U.S. Army War College, and

 Triangle Institute for Security Studies

 

Strategic Deception in Modern Democracies:

Ethical, Legal, and Policy Challenges

Compiled by

Dr. Carolyn Pumphrey

and

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio Echevarria II

Key Insights:

• Some consensus exists regarding the defi nition of strategic deception—the intentional manipulation, distortion, or falsifi cation of information to mislead an adversary. However, signifi cant 

ethical, legal, and political questions persist concerning the conditions under which modern 

democracies should apply it.

• Modern democracies assume that the use of deception will undermine trust, corrupt democratic 

processes, and erode fundamental democratic values. However, the specifi c conditions under which this 

assumption would prove correct (or incorrect) remain unexamined.

• Modern democracies, such as the United States, have ample tools available for employing 

strategic deception effectively. However, no liberal-democratic theory or doctrine for its use 

currently exists. Abstract guidelines, such as the Kantian Categorical Imperative, invariably fail when 

applied to the practical world of international politics.

• Notwithstanding the importance of the rule of law to modern democracies, ethical and political 

concerns actually hinder the use of strategic deception far more than do legal constraints.

• U.S. political and military leadership should invest more in achieving a better understanding of the 

potential long- and short-term costs of employing strategic deception. Presumably, such a cost-benefi t analysis already takes place in the development of national strategy. However, the effects of globalization might 

aggravate those costs in ways that are not fully understood.

The use of strategic deception in war (or peace) is as old as governments and militaries. However, the 

nature and extent of its employment is a major concern for modern democracies. Although, by defi nition, 

strategic deception is an attempt to deceive an adversary, one can imagine any number of scenarios in 

which its unintended or spill-over effects could mislead the public at home, as well as the populace of one’s 

allies and friends. To what extent would such unintended consequences undermine a state’s credibility? For 

societies such as the United States that are predicated on the principle of holding governments accountable, 

strategic deception seems at best a necessary evil and at worst an unjustifi able and dangerous assault on 
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core values. The term strategic deception itself 

brings with it a great deal of baggage that makes 

objective discussion of it extremely diffi cult. 

In an effort to strip away some of that baggage 

and get at the root of the nature, extent, and potential 

applications of strategic deception, the Triangle 

Institute for Security Studies (TISS) and the U.S. 

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

held a conference on October 31-November 1, 2003, 

at the Friday Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 

The purpose of the conference was to address the 

ethical, legal, and policy challenges that arise when 

democratic governments use deception. The Center 

for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the 

U.S. Naval Academy and Duke University’s Kenan 

Institute for Ethics participated as cosponsors. 

Presenters and attendees included military 

historians, philosophers and ethicists, members of 

the military and intelligence communities, lawyers, 

businessmen, and members of the press. 

MAJOR ISSUES

The conference addressed a wide range of 

issues, but the discussion generally centered around 

three overlapping questions. First, can a modern 

democracy like the United States justify the use 

of strategic deception―defi ned as the intentional 

manipulation, distortion, or falsifi cation of information to mislead an adversary? Although the 

conference focused on wartime uses of deception, 

the term wartime included war, preparation for 

war, and what has come to be known in service 

vernacular as military operations other than war. 

Second, if the United States can justify the use of 

strategic deception, what guidelines or principles, 

if any, should it follow when employing it?

In other words, in what ways should modern 

democracies limit their use of strategic deception so 

as not to threaten their core values? Third, how can 

the United States improve its current capabilities, 

particularly against determined foes, and how can 

it protect itself against being deceived? A brief 

summary of the discussion follows. 

CAN MODERN DEMOCRACIES JUSTIFY 

THE USE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION?

As one might expect, answers to this 

question varied considerably. On the one hand, 

representatives from the military attempted to 

clarify that strategic deception is directed at a foe, 

not at the friendly populace. Therefore, if used 

appropriately, it would not threaten the core values 

of a democracy. Measures taken to limit unintended 

consequences before, during, and after the act 

should form an essential part of any use of strategic 

deception. 

In contrast, some members of the media 

maintained that the use of strategic deception 

would invariably involve the press as primary or 

intermediate targets. Understandably, the media 

expressed outrage at the possibility of being 

exploited in this way. At times, their argument 

wrongly equated the act of misleading the press 

with an intent to deny freedom of the press, an 

obvious violation of a right guaranteed by the 

U.S. Constitution. However, most members of the 

press agreed that they should not have access to, 

or publicize, details about military operations. One 

presenter pointed out that the internet has changed 

the equation regarding freedom of the press by 

placing the capability to publish information 

(whether misleading or otherwise) into the hands 

of every citizen.

The conference also revealed that laws and 

ethical standards offer little in the way of an 

argument for or against the use of deception. 

Experts on military and international law stressed 

that legal constraints do little to limit the use of 

deception, especially in war. International law 

directly prohibits only perfi dy (deceptive measures 

which take advantage of symbols or positions of 

trust―such as the use of a white fl ag or a Red Cross―

to attack, wound, or kill an enemy). Also, American 

courts traditionally are reluctant to interfere in what 

they see as “policy matters.” This reluctance stems 

in part from the fact that the U.S. Constitution gives 

a great deal of freedom of action to the President 

in anything related to war. U.S. leaders, therefore, 

fi nd themselves with a fair amount of legal latitude 

when it comes to the use of strategic deception.

Similarly, modern ethical systems do not 

provide any consistent argument for or against the 

use of deception. For example, one might argue―as 

the 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant 

did―that lying in any form and for any purpose 

is a categorical evil. Yet, other theories, such as 

that of enlightened self-interest and service for 

the common good, do justify deceit in war. In fact, 
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the conference highlighted an important ethical 

paradox: To save its democracy, the United States 

might have to resort to deception which might in 

turn harm the very values and institutions it is 

fi ghting to preserve. 

Political concerns―which tend to include 

ethical and legal considerations―emerged as 

the primary determinant in whether the use of 

strategic deception is justifi able. The majority of 

those present at the conference favored the “realist” 

view that modern democracies can and should use 

strategic deception if they employ proper damage 

control and minimize the risks to their core values.

WHAT GUIDELINES SHOULD APPLY 

TO THE USE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION?

If modern democracies are justifi ed in using 

strategic deception, what guidelines, if any, should 

they follow? A tentative set guidelines did emerge 

in the course of the conference, but they could apply 

to any form of government, not just democracies. 

The use of deception, like any political-military tool, 

should follow the practical guidelines of necessity, 

feasibility, and a costs-versus-benefi ts analysis.

Necessity. Most participants agreed that the 

use of strategic deception is justifi ed if 1) national 

survival is at stake, and 2) deception is crucial to 

victory. For example, Operation BODYGUARD in 

1944, which deceived the Axis powers as to the true 

D-Day invasion site, played a major role in securing 

victory for the Allies in World War II. National 

survival was clearly at stake, and the deception 

itself was critical to achieving a successful landing. 

Of course, one could use the same justifi cation for 

Hitler’s Plan Yellow, the invasion of France in 1940. 

In Hitler’s eyes, national survival was at stake, and 

the particular deception employed, which misled 

the French and British as to the location of the 

German main attack, was crucial to victory. 

One presenter maintained that deception is a 

tool of the weak and that, as the most powerful 

nation on earth, the United States should eschew 

deception in favor of using its might to achieve its 

goals. However, this facile solution fails to take into 

account the fact that the use of overwhelming force 

will generate unintended consequences as well, 

and that these might outweigh those caused by the 

use of deception. In any case, a certain amount of 

deception is inherent in the realm of international 

politics where states necessarily mislead each other 

in order to protect their vital interests without 

having to resort to war. 

Feasibility. Clearly, the use of strategic deception 

(or any political-military tool for that matter) 

depends on having the necessary wherewithal 

at hand. Evaluating the means at hand is a basic 

step in formulating sound strategy. One presenter 

posed the important question as to whether the 

United States was actually keeping pace with the 

world-wide development of new technological 

means to invade information systems and create 

misinformation. Are we, in fact, deceiving ourselves 

regarding our alleged technological superiority?

The United States does have many natural assets 

including high levels of technological experience 

and citizens noted for their initiative and creativity. 

Its culture is diverse and refl ects a certain facility 

with “spinning” information and “advertising” 

goods. However, the conference pointed out that 

the United States has not always made the best use 

of its assets. It has not done well at capitalizing on 

the diversity of its culture and its ethnic groups 

to penetrate its adversaries at the highest levels, 

for example. Nor does it invest in the resources 

necessary to fully understand foreign cultures. 

Understanding one’s opponents, what they want 

and how they think, is absolutely crucial when 

ascertaining the feasibility of a strategic deception 

plan.

Costs-versus-Benefi ts. As previously noted, 

strategic deception can have unintended consequences. In extremely mismanaged cases, it even 

can erode international trust and harm those 

political initiatives that depend on international 

cooperation. It can also create mistrust between 

the government, the military, the public, and the 

media. Fortunately, democratic societies rely less on 

trust than on accountability. Government offi cials 

are extended a conditional trust that entitles the 

populace to take action to remove those offi cials 

should they violate that trust. Hence, democratic 

societies may prove more resilient than generally 

acknowledged by those who argue that deception 

will necessarily undermine core democratic values. 

This particular topic requires further research.

For obvious reasons, cost-benefi t analyses 

and other forms of risk management must take 

place whenever states choose to employ strategic 

deception. In addition, the rapid spread of 
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information and information technologies currently 

associated with the effects of globalization might 

complicate such analyses in ways that political 

leaders may not yet fully understand. This topic 

requires more attention as well.

HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES IMPROVE 

ITS CAPABILITIES?

Despite the dangers, common sense dictates 

that the United States should not ignore a tool that 

can help it achieve its goals with greater effi ciency. 

While some may argue that the United States is 

now in a position of strength and, as such, less 

dependent on deception, strength is always relative 

and never without its Achilles’ heels. Moreover, 

some of the avowed enemies of the United States 

remain committed to its destruction. They continue 

to think and adapt to that end. 

The United States, therefore, has a threefold 

task. First, it must develop stronger theoretical 

foundations for understanding deception, namely, 

what it is that enables one to be deceived. For 

example, it is easier to deceive an enemy into 

believing something he or she wants to believe, 

than it is to get them to embrace an entirely new 

idea. A more developed theory of deception would 

thus improve the probability that our strategic 

deception plan will work. 

Second, it must enhance professional military 

education concerning strategic deception. While 

tactical commanders understand the importance 

of deception and routinely include deception plans 

in their operational planning, senior leaders must 

understand its potential effects at the strategic 

level and the role that cyberspace could play 

in it. U.S. political and military leaders should 

reexamine current methods of risk assessment and 

risk management to ensure they are adequate for 

today’s global environment. 

Third, the academic community should examine 

more closely the potential impact of a government’s 

use of strategic deception on core democratic 

values. The key may well be that, regardless of 

the political-military tool used, government must 

remain accountable to the public. In what ways 

can strategic deception be employed while still 

preserving that accountability?

The conference began with the underlying 

assumption that modern democracies were inherently ill-suited to engage in strategic deception. 

The course of the discussion revealed that while 

democracies do not keep secrets particularly well 

and their political processes are generally slow and 

cumbersome, history shows that they can indeed 

carry out strategic deception successfully. Nor is 

the United States culturally averse to deception; we 

have used it effectively throughout our history. In 

fact, some members of the international community 

in general―and the Chinese in particular―are 

convinced that the United States is not only good 

at deception, but that its successful use of deception 

explains our rise to power. This conference 

thus helped clear away much of the confusion 

surrounding the issue of strategic deception and 

helped point the way for further study. SSI and 

TISS will publish select papers from the conference 

over the next several months.

*****

The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors 

and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position 

of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

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programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at 

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 245-4212.