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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2019-SC-0589-MR

FARAND SKINNER APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT

V. HONORABLE KENNETH HAROLD GOFF II, JUDGE 

NO. 18-CR-00012

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

A circuit court jury convicted Farand Skinner of the murder of Paul 

Harrison. Following the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced 

Skinner to twenty-three years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the resulting 

judgment as a matter of right.

1

Skinner claims several errors occurred during his trial: (1) that he should 

have received immunity from prosecution for acting in self-defense; (2) he was 

convicted on insufficient evidence; (3) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of 

a fair trial; and (4) the trial court improperly admitted evidence. For reasons 

explained below, we find that no error occurred and affirm the judgment.

 

1 Ky Const. § 110(2)(b) (“Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court imposing 

a sentence of . . . imprisonment for twenty years or more shall be taken directly to the 

Supreme Court.”).
2

I. FACTS

Farand Skinner, the victim, Paul Harrison, and the sole eyewitness, 

Timothy Day, were roommates. They had been friends for years, and Skinner 

allowed the other two men to stay at his home. According to Day, Skinner and 

Harrison frequently argued, and Skinner made Harrison move out. 

Harrison’s moving out ignited an exchange of contentious text messages 

between Harrison and Skinner about when Harrison could retrieve his 

belongings from Skinner’s house. Harrison texted that he was “going to take 

things to the extreme,” “get physical,” “knock his teeth down his throat” and 

that Skinner was going to have to “end up killing him,” he was “ready to die,” 

and “im bring aload of my shit out shoot me or do whatever but I’m going to get 

my shit.” 

Day accompanied Harrison to Skinner’s house to help him move his 

belongings. How the events unfolded upon their arrival is disputed. Skinner’s 

residence was equipped with a home-surveillance camera, and footage from 

that camera—despite low-quality video and no audio—shows Skinner emerging 

from the house as Harrison and Day arrive, Harrison exiting the vehicle and 

approaching Skinner, Skinner shooting Harrison once, and Harrison collapsing 

briefly before retreating to the vehicle. Once Harrison was inside the vehicle, 

Skinner shot at least twice into the vehicle, killing Harrison.

Skinner’s defense at trial was self-defense. He claimed that Harrison got 

out of the car, threatened to kill him, approached him aggressively with a knife, 

and in a manner that made Skinner fear for his life. 
3

Day did not testify that Harrison threatened to kill Skinner. He could 

only testify that Harrison was angry and the two argued immediately upon 

arrival. But in Day’s initial interview with police, he indicated that Harrison 

may have threatened Skinner.

After the shooting, Skinner reentered the house and called 911. He 

identified himself, his address, and reported that he had shot Harrison. The 

grand jury indicted Skinner for Harrison’s murder.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The trial court did not err in denying Skinner’s motion to dismiss 

the indictment under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 503.085. 

Skinner argues the Commonwealth improperly prosecuted him because 

he killed Harrison in self-defense; therefore, he was entitled to immunity from 

prosecution under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 503.085. Ordinarily, we do 

not “revisit whether there was probable cause” in cases in which “a jury has 

already convicted the defendant—and, thus, found [his actions were] unlawful 

beyond a reasonable doubt” unless there are flaws in the conviction.2 But 

considering the seriousness of the alleged errors and fact-intensive issues 

raised by Skinner, we will review the trial court’s denial of his immunity 

motion.3

 

2 Ragland v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.3d 236, 246 (Ky. 2015) (“In the present 

case, Truss ‘has indeed shown his conviction to be flawed due to the . . . errors 

discussed above.’ Therefore, we must ‘address the merits of his immunity claim, 

which would preclude the prosecution from going forward on remand were this Court 

to find error in the trial court's denial of immunity.”).

3 Id.
4

A trial court must deny a motion to dismiss criminal charges based on 

the accused’s claim of immunity if a substantial basis supports a finding of 

probable cause to conclude that the force used by the accused was unlawful.4 

And we will uphold the trial court’s decision to deny immunity so long as a 

substantial basis supported its finding that probable cause existed that the 

accused used unjustifiable force. A finding of probable cause requires that 

there be reasonable grounds to support a belief of unjustified force, supported 

by less than prima facie proof, but more than a mere suspicion.5 

Our precedent, Lemons v. Commonwealth, is instructive.6 In Lemons, we 

upheld a trial court’s decision to deny immunity because a substantial basis 

supported its conclusion of probable cause the defendant acted with 

unreasonable force.7 

In Lemons, the trial court found probable cause to believe the defendant 

did not act in self-defense because there were inconsistent versions of events 

from eyewitness testimony and inaccuracies in the timeline of events.8 So we 

held that the totality of the circumstances justified a reasonable belief that the 

defendant injured the victim and supported the trial judge’s finding that there 

 

4 Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 754 (Ky. 2009).

5 Id. at 715. 

6 437 S.W.3d 708 (Ky. 2014).

7 Id. at 716.

8 Id. at 715–716.
5

was probable cause to believe that the defendant had acted with unjustifiable 

force.9

As in Lemons, we find the trial court in the present case did not err in 

finding probable cause that Skinner’s use of deadly force was unjustified. The 

trial court’s finding was supported by a substantial basis found in inconsistent 

evidence and testimony. For example, while Skinner argues that Harrison 

approached him aggressively with a knife, the sole eyewitness, Day, did not 

recall seeing a knife and did not describe Harrison’s approach to the house as 

exhibiting behavior that justified the use of deadly force against him. 

Additionally, the video footage of the crime is inconclusive, at best, of the 

manner Harrison approached Skinner. These two facts comprise much of the 

evidence against Skinner. 

Skinner argues that the trial court erred because there are no differing 

versions of events. Though Skinner’s testimony is similar to Day’s eyewitness 

testimony in many respects, it differs in the aspect most critical to Skinner’s 

claim of immunity, which is whether Harrison approached with a deadly 

weapon and in a threatening manner making him fear for his life. This critical 

variance in the testimony is a small detail that has a great effect on whether 

Skinner acted justifiably. The trial court did not err in finding probable cause 

existed to believe Skinner did not have adequate reason to use deadly force. 

 
6

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Skinner’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment based on immunity. 

B. The trial court properly denied Skinner’s motion for directed verdict 

of acquittal and his new trial motion because there was sufficient 

evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 

Skinner argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a 

directed verdict of self-defense. We review a trial court’s denial of a directed 

verdict motion de novo, and we will uphold the trial court’s decision unless it 

was clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt.10 In ruling on a directed 

verdict motion, a trial court draws all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of 

the Commonwealth, assumes all its evidence to be true, reserves weight and 

credibility determinations for the jury, and must deny the motion so long as 

there is sufficient evidence to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.11 

A directed verdict motion for self-defense should only be granted in the 

rarest of circumstances and requires there to be no contradicting evidence,

fact, or circumstance that the jury could reasonably conclude that some 

element of self-defense was lacking.12 Clearly, the defendant has a high 

burden before a directed verdict for self-defense will be granted. We review this 

claim of error accordingly.

 

10 Benham v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

11Id.

12 West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Ky. 1989) (relying on 

Townsend v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1971).)
7

We find sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Skinner 

was not acting in self-defense, and the trial court properly denied his motion. 

At trial, the Commonwealth relied heavily on the surveillance video of the 

incident taken from Skinner’s residence. Though blurry, the video showed the 

victim approaching Skinner, Skinner shooting a gun, the victim collapsing, the 

victim then retreating to his vehicle, and Skinner shooting twice more into the 

vehicle. The video, however, is not clear enough to prove that the victim was 

approaching Skinner in a manner that would lead him reasonably to believe he 

was acting in fear of imminent bodily danger. 

Additionally, Skinner contends that the victim was approaching him not 

only aggressively, but with a knife. But the quality of the video footage is too 

poor to prove that claim. Overall, the lighting on the footage is dim, the images 

are fuzzy, and the video only shows each person’s movements but not the 

details of bodily features. If, as Skinner contends, the victim had a knife and 

approached him in an aggressive manner, the video was not clear enough to 

show it. A reasonable juror could find that the victim was not holding a knife, 

was not approaching aggressively, and that Skinner was not acting in selfdefense. 

As previously mentioned, the testimony of the sole eyewitness, Day, does 

not completely support Skinner’s defense. Day testified that the two men had 

been arguing, fought regularly, but he did not know Harrison customarily to 

carry a weapon. Importantly, he did not testify that Harrison approached 

Skinner with a knife or with any weapon. Day’s testimony does support 
8

Skinner’s defense in some regards, but not enough to overcome the steep 

burden of a directed verdict for self-defense. The evidence presented was 

sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to consider whether Skinner’s use of 

deadly force was unjustified. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Skinner’s motion for directed verdict. 

C. Prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive Skinner of a fair trial. 

Skinner agues misconduct by the Commonwealth resulted in a Brady13

violation that deprived Skinner of a fair trial. According to Skinner, the 

Commonwealth deprived him of exculpatory evidence, the police disposed of 

the exculpatory evidence, Detective Borders gave false testimony, and the 

Commonwealth elicited false testimony. This Court reviews claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct by focusing on the overall fairness of the trial and 

will only reverse the conviction if it finds the misconduct to be so improper, 

prejudicial, and egregious as to have undermined the overall fairness of trial.14 

We find after reviewing all the circumstances that Skinner received a fair trial.

1. The Commonwealth did not fail to disclose material evidence to the 

defense. 

Prosecutorial misconduct in the discovery process of a criminal trial can 

result in a violation of the defendant’s due-process rights.15 A Brady violation 

occurs when the Commonwealth suppresses evidence that is material either to 

guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

 

13 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

14 Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2006). 

15 Id. 
9

prosecution.16 A Brady violation also results when the government possesses 

integral information the defense does not and deprives the defendant of a fair 

trial.17 But, a Brady violation does not occur when the defense is aware of the 

allegedly suppressed information.18

Here, the Commonwealth did not improperly keep exculpatory evidence 

from Skinner. Most of the alleged misconduct by the Commonwealth relates to

the existence of a utility knife found on Harrison’s body. This knife was not 

found at the scene of the crime but was discovered later by the medical 

examiner during the autopsy. Four days after the incident occurred, 

Harrison’s personal effects were returned to his family, including the knife. 

After the personal items were released, the Commonwealth turned over the 

remaining evidence of the knife’s existence during discovery. 

Although the knife itself was missing, which is an issue that will be 

discussed shortly, the defense had the autopsy report listing a utility knife as 

an item found on Harrison’s body along with pictures of the knife’s sheath that 

held it. The defense was aware the knife had been on Harrison’s person when 

he died, what the knife’s sheath looked like, and that it had been given back to 

the family. This information was properly disclosed to Skinner during the 

discovery process. Skinner was able to cross-examine Detective Borders about 

the knife and to raise doubt about the thoroughness of the Commonwealth’s 

 

16 Commonwealth v. Parrish, S.W.3d 694, 697 (Ky. 2015).

17 Id. at 698.

18 Id. 
10

investigation. As previously mentioned, Brady concerns those instances in 

which the government possesses information that the defense does not have 

and then fails to disclose that information.19 Here, because there was no 

information withheld from the defense, no Brady violation occurred. Therefore, 

if prosecutorial misconduct occurred in Skinner’s case, it was not a result of 

the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence or information 

regarding it. 

2. The trial court’s finding that the Commonwealth did not act in bad 

faith by failing to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence was 

supported by substantial evidence. 

Skinner argues his conviction must be reversed because the 

Commonwealth’s failure to preserve evidence deprived him of a fair trial. We 

review a trial court’s ruling on a failure to preserve evidence issue for clear 

error and we will uphold the finding so long as it is supported by substantial 

evidence.20 To prove a failure to preserve evidence, the defendant must show 

the Commonwealth destroyed potentially useful evidence in bad faith.

21

Deliberate conduct may result in a finding of bad faith, but mere negligence on

 

19 Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002) (“Rather, Brady

concerns those cases in which the government possesses information that the defense 

does not and the government's failure to disclose the information deprives the 

defendant of a fair trial.”).

20 Garland, 458 S.W.3d 781, 786 (“Substantial evidence is evidence, when taken 

alone or in light of all the evidence, which has sufficient probative value to induce 

conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.”).

21 Id. at 786–87 (“Garland fails, however, to satisfy the first and most crucial 

prong of the McPherson test: bad faith on the part of the government.”).
11

the part of the Commonwealth generally does not.22 If bad faith is shown, the 

potential prejudice can be cured with a missing-evidence instruction.23

Four days after the shooting, Detective Borders returned the victim’s 

inventoried belongings to his family. This included the utility knife that 

Skinner alleges the victim was holding as he approached and supports his 

claim that he was acting in self-defense. Skinner argues this was misconduct 

and constituted a violation of his due-process rights. The trial court found 

there was no misconduct by the Commonwealth because Detective Borders did 

not act in bad faith. The trial court gave a missing-evidence instruction 

nevertheless.

Sanborn v. Commonwealth24 draws the clearest picture of bad-faith 

conduct in a failure to preserve evidence by the Commonwealth. In Sanborn, 

we held that a defendant's due-process and discovery rights were violated when 

the prosecutor deliberately erased witness-interview tapes to keep defense 

counsel from obtaining the statements contained in them.

25

By contrast, in Garland v. Commonwealth,

26 we upheld a trial court’s 

finding that the Commonwealth had not acted in bad faith when two officers 

destroyed fingernail clippings in accordance with KSP procedure. The 

 

22 Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Ky. 1997).

23 Gonclaves v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180, 197. 

24 754 S.W.2d 534, 539–40 (Ky. 1988).

25 Id. at 539.

26 458 S.W.3d 781 (Ky. 2015).
12

exculpatory nature of the evidence was not discovered before trial, but after.27

That was substantial evidence that the officers were not acting in bad faith.28

Similarly, in McPherson v. Commonwealth,

29 we upheld a trial court’s 

decision to find the Commonwealth did not act in bad faith when a detective

destroyed his preliminary notes once they had been incorporated into a draft of 

his report. As in Garland, we found this to be more a matter of routine 

housekeeping than the suppression of evidence. 

We find the trial court in the present case did not err in finding there was 

no bad faith by the Commonwealth because there was a substantial basis for 

finding that Detective Borders returned the knife to victim’s family out of 

negligence, and not deliberate misconduct. Skinner offered no evidence that 

Borders intentionally gave the knife to Harrison’s family to deprive Skinner of 

its use in his defense but only speculates that the detective knew that the 

utility knife was a deadly weapon that would provide credibility to his defense. 

Detective Borders testified that he did not check the victim’s belongings 

before returning them to the family and that he personally did not think the 

knife to be a deadly weapon, but rather an ordinary pocketknife. Also, 

Borders’s testimony regarding the crime scene indicated that the knife was not 

found immediately upon viewing the victim’s body but was found later by the 

medical examiner, sheathed and in Harrison’s pocket. Additionally, the 

 

27 Id. at 786.

28 Id. 

29 360 S.W.3d 207, 217 (Ky. 2012).
13

Commonwealth contends that Detective Borders did not consider the knife 

critical to Skinner’s defense because within the four days between the crime 

and the release of the belongings, Skinner had not mentioned that the victim 

brandished a knife but only that he was acting in self-defense because of the 

way the victim approached him. This fact further supported the trial court’s 

conclusion that Borders negligently disposed of the knife because he was 

unaware of its potential as exculpatory evidence. 

Evidence of bad faith must go beyond mere speculation.

30 We are 

unwilling to say the trial court erred by concluding that the Commonwealth did 

not intentionally deprive Skinner of potentially exculpatory evidence. 

Returning personal effects to the family is a common police procedure. And, as 

the trial court found it was negligent for Detective Borders to not check the 

victim’s belongings before returning them. But we cannot say this approaches 

the intentional conduct we found in Sanborn. The knife lends some support to 

Skinner’s claim of self-defense, but the trial court did not clearly err by finding

that Detective Borders did not act in bad faith because substantial evidence 

supported the conclusion it was a result of negligence. 

Importantly, the trial court gave the jury a missing-evidence instruction 

despite not finding bad faith. The missing-evidence instruction allowed the 

jury to infer the absent item would be favorable to the defendant’s case.31

While it is impossible to gauge the effect of exhibiting the knife would have had 

 

30 McPherson, 360 S.W.3d at 217–18.

31 Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 377, 391 (Ky. 2012).
14

on the success of Skinner’s claim of self-defense, it cannot be said that he was 

denied a fair trial because of its absence. 

3. Detective Borders did not give false testimony. 

Skinner’s third claim of prosecutorial misconduct arises from Detective 

Borders’s testimony. Detective Borders testified at the preliminary hearing, 

before the grand jury, and at trial. At the preliminary hearing, he testified that 

the victim did not appear to be armed at the scene.32 Before the grand jury, he 

testified that Skinner made two statements to police: (1) that he did not know 

Harrison to carry a weapon and (2) that he did not believe the victim to be 

armed at the time. Additionally, before the grand jury, Detective Borders 

stated that the victim did not possess a weapon and Skinner would have never 

seen a gun. Borders testified to the same facts at trial that he relayed to the 

grand jury.

a. Borders’s Grand Jury Testimony

Skinner argues that Detective Borders’s grand jury testimony was false 

because the medical examiner found the knife on Harrison’s body. Skinner’s 

argument centers around the following statement made by Detective Borders to 

the grand jury: 

Commonwealth: You didn’t find any weapon in the car of the victim 

or on the person of the victim or anything like that?

Borders: He did not possess any weapon on him. In the vehicle, in 

the rear of the vehicle, there was an air rifle but that was not 

apparent. That had to be . . . we had to find that when we 

searched the vehicle. 

 

32 The defense does not take issue with Det. Borders’s preliminary hearing 

testimony.
15

In analyzing claims of false testimony, the Court must analyze three 

factors: (1) Was the testimony false?; (2) If the testimony was false, was it 

material?; and (3) Did the prosecution know it was false?33 If the Court 

answers these three questions in the affirmative, the conviction must be 

reversed.34 In Commonwealth v. Baker, the Court of Appeals stated, 

“Generally, a defendant must demonstrate a flagrant abuse of the grand jury 

process that resulted in both actual prejudice and deprived the grand jury of 

autonomous and unbiased judgment.”35

We find Detective Borders’s grand jury testimony not falsified because

his testimony relayed what he thought at that time to be true. Borders did not 

see a weapon on the victim at the crime scene. Additionally, in Skinner’s initial 

statements to police he did not say that the victim approached him with a 

knife. Instead, Skinner said he had to defend himself because of the way that 

the victim approached him, the look in his eyes, and the way the victim raised 

his hands. Additionally, when asked if he thought Harrison had anything in 

his hands, he shook his head and said “I . . . I don’t know.”36 Borders testified 

that the victim did not have a weapon on his person when they removed him 

from the car.

37 This is true testimony because Detective Borders himself did 

 

33 Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 585, 590–91 (Ky. App. 2000).

34 Id. 

35 Id. at 588.

36 VR: 8/14/19 1:43:11; 2:19:54.

37 Skinner does not contend that Harrison had an air rifle. The air rifle was 

found at the scene during the search of the vehicle, not when the body was removed. 
16

not find a knife on the victim, even though a knife was later found during the 

autopsy. 

While the testimony presented to the jury is arguably misleading, it 

cannot be said to be false, and the Commonwealth is under no duty to present 

exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. As we have held, if the 

Commonwealth’s duty was to “present exculpatory as well as inculpatory 

evidence” it “would alter the grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an 

accusatory to an adjudicatory body.”38 Furthermore, a grand jury proceeding 

requires only a finding that the evidence supports an indictment for the crimes 

charged.

39 If the grand jury had been told that a knife was found later in the 

victim’s belongings, it is hard to say this would have changed their decision to 

charge Skinner. The fact the grand jury did not hear that a knife was later 

found on the victim was likely immaterial. 

b. Borders’s trial testimony was not false.

As previously discussed, to establish prosecutorial misconduct the 

defendant must show (1) the statement was false; (2) the statement was 

 

Borders’s grand jury testimony relays this fact. At trial, when Borders was specifically 

asked if any weapons were found on Harrison when they removed him from the 

vehicle, he stated “Certainly no firearms and I don’t believe there were any weapons of 

any type.”; VR 8/13/19 11:23:20.

38 Baker, 11 S.W.3d at 591 (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 

112 S.Ct. 1735, 1744, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992)).

39 Rice v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Ky. 1965) (“The grand jury

proceeding is not a trial. Such a body does nothing more than accuse a person of the 

offense he is alleged to have committed. The grand jury is merely required to find an 

indictment where they have received what they believe to be sufficient competent 

evidence to support it.”); Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 5.10.
17

material; and (3) the prosecution knew it was false.40 If there is a reasonable 

likelihood that perjured testimony affected the judgment of the jury, then the 

defendant’s due process rights have been violated and a new trial must be 

ordered.41

Detective Borders testified at trial that he did not find a knife on the 

victim’s body. When asked if any weapons were found on Harrison’s body at 

the scene of the crime, Borders stated: “There were certainly no firearms and I 

don’t believe there were any weapons of any type.”42 The prosecution then 

asked him to read the list of items returned to Harrison’s family that revealed 

the knife listed as one of his personal effects found during the autopsy. This 

fact was also disclosed during the medical examiner’s testimony as was a 

photograph of the sheath containing the knife.

The defense argues that Borders’s testimony about not finding a knife 

was false because it was found during the autopsy. Additionally, the defense 

argues that the Commonwealth elicited false testimony. As discussed 

previously, Detective Borders’s testimony was not false because he himself did 

not observe the knife at the scene. While the fact the knife was found during 

the autopsy was never revealed to the grand jury, at trial, immediately after 

 

40 Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Ky. 1999) (quoting United 

States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1989)).

41 Id. at 655–66 (“When [such] perjured testimony could ‘in any reasonable 

likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury,’ the knowing use by the prosecutor 

of perjured testimony results in a denial of due process under the Fourteenth 

Amendment and a new trial is required.” (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 

153, (1972)).

42 VR: 8/13/19 11:23:10.
18

Detective Borders answered that he did not find the knife, the Commonwealth 

drew Borders’s attention to the list of items contained in the medical 

examiner’s report, which disclosed that the victim did have the knife in his 

possession when he died. Additionally, the picture of the knife sheath was 

shown during the medical examiner’s testimony. The defense was aware of the 

knife, used the presence of the knife to aid its defense of self-defense, and no 

false testimony was presented that compromised Skinner’s right to a fair trial.

D. The surveillance video and 911 call recording were properly 

authenticated. 

We review preserved trial errors for abuse of discretion and will uphold 

the trial court’s ruling unless unreasonable, arbitrary, or unsupported by 

law.43 Under KRE 901, evidence is properly authenticated when the proponent 

offers enough proof for a reasonable jury to conclude the item is what it is 

proposed to be.44 The burden lies with the proponent and must provide prima 

facie evidence of authentication. 

In Litton v. Commonwealth,

45 we found surveillance photographs to be 

properly authenticated when the store owner identified the photos as fair and 

accurate representation of the location, explained how the cameras operated, 

and testified that the store owner had removed the film, sent it to the installer, 

and received the pictures from it.46 

 

43 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2004). 

44 Kentucky Rule of Evidence 901. 

45 597 S.W.2d 616, 618–620 (Ky. 1980). 

46 Id. at 619–20.
19

1. The surveillance video was properly authenticated.

As in Litton, we find the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to 

authenticate the video as a recording of the alleged offense. Skinner argues 

that the Commonwealth’s authentication was insufficient because the 

mechanical workings of the camera were explained at trial. But Detective 

Borders testified that he saw the cameras as he patrolled the scene, found the 

control unit for the camera inside Skinner’s house, and made a copy of the 

video from the control unit. This was sufficient to allow the jury to find the 

video was what it was purported to be. So the trial court did not err in finding 

the video properly authenticated. 

Additionally, Skinner does not contest the accuracy of the video footage. 

In Litton the defendant also did not argue the photos were fake, and we stated, 

“In the absence of a showing of irregularity in the production of a proffered 

photograph, we need not set up ‘unrealistic roadblocks’” and “deprive the trier 

of the facts of evidence not subject to the foibles of the imperfect memories and 

the passions and prejudices of human witnesses.”47 Here, Skinner only 

contests that Detective Borders did not testify to facts like the camera’s 

recording capabilities and technical workings. While these are facts relevant to 

authenticating the video, in this instance, these specific questions would have 

only provided additional evidence of authentication and the credibility and 

weight the jury should give to the video. Further, while Detective Borders’s 

 

47 Litton, 597 S.W.2d at 620 (quoting United States v. Hobbs, 403 F.2d 977, 

978–79 (6th Cir. 1968)).
20

testimony provided prima facie evidence of authentication, the jury also viewed

Skinner’s post-arrest interview in which he stated his surveillance camera had 

a 30-day recording span and that it was accessible with a computer mouse and 

remote. In sum, Detective Borders’s testimony provided the jury with enough 

information reasonably to conclude the video was what it was purported to be. 

2. The recording of the 911 call was properly authenticated. 

Skinner argues the Commonwealth failed to provide prima facie evidence 

of the authenticity of his 911 call following the altercation. We review 

preserved trial court evidence rulings for abuse of discretion and will affirm the 

ruling unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsupported by law.48 Like the 

surveillance video, we find the recording of Skinner’s 911 call was properly 

authenticated under KRE 901. 

The Commonwealth authenticated the call through the testimony of a 

911 dispatcher. The dispatcher explained how 911 calls are maintained and 

how they are kept in their regular course of business. She testified how the 

calls were stored in the archives, how she retrieved the recording from the

archives, and how she identified the call based on the name, address, or the 

computer-aided dispatch (CAD) report number. Further, she explained that 

she found the call and made a copy of it to a CD after listening to it and verified 

the CD was a copy of the call. This testimony authenticated the phone call, as 

 

48 Johnson, 134 S.W.3d at 566.
21

it provides prima facie evidence that this is the call Skinner made to 911 the 

night of the incident. 

Additionally, while Skinner does not argue the recording is false, it 

should be noted that additional credibility and authentication were provided by 

the statements contained in the phone call itself.49 The dispatcher asks the 

caller to identify himself, to give his phone number and address. The caller 

identifies himself as “Farand Owen Skinner III” and recites his phone number 

and address. The jury would have been able to compare the voice on the 

recording to Skinner’s voice in his interview tape and his voice at trial. This 

provided additional assurance that the 911 recording offered at trial was the 

phone call Skinner made to police following the incident. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment. 

All sitting. All concur.

 

49 Kentucky Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5) "(“Voice identification.” Identification of a 

voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or 

recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances 

connecting it with the alleged speaker.).”
22

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

David Bradley Mour

Law Office of David B. Mour

Gregory Dean Simms

Murphy & Associates

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Jesse Leo Robbins

Assistant Attorney General