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****MOVING U.S. FORCES:****
****OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY****
**The Congress of the United States**
**Congressional Budget Office**

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****NOTES****
** Unless otherwise indicated, all years referredto in this report are fiscal years.**
**Numbers in the text and tables of this report maynot add to totals because of rounding..**
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****Preface****

What combination of strategic mobilityforces--airlift planes, sealift ships, and sets of military equipment prepositionedabroad--best suits the needs of the United States? Since the Departmentof Defense (DoD) no longer plans to confront a well-armed Soviet Unionin a European conflict, some people might argue that its need for mobilityforces has declined. But today the Administration envisions a smaller,yet more flexible, set of forces that can counter regional aggressors anywherein the world. For that reason, proponents say a robust system for transportingmilitary forces over intercontinental distances is more important thanever.
This analysis, conducted by the Congressional Budget Office(CBO) for the House Committee on National Security, looks at several alternativesfor modernizing DoD's strategic mobility forces and compares the costsand capabilities of each option with those of the Administration's plan.In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the studymakes no recommendations.
Rachel Schmidt of CBO's National Security Division preparedthe study under the general supervision of Cindy Williams and R. WilliamThomas. Shaun Black developed CBO's analytic model for sealift analysisand wrote sections of Chapter 3. Nathan Stacy wrote most of the discussionof the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in Chapter 2 and Appendix B. Jo Ann Vines,Jeannette Deshong, and Victoria Fraider of CBO's Budget Analysis Divisionprovided the cost analysis. The author would like to thank Evan Christman,Ivan Eland, Wayne Glass, Frances Lussier, and Doug Taylor of CBO, as wellas numerous employees of the Department of Defense and the military services,for their help. Philip Webre and Arlene Holen of CBO, David Kassing ofRAND, and Owen Cote of Harvard University's Center for Science and InternationalAffairs provided thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the study.(The assistance of external participants implies no responsibility forthe final product, which rests solely with CBO.)
Christian Spoor edited the manuscript, and Marlies Dunsonprovided editorial assistance. Judith Cromwell produced drafts of the study.Kathryn Quattrone and Jill Sands prepared the report for publication.June E. O'NeillDirectorFebruary 1997 **Contents**
SUMMARY
ONE       INTRODUCTION
               Why Is Strategic Mobility an Issue for the Congress?               What Drives Today's Requirements for Mobility Forces? 
TWO    STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES
               The Current Strategic Airlift Fleet               Plans for Modernizing Military Airlift               Missions That Determine DoD's Requirements for Strategic Airlift 
THREE  STRATEGIC SEALIFT FORCES
               The Current Strategic Sealift Fleet               Plans for Modernizing Surge Sealift               Could DoD Rely More on Commercial Shipping? 
FOUR    PREPOSITIONED FORCES
               A Lesson from Desert Shield: Preposition Heavy Forces               Current Land- and Sea-Based Prepositioning               DoD's Plans to Expand Prepositioning               The Benefits and Risks of Prepositioning 
FIVE      EVALUATING LIFT REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES
               Problems in Identifying Lift Requirements               DoD's Most Recent Requirements for Strategic Mobility Forces               Criteria for Evaluating Strategic Lift Options 
SIX        OPTIONS FOR MODERNIZING STRATEGIC LIFT
               The Administration's Plan               Five Alternatives to the Administration's Plan               Comparison of the Alternatives by Various Measures               Conclusions
APPENDIXES
A           The Army's Goals for Strategic MobilityB            Participation in the Civil Reserve Air FleetC           Key Assumptions About Mobility OperationsD           Details About CBO's Analysis 
TABLES
S-1.        The Administration'sPlan for Modernizing Strategic MobilityiS-2.        Five Alternativesfor Modernizing Strategic MobilityiS-3.        Comparisonof the Costs and Capabilities of Alternatives for Modernizing StrategicMobility1.           Changes in Combat and Mobility Forces Under the Administration's Plan,1990-19992.           Strategic Lift Requirements of a Hypothetical Major Regional Conflict3.           Procurement of C-17s Under the Administration's Plan, 1997-20044.           Expected Delivery Schedule for LMSRs, 1996-20015.           Comparison of Army and Marine Corps Afloat Prepositioning6.           The Administration's Plan for Modernizing Strategic Mobility7.           Five Alternatives for Modernizing Strategic Mobility8.           Total Costs Under Option I9.           Total Costs Under Option II10.         Total Costs Under Option III11.         Total Costs Under Option IV12.         Total Costs Under Option V13.         Comparison of the Costs and Capabilities of Alternatives for ModernizingStrategic MobilityA-1.       ApproximateLift Requirements for Army Contingency ForcesA-2.       Changes in Numberof Personnel in Various Army Combat Units, 1987-1994B-1.        Valueof Air Force Passenger and Cargo Contracts Associated with the Civil ReserveAir FleetB-2.        Participationof Commercial Air Carriers in Military Contingencies, 1964-1996D-1.        Comparisonof Assumptions in the MRS BURU and CBO's Analysis 
FIGURES
S-1.        The Administration'sPlan to Preposition Equipment for Two Major Regional ConflictsS-2.        AirliftDeliveries to a Conflict in the Persian Gulf, Plus Sustaining Operationsin Korea, Under the Administration's              Plan and Five Alternatives1.           Department of Defense Spending on Mobility Forces, 1962-19972.           Theoretical Capacity of the Strategic Airlift Fleet Under the Administration'sPlan, 1996-20073.           DoD's Strategic Airlift Planes4.           Sealift Capacity Under the Administration's Plan, 1996-20015.           DoD's Surge Sealift Ships6.           Arrival Times of Army Combat Forces Deployed in the Persian Gulf War7.           Current Sites of Prepositioned Equipment8.           Sites for Expanded Prepositioning Under the Administration's Plan9.           Length of Time That Various Airlift and Sealift Forces Would Take to CompleteDeliveries of an Armored Cavalry              Regiment to the Persian Gulf10.         Estimated Daily Airlift Deliveries to Two Major Regional Conflicts VersusActual Deliveries in the Persian Gulf War11.         Theoretical Airlift Capacity Under the Administration's Plan and Five Alternatives,1996-200712.         Airlift Deliveries to a Conflict in the Persian Gulf, Plus Sustaining Operationsin Korea, Under the Administration's              Plan and Five Alternatives13.         AirliftDeliveries of Outsize Cargo to a Korean Conflict Under the Administration'sPlan and Five AlternativesA-1.       Changes in Weightof Various Army Combat Units, 1987-1994B-1.        Participationof Long-Range International Passenger Aircraft in the Civil Reserve AirFleet, Fiscal Years 1990-1997B-2.        Participationof Long-Range International Cargo Aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet,Fiscal Years 1990-1997 87 
BOXES
1.           Types of Military Forces: A Summary2.           Basic Units of Measure and Terms in Airlift Analysis3.           Activating the Civil Reserve Air Fleet4.           Basic Units of Measure in Sealift Analysis5.           Readiness Categories for Surge Sealift6.           Lessons Learned About Afloat Prepositioning from Operation Vigilant Warrior