert an appropriate

degree of control over the population and resources in the area.

Sense: Next, the planner could consider the sensing

capabilities that might be required. This could take the form of

Special Forces survey teams, aerial reconnaissance, or any of a

number of means designed to give the commander the capability to

sense both the environment and the progress of the relief effort.

Sustain: A relief operation such as the one we are outlining

would hinge on sustainment. As an element of operational power,

the sustainment function must be considered as it relates to our

forces. We would have to analyze the requirements and deploy the

capabilities necessary to meet our needs. Moreover, in this

operation sustainment considerations must also be considered

relative to what additional capabilities might be required to

execute the relief effort. This study would lead to a

determination of the capabilities required to store, transport,

and distribute the total required supplies as well as any

requirements for improvements to the existing infrastructure.

Move: The move function is closely linked to the sustainment

function in this operation. The planner would consider the

capabilities required to move relief supplies and equipment into

the area as well as within the area. Additionally, requirements

to move the forces executing the relief effort, as well as

requests from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), like the

International Red Cross, would have to be integrated and

balanced.

Protect: In relief operations like the one under

consideration, protection of the force seldom involves the

traditional measures needed to ward off the destructive effects

of an opposing enemy force. Rather, the planner has to consider a

broader and less easily defined combination of possible threats
8

including disease, armed bands, and terrorists. If the relief

efforts are undertaken in an area torn by civil or clan warfare,

planners will need to consider the danger of attack by one or

more factions engaged in conflict with each other.

Strike: Under the conditions laid out above, the strike

function would be viewed in two distinct ways. First, it would be

considered in terms of the degree of coercive capability

necessary to support the execution of the mission. In this light,

it would entail an analysis of the capabilities required to guard

against theft, to establish order, to police the area, and

perhaps to neutralize armed bands. Viewed in another, and perhaps

more important way, the strike function would be defined by our

ability to mass effects (relief) at the critical times and places

we sense. Decisive victory would be defined by our ability to

coordinate "strikes" to stop the dying and stabilize the

situation for local government and NGOs.

The above discussion, although incomplete in many details,

illustrates a way of thinking about future operations. Tailoring

of capabilities to specific theater and mission requirements will

be the norm in war and Military Operations Other Than War.

Structuring our thinking in terms of the elements of operational

power will facilitate this process. We have to think not in terms

of how many brigades or divisions are needed, but in terms of

what we need in the theater to sense, strike, protect, and so on.

Additionally, thinking in this way allows us to consider more

precisely the functional relationships and their effect on power.

Thinking in these terms is particularly useful against a foe

with multidimensional capabilities. Combat power is a function of

the interaction of the six elements across the Joint Force. To

succeed in multidimensional warfare, we must exert relative

dominance over our opponent across functions and mediums in the

theater of war. This dominance is the result of the total power

generated by the entire set of friendly capabilities in relation

to that which an enemy can bring to bear against us.

Spatial-Temporal Dimension in Future Warfare.

The goal is to be able to wield military power across space

and through time with heretofore unimaginable precision and

accuracy. We aim at the integration of the entire force's
9

capabilities in a way resembling the effects of a single weapon.

That is, we are striving for an unprecedented ability to

synchronize multiple capabilities, from multiple services in

time, space, and direction. If we can attain this ideal, the Army

will have achieved the capability to conduct operations in a

qualitatively different way. Commanders will be able to link

joint sensors, with joint strike and protection means, into a

protected and sustainable seamless entity whose elements are able

to interact with each other effortlessly to deliver devastatingly

accurate effects. This is our vision of the joint context in

which Force XXI will operate.

The model shown below depicts this ideal. It illustrates the

combined strike means of the Joint Force being employed in a

synchronized and precise way against a specific enemy capability;

in this case, a critical control node in the enemy's air arm. The

same idea could be applied to the employment of sensing means,

either in the broad band across the entire enemy force, or in a

narrow band aimed precisely at a particular capability. The value

of this kind of approach should be obvious; precision of this

nature will enable us to destroy the coherence of the enemy force

by taking away the lynch pins that hold it together.

In the macro sense, the elements of operational power also

provide the means to conduct a capabilities-based tradeoff

analysis. One can ask questions such as, "What is the optimum

relationship in a theater force structure between strike and
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sensing means?" Or, "What is the best mix of theater mobility

assets and protection means?" As part of the first question, it

is important to remember that the greater our capability to

sense, the more effectively the enemy can be struck. But, at some

point deploying greater sensing capabilities adds little

capability at the margin. As a part of the latter question, we

need to understand that every theater will be different in terms

of mobility requirements and that every threat will present

unique challenges in terms of our ability to provide protection

for the force. Additionally, one must recognize the temporal

variable. The relative importance of each function will vary over

time as capabilities are sequenced into the theater.

Simultaneity.

Since the Civil War, military strategists have understood
11

that strategic decision in a theater of war comes as the result

of success in a series of linked operations. These operations,

each sequential in nature, are combined in effect to destroy the

enemy's capacity or will to resist. The Civil War, both World

Wars, and the Korean War offer examples of this method. But this

approach to securing strategic decision has not always been the

norm. Throughout much of history strategic decision could be

achieved by attaining success in one great climactic battle.

As war became the endeavor of the industrialized nationstate, the size of armies grew and so did the frontages over

which their operations were conducted. These frontages were wide,

but very narrow in the depth that could be influenced by the

weapons of each opponent. The occasional cavalry raid or partisan

action notwithstanding, throughout the entire 19th century the

"reach" of opposing forces was limited to the range of their

largest weapon–the cannon. Armies could sense and strike each

other only as far as they could see and bring artillery fire to

bear. Because reserves could operate just beyond the range of

reliable detection and out of the range of artillery fire,

reserve forces could not be attacked and fixed in position. The

result was that armies had near-total freedom of movement in

their rear areas. This circumstance, exploited by the rapid

lateral movement made possible by railroads, meant that a

breakthrough could be countered more rapidly than it could be

exploited.5

 Thus, throughout World War I operation after

operation came to a halt after gaining only a few kilometers.6

Beginning in World War II, the airplane extended the range

of artillery to operational and strategic depths. For the first

time in warfare, freedom of movement behind the front was

seriously hampered. Bridges could be bombed, railroad yards

destroyed, and operational reserves delayed or disrupted. Aerial

interdiction brought legitimacy to war in the third dimension.

Although the means employed were undeveloped and unbalanced, the

concept of attacking the enemy throughout the breadth and depth

of the operational area was in place by 1945.7

During the Cold War the concept of simultaneous attack

throughout the entire breadth and depth of the theater was

developed and extended. This effort matured in 1982 with the

development of AirLand Battle doctrine by the U.S. Army. The

initial AirLand Battle doctrine and its subsequent refinement in
12

1986, along with the complementary NATO concept of Follow-On

Forces Attack (FOFA), drove operational requirements to extend

the battlefield in terms of depth and time–spatially and

temporally. But having the ability to strike deep was not enough.

What has been needed, and what can now be achieved, is a

qualitatively different way of fighting–the ability not only to

strike the enemy deep, but to see the enemy deep in real time.

With this capability, commanders can now blend previously

separate and discrete operations into a single and seamless

whole.

This was the genesis of the idea which is now developing

into its full promise: Theater-Strategic Operations. This

involves the design and execution of a theater-wide effort to

bring strategic decision in a single operation by inflicting

simultaneous tactical, operational, and strategic paralysis on an

enemy in order to bring about rapid and total collapse of

resistance.

As became evident during Operation Urgent Fury in Panama in

1989, overwhelming the enemy simultaneously at the operational

and tactical levels neutralizes his ability to react. Strategic

collapse quickly follows. Simultaneity, applied across the Joint

force is the ultimate force multiplier. Sequential operations

simply cannot achieve the synergistic impact that simultaneity

offers. The simultaneous use of force enables Joint forces to

achieve their objectives quickly, establishing control and

imposing their will on any given situation by controlling the

operational tempo to bring about order in a chaotic environment.

All of this can be achieved with minimum loss of life on either

side and minimum destruction of resources and infrastructure.

Simultaneity, the simultaneous employment of overwhelming

combat power throughout the breadth and depth of the operational

area to paralyze the enemy, is the defining characteristic of war

and Military Operations Other Than War in the Information Age.

Operation Just Cause and the maneuver phase of Operation Desert

Storm were both examples of a Theater-Strategic Operation. Had

the negotiations failed to bring about a peaceful transition of

power in Haiti, that kind of operation would have taken place

there as well.

In these operations, we received a glimpse of the leveraging
13

effect of simultaneous action. Such leverage is the result of the

application of simultaneity in three different dimensions: in

time, over time, and throughout the levels of war. Simultaneity

in time refers to the conduct of multiple actions at the same

time. Such action has the effect of overwhelming an opponent's

capacity for effective action by simultaneously presenting him

with multiple threats. It directly strikes at his freedom of

action by attacking and immobilizing multiple parts at the same

time. This is analogous to a police technique for subduing a

suspect. Three officers simultaneously rush the offending party,

one grabbing the legs while the other two each grab an arm. This

quickly overwhelms the target, causing minimum damage to all

concerned. Compare this with a sequential use of force where one

police officer at a time goes after the same suspect. In this

case the suspect would eventually be subdued, but in the process

both he and each policeman would be the worse for the exchange.

Simultaneity over time is linked to both the nature of

surprise and the decision cycle of the opponent. Surprise can be

looked at as being either cognitive or physical. Cognitive

surprise occurs when the target of the surprise is totally

unaware of the action that befalls him. That is, the enemy has no

idea that something will happen until it does. Physical surprise

is different. The target may know that something is about to

happen, but he is physically unable to do anything about it. The

effect of both types of surprise is the same. The target becomes

incapable of effective response. If the target cannot recover the

ability to take effective action, the effect of the initial

surprise will be decisive.

Considering the decision cycle of the target–its ability to

cycle among observation, orientation, decision, and action–it is

obvious that when the attacking force achieves surprise, the

opponent is faced with a situation that he has either not seen

coming, or is not oriented to block. However, at the moment of

attack the target begins a new cycle. If opposing forces can be

confronted with another action before they can act to cope with

the first, then the power of simultaneity over time becomes

evident.

To the target, the new action is for all practical purposes

simultaneous to the initial action. This type of action conducted

on a continuous basis magnifies the effect of the initial
14

surprise. It precludes the enemy from regaining its balance by

presenting ememy forces with a continuous array of actions, each

of which precludes them from taking effective action against a

previous threat. If we strike an opponent a blow to the head to

stun and in rapid succession strike the chest, stomach, and

groin, the attack takes on an indiscernible unity in the eyes of

our opponent.

Simultaneity throughout the levels of war aims at the

simultaneous paralysis of action at the strategic, operational,

and tactical levels. Historically, we have thought in terms of

tactical success leading to operational success and operational

success leading to strategic success. Paradoxically perhaps, we

have also understood that the strategic level of war sets the

conditions for the operational level, which in turn sets the

conditions for the tactical. For example, if through a successful

operational concentration of force we can achieve a tactical

advantage of 20:1 over a foe at the point of attack, then no

degree of tactical excellence on the enemy's part is likely to

overcome this disadvantage. In such a case, operational level

actions will almost predetermine tactical success. Similarly, for

good or ill, strategic action can have the same effect on the

operational level.

Conceptually, by striking the enemy simultaneously at all

levels, its ability to salvage a situation is severely hampered.

The enemy is denied the flexibility to take operational action to

recover from tactical failure and the ability to take strategic

action to recover from operational defeat. In this manner the

linkages between the three levels of war are broken, making each

irrelevant to the other. The Gulf War provided a vision of the

advantage to be accrued from such a decoupling. First, on the

strategic level, even as American and Allied forces were building

up in the Persian Gulf region, Washington isolated Baghdad

diplomatically from its traditional allies and economically from

its sources of external income. Then, before Iraq could recover

from this strategic diplomatic and economic action, Allied forces

launched the first phase of Operation Desert Storm.8

 The air

operation accomplished two tasks. First, it fixed the Iraqis in

Kuwait by taking away their ability to conduct operational-level

movements. Second, through continued strategic attacks directed

against Iraqi infrastructure, command centers, and industry, the

Iraqis were kept off balance strategically–even when they began
15

their series of SCUD attacks in an attempt to regain the

initiative. These attacks made it impossible for the Iraqi

leadership to exercise positive operational direction over their

forces deployed in Kuwait as well as over many elements

throughout Iraq. Consequently, Iraqi forces were incapable of any

coordinated response to the attacking ground forces when the

final, decisive phase of the war began on February 24, 1991.

Localized, uncoordinated tactical responses were the extent of

Iraqi military actions after the actual shooting began. In this

fashion, through a series of sequential and simultaneous multilevel actions, the Allied forces achieved the effect of

simultaneity over the Iraqis at all levels of war.

In the future, improvements in the ability to sense,

control, and strike at ever increasing ranges with ever

increasing accuracy and lethality will add further impact to

simultaneous action. Moreover, the power of simultaneity can be

seen across a wide spectrum of conflict. In support operations,

simultaneous action can bring needed assistance throughout the

affected area rapidly, thereby saving lives. If the objective is

compellance, the ability to disconnect the enemy's strategic,

operational, and tactical efforts from each other holds the

promise of quick and decisive results at lower costs. Just as the

climactic battle yielded to the need to conduct sequential

operations in the Industrial Age, the Information Age is

providing us the technologies and weapons needed to replace

sequential operations with the overwhelming simultaneous theater

operation.

The Planning Environment.

For the foreseeable future the planning environment is

likely to be dominated by general assumptions and unquantifiable

threats; an unsettling environment for any organization. For the

U.S. Army, which must prepare to advance national interests in

new, different, and perhaps unforeseen ways, the prospect is

truly formidable. A sports analogy, though not entirely adequate,

can illustrate the problem.9

During the Cold War the U.S. Army was like a football team,

preparing for a game which coaches, players, and fans hoped would

never take place. The opponent was bigger and had a deeper bench,

but the U.S Army was quicker, sufficiently powerful, and perhaps
16

smarter. The Army also knew many other things. It understood the

rules of the game. It knew the locations of the major stadiums

and the field conditions at each of these locations. It had a

good idea of its opponent's plays and probable game plans. And it

had analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent and had

developed specific game plans to counter each strength and

exploit each weakness. This knowledge allowed the U.S Army to

organize itself confidently, plan for the contest, and practice

specifically for the big game under whatever circumstances it

might be played.

The Army was ready for the whistle to blow. It may not have

known precisely when or where it would play, but coaches,

players, and fans knew that the game would be football. Today the

team and the coaches are unsure of whether they will be playing

football, baseball, or soccer–or some combination of these or any

number of other games. Furthermore, many of the potential

opponents have no commitment to playing by any rules other than

their own. Desert Storm, Somalia, Hurricane Andrew, Rwanda, and

Haiti are each as different from the other as baseball is

different from football and as legitimate sport is different from

a free-for-all.

As the Army moves into the next century, uncertainty will be

the norm and not the exception. Under conditions of relative

certainty, such as the Cold War environment, the Army could

optimize for a particular type of conflict. Under the more

uncertain conditions of today, we must structure for maximum

flexibility. When we knew where we were going to fight, against

whom, and for approximately how long, the Army organized its

forces precisely to meet those conditions. Units trained

according to very precise Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs)

under very precise conditions and command relationships. Today we

cannot make those precise assumptions, and we must structure to

meet a wider range of requirements. Structuring for this wider

range is a much greater challenge than structuring for a narrower

set of conditions.

The challenge today is to minimize the inherent problems

that come with the requirement for greater flexibility. The days

of structuring and planning solely against a known threat are not

likely to return soon. Now the challenge is to determine what

array of capabilities may be needed to perform a broader range of
17

requirements. It is equally important to determine how much of

each capability Force XXI may need and how it should best

organize these capabilities. For example, will the Army structure

a division or brigade to be multifunctional across a broad range

of mission areas on a permanent basis? Or, would it be better to

structure these headquarters so that a wide array of units with

specific capabilities can be integrated on a temporary and

mission-specific basis?

Other equally important questions must be addressed as the

Army transitions to a capabilities-based force. How many echelons

of command will be needed? Today, from squad to corps we have

seven echelons. At what level can the Army most effectively

organize and train for functional competency? At what level

should capabilities be mixed? Which capabilities should be

included in the Active and Reserve Components? These are

difficult questions to which there are no easy answers. But these

are precisely the type of questions that have to be addressed.

Moreover, every question will have to be considered within

the framework of the Joint environment. Just like the days of

structuring and planning against a known threat are over, so too

are the days when individual services could structure without

considering the capabilities that other services bring to the

fight. This is another reason why the operational power model is

so useful–it helps us to think in terms of functions that need to

be performed across mediums, rather than in terms of individual

service capabilities.

The answers will not come overnight. The Army EXFOR

(Experimental Force) at Ft. Hood, Texas and other service and

Joint tests will assist us in finding the answers to many of

these questions. Through a commitment to finding the best

solution and an iterative process of hypothesis and

experimentation, the Armed Forces will go far in minimizing the

tradeoff between flexibility and efficiency that comes with

designing a force capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st

century.

Conclusion.

Anticipating the future is an imprecise endeavor.

Nevertheless, it is imperative that we look forward, not
18

backward. Only by anticipating the requirements can the Army

expect to position itself as a relevant force in the future.

History is the only reliable source we have for analyzing how

previous armies anticipated change, and the pages of history

books are replete with armies that failed to do so. For the

nations unfortunate enough to have relied on these armies, the

cost of not being prepared was high–sometimes catastrophically

so.

The reason that many armies have failed to change with the

conditions is that armies are by nature conservative

institutions, generally resistant to change. This institutional

resistance is particularly dangerous in times of historical

transformation when a paradigm shift is evident. It is precisely

then that the most rapid organizational response is needed. One

of the most difficult, but also most essential tasks confronting

a military establishment is the acceptance and development of

bold new ideas. This is particularly true in military

institutions which have recently experienced significant military

successes, as the U.S. Army has in the Persian Gulf and in Haiti.

Ideas that have the potential to overturn long-established,

bureaucratically entrenched methods of operation are not welcomed

by the average man. When the paradigm shifts, most cannot grasp

the full potential of new ideas. New technologies and processes

can frighten those who are comfortable with the routines

established to accommodate the old technologies. Furthermore,

vested interests within the organization and within its

bureaucracy–usually for what to them are good and logical

reasons–will resist ideas that threaten the status quo.

Bureaucracies flourish on procedures instituted to insure

efficiency. Innovation is the enemy of efficiency because it

threatens established procedures. This is a mindset that we

cannot afford in Force XXI. While military professionals must

hold the security of the nation as something with which they dare

not gamble, they cannot afford to discourage the kind of

imagination and innovation that is needed to meet the varied

challenges that will arise in the 21st century.

History can be a help. Consider the struggle within the Navy

for carrier aviation. Prior to its development, the existing

naval paradigm held that decisive victory at sea depended upon

capital ships engaging with cannon at visual range. Shortly

before World War I, tests and demonstrations were conducted which
19

established that aircraft could be launched from vessels at sea

and that these planes could drop bombs with a degree of accuracy.

The use of aircraft at sea presaged an alternative approach to

the conduct of naval warfare. Throughout the inter-war period, a

generation of naval officers worked to perfect the ideas and

concepts for carrier warfare. Theory led practice because, until

the 1930s, airplanes simply did not have the power to take off

from the deck of a carrier while carrying enough ordnance to

seriously damage a modern battleship. Army Air Services Colonel

Billy Mitchell had shown that land-based aviation could do it,

but his twin-engine bombers carried 1,100 pound demolition bombs

and took off from large, grass and earth fields.10 However,

technology caught up with the concept. Better communications,

more powerful airplanes, and larger aircraft carriers provided

the means to realize the theory.

Concurrently, through gaming conducted at the Naval War

College in Newport, Rhode Island, and in exercises conducted at

sea, a doctrine of naval air power gradually evolved. This was

so not only in the United States but also in Japan, England, and

Italy. In the United States and England this was accomplished in

a period of extreme budgetary constraints and against the

opposition of a significant faction in each country's naval

establishment who believed that scarce resources could better be

spent elsewhere. Had these defenders of the status quo won the

day over the proponents of innovation and change, the subsequent

war in the Pacific may have turned out very differently for the

United States. That the establishment reacted in this way is even

more remarkable when one considers that when the admirals and

captains of 1925 were ensigns and junior lieutenants, their

senior officers had been in the Navy when there was a similar

paradigm shift from wooden hulls and sail to steel hulls and

steam power.

The Second World War, Pearl Harbor and Midway in particular,

convincingly proved the validity of carrier power and changed

entrenched notions about naval warfare. By the end of the war the

aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the Navy's prime

capital ship and another paradigm shift had taken place. The

historical method of waging naval warfare, gunnery duels at

visual range, gave way to engagements well over the horizon. In

essence, naval commanders came to understand that the aircraft

was more than just a long-range cannon, and that against an
20

integrated fleet no battleship stood a chance. Once this

understanding took hold, the carrier became the dominant naval

platform around which organizations and tactics were designed. A

new paradigm was born.

Clearly there are forces at work today which will have

consequences that military professionals need to anticipate. The

purpose of this monograph has been to identify these forces and

to suggest some of their consequences and how these might affect

the operational environment, the structure of the Army, and the

way we plan and conduct operations. While we live in a rapidly

changing world, institutional change moves slowly. Just as the

fully developed carrier concept matured over 40 years, so too

will our force of the future grow, evolve and change. For two

decades the Army has pioneered information-based systems. Now it

is evident that information and knowledge based systems,

organizations, and operations will change fundamentally the way

the Army fights. While the precise manner in which this will

happen may not be entirely clear, the one thing that is sure is

that Information Age technologies will have a profound effect on

land warfare in the 21st century.

In 1925, only the most convinced "true believers" in shipborne air power could have imagined what impact their ideas would

eventually have. They did not know precisely what equipment they

would need or how their ideas would alter institutional

organizations or the tactics of naval warfare. Yet they

persevered despite tight budgets and internal opposition. Had

they not done so it would have been clear, by the summer of 1942,

with a fleet of Japanese aircraft carriers bearing down on

Midway, just how much risk an institution and a nation can incur

by discouraging and fighting change.

Today, America's Army is in a similar position. The world

has changed and there is great risk in standing still.

Information Age technology has advanced to the point that some

can begin to see the potential that new tools will have in the

way military operations are conducted. Through the lenses of

experiments, such as the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) and

Advanced Warfare Experiments (AWEs), glimpses of what could be

are apparent even if no one is yet able to specify exactly where

all this will lead. Like those brave pioneers who developed naval

aviation, we will test the validity of our concept and
21

continuously refine the application despite the opposition of the

keepers of the intellectual status quo. We have a vision and a

plan to grow into that vision. Keeping in mind that it took the

Navy a generation until the idea of carrier-borne air power

became fact, we should not expect full, fast, and precise

solutions to all the challenges facing us today. But be very sure

that America's Army will meet these challenges.

ENDNOTES.

1. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival

at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little Brown and

Company, 1993.

2. A great degree of controversy still exists as to the

strategy and conduct of the Vietnam War. Harry G. Summers, Jr.,

in On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Novato:

Presidio Press, 1982, presents one point of view. Andrew F.

Krepinevich, Jr., presents an opposing argument in The Army in

Vietnam, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, as

does Larry E. Cable in Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars in

Vietnam, 1965-1968, London: Routledge, 1991. The air war, too, is

subject to opposing points of view. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp’s

Strategy for Defeat, San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978, holds that

political constraints prevented air power from being used to its

full potential. Articulate arguments to the contrary are

presented by Mark Clodfelter in The Limits of Air Power: The

American Bombing of North Vietnam, New York: The Free Press,

1989, and by Earl H. Tilford, Jr., in Crosswinds: The Air Force’s

Setup in Vietnam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press,

1993.

3. For a fuller discussion see: General Gordon R. Sullivan

and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st

Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

February 1993.

4. For the purpose of this discussion, control refers to the

structure, procedures, and technology in place that facilitate

the "art" of command. The entire model reflects the elements that

the commander wields, in a creative and personal way, to execute

a military operation.
22

5. John Westwood, Railways at War, San Diego: Howell North

Books, 1980, pp. 141-144.

6. Many other factors were at work in the inability of both

sides to translate tactical success into operational success. But

fundamentally, the problem was one of mobility–the failure of the

offense to sustain forward movement against an enemy whose

movement was virtually unhampered in his rear area.

7. For a discussion on deep operations theory see Richard E.

Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century

Warfare, London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1985, pp. 37-53.

8. However, our inability to destroy their SCUD missile

capability allowed the Iraqis to continue to operate, in limited

fashion, at the strategic and operational levels. The attacks on

Israel are evidence of this capability.

9. The problem with comparing sports to war is that in war,

while certain internationally agreed upon codes and standards

must be adhered to, one is also not necessarily constrained by

obeying an established set of rules. It is okay to seek an unfair

advantage–and "stealing the enemy's playbook" is entirely

legitimate.

10. See William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development

and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military, New

York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925, pp. 56-76.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler