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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE 

BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE 

US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY 

PARTNERSHIP

Kamal A. Beyoghlow

January 2020

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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ISBN 1-58487-818-5
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Kamal A. Beyoghlow, PhD, is an adjunct professor of 

international security at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where 

he teaches courses on Turkish politics and foreign 

policy, North Africa and the world, and cross-cultural 

communication. He is also an adjunct professor of 

government at American University in Washington, 

DC. He is a former professor at the US National War 

College and the Marine Corps University and served 

on President Barack Obama’s Guantanamo Periodic 

Review Board as the US State Department Principal 

Representative. He also served in the Office of the US 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department 

of State (DoS), where he was responsible for initiating 

and implementing US counterterrorism policy for the 

Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, including 

Turkey, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus. Professor Beyoghlow earned his undergraduate degree from San 

Diego State University, his master’s degree from Tufts 

University in cooperation with the Fletcher School 

of International Law and Diplomacy, and his PhD 

in political science from the University of California, 

Berkeley.
1

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE 

BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE 

US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY 

PARTNERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

If we lose our identity, character and individuality, we 

will get lost among the masses. That’s why we say, ‘One 

nation, one flag, one country, one state.’ These principles 

are the safety locks of our independence and future.

—Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, excerpt 

from speech delivered on March 3, 2017.

You never really understand a person until you consider 

things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his 

skin and walk around in it.

—Excerpt from To Kill a Mocking Bird by Harper Lee.

The US-Turkish strategic partnership established 

at the end of World War II reached its climax in the 

late eighties, and is at a dangerous crossroad. Such 

an outcome has had a devastating effect on Turkey’s 

relationship with other Western partners, especially 

NATO, which has been the backbone of America’s 

defense alliance since the start of the Cold War. This 

situation, if it continues, is likely to force the unraveling of NATO as a cohesive organization at a time 

when it is facing a myriad of collective global security 

challenges, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—far beyond its traditional defensive posture on 

the European continent. All is not lost, however, and 

with more diligent diplomatic and military-to-military 

dialogue and compromises, US-Turkish relations can 

be salvaged.
2

States with long and deep commitments to one 

another seldom experience the kind of political and 

military distrust and uncertainties characterizing the 

current state of affairs between Turkey and its traditional Western allies, including the United States. 

Much of the ongoing tensions can be traced to the 

American-led interventions in Iraq and Syria, as well 

as to other fundamental strategic disagreements over 

how best to shape the future of the Greater Middle 

East and North Africa. Although some agencies within 

the US government have had differences with Turkey 

over the latter’s increasingly authoritarian bent, not all 

elements within the US government are in agreement 

with the reasons or path forward. No one factor can 

be attributed to the new authoritarian trend in Turkey. 

After all, the majority of the Turkish public, through 

elections and referendums, has given President Tayyip 

Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) 

the mandate they need to rule and change the political rules of the game in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s 

deeply fragmented political system and its weak political parties have played a role in the changes in the 

nature and the character of Turkey’s political system 

from a military authoritarian one to a civilian authoritarian one.

From Turkey’s perspective, the United States and 

NATO have turned upside down the game plans of 

others in the region, chief among them Turkey’s ruling 

AKP and its leader, President Erdogan. Using some 

imagination, one can foresee the adverse impacts 

American operational and tactical moves have had on 

Turkey since the invasion of Iraq in 2003; and more 

recently, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War 

in 2011. America’s sponsorship, training, and military support of the Kurd-dominated Arab democratic 
3

force in Syria—a compilation of predominantly Kurdish fighters and supporters affiliated with the Syrian 

Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD); its military 

wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG); and the 

Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), fighters which Turkey 

considers its most dangerous political and military 

nemeses—have strained US-Turkish relations and 

impacted Turkish public opinion of the United States 

in a negative way. Turkey views Western military 

and logistical support for Kurds in Syria and Iraq as 

inimical to its broader regional interest of containing 

Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and beyond and preventing the emergence of Syrian Kurdish enclaves 

close to its southeast borders, where the bulk of Turkish Kurds reside. Turkey’s long-term position on any 

autonomous or federated Kurdish enclaves in surrounding regional states could invite calls by Turkish 

Kurds for similar calls and encourage the PKK—a USdesignated terror organization—to continue carrying 

out cross-border attacks on Turkish institutions and 

territory.

Although there has been no indication so far that 

rules of engagement involving US military trainees 

and special forces units have changed as far as Turkey’s security along its southeastern frontier is concerned, the potential for serious clashes between the 

Turkish military and the Syrian Kurds has been growing following the fall of Raqqa, the seat of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS’s) caliphate in Syria and 

Iraq. Since the summer of 2012, the Turkish media 

has frequently reported incidents of Turkish fighter 

jets and ground forces taking off from their bases to 

chase off Syrian Kurdish units operating too close 
4

to Turkey’s border.1 Ankara-backed Syrian groups 

fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime 

have emerged as the main beneficiary of these rules 

of engagement, which have effectively served as a 

Turkish cover for the country’s military and logistical 

operations in border regions, especially since the fall 

of the Syrian town of Afrin and the expulsion of Kurdish fighters from there by Turkish troops and their 

Muslim Syrian Sunni fighter allies, including the Free 

Syrian Army, on March 18, 2018.

Anti-Americanism in Turkey appears to be increasing as the war in Syria continues unabated. These attitudes, if they persist, are likely to adversely affect the 

resiliency of the traditional partnership among the 

United States, Turkey, and NATO—especially the 

military-to-military relationship—including basing 

rights and other defense commitments enshrined in 

NATO’s declaration of principles. Turkey is already 

moving toward an uneasy strategic alliance with 

Russia and Iran to address the future of Syria and 

to diversify its logistical and military weapon purchases and ultimate dependency beyond NATO. The 

proposed Turkish purchase of the S-400 air defense 

system from Russia to compensate for Turkey’s gap 

in air defense capability and the consummation of a 

long-standing nuclear power deal following years of 

delicate negotiations between Russia and Turkey will 

most certainly have profound security implications for 

the United States, NATO, and the Middle Eastern and 

North African states. The S-400 acquisition by Turkey 

poses two problems for NATO: (1) a lack of interoperability with existing NATO platforms and (2) fear 

1. Gunay Yildiz, “Turkey’s War with PKK Reaches New 

Peak,” BBC News, September 21, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news

/world-europe-19650034.
5

that increased military cooperation between Russia 

and Turkey could expose NATO platforms to Russian 

espionage activities, ultimately undermine Turkey’s 

resolve and commitment to NATO, and weaken the 

organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has 

long sought to weaken NATO, which he considers an 

existential threat to his state.

FROM PARTNERS TO UNSETTLED RELATIONS

US-Turkey strategic relations are complicated 

because of differing cultural and political values and 

competing priorities, but they were not always as 

problematic as they are today. With the end of the 

Second World War, Turkey shifted away from its interwar-period stance of neutrality toward a more robust 

alliance with NATO and the United States. Though 

Turkey received many benefits when it entered into 

the Western orbit, the country also acquired structural problems that persist to this day. At the international level, Turkey benefited from the Marshall Plan 

by bursting out from its self-imposed isolation of the 

interwar period into the global arena. Turkish reconstruction workers were admitted liberally to Germany 

and other Western European countries without visa 

restrictions as guest workers, and the new international trade and monetary system created at Bretton 

Woods helped Turkey’s sluggish economy get a jumpstart as the country moved from a one-party to a multiparty political system in the 1950s. The United States 

also established close bilateral relations with Turkey, 

supporting its military and security services—a trademark of the new Turkish republic under its founder, 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—while urging Western-style 

democratization and protection of human and civil 
6

rights. For the next 50 years, Turkish-US relations 

were based on this military-to-military foundation as 

a result of the Cold War and fear of the communist 

domino effect in the Greater Middle East, including 

Iran, Greece, and Turkey. As a result, Turkey joined 

NATO, sent troops to augment the UN-led forces 

on the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War, 

and integrated its weapon- and intelligencegathering platforms with those of NATO and the 

United States. Turkey was the first state in the Muslimmajority Middle East to recognize the state of Israel 

in 1949. Despite Turkish public opposition, the move 

was supported by the pro-Western Turkish General 

Staff. Turkey, along with Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi 

Arabia, would become the first line of defense against 

communist penetration in the region.2

There were, however, differences between the 

United States and Turkey over the status of Cypriot 

Turkish minorities in the 1960s and 1970s. The Johnson administration warned Turkey’s military-led government against sending troops to Cyprus in support 

of the newly established Turkish enclaves in the 1960s, 

which Turkey accepted reluctantly. But no sooner than 

the Vietnam War was winding down, Turkey once 

again raised the specter of protecting Turkish Muslim 

Cypriot minorities following the takeover of the entire 

island by a military junta closely aligned with its counterpart in Athens in 1974.3

 Turkey invaded Cyprus on 

2. George Lenczwoski, “Doctrinal Foundations,” in Soviet 

Advances in the Middle East (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 5–22; and George Lenczowski, The Middle 

East in World Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 

57–165.

3. Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since 

the Cold War (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 

117–124; Michael A. Reynolds, Echoes of Empire: Turkey’s Crisis of 
7

July 20, 1974, and immediately occupied one-third of 

the island. To this day, Turkey still maintains over 

45,000 troops there, complicating its relationship with 

Greece—a fellow NATO member—and contributing 

to occasional political tensions as a result of historical animosities and border disputes along Turkey’s 

Aegean coast. More recently, Turkey and Greece have 

been locked into a new dispute over the defection 

of Turkish officers to Greece following the July 2016 

failed coup in Turkey. Turkey has accused the officers 

of complicity in the coup, but Greece refuses to extradite them back to Turkey, citing EU human- and 

civil-rights protocols and the rule of law against potential Turkish mistreatment and torture and its unfair 

trial system.4

Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012), iii–33; and Nicole and 

Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey (New 

York, NY: Overlook Press, 2004), 109–125. A comprehensive 

approach on the Cyprus problem can be found in Ahmet Sozen, 

Reflections on the Cyprus Problem: A Compilation of Recent Academic 

Contributions (Northern Cyprus: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 2007). Also see Joseph S. Joseph, “Cyprus: Domestic 

Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Relations,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15, no. 1 (December 2009): 376–397.

4. Michele Kambas, “Greece on Turkey Asylum Row: Democracies Cannot Threaten or Be Threatened,” Reuters, December 31, 

2017; “Turkey, Greece Trade Barbs Over Arrestees,” Hurriyet Daily 

News, April 3, 2018; and “Turkey Arrests 2 Greek Soldiers Who 

Strayed into Country,” Associated Press, March 2, 2018. Turkey 

wants to exchange the two with the Turkish military defectors 

and asylum seekers in Greece. Earlier, President Erdogan had 

suggested changes to the Lausanne Treaty that ended Turkey’s 

War of Liberation against Greece after the Great War. Greece has 

refused to concede on all of these issues, including the Lausanne 

Treaty that settled the border issue between Turkey and Greece, 

except for a few Aegean islands still in dispute today; “Lausanne 

Treaty Needs to Be Revised for Turks in Greece, Erdogan Says 

on Athens Visit,” Daily Sabah, December 7, 2017. Turkish press 
8

Despite these bumps in the road, Turkey’s military 

and security cooperation with its US and NATO partners and with Israel remained strong throughout the 

Cold War because of the Soviet threat. Turkey continued to benefit from these associations as it continued 

to strengthen its formidable military institution, long 

considered by the general Turkish public as highly 

professional and uncorrupted by the political bickering that had plagued Turkish political parties since the 

early 1950s. The military was seen as bringing stability and security to the state through accepted coups 

as corrective measures, as long as the military eventually relinquished power to civilian control. Usually, 

such coups followed periods of lawlessness, leading 

to party-inspired, if not party-directed, violence; political and economic stagnation; and domestic, political 

instability. Whereas the United States supported these 

corrective measures by the Turkish military for the 

sake of safeguarding Turkey’s domestic tranquility 

and commitments to NATO and US strategic interests, 

the United States, along with its Western European 

partners, continued to press Turkey’s military toward 

a more transparent political system and the protection 

of human and civil rights the military had violated 

repeatedly since 1960, especially following the 1980 

coup.5

reports on August 14, 2018, said the two Greek soldiers had been 

released and sent back to Greece in an effort by the Erdogan government to reduce tensions with Turkey’s neighbor, Greece.

5. Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 141–157. These irritants in Turkey’s relations with its Western allies, including the 

United States—especially the development of nondemocratic, 

military-sponsored, and unsponsored, authoritarian regimes—

continue to this day to scuttle progress toward better relations 

between Turkey and its allies on many fronts. With the advent 

of AKP’s power in 2002 and the rise of the current President of 
9

These irritants in Turkey’s relations with its Western allies, including the United States, continue to 

scuttle progress toward better relations between 

Turkey and its allies on many fronts. With the rise of 

the AKP to power in 2002 and the rise of President 

Erdogan, Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies have been 

transformed from being military in nature to becoming a civilian trademark.

From 2002 to 2010, the AKP under then-Prime 

Minister Erdogan achieved two major accomplishments—namely, the transformation of its military and 

unprecedented economic growth.6

 As a result of failed 

attempts to seize power in July 2016, as it did successfully in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, the Turkish military 

today has been purged, and most of its high-ranking 

officers have either retired, been imprisoned pending trials, or are serving long jail sentences. Although 

Erdogan has used the attempted coup to increase his 

political fortunes, there is no doubt he survived an 

assassination attempt on July 15, 2016, while vacationing in Marmaris.

Erdogan is the commander-in-chief of a very different armed forces today than the one that existed 

prior to 2002. He, along with his former loyalist Prime 

Minister, Binali Yilderim, who is currently speaker of 

the Parliament, influences military appointments and 

deployment decisions, dismissing at will officers suspected of being disloyal to the AKP regime or who 

have the potential to overthrow the government by 

Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies 

has been transformed from being military in nature to becoming 

a civilian trademark, much to the displeasure of Turkey’s allies.

6. “Turkey—Sustained and Equitable Growth for Continued Economic Success,” World Bank, April 20, 2012, https://www

.worldbank.org/en/results/2012/04/20/turkey-sustained-and

-equitable-growth-for-continued-economic-success.
10

force. As a result, Turkey’s armed forces have suffered 

recently from readiness issues associated with personnel instability, logistics, and military equipment. Even 

the Turkish General Staff, which used to be an independent body, has been brought under the Ministry of 

Defense to better control its officer corps.7

Turkey’s relations with the Western alliance, 

and especially the United States, also experienced a 

downturn following the Arab popular uprisings in 

2011. Unlike its NATO partners, Turkey objected to 

the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi because 

Turkish companies stood to lose lucrative construction contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 

It only reluctantly changed its position to avoid being 

left out of any pending Libyan political arrangements 

following Gadhafi’s overthrow.

DISAGREEMENT OVER SYRIA

Turkey’s original approach to the Syrian uprising against President Assad differed markedly in the 

beginning from that of the United States. Prior to the 

Arab popular uprisings in 2011 and in Syria, in particular, Turkey sought to develop an independent 

political and diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis the Syrian 

regime of President Assad. This strategy was based 

7. Lars Haugom, An Uncertain Future for the Turkish Armed 

Forces (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 

September 2017). In a scathing article against President Erdogan’s 

control over the Turkish military—ironically a Western democratic imperative of civilian control over the military—a noted 

Turkey scholar, Steven Cook, argues that Erdogan’s recent actions 

vis-à-vis his military are increasingly leading to the politicization 

of the military, thus resulting in decline in general morale, preparedness, and readiness. Steven A. Cook, “General Erdogan’s 

First War,” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2018, www.foreignpolicy

.com/2018/02/07/general-erdogans-first-war/.
11

on Prime Minister Davutoglu’s dictum of “zero problem with neighbors” and “strategic depth”—the idea 

that Turkey’s national heritage rests on deep historical and cultural ties to its past and to its regional 

Muslim-state neighbors to the east. Davutoglu made 

over 60 cordial visits to Damascus to woo Assad away 

from his close ties to Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon 

at the regional level and from Russia at the international level. In return, Turkey offered to help Syria 

in its bid to recover the Golan Heights, occupied by 

Israel since the Six Day War in 1967 and a key sticking point in previous negotiations between Israel 

and Syria.8

 Turkey attempted similar peace overtures 

between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied 

West Bank, and also the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. 

Prime Minister Erdogan and his family established a 

close familial relationship with Assad, and Turkish 

firms flourished in the Aleppo region of Syria under 

several joint-venture arrangements made between 

2002 and 2011. As the situation inside Syria began to 

deteriorate in 2011, Turkey advised Assad to bring 

about much-needed economic and political reforms 

to no avail. Assad simply refused, equating such pleas 

with Turkish desires to weaken his grip on power, 

which he had inherited from his father, Hafez, in June 

2000 as a family-run authoritarian enterprise. By 2012, 

Turkish strategy toward Syria and the Arab World 

began to shift in the direction of regime change and 

support for moderate Sunni Muslim uprisings against 

Arab regimes, including Assad’s. Turkey felt it could 

8. “Turkey’s Davutoglu Gives Arab Spring Lecture in US,” 

Hurriyet Daily News, February 11, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdaily

news.com/turkeys-davutoglu-gives-arab-spring-lecture-in-us-13532.
12

transform the region to serve its strategic interests and 

growing influence.9

The United States welcomed the new support 

from Turkey for regime change in Damascus, and the 

two allies’ interests temporarily converged. As the 

civil war in Syria dragged on, however, and a clear 

outcome became increasingly elusive, fissures in the 

Turkish-American alliance began to surface. This 

development was exacerbated by the huge influx of 

Syrian refugees into Turkey, estimated in late 2017 to 

be about three million, which created a major humanitarian and financial burden. By 2013, Turkey started 

calling for a no-fly zone inside Syria to create a secure 

and militarily enforced safe haven that would hasten 

the return of Syrian refugees back to their homeland. 

The United States was cool to the safe-haven idea 

for three reasons: (1) opposition by some policy circles within the Obama administration to the Syrian 

safe-haven idea; (2) reluctance on the part of the 

Obama administration to be directly involved in yet 

another war following the high cost of America’s 

involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and 

(3) opposition by Russia—a key Syrian ally—to any 

direct American military intervention to topple Assad, 

much as the US and NATO had done in Libya.10

9. Graham E. Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring: Leadership in 

the Middle East (New York: Bozorg Press, 2014), 309–11.

10. Mathew Jaffe, “Obama Advisor Explains Why Clinton’s 

Syria Plan Won’t Work,” CNN, April 18, 2016, https://www.cnn

.com/2016/04/18/politics/axelrod-axe-files-ben-rhodes-syria/index.html; 

Jeffrey Mankoff, “Why Moscow Fears Arab Unrest,” Current History 111, issue 74 (October 2012), 258–63; Samuel Charap, “Russia, 

Syria, and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival 55, no. 1 (February-March 2013), 35–41; Dan Treisman, “Why Russia Supports 

Syria’s Assad,” UCLA TODAY, January 14, 2014; Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Plotting for Ukrainian Influence, Not Invasion, 

Analysts Say,” New York Times, April 9, 2014, https://www.nytimes
13

The United States has fewer national security interests in Syria compared to Turkey. The US strategic 

objectives there included safeguarding Israel’s borders, containing Iran and its Hezbollah proxy in the 

Eastern Mediterranean, and degrading and ultimately 

ending ISIS and al-Qaeda terror activities in the region. 

In contrast, Syria is a potentially existential threat to 

Turkey because of the Kurdish factor. Like the United 

States, Turkey worries about the potential escalation 

and violent spillover into its territory as well as the 

long-term, adverse, economic consequences of the 

Syrian refugee crisis and the free movement of Turkish goods and services to surrounding Arab and other 

regional markets, including Iran.

At the regional level for the United States, the 

unrest in Syria touched on key issues surrounding 

America’s closest allies in the Middle East, including Israel and many gulf Arab states. Israeli policymakers have been increasingly wary of the spillover 

effects from the Syrian Civil War on Israel since the 

beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011 because of the 

ensuing chaos and anarchy there as well as the growing power and influence of Iran and Hezbollah with 

the help of Russia in both Syria and Lebanon. Some of 

the Arab gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in particular—oppose 

Iran’s adventurism in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and 

worry about the increasing influence of Tehran on 

the restless Shia minorities within their states and 

.com/2014/04/10/world/europe/russia-plotting-for-ukrainian

-influence-not-invasion-analysts-say.html; and Anne Barnard and 

Rick Gladstone, “Russia Seeks to Exert More Influence Over 

Syria Conflict,” New York Times, April 4, 2012, https://www.nytimes

.com/2012/04/05/world/middleeast/russia-accuses-group-of

-undermining-peace-plan-in-syria.html.
14

affiliated Shia communities in neighboring states, such 

as Yemen and Kuwait.

While the United States and Turkey agreed in the 

initial stages of the Syrian Civil War that President 

Assad must go, neither side had figured out who 

would replace him, given the fluidity and shifting 

alliances among Syria’s warring factions. At one level 

stands the secular Free Syrian Army, comprised of 

defectors and rebels from within Syria’s armed forces. 

At another level are pro-al-Qaeda Nusra Front/Jabhat 

Fath al-Sham Syrian militias and ISIS fighters. At a 

third level are Syrian Kurdish militias, some of whom 

were aligned with Turkey’s old nemesis, the PKK, 

which the United States and Turkey consider a terrorist organization. Others, such as the Syrian Kurdish 

PYD militia, are tactically aligned with the PKK, but 

a small minority of them are strategically sympathetic 

to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Masoud 

Barzani clan in northern Iraq. The PYD was given a 

free hand by Assad, who allowed it to operate unchallenged as retaliation for Turkish and US support for 

the Syrian political and military Sunni factions. The 

PYD has been seeking autonomy in Syrian towns and 

villages such as Qamishli, Kobani, and Afrin, which 

formed a strategic, Kurdish, liberated belt from ISIS 

and other Syrian militias beginning in October 2014—

ironically with US air support, which Turkey resented. 

Although the PYD has not directly challenged the 

Assad regime, the latter’s overall strategy for Syria in 

the long term is to reestablish the total control over 

Syrian territory it enjoyed on the eve of the start of 

the civil war in 2011. Turkey sought to set up Sunni 

rival areas inside Syria, especially around Aleppo, 

to counter the Kurdish move because the presence 

of active pro-PKK Kurdish militias so close to the 
15

Turkish border was unacceptable. Turkey does not 

want the insurgent anti-Turkish Kurds to have a free 

hand inside Syria because it fears that such a presence 

could ultimately lead to more tangible demands for 

cultural and ethnic rights for the Kurds inside Turkey. 

The Turkish government since the time of Ataturk had 

objected categorically to the emergence of a Kurdish 

entity in the region, especially inside Turkey’s southeastern provinces.11

The Kurdish problem in Turkey goes to the heart 

of national identity and Turkish nationalism. The 

Kurds fared rather well under the Ottoman Empire by 

being left alone to practice their religious and cultural 

beliefs. Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, set out 

in 1923 to build a new national identity based solely on 

the idea of Turkishness. This concept simply replaced 

the more culturally tolerant, multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious aspects of the Ottoman Empire. 

The concept rejected minority rights for Greeks, Armenians, Alawis, and Kurds by establishing one national 

identity based on a state-driven secularism, unity of 

purpose, modern-day Turkish patriotism, and nationalism based on ethnic and national ties to old Central 

Asian tribes who invaded Asia Minor and ultimately 

succeeded in establishing the Ottoman dynasty in the 

fourteenth century AD.

Unlike the United States, Turkey’s primary driver 

of its foreign policy toward Syria is the Kurdish problem. Turkey will not tolerate the rise of a competing 

Kurdish national entity in Syria and Iraq so close to 

its predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces 

11. Robert Olson, “Denied a State, Winning a Region: Comparing Kurdish Nationalism After 1918 and 2003,” in The Kurdish 

Policy Imperative, ed. Robert Lowe and Gareth Stanfield (London, 

UK: Chatham House, 2010), 27–50.
16

for fear this might lead to calls for Kurdish autonomy 

and, ultimately, secession. Turkey fears dismemberment first and foremost when it comes to Greek and 

Kurdish demands for the return of lost rights and territories. This is the crux of the Armenian problem for 

Turkey. Unlike successive presidential administrations in Washington, Congress has been more sympathetic toward minority rights in Turkey, including 

for the Armenian, Kurdish, and Greek communities; 

this has been a source of continuing tension between 

the two NATO allies and continues to contribute to 

the misunderstanding of each side’s intentions and 

positions.

The ongoing Turkish-US-NATO tension and US 

and EU support for the PYD, the YPG, and the PKK in 

the quest to hold on to vast swaths of territory taken 

back from ISIS in 2017 in Syria and Iraq is part of two 

broader strategic trends inimical to Turkish interests. 

The first is US attempts to totally defeat ISIS by using 

Kurdish paramilitary units, avoiding full-scale US 

military troop deployment. Such a trend provokes an 

escalation of the PKK/PYD/YPG conflict with Turkish forces, aimed at getting the PYD to consolidate its 

presence in these territories, especially those along the 

Turkish borders west of the Euphrates River—areas 

contiguous to Kurdish border towns and villages 

inside Turkey. The second has to do with the mismatch between the standing US policy to focus and 

advance the anti-ISIS fight and the originally floated 

idea of elements within the US military advisor units 

in Syria to establish a Kurd-led security stabilization 

force of 30,000 fighters, thereby enabling de facto 

Kurdish autonomous enclaves inside Syria in Manbij, 

Kobani, and Raqqa, close to Turkey’s border areas 
17

with Syria.12 The scale of US support and military 

presence in Syria has guaranteed the Kurdish forces’ 

loyalty to the United States and is raising Syrian Kurdish expectations and calls for secession from Syria.

Turkey’s strategic interests in Syria have caused 

major tensions with the United States that, if not managed properly, are likely to continue and cause more 

permanent fissures. At the same time, Ankara and 

Washington have discussed the idea of setting up a 

predominantly Arab-led stabilization force in Syria as 

a hedge against any potential ISIS resurgence. Such 

plans are currently on hold because of the political 

tensions between the two nations.13

Turkey’s future military rules of engagement will 

most certainly favor containing Kurdish forces and 

associated militias, ending the de facto cover for the 

Kurdish rebels by the United States and its NATO 

partners. This scenario, however, could jeopardize the 

long-term fight against ISIS and other terrorist groups 

and could likely endanger the resilience of the current 

coalition against violent extremism in Syria and Iraq, 

where the United States retains a significant presence. 

But it would also have an adverse effect on the inner 

workings of NATO, a goal most satisfactory to America’s other adversaries, Russia and Iran. Similarly, 

12. Joanne Stocker, “Coalition Retraining 15,000 Veteran 

SDF Fighters to Serve as Syrian Border Force,” Defense Post, January 13, 2018, https://thedefensepost.com/2018/01/13/syria-border

-security-force-sdf-coalition/. This article also points out that the 

30,000-strong force will be partly composed of veteran fighters 

and operate under the leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces, 

according to the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent 

Resolve.

13. Ranking officers at the US Department of State (DoS), 

interview by the author, March 14, 2018; and ranking officers at 

the US Department of Defense (DoD), interview by the author, 

March 23, 2018.
18

Ankara’s intention to create a safe zone along the 

border stretching from Jarablus to Azaz inside Syria 

has become completely meaningless since the United 

States began backing the Kurd-dominated Arab democratic force. Preventing Syrian Kurds from controlling 

Syrian territory, which could in turn be used by more 

radical Kurdish elements against Turkish border 

towns and beyond, is the first priority for such a zone. 

Turkey believes this requires its continuous vigilance 

and the use of force against America’s Arab democratic 

force allies. Thus, the Turkish deployment of interceptor fighter jets in Syria can be explained only with one 

objective in mind—namely, to stop the United States 

from supporting the Arab democratic force and affiliated Kurdish militias. No other explanation is realistic, given that Turkish-sponsored, anti-Assad, Sunni 

militias, such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front/

Jabhat Fath al-Sham, the Free Syrian Army, and the 

Ahrar al-Sham, would not have had the wherewithal 

to carry on the fight without direct Turkish military 

backing. The eventual withdrawal of US military personnel from Syria, which would end direct support 

for the Syrian Kurdish militias, would also reduce tensions between Turkey and its NATO allies, including 

the United States. At the same time, however, Turkey 

must still contend with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah in 

Syria, all of which are adamant about restoring President Assad’s full control over all Syrian territory. 

Turkey may end up having to swallow a bitter pill, 

but at least it would have some say about the illogic 

of having a Syrian Kurdish enclave close to its border.

Turkey’s current problems with the United States 

stem from different priorities, which are in turn different from those of the US-led coalition against ISIS. 

Turkey may have opened its air bases to make coalition 
19

airstrikes on ISIS more efficient and less costly, but 

this does not mean that fighting ISIS has become a 

top priority for Erdogan and Turkey. Defeating ISIS is 

not and has never been a priority for Erdogan or his 

ruling AKP. President Erdogan, for instance, waited 

until September 25, 2014, to finally brand ISIS a terrorist group. In short, Erdogan is unhappy with US 

policies in Syria, which he sees as having in part led 

to a clear and present security breach on his southern 

border, interfered in his ability to defend his country, 

and inundated Turkey with over 3.5 million refugees, 

twice the number of refugees who flooded Europe in 

the last three years.

Deep strategic differences exist between the United 

States and Turkey over the future of the Assad regime. 

Turkey sees the current fight against ISIS as secondary 

to its long-term strategy of shaping the future of the 

greater Middle East and North Africa. On the surface, 

the end state for Turkey is a stable, secure, and friendly 

Syrian neighbor, but below is a carefully orchestrated 

plan to continue influencing domestic and regional 

Syrian and Arab dynamics. To do this right, Turkey 

will have to play a balance-of-power game based on 

placating Russia and Iran while keeping the United 

States at bay, as evidenced by its current involvement 

in the multiple cease-fire arrangements engineered by 

Russia and Iran in Astana, Kazakhstan; Sochi, Russia; 

and more recently, Ankara, Turkey.

THE GULEN AFFAIR

Turkey and its Western NATO allies, including 

the United States, at first touted Turkey’s miracle economic growth under the conservative Islamic AKP 

regime as a model to be emulated by other Islamic 
20

regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. President Obama made his first trip overseas as president 

when he arrived in Turkey on April 15, 2009. He gave 

a major speech there praising Turkey’s moderate form 

of Islam and stressed the United States was not at war 

with Muslims around the world. Eventually, Erdogan’s authoritarian overreaching tendencies in the 

form of continued violations of human and civil rights 

and suppression of freedom of speech and press in 

Turkey raised serious questions in the United States 

and in Western European circles about the negative 

direction of Turkish democracy.

The reaction of the AKP and its supporters to the 

July 2016 coup was swift and hard. Thousands of military officers were rounded up and then either dismissed, jailed, or put on trial. Secular Kemalist civilian 

government sympathizers, including liberal anti-AKP 

journalists, also met the same fate. More importantly, 

Erdogan accused his old partner, Fetullah Gulen—a 

reclusive, progressive, Turkish Muslim philosopher 

and theorist with vast followings in Turkey and 

around the world, and currently in self-imposed exile 

in Pennsylvania—with instigating the July 2016 coup. 

The two parted ways in 2010 after years of collaborating against the Turkish military. Gulen has denied 

any involvement and has surrounded himself with a 

strong defense of American lawyers and lobbyists in 

response. Gulen and his supporters were part of the 

AKP-led economic miracle between 2002 and 2010—a 

marriage of convenience in the form of the so-called 

Anatolian Tigers. The Tigers established successful 

business models in finance, banking, industry, agriculture, private charter schools, and universities throughout the world—especially in the United States under 

the Turkish-American Federation and its successor, 
21

the Turkic American Alliance, including the Rumi 

organization, with headquarters in Washington, DC, 

and chapters throughout the United States.14

The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 

Industrialists, the association of Turkic business and 

trade professionals, is a worldwide organization with 

a strong presence in Central Asia whose many members share an ethnic, religious, and cultural affinity to 

Turkey. But this success story extends to other continents, including Africa, the Middle East, South America, Europe, and North America.

The federation was a Gulen-affiliated, highly successful, Anatolian Tiger, manufacturing and agricultural model of development under the AKP that in 

turn fueled Turkey’s high economic rise between 2002 

and 2010. Members represented a new cadre of conservative and devout Muslim businessmen and businesswomen who were closely linked to Turkey’s banking, 

finance, and investment institutions worldwide—

hence, the federation’s growing prestige and influence under the AKP’s umbrella. The federation had 

a US headquarters office close to the White House in 

Washington and hosted some of the most prestigious 

conferences, where many members of both houses of 

Congress and other US government officials and associated stakeholders visited regularly. Gulen, a disciple 

of an Anatolian religious scholar, believed that Islam 

is compatible with and can coexist with the Western 

values of modernity and progress through rationalism, science, Western-style education, and interfaith 

14. The Turkic American Alliance web page lists dozens 

of such active chapters and associated chapters throughout the 

United States alone.
22

dialogue.15 A noted Turkish scholar, Omer Taspinar, 

argues Gulen and his supporters, unlike Erdogan’s 

AKP, did not seek an Islamist state in Turkey; rather, 

they sought to gradually transform the state in their 

image as a secular but conservative interfaith dialogue 

movement. He stressed that when Erdogan tried to 

rein in Gulen and his movement, they resisted and 

turned against him. Erdogan retaliated by closing 

their schools and nationalizing their lucrative and 

thriving businesses. In turn, Gulen and his followers 

responded by allegedly fueling a corruption scandal 

around Erdogan and his family starting in December 

2013.16

The increasing clout of Gulen and his followers in 

Turkey and elsewhere did not sit well with Erdogan 

since the former was viewed as a power rival. It was 

only a matter of time before the two would part ways, 

starting in 2010, but not materializing fully until after 

the attempted coup. Erdogan immediately demanded 

that the United States hand Gulen over to Turkey to 

stand trial for instigating and ordering the coup, a 

charge which Gulen fully denies. The US Department 

of Justice requested Turkey send concrete evidence of 

Gulen’s involvement in the coup, but the Turkish legal 

documents sent were either incomplete or inadequate 

for making a decision. Turkey has also accused the 

Gulen movement of being behind the assassination 

in Ankara of Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador, and has added this complaint to its US extradition request.17 Erdogan’s government unsuccessfully 

15. Omer Taspinar, “Panel Comments” (speech, The PolicyForum of the Washington Near East Institute, Washington, DC, 

July 13, 2017).

16. Taspinar, “Panel Comments.”

17. “US ‘Awaiting Evidence’ From Turkey over Gulen’s 

Links to Murder of Russian Envoy Karlov,” Hurriyet Daily News, 
23

urged both President Obama and President Trump 

to circumvent the US judicial process and expedite 

Gulen’s extradition. Obama and Trump both held 

firmly against any deal on Gulen, citing internal judicial procedures that must first be met by Turkey.

Erdogan has reacted negatively to the United 

States over the Gulen affair, arguing that the United 

States is being pressured by anti-Turkish Gulen supporters in Congress and elsewhere not to give in to 

Turkey’s demand by exaggerating Erdogan’s authoritarianism and his constant violation of human and 

civil rights and attacks on free press and speech.18

April 3, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-to-consider

-extraditing-gulen-over-murder-of-russian-envoy-karlov-justice

-department-spokesperson-129689.

18. Relations between Gulen and Erdogan began to rupture 

before July 2016, as outlined in the text over the growing political 

influence and power of Gulen over the Turkish political, economic, 

social, and security system. They actually started to unravel on 

May 31, 2010, following Gulen’s lukewarm reaction to the ill-fated 

attempt by a group of AKP humanitarian civilian sympathizers 

to ramp through an Israeli naval blockade off the Gaza Strip in 

an attempt to deliver medicine and other humanitarian supplies 

to the besieged strip. Gulen’s reaction to the MV Mavi Marmara 

flotilla incident was lukewarm in light of Erdogan’s strong public 

condemnation of Israel for the killing of 10 Turkish citizens on the 

boat (9 Israeli soldiers were injured in the confrontation, which 

took place in international waters just outside the Gaza Strip 

between the Turkish civilians on board and Israeli commandos 

who stormed the flotilla in an attempt to prevent it from crossing 

into Israeli waters). Erdogan demanded monetary compensation 

for the Turkish families affected by the Israeli attack, an apology 

from the Israeli government for the incident, and free movement 

of goods for humanitarian purposes through Israeli land checkpoints. Israel agreed to all of these demands after many years of 

secret negotiations. Joe Lauria, “Reclusive Turkish Imam Criticizes Gaza Flotilla,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2010, https://www

.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040253045752847212802

74694; and Nimrod Goren, “An Unfulfilled Opportunity for 
24

Erdogan reacted to the American rebuff by embarking 

on a series of extrajudicial actions of his own against 

alleged Gulen supporters, using his state-of-emergency powers granted to him by the Turkish Parliament and the public. As a result, Erdogan and his 

government set out to hunt down and arrest more 

alleged coup plotters and Gulen sympathizers, including US and Western European citizens.19

Turkey arrested a Turkish foreign service national 

working for the US consulate, Metin Topuz, in Istanbul in October 2017 for his alleged affiliation with 

Gulen. This prompted the United States to temporarily 

halt the issuance of travel visas to Turkish citizens in 

retaliation, although the visa issue was later resolved 

through diplomatic channels. Another Turkish citizen 

working at the US consular office in Adana, Turkey, 

was also imprisoned for alleged connections to Gulen.

Most notably, shortly after the attempted coup, 

Turkey detained an American pastor, Andrew Brunson, who had lived in Turkey for 23 years, and accused 

him of complicity with Gulen’s network to stir up 

Kurdish rebellions in Turkey in a quest to destabilize 

Reconciliation: Israel and Turkey during the Arab Spring,” Insight 

Turkey 14, no. 3 (January 2012), 121–35. Although Israel and 

Turkey have now settled the issue over the MV Mavi Marmara 

flotilla incident and returned their respective ambassadors to each 

other’s countries, signaling a return to normalcy, the honeymoon 

that existed between them before 2002 is all but over because 

of continued tensions over Gaza and alleged Israeli support for 

Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the region.

19. Erin Cunningham, “Turkey Says Its Global Dragnet 

Has Seized Dozens of Its Citizens in 18 Countries,” Washington 

Post, April 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey

-says-its-global-dragnet-has-seized-dozens-of-its-citizens-in-18

-countries/2018/04/05/3e4c144a-38d1-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story

.html.
25

the country. Erdogan has even suggested exchanging 

Brunson for Gulen.20

Brunson went on trial near Izmir on Monday, 

April 16, 2018, and fully denied allegations that he 

was involved in terrorist acts in Turkey or had tried 

to convert Sunni Muslim Kurds to Christianity. The 

Washington Post ran a short digest on the pending 

trial in its morning edition on the day the trial started 

and pointed out the legal defense fees for Brunson’s 

trial were funded by Pat Robertson’s Christian organization, the American Center for Law and Justice, 

a conservative Christian group in the United States. 

The organization, which called Brunson a “hostage 

of the Turkish government,” collected more than half 

a million signatures on a petition, claiming the case 

was putting Christianity on trial and thus provoking Turkey with perceived religious divisions. Press 

reports from Turkey said the Turkish judge presiding 

over the Brunson trial denied bail after the hearing, 

citing the potential of his flight from Turkey. The Brunson case has moved US-Turkish relations to newly 

heightened tensions after he was ordered to be transferred from jail to house arrest by an Istanbul court on 

July 25, 2018. The reason tensions continued between 

the two sides after the release of Brunson from jail and 

his transfer to house arrest is because the US government expected him to be released and remanded to 

the United States, not held in a house arrest status.

The United States has since insisted on his release 

and return to his home country, but Turkey has 

20. “America and Turkey Stop Issuing Visas,” Al-Hayat, 

October 8, 2017, 1; and Barbara G. Baker, “Turkey: Date Set 

for Trial of US Pastor Andrew Brunson,” World Watch Monitor, March 21, 2018, https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2018/03

/turkey-date-set-trial-us-pastor-andrew-brunson/.
26

refused, citing similar judicial constraints surrounding its request for Gulen’s extradition to Turkey. As a 

result, the United States levied sanctions against two 

Turkish government ministers. Turkey followed suit 

and threatened to freeze assets in Turkey allegedly 

belonging to two unidentified US cabinet secretaries.21

The question remains whether relations between 

Turkey and the United States—who signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2018 that met a persistent Turkish demand to redeploy of YPG Kurdish 

militia from Manbij—and the start of joint military 

US-Turkish security patrols are now in jeopardy as a 

result of the Brunson standoff. All indications are the 

Brunson case is on hold pending further diplomatic 

exchanges. The standoff may ultimately include an 

exchange of prisoners held or convicted by both sides. 

It is unlikely, however, any such deal would result in 

the extradition of Gulen.22

21. Adam Goldman and Gardiner Harris, “US Imposes Sanctions on Turkish Officials over Detention of American Detained 

Pastor,” New York Times, August 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes

.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/us-sanctions-turkey-pastor.html.

22. “Imprisoned American Pastor Andrew Brunson Rejects 

Terror Charges in Turkey Trial,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 

16, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/imprisoned-american

-pastor-andrew-brunson-rejects-terror-charges-in-turkey-trial-130365; 

“Andrew Brunson, US Pastor, Moved to House Arrest in Turkey,” 

New York Times, July 25, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/world

/middleeast/andrew-brunson-turkey.html; “Turkey Ministers Shrug 

Off US Sanctions Targeting Them,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 

2, 2018, 1; Carol Morello and Shibani Mahtani, “Pompeo Warns 

Turkey Clock Has Run Out to Release Jailed US Pastor,” Washington Post, August 3, 2018, A-8; “Turkey to Freeze Assets of 

Two US Cabinet Secretaries As Retaliation to Sanctions: Erdogan,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 4, 2018, 1; “Kurdish Forces to 

Withdraw from Syria’s Manbij under US-Turkey Deal,” France 

24, June 6, 2018, www.france24.com/en/20180606-manbij-militia

-kurdish-ypg-syria-turkey-usa-assad; Karen De Young, “Senior US, 
27

The US Department of State (DoS) has asked 

Turkey to stop playing “hostage politics” with Brunson and other Western nationals. “We have seen no 

credible evidence that Mr. Brunson is guilty of a crime 

and are convinced that he is innocent,” said State 

Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert on April 

16, 2018.23 This phrase has been echoed by Brunson’s 

supporters and the Trump administration, including 

Vice President Pence, who has taken a special interest 

in the Brunson case given his evangelical leanings.24

ERDOGAN AND THE POWER REFERENDUM

Another irritant in US-Turkish-NATO relations 

is the Turkish state of emergency still in place since 

the failed coup attempt in July 2016. According to 

US officials, Erdogan is structurally altering the traditionally secular and pro-Western-leaning political 

dynamics of Turkey’s political system to bolster his 

presidential power under the pretext of national security and threats to Turkey from outside the country. 

His effort to codify these powers in a national referendum gained more traction following its narrow 51 

percent passage on April 16, 2017.25 The outcome gave 

Turkish Officials to Meet over Dispute about Minister’s Detention,” Washington Post, August 7, 2018, A-2; and Zeynep Bilginsoy 

and Mehmet Guzel, “US Pastor Faces Terror Charges in Fraught 

Trial in Turkey,” Associated Press, April 15, 2018, https://www

.apnews.com/67d9fb2227d9444f9b0fc92e52362625.

23. Heather Nauert, “Department Press Briefing” (speech, 

DoS, Washington, DC, July 18, 2018); ranking officers at the DoS; 

and Heather Nauert, “Department Press Briefing” (speech, DoS, 

Washington, DC, April 16, 2018).

24. Ranking officers at the DoS.

25. Alexandra Topping, “Turkey Referendum: Erdogan Wins 

Vote Amid Dispute Over Ballots—As It Happened,” Guardian, 
28

Erdogan additional powers over the Turkish armed 

forces, the cabinet, judges, and prosecutors, whom 

Erdogan has accused of siding with Gulen in the past.

Support for the referendum was not strong, even 

among Erdogan’s supporters. Major urban centers in 

Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, traditionally AKP strongholds, all voted against the referendum. With only 51 

percent in favor, the results indicated (1) a surprising 

dissension within the AKP’s rank-and-file supporters; (2) continuing fragmentation and divisions within 

Turkey’s political parties; (3) a continuing public perception that the AKP actually lost the popular vote 

on the referendum; and (4) Turkey was moving farther away from the democratic EU, so its chances of 

joining the EU may be lost, even if they were unlikely 

anyway. Erdogan believes the presidential and parliamentary elections that took place on June 24, 2018, 

gave him the full mandate he sought to consolidate 

his grip on power and achieve his overall political 

dream of keeping his domestic and foreign political 

enemies weak and disorganized. This guarantees him 

the opportunity to remain in power at least until 2023, 

the important anniversary of the establishment of the 

Turkish republic, successor to the Ottoman Empire. 

He won 52.5 percent of the popular vote, and his AKP 

won 53.6 percent, the highest percentages since 2002. 

In sum, the June 24, 2018, elections and national referendum went Erdogan’s way. As a result, the AKP and 

Erdogan today feel vindicated, empowered, and willing to take more political risks, as he is currently doing 

with the standoff with the United States.

In the meantime, the United States continues 

to view Turkey as moving closer each day toward 

April 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/16

/turkey-referendum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-votes-presidential-powers.
29

dictatorship through public referendums and violations of democratic norms. Officials within the US 

interagency system have stressed Erdogan is successfully creating a structural problem domestically by 

eliminating any semblance of accountability and oversight. There are no checks on the president’s power 

any longer—a sure sign democracy in Turkey is on 

the wane. Erdogan responds by using scare tactics to 

mobilize the vast majority of his supporters against 

the United States.

His ardent AKP supporters point out that Erdogan 

was responsible for the 8–9 percent annual economic 

growth between 2002 and 2011, which brought Turkey 

unprecedented prosperity and global influence. 

Turkey, they argue, has continued to be a target of 

conspiracies and territorial dismemberment by great 

powers ever since it lost the Great War because of its 

ill-fated alliance with Germany in 1914.

Erdogan is simply continuing the legacy of Ataturk, who was favored by many Western powers, 

including the United States, for his neutrality in World 

War II and for laying the foundation of secularism 

that has since become the hallmark of Turkey’s political system. Erdogan—like Ataturk—invokes Turkish 

nationalism and Ottoman-style revivalism along with 

a strong centralized leadership to protect Turkey’s 

territorial integrity and sovereignty against outsiders, 

allies, and foes alike. The difference between Ataturk 

and Erdogan is the latter rose to power with the help 

of conservative, Muslim, grassroots, Anatolian-based 

farmers and lower- and lower-middle-class city dwellers. These groups had long been disenfranchised and 

politically alienated from the political and economic 

Kemalist military and the economic elite Ataturk created to safeguard his newly founded secular republic.
30

Turkish Islamic identity helped Ataturk establish 

his liberal system of governance because his society 

followed the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, 

the most liberal of all four orthodox Sunni schools. 

This may be one of the reasons why Turkey—unlike 

Iran—can never become a theocracy. It is worth noting 

Turkish secularism did not mean the end of religion as 

a fact of life in Turkish society; rather, it was an effort 

by the Kemalists to bring Islam under direct and total 

control of the state.

Erdogan wants to fuse Kemalist, secular, nationalist ideas with Islamic and Ottoman ones, drawing 

heavily on Ottoman history and culture, unlike Ataturk. Erdogan understands Kemalist secular ideas 

remain a potent force among at least half of Turkey’s 

voting society, and he uses his co-optation skills to bolster his legitimacy as the true embodiment of Ataturk’s 

nationalist legacy. This style of leadership is authoritarian and autocratic. It embodies strength and decisiveness and plays to specific segments of the Turkish 

public. In the case of Kemal, it was directed in favor of 

secular, nonreligious, minority elements. In the case of 

Erdogan, it favors a conservative Islamic constituency 

that has managed to keep Erdogan’s political party in 

power since 2002 through the ballot box.

Erdogan is also careful not to challenge Ataturk’s 

style of leadership in public for that reason. Ironically, 

Erdogan often denies he is building a new authoritarian Islamic system in Turkey, saying that Turkish 

voters can at any time deny him and his political party 

power by voting against them in periodic and snap 

local and national elections.

Erdogan often uses other forms of scare tactics and 

conspiracy theories to keep his most ardent supporters in line and to reinforce his hold on power. He gave 
31

a major policy speech on November 8, 2017, in which he 

warned his countrymen that Turkey is going through the 

most sensitive phase of its existence since independence 

in 1923. He said the events over the last five years indicate 

Turkey faced domestic- and foreign-hatched conspiracies 

using terror organizations and threats to strike at the heart 

of the Turkish state and pride. His attacks on the Turkish 

press have also been severe, all in the name of protecting 

national security and territorial integrity.26

THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

A major current irritant in US-Turkish-NATO relations is Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia, which has 

evolved since the Syrian Civil War. Historically, Russia 

and Turkey have had a contentious relationship, as the 

Muslim Ottoman Empire bordered Russia in the predominantly Muslim Caucasus region and challenged Russia’s 

26. “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Pugnacious President,” BBC 

News, June 24, 2017; Mark Lowen, “Erdogan’s Turkey,” BBC News, April 

13, 2017; “Erdogan Considers Turkey Going Through Its Most Sensitive 

Phases since Independence,” Al-Hayat, November 8, 2017; Aley Cinar, 

“The Justice and Development Party: Turkey’s Experience with Islam, 

Democracy, Liberalism, and Secularism,” International Journal of Middle 

East Studies 43, no. 3 (August 2011): 529–41; and “Attacks on the Record: 

The State of Global Press Freedom, 2017–2018,” Freedom House, 

2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/attacks-record-state

-global-press-freedom-2017-2018. This study points out that Turkey 

“remained the world’s worst jailer of journalists, with 73 behind bars 

as of December, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. The 

government permanently blocked Wikipedia in late April 2017, and 

17 journalists from an opposition newspaper were tried on charges of 

aiding a terrorist organization. Following the June 24, 2018, successful 

AKP-sponsored referendum on changing the Turkish Constitution to 

a presidential system, President Erdogan ordered the dismissal of over 

8,000 public officials, academics, journalists, and police and military 

officers. Associated Press, “Turkey Fires Thousands of State Employees in Anti-Terror Purges,” Guardian, July 8, 2018, 1.
32

hegemony in the Balkans and elsewhere. As Turkey 

realized the Assad regime could not be toppled 

because of Russia’s military support and as a result of 

the US shift in strategy toward defeating ISIS, a tactical realignment between Russia and Turkey became 

more attractive. The catalyst was the November 28, 

2015, downing of a Russian all-weather SU-24 aircraft 

close to Turkey’s border by a Turkish F-16 warplane 

using American-made air-to-air missiles. Russian 

President Vladimir Putin condemned Turkey’s action 

and denied the Russian aircraft had penetrated Turkish airspace. He subsequently demanded an apology 

and immediately ordered a boycott of Turkish goods 

and services, including trade and tourism, a major 

source of national income for Turkey.27

The downed Russian jet had just completed a 

bombing sortie against pro-Turkish Syrian rebels. The 

Russian plane crashed in the mountainous Jabal Turkmen area of the Syrian province of Latakia, which is 

contested by the Syrian government and Syrian rebel 

militia. Erdogan stressed that shooting down the Russian jet was fully in-line with Turkey’s rules of engagement and defense posture, which were put in place 

after Syria shot down a Turkish jet in 2012. These rules 

state all unauthorized flying “elements” approaching 

from Syria are considered hostile aircraft.

The Russian boycott of Turkey was gradually 

lifted, but not before it took a major toll on the Turkish economy, which has been heavily dependent on 

Russia since at least 2005. Russian sanctions affected 

Turkish tourism, construction firms, and food exports 

after Russia banned the import of Turkish fruit, 

27. “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane on Syrian 

Border,” BBC News, November 24, 2015, https://www.bbc.com

/news/world-middle-east-34907983.
33

vegetables, poultry, and salt, the sale of Turkish charter holidays to Russians, and construction projects 

with Turkish firms in Russia unless a special exemption was granted. More importantly, Russia halted 

talks about building nuclear power plants in Turkey 

originally designed to improve Turkish energy capacity, which was heavily dependent on outside sources.

Russia suspended work on TurkStream, a new 

Black Sea pipeline that was to bolster Russian gas 

imports to Turkey at a time when Turkey imported 

about 53–55 percent of its gas from Russia. Russia also 

imposed restrictions on Turkish citizens working for 

companies registered in Russia and on exchange students studying in both countries. The Russian boycott 

risked Turkey losing $3.5 billion annually in income 

from Russian tourists, $4.5 billion annually through 

the cancellation of construction projects, and 20 percent of trade. Moreover, the declining value of the 

Russian ruble caused Turkish businessmen another 

60 percent loss in revenues because Turkish goods 

became more expensive in Russia. Turkey was forced 

to look for new markets to make up these huge losses, 

so it turned to Iran and African countries, where competition with China was fierce. It was only a matter of 

time before Turkey was forced to use its traditional 

political economy and soft-power approach to resolve 

its standoff with Russia.28

Today, Russia’s relations with Turkey have dramatically improved, as evidenced by the record 4.7 

million Russian tourists who visited Turkey in 2017 

28. Selin Girit, “Turkey Faces Big Losses as Russia Sanctions Bite,” BBC News, January 2, 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world

-europe-35209987; and Gulmira Rzayeva, Gas Supply Changes in 

Turkey (Oxford, UK: Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, 2018), 

1–19.
34

and the April 3, 2018, symbolic inauguration of a 

groundbreaking ceremony for Turkey’s first nuclear 

power plant on the Mediterranean coast at Akkuyu 

despite some remaining technical glitches. The deal 

is the result of a joint-venture economic and energy 

partnership with Russia’s atomic energy conglomerate, Rosatom, which holds 51 percent to Turkey’s 49 

percent stake in the joint venture. Turkey also has the 

option of building nine more nuclear power plants 

with Russia. Akkuyu is slated to provide 10 percent of 

Turkey’s electricity needs when in full operation.29

Turkey, Iran, and Russia have also been moving 

closer together on a peace plan for Syria as part of the 

so-called Astana process between the Assad regime 

and his disparate Syrian rebel rivals, which runs 

counter to the US-, NATO-, and UN-supported peace 

talks in Geneva, Switzerland. The Geneva talks have 

stalled because of deep divisions among all players. 

Turkey insists on fully excluding the US-supported 

Syrian Democratic Forces and their Kurdish YPG and 

PKK affiliates, preventing them from gaining legitimacy for their causes at the peace table in Geneva. 

The Russian-sponsored Astana process aims to satisfy Turkey’s veto against Kurdish participation in 

any peace talks while the Geneva Peace Talks keep 

the door open for a Kurdish role in the final outcome 

of Syria’s Civil War. The Kurds hold large swaths of 

Syrian territory won from ISIS in 2017 with help from 

the US-led NATO military coalition. Both the Astana 

29. “Russia Starts Building Turkey’s First Nuclear Power 

Plant,” World Nuclear News, April 3, 2018, http://www.world

-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia-starts-building-Turkeys-first-nuclear

-power-plant-03041801.html.
35

process and the Geneva Peace Talks have been ongoing since 2012.30

Russia insists that Astana is not a substitute to the 

Geneva talks, but something that could help move 

them both forward, especially because the Geneva 

track has stalled. A high-level summit between Presidents Rouhani of Iran, Putin, and Erdogan on April 

4, 2018, in Ankara to discuss Syria was designed to 

convey unity of purpose, but, in reality, was a photo 

op that achieved little progress. Turkey’s relations 

with Russia and Iran, although driven by energy and 

economic factors, are justified by Ankara on the basis 

Turkey must engage with all of its neighbors to keep 

an eye on their regional intentions and capabilities, 

especially in regard to national security issues affecting Turkey and for economic reasons that directly 

impact its survival. Turkey simply wants to maintain 

its open-door policy to bolster its vital and growing 

trade relations with Tehran and Moscow and to elicit 

their help in resolving frozen and protracted conflicts 

in Turkey’s region, especially in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

30. “Russia’s Lavrov, FM Cavusoglu to Discuss Planned 

Four-Way Syria Summit,” Daily Sabah, August 13, 2018, 2. Though 

it is contrary to US strategic goals, Turkey’s desired outcome from 

the Astana process is an uncertain and precarious alliance among 

Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Turkey’s strategy in this alliance is to 

leverage as much political concessions and influence as possible should a political settlement on Syria emerge in the future. 

The United States has been attempting to achieve similar objectives through the Geneva Peace Talks, but with a strategic outcome more favorable to the Western nation. The peace talks have 

been stalemated over the Syrian regime’s refusal to recognize 

the political rights and grievances of the Turkish-backed Syrian 

rebel delegation, which the Damascus regime continues to label 

as a terrorist group. The Syrian regime’s bellicose reaction, which 

has been ongoing since the uprising began in 2011, is designed to 

render the rebel political cause illegitimate.
36

and Georgia. Turkey’s strategic perspective toward 

Russia and Iran revolves around remaining relevant 

and keeping an eye on what they are doing in the 

region. Turkey does not want to be drawn into an 

Arab-Iranian, sectarian, Sunni-Shia, religious conflict. 

Turkey is concerned about Iran but does not want 

to confront it given current peaceful coexistence and 

extensive bilateral trade ties since at least the beginning of the twentieth century.

Turkey, Russia, and Iran continue to exhibit divergent, strategic objectives in Syria on the final status 

of President Assad of Syria as well as on the NATO 

and US retaliation against Syrian chemical facilities 

on April 14, 2018. Iran and Russia condemned the air 

attacks, but Turkey did not, saying more is needed to 

punish Assad for his use of chemical weapons against 

his civilian population in Douma, near Damascus.31

Russia went as far as denying any culpability in the 

chemical attack on Douma or the use of chemical 

agents prior to the NATO-US retaliatory air strikes.

The new Russian ambassador in Ankara repeated 

the denial chemical agents were used and said the 

accusations were nothing more than a propaganda 

campaign against Russia. The ambassador also denied 

Russia’s culpability in the nerve-gas attack on a retired 

KGB agent and his daughter living in Salisbury, 

31. “Turkey Welcomes US-Led Strikes Targeting Assad 

Regime in Syria,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 15, 2018, 1. According to this article, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, “The Syrian regime, which has been tyrannizing its 

own people for more than seven years, be it with conventional or 

chemical weapons, has a proven track record of crimes against 

humanity and [other] war crimes.” This statement came only a 

week after the much-publicized presidential Ankara summit 

between Erdogan, Rouhani, and Putin.
37

England.32 The Organization for the Prohibition of 

Chemical Weapons issued an interim fact-finding 

mission report on July 6, 2016, saying it did not find 

evidence of chemical use in Douma on April 7, 2018, 

or in Al-Hamdaniya or Karam al-Tarrab on October 

30, 2016, and November 13, 2016, respectively. In an 

earlier report, the organization confirmed the use of a 

chemical agent in the Salisbury attack but could not 

pinpoint its source.33

One of the most controversial problems facing 

Turkey-US-NATO relations, however, centers on the 

proposed sale and transfer of the Russian S-400 missile to Turkey. Turkey signed an accord with Russia 

in December 2017 to supply it with the S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries, hoping this was a first 

step toward an eventual joint venture to produce 

the missile in Turkey. The S-400 Triumph is based 

on an earlier Russian S-300 version, but reportedly 

32. Ali Unal, “Interview with New Russian Ambassador to 

Turkey, Aleksey Yerhov: Bilateral Relations Based on Win-Win 

Principle,” Daily Sabah, April 16, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.

com/diplomacy/2018/04/16/russian-ambassador-to-ankara-aleksey

-yerhov-turkey-russia-bilateral-relations-based-on-win-win-principle; 

and Malik Kaylan, “The Summit Meeting in Ankara Between 

Russia, Turkey, and Iran: What It Means For The Region,” Forbes, 

April 6, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2018/04/06

/the-summit-meeting-in-ankara-between-russia-turkey-iran-what-it

-means-for-the-region/#50d20a2515eb.

33. “OPC Issues Fact Finding Mission Report on Chemical Weapons Use Allegations in Douma, Syria in 2018 and in 

Al-Hamadaniya and Karm Al Tarrab in 2016,” Organization for 

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, July 6, 2018, https://www

.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2018/07/opcw-issues-fact-finding

-mission-reports-chemical-weapons-use-allegations; and “Chemical 

Watchdog Confirms UK Findings on Salisbury Nerve Agent,” UN 

News, April 18, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1007642.
38

has more sophisticated electronic gear capabilities.34

Both NATO and the United States oppose this sale 

to Turkey on political and technical grounds. On the 

surface and politically, the Turkey-Russia deal sends 

a message that Turkey is abandoning its commitment 

to stay within NATO—a major complaint in the US 

Congress—but technically, it raises many important 

issues concerning interoperability and weapon and 

doctrine integration within existing and future NATO 

military platforms as well as trust issues regarding 

whether NATO’s secret weapon systems and platforms would be compromised due to Turkey’s bend 

toward Russia.35 Moreover, Turkey is using the S-400 

issue to press the United States and NATO to support 

its evolving anti-Kurdish strategy in the region as a 

whole. In a major policy speech on March 27, 2018, 

Turkey’s Defense Minister, Nurettin Canikli, tried to 

deflect Western and US criticisms over Turkey’s quest 

to purchase the S-400 system, pointing out the Russian missile deal does not compete with other US and 

NATO platforms, including the proposed sale of the 

American F-35 fighter jet to Turkey. Ironically, the US 

Senate voted on July 24, 2018, to delay delivery of the 

coveted F-35 jets to Turkey by a vote of 87 to 10, perhaps in retaliation for Turkey’s perceived departure 

34. David Brennan, “What Is the S-400? The Russian Anti-Aircraft Weapon Dividing NATO,” Newsweek, March 12, 2018, www

.newsweek.com/what-s400-russian-anti-aircraft-weapon-nato-840046.

35. “Russia behind US-Turkey Tensions, US General Claims,” 

Sabah Daily, March 14, 2018. A commander of the Kurdish YPG, 

the leading Kurdish militia within the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, stated that “Russia betrayed the Kurds.” Russia’s 

relationship with the Kurds has never been based on long-term, 

strategic cooperation. On the contrary, throughout its history, 

Moscow has used the Kurdish card only when it needed to reach 

a compromise with the countries in the Middle East.
39

from its traditional Western and US strategic and 

operational commitments.36

On the surface, the issue of the S-400 sale to Turkey 

appears straightforward as far as Turkey is concerned, 

but it is not. According to interviews with officials 

from the Departments of State and Defense in March 

2018, Turkey has tried to convince the United States 

and its NATO allies to allow it full control and joint 

production of the equivalent Patriot missile system. 

This would require transferring highly guarded technical secrets and special codes associated with manufacturing the American Patriot missile platform 

system to Turkey.

Turkey hopes a joint US-Turkish-NATO venture 

to manufacture the Patriot in Turkey would add to 

its growing arms sales industry as well as its regional 

and global prestige and influence. NATO and the 

United States have rejected the Turkish demand but 

seem to be seeking other ways to satisfy Turkey’s 

quest to enhance its technical arms superiority while 

keeping it within NATO’s collective defense and security frameworks. In the meantime, Russia and Turkey 

are still negotiating the S-400 terms, and it is not clear 

whether Russia will follow suit in refusing to share 

highly guarded technical data for the S-400 system 

with Turkey or any other state.

NATO, the United States, and Russia want to keep 

Turkey dependent on them for weapon platform 

purchases and as a means to manage their separate 

36. “Purchase of Russian S-400 Does Not Affect Purchase of 

American F-35,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 27, 2018, 1; Ranking 

officers at the DoS; Ranking officers at the DoD; “US Senate 

Approves Decision to Delay Delivery of the F-35 Jets to Turkey,” 

Daily Sabah, August 2, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/

defense/2018/08/02/us-senate-approves-decision-to-delay-delivery-of

-f-35-jets-to-turkey.
40

relations with Ankara. Russia in particular fears that 

Turkey may end up selling the S-400 weapon system 

to Russia’s nemeses, Ukraine, Georgia, and Afghanistan, which it seems would upset the regional balance of power and upend frozen conflicts at Russia’s 

expense.

Nevertheless, Russia has embarked on a major 

public relations charm campaign since December 2017, 

despite the conflict between Turkey and itself over the 

most important, remaining, divisive, political issue—

namely, the long-term fate of President Assad. Turkey 

still wants Assad to be removed from office, but Russia 

insists on keeping him in place. Russia’s charm offensive seems to be softening the country’s relations with 

Turkey. A year after the 2016 assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara, Turkey-Russia relations 

have improved markedly.37

Turkey’s original, short-term aim to acquire 

the S-400 is linked to its quest to develop a reliable 

surface-to-air missile system because of its current 

combat-ready pilot shortages. This means the Russian 

missile would be deployed in place of its fighter aircraft as a temporary measure until perhaps new pilots 

were fully trained and ready for deployment in theater 

operations. The main challenge Turkey would face in 

deploying the S-400 is “interoperability with existing 

NATO integrated air and missile defense systems.”38

37. Ali Unal, “Interview with Russian Ambassador.” In 

addition to thanking the Russian president for Russia’s UN vote 

against the US resolution to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv 

to Jerusalem in December 2017, Erdogan made a similar gesture 

toward the Vatican. “Erdogan, Pope Francis Back Jerusalem’s 

Status during Vatican Talks,” Daily Sabah, February 5, 2018, 1.

38. For an excellent assessment of Turkey’s multilevel 

challenges of integrating its S-400 system, see Can Kasapoglu, 
41

TURKEY’S EVOLVING ARMED FORCES

As the United States and NATO reach a critical 

juncture in their relationship with Turkey, it is worth 

pointing out that Turkey, despite its NATO membership, has been the odd man out. Despite its sacrifices 

during the Cold War to serve transatlantic interests 

against communism in the Middle East, the Korean 

Peninsula, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, Turkey never 

felt it got the appreciation or credit it deserved from 

its NATO partners. This can be attributed to three factors. The first is historical factors related to the former 

Muslim caliphate (the Ottoman Empire) and its troubled relationship with the West beginning in the early 

nineteenth century and ending with the loss of its 

empire following its defeat by Allied forces during 

the Great War. The Armenian Genocide, the War of 

Greek Independence, and the fate of Turkey’s Greek 

minorities did not help improve Turkey’s image 

despite efforts by the founder of the modern Turkish 

republic to mend fences with Europe through neutrality and friendship arrangements before and during 

the Second World War and its aftermath. Second, 

Turkey has cultural and religious differences with its 

NATO partners. The more Turkey tried to integrate 

within the European cultural theater, the more it was 

shunned. The United States tried as an honest broker 

to support Turkey’s inclusion in Western Europe to 

safeguard NATO and preserve its collective security 

mission against Soviet, and later Russian, penetration and aggression. Finally, the nature of the Turkish 

“Turkey’s S-400 Dilemma,” EDAM Centre for Economics and 

Foreign Policy Studies, July 1, 2017; and Nurlam Aliev, “Russia’s 

Arms Sales: A Foreign Policy Tool in Relations with Azerbaijan 

and Armenia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 47 (March 20, 2018).
42

military under the new republic in 1923 and beyond 

sets Turkey apart. Until 2002, the secular Turkish military controlled the civilian democratic process and 

saw itself as the guardian of Kemalist ideas against 

mostly domestic enemies of the state—namely, unruly 

Turkish political parties bent on political violence to 

achieve domestic political ends as well as political 

Islam. It was not unusual, however, for the Turkish 

military to use Islam against extreme leftist ideologies 

during the Cold War to keep both sides off-balance.

Turkish secularism under its founder, Ataturk, 

resembled the French laïcité system (referred to as 

“Liklik” in Turkey) of preventing the influence of religion in political matters.39 Due to domestic, public 

pressures after Ataturk’s death in 1938, however, the 

state coopted Islamic institutions and clerics through 

Diyanat, Turkey’s religious foundation, especially in 

rural areas where Islam remained entrenched. Religion thereby came under the direct control of the state, 

transforming the previous total separation between 

the state and society at large. Thus, starting in the 

1950s, religion and Islam in particular were managed 

by the Kemalist military not as a theocracy, but as a 

vehicle for the political mobilization of secularized 

institutions under Western-oriented military rule and 

as a hedge against extreme political movements left 

39. Ahmet Kuru and Alfred Stepan, Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 

4–5, 102–111. This reference refers directly to the concept of laïcité

and its application in Turkey. For additional discussion of secularism and Islam in Turkey following the establishment of the 

Turkish republic, see Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 65–69; Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New 

York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 42–43; and Andrew Finkel, 

Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
43

and right of center. Even today, the fine line between 

religion and state remains more or less unchanged. 

In short, laïcité in Turkey has been anything but rigidly practiced. Islam under the Turkish system, while 

a central part of the fabric of Turkish society, must 

always be controlled and managed by the state and its 

predominantly secular institutions.

The Turkish state controls the religious institutions and Muslim clerics in Turkey, including the 

Imam Hatip schools and associated foundations. This 

system started under Ataturk, but continues to this 

day. Under Kemalism, the government maintained 

full control over religious affairs through Diyanat as 

well as over all ethnic and religious minorities by the 

military-dominated National Security Council that 

oversaw the day-to-day ruling of the state through 

state-of-emergency proclamations, constitutional declarations, and military coups from 1960 until 2002.

This state of affairs did not sit well with Turkey’s 

Western allies within NATO or the United States, 

who advocated more transparent and liberal democratic practices, including full civilian control over the 

military. But this was overlooked during most of the 

Cold War in favor of preserving Turkey’s active support and membership within NATO against the Soviet 

Union.40

The closest Turkey came to resolving these contentious issues was in 2002 with the rise of Erdogan 

and his AKP. For over 10 years under AKP leadership, 

Turkey enjoyed a honeymoon with Europe and the 

United States. The military, however, lost power to 

the civilians through the ballot box and was severely 

purged and weakened. As a result, the United States 

40. Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 180–97; Kinzer, Crescent 

and Star, 213–28; and Finkel, Turkey, 68–105.
44

and NATO touted Turkey’s moderate Islam as a 

model to be emulated by Muslims throughout the 

Middle East and North Africa. The honeymoon was 

precarious at best.

Turkey’s differences with Western NATO allies 

intensified following the Arab popular uprisings of 

2011 over strategic and operational issues. Strategically, Turkey wanted to avoid the economic and 

security fallout of regime change that NATO and the 

United States favored. Instead, it gravitated toward 

bringing about internal political reform through its 

support for domestic pressure groups and antiregime 

militia. Operationally, Turkey was worried about 

losing control of the fluid situations following military interventions by NATO and other outside players, citing the instability following the overthrow of 

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein’s 

regime in Iraq, and the Gadhafi regime in Libya.

At the same time, Erdogan set out to weaken his 

domestic political opponents, but the increasingly 

authoritarian nature of his policies and his effort to 

idolize Islam as a great religion did not sit well in 

Western Europe and the United States, who were reeling from a spike in al-Qaeda- and ISIS-inspired terror 

attacks. Turkish officers within NATO were instructed 

to challenge their European counterparts on the use 

of the term “Islamic terrorism,” which caused a great 

deal of tension between the traditionally professional, 

nonpoliticized NATO officers.41

41. This is based on the author’s firsthand observation of 

the contentious debate between NATO officers detailed to the 

NATO Intelligence Center in the UK on the propriety of linking 

the word “Islam” with terrorist activities. Turkish officers were 

instructed by their government to challenge their Western European NATO allied officers’ counterparts on this issue and to insist 

on developing a neutral definitional lexicon to be used in NATO 
45

More importantly for NATO and the EU, Erdogan’s 

neo-Ottoman nationalist synthesis couched in Turkish 

Islamic national slogans and agitation in Western European capitals did not fare well. Tensions have risen in 

many Western European capitals, including Germany, 

Austria, and the Netherlands, since the spring of 2017 

over the Turkish government’s insistence on holding 

large rallies of its supporters in Europe against Gulen 

and the Kurdish PKK-led insurgency in Syria and 

Iraq. In response, EU officials refused to issue permits 

for the rallies and Turkish officials, including Foreign 

Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, were barred from traveling to deliver rally speeches.42

The EU promised to restart coveted accession 

talks with Turkey for EU membership in 2005, only to 

intelligence publications for the definition of “terrorism,” free 

from any religious, Islamic connotation. The author was invited 

to lead a series of seminars to help bridge the cultural and linguistic differences between Western European and Turkish officers detailed to the center in the UK; Julian E. Barnes and David 

Gauthier-Villars, “NATO Apologizes for Offending Turkey,” Wall 

Street Journal, November 17, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/nato

-apologizes-for-offending-turkey-1510941321; “Looking at the map 

is enough to see Turkey’s importance NATO Secretary General 

Jens Stoltenberg Says,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 30, 2018; “Jihad 

Not Related to Terrorism, Turkish FM Davutoglu Says,” Hurriyet 

Daily News, February 18, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com

/jihad-not-related-to-terrorism-turkish-fm-davutoglu-says-41322; and 

“Turkey Slams EU’s Top Diplomat over Afrin Remarks,” Hurriyet 

Daily News, March 19, 2018.

42. Oren Dorell and John Bacon, “Turkey’s President Says 

‘Nazism is Alive in the West,’” USA Today, March 13, 2017, 3-A; 

and Omer Taspinar, “The End of the Turkish Model,” Survival 56, 

no. 2 (April-May 2014): 49–64. For a detailed analysis of the AKP 

model, see Natalie Tocci et al., Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective, 

German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 31, 2011, 

18–21.
46

declare once again that Turkey was no longer being 

considered for membership. Repeated US pressure 

on the EU to admit Turkey was met with resistance 

from its transatlantic member partners. American 

support for Turkey’s inclusion in the EU is based on 

its consistent goal of preserving NATO’s cohesion in 

the face of increasing threats and vulnerabilities from 

Russian and Iranian influence as well as terrorist 

organizations.43

Today, Turkey’s military structure continues to 

evolve into a unilateral entity farther away from 

NATO’s original doctrine of collective defense, collective security, and joint integrated weapon platforms. 

The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on March 

25, 2018, that the long-awaited debut of Turkey’s light 

aircraft carrier was approaching. The vessel, the construction of which began in 2016, is intended to meet 

“various needs of the Turkish armed forces such as 

sustaining long-endurance, long distance military 

combat or humanitarian operations.”44

The ongoing transformation of the Turkish armed 

forces will affect NATO and the United States in more 

ways than one. The secular, Western-oriented identity 

that prevailed from 1923 to 2002 is being dismantled, 

which could further “exacerbate ideological and political factionalism within the officers’ corps according 

43. The EU acknowledges Turkey was one of the first states 

that applied to join the union in 1959 beyond the original founder 

states, but argues today Turkey still is not a liberal democracy 

and President Erdogan is subverting the rule of law and accountability by continuing to invoke the state of emergency and rule by 

decree following the failed coup in July 2016, which runs contrary 

to the EU’s basic democratic standards.

44. Robert Farley, “Will Turkey Really Get an Aircraft Carrier 

Armed with F35s?,” National Interest, February 21, 2019.
47

to a new study.”45 The study states Erdogan is consolidating his grip on the armed forces and bringing 

them under his direct command. His quest to weed 

out Gulen and other old, secular, Kemalist tendencies 

is ongoing and appears to have been successful so far, 

especially since the failed 2016 coup. Erdogan is using 

the attempted coup of July 2016 to purge the Turkish 

armed forces and to bring them under his total control. He is cognizant of the history of the armed forces 

coups and argues the armed forces prior to the July 

attempted coup were infiltrated by Gulen supporters and Gulen himself was responsible for instigating 

the failed coup—hence, his repeated requests to the 

United States to extradite Gulen back to Turkey to 

stand trial for his role in the coup.

The study also highlights the significant challenges 

Turkey is likely to face in the near future as a result of 

this coerced transformation: (1) shortages of qualified 

pilots; (2) shortages in fully trained and equipped man 

power; (3) new officers being indoctrinated more in 

conservative nationalist and religious doctrines than 

their predecessors were; (4) an officer corps that is 

more representative of the Turkish society as a whole; 

and (5) more civilian control over the military, as is the 

norm in Western democracies, including the United 

States.46

45. For an excellent assessment of the current transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces, see Lars Haugom, An Uncertain Future. Also see Lars Haugom, “The Turkish Armed Forces 

and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey after the 15 July 2016 Coup 

Attempt,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2, no. 1 (January 

15, 2019): 1–8.

46. For an excellent assessment of the current transformation 

of the Turkish Armed Forces, see Lars Haugom, An Uncertain 

Future.
48

TURKEY AND AMERICA’S GULF ALLIES’ 

COMPETING EXPECTATIONS

Like all other regional and international players 

in the Syrian Civil War, the strategic objectives of the 

gulf states evolved as the war continued. In the early 

stages of the civil war, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the 

UAE were in sync with the United States and Turkey 

on the need for regime change and the removal of 

President Assad from power. Saudi Arabia had been 

unhappy with Syrian culpability in the assassination 

of its Muslim Sunni Lebanese client, Prime Minister 

Rafiq Hariri, by Syrian agents in Lebanon on February 

14, 2005. But the kingdom was more concerned with 

continued Syrian interference and influence in the 

political dynamics of Lebanon, and more importantly, 

its cozying up with predominantly Shia Iran and its 

sponsorship of the politically powerful Lebanese Shia 

Hezbollah movement, which was vehemently anti-Israel and anti-Sunni Arab gulf states. In short, Saudi 

Arabia was a regional rival of Iran in Lebanon and 

viewed Assad’s departure as an important means to 

reducing Iranian influence in Lebanon since Iran was 

the main source and benefactor of Hezbollah’s rising 

influence in that state. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also 

worried about the expanding Iranian influence among 

their ethnic Shia population, whom they considered to 

be subversive elements and regime dissidents.

Syria under Assad received Iranian financial aid 

and discounted oil and gas in return for supporting 

the Iranian clerical regime in Tehran and Qom and 

for allowing shipments of Iranian arms and training 

personnel to freely transit Syria to Lebanon.47 Qatar 

47. Karim Sajadpour, “Iran’s Real Enemy in Syria,” Atlantic, 

April 16, 2018.
49

was also viewed as a rival to Saudi Arabia in Lebanon following its successful effort to broker a ceasefire deal in its capital in May 2008, after fierce clashes 

in Beirut between Sunni militia associated with Hariri 

and Saudi Arabia on one hand, and Hezbollah and 

its patron, Iran, on the other.48 Saudi Arabia viewed 

the Qatar-sponsored cease-fire in Lebanon in 2008 as 

an interference in its affairs and has resented it since. 

Ironically, Saudi Arabia and Qatar share the same 

conservative Sunni Islamic beliefs. But Iran and Qatar 

share rich maritime gas fields within a few nautical 

miles of each other, necessitating at least a working 

relationship between the neighbors.

As the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) took control 

of Egyptian politics through the ballot in 2012 after 

the fall of President Mubarak, Saudi Arabia and the 

UAE embarked on a major campaign to confront the 

Brotherhood, fearing that its populist win would cascade into their backyard and ultimately lead to similar 

uprisings or demands for political change. As a result, 

Turkey and Qatar, who were sympathetic to the MB 

and other associated movements, united to form a 

front, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE countered by 

supporting the overthrow of the freely elected MB 

government by the Egyptian military on July 4, 2013. 

The lines had been drawn. Turkey and Qatar opposed 

the new military regime in Egypt, while Saudi Arabia 

and the UAE supported it.

The rise of ISIS and the success of its military campaigns in Iraq and Syria in June 2014 and Russia’s 

military intervention in September 2015 prompted 

48. Alistair Lyon, “Qatar Pulls off Mediation Coup in Lebanon Crisis,” Reuters, May 22, 2008; Sultan Barakat, Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement, Brookings Doha Center 

Analysis Paper 12 (November 2014).
50

change in the realignment and strategic objectives of 

the players in the Syrian Civil War. While the United 

States focused on defeating ISIS in Syria and Iraq, 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE were busy realigning themselves to confront ISIS symbolically in Syria as well as 

in Shia Iran, its Lebanese Hezbollah client, the Shia of 

Iraq, and the MB in the Greater Middle East.49 The last 

was seen as a revolutionary threat to the conservative 

monarchies and their tribal offshoots in the Persian 

Gulf, given its political success against Mubarak—a 

long-time ally of these Arab gulf regimes.

Besides the MB, the Shia-Sunni die was cast as an 

existential threat to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For 

Qatar, gulf security and stability necessitated closer 

economic and political ties with Iran. For Turkey, 

the threat remained the Kurds. Neither Turkey nor 

Qatar want to embark on a sectarian conflict with Iran, 

regardless of the countries who support it.50 These 

49. Although relations among Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi 

Arabia are at a low ebb because of Turkey’s perceived support for 

Hamas and President Morsi of Egypt, formerly of the MB, they 

have not reached the level of public hostility and suspicion that 

exists today between the UAE and Turkey. Whereas in March of 

2013 UAE-Turkey trade relations reached Dh33.3 billion (approximately nine billion US dollars), in total value today they are at 

a trickle, and overall relations are at a stalemate. “Erdogan Says 

UAE’s Slanders About Turks, Ottomans Stem from Its Own Dirty 

Business,” Daily Sabah, December 20, 2017; “New Street Signs 

Honoring Ottoman Commander Hung Near UAE Embassy in 

Turkey,” Daily Sabah, January 9, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com

/diplomacy/2018/01/09/new-street-signs-honoring-ottoman

-commander-hung-near-uae-embassy-in-turkey; “Turkish Soap 

Operas Latest Casualty of Mideast Conflict,” New York Daily 

News, March 5, 2018; and “1st King of Saudi Arabia Accused of 

Receiving Bribes from Britain after Release of Confidential Documents,” Daily Sabah, April 19, 2018, 3.

50. Omer Taspinar, Turkey and the Arab Gulf States: A Dance 

of Uncertain Expectations (Washington, DC: Arab Gulf States 
51

shifting priorities and approaches, with each player 

pursuing diverse interests, weakened the original unified resolve to address the Syrian Civil War directly 

and gave Assad the political and military wherewithal 

to withstand pressures to remove him from office.

The United States is currently contemplating pulling out its small contingent of military-related personnel from northwest Syria and replacing it with Saudi 

forces or a combined Arab force, the deployment of 

which would undoubtedly have unintended consequences. The latter would face a dilemma as it sought 

to bridge the gap between US and Turkish operational 

objectives resulting from the continued presence of 

the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces west 

of the Euphrates River or along the border with Syria. 

The Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces militia, along with 

its affiliated Syrian, PKK-US, and Western-terroristdesignated supporters who helped achieve victory 

against ISIS and the destruction of most of its caliphate 

in Syria, would almost certainly be sidelined by the presence of any Arab peacekeeping force. Such a force may 

also advance Syrian Sunni fortunes at the expense of 

the Kurds and perhaps the Syrian-Iranian-HezbollahRussian military alliance. Such a scenario would play 

into Turkey’s original plan of eliminating any Kurdish 

armed deployment or presence along its borders with 

Syria west of the Euphrates River.

Institute, 2015), 5. Turkey wants to keep all of its options open 

because it relies heavily on all gulf states’ foreign direct investments (including Iran’s) and other economic and financial perks. 

It does not want to get into a crossfire between rival Muslim Sunni 

and Shia forces in the Greater Middle East. Mohammed Ayoub, 

“Behind the Democratic Wave in the Arab World: The Middle 

East’s Turko-Persian Future,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 2 (February 

2, 2011): 57–70.
52

Any proposed, multinational peacekeeping or 

peacemaking force made up of Saudi and Egyptian 

soldiers, plus perhaps Bahraini, Emirati, Qatari, and 

Kuwaiti military personnel, would also most certainly 

falter, given the competing priorities and current tensions stemming from the June 5, 2017, move by Saudi 

Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain to cut diplomatic 

and transport ties with Qatar, which is a close ally of 

Turkey, after accusing it of supporting terrorism. A 

Qatari military contribution to any Arab-Syrian stabilization force would most likely side with Turkey 

against the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces and associated PKK militia. This would also result in each of 

the members then pursuing their own operational 

and strategic priorities and forming independent fiefdom-like enclaves in Syria’s northeastern region.

An Arab force under these circumstances would 

face other more serious complications because of the 

overlapping nature of peacekeeping juxtaposed with 

peace-enforcing operations as outlined by the UN 

Charter. In the latter case, given the current animosities among Saudi Arabia-UAE-Egypt with Iran and 

Hezbollah in Syria and elsewhere, such operations 

would almost surely bring the two camps into open 

warfare by accident or design. The experience of such 

a combined force with the dual missions in other 

former troubled areas in the Greater Middle East, particularly Lebanon between 1975 and 1980, has been 

one of little or no chance of success.51

51. Julian Borger, “Syria: Proposal to Replace US Troops with 

Arab Force Comes with Grave Risks,” Guardian, April 18, 2018; 

Michael Gordon, “US Seeks Arab Force and Funding for Syria,” 

Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2018; and Zachary Cohen, “Bolton 

Dealing to Build an Arab Military Force in Syria,” CNN, April 

18, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/18/politics/trump-us-syria

-strategy-arab-force-pompeo-bolton/index.html. Then US Defense 
53

For its part, Turkey may also take full advantage 

of these divisions and competing priorities within any 

proposed Arab force to quickly reinforce the security 

belt along its border with Syria, especially in the coveted areas of Manbij and Kobani, which is because of 

Turkey’s obsession with opposing any autonomous 

Syrian or Iraqi-Kurdish entity or state next to its borders. Turkey intends to use any territory occupied by 

its military in Syria as a bargaining chip to demand 

political concessions and guarantees from both allies 

and foes, gaining tactical and strategic advantage as 

far as Syria’s future is concerned. In any scenario, Syria 

will almost certainly remain unstable for a long time 

to come with or without the presence of US troops.

THE AMERICAN SYRIAN EXIT STRATEGY 

DILEMMA

The debate about the US military deployment and 

long-term US intentions in Syria goes on in Washington, with President Trump contemplating an end to 

US military involvement, perhaps because of the lack 

of important US strategic interests. Congress, however, is increasingly concerned about the lack of a 

clear US strategy for a post-ISIS Syria once the primary 

objective of defeating ISIS has been fully met. Several 

Secretary James Mattis expressed reservations about the proposed Arab states’ involvement in the new proposed security 

force in Syria, perhaps to placate Turkey, but probably to avoid 

the clashing interests of such an endeavor. Paul Sonne and Missy 

Ryan, “Mattis Warns Against Leaving Syria to Arab Allies with 

No Direct US Role,” Washington Post, April 27, 2018, A-18. It is 

worth noting that the current press reporting on the ongoing discussions between the United States and Egypt on the possibility 

of the latter leading an Arab force to Syria is currently being done 

through intelligence, rather than diplomatic or political-military, 

channels.
54

members of Congress have voiced concern over the 

long-term presence of Iran and its Lebanese benefactor Hezbollah in Syria, which would threaten the security of America’s allies, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon.52

American military field commanders in Syria and 

US Central Command (USCENTCOM) have advised 

President Trump on the need to stay in Syria for the 

long haul to stabilize the areas under their control 

or under the control of allied Syrian Kurdish forces 

to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and strengthen 

Kurdish political and social institutions.53 Such advice 

may have been driven by or based on US Army Field 

Manual 3-0, a service document that guides military operations and doctrine and their possible aftermath.54 The differences in the strategic and operational 

approaches between US Joint Commands and the US 

52. Karen DeYoung, “President, Congress at Odds on Syria,” 

Washington Post, April 19, 2018, A-1.

53. Ranking officers at the DoS; Ranking officers at the DoD; 

Missy Ryan and Paul Sonne, “Even As Trump Urges Syria Exit, 

Troops See Unfinished Job,” Washington Post, April 7, 2018, A-1; 

Greg Jaffe, “For Trump and His Generals, ‘Victory’ Has Different Meanings,” Washington Post, April 5, 2018, https://www

.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-trump-and-his

-generals-victory-has-different-meanings/2018/04/05/8d74

eab0-381d-11e8-9c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html; and Liz Sly, 

“US Troops in Syria May Be at Risk of ‘Mission Creep’ After a 

Deadly Battle in the Syrian Desert,” Washington Post, February 

9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria

-accuses-us-of-aggression-after-its-warplanes-strike-pro-government

-forces/2018/02/08/bab1502a-0cb4-11e8-8890-372e2047c935_story

.html; The DoD may have accepted the inevitable downsizing of 

its military presence in Iraq. Tamer al-Ghobashy and Paul Sonne, 

“Pentagon Ends Combat Against ISIS in Iraq, But Will Retain 

Troop Presence,” Washington Post, May 1, 2018, A-9.

54. Michael Lundy, GEN (USA), and Rich Creed, COL (USA), 

“The Return of US Army Field Manual 3-0,” Military Review 97, 

no. 6 (November-December 2017): 14.
55

Army are important. Although Field Manual 3-0 is a 

US Army service document—and although USCENTCOM, as a joint command, is not obligated to follow 

it—recent statements from USCENTCOM appear 

to have echoed a similar doctrinal exit approach to 

Iraq and Syria. In a panel discussion at the United 

States Institute of Peace on April 3, 2018, the head of 

USCENTCOM, General Joseph L. Votel, stated Syria 

is more complicated than Iraq and hard work remains, 

such as stabilizing areas, consolidating gains, getting 

people back into their homes, and addressing the 

long-term issues of reconstruction.55

The main challenge for any US military withdrawal 

from Syria will be translating war gains into political 

outcomes, given that Syria does not pose a threat to 

America’s vital interests. The flip side of this coin is, of 

course, mission creep. At the heart of the matter is the 

tension between President Trump’s understanding of 

what constitutes victory on the battlefield in unconventional or asymmetrical combat zones and what his 

military advisors and field commanders in Syria may 

want to achieve in the long run in Syria. For its part, 

Turkey will most likely try to fill the vacuum created 

by an American exit from Syria and create a de facto 

safe haven there, if only to repatriate as many Syrian 

55. David Staten, SGT (USA), “CENTCOM Commander 

Discusses Stabilization Posture in Iraq, Syria,” Department of 

Defense News, April 3, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom

/News/Article/Article/1483798/centcom-commander-discusses

-stabilization-posture-in-iraq-syria/; Karen De Young and Missy 

Ryan, “As Trump Talks of Leaving Syria, His Top Commander in 

the Middle East Emphasizes the Need to Stay,” Washington Post, 

April 4, 2018, A-1; Karen De Young and Shane Harris, “Trump 

Orders Swift Syria Withdrawal,” Washington Post, April 5, 2018, 

A-1; and Liz Sly, “Kurds Pulling Back from ISIS Fight,” Washington Post, March 7, 2018.
56

refugees from the estimated 3.l million currently 

residing in Turkey as possible, and at the same time, 

secure its border towns and villages from potential 

PKK attacks. Turkey may also use any territorial gains 

at the expense of Syrian Kurdish forces to repopulate 

the liberated areas with its Syrian Muslim Sunni supporters as a bargaining chip in a final Syrian political 

settlement.56

The United States faces the same problem that has 

always plagued militaries as they grapple with the 

most appropriate time to withdraw prematurely from 

theaters of combat. The tyranny of time has haunted 

US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq before, 

but the issue touches on a more fundamental question 

about war termination challenges involving nonstate 

actors in Syria. Most wars involving terrorist organizations may never end because terror groups evolve 

depending on contexts and changing regional and 

international political dynamics. Although terrorist 

groups can be defeated, the current nature and character of ethnic, national, and religious rivalries in the 

Greater Middle East will make terrorism an instrument of states and nonstate actors, at least in the near 

future.57

Terrorist adversaries will often come to the fight 

long after the United States thought it had won and 

56. Liz Sly and Zakaria Zakaria, “With ISIS Striking Back in Syria, a US Withdrawal Would Be a ‘Disaster,’ 

Kurds Warn,” Washington Post, April 5, 2018, https://www

.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-kurds-warn-of-a-disaster-if-us

-troops-leave/2018/04/05/0b5619e0-386e-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_

story.html.

57. Sune Engel Rasmussen, “As Islamic State Fades in Syria, 

a New Militant Group Takes Root,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 

2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-islamic-state-fades-in-syria

-another-militant-group-takes-root-1524064045.
57

its troops had departed a given theater. This may be 

related to the inability of the US military to bridge 

the gap between its use of overwhelming force and 

the difficulties involved in defeating ragtag, illegal 

combatants bent on dying for their causes. Given that 

civilians in the United States have supremacy over US 

military institutions in terms of expectations, the US 

strategic outcome in Syria may not be as clear-cut.58

Given ISIS’s degraded combat posture and the increasingly diminished combat capabilities of its remaining enclaves in Syria, the limited maneuver warfare 

employed effectively by the US Marine Corps and the 

US Army against Japanese forces during World War II 

in the Solomon Islands could offer a viable exit strategy for Syria.

Given ISIS’s degraded and declining military and 

large-scale war-making capabilities and political and 

financial fortunes, especially in Syria and Iraq, US 

Marine Corps and US Army lessons learned from 

maneuver warfare since World War II preclude continuing the fight on ISIS’s terms by using conventional 

overwhelming force. Hence, it is more beneficial to 

use maneuver operations and tactics to contain and 

deprive ISIS of its momentum in waging violence in 

these states since ISIS as an insurgency is now more 

incapable of holding wide swaths. Most ISIS fighters 

are either incarcerated or corralled in isolated, unpopulated areas; hence, ISIS has been reduced to attacking 

soft targets rather than carrying out wide-scale warfare as it once did in Iraq and Syria.

58. Philip A. Crowl, “The Strategist’s Short Catechism: Six 

Questions without Answers,” in The Harmon Memorial Lectures 

in Military History (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 

1988), 377–88.
58

In short, maneuver warfare doctrine could serve 

as a prelude to a US exit strategy, given the operational and strategic insignificance of the remaining 

ISIS enclaves.59 Put another way, the military historian 

and theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, could provide insight into the exit strategy debate in the United 

States. To win, Clausewitz says the cost of war must 

remain proportionate to the objective sought, constantly balancing ways, means, and ends.60

In the absence of a US war termination strategy in 

Syria, any alternative, desired end state in Syria will 

become elusive. The American public’s threshold 

for prolonged warfare remains low and difficult to 

gauge ahead of time. The objectives and desired end 

state also change often in the course of war because of 

domestic, regional, and international actors, as well as 

other intervening factors, which preclude the achievement of total domination of the battlespace, as is the 

case in Syria today.

Alternatively, if the objectives are attained, there 

may be pressure to attain additional objectives beyond 

those originally set, especially if the United States is 

seen to be engaged in a limited war and its adversaries 

and allies in the theater view their operations in terms 

of total war. Unlike the United States, a superpower 

that sees a fight against a terror group, regional players and American allies in the Middle East and North 

59. Gerhard L Weinberg, A World At Arms (Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 1994), 341–48; and Richard Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary (New York: Penguin Books, 1943). A good 

discussion of operational maneuver can be found in Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command, Campaigning, Marine Corps 

Doctrinal Publication 1-2 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, August 1997), 78–84.

60. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 92.
59

Africa view the fight as involving the survival of their 

regimes. An examination of the treatment of political 

Islamists such as the MB by Egypt, the UAE, Yemen, 

and North African countries indicates they view the 

conflict as total war. Thus, Islamic regimes view ISIS 

as an existential threat just as much as, or perhaps 

even more than, the West does.

A better state of peace, as opposed to a definite 

end state, is the more likely outcome in a limited war 

scenario. By contrast, the Syrian Civil War is likely 

to result in a clearer end state—the defeat of Assad’s 

opposition forces. War termination and victory 

become more elusive under these circumstances.

There is perhaps a current mismatch between what 

the national command authority wants out of the US 

involvement in Syria and what the evolving US military strategy is for Syria. Military operations and 

tactics become irrelevant without a viable national 

strategy that links ways, means, ends, risks, and consequences to one another.61

TURKEY-US RELATIONS POINT COUNTER 

POINT: THE TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

There are several contentious issues separating Turkey from the United States. Foremost among 

them is US support for the Kurd-dominated Syrian 

Democratic Forces, which was established with the 

help of the United States in 2015 to fight and defeat 

ISIS. Following the fall of ISIS’s purported capital of 

Raqqa in Syria in October 2017, US military field commanders proceeded to float the idea of converting the 

Syrian Democratic Forces from an effective offensive 

61. Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American 

Statecraft (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
60

organization to a defensive border protection and 

patrol entity to be deployed along the Syrian-Turkish

border to protect against any new ISIS resurgence or infiltration into Syrian Democratic Forcesliberated Syrian enclaves. Later, however, under 

constant protestations from Ankara, the Defense 

Department announced the new force’s mission (stabilization), its intended size (small), and its intended 

composition (Arab militia, not Kurdish).62

From the beginning, Turkey, suspicious of America’s strategic plans for Syria, raised the issue of the 

ambiguity surrounding US intentions during several 

high-ranking diplomatic discussions with US diplomats, including former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump. Turkey also had serious 

reservations about the US Army training and equipping the Syrian PYD; its militia, the YPG; and most 

importantly, the PKK, which Turkey and the United 

States have both designated as a terrorist organization. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Kurdish Syrian 

Defense Forces’ association with the PYD, YPG, and 

PKK is ultimately designed to challenge Turkey’s sovereignty and carry out cross-border terrorist attacks 

deep into the Turkish heartland. In short, Turkey feels 

the United States is pitting its short-term interests 

against its principles in Syria by joining forces with 

known terrorist groups by proxy and by abandoning 

long-term, strategic partnerships with Ankara in the 

fight against terrorism.63

The other existential threat Turkey says it faces 

revolves around what it perceives as the persistent 

62. Ranking officers at the DoD.

63. Turkish Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social 

Research, interview with the author, March 27, 2018. The foundation’s views reflect current Turkish government views.
61

influence of the moderate Muslim cleric, Fetullah 

Gulen. There is no doubt that the ruling AKP and 

Erdogan see Gulen as an existential threat. President 

Erdogan has offered to exchange Brunson, two Turkish nationals, and a dozen or so US citizens currently 

in custody in Turkey for Gulen and two other Turkish operatives convicted in New York City of violating 

US- and UN-imposed sanctions on Iran.64 There are 

other disagreements that Turkey has with the United 

64. Benjamin Weiser and Carlotta Gall, “At Iran Sanction 

Trial: A Star Witness Revealed, and a Sleepy Juror,” New York 

Times, December 2, 2017; “FETO-Linked Judge Berman ‘Won’t 

Allow’ Prison Call that Could Indict Zarrab to Be Played For 

Jury,” Sabah Daily, December 19, 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com

/americas/2017/12/19/feto-linked-judge-berman-wont-allow-prison

-call-that-could-indict-zarrab-to-be-played-for-jury; and Mehul Srivastava, “US-Turkey Relations Take Another Turn for Worse,” 

Financial Times, October 9, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content

/39cdc78c-ad04-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130. The two Turkey operatives, Iranian-born Reza Zarrab—a gold merchant residing in 

Turkey but of Iranian origin—and his coconspirator, Turkish 

banker Mehmet Hakan Atilla, were convicted along with seven 

other coconspirators of violating US sanctions worth over a billion 

dollars for exchanging Turkish gold (an unsanctioned item if sold 

to private Iranian entities vice Iranian government agencies) in 

exchange for Iranian oil. Zarrab is reportedly cooperating with US 

prosecutors in exchange for his freedom. He was captured while 

vacationing with his family in Florida. US prosecutors traced the 

gold to Iranian shadow government agencies. The convictions 

of Zarrab and Atilla shed light on corruption charges against 

President Erdogan and his family, which he denies, saying only 

that the gold-for-oil transaction was a private one and a routine 

trade activity not covered by the US sanction regime, and that the 

American judge presiding over the Zarrab-Atilla cases is biased 

against Turkey because of his ties to Gulen, who is out to smear 

President Erdogan’s reputation. More important, however, is the 

negative impact on US-Turkey relations of any possible US sanctions against Turkey, given the ongoing tensions between them 

on several other issues.
62

States, including the latter’s unconditional support for 

Israel against the Palestinians, the decision by Trump 

to move the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to 

Jerusalem, and the subsequent UN General Assembly 

vote against the US position, at which time the United 

States threatened to cut off financial aid to countries 

who voted against the US decision.65

Turkey believes that although the current partnership with the United States and NATO is in trouble, 

there is no viable alternative to its NATO membership and commitment, despite all of the rhetoric to the 

contrary. Turkey believes that America’s shifting tactics, from changing the Assad regime to fighting and 

defeating ISIS specifically and terrorism in general, are 

a symptom of the contradictions inherent in US foreign policymaking.

Unlike the United States, Turkey views the ISIS 

threat as secondary to the bigger, regional problems 

it faces. ISIS did not and does not impact the region 

directly, Turkish officials argue. The US-KurdishSyrian Defense Forces alliance and its offshoot, 

including foreign fighters, are more directly Turkey’s regional problem. ISIS to Turkey is an American 

obsession devoid of any long-term, strategic vision, 

and as a result, the United States is not draining the 

terror swamp in Syria, but rather focusing on the 

symptoms and not the root of the terror threats and 

65. “President Erdogan Slams US for Threatening to Cut 

Off Aid to Countries over Jerusalem Vote,” Hurriyet Daily News, 

December 31, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president

-erdogan-slams-us-for-threatening-to-cut-off-aid-to-countries-over

-jerusalem-vote-125037. Earlier, President Erdogan thanks Russian 

President Putin for supporting the UN General Assembly Resolution against the United States. “Erdogan Thanks Putin on Jerusalem Resolution Support in Phone Call,” Hurriyet Daily News, 

December 22, 2017.
63

vulnerabilities emanating from ISIS—namely, ISIS’s 

broad public and messaging appeal. Turkey also 

believes that any US-Syrian stabilization projects in 

Syrian-liberated areas are artificial fixes with no longterm success guarantees because they lack a link to 

broader strategic objectives. Given the original program under the Obama administration of arming and 

funding “vetted Syrian opposition groups,” Turkey 

questions why and how the PKK—a US-designated 

terrorist organization—became “vetted.”66

Turkey argues including the PKK in the Kurdish 

Syrian Defense Forces was a big American blunder 

because the PKK took advantage of US and NATO 

terror vulnerabilities in Syria by temporarily switching tactics to fighting ISIS in return for cash, weapons, and training—fighting which Turkey fears will 

eventually be redirected against its towns and cities. 

Turkey believes the PKK has its own strategic agenda 

in Syria that runs contrary to US-Turkish efforts in 

the fight against regional and international terrorism 

within their longstanding counterterrorism cooperation and coordination strategies.

According to Turkey, America’s ambiguous position after combat ended in Raqqa can only mean that 

the United States wants a permanent Kurdish enclave 

there. Iran, Syria, Russia, and Turkey have strongly 

opposed any such move. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, went as far as demanding 

the resignation of the “pro-Kurd” US special envoy 

to the coalition against violent Islamic extremism and 

ISIS for allegedly backing Syrian Kurdish fighters and 

66. “Disrespect for Red Lines: Why Turkey is a US Ally but 

Not a Partner,” Sputnik News, September 11, 2017; and Helen 

Cooper, “Obama Requests Money to Train ‘Appropriately Vetted’ 

Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, June 26, 2014.
64

their nationalist aspirations. Last January, Cavusoglu 

was quoted as saying the United States was guilty of 

siding with the wrong partner in Syria in reference to 

the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces and the associated 

Kurdish militia; however, President Erdogan in earlier 

statements praised the United States and said Turkey 

was always ready to cooperate with the United States 

over Syrian issues.67 Meetings between former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Cavusoglu and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Cavusoglu 

have yielded only minor results, although diplomatic 

channels continue to remain open between Ankara 

and Washington.68 According to press reports, on July 

26, 2018, Christian Evangelist Andrew Brunson was 

moved to house detention from his jail cell in Istanbul 

following the personal intercession of Pompeo.

TURKEY-US RELATIONS POINT COUNTER 

POINT: THE US PERSPECTIVE

The American position on current US-Turkish 

relations differs dramatically from the mostly unified 

Turkish position given the diverse nature and character of America’s liberal constitutional democracy and 

general political culture. For example, there are currently differing institutional views regarding Turkey 

67. “Turkey Says Pro-Kurd US Envoy Brett McGurk Should 

Leave,” BBC News, May 18, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world

-europe-39960381; “US Picked the Wrong Partner, Ankara Criticizes Washington in New York Times Article,” Hurriyet Daily News, 

January 29, 2018, 1; “Turkey Wants to Cooperate with US in Syria, 

Erdogan Says,” Daily Sabah, December 31, 2017, 1; and Turkish 

diplomats, interview with the author, February 20, 2018.

68. Semih Idiz, “Pompeo’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fails to Calm Tensions,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 

2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2018/05/turkey

-united-states-cavusoglu-pompeo-meeting.html.
65

and its regional and international policies. A majority 

of members of Congress view Turkey as non-Western, 

Islamic, authoritarian, and unfriendly to minorities, 

citing the violent confrontation between Erdogan’s 

bodyguards and Kurdish protesters and their American supporters outside the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC, on May 17, 2017. Congress is also upset 

over the detention of two Turkish nationals working 

on consular issues in Istanbul and Adana, Turkey, 

as well as the detention of Andrew Brunson, and 

has demanded their unconditional release. Gulen’s 

Hizmet organization in the United States has been 

highly successfully in lobbying Congress against 

Erdogan since at least 2015. Moreover, some members 

of Congress have expressed objections to Turkey’s 

warming relations with Russia and Iran as well as the 

proposed acquisition by Turkey of the Russian S-400 

air defense system. Congress passed a law in August 

2017 forbidding any associated company or state from 

conducting business with Russian defense entities, 

which ultimately will adversely impact Turkey as 

well. Members of Congress have also been unhappy 

with Turkey’s increasingly anti-Israeli and pro-Hamas 

positions. Some members have threatened to withhold 

aid and levy special sanctions on Turkey in an effort to 

get it to change its policies. A noted scholar on Turkey, 

Steven Cook, went as far as labeling the US-Turkish 

alliance a myth.69

69. Amberin Zaman, “US Sanctions Loom over Defiant 

Turkey,” Al-Monitor, April 20, 2018; Gregg Roman, “Navigating the US Collision with Turkey,” The Hill, March 5, 2018; 

Barcin Yinanc, “Turkey Could Face Sanctions for S-400 Purchase,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 1, 2018, http://www

.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/barcin-yinanc/turkey-could-face

-us-sanctions-for-s-400-purchase-126601; and Steven A. Cook, 

“The American Alliance with Turkey Was Built on a Myth,” 
66

While USCENTCOM and US European Command 

are in sync as far as broad US military strategy is concerned in the fight against ISIS and other terror groups, 

both oppose the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400 

system. Both agree to US objectives to minimize the 

influence of Russia and Iran in the region and both 

support any US policy in Syria as long as it emanates 

from the American presidency. They do, however, 

have different perspectives on Turkey and its current 

leadership, with US European Command tending to 

be more open-minded on Turkey’s operational and 

strategic concerns about its neighbors and USCENTCOM less so, according to US officials interviewed 

by the author. This probably goes back to 2003, when 

USCENTCOM-led troops were barred by the AKP-led 

Turkish Parliament from transiting Turkish territory 

to attack the Saddam Hussein regime in neighboring Iraq. Moreover, USCENTCOM sees Turkey as an 

obstacle to its end state in Syria—namely, supporting 

and developing the Syrian Kurdish liberated areas 

under its direct control.70

Former Secretary of Defense General James Mattis 

went out of his way to serve as an honest broker by 

moderating disagreements between his commanders 

and Turkey. He has assured Turkey that the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces will now predominantly be 

made up of Arab, vice Kurdish, fighters, and there was 

a difference between the YPG and PKK fighters as far 

as the United States is concerned. Despite these differences, the Defense Department has forged ahead, providing an alternatively acceptable air defense system 

Foreign Policy, October 12, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12

/the-american-alliance-with-turkey-was-built-on-a-myth/.

70. Ranking officers at the DoS; and ranking officers at the 

DoD.
67

to Turkey that would meet its minimum defense 

needs and sway it away from further Russian weapon 

purchases if only to ensure that congressional sanctions against Turkey are put on hold. A consensus is 

emerging in the US policy community that Turkey has 

yet to master the art of American checks and balances. 

All of this has developed while the Departments of 

Defense and State have been working hard to keep 

Turkey within the Western orbit and away from the 

Russians.71

American officials commented in late spring 2018 

that current relations between the United States and 

Turkey are complicated and often swing between 

cooperation and enmity. The officials acknowledged 

that US support for the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces 

has caused bumps in the strategic relationship between 

the two countries, but this damage is reparable if ways 

can be found to bridge the declining trust and enhance 

communication between the two sides. The same officials stated Turkey has some legitimate grievances and 

the United States was working hard to address them. 

They opined that although the Syrian YPG militia’s 

close ties to the US-designated PKK terror group are 

known, the YPG was and still is a “battle necessity” 

for the United States. The officials emphasized when 

the United States tried repeatedly to enlist Turkey 

and its vetted Syrian Sunni Arab fighters in the fight 

against ISIS, the response from Turkey was mute. The 

United States had no other choice but to go with the 

Syrian Kurds.

As the stakes in Syria became high, the US justification for choosing the Syrian Kurdish side hinged on: 

(1) Turkey’s lackluster response to the US position on 

71. Ranking officers at the DoS; and ranking officers at the 

DoD.
68

setting up a counter-ISIS force; (2) the inability of the 

United States to enlist the military support of an indigenous Syrian Sunni force that was trustworthy and 

committed to America’s strategic objectives of focusing on fighting and defeating ISIS; and (3) the American goal of defeating ISIS first and foremost. Thus, for 

the United States, forming a predominantly Kurdish 

Syrian Defense Forces was picking the best of many 

bad options, especially given that American public 

opinion was opposed to new military ventures in the 

Middle East. In the opinion of US officials interviewed 

by the author, America needed to recruit Syrian-based 

fighters to engage and defeat ISIS. The Kurds appeared 

to fit that bill because they were reliable, capable, and 

willing to implement the US operational plan against 

ISIS, according to the same DoS official. Members of 

the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces had sacrificed and 

died in Syria for the United States, and now the latter 

was obligated to return the favor in kind, promising arms, training, infrastructure rebuilding following combat, and the establishment of local governing 

councils in liberated areas.

At the same time, US officials have made it clear 

to Turkey that the United States will not engage in 

hostage diplomacy over the detainees in exchange 

for Gulen and other demands, in accordance with 

the long-standing US policy of not making deals with 

and giving no concessions to hostage takers. As for 

the Turkish employees of the US consulates in Istanbul and Adana, they were performing routine contacts with Turkish society, which was part of their job 

description.

Hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens have 

also been caught up in this campaign of detention and 

harassment since the failed coup under the seventh 
69

state-of-emergency decree. State Department officials 

acknowledged to the author that the United States has 

lost the messaging battle with the majority of Turkey’s 

youth as more and more of them are today buying into 

President Erdogan’s populist, anti-NATO and anti-US, 

nationalist rhetoric. Erdogan engages in this rhetoric 

to please his most ardent and loyal AKP constituency; 

nevertheless, he keeps the door open for dialogue 

with the United States and other NATO allies. Some 

scholars on Turkey attribute Erdogan’s domestic populist strategy and authoritarian tendencies to his success at the ballot box and to his unique political skill 

of keeping his domestic rivals off-balance—a winning 

electoral strategy. Others have alluded to the need 

for a corrective strategy to bring Turkey to a more 

liberal constitutional system, complete with accountability and oversight.72 These officials also believe that 

although Erdogan’s detractors see him increasingly 

becoming a dictator, he sees himself as a reformer 

reflecting the longstanding public quest for domestic 

change and power, especially regarding the military 

that ruled Turkey indirectly from 1923 to 2002. Given 

Turkey’s historic loss of territory following World 

War I, state survival remains paramount today, but, 

at the same time, Turkey is willing and able to serve 

as America’s eyes and ears against terrorist threats 

and vulnerabilities. In other words, Turkey remains 

a significant US strategic partner in the fight against 

terrorism, especially given its geostrategic location in 

one of the most unstable corners of the world. Russia, 

on the other hand, is taking advantage of Turkey’s differences with the United States and NATO to advance 

72. Henri J. Barkey and Omer Tspinar, “Republic of Turkey,” 

in The Government and Politics of the Middle East, ed. Mark Gasiorowski and Sean L. Yom (Boulder, CO: The Westview Press, 
70

its interests in the Greater Middle East at the latter’s 

expense. In short, Russia is playing an opportunistic 

game with Turkey’s help—something that is acceptable to neither NATO nor the United States given Russia’s overall stated goal of weakening and ultimately 

destroying the alliance politically.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

While the current standoff between Turkey and 

the United States appears to be moving from bad to 

worse, it has yet to reach a breaking point or a point 

of no return. Although tensions and policy differences 

continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by 

well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment point to perhaps better days to come, given the 

resilience and endurance of the ties that bind the two 

nations together. The US perspective on Turkey could 

be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal 

of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the 

slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against 

ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United 

States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, 

2017), 203–32; Henri J. Barkey, “Erdogan’s Foreign Policy is 

in Ruins,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2016, https://foreignpolicy

.com/2016/02/04/erdogans-foreign-policy-is-in-ruins/; Henri J. 

Barkey, “Turkey’s Moment of Inflection,” Survival 52, no. 3 (JuneJuly 2010): 39–50; Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy 

and Violence in the New Middle East (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2017); and Soner Cagatpay, The New Sultan, Erdogan and the 

Crisis of Modern Turkey (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2017). Both Cook 

and Cagatpay have raised the issue of Turkey becoming an illiberal, authoritarian democracy under Erdogan’s AKP-led regime 

and political party; Henri J. Barkey and Eric Edelman, “Turkey’s 

Forgotten Detainees,” Washington Post, July 30, 2018, A-17.
71

Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and 

Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing 

in recent months over new border disputes in the 

Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group 

of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed 

coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains 

high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and 

Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access 

off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States 

and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even 

entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot 

gas and oil tracks at sea.

Despite these and other policy differences over 

Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, 

both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage 

to their alliance. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military 

confrontation with the country over Syria. The most 

hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted 

problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems 

from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United 

States as important to America’s national security 

interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. 

Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions 

and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but 

its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by 

Western standards, will work toward increasing harmonization toward the United States and its NATO 

allies in the long run. This can only happen through a 

sustained strategic dialogue.

The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States 

engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that 

separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes 
72

more visible. There is indeed current evidence for 

better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding 

policy and strategic differences. In short, Turkey is not 

yet lost, but there are challenges facing America and 

its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap 

between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a 

fundamental question: What kind of strategic relationship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or 

desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic crossroad. The answer lies in the need for the United States 

to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa 

that takes into account the new realities of Turkish, 

NATO, and American domestic political dynamics, 

their changing nature and character, as well as Turkey’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and 

its goal of becoming a great regional power. Turkey, 

NATO, and the United States share Western values, 

and these values, although not equal for all partners, 

are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied 

properly across the board.

Turkey, NATO, and the United States must come 

to realize the context that brought them together is 

changing and their interests and policy directions 

must be reset. This is driven by the changing nature 

of world politics and the liberal structure of the international system, given the rise of China’s economic 

diplomacy and Russia’s political and economic interventionism abroad. While US and NATO involvement 

in the Syrian Civil War was a game changer, so was 

Turkey’s involvement, given the unintended consequences, including the presence of over 3.1 million 

Syrians in Turkey—a high price to pay. Domestically, 

the refugee issue necessitated the strategic shift in Turkey’s domestic, regional, and international postures 
73

after the third AKP win in the November 2015 snap 

elections.

Turkey, NATO, and the United States have worked 

and fought together since the Korean War in 1950. 

That war was an important milestone for Turkey in 

particular, much like perhaps the Gallipoli Campaign, 

albeit not at the same level. The Turkish brigade in 

Korea lost 400 defending the US Army’s retreat after 

the battle of Chongchon River. Such memories linger 

on in the Turkish psyche with great nostalgia. The 

Korean War for Turks is yesterday in historical terms. 

A few years ago, American scholars and analysts outlined policy differences between the United States and 

Turkey and provided constructive paths toward reconciling the differences.73

The Brunson affair appears to be the key to moving 

forward if it can be resolved diplomatically. For now, 

each side is digging in from recent moves and countermoves, including economic sanctions and asset 

freezes. Although the Gulen affair looms large over 

all outstanding contentious issues, Turkey’s back is 

to the economic wall; this leaves Erdogan with many 

bad options and little room for maneuver, despite all 

rhetoric to the contrary. Turkey’s economy, which 

ranks 17th in the world, is today facing not only serious domestic challenges, but, should its economy 

collapse altogether, the impact would most certainly 

73. Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2008), 151–62; Steven Cook et al., 

US-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012); Phillip H. Gordon and Omer 

Taspinar, Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can 

Revive a Fading Partnership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute 

Press, 2008); and Hugh Pope, “Pax Ottoman?: The Mixed Source 

of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November-December 2010).
74

reverberate throughout the international liberal monetary and trade order the United States has championed and worked so diligently to sustain since World 

War II. There is no win-win outcome here.74

The removal of tariffs and sanctions against 

Turkey by the United States can be initiated by a presidential executive order; this could be a short-term fix 

and a face-saving mechanism for Turkey in the current standoff. But under the currently charged circumstances, this cannot happen without Turkey making 

the first move to release Brunson. Short of that, Turkey 

still holds a wild card—namely, the status of the strategic Incirlik Air Base, which it could play by ordering the shuttering of the base, a move which would 

have disastrous strategic consequences for all parties 

involved. The bottom line is that there is no easy exit 

from the current messy standoff between Turkey on 

one hand and the United States and NATO on the 

other. The long-term implications for US-NATOTurkish relations are dire.

Therefore, given the more complicated but inherently symbiotic nature of the relations between the 

United States and its NATO allies vis-à-vis Turkey, 

the following policy recommendations are in order.

74. David Lynch and Kareem Fahim, “Turkey’s Currency 

Crisis Triggers Global Worries,” Washington Post, August 14, 2018, 

A-1; Carlotta Gall and Jack Ewing, “Tensions between Turkey 

and US Soar as Trump Orders New Sanctions,” New York Times, 

August 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/business

/turkey-erdogan-economy-lira.html; and Jack Ewing and Alexandra 

Stevenson, “Plunge in Lira, Turkey’s Currency, Fuels of Financial 

Contagion,” New York Times, August 13, 2018, 1.
75

POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR THE UNITED 

STATES

• The United States should continue its strategic, 

political-military dialogue with Turkey, regardless of the latter’s economic and military ties 

with its neighbors. Turkey’s relations with Iran 

and Russia, for example, are transactional and 

tactical, yet its relations with the US and NATO 

are strategic and enduring.

• The United States should develop a clearer 

strategy for Syria, especially toward the Kurds. 

The lack of a clear exit strategy, coupled with 

the American public reluctance to support 

expanded military operations in Syria, should 

be a signal that the time has come to elevate 

tactical and operational activities to a strategic 

level.

• USCENTCOM and US Special Operations Command commanders and their staffs should sustain their direct, face-to-face communication 

with their Turkish counterparts, not just institutional communication. There is no substitute for 

effective, personalized command relationships. 

Turks respond positively to such personal 

approaches, even though they may not show it, 

because culturally they avoid losing face. Questioning a Turkish decision on any issue is seen 

as attacking the decision-maker. Command 

relationships can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation on all political-military 

levels.

• The Defense Department should reinvigorate its 

long-term professional military education projects with Turkey. Specifically, the US National 
76

Defense University, which has credible and 

long-standing experience in all fields of research 

and defense studies, should offer assistance to 

the newly established Turkish Defense University in the form of curriculum development, 

leadership, and exchange programs between 

resident specialists both civilian and military. 

Mid-level professional military education institutions such as the US Army War College and 

the Marine Corps University can also play a critical supporting role in this endeavor. This will 

help familiarize Turkish officers with US procedures and capabilities and promote interoperability, which will facilitate future cooperation, 

create goodwill, and lead to the development of 

long-term personal relationships.

• A review of the ongoing exchange of International Military Education and Training-type 

programs between the United States and Turkey 

should take place to identify problem areas and 

seek ways to increase the enrollment of officers on both sides, including in service branch 

training schools. In short, service-to-service 

connections need to be reinvigorated. Planners 

and commanders in the US Army, for example, 

should be continually sensitized to the interests 

and objectives of Turkey, including with respect 

to the Kurdish issue, and how this may affect 

the operational environment in zones of continuing conflict in order to facilitate deconfliction and avoid confrontations.

• Given US-Turkish military-to-military relations 

have been affected in recent years, primarily 

by USCENTCOM because of the wars in Iraq 

and Syria, US European Command should be 
77

encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding this 

relationship in the future.

• The United States should strive to rebuild trust 

with Turkey and its citizens—a country and 

people who, given their history after Turkey’s 

defeat in World War I, tend to believe in great 

power dismemberment conspiracies directed 

against them.

• The F-35 training program in Texas for Turkish pilots should be expanded because it has 

had a positive public diplomacy impact on the 

Turkish press and public. A recent photo of a 

Turkish pilot training in the cockpit of an F-35 

jet in Texas was very well received in Turkey as 

a good-will American gesture.

• The United States should emphasize it will 

ensure the Syrian Kurds will have a political 

role in Syria once hostilities end, but any Kurdish national aspirations will be contained within 

Syria. Failing this, the United States would have 

to decide whether its strategic partnership with 

Turkey is more important than its partnership 

with nonstate partners.

• The United States should emphasize it will not 

support sectarian enclaves or territorial dismemberment in Syria.

• The United States should assure Turkey that its 

security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity 

are an integral part of the US-NATO commitment to the country.

• The United States should reinvigorate its Turkish youth outreach through educational and 

cultural messaging to regain the momentum for 

a secular, stable, and pro-West Turkey.
78

• The United States should use existing, multilateral and bilateral, diplomatic formats, such as 

the G20, for higher-level engagements. American policymakers should emphasize areas of 

convergence and common interests—such as 

terrorism, international crime, drug and human 

trafficking, and migrant rescue—where the 

Turkish and US military can cooperate.

• The United States should continue militaryto-military talks at the level of the Secretary of 

Defense to, among other things, avoid accidental clashes in Syria.

• The United States should persist in sharing 

the realities and shortcomings of Turkish policies that have a direct, adverse effect on the 

United States and its NATO allies without 

threatening Turkey with dire consequences. 

Turkish officials respond better to learning 

about issues through person-to-person, diplomatic exchanges, rather than institution-toinstitution exchanges through diplomatic 

demarches. This will require efforts to better 

understand the Turkish narrative through 

increased linguistic training and other educational and cultural exchanges.

• The United States should exhibit patience, presence, and perseverance in Turkey. Turkey and 

the United States cannot afford to lose each 

other.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO

• NATO should continue to be inclusive of all of 

its members and avoid encouraging the perception Turkey currently has of the organization, 

which is some members are more equal than 
79

others. Turks have long held the perception 

that despite their sacrifice in joining NATO and 

getting involved in the Korean War and in protecting Europe’s southern flank during most of 

the Cold War period, Greece has been Western 

Europe’s more favored strategic partner. This 

is one of the main reasons Europe continues to 

treat Turkey as second-class when compared to 

Greece and the Greek Cypriots.

• NATO should continue to make constructive 

efforts to resolve internal and bilateral problems with Turkey, acting as an honest broker.

• NATO should work to resolve lexicon definitions and reach final consensus with Turkey on 

terms such as “terrorism,” “Islamic terrorism,” 

and “Islam” to enhance counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence cooperation and in-service 

coordination at all levels.

• NATO should embark on a messaging campaign that celebrates Turkey’s history and 

culture and downplays the importance or relevance of NATO to neo-Ottoman Turkey, since 

the latter has more to do with Turkey’s domestic politics than its foreign policy.

• NATO should manage and resolve strategic, operational, and tactical differences with 

Turkey, taking into more realistic assessment 

the latter’s evolving military doctrine and 

changing chain-of-command structure.

WHAT TURKEY MAY WANT TO CONSIDER 

DOING

The following are policy initiatives that could have 

positive effects on US-Turkish relations.
80

• Turkey should cut down on the political rhetoric against the United States and Western European partners and release Brunson and other 

US citizens from detention unconditionally.

• Turkey should continue the strategic dialogue 

with the United States and NATO.

• President Erdogan should shed his authoritarian tendencies in favor of the rule of law and 

fair and free elections, given his increasingly 

authoritarian tendencies, as stated previously.

• Turkey should search hard for points of conversion with the United States and NATO to 

re-rebuild trust through confidence-building 

measures.

• Turkey should explore new ways to establish 

a new dialogue with Israel on the Palestinian 

question.

• Turkey should brandish and revive its moderate, multicultural, Muslim credentials as a 

model.

• Turkey should address the issue of minorities 

head on, as it did when President Erdogan communicated the message of sorrow for the victims of the 1915 Armenian Genocide.

• Turkey should end the state-of-emergency 

decrees.

• Turkey should ensure that the protection of 

human and civil rights in Turkey go hand-inhand with the fight against terrorism.

• Turkey should revisit its laws governing terrorist offenses and bring them in line with universally acceptable standards.

• Turkey should end its siege mentality and 

insecurities driven by conspiracy theories and 

unproven facts.
81

• Turkey should fully support the UN peace 

initiatives on Syria as the best alternatives for 

achieving long-term Turkish regional security 

and stability.

POSTSCRIPT

Several key developments that confirm rather 

than invalidate the basic assessments in this study 

have emerged since this manuscript was submitted 

to the editors. Foremost among them is the arrival of 

the first shipments of the S-400 antimissile platforms 

from Russia in July 2019 despite strong US and NATO 

objections.75 The US Congress in particular has threatened to levy sanctions against Turkey—a key NATO 

ally—should Turkey deploy the system, which Congress sees as violating existing trade sanctions against 

Russia. These latter sanctions extend to any foreign 

entity or state that imports weapon-related technologies from Russia.76 The Trump administration, under 

pressure from Congress, finally canceled the Turkishcoveted $428 billion F-35 aircraft sale to Turkey to 

compel the latter to reverse its decision regarding the 

S-400 purchase worth several billion dollars.77

75. Ryan Browne, Nick Paton Walsh, and Kara Fox, “Russia 

Starts Delivery of S-400 Missile System to Turkey, Setting up Standoff with US,” CNN, July 12, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/12

/europe/turkey-russia-missiles-intl/index.html.

76. Karoun Demirjian, “The Law Says Trump Must Punish 

Turkey. Congress May Force Him to Follow through,” Washington Post, August 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com

/national-security/law-says-trump-must-punish-turkey-congress

-may-force-him-to-follow-through/2019/08/06/92d77a38-b597-11e

9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html.

77. Richard Aboulafia, “Turkey after the F-35: Choice for 

Alternative Fighter Will Help Shape Country’s Future,” Forbes, 

July 21, 2019. Ironically, the Turkish press on August 2, 2019, 
82

For his part, President Erdogan has stated publicly 

the S-400 purchase from Russia was a commercial, not 

a strategic, transaction, stressing that the decision to 

go ahead with the purchase was also based on Turkey’s sovereign right—thus rejecting US and NATO 

claims that the purchase endangers NATO’s operational and military intelligence systems.78 He also 

threatened that if the United States went along with 

its decision to impose sanctions on Turkey, the latter 

would retaliate.79 It is not clear how, but should such 

events unfold, they could undoubtedly lead to irreparable damage and could push Turkey more into the 

Sino-Russian orbit. Such developments would most 

likely adversely impact US and NATO interests.

The other current irritant in US-Turkish relations 

revolves around Turkey’s insistence on removing 

pro-US Kurdish Syrian militias from all areas contiguous to its historic border with Syria. The goal is to 

revive the idea of establishing a 20-mile safe zone for 

Syrian refugees returning from Turkey that is free of 

any PKK-YPG presence. President Erdogan first surfaced the idea of a free zone inside Syria in 2012. He 

revived the idea on December 19, 2018, but has not 

ran stories picked up from Israel’s Channel 12 television station 

saying that Israel pressured members of Congress and the Trump 

administration to cancel the F-35 program with Turkey. See 

“Israel Secretly Lobbied Trump’s Government to Cancel F-35 Deal 

with Turkey,” Daily Sabah, August 2, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.

com/defense/2019/08/02/israel-secretly-lobbied-trumps-government-to

-cancel-f-35-deal-with-turkey-reports.

78. “Turkey Expects US to Act as a True Ally: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, August 6, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com

/diplomacy/2019/08/06/turkey-expects-us-to-act-as-true-ally-erdogan.

79. “Turkey to Retaliate if US Imposes Sanctions over S-400 

Purchase, FM Cavusoglu Says,” Daily Sabah, July 22, 2019, https://

www.dailysabah.com/defense/2019/07/22/turkey-expects-us-not-to

-impose-sanctions-over-s-400-fm-cavusoglu-says.
83

received US consent to the plan. A free zone in Syria 

would mean the end of any Kurdish Syrian militia 

presence, including the US-backed Kurdish Syrian 

Defense Forces west of the Euphrates River. President 

Erdogan threatened to establish the free zone with or 

without support from his NATO allies; this prompted 

a visit to Ankara by Ambassador James Jeffrey on 

July 22, 2019, to dissuade Turkey from any unilateral 

move that would adversely affect US Special Forces or 

their Syrian Kurdish proxies.80 Such a unilateral military incursion by Turkey against the Kurdish Syrian 

Defense Forces has been rejected by the United States 

on several occasions before. US Secretary of Defense 

Mark Esper pointed out recently that any such moves 

by Turkey to push the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces 

east of the Euphrates River by force would not be 

acceptable.81 The most recent meeting between DoD 

and Turkish military officials in Ankara indicates 

the diplomatic talks may yet bear fruit, but differences between the two sides concerning the size of 

the free zone and the status of Kurdish fighters west 

of the Euphrates still have to be fully developed. The 

United States is aiming to address Turkey’s concerns 

about the YPG/PKK presence along its border without abandoning the latter, given their strong role in 

defeating ISIS and containing associated forces such as 

the Nusra Front militia made up of former al-Qaeda 

80. Jean Yackley, “US Envoy Holds Talks in Ankara as Turkey 

Threatens to Invade Syria,” Al-Monitor, July 22, 2019, https://www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/us-envoy-talks-turkey-invade

-syria-threat.html#ixzz5vxPGeMhf.

81. Idrees Ali, “Any Turkish Incursion into Syria ‘Unacceptable,’ Will Prevent It: Pentagon Chief,” Reuters, August 

6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-syria

/any-turkish-incursion-into-syria-unacceptable-will-prevent-it

-pentagon-chief-idUSKCN1UW0TG.
84

elements.82 There are, however, other complications 

surrounding the establishment of any buffer zones in 

Syria given Syrian President Assad’s insisting all uninvited foreign troops, including those from the United 

States and Turkey, leave and turn territories under 

their control over to Syria. Russia, Iran, and Iran’s 

Lebanese Hezbollah proxy all support Assad’s position. The current violation of several cease-fires and 

daily bombardments by Syria and its allies in Idlib, a 

small enclave controlled by Turkey in northwest Syria 

and inhabited by al-Qaeda and anti-Assad, Syrian 

militia, that is Ahrar al-Sham, and their families, attest 

to Assad’s strategic interest in extending his full control over all territories lost during the early days of the 

Syrian popular uprising in 2011.

In the meantime, continuing tensions between 

Turkey and its regional neighbors—especially 

Syria, Libya, the Arab gulf states, Israel, Greece, and 

Cyprus—are likely to ensure that Turkey-US relations 

remain at a crossroad.

POSTSCRIPT II

On October 14, 2019, Turkey entered Syria with 

tacit support from President Trump to secure strategic terrain adjacent to its border areas and to primarily 

expel its old nemesis, the PKK, and its Syrian affiliate, 

the YPG—whom Turkey and its Kurdish umbrella 

organization, the Syrian Defense Forces, consider to 

be terrorist organizations. Turkey may finally be able 

to establish its long-coveted safe zone in the liberated 

82. Sarah Dadouch, “Turkey, US Agree to Form Joint Operation Center for Syria Safe Zone,” WHTC, August 7, 2019, 

https://whtc.com/news/articles/2019/aug/07/turkey-says-us-getting

-closer-to-its-views-in-syria-safe-zone-talks-anadolu/925363/?refer

-section=world.
85

areas to allow some of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees 

currently residing in Turkey to return. This of course 

is a temporary solution to Turkey’s more complex and 

protracted economic and financial problems resulting 

from the Syrian refugee problem it currently faces. It 

is most likely, however, that such a zone will remain 

unstable for the foreseeable future because of strategic 

differences with Russia, Iran, and Syria, who prefer full 

and total control over all Syrian territory by the Syrian 

regime of Bashar Assad—an end state that is inimical to Syrian Kurdish aspirations for local autonomy. 

Moreover, though it has the tacit support of Russia, 

the current Turkish incursion into Syria is not likely to 

reach deep into Syria’s heartland, which is currently 

under the control of Damascus and its Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian military. In short, the current Turkish 

military operations in Syria are indeed limited both in 

scope and sustainability. In the meantime, President 

Trump is under increasing pressure from key supporters in Congress and elsewhere to halt or to slow down 

Turkish military operations against the Kurds. Sanction threats against Turkey by key allies of the president and Congress could backfire, however, given that 

Turkey is an important strategic partner in NATO and 

an important player in the global fight, along with the 

United States, against terrorism and extremism in the 

region. The unintended consequence of the proposed 

US sanctions against Turkey is to move Turkey closer 

to the Russian orbit, thus weakening NATO as an alliance and forcing Turkey to take dramatic steps to curtail US military presence on Turkish soil, especially 

at Incirlik Air Base. In the meantime, there appears to 

be a split between NATO on one hand and Western 

European capitals on the other over the timing and 

aggressiveness of Turkish military operations currently underway in Syria. NATO has refrained from 
86

criticizing Turkey, thus recognizing that the latter has 

legitimate grievances, while Western European leaders have been quick to criticize Turkey for attacking 

the Syrian Kurdish-controlled areas. NATO is currently struggling to preserve the cohesion of the troubled alliance, while individual Western European 

states are taking steps to contain Turkey.83 The current 

US objective to reach a settlement between Turkey 

and the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces to redeploy the 

Kurdish militia as far away as possible from Turkey’s 

border is a step in the right direction.

83. Michael Birnbaum, “European Leaders Demand a Halt 

to Turkish Offensive in Syria,” Washington Post, October 14, 

2019, A-15; “Germany, France Stop Arms Exports to Turkey 

Amid Operation Peace Spring in Syria,” Daily Sabah, October 13, 

2019, 1; and “Turkey Has ‘Legitimate Security Concerns’: NATO 

Chief,” Anadolu Agency, October 14, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr

/en/europe/turkey-has-legitimate-security-concerns

-nato-chief/1613310. For an insightful look into why the USSyrian-Kurdish alliance was doomed to fail, see Amanda Sloat, 

“Our Alliance with Kurdish Fighters Was Doomed,” Washington 

Post, October 13, 2019, B-4.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

∗∗∗∗∗

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Dr. Isaiah Wilson III

Director of Research

Colonel George Shatzer

Author

Dr. Kamal A. Beyoghlow

Editor in Chief

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

∗∗∗∗∗

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website