COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM:

DEVELOPING THE ANTITERRORIST CAPABILITIES

OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES

Roger N. McDermott

February 2004

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assistance and cooperation proved invaluable in carrying out this research. 

In particular, he is grateful for the comments and advice on draft versions of 

this monograph from Dr. Steven Metz, Director of Research, SSI; and Richard 

Giragosian, Peter Konecny; Carleton University, Canada; Stéphane Lefebvre; 

Colonel Robert McMullin; and, William D. O’Malley.

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iii

FOREWORD

 Central Asia is a key theater in the war on terrorism. It is a 

region of fragile new states, all facing a wide range of challenges. 

Ungoverned regions―the cauldron of terrorism―are common. As 

the U.S. State Department notes, the United States, “learned a harsh 

lesson after we disengaged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. We 

must not allow countries to become breeding grounds for extremism 

and terrorism. To prevent these destructive forces from taking root 

in Central Asia, we have intensified our efforts to help the countries 

of this area become stable, prosperous, and fully integrated members 

of the world community and the global economy.” The question is 

how to undertake this complex endeavor.

 In this monograph, Roger N. McDermott offers a framework 

for improving the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian 

militaries. This includes increased and focused military training 

with a special emphasis on Special Forces units. The training should 

take place within a regional train and equip program to increase 

effectiveness and efficiency. But, McDermott argues, all assistance 

to the Central Asian states must complement broader diplomatic 

efforts to promote social, economic, and political reform.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

to provide Army and Department of Defense leaders with ideas for 

augmenting the antiterrorist capabilities of America’s partners in 

Central Asia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ROGER N. MCDERMOTT is a graduate of the University of Oxford 

specializing in defense and security issues in the Commonwealth 

of Independent States (CIS). He is an Honorary Senior Research 

Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, 

University of Kent at Canterbury (UK); Senior Associate, Cornell 

Caspian Consulting (Stockholm and Washington, DC), and Senior 

Consultant, Promineon Consulting (London). Dr. McDermott 

regularly writes for scholarly journals, including the Journal of Slavic 

Military Studies and Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Analyst, Central 

Asia and Caucasus Institute (CACI), and the Paul H. Nitze School 

of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 

Washington, DC, have published his articles, which analyse the 

geopolitics and course of military reform in Central Asia. His papers 

have also been published by Conflict Studies Research Center, 

Defense Academy of the United Kingdom (Sandhurst) and Foreign 

Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth (Kansas). Dr. McDermott 

is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 

(London) and the co-editor of the book, Russian Military Reform 1992-

2002 (Frank Cass: London/Portland, 2003).
v

SUMMARY

 Political: U.S. military and security engagement programs in 

the Central Asian region must complement Washington’s broader 

diplomatic efforts to promote democratic, social, economic, and 

political reform programs; and these ought to be part of a long-term 

drive toward promoting greater stability and avoiding the risk of 

failing states slipping further into trouble. The United States must 

reassure its partners in the region, particularly those assisting in the 

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), that they will not be abandoned 

at a later date, giving a more long-term commitment to assisting

the development of their young independent states, helping them 

move towards democracy, strengthening them economically, and 

ensuring the avoidance of a security vacuum in the region. They also 

need to be reassured that the security situation in Afghanistan will 

settle, and that “warlordism” and terrorism training camps will not 

again flourish there and serve as a training ground for many of the 

terrorist groups that threaten to infest the region.

 In pursuing its security strengthening and assistance programs 

in the region, the United States should, directly or through NATO 

(which has specific mechanisms to that effect), underscore the 

common nature of the threat to each of the regional actors and seek 

to encourage deeper and more widespread sharing of intelligence 

within Central Asia. Furthermore, developing the antiterrorist 

capabilities of these states still further should be conditional upon 

closer regional cooperation and security integration; weak and 

isolated states must avoid pursuing “islands of security,” rather 

they must join together in a new spirit of security cooperation to 

promote long-term stability in Central Asia. This must be done with 

finesse in a region where there are two rival states, Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan, vying for dominance and the other three, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are essentially failing states. Clearly, 

the latter three states will see benefit in security cooperation, but the 

real challenge will be to develop a political and military base to the 

assistance program that will attract the stronger states. Policymakers 

must work equally strenuously to foster political and social progress 
vi

within the region to deprive radical groups of potential local 

popular support, based upon social injustice, human rights abuses, 

and poverty. Security policymakers must also pay attention equally 

to emerging threats within Central Asia, such as the Islamist Hizbut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation), working with its partners in 

the region on preventing their full emergence, besides concentrating 

on reducing or countering more pressing or immediate threats, such 

as the remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

Military training:The conventional force capability of Uzbekistan 

and Kazakhstan is far superior to that of their neighbors, and this 

situation will not change in the foreseeable future. U.S. training and 

broader assistance efforts should avoid contributing to the military 

rivalry between these two states. These future Central Asian military 

assistance programs need to focus on two threat parameters: 

counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. There cannot be a 

cookie cutter approach to the development of these programs, as the 

effort must recognize the dramatic differences in the capabilities and 

needs of each of the state’s military and security forces. These two 

missions also require specialized skills, training, and equipment sets 

that are not generally standard in a conventional force. U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) should train and accompany their Central 

Asian counterparts on military exercises and operations, and 

attempt to train their leaders differently; in particular, leading them 

to carefully examine the uses of SOF in modern warfare. Improved 

in-country training, utilizing Mobile Training teams (MTTs) for the 

delivery of whole unit training that addresses the needs of developing 

an effective NCO corps that will in turn train their rank and file, will 

encourage individual initiative and help further undermine the old 

Soviet style top-down management system.

 U.S. training should encompass all the SOF type units from 

the various security agencies responsible for securing the country’s 

border and counterterrorist operations. In many cases the military 

will not have the lead in such operations, but will be supporting 

another agency. The goal is to train these agencies together to 

promote greater operational integration.

 More training should be structured for the long term, including 

help creating special warfare centers, mountain warfare/light 
vii

infantry centers, mountain warfare leaders, common operational 

skills, and an interagency communications structure to facilitate 

closer integration between the military and other security agencies. 

Future trainers within each state then will have the necessary skills 

and education to carry out effective training without overseas 

assistance. Clearly, not all of these states can afford developments of 

such centers; a possible solution would be regional centers fostering 

closer cooperation among the states.

Military Equipment: Military equipment supplied to the Central 

Asian militaries should be targeted carefully towards achieving 

improved defensive and offensive capabilities; that will entail 

basic protective kit, communications, tactical intelligence, and 

troop mobility. Such equipment would include light-weight and 

functional body armor capable of giving adequate protection against 

a 7.62mm round; body armor to protect against fragmentation 

weapons; gas masks; protective head gear; night vision equipment; 

thermal sights; modern sniper weapons; communication equipment 

at operational and tactical level; modern individual and crew-served 

weapons with sufficient quantities of ammunition to train with 

them; Global Position System (GPS); mobile sensors; troop carriers; 

armored mobile vehicles such as the High-Mobility, Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) or Light Armored Vehicle (LAV); and 

helicopters for greater small unit mobility. A greater effort should 

be made to ensure maximum overlap between equipment given to 

these militaries and that utilized in military-to-military training.

 Devising a Central Asia Train and Equip Program (CATEP):

U.S. political decisionmakers and military planners are faced with 

growing challenges developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the 

Central Asian militaries. Consistent with U.S. policy in the Caucasus, 

the United States should devise a systemic and coordinated train 

and equip program in Central Asia. A CATEP would require 

flexibility both at the planning and implementation stages, allowing 

for adaptation to the particular needs of each participating state as 

well as the constructive participation from the regional militaries 

themselves. The scope and cost of such a program suggests the 

need to develop a multinational approach, building on the NATO 

Secretary General’s efforts to enhance the alliance’s relations with 
viii

the states in Central Asia. A NATO based supporting structure 

should be formed to strengthen the program, utilizing the experience 

of member states and partners in Partnership for Peace (PfP). Thus, 

the burden of the assistance program would be shared. There 

should be political linkage between investing in such a program and 

encouraging the Central Asian militaries to cooperate more closely;

this could be especially beneficial in fostering a longer-term regional 

approach to security. A CATEP could be organized around regional 

training centers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. U.S. DoD officials 

should work closely with the regional MODs to assist in producing 

workable blueprints for continued training after U.S. military 

advisors have completed their assigned tasks. Concurrently, 

U.S. policy must promote the formation of elite units within the 

region, capable of meeting the future and evolving security needs 

of the 21st century. As the distinction between war and peace has 

blurred as a consequence of the post 9/11 security environment, a 

CATEP should cultivate enhanced levels of interagency cooperation. 

Evaluating the cost of such programs should be weighed against the 

cost of a continued open-ended risk of having to deploy U.S. forces 

in support of regional partners: these states seek to fight terrorism 

themselves, and not to depend on U.S. power projection in a crisis.
1

COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM:

DEVELOPING THE ANTITERRORIST CAPABILITIES

OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES

Introduction.

 “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end 

there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 

been found, stopped, and defeated.”1

 President George W. Bush, 

addressing the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, highlighted 

the protracted and on-going nature of combating international 

terrorism on a global scale in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 

on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, (henceforth 

9/11). The ensuing military campaign, which began with the violent 

overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, brought the Central Asian 

states, (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 

Uzbekistan) to the forefront of U.S. global strategy.2 On September 

24, 2001, Turkmenistan offered transport and overflight rights 

for humanitarian relief in support of U.S. antiterrorism efforts 

in Afghanistan; there soon followed offers from Kazakhstan of 

airfields, bases and overflight rights, and subsequent proposals from 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.3

 The Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev offered basing 

rights to U.S. forces; the fact that no bases were created in the early 

stages of the campaign was not caused by lack of trying on the part 

of the Kazakh government.4

 The Kazakhs did allow more than 800 

overflights during 2002 in support of operations in Afghanistan, as 

well as transshipment of supplies through its territory, and have 

generally proven supportive in the war on terrorism and the conduct 

of U.S. policy.5 Kazakhstan sent a small team of representatives to 

the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); the three officers arrived 

in June 2002 and serve there in a liaison capacity.6 Other Central 

Asian states, notably Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, were 

more forthcoming in their support and proved crucial in providing 

bases for the projection of U.S. power into Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan 

granted basing for combat and combat support units at Manas 
2

airport for U.S., Canadian, French, Italian, Norwegian, and South 

Korean forces. Tajikistan permitted the use of its international 

airport at Dushanbe for refueling and basing for U.S., British, and 

French forces. Uzbekistan offered basing for U.S. forces at KarshiKhanabad and opened a land corridor for humanitarian aid to 

reach Afghanistan through Termez.7

 Thus, the Central Asian states 

emerged as key partners in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 

and the bases established in the region proved critical to U.S. forces 

securing the rapid downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, removing 

a long-standing threat to the region. Their continued partnership will 

be a significant piece of the strategy for preventing the resurgence of 

terrorism.8

 On April 10, 2003, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth 

Jones highlighted the continued importance of security within 

Central Asia and the ongoing commitment of the U.S. Government 

to the region:9

A stable, prosperous Central Asia and the Caucasus will mean a more 

secure world for the American people and a more prosperous future for 

the people of the region. I want to reaffirm in the strongest terms the 

United States long-term commitment to intensive engagement in this 

important region of the world. Engagement results in a classic win-win 

situation for everyone. This is attainable, and we will continue to strive 

for it.10

 In the following monograph, recent U.S. military engagement 

in Central Asia will be explored in the context of the complex 

operational environment in which the countries of the region 

struggle to cope with terrorism. At a time when the coalition against 

global terrorism appears internally divided and many question the 

benefits of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. policymakers must 

keep the Central Asian states focused on reform and the struggle 

against terrorism. Finally, methods of furthering U.S. and western 

“intensive engagement” will be examined, with an emphasis on the 

development of the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian 

militaries.
3

Operational Environment.

 The operational environment within Central Asia covers an area 

of 5.8 million square kilometers (km). It includes huge expanses 

of steppe and desert. This flat landscape also gives way to several 

mountainous areas: the Pamir range stretching 800km across 

Tajikistan rises to between 5,000 to 7,000 meters (m); the Tian Shan 

range extends across Kyrgyzstan through eastern Xinjiang, China. 

These jagged ice-clad peaks rise to between 4,000 to 7,000m. The 

region is an earthquake zone; in 1948 Ashgabat was destroyed 

by a major earthquake, and in 1966 Tashkent was also leveled. 

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Caspian littoral states. The road 

and rail infrastructure often covering very large distances is poor, 

with few hard surfaced roads, for instance, including between major 

urban areas.11

 Within this operational environment with its mountainous areas 

and rugged terrain with many passes and transit routes known 

only to locals and militants, drug traffickers and criminal networks 

operate and consequently overstretch the resources of the regional 

security structures. Terrorists have proven resilient and manifold, 

keen to promote their political goals by destabilizing the regimes 

and conducting offensive operations against various targets.12

Islamic extremism has burgeoned, helping foment Civil War in 

Tajikistan between 1992-97 and insurgencies within the Batken 

region in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, as well as the series of 

bombings in Tashkent in 1997 and 1999. Although these were closely 

associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), other 

dangerous groups have emerged. These include Hizb-ut-Tahrir al 

Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), a professed nonviolent Islamic 

movement, and its early splinter group, Akromiylar, established 

in 1997 by Yuldashev Akrom, whose aims range from establishing 

an Islamic Caliphate throughout the region based on Shariah law 

to overthrowing the government of Uzbekistan. In 1999 a more 

secretive splinter group from Hizb-ut-Tahrir was established by 

Mirzazhanov Atoyevich, again advocating the violent overthrow of 

the Central Asian governments. Additional groups known to operate 

in the Ferghana valley (which straddles Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan) include Adolat Uyushmasi, Islam Lashkarlari, Tovba, 
4

Nur (Ray of Light), Tabliqh (Mission), and Uzum Sokol (Long 

Beard).13

IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

 Russian intelligence, like their counterparts in Central Asia, 

have long monitored the activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, expressing 

concern about the group’s radical tendencies and its espoused 

aim of overthrowing secular governments in Central Asia. Indeed, 

the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested more than 100 

members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Moscow in June 2003. According to 

Sergey Ignatchenko, head of the FSB Public Relations Center, two 

members were charged. The Kyrgyz arrested member was alleged 

to have possessed 100 grams of plastic explosive and 3 grenades, 

while the Tajik member was alleged to have 400 grams of TNT 

and two detonators with Bickford fuses―both men also possessed 

propaganda literature.14 After the discovery of the weapons cache in 

Moscow, other Western states stepped up their surveillance of Hizbut-Tahrir within their own countries. Henning Fode, the Danish 

Solicitor General, confirmed that Denmark is considering following 

Germany by proscribing the group, already declared as a terrorist 

organization in the Russian Federation. Intelligence services in the 

Ukraine―particularly in the Crimea where there is a large Muslim 

population―have begun monitoring it. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is also banned 

in the Gulf states.

 There is little doubt that the Central Asian Republics perceive the 

existence of a continued and difficult to quantify threat from regional 

terrorists, though concerns have been raised that they overstate the 

case against Hizb-ut-Tahrir to justify repression. Nevertheless, from 

within the ranks of this secretive Islamic group, a vast residue of 

potential recruits for terrorism exists. Preventing its emergence as 

a new terrorist organization would be consistent with the broader 

aims of the GWOT.15

 Overlap between the various militant groups is not difficult to 

find, nor is it surprising. The Islamic Party of Tajikistan was thought 

to have been formed from the remnants of the IMU after fighting 

in Afghanistan during the fall of 2001. This group contains Uzbek, 

Kyrgyz, and Tajik militants and could even contain the ubiquitous 
5

Chechens.16 Likewise the IMU is reported to contain Afghans, 

Chechens, Tajiks, and Uighurs, and has received financial support 

from Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, many of whom are experienced 

veterans of guerrilla conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Kyrgyz 

Defense Minister Esen Topoyev believes that Taliban remnants and 

IMU members have merged to form a “new” structure, the Islamic 

Movement of Turkestan (IMT), which in fact simply represents the 

IMU under a different name.17 In Kyrgyzstan in December 2002 and 

May 2003 a series of bombings took place, resulting in 8 people 

killed and 40 injuries; these attacks have been attributed to the IMT.18

But fears of a resurgence of the IMU continue to haunt the Central 

Asian Republics. In June 2003 the Kyrgyz National Security Service 

(KNB) discovered weapons belonging to the IMU in the Itijaz Gorge 

of the Batken containing ordnance of Soviet, Iranian and Pakistani 

origin. Kyrgyz intelligence suspects these weapons were left there 

for possible use by the IMU.19 Tokon Mamytov, deputy chairman of 

the Kyrgyz KNB, was in little doubt that these weapons caches were 

linked to the IMU, and furthermore, he intimated that intelligence 

links IMU with Chinese terrorists. Mamytov also disclosed that 

terrorists within Central Asia have received $400,000 in funding 

from other international terrorist organizations during the first 6 

months of 2003.20

 Other dangerous radical extremist groups such as the Uighur 

separatists, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), in XinjaingUighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China, maintain links with the 

IMU.21 In July 2003, Chairman of the Kazakh KNB Nartai Dutbayev 

confirmed the increased activity of IMU in Kazakhstan, resulting 

in increased surveillance and monitoring of their movements. In 

southern Kazakhstan, according to Dutbayev, Chinese separatists 

are also becoming more organized and causing concern for the 

Kazakh authorities; consequently a number of Uighurs were 

detained by the KNB, which reportedly confiscated weapons, 

ordnance, and home-made explosives.22 The Uzbek National 

Security Service (SNB) reportedly tracked over 600 members of the 

IMU to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.23 Recent discoveries 

of weapons caches in the Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan will only 

further fuel such concerns.24 The existence of these terrorist groups, 

religious extremists, and separatists provides security interests for 
6

regional powers such as Russia and China, both keen to achieve 

regional stability and minimize the potential spillover effect of 

political violence into their own territories.25

 Hizb-ut-Tahrir represents a potential threat within the region, 

not simply insofar as it espouses the aim of overthrowing the Central 

Asian governments, but also in its links to international and regional 

terrorists. It openly spreads its propaganda against these states, as 

well as promoting anti-Semitism and spreading propaganda against 

the United States and the United Kingdom. Hizb-ut-Tahrir uses 

its international headquarters in London to orchestrate its global 

activities in more than 40 countries. Since the beginning of the 

GWOT, it has strongly opposed the presence of U.S. and coalition 

military forces deployed in Central Asia.26

An important focus of the GWOT is on emerging terrorist threats 

to U.S. interests overseas, as well as seeking to deny international 

terrorists the opportunity to launch global operations. During his 

national address on September 20, 2001, U.S. President George W. 

Bush linked al Qaeda and the Taliban directly to the IMU.27 Indeed, 

the nature of such links, long suspected by regional intelligence 

services, points to a potentially explosive nexus of militant 

Islamic groups, drug traffickers, and criminal groups. The Central 

Asian states will need ongoing assistance in assessing, analyzing, 

identifying, and countering this historical and evolving threat.

 The activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir within Central Asia have 

reportedly increased since the war in Iraq (Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM). This has been related largely to the dissemination of 

propaganda against the west and the countries within the region 

supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).28 Despite the 

undoubted success of OEF in decimating the IMU, a risk remains of 

Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU cooperating with al Qaeda remnants 

and a dangerous radical Islamic terrorist threat emerging within 

Central Asia.29 Although scholars such as Ahmed Rashid have 

highlighted this very danger of disparate militant Islamists uniting 

to form a new terrorist organization, in reality a high level of disunity 

among these groups makes it unlikely to succeed.30 What is clear, 

however, is that the criminal gangs, narcotics barons, and religious 

ideologues endemic in Central Asia, notably in the Ferghana valley, 

will continue to foment terrorism for the foreseeable future.31
7

Counterterrorism: Police and Intelligence Factors.

 Counterterrorism within any modern state involves the use of 

police-based operations leading to investigation and conviction 

through the criminal courts. Currently the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is developing regional 

counterterrorist legislation.32 A police-led investigative approach, 

depending upon the timely gathering and use of intelligence, is a 

vital preventative measure and part of a process of professionally 

dealing with terrorist incidents in a way that does not foment 

further support for the terrorists’ cause among the local population. 

Nonetheless, the police forces in Central Asia, which are inherently 

corrupt and lacking professional experience in dealing with the 

intelligence-gathering process and the construction of databases, 

desperately need reform.

 A reformed police structure could increase the efficiency in 

dealing with actual incidents and bring to justice those responsible for 

utilizing political violence. It would also have the distinct advantage 

of avoiding arrests and incarceration on a grand scale which often 

increases public support or sympathy for the terrorist cause. The 

heavy-handed pounding of Chechen villages and widespread 

destruction inflicted by the Russian armed forces during what it 

describes as a “counterterrorist operation” has had reverberations 

beyond the region, generating sympathy among Islamic extremists, 

human rights campaigners, and others throughout the world. 

 A police- and intelligence-led strategy, with the military only 

involved when necessary, is an important element of counterterrorism for a modern state. The Central Asian states can be assisted 

in this by more contacts and liaison with western counterterrorist 

specialists and national police and intelligence services. The 

experience of the British Special Branch police in countering Irish 

Republican terrorism for more than 30 years, and the Antiterrorist 

Branch’s forensic and investigative skills can be shared with the 

Central Asian states.33 Equally, the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States 

can share their experience.34 The post 9/11-security environment 

demands improved intelligence cooperation, not just between 
8

agencies but between nations. Precedents do exist. The UKUSA 

Agreement, signed in June 1948 between the United States, the 

UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, authorized the sharing 

of signals intelligence among its signatories. The NATO Special 

Committee (AC/46), established by the North Atlantic Council in 

1952, provides a long established intelligence exchange mechanism 

between allies. Despite these multilateral mechanisms, the bilateral 

sharing of intelligence has always been the preferred and more 

effective route. In Central Asia, agreements exist between the 

regional security agencies that supply a theoretical basis for sharing 

intelligence, but in practice it is limited in its scope and nowhere 

near effective enough.35

The Experience of Terrorism in 1999/2000.

 With weak armed forces and security structures, the antiterrorist 

operations conducted by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 

2000 were rendered ineffective by militant incursions. In 1999 the 

IMU raised more than $3 million by kidnapping four Japanese 

geologists, and a further $50,000 for three Kyrgyz district officials, 

including General Anarbek Shamkeyev, the commander of the 

Kyrgyz Interior Ministry troops, during an incursion into the Batken 

Region. The funding of the IMU includes money raised from drug 

trafficking in the region. 

 The IMU incursion into the Batken in 1999 left deep wounds 

within the region. The memory is still fresh, along with the failures 

of the local forces to combat them effectively, especially within the 

security forces and militaries. In the summer of 1999 approximately 

800 IMU members launched well-planned incursions into the 

Batken, apparently in an effort to establish a forward base for future 

operations against Uzbekistan.36 In the following summer of 2000, 

a smaller force of around 100 IMU members launched another 

incursion, attacking Kyrgyz security forces and seizing villages 

in Uzbekistan where 27 soldiers were killed.37 The three-pronged 

attack came close to Tashkent, and saw a repetition of rebel demands 

for the overthrow of Karimov’s government and the establishment 

of an Islamic state governed by Shariah law.38
9

Weaknesses of the Military Campaigns.

 Kyrgyz security structures failed to cope adequately with 

the challenge of well-organized terrorists utilizing the tactics of 

guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the terrorists effectively used the 

rugged, sparsely populated terrain to mask their movement into 

and out of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz military was severely hampered 

in its ability to find, fix, and engage enemy forces, lacking vital 

intelligence or reconnaissance assets as well as operational mobility. 

Enemy forces also successfully used the cover of darkness to move, 

while the Kyrgyz units deployed were powerless to respond in the 

absence of any night fighting capability.39

 In this context, the Kyrgyz armed forces proved unable to 

rapidly contain the crisis, which escalated as time passed. Reporting 

indicated the Kyrgyz military employed artillery against the terrorist 

camps, only to find they were earlier abandoned. While Kyrgyz 

soldiers, often inexperienced conscripts, searched for the militants, 

the enemy maintained the initiative and engaged in sporadic attacks 

on the soldiers. According to some Kyrgyz soldiers, they felt that the 

militants could have picked off more soldiers had they chosen to do 

so.40

 Poorly trained Kyrgyz conscripts had dated communications 

equipment and old Soviet rifles which, in some cases, lacked sights.41

Undeniably Kyrgyz soldiers were not adequately trained or properly 

equipped to conduct effective combat operations. In response to 

these setbacks, a battalion was speedily constructed in Koi-Tash in 

September 1999 consisting of conscripts, volunteers, and veterans of 

the Soviet-Afghan war. It was rushed into the field without a night 

fighting capability, inferior air support, poor communication and 

intelligence, no body armor, proper maps of the area, or essential 

rations, and with helmets incapable of withstanding a round from 

a Kalashnikov assault rifle.42 Many reportedly felt exposed and at 

risk. They faced a determined enemy armed with light weapons 

and night vision goggles, who was prepared for a lengthy armed 

struggle.43 The militants’ rations included dried fruit and other 

easily transportable foodstuffs, from which the Kyrgyz MoD learned 

the necessity of improving the rations for their soldiers in the field.44

In terms of cost to the Kyrgyz economy, the Batken campaign in 1999 
10

consumed around one-third of the defense budget. More costly still 

was the singular lesson it had taught the government and military: 

Kyrgyzstan simply did not possess the forces capable of neutralizing 

the terrorists. Despite proposals for reform by analysts close to the 

government, including restructuring and reequipping the armed 

forces, President Akayev could only offer vague commitments to 

creating “small, mobile forces” capable of rapid reaction in a crisis.45

The promises were there, but the assets―trained and experienced 

personnel and equipment―necessary to fulfill these promises were 

not.

 The IMU incursions of 1999, which took several months to resolve 

and cost the lives of many Kyrgyz and Uzbek servicemen, were being 

evaluated throughout the region when the situation reoccurred 

in the summer of 2000. This time, tentative plans, agreed between 

the states in the aftermath of events in the Batken in 1999, were for 

the regional militaries to cooperate on operations and intelligence 

to resolve the crisis.46 In theory, the cooperation pledges involved 

the formation of a coordination center for the security agencies in 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Bishkek’s proposal to unite 

and form a joint task force to destroy the terrorists quickly exposed 

the tenuous nature of regional military cooperation; as the prospect 

of a joint task force fell apart an appeal was made by the presidents 

of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Russian 

support based on previous antiterrorist agreements. The Central 

Asian Republics were unable to integrate the response of their own 

security agencies closely, or cooperate with neighbors to counter the 

resurgent threat to national security from the IMU successfully.47

 During military operations in August 2000, IMU members were 

allowed to escape during the incursion into the Surkhandarya 

region of Uzbekistan, owing to inaccurate Soviet maps of the local 

area being used by the Uzbek and Kyrgyz armies that precluded 

accurate coordination and accurate force on target.48 Kyrgyz 

“Scorpion” Special Forces were deployed to the Kyrgyz-Uzbek 

border areas, working with the local administrations in efforts to 

subdue the militant activity. Additional border posts were set up 

along the frontier with Tajikistan, and local guides were used.49

Although the response to the incursion in 2000 was more effective 

than the previous year, it revealed the continued weaknesses of 
11

the Kyrgyz security forces and served as a stark reminder of the 

imbalance within the region; Uzbek armed forces were better able 

to coordinate their efforts among border troops, Special Forces units 

from the MOD, MVD, and SNB.50

 The identified operational weaknesses from the military 

campaigns against the IMU incursions in both 1999 and 2000 can be 

summarized as follows:

• Failure at the planning and implementation stages to properly 

coordinate the deployment and operational activities of the 

armed forces between the various power ministries.

• Absence of well-trained, mobile, combat-ready soldiers capable 

of effectively conducting operations in mountainous terrain.

• Lack of basic protective kit for soldiers deployed to carry out 

combat. Poor equipment and communication systems in the 

field.

• Inferior quality military intelligence resulting from the lack of 

operational and tactical intelligence and reconnaissance assets.

• Poor targeting information, which prohibited finding, fixing, 

targeting, and then effectively engaging enemy forces. The 

process remains too slow and cumbersome to provide timely 

targeting data to either air or ground assets.

• Support from air assets was sporadic, inaccurate, and 

unproductive, degrading the morale of ground forces. 

• SOF did not play the lead role in operations, being used instead 

as light infantry.

• Limited transnational military cooperation rendering ineffectual 

any efforts to pursue fleeing insurgents, or contain the conflict.

• Failure to achieve a synergy of the armed forces deployed in the 

Batken region or gain full spectrum dominance over the enemy.

Russia’s Role in Central Asia: Promoting Stability.

 President Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia promising 

to resolve the Chechen crisis, and had staked his reputation on a 
12

tough approach to terrorism. Russia rightly has regarded the former 

Soviet Republics in Central Asia as a source of instability and sought 

to promote ways of countering the spread of Islamic militancy, 

terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and criminality from these states 

into Russia. Moscow thus has committed itself to supporting border 

security within Tajikistan, basing a Federal Border Guard group along 

the Tajik-Afghan border, and continuing to station its 201st Motor 

Rifle Division (MRD) in Dushanbe.51 Despite being professional, 

the 201st MRD suffers from a host of problems symptomatic of the 

malaise in the modern Russian armed forces: under financing, a 

shortage of new equipment, difficulties in retaining new recruits, 

undermanning, poor health among recruits, low morale, and no 

field training above that of battalion level. Consequently it fails to 

maintain a high level of combat readiness, despite its supportive 

role in conjunction with the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) 

in bolstering Tajik border security.52 The FPS has now been placed 

under Russia’s FSB as a result of the Putin’s reforms in March 2003.

 Russia’s military presence within Central Asia has provided 

important leverage over the countries, but did not prevent the 

stationing of U.S. and coalition forces in support of OEF.53 Thus, 

Moscow perceived that it had lost out in the “zero-sum” game, and 

its influence had waned in the region.54 Despite this, Moscow has 

doggedly attempted to reassert its security agenda within Central 

Asia, principally through multilateral CIS bodies created before 

9/11. These institutions, such as the Collective Security Treaty 

(CST),55 while generally eliciting support in the region’s capitals, 

have been undermined by a sense that they are mere “paper” 

organizations and critically by Uzbekistan’s decision in 1999 to 

withdraw from the CST.56

 After years of paper agreements calling for cooperation against 

regional and international terrorism, in April 2003, at the Dushanbe 

summit of the CST members, the body was transformed into a new 

political-military body: the Collective Security Treaty Organization 

(CSTO). Members agreed that a united headquarters for the 

organization would be formed in Moscow in January 2004, headed 

by Russian General Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff.57

Its charter contains a NATO-like provision for a joint response to 
13

aggression against any member state. Secretary-General of the CSTO 

Council Colonel-General Nikolai Bordyuzha is a former Secretary of 

the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Director of the 

FPS.58 Indeed, Russia has agreed to finance 50 percent of the CSTOs 

activities, with the other members each contributing 10 percent. 

Furthermore, the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) 

created under the CST is placed under the command of the Russian 

Major-General Sergey Chernomordin.59 Since its inception on May 

25, 2001, the CRDF, with its headquarters in Bishkek, was tasked 

with providing a security mechanism for defense against regional 

terrorism within Central Asia, capable of deployment across the 

borders of its members.60 Although the CRDF are to be based on 

designated components of the militaries of the member states―

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia―in reality the 

reaction force is built around the 201st MRD in Dushanbe; battalions 

from the other signatories in Central Asia initially totaling 1,300 

personnel join a battalion from the 201st MRD.61 Thus, although the 

CRDF is a regional multilateral force, in practice it is Russian funded 

and designed and built around a Russian combat formation and 

presumably its division’s support structure.

Attempts to improve the potential effectiveness of the CRDF 

have not been restricted to political efforts to strengthen the 

CSTO, they have manifested in an agreement between Russia and 

Kyrgyzstan to create an aviation component to support the CRDF, 

through a joint base at Kant, 20 km east of Bishkek. The Russian 

air force first deployed to Kant in late 2002 in order to test facilities 

before the formal opening the joint Russian-Kyrgyz base in October 

2003. Bishkek has both Washington and Moscow vying to maintain 

a military presence in Kyrgyzstan. They are currently playing a 

difficult game, walking a security tightrope between the two in an 

effort to secure access to much-needed military assistance and to 

enhance their own long-term security.62

Antiterrorist cooperation within the CIS developed in response 

to the increased threat posed by Islamic militancy within the former 

Soviet Union. The first “Agreement on Cooperation in the Fight 

Against Crime,” containing a provision against terrorism, was 

signed on November 25, 1998. This paved the way for a CIS Treaty 

on Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism in June 1999, and in 
14

June 2000 the Presidents’ Council approved a program for combating 

international terrorism until 2003.63 A CIS Antiterrorist Center (ATC) 

was formed at that time under the command of Russian LieutenantGeneral Boris Mylnikov, with a staff of 60 based in Moscow. It 

functions as an information support structure, holding information 

in a database on terrorists and terrorists groups operating within 

the CIS facilitating interaction among the antiterrorist agencies of 

CIS member states.64 The CIS ATC has an office in Bishkek, which 

collects information on terrorists and acts as a focal point for 

information gathering and dissemination in Central Asia. It runs at 

an estimated annual cost of $821,226.65 However, given the troubled 

history of intelligence sharing and cooperation between the Central 

Asian states, it remains unclear how effective the ATC is in practical 

terms.66

CSTO Military Exercises.

 The CRDF remains untested in conflict, making any assessment 

of its actual capabilities subject to real world developments. Its 

military exercises reveal much concerning how it may be used in a 

crisis. For example, SOUTH ANTITERROR 2002 featured a series of 

operational-tactical exercises held in Kyrgyzstan in April 2002. The 

regional ATC based in Bishkek was also a key player in the exercises, 

supported by the national components of the CRDF using heavy 

ground equipment, combat aircraft, and air defense systems.67 The 

tactics used in these exercises implied a potentially heavy-handed 

and inefficient way of combating terrorists and suggested that little 

new thinking existed in the potential use of the CRDF. Tashkent, 

meanwhile, has made known its view that the training exercises 

were irrelevant, vehemently opposing the emergence of what it 

perceives as military blocs within Central Asia.68

 Similarly high profile command and staff exercises were held in 

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan June 13-16, 2002. SOUTHERN SHEILD 

OF THE COMMONWEALTH 2002 rehearsed combating terrorist 

incursions within the region. Participation included ground forces, 

Special Forces and aviation. A battalion from the 201st MRD in 

Tajikistan represented Russia. Kazakhstan contributed an airborne 

assault company, and the Kyrgyz supplied a mountain infantry 
15

battalion, its “Scorpion” Special Forces and Mi-8 helicopters.69

Despite these military exercises and the public statements regarding 

its capacity to react robustly to terrorism, doubts remain concerning 

the CRDFs ability to respond to any future crisis. 

 In addition, antiterrorist exercises are periodically conducted 

under the direction of the FSB, in cooperation with the ATC and 

regional power structures. These exercises usually involve a re-run 

of events similar to the Batken incursions in 1999 and 2000, with 

terrorists leading an incursion in large numbers, meeting with a 

response from air and ground assets.70 More rarely, they entail 

hostage rescue, storming a building, or ending a siege. Scenarios 

appear stilted, often showing little awareness of the terrorists’ 

capacity to alter chosen tactics. The exercises are Russian organized, 

led, coordinated, financed, and utilized, therefore, Russian methods 

of counterterrorism are employed―which, if the campaigns in 

Chechnya are considered, revolve around disproportionate tactics 

that in long run only fan the flames of terrorism through the levels of 

civilian and collateral damage inflicted.71

 One new feature of CRDF military exercises, however, was 

revealed in April 2003, when evidence emerged that Russian 

military planners were attempting to learn from OEF and Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM. During exercises held in southern Tajikistan, 

information warfare (IW) techniques saw the deployment of an 

experimental mobile TV and radio station72 on the firing range in 

Tajikistan, in clear recognition of the need to conduct IW concurrent 

with antiterrorist combat operations. It reportedly acted as a 

reliable communication center and had the capacity to jam enemy 

broadcasts.73 These changes demonstrate the desire to use Russia’s 

experience with IW in Chechnya, and avoid repeating the same 

mistakes; more significantly it highlights a recognition within the 

Russian military for the need to gain information dominance within 

the theater of operations, minimizing the risk of sympathy for the 

terrorists’ cause spreading among the local population―helping to 

localize the conflict. According to Major-General Chernomordin, 

commander of the CRDF, plans exist to standardize communications 

equipment among the participants of the CRDF, since the lack of 

standardized equipment has presented command and control, 

and coordination problems.74 SOUTHERN SHIELD OF THE 
16

COMMONWEALTH exercises under the command of the CSTO, 

focusing on counterterrorism, scheduled for late 2003, with more 

exercises planned for 2004.75

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Chinese Influence.

 Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),76

formerly known as the Shanghai Five, existed principally to address 

issues stemming from border security and delineation, the Alliance, 

with the guidance of its leading members, Russia and China, has 

developed an interest in countering regional and international 

terrorism.77 Various SCO declarations have reiterated the intention 

of member states to work together to promote a UN-based approach 

to countering terrorism.78 Thus it acts as a forum within which the 

Russian and Chinese governments can seek to equate their own 

domestic experience of terrorism, in Chechnya and Xinjiang, with 

the GWOT, while the Central Asian states use the opportunity to 

balance the regional influences of Moscow and Beijing.79 The SCO 

has also formed its own ATC. Scheduled to open in January 2004 

in Tashkent, it has established a secretariat in Beijing, which will 

work closely with its CIS counterpart.80 China and Russia will each 

contribute between 32-38 percent of the costs for the ATC, with the 

rest being shared among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan. Consequently, most of its staff will come from China 

and Russia with the other SCO participants contributing technical 

personnel.81

 Thus, China is gradually becoming engaged in regional political 

and military efforts to combat terrorism. This was highlighted in 

China’s historic participation in joint SCO-sponsored antiterrorist 

military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002. These exercises 

took place in the border areas between China and Kyrgyzstan; the 

first part of the exercise was conducted in the Sary-Tash Gorge in 

Kyrgyzstan and the second in China’s Lanzhou Province. Border 

guards, supported by helicopters and tanks used in the exercises, 

were observed by the CIS ATC, testing their cooperative capabilities. 

The exercise’s scenario focused on eliminating terrorists entering 

and operating in each of their countries.82 At an SCO summit held in 

Moscow, SCO defense ministers met on May 29, 2003, reaching an 
17

agreement on the participation of China in the SCOs first multilateral 

military exercises focusing on antiterrorism. In August 2003, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined China and Russia 

in the conduct of COOPERATION-2003, setting up an “antiterrorist 

joint headquarters” deploying combat units along the Sino-Kazakh 

border.83 Russia and China agreed to work closely to foster a more 

coordinated approach to countering terrorism. Believing they share 

common interests in this area, they will emphasize more effective 

cooperation between the two ATCs as well as upgrading the 

interaction between antiterrorist agencies in both Russia and China.84

Nonetheless, Uzbekistan’s refusal to play any part in these military 

exercises weakens the SCOs’ attempts to promote such multilateral 

initiatives. 

 It is apparent that, while Russia remains militarily engaged in 

Chechnya, it will be in no position to conduct any major or significant 

military operations beyond its territory.85 The conduct of such 

operations, which it is committed to on paper through the CRDF, 

would not only be Russian-led but perhaps also presage a political 

price for such support exacted upon the regional states. In any case, 

Moscow’s efforts to date have been aimed, however imperfectly, at 

achieving regional stability. Russian security assistance within the 

region is restricted by continued economic constraints and its own 

efforts to reform its armed forces, leaving it in a limited position to 

lend moral and political support to regional states seeking to build 

professional armies. Russia lacks experience in this field, struggling 

as it is with the Herculean task of professionalizing its own army―an 

experiment still in its infancy in Russia after more than a decade of 

discussion and aborted efforts.86

 In fact, there need not be a clash of interests within the region, 

between the United States and Russia. Indeed, the United States 

and NATO engagement programs and Russia’s security interests 

pursued bilaterally and through the CSTO all share a common 

aim, namely the promotion of greater security and stability within 

the region. Security can only be pursued and enhanced through 

cooperation, not competition. General Anthony Zinni, former 

commander of U.S. CENTCOM, noted the following about the 

convergence of security interests, particularly in addressing the 

threat of Islamic militancy: “I think the conduct of those operations 
18

against terrorism, and eventually dealing with the drug trade is 

both in the United States and Russian interests.”87 Russia will seek 

to expand its security interests in Central Asia for the foreseeable 

future, while China will become more actively engaged, reflecting its 

growing economic interests as well as its security concerns related to 

Uighur separatists.

Antiterrorist Capabilities in Central Asia.

 Military reform has been prioritized within the Central Asian 

militaries in the context of the growing international security interest 

in the region, coping with the problems linked to Soviet legacy 

forces, domestic economic constraints, and recognition of a fluid and 

volatile threat environment. The most marked progress has been in 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while the others have lagged behind, 

reflecting their economic and political weakness.

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Year

US$ Millions

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Source: The Military Balance 1994-95 to 2002-03.

Figure 1. Defense Budgets in Central Asia.

 As the graphic above illustrates, defense budgets within the 

region have fluctuated during the last decade, though Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan have remained consistently above the smaller 

regional militaries―reflecting their larger countries and economies. 
19

Allowing for inconsistency in the reported defense figures and the 

problems of the figures in The Military Balance, these figures broadly 

support the picture of inadequately funded militaries. Kazakhstan’s 

defense budgets in 1992-93 were disproportionately large (1992: 

$1,480 million and 1993: $707 million). These out-of-range figures 

are tied principally to the nuclear weapons they inherited from the 

USSR, and the budget began to stabilize itself once they had agreed 

to get rid of them. The early attempts to maintain large legacy 

forces may explain the dip toward the mid 1990s, which presaged 

the subsequent lowering of defense budgets. Fluctuations in the 

figures for Uzbekistan reflect its evolving military reform priorities 

combined with the exclusion, since 1999, of “other troops” (MVD, 

Border Guards, etc.) from the budget. The defense budgets in 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have been largely static 

throughout the period.

 Although these defense budgets are generally small, they exclude 

spending items that would be included in a defense budget of a 

NATO member state. They also conceal greater spending potential 

in the local currency, as well as privileges extended to servicemen 

such as tax exemptions.88 The average defense budget in the period, 

for the leading militaries, represents one-third to one-half the size 

of the defense budget of the smallest NATO members, excluding 

Luxembourg.89 It is clear, therefore, that the Central Asian Republics 

cannot afford broad-scale conventional force modernization, but can 

afford to focus on the development of small, elite formations that are 

more professional and combat capable. This will need the full support 

of foreign assistance programs and the maintenance of closer links 

with the region’s militaries and security forces, emphasizing followup work and more multilateral military exercises maximizing their 

exposure to foreign militaries.

Force Structures.

 Among the Central Asian states, the militaries’ efforts to combat 

terrorists incursions have generally employed Soviet legacy forces 

that were structured and equipped for Moscow’s conventional 

wars. Much of this heavy force structure is ill-equipped for 

unconventional, guerrilla type conflict. Where they existed or are 
20

being constituted, the militaries are finding that their elite, more 

professional and better trained, lightly armored, and more mobile 

formations (most likely special operations forces) are best suited 

to confront this type of threat. This kind of formation often has 

a specific or more narrow mission orientation than traditional 

conventional units. Undoubtedly, the most competent and battle 

ready of the regional Special Operation Forces (SOF)90 are those of 

the Republic of Uzbekistan. Like their counterparts throughout the 

region, these units are under the control of the various state “power 

ministries,” immediately raising problems of effective coordination 

and deployment. The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MVD) Special 

Purpose Forces (OMON) are in essence the paramilitary arm of the 

police and are similarly structured to their Soviet predecessor. An 

MVD Special Forces company also is based in Tashkent as well as the 

Special Forces under the operational control of the National Security 

Service (SNB).91 However, in Uzbekistan the SOF which are most 

effective and well-trained are the SOF Battalions under the MOD. 

Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan is placed under the operational 

control of the SNB and the armed forces support them as needed; 

under certain circumstances for a specific mission or campaign they 

could be placed under the operational command of the military.92

 In Kazakhstan the National Security Service (KNB) has 

operational control of its antiterrorist “Aristan” (Lion) unit based 

in Astana. The KNB oversees the police volunteer units known as 

“Sarbazy” (Warriors), which operate within the local districts. In 

addition, the police units (OMON) also support antiterrorist tasks 

and include a “rapid reaction” group “Kyran” (Eagle), which has 

10 teams deployed in Almaty. The MVD also controls its Alpha, or 

renamed KGB units with bases in Almaty and Semey including two 

Special Forces units: “Sunkar” (Hawk) and “Berkut” (Golden Eagle). 

Its MOD SOF is also based in Almaty and Semey. Operational control 

for counterterrorism in Kazakhstan is currently shared by the MOD 

and MVD, but it is likely that in future the KNB will be assigned this 

position.93 This pattern for the organization and operational control 

of SOF in Central Asia is also replicated in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 

and Turkmenistan.94

 Throughout the region, SOF is affected by “Soviet thinking” 

within the older generation of officers. This is especially significant 
21

since it acts as a constraint on efforts to enhance the operational 

capabilities of these forces. However, key skills tend to be found 

among these older Soviet and Russian trained officers. 

U.S. SOF can be used in a variety of ways and have excellent 

capabilities against terrorists. They are light, mobile, and trained 

to work well with the local populace; tailored for deep and longrange reconnaissance; and trained and equipped to identify, target 

and designate, if needed, terrorist groups and their operating bases. 

They can maximize the use of conventional assets while minimizing 

the loss of life among civilians. U.S. SOF often operate in small 

teams, performing reconnaissance missions as well as direct action 

against enemy targets. They need operational mobility and good 

communications to keep them within range, responding quickly to 

terrorist activity and a fluid “front-line.” 

 The Central Asian states do not yet possess the mobility or 

communications, essential equipment, and training to support the 

development of highly combat-ready SOF.95 One key is their inability 

to recognize the battle utility of SOF operating in small groups. Such 

a transformation will necessitate the reform of the structure, doctrine 

and thinking of the commanding officers, who need to learn the 

importance of “bottom up” initiative from the junior ranks.

 In 1993, the 7th Special Operations Squadron toured the Central 

Asian states, supplying initial U.S. SOF contacts with the newly 

independent former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.96 U.S. military 

links with the region in the 1990s developed most with Uzbekistan 

on a bilateral basis and through multilateral military exercises 

utilizing NATO’s PfP.97 Since 1999, however, the five Central Asian 

states have been in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR)98

and U.S. SOF that deploy to the region are under the operational 

control of Special Operations Command-Central (SOCCENT) based 

at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida. Since then U.S. SOF have been the 

lead provider of military-to-military training of the Central Asian 

militaries.99 12-man A-teams deliver training in the host nation for a 

month at a time four times each year, with the focus on patrolling, 

small arms and explosives and small unit skills. These links were 

crucial politically in gaining the support offered by the Central 

Asian states for OEF.100 Understandably, given the energy and 

security interests of the United States in the Caspian Sea, levels of 
22

financial assistance through existing programs rose steadily during 

the 1990s. U.S. funded security programs for Central Asia totaled 

$356,120,000 during 1992-2001.101 Assistance increased still further 

after 9/11. All of the states receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and since 

2002 became eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a 

grant basis.102 In 2002, FMF to the region was as follows: Kazakhstan, 

$4,750,000; Kyrgyzstan, $11,000,000; Tajikistan, $3,700,000; and 

Uzbekistan, $36,210,000.103 IMET funds: Kazakhstan, $800,000; 

Kyrgyzstan, $600,000; Tajikistan, $250,000; Turkmenistan, $450,000; 

and Uzbekistan, $1,000,000.104

 These levels of funding have gone some way to furthering 

U.S. military engagement within the region, but the programs 

and training given have had to face the harsh realities of poor, 

underfunded post-Soviet militaries. Although some of the facilities 

within which training occurred were reportedly very good,105 the 

quality of the soldiers in the indigenous militaries often left a lot 

to be desired. For example, the Kazakh soldiers receiving training 

from U.S. SOF in 2002 were alleged by some trainers to be of poor 

quality.106 The nature of this training has not always specifically 

targeted the antiterrorist side of these militaries, instead training 

border and peacekeeping troops in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Uzbekistan. In January and February 2003, U.S. SOF conducted 

joint military exercises in Kyrgyzstan, called BALANCE KNIGHT, 

which included the Kyrgyz National Guard (MVD) and the Kyrgyz 

SOF “Scorpion” battalion. During BALANCE KNIGHT, shooting, 

mountaineering, rapid response, helicopter maneuvers, and medical 

and engineering skills were drilled.107

Uzbek Special Forces.

 Uzbek armed forces, particularly its Special Forces, are regarded 

as the most effective in the region. Its MOD SOF are organized into 

seven battalions with the brigade headquarters in Tashkent; these 

battalions are not under the command of the Military Districts and 

have responsibilities along Uzbekistan’s borders. All Uzbek SOF 

battalions are professional, with their servicemen signing 3-year 

contracts. Yet in training and operations, they are utilized as light 

infantry.108
23

 In 2000 in Surkhandarya, for example, they were inserted in small 

teams and took casualties while attempting to confront the IMU in 

well-prepared defensive positions. During the operation they were 

utilized as light infantry, pushing the IMU into hard terrain before 

calling in air and artillery strikes. Although they eliminated the small 

group of IMU guerrillas, the local population had to be evacuated, 

allowing sympathy to grow for the insurgents and their cause.109

Thus, Uzbek SOF were essentially misused, failing to fix and locate 

the enemy and call in conventional light infantry and close air 

support to wipe out their targets. The Uzbek SOF, professional and 

the most advanced in the region, may have expanded too rapidly, 

sacrificing quality for quantity. Clearly they need more effective 

reform programs, to include better counterterrorist training, refined 

tactics, critical equiptment items, etc.

 The United States has given critical support to the Central Asian 

militaries, but this can be developed still further through training,

providing equipment, and promoting intelligence cooperation, both 

within the region itself and internationally. In what follows, some of 

the shortcomings of U.S. military engagement will be highlighted 

and the continued weakness of the antiterrorist capabilities of the 

Central Asian states will be explored before suggesting a roadmap 

for markedly enhancing these capabilities in the future.

Training and Equipment.

 The Central Asian Republics with the least effective SOF 

are those that have received less exposure to U.S. and western 

militaries either through bilateral training or NATO’s PfP activities. 

Consequently, the least combat-ready forces in the region are those 

in Turkmenistan, closely followed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

 The majority of SOF training in Tajikistan has been geared 

towards the enhancement of the Tajik border guards (KOGG) and 

the OMON unit of the MVD. However, if properly and thoroughly 

trained through U.S. assistance programs, these forces could 

become very effective as covert operators, gathering intelligence 

and helping to prevent specific events. Achieving this will involve a 

comprehensive rise in the number of U.S. SOF carrying out training 

in unconventional warfare techniques.110 This requires political will 
24

and direction, as well as provision of more effective equipment and 

materials to the trainers for use during training. There is little point 

in assisting these forces by providing training using equipment that 

does not stay with the recipients. Likewise, the best quality and 

most cost effective training is provided through MTTs, which can be 

deployed to the host nation and encompass whole unit training.111

 Officers in Central Asia should also be exposed to improved 

psychological training, widening their horizons by teaching them 

political and social awareness. The future success of these militaries 

will depend upon the creation of a new generation of officers capable 

of leading their armed forces in the 21st century, responding to the 

evolving international and regional security environment.112 More 

English language training is needed to facilitate interoperability 

with Western militaries; enabling officers to access English language 

learning tools will be a key to closer integration with the West. 

However, in some cases C2

 breaks down within the region, through 

language barriers that reflect the rapid changes in the ethnic 

composition of the post-Soviet legacy forces. In Uzbekistan, for 

example, most officers speak Russian and Uzbek, while the soldiers, 

whether contract or conscript speak only Uzbek. Though the Uzbeks 

are working toward more Uzbek language courses for their officers, 

assistance would speed up this process.113

 Another key factor on enhanced training in the region, 

inculcating more independence in the junior officers, would involve 

access to e-learning tools. Through such promotion of self-training, 

an Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) option within the officers’ 

ordinary training cycles would stimulate self-awareness and 

professional development.114

 They also require more use of a modeling and simulation system, 

providing Computer Assisted Exercises. This is a cost effective way 

of training the individuals, staffs, combat teams or multiple combat 

formations, and may be used to diversify the standard scenarios 

of conventional military exercises held within the CIS.115 All too 

often their exercises are inflexible and show little awareness of the 

potential of terrorist groups to vary their targets and strategies. 

Doctrinal awareness of the nature of low-intensity conflict, stability 

operations, and counterterrorist operations needs to be developed at 

the theoretical level. These militaries were originally designed by the 
25

Soviets for large-scale conventional war, using divisions and carrying 

out operations on a massive scale. Within the military academies, 

they must break this mold and develop or embrace new doctrinal 

manuals and begin teaching the basics of counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism.116 Officers must learn basic practices associated 

with counterterrorism, such as setting up roadblocks, vehicle 

searches, etc.

 Effective training is only one of the building blocks needed in 

developing the antiterrorist capabilities of these militaries. Despite 

their best efforts and most financial resources being funneled 

towards the SOF in each state, they lack basic kit and advanced 

weaponry. For instance, they find it difficult to obtain a clear picture 

of the battle space, lacking C4ISR equipment and remote sensors.

 The region’s SOF require the type of equipment that will enhance 

their operational mobility and generally improve their combat 

capabilities. This includes night-vision equipment and thermal 

sights; modern sniper weapons; communication equipment at 

operational and tactical level; modern individual and crew-served 

weapons with sufficient quantities of ammunition to train with them; 

light-weight and functional body armor capable of giving adequate 

protection against a 7.62mm round; body armor to protect against 

fragmentation weapons; gas masks; protective head gear; spare parts 

to assist in repairing the Soviet era equipment they possess; Global 

Position System (GPS); communications equipment to enhance C3I; 

mobile sensors; armored mobile vehicles such as the HMMWV; and 

helicopters for greater small unit mobility.117 It is also important to 

stress the fundamental requirement for engineers and support staff 

being sent the host nation before, during and after the supply of any 

Western equipment; the regional militaries are not automatically 

capable of carrying out their maintenance and repairs.118

 Furthermore, specific needs such as mobile sensors, which are 

essential for use by SOF, would enable the local SOF to “watch” for 

traffic in unusual places, or could be utilized in aiding the security of 

remote or inaccessible areas in the mountains, through which drug 

traffickers and militants may seek to pass. In particular a Remote 

Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) would allow greater awareness 

of movements and potentially dangerous incursions, filling the gaps 
26

along very extended and rugged borders and providing oversight of 

remote trails into and out of the country 119

Small Units.

 Their weaknesses are manifold, as observed in the use SOF 

during the terrorist incursions within the region in 1999 and 2000. 

These include unit movement, collective task proficiency, react-tocontact skills and individual marksmanship.120

 More exercises, in-country whole unit training, military 

exchanges inside the United States and other coalition partner 

countries, as well as U.S. SOF military-military training are all useful. 

Yet they need to be coupled with recognition that security can also 

be enhanced by commitment to long-term military reform, especially 

professionalization and development of an NCO corps with distinct 

management/command responsibilities. This should include SOF 

professionalization. Indeed, counterterrorist-operations demand 

a high level of professionalism on the part of the ordinary soldier. 

There is little doubt that creating professional armed forces within 

Central Asia would result in greater security, deter some terrorist 

activities and improve interoperability with western militaries. 

Progress is being made toward professionalizing the armed forces 

in Uzbekistan. There is evidence that Kazakhstan may be seriously 

pursuing similar goals. But challenges remain within Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and especially Turkmenistan.121

 Small units capable of mobile rapid reaction, professionally 

trained and able to minimize the widening of local conflict by 

using a “light touch” in their operations still require the operational 

support of the other branches of the armed forces. The Central Asian 

militaries will need upgraded airframes and platforms to facilitate 

support operations, small unit insertion, battlefield logistics, C2, 

airborne fire support, and reconnaissance.

Central Asian Train and Equip Program?

 Growing support exists within the Central Asian militaries for 

deeper engagement with the United States as well as expanded 

participation within NATO’s PfP. Although the challenges are 
27

significant, options for greater levels of successful engagement can 

be found in examples from the experiences of the former Warsaw 

Pact members, and indeed elsewhere within the former Soviet 

republics.

 In Eastern Europe, for instance, Romania faced the challenges 

of poor unit readiness, questionable force capability and force 

restructuring after the end of the Cold War. Its 812th Battalion, 

“Carpathian Hawks,” successfully carried out joint missions in 

Afghanistan under the operational command of the 1st Brigade 

Task Force “Devil,” headed by U.S. Colonel John F. Campbell.122

At Kandahar, the “Carpathian Hawks” were responsible for base 

security, patrols, data collecting, and information operations. They 

also participated in complex reconnaissance and joint combat 

missions.123 The undoubted success of the “Carpathian Hawks” lay 

in their adoption of modern training methods and NATO standard 

operating procedures, enhancing readiness and combat capability 

and then gaining invaluable operational experience between 1996-

2002 in various missions under UN and NATO command in Angola, 

Bosnia, and Kosovo.124

The Georgian Model: GTEP.

 A critical part of the U.S political and military assistance to Georgia 

began in May 2002, with the implementation of the Georgia Train 

and Equip Program (GTEP), costing $64 million. The program was 

designed to run over 2 years, enhancing the antiterrorist capabilities 

of the Georgian army, promoting their cooperation in the GWOT, 

and helping to alleviate the tension created within the Georgian state 

as a result of Chechen and other militants operating in the Pankisi 

Gorge.125 This important security program is a time-phased training 

program, conducted in-country in cooperation with the Georgian 

MOD, with its prime focus on training the Georgian 16th Mountain 

Battalion, 113th Light Infantry Battalion and 11th MRD.126 The initial 

program, conducted under the command of Special Operations 

Command Europe (SOCEUR), focused on the Georgian MOD and 

Land Forces Command to enhance their effectiveness in creating 

and sustaining standard operating procedures, training plans, 

and a property accounting system.127 The curriculum consisted of 
28

performance-oriented practical exercises similar to those taught at 

the U.S. National Defense University, Joint Forces Command, and 

U.S. Army War College. 

 Tactical training, consisting of approximately 100 days per unit, 

is designed to instruct the Georgian battalions in light infantry 

tactics, platoon-level offensive and defensive operations, and 

airmobile tactics. Its curriculum includes basic individual skills, 

combat lifesaver, radio operator procedures, land navigation, human 

rights education, and combat skills, including rifle marksmanship, 

movement techniques, and squad and platoon tactics.128 The program 

also ensures that those trained and entering service in the battalions 

do so on a professional basis, signing contracts on completion of their 

training, thus enhancing the status of the battalions.129 Furthermore, 

the participation of Georgian border troops and two platoons from 

the MVD ensures greater interoperability among the forces.130

 The program has not been without its problems. Requests for 

more equipment have been made by the Georgian MOD during the 

course of the program, and there have been difficulties in persuading 

the Georgian MOD to devise a blueprint for future training following 

the scheduled departure of U.S. military advisors in 2004.131

 Nonetheless, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, praised the level of training during a visit to Georgia 

in November 2002, equating it with what he would expect to see in 

U.S. training of similar sized units.132

Adapting the Georgian Model.

 Devising a version of GTEP for the enhancement of Central Asian 

security is certainly a viable option, provided it can be formulated to 

address the specific needs of the Central Asian militaries, enabling 

them to develop their antiterrorist capabilities within a difficult 

and challenging operational environment. It must be coupled with 

long-term interagency planning, and efforts to develop new levels 

of regional security cooperation. Moreover, there is a vital role for 

NATO to play in supporting and implementing such a program.
29

CATEP.

 CATEP regional centers should be established in Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan, and be open to full participation from all the Central 

Asian militaries. NATO should play an active role through the PfP 

program to further strengthen the international dimension of the 

assistance program and expand the scope of its activities. Achieving 

this would entail the following basic outline.

 A Political Steering Group (PSG) would be formed to coordinate 

the program, maximizing its efficiency and effectiveness. The 

PSG would maintain control and direction over the multinational 

program, supply political oversight of the Military Working Group; 

and liaise between NATO and national governments. The PSG 

should be restricted to NATO members and representatives for the 

CA states. A military working group (MWG) would be responsible 

for planning details and proposing further assistance required to the 

PSG. It would facilitate pooling international expertise and scarce 

resources in support of the CATEP; preparing an implementation 

plan; and overseeing the execution of all aspects of the assistance 

programs. CA states could provide representatives to participate in 

the work of the MWG. Finally, a Training Assistance Sub-Working 

Group (TASWG) would coordinate, manage, and oversee the 

implementation of the MWGs’ training assistance programs. The 

United States should assume chairmanship of the TASWG, with the 

participation of other NATO members willing to become involved in 

the program. See Figure 2.

 At the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, NATO 

Secretary-General Lord Robertson, stressed the importance of 

closer links with Central Asia. The Alliance must secure the political 

will to deepen PfP engagement in the region in the near future. 

Russia ought to play a positive consultative role, in keeping with 

the cooperative spirit being cultivated through the NATO-Russia 

Council mechanism, though Moscow should not have a veto on 

such a program.133 NATO has gained experience in dealing with 

terrorism since 9/11 which its members can share with Central Asia. 

It can also encourage these partner states to utilize Article VIII of the 

NATO Charter, in seeking additional security assistance programs 

and antiterrorism training.134
30

Country Proposed Role

Canada Member, PSG and MWG; Possible Chairman, MWG and PSG.

Denmark Possible Member, MWG and TASWG; and provision of trainers and 

training assistance.

France Member, PSG and MWG, Chairman of TASWG; provision of training 

assistance.

Germany Possible Chairman, PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance.

Italy Member PSG and/or MWG.

Netherlands Member, PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance.

Poland Member, MWG; Member TASWG; provision of trainers and access to 

its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Turkey Member of PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance and access 

to its training facilities for CATEP personnel.

UK Member, PSG, MWG, and TASWG; provision of trainers and access to 

its training centers for CATEP personnel.

United States Member, PSG and MWG; Chairman of TASWG; alternative Chairman 

of PSG or MWG; provision of training assistance and access to its 

training centers for CATEP personnel.

Figure 2. Possible NATO Participants in CATEP Support 

Structure.

 Many NATO members are actively engaged in Central 

Asia through bilateral assistance programs. NATO PfP nations 

could also join this assistance effort. In particular, the Baltic 

States, with their experience of English Language Training,

could play an invaluable role. (See Figure 3.) Moreover, other 

PfP members such as Ukraine have good facilities for exercises 

and have recently held multilateral military exercises at

their Yarovsky firing range in the Lvov region, aimed at improving 

antiterrorist operations; these witnessed the participation of Austria, 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Georgia, 

Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldavia, 
31

Country Proposed Role

Estonia Member TASWG; provision of trainers and ELT assistance and access to 

its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Latvia Member TASWG; provision of trainers and ELT assistance and access to 

its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Sweden Access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Ukraine Provision of trainers and access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Figure 3. Possible NATO PfP Participants in CATEP Support 

Structure.

Con

3 Mo

4 Mo

3 Mo 2 Mo

1 Mo 1 Mo

1 Mo

4 Mo

4 Mo

2 Mo

2 Mo

2 

Wks

ELT (Decentralized)

Revise Annual Tng Plan

(MTT)

Develop Detailed Tng

Curriculum Decentralized

Prepare Instructors 

for AT/SOF

SOF Staff Mgt Tng

(Centralized)

ELT & Mil Training AT

Cadre (Cent)

Operational & Tactical

Intelligence (Decentralized)

NATO SOF Unit

Training (Centralized)

CT Ops in Special

Conditions

Mgt Tng (Decent)

Consolidated SOF/AT

Exercise (Centralized)

Figure 4. Proposed First Year Outline for CATEP.136
32

Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, United States, Turkey, 

and Ukraine.135

 The key to success will be the development of a systematic and 

well-coordinated assistance program that focuses on improving the 

capabilities of each of the CA member states. The first step is breaking 

the local militaries’ ties to their Soviet legacy and developing a 

building block training support program that will allow them 

to do this. In the end, the U.S. and NATO participants hope that 

the resulting forces/formations will have improved operational 

capability against the terrorist threat and will be better prepared, if 

necessary, to operate in concert with Western forces.

 The proposed first-year training program outlined in Figure 

4 would be an initial step towards implementing the CATEP. At 

the end of its first year, the antiterrorist capabilities of the region’s 

militaries would not be greatly enhanced, but the organization will 

be in place, with training programs specifically designed to meet the 

needs of the local militaries, conducted by experienced or trained 

personnel, and with the training support and management systems 

that will help them to develop their own future training systems 

with greater effectiveness.

1. ELT. An essential building bloc for the program will be ELT, 

designed and implemented by teaching those who will in turn train 

their rank and file; language laboratories are insufficient to guarantee 

success in this vital area. 

2. Revise the annual training plan. This needs to be done in 

conjunction with the CA MODs, addressing the on-going needs of 

the program and promoting greater efficiency in the management of 

the MODs.

 3. Develop a detailed curriculum. This will cover all the 

aspects of SOF operations, conducting antiterrorist operations and 

incorporating the necessary flexibility to meet the requirements of 

the various militaries and types of formations, especially local SOF.

 4. Prepare instructors for antiterrorist SOF training. Designed 

as a train-the-trainers package, this should concentrate on the 

leadership cadre and foster inoperability and individual initiative. 

 5. SOF Staff management training. This should place particular 

emphasis upon encouraging delegation of responsibility down 

the chain of command, thus fostering individual responsibility 
33

and initiative at the small unit level, so necessary for antiterrorist 

operations.

 6. The ELT and military training antiterrorist cadre. This would 

also include training that is topic specific for unit leaders, officers, 

and NCOs. It would comprise C3

I issues, use of intelligence and 

the supporting roles of air, logistics, MEDEVAC, operating with 

coalition forces, etc. 

7. Operational and tactical intelligence training. This should 

prepare the leadership and NCOs in the full use of intelligence 

assets, including SOF units used in intelligence gathering missions, 

to achieve full-spectrum dominance of the enemy in battle. Military 

intelligence failings contributed significantly to the weaknesses of 

the antititerrorist campaigns in the Batken in 1999 and 2000.

 8. NATO SOF unit training. This will establish the basis for 

NATO operational practices and enhance the scope for future joint 

operations. 

 9. Counterterrorist operations in special conditions. Given 

the diverse topography of Central Asia, this should prepare elite 

units for conducting operations under special conditions such as 

mountainous or desert terrain. 

10. Consolidated antiterrorist exercise. This will allow detailed 

assessment of progress and revision of new skills absorbed during 

the training cycle.137

 Developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian 

militaries will involve the formulation of an antiterrorist training 

cadre in each state―a crucial element in establishing a CATEP. 

The long-term aim is the development of an independent, national 

training capability for these elite units, rather than reliance on 

foreign assistance. The security problems presented by the specter of 

terrorism can only be met by these countries themselves in the long 

term, through the development of effective, professionally trained 

elite units. The West has an undoubted assistance role to play, but 

it can only do so with the political support and commitment of the 

Central Asian Republics.
34

ENDNOTES

1. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 

American People,” United States Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001, 

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

2. Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S. Plants Footprint in Shaky Central Asia,” Washington 

Post, August 27, 2002.

3. Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and 

Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), Foreign 

Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, January 6, 2003.

4. Col. Robert C. McMullin, “Caspian Sea Regional Security in the 21st 

Century,” USAWC, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, April 2003, p. 16; Lyle J. Goldstein, “Making the Most of Central 

Asian Partnerships,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2002, pp. 82-90.

5. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, Released by the Office of the Coordinator 

for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, April 30, 2003, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/

pgtrpt/2002/html/19984.htm.

6. They also report to the Kazakh mission at NATO HQ, Brussels, acting as 

a useful facilitator in the deployment of 25 Kazakh military specialists to Iraq 

in support of the international peacekeeping operation. Uzbekistan was the 

first Central Asian state to send a small team of representatives to CENTCOM, 

sending four officers in December 2001; Kyrgyzstan followed by sending five 

officers in May 2002; and Tajikistan shortly afterwards assigned four liaison 

officers to CENTCOM. See www.centcom-mil/operations/coalition/coalition-pages/

kazakhstan.htm. 

7. Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States”; “International Contributions to 

the War Against Terrorism,” U.S. Department of Defense Fact Sheet, June 7, 2002, 

www.defenselink-mil/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf. 

8. Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander U.S. Central 

Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003, p. 15.

9. In using the word “region” in referring to Central Asia, it is important to 

remember that it is not a region in any sense other than geographically; there is no 

recent history of the formation of a real political, economic, and security regional 

based approach. The long-term aim of western engagement is partly to foster the 

development of genuine regional cooperation on security and other issues: first the 

Central Asian governments must be dissuaded from any isolationist tendencies, 

while developing interstate trust.
35

10. Elizabeth Jones, “U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus: 

Staying our Course Along the Silk Road,” Speech delivered at the University of 

Montana, Missoula, MT, April 10, 2003; See Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S. 

Security Concerns in Central Asia, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, October 2002.

11. Atlas Des d’Orient, La Découverte, 2002; William D. O’Malley, “Central 

Asia and South Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints,” 

Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds., Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the 

South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, pp. 272-

276.

12. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 15, 2003; See Tamara Makarenko, 

“The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 

February 2002.

13. Some of these, such as Adolot, are registered as political parties and seek 

the opportunity of standing in an election, while the regimes themselves contribute 

to the problem by refusing to open their political systems to greater democracy, 

thus risking radicalizing the opposition in many cases; Vecherniy Bishkek, Bishkek, 

May 28, 1999; M. Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1995; Nancy Lubin and Barnett Rubin, Calming the Ferghana 

Valley. Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, New York: Century 

Foundation, 1999; “Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localized Poverty and 

Social Unrest,” ICG, Asia Report, No. 16, Osh/Brussels, 2001; Michael Fredholm, 

Uzbekistan and the Threat From Islamic Extremism, K39, CSRC: Camberley, March 

2003.

14. “Russian FSB Detains 121 Suspected Members of Banned Islamic Salvation 

Party,” Kavkazskiy Uzel, June 9, 2003; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, June 18, 2003, p. 

4. 

15. Another important dimension in the GWOT is the prevention of failing 

states being used, such as Afghanistan was used by al Qaeda and the Taliban, as 

harbingers of international terrorism. Likewise, the economically weaker Central 

Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, must not become 

the future breeding grounds for international terrorists; otherwise the problem is 

simply shifted around without any resolution.

16. Ibid; Central Asian militants have probably exaggerated the idea of a panAsiatic movement, scaring the authorities as a consequence. The IPT may never 

have existed in reality.

17. Khabar Television, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, July 16, 2003.
36

18. The Military Balance, 2003-04, Oxford, England: International Institute for 

Strategic Studies (IISS), 2003, p. 22.

19. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, July 1, 2003, p. 5.

20. Krygyzstan has suffered a series of terrorist attacks in recent months, 

leaving 28 dead. In addition to an attack on a bus on December 26, 2002, a bomb 

planted in a Bishkek market place killed 7 and wounded another 40. Hamid 

Toursunof, “Turkestan: A New Terrorist Nexus? Kyrygz Authorities Warn that 

Chinese Separatists, the IMU, and Hizb ut-Tahrir are Joining Forces,” Week in 

Review, July 8–14, 2003, Transitions Online, July 14, 2003.

21. The UN and the U.S. State Department both have officially proscribed this 

terrorist organization. Xu Tau, “Extremist Threat in Northwestern China,” Central 

Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5, 2000, p. 85.

22. Khabar Television, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, 1400 GMT, July 11, 

2003; Novye Izvestia, Moscow, July 22, 2003, p. 5.

23. Berlingske Tidende, Copenhagen, BBC Monitoring Service, June 10, 2003; 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

24. Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, 

and Regional Stability,” Testimony Before the U.S. Congress, Committee on 

International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 

23, 2003.

25. Bakhram Turnasov, “Extremism in Uzbekistan,” K33, Conflict Studies 

Research Center, RMA, Sandhurst, July 2002, p. 9.

26. The radical anti-western and anti-Semitic nature of its literature can be 

seen on the groups website: www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org; “Radical Islam in Central Asia: 

Responding to Hizb-ut-Tahrir,” International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels, June 30, 

2003; Ariel Cohen, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir: an Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central 

Asia,” Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 2003, www.heritage.org/

Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm; Ariel Cohen, “Have American Officials 

Identified a New Threat in Central Asia?,” Eurasianet, June 24, 2003; Izvestia,

Moscow, July 4, 2003, p. 4.

27. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 

American People,” United States Capitol, Washington, DC, www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

28. Vecherniy Bishkek, Bishkek, April 30 2003; Biznes I Politika, Dushanbe, BBC 

Monitoring Service, February 21, 2003, pp. 1-2; Michael Lueders, “Borderland: 

Power and Faith in Central Asia,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, March 31, 2003. 
37

29. Extreme caution should be exercised in comparing Islamic extremism in 

Central Asia with the Middle East. The practice of religion differs significantly, 

while there is no “struggle for homeland liberation” paradigm as in the Middle 

East. The ethnic politics are very different and the average village dweller in 

Central Asia does not care about Israel; while the U.S. dynamics at play are also 

distinct. See further Tamara Makarenko, “The Rising Threat of Militant Islam 

in Central Asia,” M. Ranstrop, ed., Islamic Extremism and Terrorism in the Greater 

Middle East, Hurst & Co: London, 2003.

30. Vitaly V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 

University of California, Berkeley, Spring 2003.

31. Fiona Hill, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional 

Stability,” House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and Central Asia, July 23, 2003; Alisher Khamidov, “Countering the 

Call: The U.S., Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia,” Muskie 

Fellow in International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, U.S. Policy 

Towards the Islamic World, Analysis Paper #4, The Brookings Institution, July 2003, 

www.brook.edu/fp/saban/khamidov20030701.pdf. 

32. “Review of the Implementation of OSCE Commitments to Prevent and 

Combat Terrorism,” OSCE, June 10, 2003.

33. Author discussions with Western intelligence services.

34. FEMA existed as an independent agency until March 2003 when it became 

part of the Department of Homeland Security, www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm. 

35. See “Central Asia: the Politics of Police Reform,” International Crisis 

Group, Brussels/Osh, December 2002; British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 

tasked with producing intelligence assessments for senior policymakers, has long 

involved the CIA in its work, and vice-versa. Israel has been effective in developing 

good intelligence liaison links with the intelligence services of Arab states 

including Jordan; Stéphane Lefebvre, “International Intelligence Cooperation: 

Difficulties and Dilemmas,” Colloque Renseignement et Sécurité Internationale, Laval 

University, Quebec, March 20, 2003, (forthcoming in the International Journal of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence).

36. Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 

2001,” CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, September 10 2001, p. 16.

37. Sultan Jumagulov and Kubut Otorbaev, “Kyrgyz IMU Fears Mount,” 

IWPR, August 3, 2001, www.iwpr.net.
38

38. David Filipov, “Islamic Rebels Thrive in Central Asia,” The Boston Globe,

December 31, 2000.

39. ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS)-SOV1999-1002, October 2, 1999; ITAR-TASS, Moscow, September 20, 1999; Interfax,

Moscow, October 2, 1999.

40. Bakhrom Tursunov and Marina Pikulina, Severe Lessons of Batken,

Camberley, England: K28, Conflict Studies Research Center (CSRC), pp. 8-10; 

Asel Otorbaeva, “Kyrgyz Private Relives Batken Nightmare,” IWPR, September 1, 

2000.

41. Kyrgyz soldiers were issued with old Soviet manpad radios, and many 

failed to work in the field, making it impossible to coordinate ground and air 

elements or receive and convey intelligence. They were promised $50 per day 

and received only a fraction of that amount. The Kyrgyz government evidently 

believed a show of force could affect the end of the incursion, deploying troops 

without adequate training or equipment to respond to the threat.

42. The militants were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and their rounds 

would not be stopped by the helmets issued to the Kyrgyz soldiers; Otorbaeva, 

“Kyrgyz Private Relives Batken Nightmare,” Military Parade, www.milparade.com/

ra/content1.htm. 

43. One Kyrgyz officer later recounted the extent of their predicament: 

Only we and the police special forces were left. Two generals 

commanded them, Isakov and Sadiev. The operation led to nothing. In 

approaching the place, a militant fired a shot from a sniper rifle and hit 

a soldier in the leg. After that, the detachment waited a little more and 

left empty-handed. And what we were dealing with was only a band 

numbering 25-30.

Vecherniy Bishkek, Bishkek, August 23, 2002.

44. Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 5, No. 162, September 

3, 1999; Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 5, No. 173, September 

21, 1999.

45. Leonid Bondarets, “On the Optimization of the Defense and Security 

Systems,” George C. Marshall Center, 2000; Interfax, Tashkent, FBIS-SOV-1999-

1129, November 29, 1999.

46. BBC Monitoring Service, London, April 24, 2000.
39

47. BBC Monitoring Service, August 20, 2000; BBC Monitoring Service, August 

27, 2000.

48. Novye Izvestia, Moscow, July 23, 2003, p. 1.

49. Turat Akimov, “Batken Conflict Returns,” IWPR, August 18, 2000.

50. Bondarets, “On the Optimization of the Defense and Security Systems,” 

2000.

51. Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Security Agenda in Central Asia,” Central 

Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 2, No. 14, Information and Analytical Center, Sweden, 

2002, pp. 16-23.

52. M. J. Orr, “The Russian Garrison in Tajikistan―201st Gatchina Twice Red 

Banner Motor Rifle Division,” Occasional Brief No. 85, Camberley, England: CSRC, 

October 2001, pp. 5-6.

53. The Russian military have well-known reservations concerning the 

continued presence of U.S. and NATO forces within Central Asia, and were 

reportedly dismayed by the 3-year extension of the lease agreement between 

the United States and Kyrgyzstan for the coalition base at Manas, Bishkek. See 

Kommersant, Moscow, August 13, 2003.

54. McDermott, “Russia’s Security Agenda in Central Asia”; Marcel de Haas, 

“The Development of Russia’s Security Policy 1992-2002,” in Anne C. Aldis and 

Roger N. McDermott, eds., Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/Portland, 

OR: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 3-21.

55. The CRDF is divided into three operational zones―Western Zone (Russia 

and Belarus), Caucasus Zone (Russia and Armenia) and the Central Asian Zone 

(Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).

56. Kenley Butler, “Internal Conflicts and Security Concerns in Central 

Asia and Afghanistan,” NIS Nonproliferation Program, Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/caconf.htm. 

57. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 21, 2003, p. 9.

58. Bordyuzha graduated from the Perm Higher Command and Engineering 

School in 1972 and then entered the KGB, where he remained until 1992. Between 

1992-95 he was Deputy Commander of the Federal Border Troops, and between 

1995-98, he was Deputy Commander of the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) 

before being appointed to the presidential administration. See Kommersant,

Moscow, April 24, 2003, p. 4; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, May 12, 2003, p. 10.
40

59. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, April 19 2003, p. 2.

60. Interfax, Moscow, May 16, 2002.

61. It retains a total strength of around 1,300 troops, as of September 2003; 

Ibid.

62. See William D. O’Malley and Roger N. McDermott, “Kyrgyzstan’s 

Security Tightrope: Balancing its Relations Between Moscow and Washington,” 

FMSO, Fort Leavenworth: KS, 2003.

63. Miriam Arunova, “The CIS: Summing up the Past Decade and Future 

Prospects,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 3, No. 15, 2002, pp. 14-16.

64. Ibid.

65. Interfax, Moscow, September 18, 2002.

66. Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 7, No. 108, June 5, 2001; Sophie 

Lambroschini, “Central Asia: CIS Plans Rapid-Reaction Force to Fight 

Terrorism,” RFE/RL Newsline, May 22, 2001, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/

22052001112028.asp. 

67. Vremya Novostei, Moscow, April 4, 2002.

68. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 23, 2002.

69. ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 1327 GMT, BBC Monitoring Service, June 13, 2002.

70. Ibid.

71. Khabar TV, Almaty, April 18, 2002; Interfax, Moscow, BBC Monitoring 

Service, April 23, 2002; AKIpress website, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, June 12, 

2002; Asia-Plus News Agency, Dushanbe, BBC Monitoring Service, 0946 GMT, June 

14, 2002; M. J. Orr, “Better or Just Not so Bad? An Evaluation of Russian Combat 

Effectiveness in the Second Chechen War,” The Second Chechen War, p. 94.

72. The 100-megawatt transmitter reportedly receives signals from two 

satellites simultaneously. See Channel One TV, Moscow, BBC Monitoring Service, 

0800 GMT, April 4, 2003.

73. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 7, 2003, p. EV.

74. ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, April 8, 2003.
41

75. The Military Balance, 2003-04, Oxford, England: IISS, 2003, pp. 22-23.

76. The six member states of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

77. Zulfia Rakhimova, “Uzbekistan in GUUAM and the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 5, No. 11, 2001, pp. 158-168; 

Alexander Lukin, “China Advancing Bilateral Cooperation,” International Affairs,

Vol. 48, No. 1, 2002, pp. 141-152.

78. Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

Summit Ends,” RFE/RL, Prague, June 15, 2001; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, BBC 

Monitoring Service, 0848 GMT, January 7, 2002; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, BBC 

Monitoring Service, 1043 GMT, May 15, 2002; Izvestia, Moscow, June 7, 2002, p. 4; 

Parlamentskaya Gazeta, Moscow, June 8, 2002, p. 1.

79. Xing Guangcheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Fight 

Against Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 

4, No. 16, 2002, p. 16.

80. Kyrgyz-Press International News Agency, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, 

1425 GMT, April 1, 2003; ITAR-TASS, Moscow, August 6, 2003.

81. Interfax, Bishkek, FBIS-SOV-2002-1226, December 26, 2002.

82. Public Educational Radio and TV, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, 1430 

GMT, October 14, 2002; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, FBIS-CHI-2002-1224, 

December 24, 2002.

83. Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, (Internet Version), BBC Monitoring Service, June 4, 

2003; ITAR-TASS, Moscow, August 6, 2003; People’s Daily Online, Beijing, August 

13, 2003; Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, August 12, 2003, p. 1.

84. Interfax, Moscow, July 17, 2002.

85. Pavel Baev, “The Challenge of “Small Wars” for the Russian Military,” in 

Aldis and McDermott, eds., Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, pp. 189-208.

86. Roger N. McDermott, “Putin’s Military Priorities: The Modernization of 

the Armed Forces,” in Aldis and McDermott, eds., Russian Military Reform 1992-

2002, pp. 259-277.

87. An Interview With General Anthony Zinni, “Russia and the Middle East,” 

Washington Profile News Agency, May 19, 2003, www.washprofile.org. 
42

88. Sam Perlo-Freeman and Peter Stalenheim, “Military Expenditure in the 

South Caucasus and Central Asia,” in Alyson J. K. Bailes, et al., Armament and 

Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, July 

2003, pp. 15-20; Chris Hill and Peter Sutcliffe, “An Economic Analysis of Military 

Expenditure Levels in Central Asia and Transcaucasia,” NATO Colloquim 2001, pp. 

271-90, www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/colloq01.htm.

89. The Military Balance, 1992-03 to 2002-03, Oxford, England: IISS.

90. I am making a clear distinction between forces whose function is to carry 

out combat operations (SOF) and those that are referred to as Special Forces, 

which are in fact combined forces with special designated tasks: chemical units, 

construction units, engineering units, intelligence units, signal units, medical 

units, and topography and cartography units. 

91. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS, Issue 11, 2002, pp. 

819, 827, 829.

92. Author interviews with Western military officers.

93. Ibid.

94. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, pp. 286, 295-296.

95. Edward F. Bruner, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Special 

Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for 

Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, 

October 15, 2001; author interviews with Western military officers.

96. See 7 acs/7 sof/7 sos History, via www.7thsos.com/History.htm. 

97. See Shamil Gareyev, “Military Cooperation: Uzbekistan and the 

U.S.A.,” Winter 1997-98, www.pacom.mil/forum/UZBEK.html. Four of the 

Central Asian Republics joined NATO’s PfP in 1994, Tajikistan finally joined 

in 2002. On multilateral military exercises, see J. Moffat, “Central Asia: U.S. to 

Participate in Joint Military Exercise,” RFE/RL, August 29, 1997; “NATO PfP 

Exercise Cooperative Nugget 97,” www.saclant.nato.int/pio/EVENTS/Exercises/

COOP%20Nugget/cn97.htm; “Fact Sheet on Centrasbat 2000,” www.usembassy.uz/

centcom/military.htm. 

98. See: Major William M. Tart, “Ethnic Conflict and CENTCOM Policy for 

the Central Asian Republics,” Air Command Staff College, Air University, AU/

ACSC/175/2000-04, April 2000.

99. Turkmenistan has been the exception, seeking to eschew foreign military 

contacts.
43

100. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Central Asian Partners: Low Key Spadework 

by Green Berets Reaps Valuable Benefits for War in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces 

Journal International, January 2002, p. 60.

101. These programs were as follows: Collaborative Research Program, 

Department of Health and Human Services–BTEP, Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention, Materials Protection, Control & Accounting, Export Control Program 

(Nuclear), Arms Control Support, IMET, Counterproliferation, Nonproliferation 

and Disarmament Fund, FMF, Science Centers, Export Control and Border Security, 

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), Comprehensive Threat Reduction, Customs 

Border Security and Counterproliferation, DoD/FBI Counterproliferation, and 

Civilian R&D Foundation. See Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States.”

102. Ibid.

103. No FMF funds were assigned to Turkmenistan in the FY 2002.

104. The Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) funds were Kazakhstan, 

$2,660,000; Kyrgyzstan, $2,000,000; Tajikistan, $7,500,000; Turkmenistan, 

$5,000,000; and Uzbekistan, $4,300,000. These were broadly in line with the 

prioritizing of border security in the region in an attempt to counter the flow of 

narcotics, arms, militants. and illegal migration. See “U.S. Government Assistance 

to and Cooperative Activities With Eurasia,” FY 2002 Annual Report, Prepared by 

the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. State 

Department, January 2003.

105. Anthony Davis, “U.S. Special Forces Train Kyrgyz Units,” Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, August 29, 2001.

106. The Times, London, March 30, 2002, p. 20.

107. Interfax, Moscow, January 24, 2003.

108. Author interviews with Western military officers.

109. Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 6, No. 171, September 

15, 2000.

110. Author interviews with U.S. SOF.

111. Author interviews with Western military officers.

112. The United States and NATO are currently moving away from the view 

of the armed forces existing for the defense of territory to the defense of values. 
44

Such a revolution in military terms will generate experience that will be invaluable 

if shared with partner states in Central Asia; they also must face such challenges, 

since their main threat parameters are not about the defense of territory.

113. Author’s interview with the MOD of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

114. Ibid.

115. Author interviews with Central Asian military officers.

116. An article that appeared in the Russian Armeyskiy Sbornik in October 

2002 illustrated adequately the limited nature of Russian counterinsurgency 

theory, despite the Russian armed forces being so heavily involved in “small 

wars” during the last decade. Russian military journals have continued to stick 

doggedly in this period to analysis of general war, rather than what is termed 

“operations other than war.” Both the organization and tactics explored within 

the article were presented in very vague terms, consequently of questionable 

value as an aid to training soldiers in counterinsurgency. See Colonel Sergey 

Batyushkin, Relying on Surprise, Camberley, England: CSRC, UK Translation 

606, October 2002. Since the Central Asian militaries share a Soviet heritage, they 

likewise suffer from unsophisticated and underdeveloped doctrinal and training 

manuals for counterinsurgency operations, within their academies and military 

education facilities. The one regional exception at present is Uzbekistan; since 

9/11, the Uzbek Armed Forces Academy in Tashkent has run counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency lectures, though it still needs further support and assistance in 

strengthening this component of its training and education programs.

117. Author interviews with Western and Central Asian military officers. 

U.S. SOF use communications systems such as the Special Mission Radio System 

(SMRS) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS); such systems would radically 

improve communications within the Central Asian SOF.

118. There are reported cases of Kazakh soldiers being killed in mobile 

vehicles that have been supplied to Kazakhstan simply because they did not 

properly prepare their soldiers in their use. Equally, Naval Cutters that have 

been supplied to the embryonic Kazakh Navy have been subjected to a lack of 

maintenance skills. During the 1990s, when the U.K. supplied Challenger tanks to 

Jordan, the first step was precisely this task of dispatching engineers to teach the 

necessary basic maintenance skills.

119. Author interviews with U.S. SOF. The system operates on the basis of 

collecting information in response to seismic-acoustic energy, magnetic field 

changes and changes to the infrared field production. It can, therefore, detect 

movement of enemy personnel and vehicles, processing the information and 

transmitting the information in short bursts to a system monitor set. It can be used 

to produce a time-phased record of enemy activity. The I-REMBASS is designed 
45

for SOF use, but is smaller and lighter. See www.usaic.hua.army.mil/SCHOOL/

111MI/309th/96R/rembass.htm.

120. Author interviews with Western military officers.

121. Murat T. Laumulin, “The Armed Forces, Military Reform and Civilian 

Control Over the Security Structure in Kazakhstan,” Institute for Strategic 

Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2003, www.kisi.kz/English/

Our_publications/Laumulin_1_en.html; O’Malley and McDermott, “Kyrgyzstan’s 

Security Tightrope”; Rustam Burnashev and Irina Chernykh, “The Armed Forces 

of the Republic of Tajikistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 18, 2002, pp. 

93-105; Anton Alexeyev, “The Armed Forces of Turkmenistan,” Paper Presented 

at the Department of Oriental Studies of St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, 

2002; Sergey Masurenko, “Civil-Military Relations in Uzbekistan and the Reform 

of the Armed Forces,” PfP Consortium, Security Sector Reform Working Group 

Meeting, NATO Defense College, Rome, April 7-8, 2003; Author interviews with 

Central Asian military officers.

122. Bucharest Ziua, (Internet Version), Bucharest, June 11, 2003.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Prime-News, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1130 GMT, 

November 27, 2002.

126. The program beaks down as follows: Phase I: logistics and engineering; 

Phases IIA and IIB: military joint doctrine, C2, staff/organizational training for the 

Georgian MOD and Land Forces Command; Phase IIIA: Unit level tactical training 

of the Georgian Commando Battalion; Phase IIIB: Unit level tactical training and 

specialized military mountaineering training for the 16th Mountain Battalion; 

Phase IIIC: training the 560 man 113th Light Infantry Battalion/11th MRD to 

conduct patrol base operations, ambush procedures, urban terrain operations, 

long-range patrols, platoon level raids, and daylight company-level attacks and 

night defensive operations. 

127. “Georgia Train and Equip Program Begins,” U.S. Department of Defense, 

April 29, 2002, www.defenselink.mil/news. 

128. Ibid.

129. Kavkasia-Press News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1303 GMT, 

May 22, 2003.
46

130. Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1000 GMT, May 23. 2003.

131. Eric A. Miller, “Morale of U.S. Trained Troops in Georgia is High, But 

U.S. Advisors Concerned About Sustainability,” Eurasia Insight, Eurasianet, May 

5, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050503_pr.shtml. 

132. Prime-News, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1130 GMT, 

November 27. 2002.

133. Russia has proven uncomfortable with the entry of U.S military forces 

into Central Asia, which traditionally it has regarded as being in its own sphere of 

influence. In February 2003, Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, called on the 

UN Security Council to establish “time-frames” for limiting the duration of the 

U.S. military presence in the region. Moreover, the Russian military press often 

portrays the basing of U.S. and Western forces in Central Asia in sinister terms, 

believing it goes beyond supporting the GWOT. See Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, 

July 15, 2003.

134. NATO Basic Texts, April 11, 2000, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/

b541023u.htm. 

135. RIA, Oreanda, Kiev, July 21, 2003.

136. The provisional first year program focuses on inculcating the prerequisite 

leadership skills among the officer corps within the region’s militaries.

137. An enhanced and further refined second-year program would follow, 

consolidating the first-year achievements and concentrating on antiterrorist small 

unit training. At that stage, drawing on the U.S. military engagement experience 

gained in Georgia through the GTEP, follow-up work would begin with the 

region’s MODs, constructing appropriate blueprints for how the host nations will 

continue training their antiterrorist forces after the completion of the program.