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23-716-cv

Russo v. Wyandanch Union Free School District

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE 

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd day of May, two thousand twenty-four. 

Present: 

ROBERT D. SACK,

 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 

 MYRNA PÉREZ, 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________

FILOMENA RUSSO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 23-716-cv

WYANDANCH UNION FREE SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, PAUL SIBBLIES, in his 

individual capacity, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

_____________________________________ 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: GEOFFREY A. KALENDER (John C. Luke, Jr., on the 

brief), Slater Slater Schulman LLP, New York, NY

For Defendants-Appellees: MICHAEL A. MIRANDA, Miranda Slone Sklarin 

Verveniotis LLP, Mineola, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (Gary R. Brown, District Judge). 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Filomena Russo appeals from a judgment of the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gary R. Brown, District Judge), entered on March 29, 

2023, granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Wyandanch Union Free School 

District (the “District”) and Paul Sibblies, the principal of the District’s high school. Russo, a 

former teacher at the District’s high school, sued Defendants-Appellees in 2021, claiming

(1) gender and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) a hostile work environment under Title VII and 

§ 1983, (3) retaliation under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), 

N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and (4) defamation under New York law. Russo’s claims stem 

primarily from the District’s investigation into allegations of Russo’s sexual misconduct toward 

high school students on a school trip, which resulted in Russo being administratively reassigned

for five days before she was ultimately cleared of wrongdoing and permitted to return to her 

teaching position. The district court dismissed Russo’s defamation claim at a pre-motion 

conference and granted Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to all of her 

remaining claims. Russo now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Defendants-Appellees as to her Title VII disparate-treatment gender discrimination claim and her 

Title VII and NYSHRL retaliation claims, as well as the district court’s exclusion of certain 

affidavits as inadmissible hearsay in deciding the summary judgment motion.

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 We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the case. 

1 Russo does not challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees as to her 

§ 1983 claims for gender and sex discrimination and hostile work environment. She also does not meaningfully appeal 
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“When a party challenges the district court’s evidentiary rulings underlying a grant of 

summary judgment, we undertake a two-step inquiry.”2 Picard, Tr. For SIPA Liquidation of 

Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC v. JABA Assocs. LP, 49 F.4th 170, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2022). “First, 

we review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, which define the summary judgment record,” for 

abuse of discretion; “[o]nly admissible evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on 

a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 181. “A district court abuses its discretion when it bases 

its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or 

render[s] a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. Second, 

“with the record defined, we review the trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo, 

construing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” id., “and will affirm 

when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law,” Kasiotis v. N.Y. Black Car Operators’ Inj. Comp. Fund, Inc., 90 F.4th 95, 98 (2d 

Cir. 2024). 

 Here, we need not address whether the district court abused its discretion in not considering

two affidavits as inadmissible hearsay, because even if the affidavits were part of the summary 

judgment record, we would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to DefendantsAppellees for the reasons explained below.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, “a plaintiff must demonstrate 

that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the defendant was aware of that activity, (3) she was 

subjected to a retaliatory action . . . that w[as] materially adverse, and (4) there was a causal 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to her Title VII hostile work environment claim based on Sibblies’s 

alleged sexual harassment, despite invoking that claim in her brief’s statement of issues. 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, 

footnotes, and citations are omitted. 
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connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Carr v. N.Y. City 

Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023). Upon making that showing, the burden then shifts 

to the employer to provide a “legitimate non-retaliatory reason[]” for the adverse employment 

action, “at which point, the burden shift[s] back to [the plaintiff] to come forward with evidence 

establishing that it is more likely than not the employer’s decision was motivated, at least in part, 

by an intent to retaliate against him.” El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 932–33 (2d 

Cir. 2010).3

 

Russo’s retaliation claims fail because she cannot show causation between her protected 

activity (filing this lawsuit) and the alleged adverse actions. To be sure, the temporal proximity 

here was very tight—Defendants-Appellees were served on June 14, the investigation into Russo 

began on June 15, and Russo was administratively reassigned on June 18. Nonetheless, temporal 

proximity alone, while sufficient to establish the de minimis burden at the prima facie stage, see

Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2023), is insufficient to establish retaliatory intent 

(through pretext or otherwise) at the third stage of the burden-shifting framework, see Bentley v. 

AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 2019). Here, Russo offers nothing more than temporal 

proximity to support an inference of retaliatory motive. 

Russo’s theory of causation seems to be the following: (1) upon learning of her lawsuit 

against Sibblies and the District on June 14, Sibblies wanted to retaliate against Russo, (2) Sibblies 

and Dwight Singleton, a coach at the high school, recruited two former students to drum up false 

3 Russo argues that the district court erred in applying the same causation standard to the analysis of her Title 

VII and NYSHRL retaliation claims because, following the 2019 amendment of the NYSHRL, retaliation claimants 

may prevail by showing that “the defendant was motivated at least in part by an impermissible motive.” Appellant’s 

Br. at 19–21. We decline to reach the question of the applicable causation standard under the NYSHRL because we 

conclude that, under either standard, Russo has failed to produce sufficient evidence of a causal connection between 

her filing of this lawsuit and the alleged adverse action.
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accusations against her over the course of less than 24 hours, (3) Singleton and the two former 

students reported the false accusations to Kester Hodge, a District HR employee, who was 

investigating Russo’s complaint against Singleton but who was unaware of Russo’s lawsuit, on 

June 15 and 16, respectively, (4) Hodge elevated the allegations against Russo to the 

Superintendent on June 17, and (5) Russo was placed on paid administrative reassignment on June 

18. Her theory primarily relies on affidavits of the former students’ mothers that contain 

statements (including hearsay statements) tending to show that Singleton coerced their sons to 

make untrue allegations of sexual misconduct by Russo. 

Russo’s theory of causation as it relates to Sibblies fails because she adduces no evidence 

tying Sibblies to this alleged scheme. And to the extent that Russo’s allegations supporting her 

retaliation claim implicate Singleton, Russo chose not to sue him. Moreover, during oral 

argument, Russo’s counsel made a couple of concessions that defeat her theory of causation as it 

pertains to the District. First, Russo’s counsel agreed that in light of the serious allegations made 

against Russo, it was reasonable for the District to—and, in fact, it had a duty to—conduct an 

investigation. See Oral Argument Audio Recording at 12:14–14:10, Russo v. Wyandanch Union 

Free Sch. Dist. (No. 23-716). It is also undisputed that Hodge was unaware of Russo’s lawsuit 

when he interviewed Singleton and the former students, meaning he could not have had a 

retaliatory motive for his actions at that time. Second, Russo’s counsel conceded at oral argument 

that she does not argue a cat’s paw theory of liability whereby Singleton was involved in Hodge’s 

decision to investigate her to such a degree that any retaliatory animus on the part of Singleton 

could be imputed to Hodge, see Oral Argument Audio Recording at 02:40–03:58, Russo v. 

Wyandanch Union Free Sch. Dist. (No. 23-716); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (“[A] Title VII plaintiff is entitled to succeed, even absent evidence of illegitimate bias 
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on the part of the ultimate decision maker, so long as the individual shown to have the 

impermissible bias played a meaningful role in the process.”). Thus, Russo has put forth no 

evidence that any bad faith by Singleton somehow impacted Hodge’s independent, third-party 

assessment that the allegations were sufficiently serious to merit further investigation per District 

policy.4

 

* * * 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT:

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

4 Russo’s Title VII disparate treatment also fails. She adduces no evidence that the District’s decision to 

investigate her and place her on administrative reassignment was motivated by her gender, aside from an oblique 

accusation in her brief that Sibblies “arranged the accusations and subsequent investigation to target Ms. Russo, 

knowing that such salacious accusations are readily believed about women,” Appellant’s Br. at 30. Even assuming 

that there is evidence to support this theory, and that Sibblies’s intent can be imputed to the District despite not being 

involved in any of the alleged adverse actions (which is unlikely), any discriminatory motive by Sibblies would have 

stemmed from Russo’s protected activity of filing a lawsuit against him, not her gender. Such a theory is cognizable 

as retaliation rather than disparate treatment, and we have concluded above that her retaliation claims fail.