[Cite as State v. Dykes, 2013-Ohio-872.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

CASE NO. 2012-L-021

 - vs - :

OKEMA K. DYKES, :

 Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 11 CR 

000412. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Alana A. Rezaee, Assistant 

Prosecutor, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For PlaintiffAppellee). 

R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. Clapp, Assistant 

Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For DefendantAppellant). 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Okema K. Dykes, appeals the judgment of conviction, after a 

jury trial, on one count of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery; he was found 

guilty under a theory of complicity. Appellant argues the verdict is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
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{¶2} There was testimony presented at trial that, if believed by the jury, 

established the following: On the morning of July 19, 2011, appellant and an 

accomplice robbed Daniel Adkins, an employee of Painesville Recycling, as he was 

leaving the parking lot of Key Bank with two bags of cash for his employer. At the end 

of June or beginning of July 2011, appellant had approached his friend Tyrell Hurd 

about planning this robbery; he stated that he had a plan to rob “the recycling guy” and 

indicated that he had been watching Mr. Adkins in order to learn his schedule and 

movements. Mr. Hurd agreed to the plan and accompanied appellant during the second 

week of July on an observation mission. They observed Mr. Adkins leave the recycling 

facility and proceed to Key Bank in Painesville. From the parking lot, appellant and Mr. 

Hurd watched as Mr. Adkins exited the bank and returned to his car with two bags of 

what they presumed to be cash. 

{¶3} There was further testimony that appellant and Mr. Hurd agreed to 

execute their plan on July 19, 2011, and that Mr. Hurd would take the money from Mr. 

Adkins, while appellant would drive. They expected a take of between $30,000 and 

$40,000 and intended to split the money evenly. 

{¶4} Appellant and Mr. Hurd began communicating via text message early on 

the morning of July 19, 2011. Mr. Hurd picked up appellant around 9:00 a.m. in his 

girlfriend’s silver Jeep. Mr. Hurd slid over to the passenger side, and appellant took the 

wheel. They went to a house on Jefferson Street in Painesville, where appellant 

retrieved a silver handgun; Mr. Hurd placed the handgun in his waistband. They 

proceeded to the car wash across the street from Painesville Recycling and waited for 
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Mr. Adkins to leave for the bank. When they saw Mr. Adkins depart from the recycling 

center, they followed him to Key Bank and parked in a lot close to the bank. 

{¶5} The state’s evidence indicated appellant positioned the car backwards in 

the parking spot in order to make a quick get-away; Mr. Hurd hid behind a dumpster 

near the bank and waited for Mr. Adkins to emerge. Mr. Adkins eventually exited the 

bank with two brown bags and got in his car, placing the bags on the front passenger 

seat of his vehicle. Mr. Hurd then approached the vehicle and reached through the 

open passenger window for the bags of cash. Mr. Adkins attempted to fight off Mr. Hurd 

and a struggle ensued. At some point during the struggle, Mr. Adkins saw the silver 

handgun in Mr. Hurd’s hand; Mr. Hurd told Mr. Adkins to let go of the money. Despite 

Mr. Adkins’ best efforts, Mr. Hurd was able to wrest one of the bags of cash from the 

car. 

{¶6} Mr. Hurd ran through the parking lot and jumped in the waiting Jeep. 

Appellant and Mr. Hurd then fled the scene. As they were driving, appellant and Mr. 

Hurd noticed a Fairport Harbor Police officer and became concerned he was watching 

them. Appellant pulled into the parking lot of Harbor Bait and Tackle, exited the Jeep, 

and went into the store. Mr. Hurd followed him into the shop, but minutes later, he left in 

the Jeep and returned to his girlfriend’s house, leaving appellant in the store. 

{¶7} Mr. Adkins, meanwhile, had returned to Key Bank to report the robbery. 

He indicated he had been robbed by a young African-American male wearing a blue 

hooded sweatshirt. Radio traffic as a result of Mr. Adkins’ report was substantial in the 

minutes following the robbery. Officer Crowley of the Painesville Police Department 

responded to Harbor Bait and Tackle, after a radio report indicated that the Fairport 
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Harbor officer had, in fact, observed appellant and Mr. Hurd and had followed them to 

the shop’s parking lot. Officer Crowley observed appellant and Mr. Hurd inside Harbor 

Bait and Tackle and focused his attention on appellant, because appellant was wearing 

a blue top that matched Mr. Adkins’ description of the man who had robbed him. Mr. 

Hurd had apparently taken off his blue sweatshirt, and was wearing a gray tank top 

when he exited the store and left in the silver Jeep. 

{¶8} Officer Crowley approached appellant as he exited the store, stated that 

he matched the description of an individual just reported to have been involved in a 

crime, and then searched appellant. Officer Crowley did not find any weapons on 

appellant’s body. Appellant proceeded to tell Officer Crowley that he did not know the 

man in the silver Jeep, and that after meeting him at an apartment complex, he had 

merely been assisting him in finding the freeway on-ramp. Appellant was detained 

pending investigation. 

{¶9} Officer Ticel of the Painesville Police Department arrived on scene shortly 

thereafter. He learned that one suspect had left the scene and that appellant was 

detained in the back of the Fairport Harbor cruiser. He spoke to appellant, who initially 

stated there was nothing to talk about, but then provided the same story he had told 

Officer Crowley. Officer Ticel thought the story was “highly improbable” and had 

appellant placed in the back of his cruiser pending further investigation. 

{¶10} The investigation led other officers to locate Mr. Hurd and the silver Jeep 

at his girlfriend’s apartment. The officers arrested Mr. Hurd and located the clothing he 

was wearing during the robbery, the bag of money, and the silver handgun on the 

passenger seat of his girlfriend’s other vehicle. Officer Tuttle and Detective Levicky of 
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the Painesville Police Department secured the evidence and dusted the silver Jeep for 

fingerprints. Testing by the Lake County Crime Laboratory confirmed that appellant’s 

fingerprints matched those found on the inside driver’s side door of the silver Jeep and 

that the firearm was operable at the time of the robbery. 

{¶11} Appellant was taken to the Painesville Police station, where he 

subsequently changed his version of the events during questioning. Initially, appellant 

had told Officer Ticel that he did not know Mr. Hurd, but that he had agreed to drive him 

to the freeway entrance. Appellant then changed his story, stating that he had met Mr. 

Hurd at a party a week earlier and then had seen him again that morning. He stated 

that he knew Mr. Hurd as “Little Daddy” and agreed to drive him to go meet a girl. He 

told the police that “Little Daddy” asked him to stop in a parking lot and told appellant 

that he would be right back, while appellant waited in the car. He observed “Little 

Daddy” running back to the car and claimed that he tried to get out and leave, but was 

told to go. Appellant then did as he was told and drove away, but decided to pull into 

the Harbor Bait and Tackle parking lot because he felt something was not right. 

Appellant continuously denied having any knowledge of the robbery. 

{¶12} As the investigation continued, appellant eventually admitted to police that 

he did, in fact, know Mr. Hurd and that they had daily contact over the three-year period 

prior to the robbery. Appellant was arrested, and two cell phones were collected from 

him. Testing done by the Lake County Crime Lab confirmed that Mr. Hurd and 

appellant had utilized the two phones to communicate prior to and on the day of the 

robbery. 
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{¶13} Appellant was indicted September 16, 2011, on one count of aggravated 

robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a first-degree felony; one count of robbery in 

violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), a second-degree felony; and two counts of having a 

weapon while under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) and (A)(3), thirddegree felonies. Both robbery charges also carried two firearm specifications and a 

repeat violent offender specification. 

{¶14} The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2012. Mr. Hurd testified on 

behalf of the state and admitted on the stand to participating in the robbery with 

appellant. He indicated that the initial idea was appellant’s, but that together they 

observed Mr. Adkins, agreed on a plan of action and date for the robbery, and 

conducted the robbery together, with appellant driving and Mr. Hurd actually taking the 

money. Mr. Hurd testified that appellant had provided him with the silver handgun used 

in the robbery. Appellant did not take the stand, nor did he put on any defense 

witnesses or evidence. 

{¶15} A jury found appellant guilty of the aggravated robbery and robbery 

counts, via a theory of complicity. He was found not guilty of both having a weapon 

under a disability counts and the firearm specifications. The trial court merged the two 

robbery counts and sentenced appellant to ten years in prison. The court further found 

appellant to be a repeat violent offender and sentenced him to an additional seven 

years, for a total prison sentence of 17 years. 

{¶16} Appellant timely appealed and now brings the following assignment of 

error: 
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{¶17} “The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant when it 

returned a verdict of guilty against the manifest weight of the evidence.” 

{¶18} To determine whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, a reviewing court must consider the weight of the evidence, including the 

credibility of the witnesses and all reasonable inferences, to determine whether the trier 

of fact “lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 387 (1997). In weighing the evidence submitted at a criminal trial, an 

appellate court must defer to the factual findings of the trier of fact regarding the weight 

to be given the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio 

St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶19} Appellant’s argument that his conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence rests on the circumstantial nature of the evidence against him and what he 

alleges is Mr. Hurd’s lack of credibility. He suggests that the state relied solely on Mr. 

Hurd’s testimony in achieving a conviction against appellant under a theory of 

complicity, and that, as a result, the jury lost its way. A review of the trial testimony and 

exhibits reveals, however, that this is not the case. Although the state relied heavily on 

Mr. Hurd’s testimony, plenty of additional evidence was presented to the jury to support 

appellant’s conviction. 

{¶20} Initially, it must be recognized that circumstantial evidence possesses the 

same probative value as direct evidence. State v. Hendrix, 11th Dist. No. 2011-L-043, 

2012-Ohio-2832, ¶137, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272 (1991). 

“Circumstantial evidence has been defined as testimony not grounded on actual 
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personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from 

which inferences are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be established.” 

State v. Windle, 11th Dist. No. 2010-L-033, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶34, citing State v. Nicely, 

39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt may therefore be 

established by circumstantial evidence. Hendrix, supra, ¶137. Furthermore, “the choice 

between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of 

fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of 

fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). 

{¶21} A review of the record reveals that a variety of evidence was presented for 

the jury’s consideration, and the determination as to weight and credibility of that 

evidence was exclusively within the jury’s purview. The state presented testimonial 

evidence from 12 witnesses, including law enforcement personnel, evidence 

technicians, the victim Mr. Adkins, and Mr. Hurd. Between testimony from Detective 

DeCaro of the Painesville Police that he had observed appellant watching the recycling 

center from across the street the day before the robbery, Mr. Hurd’s testimony regarding 

appellant’s planning of and involvement in the crime, and officer descriptions of 

appellant’s own bizarre explanations during police questioning about what had occurred 

that day, the jury was provided with a clear picture of the events. 

{¶22} In addition, over 13 pieces of physical evidence were admitted into the 

record to support the witness testimony. That evidence included appellant’s versions of 

the events as relayed during his video-taped interviews with police, text messages 

between appellant and Mr. Hurd that unequivocally demonstrated appellant’s 

involvement in the planning and execution of the robbery, and appellant’s fingerprints 
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lifted from the inside of the vehicle used to flee the scene of the crime. It is particularly 

noteworthy that while appellant’s version of the events given to the police changed 

repeatedly, it always conflicted with both Mr. Hurd’s testimony and the physical 

evidence collected. 

{¶23} The state submitted substantial evidence to the jury in support of 

appellant’s conviction, and a review of that evidence reveals that the state clearly met 

its burden of persuasion. This court cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way in 

coming to its final conclusion regarding appellant’s guilt. 

{¶24} The assignment of error is without merit, and the decision of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.