NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ERIC LONG, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-10351 

D.C. No. 

2:21-cr-00229-GMN-BNW-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 6, 2023

Portland, Oregon

Before: BERZON, NGUYEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Eric Long pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 24 months of 

imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. He appeals, 

challenging (1) the district court’s application of a four-level sentencing 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for using the firearm in connection 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JAN 5 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

with a felony, (2) the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, and (3) the terms 

of a condition of supervised release requiring him to obtain mental-health 

treatment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We 

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Where, as here, a defendant preserved a challenge to the application of a 

sentencing enhancement, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear 

error. United States v. Hong, 938 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2019). We review the 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Long did not challenge the

mental-health treatment condition before the district court, we review the legality 

of that condition for plain error. United States v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144, 1150 (9th 

Cir. 2022). 

1. The parties dispute whether the government needed to prove that the fourlevel enhancement applied by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and 

convincing evidence. See United States v. Lucas, 70 F.4th 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 

2023), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 77 F.4th 1275 (9th Cir. 2023). We need 

not resolve that dispute because the district court did not clearly err in finding that 

the government met its burden under either standard. 

The government introduced ample evidence that Long committed a felony—

assault under Nevada law—including a written statement from his former neighbor 
3 

Dyeshune Hood, a recorded conversation between Hood and responding officers, 

and, in particular, a FaceTime recording that shows Long brandishing a handgun 

and advancing toward Hood. Contrary to Long’s assertions, the district court did 

not err by considering Hood’s “unsworn” statement and the “partial” FaceTime 

recording. “The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at a sentencing hearing,” 

and Hood’s statement was not unreliable simply because it was unsworn. United 

States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013); see Fed. R. Evid. 

1101(d)(3); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). Although the FaceTime recording did not capture 

the entire interaction, its contents corroborated Hood’s written statement and her 

testimony to police with regard to whether Long held a gun and advanced on her 

angrily. See United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993), amended, 

992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that presumptively unreliable evidence can 

become reliable when corroborated). Because corroborated statements are 

“sufficiently reliable even if such statements are self-serving and contrary to the 

testimony of the defendant,” Latazsha Reese’s conflicting statement also does not

render either the FaceTime recording or Hood’s statement unreliable. United States

v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2001); see United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 

922, 933 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are not in a position to weigh conflicting evidence, 

which is an important responsibility of the district court.”). Long therefore fails to 

establish that the district court relied on false or unreliable information. See United 
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States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–37 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The district court’s finding that Long committed assault is not clearly

erroneous. As we have explained, the FaceTime recording and Hood’s multiple 

statements support that finding, which the court noted was based on “all the 

information” in the record. Thus, despite Long’s assertions, “the record and 

context make clear that the judge ‘considered the evidence and arguments,’” 

United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007)), such that she did not need to “directly 

address each and every one of [them].” United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 806 

(9th Cir. 2012). 

2. Long’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Long presented the district 

court with the same substantial medical concerns, family considerations, and 

criminal-history arguments that he repeats on appeal. The court considered those 

matters and the factors required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to impose a belowGuidelines sentence. We find no abuse of discretion. 

3. The terms of Long’s Mental Health Treatment Supervised Release 

Condition are identical to the terms of the mental-health treatment condition that 

we held unconstitutional in Nishida. 53 F.4th at 1155–56. We therefore vacate 

Long’s Mental Health Treatment Supervised Release Condition and remand “so 

that the district court can clarify the scope of authority delegated to the probation 
5 

officer consistent with [that decision].” Id. 

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.