1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: F eb ru ar

y 18, 201 5 4 N O. 33, 150 5 FL AGS TAR

BA NK, FS B, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 JONA THA N K . L ICHA , and 9 PAMELA S. MACKENZ IE -LI CHA, 10 hus ba nd a nd w ife ; et a l., 11 D ef

en dants -Appe llants . 12 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF SOC ORR O C OUN TY 13 Ed m un d H. Ka se III , D ist ri ctJu dg e 14 Sutin, T hay er & Brow ne, P .C. 1 5 M i c h e l l e K. Os t rye 16 Justi n R. S aw y er 17 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 18 for Appellee 19 Er ic O rtiz L aw 20 E ri c N
. O rt iz 21 Joseph C. Gonzales 22 Je anY
. Chu 23 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 24 fo r Appe llants1 OPIN ION

2 GAR CIA , Jud ge. 3 { 1} De fendants Jon athan K. Licha and Pam ela S. MacK enzie-L icha (the L ichas), 4 ap pe al the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r gr an tin g su m m ar y j udgm en t f

or f or ec los ur e in f

av or 5 of Plaintiff F lagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar). The L ichas prim arily assert on appeal that 6 iss ue s of

f ac t c onc er

nin g F la gst ar ’s s tandi ng t o e nf or ce the not e an d m ortga ge 7 p r e c l u d e ds u mmary j u d g me n t . We d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e L i c h a s a n da f f i rm. 8 BACKGRO UND 9 A . Th e Lo an an d th e D ist ri ctC ou rtP ro ce ed in gs 10 { 2} O n Ma r c h 4 , 2 0 0 9 , t h e L i c h a s e x e c u t e dap r o m i s s o ry n o t e t o L en din g 11 So lut ion s, I nc . ( L en din g S olu tio ns) to bor ro w $181 , 878. A s sec ur ity fo r the loan, the 12 L ic ha s si gne d am ortga ge c ontra ct w ith Mor

tga ge E le ctro nic Re gis tr at ionS y ste m s, 13 Inc. (ME RS), as the n om inee for Le ndin g Solutio ns. O n July18, 2011, Flagstar f iled 14 a fo re cl osur e co m

pla int a ga ins t th e Licha s, a lle gin g th at F la gst ar w as the c ur

re nt 15 hol de r of

the not e and the m ortga ge an d that the L ic ha s we re in def au lt. T he c opy

of 16 the not e tha t Fla gst ar atta ch ed to its co m pla int co nta ine d an indor se m en t signe d by 17 Ry an P. Tall y , vi ce p res id en t o f Len di ng So lu ti on s, al on g wi th th e wor ds , “ PAY TO 18 O RD E R O F: F L A G ST A R B A N K , F SB W IT H O U T RE CO U RS E
. ” Fl agstar al so 19 attached to its com

plaint a copy

of the m ortgage wi t h M ER S and a copy of a2

1 m ortga ge a ssi gnm en t f ro m ME RS to Fl ag star da te d Apr il 29, 201 1. 2 { 3} T he L ic ha s fi le d a pr o se m oti on as kin g the dis tr ic t co urt to dis m iss the 3 com plaint on the basis that the com plaint had failed to state a claim upon which re lief 4 co u l d b e g r a n t e d
. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt s u m m a r i l y d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n . F l a g s t ar f ile d a 5 m oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t, w hic h it la te r w ith dr ewto giv e the L ic ha s op portun ity 6 to answ er

the c om pla int
. T he L ic ha s the n re ta ine d co unse l, w ho fi le d an an sw er to the 7 com plaint on their behalf. The answer asserted, am ong o ther things , that F lagstar 8 lacked standing to bring th e com plaint because it w as not “ the hold er in due course” 9 an d b ecau se itwas “ no t t he co nt ract ua l p art y wit h re sp ect to th e tr an sa ct io n.” 10 { 4} Flagstar re newed its sum m ary j udgm ent m otion , a sserting that it was “ entitled 11 to enforce the [ n] ote and [m ] ortgage” b ec au s e th e note and m ortgage we re 12 “ transferr ed and assigned to [Flagstar] .” In suppo rt of this assertion, Flagstar re ferr ed 13 to a copy of the ME RS assignm ent that it had attached to its com plaint and it attached 14 an aff idavit of Lisa Jones, an e m ploy ee of F lagstar. In her af fidavit, Ms. Jones stated 15 that “ [t ] he or igi na l [n ] ote is m ai nta ine d in a vault at F la gst ar [, ] ” that “ Fl ag star’ s va ult 16 doc um en t m an ag em en t sy ste m ” ind ic at es “ that F la gst ar he ld p oss es sio n of

the 17 original [n ]o t e when it comm enced the instant foreclosure action,” that Flagstar 18 co nti nue s to “ hol d[ ] poss es sio n of the or igi na l [n ] ote [, ] ” an d that sh e “ re vie w ed the 19 co py of the [ n] ote . . . a nd h a[s ] co nf irm ed that i t i s atr

ue a nd c or

re ct c opy of the3

1 original [n] ote that is m aintained at Flagstar. ” Attached to this affidavit w ere copies 2 of the note containin g the i n d o rs em ent to Flagstar, the m ortgage, and the MERS 3 as sig nm en t, w hic h a

ppe ar to be ide nti ca l t o the doc um en ts tha t F la gst ar a tta ch ed to 4 its c om pla int
. 5 { 5} Inr es pons e to Fl ag star’ s re ne w ed sum m ar y j udgm en t m oti on, the L ic ha s m ad e 6 f o u r a rg u m en t s re l ev an tt o t h i s ap p ea l . Th ei r f i rs tar g u m en tco n ce rn ed Fl ag s t ar ’s 7 standin g to foreclose. They argu ed t h at there w ere factual disputes abou t whether 8 Le n d i ng Soluti ons auth orized ME RS to assign the m ortgage to Flagstar, whether 9 Fl ag star ga ve a ny

c onsi de ratio n f

or the a ssi gnm en t of

the no te an d m ortga ge , a nd 10 w he the r Fl ag star w as the curr en t ow ne r of the m ortga ge . I n su ppor t of the ir a sse rt ion 11 that F la gst ar

w as not the ow ne r of

the m ortga ge , the L ic ha s su bm itt ed a n a ff idavit of 12 Van es sa DeN ir o, a n a tto rn ey w ho p er fo rm ed

a“ loan audi t” f

or the L ic ha s. Ms
. 13 De Niro stated in h er affidavit that, based on her re search, Ginnie Mae wa s the owner 14 of the m ortga ge loan. H er

a ff idavit a lso c ont ai ne d num ero us leg al a rg um en ts and 15 co nc lu si on s o f la w. 16 { 6} Se co nd, the L ic ha s arg ue d th at the y sho uld ha ve be ena ff

or de d an op portun ity 17 to c ondu ct

a ddi tio na l di sc ove ry

on the iss ue of

w he the r Fl ag star ha d st an din g to 18 foreclose. Third, they argued that the district court sho uld sanctio n Flagstar for “bad 19 faith d iscovery tactics” because it stated in its responses to the Lichas’ interrogatories4

1 that the “ subj ec t l oan” w as “ ow ne d by F la gst ar” wh en the “ tr

ue ow ne r is [ G inn ie 2 Mae] .” Fourth, they

argued that “ there w as a potential violatio n of [the] Hom e L oan 3 Pro te ct io n Act .” 4 { 7} In its reply , F lagstar m oved to strike the D eN iro aff idavit because, am ong o ther 5 re as ons, the a ff

idavit co nta ine d state m en ts that w er e “ ina dm iss ibl e he ar say , vio la te 6 the best e vidence rule[, ] or are inadm issib le legal conclusion s.” F lagstar argued that 7 the L i c h a s d i dn o th a v e s t a n d i n g t o c h a l l e n g e t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n p a i df o r t he 8 assignm ent of the m or t g ag e to Flagstar. Flagstar a lso attached an affidavit and an 9 exhibit to its reply showing an undated endorsem ent in blank by Flagstar on the back 10 of the note. 11 { 8} W ithou t hold ing a hear i ng , the d istrict court entered an order granting su m

m ary 12 j udgm en t i n f

av or of F la gst ar , in w hic h it

c onc lud ed th at

F la gst ar w as e nti tle d to 13 en fo rc e the not e an d m ortga ge . In the sa m e or de r, it str uc k the D eN ir o a ff

idavit a nd 14 de nie d th e L ic ha s’ r eque st f or a ddi tio na l di sc ove ry , but it did not dis cu ss the r ea sons 15 for these decisions. It late r denied the Lic has’ m otion to reconsider. 16 B. A rg um en ts on A pp ea l 17 { 9} All but one of the ar g u m ents set forth in the Lichas’ brief in chief we re 18 preserved in the district court. T he unpreserved ar g um ent asserts that the Jones 19 af fi da vi t att ac he d to F la gst ar ’ s su m m ar y j udgm en t m oti on d id n ot s howthat M s.5

1 Jone s ha d “pe rs ona l kn ow le dge ” co nc er nin g he r state m e n t

th at F la gst ar

pos se sse d th e 2 o ri g i n al n o t e o n t h e d at e i tfi l ed fo r f o re cl o s u re b ec au s e s h e r el i ed o n Fl ag s t ar ’s 3 co m put er sy ste m f or thi s inf orm at ion
. F la gst ar

c or re ct ly c ount er s th at

the L ic ha s di d 4 not r ai se thi s arg um en t in the dis tr ic t c ourt. T hus, w e do n ot a ddr es s th is i ssu e 5 be ca use the L ic ha s do not ar gue , an d w e do not fi nd, that w e shou ld a ppl y the pub lic 6 i nt e r e st e xc e pt i ont o t he r

ul e t hatapp e l l a t e c ourt s do n ot a ddr e ss u np r eserved 7 a r gu m en ts . See Ru le 12 -2 16 NMRA; O ’N ee l v

. U SA A I ns. Co

. , 2 0 0 2
- N M C A -0 28, 8 ¶ 3 2 , 1 3 1 N
. M
. 6 3 0 , 4 1 P
. 3 d 3 5 6 ( d e c l i n i n g t o c o n s i d e r u np r e s e rv e d ar gum en ts o n 9 appeal wher e there wa s no basis to apply the general public interest exception). 10 { 10} The f

ive preserved argum ents that the Lichas renew in their brief in chief are 11 whether: ( 1) T here w ere dispu ted issues of m aterial fact regarding whether Flagstar 12 was th e hold er

of the not e an d th e m ortga ge ; ( 2) T he L ic ha s have standi ng t o 13 challenge the validityof the assignm ent of the note and m ortgage; (3) T he De Niro 14 af fi da vit sho uld not ha ve be en str ic ke n; (4) T he dis tr ic t cour t shoul d have al low ed

the 15 L ic ha s m or e tim e to con duc t addi tio na l disc ove ry ; and ( 5) T he dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d 16 ha ve he ld a he ar ing be fo re it de ci de d to str ike the D eN ir o af fi da vit , de ny

the L ic ha s’ 17 req u es t for bad fa ith dis covery sanctions agains t Flagstar, and grant summ ary 18 j udgm ent in favor of Flagstar.6

1 { 11} The L ichas did no t renewvarious oth er issu es i n their b rief in chief that they 2 raised in the district court. Howe ver, because Flagstar raises tw o of these addition al 3 iss ue s init s answ er

br ie f an d th e L ic ha s a ddr es s th em in th ei r re ply br ie f, w e sha ll 4 dis cu ss the m

in thi s op ini on. Se e Bras he ar v . P ac ke rs , 199 4- N MS C- 108, ¶ 7, 118 5 N
. M. 581 , 883 P
. 2d 1 278 (“ [I ] f anappe lle e ra ise s an ar gum en t no t a ddr es se d by the 6 ap pe llant i n its ope nin g br ie f, the appe llant m ay r ep ly
. ” (a lte ratio n, int er

na l qu otatio n 7 m arks, and citation om itted)). Th ese tw o additio nal issues are w hether ME RS w as 8 authorized to assig n the m ortgage to Flagstar and whether the Lichas’ contention that 9 the original lend er “ m ay have” violated the Hom e L oan Protection Act pre cl udes 10 summ ary

j udgm ent in favor of Flagstar. 11 DISC US SION 12 A. Stand ard of R eview 13 { 12} W e re vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r gr an tin g su m m ar y j udgm en t de nov o. 14 Summe rs v. A rdent Health Servs., L. L. C. , 2011 -N MS C- 017, ¶ 10, 150 N
. M. 123 , 257 15 P. 3d 9 43. “ Sum

m ary judg m en t i s a

ppr opr ia te w he re the re a re no g enuin e iss ue s of 16 m aterial fact and the m ovant is enti tled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. ” M ont gom er y 17 v. Lomos Al t o s , I

n c. , 2007-NMS C-002, ¶ 16, 141 N. M. 21, 150 P.3d 971 (internal 18 quot at ionm ar

ks and cit at ion om itt ed ). “ O n r ev ie w , w e ex am ine the w hol e re co rd f or 19 an y e vid en ce that pla ce s a ge nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t i n di sput e, a nd w e vie wthe7

1 fa ct s in a li gh t m ost

f av or ab le to the party

opp osi ng the m oti on and drawa ll 2 reasonable inferen ce s i n s uppo rt of a tr ial on the m erits[. ] ” Handmaker v . H enney , 3 1999 -N MS C- 043, ¶ 18, 128 N
. M. 328, 992 P. 2d 8 79 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and 4 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). T he party m ovi ng f

or sum m ary jud gm en t ha s th e bur de n “ to 5 es ta bli sh tha t no ge nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l fa ct ex ist s fo r tr ia l an d that the m ovant i s 6 e nt i t l e d t o j ud gm e nt

a s am a t t e r

o f law .” C & H

Co nstr. & P av ing

Co

. v . Ci tiz en s 7 B ank, 197 9- N MC A -0 77, ¶ 9, 93 N
. M. 150 , 597 P.2 d 11 90. H ow ev er , “ [t ] he party 8 oppo sing a m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent cannot defeat the m otion
. . . by the bare 9 contentio n that an issu e of fa ct exists, but m ust sh ow that evidence is available w hich 10 would justify a t ri al of the issue.” Spe ars v . Ca non de Ca rnue L and G rant , 196 9- 11 N MS C- 163, ¶ 12 , 8 0 N.M. 766 , 461 P
. 2d 4 15; see G uest v
. B erardi ne lli , 200 8- 12 NMC A- 144, ¶ 35, 145 N. M. 186 , 195 P. 3d 353 (“ Ge neral assertions of the existence 13 of a triable issue ar e insufficient to overcom e sum m ary j udgm ent on appeal.”). 14 B. Stand ing 15 { 13} St an din g is aj ur isd ic tio na l pr er equis ite that “ m ay not be w ai ve d an d m ay

be 16 raised at any stage of the proceedings, even sua sponte bythe appellate court. ” B ank 17 of N

. Y. v . R om er o , 2014 -N MS C- 007, ¶ 15, 320 P
. 3d 1 ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and 18 citation om itted). Plaintiffs who b ring foreclosure actions m ust dem onstrate that they 19 ha d th e rig ht to e nf

or ce the not e an d m ortga ge a t the ti m e that the y f ile d th e8

1 fo recl os ur e su it
. Id

. ¶ 17. 2 1. Right to Enf

orce t he N ote 3 { 14} To e sta

bli sh the ri ght to en fo rc e a ne got ia ble ins tr um en t suc h as a not e, a 4 plain t i f f m us ts ho wt hati ti s: ( 1) t he “ ho l de r ” o f t he i ns t r um e nt ; ( 2) a“ nonh older” 5 who possesses th e instrum ent and has the rights of a hold er; or (3) a person who do es 6 not pos se ss the ins tr

um en t, but

is none the le ss en tit le d to e nf or ce it pur suant t o c er

ta in 7 pr ovi sio ns o f the U nif orm Co m m er ci al Co de ( U CC ). N MS A 197 8, § 55 -3 -3 01 8 (1 992) ; se e R om er o , 201 4- N MS C- 007, ¶ 20. T he U CC de fi ne s th e “ hol de r” of the 9 ins tr um en t, in pe rt ine nt p ar

t, a s “ the pe rs on i n po sse ssi on o f a ne got ia ble ins tr um en t 10 that i s pay ab le e ith er to be ar er

or to anide nt ified p er son that i s th e pe rs on i n 11 poss es sio n[ .] ” NMSA 1 97 8, § 55 -1 -2 01 (b )(2 1) (A) (2 00 5) ; se e R om ero , 2014-NMS C12 007, ¶ 21 . Athi rd

party w ho i s no t the pay ee of the ins tr um en t “ m

ust pr ove both 13 phy sic al pos se ssi on and the r igh t t o e nf

or ce m en t thr oughe ith er

apr ope r ind or se m en t 14 or a transfer by

negotiatio n.” R om er o , 201 4-NMS C-007, ¶ 21. T he UC C re cognizes 15 tw o ki nds of in do rs em en ts f or the pur pose of ne got ia tin g an in str

um en t: a blank 16 in do rs em en t an d a sp eci al in do rs em en t. Id

. ¶¶ 24-25. “ A blank indorsem ent . . . does 17 not ide nt ify a pe rs on t o w hom the ins tr um en t i s pay ab le [, ] but

ins te ad m ak es it 18 pay able to any one who hold s it as bearer paper. ” Id

. ¶ 24 (c iti ng NM SA 1978 , § 55 -3
- 19 205( b) (1 992) ). “ [A ] spe ci al ind or se m en t ‘ ide nti fi es ape rs on t o w hom it m ak es the9

1 instrum ent pay able.’ ” Romero , 2 01 4- N M S C
- 00 7, ¶ 2 5 ( qu ot i ng Section 55-3-20 5(a))
. 2 “ Whe n sp ec ia lly

ind or se d, a n in str

um en t be co m es pay ab le to the i de nti fi ed pe rs on 3 and m ay

be negotiated onl y

by the indorsem en t o f t h at person.” R om er o , 201 4- 4 NMS C-007, ¶ 25 (internal quot ation m arks and citation om itted). 5 { 15} Inthi s c as e, be ca use the pay ee of

the not e w as L en din g S olu tio ns, w e m ust 6 determ ine whether Flagstar provided sufficient evidence of how it becam e the holder 7 by eit he r an in do rs em en t o r tr an sf er. Se e id. ¶ 21. B ecause the note that Flags tar 8 atta ch ed

to its c om

plain t w as spe ci al ly

ind or se d by

L en din g S olu tio ns, ide nti fy ing 9 Flagst a r

a s t he p e r so n t o w ho m

t he n ot e w a s pay abl e , w e c on c l ud e t hatF l agstar 10 providedsufficient evidence that it wa s the hold er of the note with the right to enforce 11 it un de r th e UCC. Se e id. ; § 55-3-301 ; § 55-1-201 (b)(21)(A ); § 55-3-205(a). 12 { 16} D ur ing the sum m ar y j udgm en t pr oc ee din gs, F la gst ar sub m itt ed

ac opy of the 13 ba ck pa ge of the n ot e show ing that F la gst ar ha d in dor se d th e not e in b lank. T he 14 L ic ha s arg ue that Fl agstar’ s bl an k in dor se m en t onthe ba ck of the not e w as a 15 “ conflicting in dorsem ent[] ” that cre ated an issue of fac t precluding su m m ary 16 j udgm en t. W e dis ag re e. F la gst ar ’ s bl an k in dorse m en t i s c onsi ste nt w ithL en din g 17 So lut ion ’ s sp ec ia l i ndor se m en t to Fl ag star. Be ca use F la gst ar

ha s sh ow n th at

it is the 18 hol de r of

the not e due to L en din g S olu tio ns’ s pe cia l i ndor se m en t, the e ff ec t of 19 Fl ag star’ s bl an k in dor se m en t i s to al low Fl ag star to ne got ia te , or tr an sf er , the not e to10

1 an ot he r pe rs on . See NMS A 197 8, § 55-3-201 (a) (1992) (defining “ [n] egotiation ” as 2 “a t r a n s f

e r o f p o s s e s s i o n , w h e t h e r

v o l u n t a ry o r

i n v o l u n t a ry, o f

a n i n s t r u men tb y a 3 pe rs on o the r than the iss ue r to a pe rs on who the re by

be co m es it s ho lde r” ); Casarez 4 v. G arc ia , 1983-NMC A- 013, ¶ 16, 99 N .M. 508, 660 P. 2d 598 (rec ogni zing that when 5 a n o t e i s s p ec i al l y i n d o rs ed t o a t ra n s fe re e, t h at t ra n s fe re e may “ fu rt h ern eg o t i at e[ ]” 6 the not e “ onl y

by his ind or se m ent” ). T he L ic ha s have not c la im ed that the re is 7 ev ide nc e that F la gst ar , a ft er ind or sin g the not e in b lank, ha d tr an sf er re d th e not e to 8 an oth er pe rs on. W ith out suc h ev ide nc e, Fl ag star’ s blank ind or se m en t on the not e it 9 co nti nue s to hol d ha s no e ff ec t onthe iss ue s w e ad dr es s inthi s a ppe al
. 10 2. R igh t to F or ec los e th e M or tg age 11 { 17} Our S uprem e Court has rec ently held that wher e a plaintiff has not establi shed 12 th e ri gh t t o e nf

or ce t he no te , itcan no t fo recl os e th e m or tg ag e, ev en if e vi de nc e sh ows 13 th at th e m or tg ag e was ass ig ne d t o t he pl ai nt iff
. Se e R om er o , 201 4- N MS C- 007, ¶ ¶ 34- 14 35. In doing so , the S uprem e Court included quo tations fr o m various autho rities 15 re co gni zi ng tha t w he re the f orecl os in g plai nti ff

e sta bli she s th e ri ght

to en fo rc e the 16 note, the plaintiff autom atically has the right to foreclose the m ortgage that secures 17 th e n ot e. Se e id
. ¶

35. A uth or iti es in N ewMe xic o and el se w he re ar e co nsi ste nt w ith 18 th is pri nc ip le
. Se e, e . g. , Simson v. B ilderbeck, I nc. , 196 6- N MS C- 170, ¶

¶ 13- 14, 76 19 N
. M. 667 , 417 P
. 2d 8 03 ( re co gni zi ng tha t “ [i ] t ha s f re que ntl y be enhe ld tha t a11

1 m ortga ge is but

a n in ci de nt t o th e de bt, the paym en t of w hic h it se cure s, a nd i ts 2 ownership follows the assignm ent of the debt” and concludin g t hat the plaintiff, 3 “ [h] aving a right .
. . to e nforce the note, . . . c ouldforec lose the m ortgage” (internal 4 quot at ionm ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed )) ; 55 A m . Jur
. 2d Mort gages § 92 7 ( 2009 ) 5 (“ G en er al ly , the tr an sf

er or as sig nm en t of a ne got ia ble pr om iss or

y not e carr ie s w ith 6 it, as an incident, a deed of trust or m ortgage upon rea l estate or chattels that secure 7 its paym en t. T he m ortga ge f oll ow s th e debt, in the se nse that the a ssi gnm en t of the 8 not e ev ide nc ing the de bt a uto m at ic al ly

c ar ri es w ithit

the a ssi gnm en t of

the 9 m ortga ge . . . . A n a ssi gnm en t of the obl igatio n op er at es a s an as sig nm en t of the 10 m ortga ge a s e ff

ec tiv el y f or a ll pur pose s a s af

orm al w ri tte n a ssi gnm en t. T he re is no 11 necessity

for the granting or rec ording o f a separ ate m ortgage assignm ent . ” ( footnot es 12 om itted)). 13 { 18} Co nsi ste nt w iththe se author iti es , w e cl ar if y that i n or de r to d em onstrate 14 standin g to bring a m ortgage foreclosure action, the plaintiff m ust establish that it had 15 the ri ght to e nf

or ce the not e at

the ti m e it fi le d su it an d th at the not e w as se cure d by 16 a m ortgage—the plainti ff nee d not add itio n ally establish th at the m ortgage wa s 17 fo rm al ly

a ssi gne d be ca

use the ri ght to en fo rc e the m ortga ge au tom at ic al ly f oll ow s th e 18 rig ht to en fo rce t he no te . Se e R om er o , 201 4- N MS C- 007, ¶ 35; Sim son , 1966-NMS C19 170, ¶ ¶ 13- 14; 55 A m . Jur
. 2d Mortgages § 92 7. T he re fo re , the L ic ha s’ c ha lle nge to12

1 the ME RS a ssi gnm en t w as not a m at er ia l i ssu e that pr ec lud ed sum m ar y j udgm en t 2 because, when F lagstar established the right t o en force the note, Flagstar 3 au to m at ic al ly esta bl is he d i ts rig ht to en fo rce t he m or tg ag e. S e e R om er o , 201 4- 4 N M S C
- 0 0 7 , ¶

35; see also Rome ro v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 200 9- N MC A -0 22, ¶ 12, 5 145 N
. M. 658, 203 P
. 3d 8 73 ( “ A n is sue of f ac t i s ‘ m at er ia l’ if

the e xis te nc e (o r non6 ex ist en ce ) of

the f ac t i s of co nse que nc e unde r the sub stanti ve r ule s of lawgov er

nin g 7 th e p art ie s’ di sp ut e.”), rev’d on other gro unds by 2010 -N MS C- 035, 148 N
. M. 713 , 8 242 P. 3d 2 80; Sim son , 1966 -N MS C- 170, ¶¶ 13- 14; 55 A m . Jur
. 2d Mortgages § 92 7. 9 3. C on sid er at ion 10 { 19} W e re

j ec t the L ic ha s’ a rg um en t tha t the que sti on o f w he the r Fl ag star ga ve 11 consideration for th e n ote and m ortgage wa s a m aterial issue that precluded sum m ary 12 j udgm ent. T he Lic has cite n o au t h ority and this Cou rt has found no authority that 13 requires the holder of a note, as the plaintiff in a foreclosure a ction, to establish th at 14 it ga ve c onsi de ratio n to the or ig in al lende r fo r the r igh t t o e nf or ce the not e an d 15 m or tg ag e. Alt h o u g h N e w Mex ic o c ou rts ha ve no t d ire ct ly add res se d t hi s i ss ue , we 16 ag re e w iththe w ei ght of auth or ity

that c onc lud es that pe rson s m ay not r ai se the 17 de fe nse of la ck of co nsi de ratio n w he re the y w er e not part ie s to the tr an sf

er be ca use 18 su ch de fen se is av ai labl e on ly to t he pa rti es to th e tr an sf er. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages 19 § 41 2 ( 2009 ) (“ A n a ssi gnm en t of am ortga ge m

us t be s uppo rt ed

by agoo d and13

1 va lua ble c onsi de ratio n inor de r to b e va lid as between the parties
. H ow ev er , the w an t 2 of c onsi de ratio n is not

a va ila ble a s ade fe nse to one w ho w as n ot a party to the 3 assignm ent and hence wa s not th ereby injured [.] ” (e m

phasis add ed) (f

ootn otes 4 om itt ed )) ; R ee ves v . R ec onT rus t C o. , 846 F
. S upp. 2d 1 149, 1164 ( D
. O r. 201 2) 5 (c onc ludin g th at the de fe nse of la ck of c onsi de ratio n is not

a va ila ble to thi rd -p ar

ty 6 debto r s t o vo i d t he m or t ga ge a ss i gn m e nt t o M E R S )
. T he r e f or e , be c aus e t he Lic has 7 w er e not

part ie s to the tr an sf

er of the not e and m ortga ge fr om L en din g S olu tio ns t o 8 Fl ag star, w e co nc lud e that the L ic ha s’ la ck -o f- co nsi de ratio n arg um en t do es not r ai se 9 aniss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t pr ec lud ing sum

m ar y j udgm en t. 10 C . Ex cl us ion of

t he D eN ir o A ff

id avi t 11 { 20} W e re view a di s t ri ct court’ s decision to strike an aff idavit at the summ ary 12 jud gm en t s ta ge of t he pro ce e d i ng s fo r an ab us e o f di sc ret io n. See Ak ins v. U nited 13 St eelwo rk

er s o f Am. , 2 0 0 9 -N M CA -0 5 1 , ¶4 0 , 1 4 6 N.M . 2 3 7 , 2 0 8 P. 3 d4 5 7 (“W e 14 re vie wadis tr ic t cou rt’s dec isi on t o a dm it or e xc lud e ev ide nc e fo r ab use of 15 discretion.”), aff’d

2 0 1 0
- N M S C
- 0 3 1 , 1 4 8 N
. M
. 4 4 2 , 2 3 7 P
. 3 d744 ; Mitchael v. 16 Intracorp , I

nc. , 179 F. 3d 84 7, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1 9 9 9 ) (“Li ke other evidentiary 17 rulings , w e re view a d i s t ri ct court’ s decision to exclude evidence at the sum m ary 18 j udgm en t st ag e fo r ab use of dis cr et ion
. ” (i nter na l qu otatio n m ar ks and c itatio n 19 om itt ed ))
. I n do ing so, w e “ pr es um e[ ] that the dis tr ic t cour t [w a] s cor

re ct ” and “ the14

1 burden is on the appellant to clearly dem onstrate the district court’ s error. ” A ki ns , 2 20 0 9
- N M C A
- 0 5 1 , ¶

4 0
. A f f i d a v i t s s up p o rt i n g o r

o p p o s i n g as u m

m a ry j u d gm en t 3 m oti on 4 sha ll be m ad e on p er sona l know le dge , sha ll se t f orth s uc h f

ac ts a s w oul d 5 be a dm iss ibl e in e vid en ce , a nd s ha ll showa ff irm at ive ly

that the a ff

iant 6 is com

petent to testify

to the m atters stated therein. Sw orn or certified 7 co pie s of

a ll pa pe rs or part s th er eo f re fe rr ed to in an a ff idavit sha ll be 8 atta ch ed

the re to o r se rv ed

the re w ith
. 9 Ru le 1- 056( E ) N MR

A
. A t the sum

m ar y j udgm en t st ag e, a di st ric t cour t “ m ust 10 consider e vidence even i f t h e form of the e vid en ce , suc h a s ade posi tio n, w oul d be 11 i na dm i ss i bl e a t t r i a l , ” bu t “ i t c a nn ot c on si de r e vi de nc e i f the subs tance of the 12 evidence is inadm issib le at trial. ” W ild e v. W es tla nd D ev . Co

. , 201 0- N MC A -0 85, 13 ¶ 2 8, 1 48 N.M. 62 7, 2 41 P.3d 62 8 (f irs t em ph as is ad de d) . For in st an ce, “ he ars ay . . . 14 is not generally adm issib le at trial, so a ffidavits or depositi ons cont aining h earsay are 15 not sufficie nt e vidence of a fa ct.” Id

. (internal q uotatio n m arks and citation om itted). 16 Furtherm ore, opini ons of witnesses concerning qu estions of law are inadm issib le at 17 tri al
. Se e B ea l v

. S. U nio n G as C

o. , 196 0- N MS C- 019, ¶

¶ 29- 30, 66 N
. M. 424 , 349 18 P. 2d 3 37. 19 { 21} Ms
. D eN i r o s t a t e di n h e r a f f i d a v i tt h a ts h e h a d

p e r f o rm e da“ M o rt ga ge 20 Se curi tiz at ion A na ly sis an d L eg al Ch ai n of T itl e Re port” ba se d onhe r re se ar cha nd 21 an al y sis of “ doc um en ts[ ] ” and “ co unty re co rd s[ , ] ” and he r use of “ int er ne t t ool s and15

1 c o m m e r c i a l a n d g o v e rn m e n t w e b s i t e s . ” H e r a f f i d a v i t c o n t a i n e d f

o u r pa rt s: a 2 “ securitization analy sis”; a “ chain of title report”; a “ supp lem entary legal analy sis”; 3 and a conclusion . I n her securitization analy sis, she stated that her re search r evealed 4 that “ [t] he [m ] ortgage associated with [the subje ct loan] is a m ortgage back [sic] 5 se cu rit y

. . . gu aran te edby [Ginn ie M a e ] (Gin ni e Ma e II RP B Tru st /P oo l 2 00 9) .” 6 (E m pha sis om itt ed
. ) Sh e did

not ide nti fy or inc lud e co pie s of a ny of the doc um en ts, 7 co unty r ec or ds, or w eb sit e pag es that sh e re lie d onin m ak ing thi s de te rm inatio n. S he 8 the n st at ed

that: 9 By

[ G inn ie Ma e] pur ch as ing the sa id [ m ] ortga ge [ l] oan and s el lin g 10 certific ates as shares of the [G innie Mae] RPB Pool 200 9[] to investo rs 11 ba se d onthe pla ce m en t of the loan, [ G inn ie Ma e] w as e xe rc isi ng r igh ts 12 of ownership over the said [m ] ortgage [l] oan[, and b] y exercising such 13 ri ght s of

ow ne rs hip , [G inn ie Ma e] m ad e a cl ai m of ow ne rs hip of

the sa id 14 [m ] ortga ge [ l] oan. 15 Inthe c ha in o f tit le r ep ort, Ms
. D eN ir o st at ed that she did not fi nd the as sig nm en t of 16 the m ortgage from MER S to Flagstar in the county rec ords. She then concluded that 17 “ [t ] he re is no l eg al e vid en ce that F la gst ar is the ow ne r of the sa id [m ] ortga ge ” or “ the 18 [n ] ote ” an d th at

F la gst ar w as “ at m ost , am er e se rv ic er

of the [ m ] ortg ag e. ” T he 19 rem ainder of th is part o f th e affidavit, and the parts identified as supp lem entary legal 20 analy sis and conclu sion d o not con tain facts, but rather legal ar gum ents and legal 21 co nc lus ion s. 22 { 22} The L ichas contend th at the district c ourt should not have excluded the DeN iro16

1 af fi da vit be ca use i t es ta

bli she d age nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t a s to the ow ne rs hip 2 of the not e an d m ortga ge . W e re j ec t this c ont en tio n. 3 { 23} Most of the statem ents that Ms. D eN iro m ade in her aff idavit concerned legal 4 co nc lus ion s th at

w oul d have be enina dm iss ibl e at tr ia l, a nd w er e thu s pr ope rl y 5 ex cl ud ed
. Se e B ea l , 196 0-NMSC- 019, ¶ ¶ 29- 30 ( co nc lud ing that e xpe rt te sti m ony 6 w as pr ope rl y

str ic ke n a t tri al be ca

use it is not the func tio n of an y w itn es s, e xpe rt or 7 non- ex pe rt , to state a n op ini on on a m atte r of law ); W ild e , 201 0- N MC A -0 85, ¶

28 8 (stating that ou r Suprem e Cou rt h as m ade clear that a c ourt cannot cons ider evidence 9 at the sum

m ary j udgm ent stage “ if the subs tance o f t he evidence is inadm issib le at 10 tr ia l” ). T he onl y

state m en t i n he r af

fi da vit co nc er

nin g adis put ed fac tua l

iss ue about 11 Fl ag star’ s st an din g w as that “ [t ] he [m ] ortga ge as soc ia te d w ith[ the sub j ec t l oan] is a 12 m o rt g age back [sic] security
. . . guaranteed by

[G innie Mae] (G innie Mae II RPB 13 Tr ust/Poo l 2009 )[, ] ” w hich resulted in Ginnie Ma e h avi ng “ r ights of owner ship [ov er] 14 the sa id [ m ] ortgage [l]oan. ” (E m pha sis om itt ed
. ) T his state m en t w as pr ope rl y 1 5 ex cl u d ed fo r t wo re as o n s . F i rs t , M s . De Ni ro cl ai m ed t h at s h e r el i ed o n “ d o cu m en t s []” 16 an d “ co unty

r ec or ds[ , ] ” an d he r use of “ int er ne t t ool s and c om

m er ci al a nd 17 go v er nm ent websites” in m aking her statem ents, but none of these sou rces w ere 18 id en ti fie d o r at ta ch edto th e aff id av it , in vi ol at io n o f Ru le 1
- 0 5 6 ( E). See Ru le 1- 19 056(E) (“Swo rn or cer tified copies of all papers or parts there of ref erre d to in an17

1 af fi da vit sha ll be at ta ch ed the re to o r se rv ed the re w ith
. ”) ; cf. State v. L opez , 200 9- 2 N MC A -0 44, ¶

¶ 14, 26, 146 N
. M. 98, 206 P
. 3d 1 003 (h old ing that, pur suant t o th e 3 be st ev ide nc e ru le , tr ia l te sti m ony re ly ing on doc um en ts w as ina dm iss ib le w ith out 4 subm issio n of such docum ents or an explanati o n as to why the docum ents wer e 5 unava ila

ble ). S ec ond, Ms
. D eN ir o’ s st at em en ts are va gu e an d onl y appe ar to 6 refe rence the ownership of the m ortgage—not the note. Bec ause we have concluded 7 that the r igh t to for ec los e the m ortga ge auto m at ic al ly f oll ow s th e ri ght

to en fo rc e the 8 n o t e, an dFl ag s t ares t ab l i s h ed t h at i t h ad t h e r i g h tt o en fo rc e t h e n o t e, Ms . De Ni ro ’s 9 state m en ts a

bout ow ne rs hip of

the m ortga ge w er e not m at er ia l t o th e iss ue of 10 Fl ag st ar’s righ t t o fi le th is for ecl os ur e act io n. See R om er o , 200 9- N MC A -0 22, ¶ 12. 11 T he re fo re , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t cour t did not abus e its dis cr et ionin str iki ng 12 th e DeNir o a ffi da vi t. See A ki ns , 200 9- N MC A -0 51, ¶ 40; see also Mitchael , 179 F
. 3d 13 at 854
. 14 D. The L ichas’ R eque st for F urth er D iscovery 15 { 24} The L ichas argue that the district court shou ld have granted its request for m ore 1 6 t i m e t o co n du ct d i s co v ery b ef o re i t g ra n t ed Fl ag s t ar ’s s u m m ary ju d g m en tm o t i o n . We 17 disagree. 18 { 25} “ [W] e re vie wadis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n li m iti ng d isc ove ry sol el y on the 19 gr ound s of abuse of discretion.” Sanc he z v . Ch urc h of

Sc ie nto log

y , 199 3- N MS C- 034,18

1 ¶ 17 , 11 5 N
. M
. 66 0, 85 7 P
. 2d 77 1. G e ne r a l l y , “ a c ourt sh ou l d no tgrant summ ary 2 j udgm ent before a party has com pleted discov ery .” Su n Co un tr y S av . Ban k o

f N.M., 3 F

. S. B

. v . M

cD ow el l , 1989-NMS C-043, ¶ 2 7 , 108 N. M. 528, 775 P. 2d 73 0. In 4 de te rm ini ng whe the r sum m ar y j udgm en t w as pr em at

ur e ba se d upon dis co ve ry

iss ue s, 5 we consider the following factors: (1) whether the nonm ovant so ught a continuance 6 during th e sum

m ary j udgm ent m otion st ag e to com plete its discov ery ; (2) w hether, 7 betwee n the tim e the sum m ary j udgm ent m otion wa s filed and the grant of summ ary 8 j udgm en t, the non m ovant had suf fi ci en t t im e to o bta in d isc ove ry ; ( 3) w he the r the 9 nonm ovant s ubm itt ed

a n a ff idavit in oppo sitio n to the sum m ar y j udgm en t m oti on 10 “ co nta in[in g] astate m en t of the ti m e re qui re d to c om ple te the dis co ve ry , the 11 part ic ular ev ide nc e ne ed ed , w he re the part ic ular ev id en ce w as loc at ed a nd the 12 m ethods use d to obt ai n th e ev ide nc e[ ] ”; a nd ( 4) w he the r the pa rty w ho m ove d f or 1 3 s u m m a ry j u d g m e n t“ g a v e a n ap p r o p r i a t e r e s p o n s e t o ad i s c o v e ry r e qu e s tf r o m t he 14 nonm ovin g party .” Id

. 15 { 26} Apply ing th ese fa ctors, the record shows that the Lic has propou nded 16 int er ro ga tor ie s and r eque sts f or pr oduc tio n up on Fla gst ar on S ep te m

be r 7, 201 2. 17 Flag st ar res pond ed

to the se r eque sts on O ct obe r 31, 201 2 and s uppl em en te d it s 18 re spon se s onMarc h 6, 201 3. T he r ec or d sh ows th at dur ing the f

our -m onth pe ri od 19 betwee n the tim e th ey rece ived Flagstar’ s initial responses and the tim e that Flagstar19

1 fi le d it s su mm ary

j udgm en t m oti on, the L ic ha s m ad e no f orm al obj ec tio n to the 2 m anner in which Fl ag s t ar re spon ded to their requests, nor did they seek addition al 3 dis co ve ry

f ro m F la gst ar . O nly

a ft er F la gst ar m ov ed

f or sum m ar y j udgm en t di d th e 4 Lichas c ontend in their oppo sition to the m otion that “ [f] urther discovery is needed 5 to de te rm ine w he the r ME RS ha d pr ope r au tho ri zatio n to ac t on be ha lf of Lending 6 So lut ion s” w he n it

a ssi gne d th e m ortga ge to Fl ag star; that F la gst ar “ co nti nuou sly 7 refused to provide requested original loan docum ents or consid eration or value given 8 in e xc hange f

or the [ a] ssi gnm en t of

[ m ] ortga ge ”; that the L ic ha s ne ed ed tim e to 9 “ ins pe ct

the
. . . loa

n a ppl ic at iona nd a ll dis cl osur es m ad e or not m ad e to the m ” an d 1 0 the “ fu l l m o rt g a g e f

i l e ” s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d “ d e t e rm i n e w h e t h e r t h e l o a n i s v oidor 11 voi dable due to fr au d or m isr ep re se ntatio n” ; an d that F la gst ar “ ha s r ef use d to pr ovi de 12 true discovery

resp o n s es ” b ecause its statem ent that “ the loan had never been 13 se curi tiz ed ” w as “ fa lse
. ” T he L ic ha s di d no t su bm it ana ff

idavit w iththe ir

opp osi tio n 14 de ta ili ng the ti m e re qui re d to c om ple te the ir

dis co ve ry

or the m et hods ne ed ed

to 15 obt ai n th e ev ide nc e the y sou ght
. 16 { 27} D ur ing the ne xt thr ee -m onth int er va l be tw ee n the tim e that Fl ag star m ove d f or 17 sum m ar y j udgm en t and the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r gr an tin g it , the L ic ha s di d no t 18 propou nd any

further discovery

requests upon Flagstar, they did no t m ove to com

pel 19 Fl ag star to pro duc e any doc um en ts the y cl ai m ed that Fla gst ar im pr ope rl y w ith he ld,20

1 an d th ey

did not m ove f or astay or c ont inu an ce of

the su mm ar

y j udgm en t 2 proceedings. Furtherm ore, the Lic has do no t dispu te Flagstar’ s claim that it provid ed 3 th em wit h a n “ op po rtu ni ty t o in sp ect th e or ig in al no te bu t t he Lich as fai le d t o d o s o.” 4 Fo r the se r ea sons , w e co nc lud e that the L ic ha s di d no t a ct r ea sona bly in pur sui ng the 5 de fi ci en ci es c la im ed

to ex ist in dis co ve ry

a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt di d n ot abuse it s 6 di sc ret io n i n den y in g t he Lich as m or e ti m e to pu rs ue di sc ov ery. See Sanchez , 1993
- 7 N MS C- 034, ¶ 17; Su n C ou nt ry Sa v. Ban k o

f N.M., F.S.B. , 198 9- N MS C- 043, ¶ 29 8 (a ff irm ing sum

m ar y j udgm en t w he re no nm ovant “ did not a ct r ea sona bly in 9 discovering
. . . inform ation” because it did no t file a m otion to com pel, did not seek 10 a continu an ce o f th e sum m ary j udgm ent proceedings, did not attem pt to cond uct 11 ad dit ion al dis co ve ry

w hil e the sum

m ar y j udgm en t m oti on wa s pe ndi ng, a nd d id n ot 12 inc lud e an af

fi da vit el ab or at ing on the tim e an d m ethods ne eded to c om ple te 13 discovery ). 14 E. Hom e Loan P rotect ion Ac t 15 { 28} A lth oughthe L ic ha s do not r ai se a n is sue in the ir

br ie f in c hie f co nc er

nin g th e 16 Hom e L oan Protection Act ( HL PA ), NMS A 1978, § § 58-21A-1 to -14 (2003 , a s 17 am en de d th ro ugh 2009 ), Fl ag star ar gue s in its answ er br ie f that i t i s no t su

bj ec t t o th e 18 H L PAc la im s th at

w er e m ad e by

the L ic ha s duri ng the sum m ar y j udgm en t 19 pr oc ee din gs. The Lich as co unt er in the ir r ep ly br ie f that F la gst ar

is subj ec t t o th e21

1 H L PA , that the L ic ha s “pr es en te d af ac tua l di sput e as to w he the r [F la gst ar ] m ay ha ve 2 vio la te d th e H L PA [, ] ” an d th at thi s f ac tua l di sput e pr ec lud ed

sum m ar y j udgm en t. 3 How ever, the Lic has do not identify or d iscuss the nature of the fa ctual dispu te they 4 cl ai m e xis ts. I nst ea d, the y

m er el y state that m or e dis co ve ry is re qui re d to de te rm ine 5 whether there was an HL PAviolatio n. Be cause the L ichas do no t identify an actual 6 fa ct ua l i ssu e w ithr eg ar d to the H L PAin the ir appe llate br ie fs , a nd b ec au se w e ha ve 7 concluded th at they

did no t act re asonablyin pursui ng dis covery prior to the summ ary 8 j udgm ent ruling, we need not further address the legal qu estion of whether Fla gstar 9 vi ol at edth e HLPA. See M ont gom er y , 200 7- N MS C- 002, ¶

16. ( “ Sum

m ar y j udgm en t 10 is a ppr opr ia te w he re the re a re no ge nu in e iss ue s of m at er ia l f

ac t and the m ovant i s 11 en tit le d to j udgm en t a s am atte r of law . ” (i nterna l qu ot at ionm ar ks and c itatio n 12 om itt ed )) ; Spe ars , 196 9- NMSC -1 63, ¶ 12 ( “ T he party

opp osi ng a

m oti on f

or 13 sum m ar y j udgm en t cannot de fe at the m oti on . . . by the bare c ont en tio n th at

a n is sue 14 of f ac t e xis ts, but m

ust sho wthat e vid en ce is av ai la ble [. ] ”) ; G uest , 200 8- N MC A -1 44, 15 ¶ 35 ( “ G en er al a sse rt ion s of the e xistenc e of

atr ia ble iss ue a re ins uf

fi ci en t t o 16 overcom e sum

m ary j udgm ent on appeal.”). 17 F. Hearing 18 { 29} Fi na lly , the L ic ha s c la im that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed when it deci de d th e 19 su m m ary jud gm en t m ot io n with ou t a he ari ng . W e reject th is co nt en ti on be cau se we22

1 are aw are of no a

utho rity , and the Lichas have c ited non e, that requires a district court 2 to ho lda he ari ng on a su m m ary jud gm en t m ot io n. Se e Cu rryv . G re at N w. I ns. Co

. , 3 2014 -N MCA -031, ¶ 28, 320 P. 3d 482 (“ Where a party cites no autho rity to supp ort 4 an arg um en t, we m ay as su m e no su ch au th or it y e x i s t s.”) , cert. denied , 201 4- 5 N MC E RT -0 03, 324 P
. 3d 375. W e ha ve pr ev iou sly re co gni ze d that “ [i ] n c onsi de ri ng 6 a m ot i on f

or sum m a ry j ud gm e nt , t he [ di str i c t ] c ourt . . . i s no t r e qu i r e d t o[ ] hold an 7 or al he ar ing
. . . . w he n the oppo sin g party ha s had an a de qua te opp ortun ity to re spon d 8 to [the] m ovant’s ar gum ents throug h the briefing process.” Nat ’l Excess Ins. C o. v. 9 B ing ham , 198 7- N MC A -1 09, ¶ 9, 106 N
. M. 325 , 742 P
. 2d 5 37. T he L icha s filed a 10 w ri tte n re spon se in oppos iti on to Fla gst ar ’ s sum m ar y j udgm en t m oti on and h av e not 11 cl ai m ed

that the y did not ha ve a n op portun ity

to res pond

to Fl ag star’ s arg um en ts 12 during th e briefing process. Ther efore, we conclude that the district court did no t err 13 w he n it

gr an te d su m

m ar y j udgm en t w ith out

ahe ar ing
. 14 { 30} T he L ic ha s a lso a rg ue that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have he ld a heari ng o n th ei r 15 request for discovery

sanctions agains t Flagstar becau s e: s t atem ents in the DeN iro 16 af fi da vit c ontra dic te d so m e of

F la gst ar ’ s re spon se s to th e L ic ha s’ dis co ve ry r eque sts ; 1 7 a h ea ri n g wo u l d h av e al l o we d t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt t o d et er m i n e w h et h erMs . De Ni ro ’s 1 8 s t at emen t s we re co rr ec tan dFl ag s t ar ’s s t at e me n t s we re fa l s e; an di f F l ag s t ar ’s 19 statem ents wer e fa lse, the district court could have granted the Lichas’ request for bad23

1 fa ithdis co ve ry

sanc tio ns. W e re

j ect th is argum en t f

or thr ee r ea sons . F ir st, w e ha ve 2 al re ady c onc lud ed that the state m en ts in the D eN ir o a ff idavit w er e ina dm iss ibl e an d 3 the district court properly struck them . S econd, even if the district court had 4 considered the DeN iro aff idavit, the statem ents i n t h e af fidavit that contradict 5 Flagstar’ s right to foreclose the m ortgage fail as a m atter of law because Flagstar 6 es ta bli she d it ha d th e ri ght

to en fo rc e the not e. T hir d, the L ic ha s c ite no a uth or ity , a nd 7 we have found no ne, that r equires a district cou rt to holda hear ing on an unresolved 8 re que st f

or dis co ve ry

sanc tio ns f

or the se parate pur

pose of w ei ghi ng the c re dib ili ty 9 of ind ivi dua ls who hav e m ad e co nf lic tin g st at em en ts d

ur ing the dis co ve ry

pr oc es s. 10 Se e Cu rry , 201 4- N MC A -0 31, ¶ 28. 11 CON CLU SION 12 { 31} Fo r the r ea sons se t f orth h er ei n, w e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s o rd er gr an tin g 13 summ ary

j udgm ent in favor of Flagstar. 14 { 32} IT IS S O ORDERE D. 15

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 16 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e24

1 WE CO NCUR:
2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 3 M IC HA EL E. V IG IL , C hi ef Ju dg e
4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 5 M . M ON IC A Z A M OR A , Ju dg e