PRESENT: All the Justices

HENRY ANDERSON, JR., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 082416 OPINION BY 

JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 September 18, 2009 

MICHAEL D. DELORE, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 

James W. Updike, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred in 

refusing to issue an injunction requiring the owners of certain real 

property with frontage on Smith Mountain Lake to remove from their 

land a dock and beach area located within the alleged “extended lot 

lines” of an adjacent landowner’s property. 

 Henry Anderson, Jr. and Linda W. Anderson own a parcel of land 

(the Anderson lot) that lies immediately above the 800-foot contour 

of Smith Mountain Lake in Bedford County. Michael D. Delore and 

Deborah Fountain-Delore own property (the Delore lot) that is 

adjacent to the Anderson lot and also lies immediately above the 800-

foot contour. 

 These two parcels derive from a common grantor, the Villamont 

Corporation (Villamont), which in 1958 purchased about 140 acres of 

real property on Smith Mountain Lake for the development of a 

subdivision known as Gross Point. As part of this development, 

Villamont retained ownership of the land below the 800-foot contour 

but conveyed to Appalachian Power Company (the company) a flowage 

easement so that the company can change the level of the water in 
Smith Mountain Lake, up to the 800-foot contour, as needed for the 

operation of a power station. 

 Villamont later conveyed by separate deeds (the Villamont deeds) 

the two lots at issue to the predecessors in interest of the 

Andersons and the Delores. The Villamont deeds were recorded in the 

Bedford County land records and included the following provision: 

There is also granted and conveyed hereby an easement 

of right of way appurtenant to the aforesaid lot over 

and across the strip of land lying immediately between 

the lot herein conveyed and Smith Mountain Lake for 

the purpose of securing access to Smith Mountain Lake 

from the aforesaid property. (emphasis added) 

All later deeds in the chain of title of the Anderson lot 

contained substantially identical language. Thus, when the Andersons 

purchased their lot in 2001, their deed expressly conveyed to them a 

right of way over the “strip of land lying immediately between [the 

Anderson lot] and Smith Mountain Lake.” 

The deed conveying the Delore lot in 2002 did not contain the 

language regarding the easement quoted above, but the deed expressly 

conveyed the land “together with the buildings and improvements 

thereon and the privileges, appurtenances and easements thereunto 

belonging.” Every other deed in the Delores’ chain of title included 

either this language, or the original language establishing an 

easement that was contained in the Villamont deeds. 

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At the time they purchased their lot, the Delores also acquired 

a pre-existing dock structure that was erected in 1979 by one of the 

Delores’ predecessors in interest. The Delores later secured permits 

from American Electric Power Company and the Bedford County 

Department of Planning to replace pre-existing riprap with a beach 

area along the shoreline of Smith Mountain Lake. 

In January 2007, the Andersons filed a complaint against the 

Delores in the circuit court seeking an injunction requiring the 

Delores to remove from their property the dock and the beach area, 

including a sand box and associated riprap. The Andersons alleged 

that these structures encroached within the “extended lot lines” of 

the Anderson lot and interfered with the Andersons’ use and enjoyment 

of their property. 

The Andersons appended to their complaint a “resurvey” of the 

Anderson lot, which was prepared in 2006, that included depictions of 

“extended lot lines” that had not appeared previously on any document 

in the Anderson’s chain of title. These additional lines were drawn 

by extending the existing property lines through the area between the 

800-foot contour to the waters of Smith Mountain Lake. This 

“resurvey” also depicted the Delores’ dock and beach area as lying 

within the “extended lot lines” of the Anderson lot. 

After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

circuit court conducted a hearing. The Andersons argued that by 

virtue of their deed, they have an express easement that affords them 

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exclusive access to Smith Mountain Lake within the “extended lot 

lines” of the Anderson lot. The Andersons also argued that the 

placement of the Delores’ dock violated certain present and prior 

provisions of the Bedford County Zoning Ordinance (the zoning 

ordinance). 

In their motion for summary judgment, the Delores noted that the 

Andersons’ deed did not define the easement by reference to 

“extensions of the lot lines.” The Delores contended that the term 

“immediately” in the Andersons’ deed plainly limited the Andersons’ 

right of access to a path constituting “the shortest distance between 

the lot and the waters of Smith Mountain Lake.” The Delores also 

denied that the placement of the disputed structures violated any 

present or prior provisions of the zoning ordinance. 

 Based on the parties’ pleadings, the documentary evidence, and 

the argument of counsel, the circuit court held that the Delores 

“have not interfered with the [Andersons’] reasonable use and 

enjoyment of their easement to access Smith Mountain Lake.” The 

circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Andersons appealed 

from the circuit court’s judgment. 

 The Andersons assert that their deed conveyed an exclusive right 

of access to Smith Mountain Lake below the 800-foot contour within 

the “extended lot lines” of the Anderson lot. The Andersons argue 

that the Delores’ interpretation of the easement, which would allow 

only a right-of-way over the most direct path to the lake, 

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effectively would convert the land below the 800-foot contour into a 

public beach. The Andersons further argue that the placement of the 

Delores’ dock and other structures lying within the Andersons’ 

“extended lot lines” violated provisions of the present and prior 

zoning ordinances. 

 In response, the Delores assert that the Andersons failed to 

prove that they have an exclusive easement defined by “extended lot 

lines.” The Delores contend that the Andersons are seeking to 

enlarge their property rights beyond the plain language of the 

easement solely in reliance on the 2006 plat. The Delores argue that 

this plat lacks legal efficacy, because it was created after the 

present dispute arose and does not appear in the Andersons’ chain of 

title. The Delores further argue that even if the Andersons are 

correct in defining the easement’s lateral dimensions by reference to 

“extended lot lines,” the Andersons failed to establish that the 

Delores’ dock and beach area have interfered with the Andersons’ 

access to Smith Mountain Lake. The Delores also maintain that the 

record lacks any evidence that their dock and other structures were 

constructed in violation of the present or prior zoning ordinances. 

 In addressing these arguments, we are guided by the following 

general principles. An easement is a privilege held by one landowner 

to use and enjoy certain property of another in a particular manner 

and for a particular purpose. United States v. Blackman, 270 Va. 68, 

76, 613 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2005); Stoney Creek Resort, Inc. v. Newman, 

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240 Va. 461, 464, 397 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1990); Bunn v. Offutt, 216 Va. 

681, 684, 222 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1976). We have described this 

privilege as encompassing an affirmative right to use and enjoy the 

encumbered property free from interference by the grantor of the 

easement or by other persons. Bunn, 216 Va. at 684, 222 S.E.2d at 

525. Easements can be created by express grant or reservation, or by 

implication, estoppel, or prescription. Nelson v. Davis, 262 Va. 

230, 235, 546 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2001); Bunn, 216 Va. at 684, 222 

S.E.2d at 525. 

 In resolving a dispute between landowners regarding the terms of 

an easement that is granted or reserved expressly by deed, we apply 

the customary rules governing the construction of written documents. 

Pyramid Development, L.L.C. v. D&J Associates, 262 Va. 750, 754, 553 

S.E.2d 725, 728 (2001); Cushman Virginia Corp. v. Barnes, 204 Va. 

245, 251, 129 S.E.2d 633, 639 (1963); Hamlin v. Pandapas, 197 Va. 

659, 663-64, 90 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1956). Thus, we ascertain the 

rights of the parties from the words set forth in their deeds. 

Pyramid Development, 262 Va. at 754, 553 S.E.2d at 728; Cushman, 204 

Va. at 251, 129 S.E.2d at 639; Hamlin, 197 Va. at 663-64, 90 S.E.2d 

at 833. 

 A deed may expressly create an easement but fail to define 

specifically its dimensions. See Waskey v. Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 211, 

294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982); Cushman, 204 Va. at 252, 129 S.E.2d at 

639. When this situation occurs, and the deed language does not 

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state the object or purpose of the easement, the determination of the 

easement’s scope “is made by reference to the intention of the 

parties to the grant,” ascertained from the circumstances pertaining 

to the parties and the land at the time of the grant. Waskey, 224 

Va. at 211, 294 S.E.2d at 881; accord Cushman, 204 Va. at 252, 129 

S.E.2d at 639. However, if the granting language states the object 

or purpose of the easement, the dimensions of the easement may be 

inferred “to be such as are reasonably sufficient for the 

accomplishment of that object.” Hamlin, 197 Va. at 664, 90 S.E.2d 

834. 

 The issuance of an injunction to prevent encroachment within the 

boundaries of an easement is an equitable remedy, and the proponent 

of such remedy bears the burden of proving facts establishing the 

easement and the need for the relief sought. See Shenandoah Acres, 

Inc. v. D.M. Conner, Inc., 256 Va. 337, 342-33, 505 S.E.2d 369, 371-

72 (1998); Rosso & Mastracco, Inc. v. Giant Food, 200 Va. 159, 161, 

104 S.E.2d 776, 778-79 (1958); Harless v. Malcolm, 197 Va. 56, 57, 87 

S.E.2d 817, 817-18 (1955). The decision whether to grant injunctive 

relief lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and an 

appellate court will not disturb the circuit court’s judgment on 

appeal unless the judgment is plainly wrong. Nishanian v. Sirohi, 

243 Va. 337, 340, 414 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1992); Blue Ridge Poultry & 

Egg Co., Inc. v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 144, 176 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1970). 

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 In the present case, the Andersons bore the burden of proving 

that their easement below the 800-foot contour included the land on 

which the Delores allegedly have encroached. See Magee v. Omansky, 

187 Va. 422, 431, 46 S.E.2d 443, 448 (1948). Upon our review of the 

record, we conclude that the Andersons failed to satisfy their 

evidentiary burden. 

 The Anderson’s deed conveyed an easement “over and across the 

strip of land lying immediately between the lot . . . and Smith 

Mountain Lake.” By its plain terms, this deed did not specify the 

lateral dimensions of the easement over the described “strip of 

land.” The only reference in the deed relevant to the location of 

the easement is found in the words “immediately between.” Moreover, 

the deed does not contain any reference to the term “extended lot 

lines.” 

 In the absence of express language specifying the lateral 

dimensions of the easement or otherwise describing its scope, the 

Andersons were required to present evidence that the grantors of the 

Villamont deeds intended to convey an easement to the Andersons’ 

predecessors in title over property from the 800-foot contour to the 

water’s edge encompassing the disputed area on which the Delores’ 

improvements lie. The Andersons, however, did not present such 

evidence. They failed to offer any testimony addressing this issue, 

and the only documents they presented were the deeds in the parties’ 

respective chains of title, the permits and related documentation 

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concerning the Delores’ structures at issue, and the 2006 plat 

prepared after the present dispute arose. 

 We observe that in certain instances involving subdivisions 

created by a common grantor, we have determined the grantor’s intent 

by reference to a common scheme of development. See Forster v. Hall, 

265 Va. 293, 300, 576 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (2003); Mid-State Equipment 

Co., Inc. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 141, 225 S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976). We 

are unable to do so in this case, however, because the record lacks 

any evidence regarding other conveyances by Villamont to property 

owners in the Gross Point subdivision. Therefore, we conclude that 

the record before us fails to support the Andersons’ claim of 

encroachment based on their theory of “extended lot lines,” and that 

the circuit court was not plainly wrong in refusing the Andersons’ 

request for injunctive relief. 

 In reaching this conclusion, we do not decide the lateral 

dimensions of the particular easement before us. We hold only that 

with regard to the present allegations of encroachment, the Andersons 

failed to meet their burden of proof. Thus, our holding is limited 

to the particular encroachment alleged here by the Andersons and does 

not preclude a future request for injunctive relief involving 

structures other than the beach area, rip rap, and dock, as presently 

configured, which are the subject of this litigation. 

 Finally, we find no merit in the Andersons’ request for 

injunctive relief based on the Delores’ alleged zoning ordinance 

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violations. Those present and prior zoning ordinances do not create 

a private right of action but, like other such ordinances, authorize 

localities to adopt regulations limiting the use and development of 

property and to seek the imposition of penalties for violations of 

those regulations. See Code §§ 15.2-2280, 15.2-2286(A)(5); Shilling 

v. Jimenez, 268 Va. 202, 207-08, 597 S.E.2d 206, 209-10 (2004). 

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in declining 

to grant the Andersons relief based on the zoning ordinance 

provisions. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

Affirmed.

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