Information Technology for the Soldier: The Human Factor 

by James D. Walrath 

ARL-TR-3525 May 2005 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
NOTICES 

Disclaimers 

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position 

unless so designated by other authorized documents. 

Citation of manufacturer’s or trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or 

approval of the use thereof. 

Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. Do not return it to the originator. 
Army Research Laboratory 

Adelphi, MD 20783-1197 

ARL-TR-3525 May 2005 

Information Technology for the Soldier: The Human Factor 

James D. Walrath 

Computational Information Sciences Directorate, ARL 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
ii 

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data 

needed, and completing and reviewing the collection information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to 

Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents 

should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

May 2005 

2. REPORT TYPE 

Final 

3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 

October 2003 to September 2004 

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 

5b. GRANT NUMBER 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 

Information Technology for the Soldier: The Human Factor 

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 

5d. PROJECT NUMBER 

5e. TASK NUMBER 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

James D. Walrath 

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

U.S. Army Research Laboratory 

ATTN: AMSRD-ARL-CI-CB 

2800 Powder Mill Road 

Adelphi, MD 20783-1197

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 

 REPORT NUMBER 

ARL-TR-3525

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 

U.S. Army Research Laboratory 

2800 Powder Mill Road 

Adelphi, MD 20783-1197 

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT 

 NUMBER(S) 

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

14. ABSTRACT 

The Future Force is the linchpin of the Army’s modernization plan. It is a concept embracing the integration of new technology, 

especially information technology, and revolutionary operational concepts to create a force that totally dominates future land 

operations across the full spectrum of military operations. The Department of Defense Horizontal Fusion portfolio supports the

Future Force goal of revolutionizing the digitization and distribution of information to all echelons, including the rifleman at the 

edge of battle. This report briefly describes a novel system for providing distributed information technology at the warrior’s edge, 

Soldier reactions to the system, and a critical human factors challenge to such a system’s use. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Horizontal fusion, Quantum Leap, warrior’s edge 

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

James D. Walrath 

a. REPORT 

Unclassified 

b. ABSTRACT 

Unclassified

c. THIS PAGE 

Unclassified 

17. LIMITATION 

OF ABSTRACT 

UL 

18. NUMBER 

OF PAGES 

18 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 

301-394-5616 

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) 

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
iii 

Contents 

List of Figures iv

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Warrior’s Edge Soldier System.......................................................................................1 

2. Quantum Leap Demonstration 2

3. Soldier Reactions 5

4. Perceptual and Cognitive Implications 6

5. Discussion 8

6. References 10

Distribution List 11
iv 

List of Figures 

Figure 1. Collaboration display showing the location of two all-terrain vehicles (ATV 2 and 

ATV 3), Soldiers 3 and 12, and packbot 1. (Also shown is attentional ink (arrows) and the 

symbol for an enemy wheeled unit.)....................................................................................... 4 

Figure 2. The LFN mounted in the back of a HMMWV with (from left to right) the radio 

telephone operator (RTO), the platoon leader, and a rifleman. (The RTO and rifleman are 

wearing a Warrior’s Edge Soldier system). ............................................................................ 5 
1 

1. Introduction 

The ability to more quickly and efficiently share information throughout the Department of 

Defense (DoD) and with its allies has been a goal for some years, but the events of September 

11, 2001, effected a new urgency in this net-centric transformation. Thus, in 2003, the DoD 

began a new initiative called the horizontal fusion (HF) portfolio. The DoD felt that it already 

had many of the pieces for successful transformation (e.g., Net-Centric Enterprise Services, the 

bandwidth expansion of the global information grid, the joint tactical radio system, and the 

transformational communications satellite). What was needed was a plan for making the 

quantum leap from information accumulation to information sharing. The HF initiatives’ goal 

was to force this leap, making decentralization of information and enhanced decision making a 

reality. In 2003 and 2004, the HF program conducted Quantum Leap (QL) proof-of-concept 

demonstrations to assess progress and stimulate interest in the portfolio. 

Different echelons have different requirements but for the Soldier on the ground, HF means 

knowing the position of objects of military interest within the spatial and temporal bounds 

defining that operator’s battle space. It also means the front line Soldier has access to existing 

intelligence critical to his mission but heretofore not accessible in time to make a difference. 

Finally, it means that tactical information, previously available only to the Soldier at the edge of 

battle, can be almost instantly available to planners and analysts at higher echelons. 

The following is a discussion of one such system, its functionality, the Soldiers’ reactions to it, 

and some thoughts about the perceptual and cognitive implications of its use. 

1.1 Warrior’s Edge Soldier System 

Information about the location and movement of friendly personnel is often referred to as “blue 

force tracking,” and there are a number of systems being constructed to provide this kind of 

information at various echelons. One such system has been designed at the U. S. Army Research 

Laboratory (ARL) under the Warrior’s Edge (WE) program, which focuses on network-centric 

warfare for the dismounted infantry Soldier at the platoon level and below. ARL’s prototype 

system, the WE Soldier System (WESS), goes beyond basic blue force tracking. First, it adds a 

means of placing military symbols and hand-drawn gestures on a map or terrain image common 

to all Soldiers participating in the WE distributed collaboration. A second function integrates a 

laser range finder. A third function integrates a small video camera with associated video server 

and client software. Finally, the ability for the Soldier to create a multimedia situation report 

including voice, text, and video annotations has been incorporated. The implementation and 

impact of these additional functions are discussed more fully in a following section. 

WESS is centered around a tablet computer which processes data from the Soldier’s global 

positioning system (GPS), electronic compass, laser range finder, video camera, and microphone. 
2 

A wireless network device provides the digital communications link for WESS. Information 

generated by the system is made available through the local wireless network to all other platoon 

members and to other, higher echelons through a local gateway. Information is also available to 

collaborators from sources other than Soldier systems. Robotic platoon assets provide video 

reconnaissance and acoustic detection of sniper fire, including the position of the suspected 

sniper and video of that location. Data are available from remote unattended sensors designed to 

detect mortar fire, including the likely firing position and point of impact. Other remote 

unattended sensors detect the presence of vehicles, their position, and direction of travel. All 

these data can be added to the WE local picture, which is digitally distributed to all Soldiers in 

the collaboration. 

The Soldier systems, robotic assets, and unattended sensors generate a formidable amount of 

information, the nexus of which is the local fusion node (LFN). ARL’s version of the LFN 

exists as a slide-in module of computer and communications equipment on a platoon asset such 

as a high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The LFN has access not only to 

the information generated by platoon assets (the local information) but also to a global 

information grid, the collateral space (CS), via a secure internet. The LFN’s access to 

information in the CS is not direct, requiring passage through several security levels such as the 

low side node and a cross domain solution called the tactical gateway. Every platoon member 

receives the local information. For the platoon leader, both local and global information is 

available at the LFN. The platoon leader can use global and local information for planning and 

to make real-time assessments of mission status. The LFN provides other functions as well. FM 

radio signals from the squad radios are received at the LFN and converted into voice over 

internet protocol (VOIP) format. Similarly, VOIP format coming to the LFN from above can be 

converted to FM signals for broadcast to squad radios. Thus, the squad radio offers the WE 

Soldier communication with any member of his platoon (via FM) or to higher echelons (via the 

VOIP link at the LFN). A flat-bed scanner and associated computer assets are also available at 

the LFN for scanning and translating foreign language documents. 

2. Quantum Leap Demonstration 

ARL’s Soldier system, robotic platforms, remote unattended sensors, and LFN were tested as 

part of the 2003 QL I and 2004 QL II demonstrations. In the QL II demonstration, ARL tested 

an upgraded Soldier system and added the low side node and tactical gateway, which were not 

part of QL I. Both demonstrations focused on network-centric urban warfare operations 

designed to make relevant intelligence available to both the CS and the front line Soldier in real 

(or near real) time. In both demonstrations, ARL’s systems were used by infantry Soldiers 
3 

executing tactical scenarios in and around the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) site at 

Fort Benning, Georgia. 

The Soldier system for QL I consisted of a backpack containing a tablet PC, battery, GPS 

receiver, and miniature inertial navigation system (with compass). Cabled to the backpack was a 

headset with microphone, audio switching box, laser range finder, and a second tablet PC serving 

as the Soldier’s primary display. Networking was accomplished with PC network cards 

operating in the 2.4-GHz band. For the QL II demonstration, the tablet PC in the backpack was 

upgraded, the inertial navigation system was replaced with a digital compass, and the second 

tablet PC was eliminated. Added to the system for QL II was a helmet-mounted monocular 

display, a hand-held FM radio transceiver, a palm-sized touch pad (providing cursor control for 

the backpack PC), and an ad hoc digital radio (also using 2.4 GHz). The QL II Soldier system 

weighed approximately 28 pounds. Software running on the tablet PC was developed by ARL 

and its contractors, with the exception of Microsoft1 XP, ArcMap2 (a geographic information and 

mapping system), and various device drivers. All Soldier system components, used in both 

demonstrations, were commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, except for the audio switching 

box, which was fabricated at ARL, and the ad hoc network box, which was supplied by a 

contractor. 

The WE hardware and software provided the dismounted infantry Soldier with a means of 

collaborating (via a wireless digital network) with all similarly equipped Soldiers. In the 

collaboration, Soldiers saw a common map or aerial reconnaissance image upon which were 

icons tracking the position of each WE Soldier and robotic asset—basic blue force tracking. 

Soldiers could draw on the map/image using different colors of digital ink, and the gestures were 

immediately shown on each collaborator’s display. We refer to this function as attentional ink 

because the gestures drawn on the map/image are used to draw everyone’s attention to things 

such as a particular location, a route of maneuver, or a building. Soldiers could also easily 

access any military symbol contained in FM 2525 and place it on the map/image. Figure 1 is a 

screen capture showing an example of the collaboration display. Voice communication between 

Soldiers (in QL II) added another mode of collaboration. Warrior’s Edge-equipped Soldiers 

could also combine voice with video and text, creating a multimedia situation report which could 

be sent higher. 

 1

Microsoft is a registered trademark of Microsoft. 

2

ArcMap is a trademark of ESRI. 
4 

Figure 1. Collaboration display showing the location of two all-terrain vehicles 

(ATV 2 and ATV 3), Soldiers 3 and 12, and packbot 1. (Also shown is 

attentional ink (arrows) and the symbol for an enemy wheeled unit.) 

Each Soldier equipped with the WE system could also view streaming video from any camera 

integrated into the collaboration. For example, the PL situated at the HMMWV with the LFN 

may have wanted to see a suspected enemy combatant who had been detained at a vehicle 

checkpoint some distance away, or Soldiers in a fire team may have wanted to see the video 

provided by a small robotic platform imaging the approach to the team’s position. A still image 

could easily be extracted from the streaming video, incorporated into a situation report 

(annotated if desired), and sent to higher echelons for further analysis (e.g., the face of the 

detainee at the vehicle checkpoint or the markings on captured munitions). 

A WE Soldier observing the video stream from a robotic asset could also control that asset (i.e., 

panning and tilting the video camera and driving the robot). Illuminating a target with the laser 

range finder created a vector on the map/image originating at the sensing Soldier’s position and 

terminating in an icon placed at the target’s position. In the QL II system, the tablet PC was 

controlled using either the touch pad or voice, by using the audio switching box to direct 

microphone output to the tablet PC speech recognition system. 

Figure 2 shows three Soldiers and the LFN during QL II in August 2004 at the MOUT site, Fort 

Benning, Georgia. 
5 

Figure 2. The LFN mounted in the back of a HMMWV with (from left to right) the radio telephone 

operator (RTO), the platoon leader, and a rifleman. (The RTO and rifleman are wearing 

a Warrior’s Edge Soldier system). 

3. Soldier Reactions 

Under contract to ARL, Aptima, Incorporated, used subjective and objective research methods to 

assess the efficacy of the prototype WESS from the user’s perspective. In the 2003 QL exercise, 

the users were 14 U.S. Army dismounted infantry Soldiers drawn from the Ranger Training 

Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. In the 2004 QL II exercise, the users were 13 Infantry 

Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The leadership for both 

groups included a platoon leader (a 1st Lieutenant) and a senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

(a staff sergeant). The subordinate troops and their leadership were interviewed separately. 

Aptima’s reports on the Soldiers’ assessment of the WE system showed some differences 

between the 2003 and 2004 demonstrations but also documented opinions that were consistent 

across the two years. In the 2004 demonstration, Soldiers used a hand-held commercial FM 

radio transceiver for squad communications. This capability was consistently chosen as the most 

supportive technology in that demonstration. The 2003 demonstration did not include a squad 

communications device so no comparison can be made regarding this technology. In both 

demonstrations, Soldiers had available a small, teleoperated robotic platform (PackBot by 
6 

iRobot3) equipped with a steerable video camera. In 2003, the PackBot was used to maneuver 

through a building, floor by floor, searching for enemy combatants. In 2004, the PackBot was 

used as a reconnaissance asset, driven to a location and parked with its camera pointing toward 

an area of interest. This change in the PackBot’s mission was reflected in different Soldier 

assessments of the robot’s usefulness. In 2003, the PackBot was consistently seen as 

significantly slowing operational tempo, as the Soldiers were trained to clear the building in 

much less time than it took the PackBot to maneuver about inside the structure. In 2004, the 

PackBot was viewed as a useful teleoperated robotic sensor. This is a testament to the fact that, 

for maximum utility, a new technology’s impact on operations must be carefully considered 

before implementation. 

In both demonstrations, blue force tracking was seen as very useful information. In fact, Soldiers 

in the 2003 demonstration rated blue force tracking as the biggest system win. In 2004, as stated 

earlier, that honor went to the squad radio. In both demonstrations, Soldiers felt the WE system 

required too much user interaction—often requiring unanticipated user input to restore services. 

This was not an unexpected observation, considering the fact that the systems were constructed 

from COTS components which obviously were not optimized for this particular use. Soldiers 

participating in both demonstrations remarked that network connectivity was not dependable 

enough for the Soldier systems to be fully useful. One final common observation was not related 

so much to hardware as to concept. Following both demonstrations, there was general consensus 

among the officers, the NCOs, and the subordinate troops that the rifleman was receiving too 

much information, and much of the functionality available to him was not needed at that echelon. 

4. Perceptual and Cognitive Implications 

WESS addressed two primary goals: to allow the front-line Soldier to act as an information 

source and as an information sink. In the former case, the Soldier could provide information 

about the local battle space, which could be of considerable value to planners and analysts. The 

latter case was a remediation of the legacy system’s challenge in getting timely intelligence and 

command and control information down to the front line Soldier. 

In the case of information moving to the Soldier, the design emphasis was on providing 

information for the tactical Soldier. In the tactical environment, the Soldier is subject to 

considerable stress. Stress occurs from four sources: environmental, physiological, emotional, 

and cognitive. Environmental stressors are conditions such as heat and humidity, cold, wetness, 

and vibration. Physiological stressors develop from lack of sleep, illness, injury, dehydration, 

fatigue, etc. Emotional stress can result from many conditions such as fear, anxiety, anger, and 

 3

iRobot is a registered trademark of iRobot. 
7 

grief. The cognitive system can be stressed by overloading short-term memory, difficult mental 

operations, uncertainty, time pressure, and information overload. 

The U.S. Army (2003) recognizes that stressors experienced by Soldiers in tactical situations 

typically do not arise from a single source. Human performance research on the combinatorial 

effects of different stressors is somewhat equivocal. Be that as it may, it is instructional (though 

overly simplified) to view stress as that which drives arousal (i.e., general energy mobilization or 

intensity of behavior). A long-held and popular view of arousal is that performance and arousal 

are related by an inverted U relation, the Yerkes-Dodson (1908) curve, such that performance is 

best at some intermediate level of arousal. The actual physiological and psychological processes 

relating stress, arousal, and performance are complex, but it is safe to presume that high levels of 

stress result in super states of arousal usually accompanied by a degradation in performance 

(Hockey, 1986). The particular performance of interest here is the Soldier’s ability to divide 

attention between the immediate world around him and the information displayed on WESS. 

A classic paper by Easterbrook (1959) described the relationship between levels of arousal and 

the perception of environmental events in humans. His work suggested that, as arousal levels 

increase, the focus of attention is more restricted and fewer information channels are 

processed—a phenomenon dubbed perceptual narrowing. Considerable work in this area 

followed Easterbrook (see Broadbent, 1971; Kahneman, 1973), thus reinforcing the relationship 

between heightened levels of arousal and perceptual narrowing. 

The “spotlight” metaphor is often used as an aid to conceptualizing perceptual narrowing. 

Imagine that your attention to the outside world is like the beam from a spotlight. You attend to 

sights, sounds, and smells that are illuminated by the spotlight, while those elements of the 

environment that lie outside the spotlight are not in your consciousness. In times of very high 

arousal, the diameter of the spotlight’s beam can shrink appreciably. According to Schmidt 

(1989), “This is usually thought of as a reduction in the ability to deal effectively with relatively 

unlikely peripheral events in favor of focusing on more likely central events.” 

This raises the question, “How much WESS information can a Soldier attend to in times of very 

high states of arousal?” No experimental data exist to answer this question. Further, it would be 

difficult to obtain these data because of ethical considerations in placing experimental subjects 

under the representative sources and levels of stress sufficient to induce these very high levels of 

arousal. Anecdotal evidence exists in the form of Soldier comments in after-action interviews 

conducted by Aptima during the two QL demonstrations. During these interviews, Soldiers 

almost universally expressed the opinion that they would not attend to the WESS display if they 

felt they were in mortal danger. Under these conditions, the Soldiers felt certain they would 

want both eyes on the real world and their weapon to be ready. While speculative, these 

opinions are none the less compelling. 

The irony is that a Soldier in mortal threat could be reasonably expected to benefit from pertinent 

tactical information but probably has no spare perceptual or cognitive resources available for 
8 

acquiring or processing this information, especially visually. His attention is wholly and 

completely focused on the immediate real world and the threats therein. Overcoming this 

shrunken perceptual field phenomenon is not a trivial problem. Forcing all critical information 

to the Soldier’s central visual field, as required by WESS, is most likely not the best solution. 

5. Discussion 

Research has shown that alternate sources of information are the first to be ignored in situations 

when exigencies of the moment take priority for survival (Karsh, Walrath, Swoboda, & 

Pillalamarri, 1995). We are basically more trusting of our own senses and subjective experience 

than of our ability to process and integrate objective information, especially when we believe 

that a quick decision is needed for our survival (MacMillan, Entin, & Serfaty, 1994). What, 

then, is to be done regarding the push of information to the warrior at the edge of battle? 

There would seem two possibilities: find a means of making the WESS information both 

preattentive and overwhelmingly compelling or scale back what is available. The latter option 

was suggested by the Soldiers who participated in QL I and II. Perhaps, as these Soldiers 

suggest, only squad leaders and higher need the complete WESS functionality. Below this 

echelon, more basic services might be in order. For example, moving some critical information 

from the visual sense to the auditory sense might be beneficial. Many Soldiers now carry a 

squad radio and its use is second nature (i.e., there is no training issue). Suppose that the 

Soldier’s radio contains a GPS receiver and could securely transmit the Soldier’s position 

information each time the push-to-talk button is activated (or when interrogated by the LFN or 

automatically at some predetermined interval). The LFN could fuse this information with the 

map or image viewed by the RTO. In this case, the RTO, not the individual rifleman, has blue 

force tracking. However, if the rifleman needs positional information, he can do what is natural; 

he can ask the RTO. This can be done without diverting his principal sensory modality (vision) 

away from the real world, just as GPS systems for automobiles use the auditory channel for 

passing directions to drivers who must maintain visual attention outside the vehicle. 

Additionally, if one of these GPS-equipped squad radios should fall into enemy hands, no 

information about the location of friendly Soldiers, assets, or control measures would be 

compromised (as would be the case for a complete WESS). 

We can also realize efficiencies by not equipping every Soldier with video cameras and laser 

range finders. Although a leadership decision, services offered by these two technologies may 

be more appropriate at the squad leader position. Heading and range-to-target information and 

video could be sent to the LFN by a squad leader, who carries a second radio dedicated to 

transmitting these data. At the LFN, bearing, range, and video information can be fused with 

text and audio (saved locally), thus creating a situation report. 
9 

Sending information to the LFN via FM radio has the added benefits of significantly increased 

range and greater reliability, compared with current wireless networking technology. Available 

bandwidth is less with this method but may be adequate for the task. 

Viewing video from robotic assets and controlling robotic assets would still require some type of 

networked display and control component, although not every rifleman would need to carry this 

equipment just as not every rifleman carries a heavy machine gun. This task-specific equipment 

could consist of a self-contained module (e.g., a Toughbook4

) issued to a designated user only 

when the squad or platoon is to execute a mission involving the robotic assets and that mission 

requires the control of these assets from other than the LFN. 

In this scenario, the LFN assumes more of a fusion role, being the source for blue force tracking 

and multimedia situation reports. There is no question that this would increase the task demands 

on the RTO. How much of an increase and to what extent it might be mitigated remain 

unanswered. 

The QL I and II demonstrations produced a wealth of information for the technologists as they 

cycled through the test-fix-test prototype development. The exercises also highlighted questions 

in terms of the human factor. To what extent can Soldiers in tactical situations divide their 

attention between subjective and objective information? Which information technologies are 

most appropriate at different echelons? What is the best method for making critical information 

preattentive and compelling? How will the infusion of new information technologies affect task 

loading and pace? 

More than 50 years ago, three eminent scientists wrote the following: 

We can make a machine that will do almost anything, given enough 

time and engineers. But man has limits to his development as far as 

we can see it. . . . Machines that demand superhuman performance 

will fail, and jobs that push man beyond the limits of his skill, speed, 

sensitivity and endurance will not be done. We are now reaching the 

point where, because of our limitations, better and better equipment 

does not necessarily insure better and better performance (Chapanis, 

Gardner, & Morgan, 1949, p. 7). 

The evidence of history blunts this argument somewhat. Science and technology have come 

further since 1949 than (some argue) the previous 5,000 years and yet we and our machines are 

still doing well. Nonetheless, Chapanis (et al.) makes a reasonable point. We must be mindful 

of the user’s capabilities and limitations as new systems are created. Such concern, however, 

should not limit our thinking about what might be possible. 

 4

Toughbook is a registered trademark of Panasonic. 
10 

6. References 

Broadbent, D. E. Decision and stress. London, England: Academic, 1971. 

Chapanis, A.; Gardner, W.; Morgan, C. Applied experimental psychology: Human factors in 

engineering design. New York: Wiley, 1949. 

Easterbrook, J. A. The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior. 

Psychological Review 1959, 66, 187–201. 

Hockey, G. J. Changes in operator efficiency as a function of environmental stress, fatigue, and 

circadian rhythms. In K. Boff, L. Kaufman, and J. Thomas (eds.), Handbook of Perception 

and Human Performance. Volume II, Cognitive Processes and Performance (p 44–44). 

New York: Wiley, 1986. 

Kahneman, D. Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 

Karsh, R.; Walrath, J.; Swoboda, J.; Pillalamarri, K. The effect of battlefield combat 

identification system information on target identification time and errors in a simulated tank 

engagement task; ARL-TR-854; U. S. Army Research Laboratory: Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, MD, 1995. 

MacMillan, J.; Entin, E.; Serfaty, D. Operator reliance on automated support for target 

recognition. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 38th Annual 

Meeting (pp. 1285–1289). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 

1994. 

Schmidt, R. Unintended acceleration: A review of human factors contributions. Human 

Factors 1989, 31, 345–364. 

U. S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Implement measures to reduce combat stress. Basic 

Noncommissioned Officer Course 2003, L301. 

Yerkes, R. M.; Dodson, J. D. The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit-formation. 

Journal of Comparative and Neurological Psychology 1908, 18, 459–482. 
11 

Distribution List

ADMNSTR 

DEFNS TECHL INFO CTR 

ATTN DTIC-OCP (ELECTRONIC COPY) 

8725 JOHN J KINGMAN RD STE 0944 

FT BELVOIR VA 22060-6218 

DARPA 

ATTN IXO S WELBY 

3701 N FAIRFAX DR 

ARLINGTON VA 22203-1714 

OFC OF THE SECY OF DEFNS 

ATTN ODDRE (R&AT) 

THE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON DC 20301-3080 

US ARMY TRADOC 

BATTLE LAB INTEGRATION & TECHL 

DIRCTRT 

ATTN ATCD-B 

10 WHISTLER LANE 

FT MONROE VA 23651-5850 

US MILITARY ACDMY 

MATHEMATICAL SCI CTR OF 

EXCELLENCE 

ATTN MADN-MATH LTC T RUGENSTEIN 

THAYER HALL RM 226C 

WEST POINT NY 10996-1786 

SMC/GPA 

2420 VELA WAY STE 1866 

EL SEGUNDO CA 90245-4659 

US ARMY ARDEC 

ATTN AMSTA-AR-TD 

BLDG 1 

PICATINNY ARSENAL NJ 07806-5000 

COMMANDING GENERAL 

US ARMY AVN & MIS CMND 

ATTN AMSAM-RD W C MCCORKLE 

REDSTONE ARSENAL AL 35898-5000 

US ARMY INFO SYS ENGRG CMND 

ATTN AMSEL-IE-TD F JENIA 

FT HUACHUCA AZ 85613-5300 

US ARMY NATICK RDEC 

ACTING TECHL DIR 

ATTN SBCN-TP P BRANDLER 

KANSAS STREET BLDG 78 

NATICK MA 01760-5056 

US ARMY SIMULATION TRAIN & 

INSTRMNTN CMND 

ATTN AMSTI-CG M MACEDONIA 

12350 RESEARCH PARKWAY 

ORLANDO FL 32826-3726 

HICKS & ASSOC INC 

ATTN G SINGLEY III 

1710 GOODRICH DR STE 1300 

MCLEAN VA 22102 

DIRECTOR 

US ARMY RSRCH LAB 

ATTN AMSRD-ARL-RO-D JCI CHANG 

ATTN AMSRD-ARL-RO-EN W D BACH 

PO BOX 12211 

RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK NC 27709 

US ARMY RSRCH LAB 

ATTN AMSRD-ARL-D J M MILLER 

ATTN AMSRD-ARL-CI-OK-T TECHL PUB 

 (2 COPIES) 

ATTN AMSRD-ARL-CI-OK-TL TECHL LIB 

 (2 COPIES) 

ATTN IMNE-ALC-IMS MAIL & RECORDS 

 MGMT 

ATTN AMSRD-ARL-CI-CB J D WALRATH 

 (6 COPIES) 

ADELPHI MD 20783-1197 
12 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK