CASTRO’S CUBA:

QUO VADIS?

Francisco Wong-Diaz

December 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-267-5
iii

FOREWORD

The United States, particularly the Army, has 

a long history of involvement with Cuba. It has 

included, among others, the Spanish-American War 

of 1898, military interventions in 1906 and 1912, the 

1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion, the 1962 Missile Crisis, 

counterinsurgency, and low intensity warfare in Latin 

America and Africa against Cuban supported guerrilla 

movements.

During the Cold War, Fidel Castro’s Communist 

takeover on January 1, 1959, heightened U.S. concerns 

and highlighted the threat Cuba posed as a strategic 

ally of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet bloc 

in the 1990s raised hopes for an end to the Communist 

regime in Cuba. However, after almost 5 decades 

of authoritarian one-man rule, the Cuban dictator 

remains firmly in power. On July 31, his brother, Raul 

Castro, assumed provisional presidential power after 

an official announcement that Fidel was ill and would 

undergo surgery.

This monograph is designed to contribute to the 

process of understanding the strategic and political 

implications attendant to Castro’s eventual demise 

or incapacitation. Dr. Francisco Wong-Diaz draws 

attention to the need to anticipate possible transition 

or succession scenarios and examines the consequences 

that might follow and the role that the United States 

might be called to play.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this report as part of its ongoing analytical program 

in support of Army participation in national security 

policy formulation and implementation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

FRANCISCO WONG-DIAZ is an attorney and 

professor of law, political science and international 

relations at the City College of San Francisco. He is a 

Member of the Committee on the Present Danger, the 

World Association of International Studies (WAIS), 

and the State Bars of California and Florida. He served 

as Associate Dean and Director of the Inter-American 

Center at Miami-Dade College, and was a visiting 

scholar at the University of California at Berkeley 

Graduate School of Business, visiting researcher at 

the Hoover Institution, and a Rackham Fellow at the 

University of Michigan. Dr. Wong-Diaz has also served 

on the editorial board of the California Lawyer and taught 

at the University of Michigan, University of Detroit, 

and San Francisco State University. For over 2 decades, 

he has provided political analysis and commentary for 

Univision, KDTV-14, in San Francisco, California. He 

specialized in national security law at the University 

of Virginia National Security Law Center and is listed 

in Who’s Who in America. His publications include 

American Politics in a Changing World (2nd ed., 2004); 

scholarly articles; and contributions to the New York 

Times, Washington Times, San Jose Mercury News, Marin 

Independent Journal, FrontPage Magazine, and other 

outlets. Dr. Wong-Diaz holds a B.A. with honors from 

Northern Michigan University, an M.A. and Ph.D. in 

political science from the University of Michigan, and 

a J.D. from UC-Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law.
v

SUMMARY

This paper serves multiple purposes, the most 

important of which is contributing to the depth of 

knowledge about Castro’s Cuba and Cuba’s Fidel in 

a time of transition. Evidence supporting the analysis 

and conclusions is derived from open sources.

Interest and concern about the unfolding Cuban 

reality increased after Fidel Castro provisionally 

delegated his presidential powers to his brother, Raul, 

on July 31, 2006, allegedy due to a life-threatening 

illness. Images of Castro collapsing while making a 

speech in 2003, falling on stage and breaking his left 

knee and right arm in 2004, or scoffing at reports by the 

Central Intelligence Agency in 2005 that he suffered 

from Parkinson’s disease while clearly favoring a limp 

arm have been flashing on television screens for several 

years. 

This monograph examines alternative scenarios 

in the twilight of Fidel Castro and in a post-Castro 

Cuba. They constitute a triad of outcomes; namely, 

a violent regime change, a peaceful transition to 

democracy, or a dynastic succession. Regime change 

is a possibility since Cuba is one of Freedom House’s 

two not-free countries in the Americas and a state 

sponsor of terrorism. However, after 47 years of oneman rule, a violent overthrow of the Communist 

dictatorship is highly unlikely. There is no organized 

armed opposition within Cuba, and the repressive 

state machinery operates effectively against real or 

potential enemies. The Cuban armed forces (FAR) 

remain loyal after having been purged, and are tightly 

controlled by Raul. In addition, on August 6, Secretary 

of State Condolezza Rice publicly stated that the Bush 

administration had no intention to invade Cuba.
vi

The global war on terror, Iraq, nuclear proliferation 

issues raised by Iran and North Korea, and the current 

terrorist attacks against Israel are the hot foreign policy 

priorities of the Bush administration. The United 

States would need to feel directly threatened before 

considering the use of force against Cuba. So despite 

U.S. Government rhetoric in the July 5, 2006, report of 

the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) 

about liberating Cuba, Castro knows that he will retain 

power as long as he lives. 

A peaceful transition to democracy and a free 

market economy is also unlikely as long as Fidel is 

alive. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there 

was hope that Cuba might undergo something similar 

to the “color” or “flower” revolutions that transformed 

many of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Unlike the 

Europeans, however, Cuba’s Communist party and 

security services remain loyal, and there is no solidarity 

movement or opposition leader with a credible plan. 

Cuban civil society is rather weak, and dissidents are 

unable to work openly and in full coordination. More 

importantly, the main reason why no color, flower, or 

cedar revolution will ever occur in Cuba is that Castro 

and his closest lieutenants have studied those events 

very closely, identified and anticipated the relevant 

contingencies, and learned how to deal with them.

A dynastic succession based on collective leadership 

is the unfolding Cuban scenario. Castro wants to retain 

personal power for as long as he can to protect his 

dominant position and interests. To accomplish this, 

first, he has sought close commercial and security ties 

with China, Venezuela, Bolivia, and even the mullahs 

of Iran. Next, he organized a succession process. Under 

Cuban law, the first Vicepresident of the Council 

of State, his brother Raul, assumes the duties of the 
vii

president. Raul, who turned 75 on June 3, assumed 

provisional power on Monday, July 31, following an 

announcement that Fidel was ill and would undergo 

surgery. Raul has physical ailments, too, and there is 

no clear indication that anyone else has been groomed 

to replace him.

So at age 80, the Cuban dictator’s place in history, 

for better or for worse, already has been established. 

For almost 50 years, the Cuban people have suffered 

political repression and tyranny under his one-man 

rule.

Castro’s eventual passing, the so-called “biological 

solution,” would constitute good and transformative 

news for Cuba if progress is made along a range of issues 

from development of true and honest representative 

institutions of governance to improvement of the 

Cuban people’s quality of life. The overarching 

American foreign policy objective should be to 

pressure the successor regime while encouraging a 

strong bias among Cuban elites for internally generated 

democratization, the rule of law, and transparency in 

reciprocity for graduated normalization of relations 

with the island.

1

CASTRO’S CUBA:

QUO VADIS?

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 

and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) on December 21, 1991, many predicted 

an end to Fidel Castro’s Communist rule. Against all 

odds, however, his totalitarian regime has survived the 

devastation of its economy from the loss of billions of 

dollars in Soviet economic and military subsidies, chronic 

economic mismanagement, an American embargo 

tightened by the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and 

the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, and branding as a state 

sponsor of terrorism.1

This unlikely outcome largely is owed to underestimation of Castro’s experienced political leadership, 

ruthlessness, and pragmatic instinct for survival, together 

with a continued lack of understanding on the part of 

the United States of the political culture of his corrupt 

regime. Over the years, he has outlived 10 U.S. presidents 

and 16 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directors. An 

unusual individual with an eidetic memory, Castro is 

totally narcissistic but able to learn new tricks and teach 

old ones. As Brian Lattell writes: 

Since the dawning of his political career in the late 

1940s Fidel Castro has demonstrated exceptional, often 

remarkable leadership qualities. Few of them would be 

considered admirable in a democratic society or ethical 

by any standard, but they have been critical to his 

success in holding on to power for more than 47 years, 

longer than any other leader in the history of the Western 

Hemisphere except one. Only the 19th century Brazilian 

emperor, Pedro II, in power for 49 years, ruled longer 

than Castro has.2
2

 On July 31, Fidel’s brother, Raul, assumed provisional 

power following an announcement that Fidel was ill and 

would undergo surgery. So friend and foe alike wonder 

about Castro’s capacity to rule and speculate about 

what will happen to Cuba after his inevitable death 

or incapacitation.3 On June 23, 2001, images of Castro 

collapsing while making a speech flashed across television 

screens. In May 2003, he suffered another fainting spell in 

Buenos Aires, Argentina. On October 20, 2004, in Santa 

Clara while leaving a graduation ceremony, he tripped 

and fell on stage, breaking his left knee and right arm. 

About a year later, on November 17, 2005, at the University 

of Havana, Castro scoffed at reports by the CIA that he 

suffered from Parkinson’s disease, insisted he would step 

down if he became too ill to govern, and went on to speak 

for 5 1/2 hours. On July 26 , the anniversary of the attack 

on the Moncada Barracks that originated his revolution, 

the eyes of the world once more turned to Bayamo, Cuba, 

not only to hear what the Maximum Leader might say or 

do but also for any signs of his mortality.4

This paper briefly considers alternative Cuban 

scenarios in the twilight of Fidel Castro. One must 

remember that he entered center stage with a bang on 

January 1, 1959, and might wish to exit in the same manner. 

The main purpose of this paper is to help anticipate and 

deal with future contingencies in order to narrow the 

choice of solutions. While it is not my intent to provide 

a complete analysis of the policy options available, 

a failure to deal properly with the social upheaval that 

might follow the end of Castro’s reign would have 

significant consequences for the United States. As 

Niels Bohr once said, however, “prediction is difficult, 

especially about the future.”5 It is a useful caveat to keep 

in mind, for history is replete with failed prognostications 

about, in Lockwood’s felicitous phrase, Castro’s Cuba 

and Cuba’s Fidel.6
3

A TRIAD

The contentious debate over Cuba’s future direction 

harks back to the early 1960s and the John F. Kennedy 

administration. One of the earliest arguments was made 

by RAND analysts Roberta and Albert Wohlestetter, 

who put out a proposal for a study of Post-Communist 

Cuba.7 Since that time, predicting the future course of 

Cuba after Castro has been a popular topic that can be 

viewed as a triad of potential outcomes; namely, regime 

change, democratic transition, or dynastic succession. It 

constitutes a useful framework for analysis and will be 

examined in that order. 

Regime Change.

Cuba is one of two not-free countries in the Americas, 

one of six countries on the State Department list of states 

sponsoring terrorism, and, in the words of Mexican 

writer Carlos Fuentes, a former supporter and apologist, 

a “suffocating dictatorship.”8 Cubans, for example, 

can be imprisoned for such political “crimes” as being 

disrespectful, dangerous, or insulting to the symbols of 

the homeland. Nonetheless, the violent overthrow of the 

regime is highly unlikely to occur. Cuban civil society is 

rather weak, and the opposition is unable to work openly 

and in full coordination. There also is no organized 

armed opposition within Cuba. The repressive state 

machinery operates effectively against real or potential 

enemies within both the state apparatus and the society 

at large. And if revolutions are said to be led by the 

middle classes, Cuba sent it abroad decades ago.9 The 

masses are conveniently mobilized and rallied by the 

government against internal opponents and dissidents, 

as well as against the American hegemon as needed. They 
4

also are reminded of the threat presented by the hordes 

of returning exiles claiming restitution for expropriated 

and confiscated land and property in spite of the fact 

that some exile leaders are seeking reconciliation, giving 

reassurances about negotiating property claims, and have 

long admitted lacking the wherewithal to help overthrow 

the regime by force.10

The Diaspora is riddled with dissension, paranoia, 

and distrust, in no small part instigated by the Castro 

regime. Indeed, it is a truism that the exile community 

long has been penetrated by the Cuban Intelligence 

Service (CuIs), a resilient institution that continues to 

work aggressively in the United States. Cuba’s Directorio 

General de Inteligencia (DGI) successfully has placed spies, 

sleeper cells, and illegal operatives who have reported 

and sometimes encouraged exile activities and generated 

infighting among the various groups. Major Florentino 

Aspillaga Lombard, the Cuban DGI resident in Prague 

who defected to the United States in 1987 contended 

that most, if not all, of the Cuban agents recruited by 

the CIA from the mid-1960s onward were doubles--

pretending to be loyal to the United States while working 

in secret for Havana. Four years later, CIA analysts and 

counterintelligence officers glumly concluded the major 

was telling the truth. This meant not only that much of 

what the agency knew about Cuba was wrong, but also 

that a great deal of what Cuba knew about the CIA was 

right.11

In a 1998 CNN interview, Castro made the rare 

admission that Cuba has dispatched spies across the 

United States to gather information about “terrorist 

activities” by anti-Castro political groups. He said, “Yes, we 

have sometimes dispatched Cuban citizens to the United 

States to infiltrate counterrevolutionary organizations, 

to inform us about activities that are of great interest 
5

to us.”12 Indeed, Cuban spies have found considerable 

success penetrating U.S.-based exile groups. A notable 

example is that of Juan Pablo Roque, a former MiG-23 

pilot who defected to the United States in 1992, became a 

paid source for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

and joined the ranks of the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR). 

He redefected back to Cuba just days after the early 1996 

BTTR shoot-down, denouncing the exile group on Cuban 

television, and accusing it of planning terrorist attacks 

against Cuba and Castro. Another example involves the 

case of Jose Rafael Fernandez Brenes, who jumped ship 

from a Cuban merchant vessel in 1988. From 1988-91, he 

helped establish and run the U.S. Government-financed 

TV Marti, whose signal was jammed from its inception 

in March 1990, due in part to frequency and technical 

data provided by Fernandez Brenes. Likewise, Francisco 

Avila Azcuy ran operations for Alpha 66, one of the most 

violent anti-Castro exile groups, all the while reporting 

secretly to the FBI and Cuban intelligence. Avila planned 

a 1981 raid on Cuba, telling both the FBI and the DGI all 

about it. His information helped convict seven members 

of Alpha 66 for violating the Neutrality Act by planning 

an attack on a foreign nation from U.S. soil. He also 

informed on the personal lives and tastes of 40 top antiCastro leaders.13

During the Cold War, the United States rightfully 

treated Castro’s regime as a potential threat to our interests 

and adopted a policy of isolation and containment. 

However, no one seriously believes today that the United 

States is planning to conduct offensive combat operations 

to overthrow Castro. In the current global environment, 

any credible American initiative to effect a regime change 

would have to be based not on the old strategic calculus 

of the Cold War, but on an estimation of Cuba’s capability 

to threaten U.S. security. Wayne S. Smith, former Chief 
6

of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana from 1979-82, 

contends there is no threat because we have achieved 

our strategic objectives; namely, Cuba has no troops 

operating in Africa, and it no longer assists revolutionary 

movements and has no military ties with the former Soviet 

Union.14 However, on May 6, 2002, Under Secretary of 

State John R. Bolton made the allegation that Cuba had 

a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability and, 

as a state sponsor of terrorism, presented a real threat. 

The perception of a Cuban threat is highlighted not by its 

military, commercial, and investment ties with China, but 

by its aggressive intelligence collection activities targeting 

the United States. Castro has maintained Cuba’s role 

as an intelligence collection platform previously for the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and now for 

China. In particular, operations continue near Havana at 

Torrens (also known as Lourdes), the massive 28 squaremile signals intelligence (SIGINT) base set up by the 

Soviet Special Forces (GRU) military intelligence in the 

mid-1960s.15

In his CNN interview, Castro further denied spying 

to collect information on the U.S. military. “We aren’t 

interested in strategic matters, nor are we interested in 

information about military bases,” he said. This is, of 

course, not true. The U.S. Department of State issued a 

fact sheet on July 30, 2003, examining Cuba’s history of 

espionage against the United States as the latest evidence 

that Castro’s regime “has long targeted the United States 

for intensive espionage activities.”16 Cuba probably has 

shared the output of his intelligence services with China 

and other U.S. rivals. The motivation clearly is more than 

defensive as Castro, who is pathologically anti-American, 

has been engaged in a protracted, asymmetrical conflict 

with the United States.17 Over the decades, the dictatorship 

has gone from operating training camps for guerrillas and 

terrorists, supporting insurgency movements, exporting 
7

revolution, or acting as a Soviet mercenary in proxy 

wars, to its current ties and joint operations with Iran and 

China--all indicative of a willingness to pursue policies 

inimical to American interests.18

The case of Ana Belen Montes, a Puerto Rican who 

was the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) top Cuban 

analyst until she confessed to spying for Cuba for 16 

years (from 1985 to the time of her arrest on September 

21, 2001), is of great significance. She was sentenced to 

25 years in federal prison in September 2002. Montes did 

tremendous damage to our national security by revealing 

Pentagon contingency plans, sources, and methods, 

as well as giving the Cuban Government the names of 

four U.S. covert intelligence officers working in Cuba. 

Moreover, as the foremost Department of Defense (DoD) 

briefer on Cuba and trainer of new analysts, she gathered 

and submitted writings, documents, and profiles 

about officials; and influenced policy, recruitment, and 

promotional assignments. Her betrayal was significant 

due particularly to her influence on policy and strategy. 

After the demise of the USSR, a consensus had emerged 

among American analysts, reflected in a 1998 DoD report 

to Congress, that Castro’s Communist government posed 

“a negligible threat to the United States or surrounding 

countries.” Montes was a major source of this estimate, 

and after her arrest, DIA officials remarked that they had 

to discard most of what they thought they knew about 

Cuba.19

In June and September 2001, five members of the socalled Red Wasp Network were convicted of espionage or 

related crimes. These Cuban spies sought to infiltrate U.S. 

Southern Command headquarters. One was convicted 

for delivering a message to the Cuban Government that 

contributed to the death of four fliers from BTTR who 

were shot down in 1996 by Cuban MiGs in international 

airspace.20
8

In 2000, Mariano Faget, a Cuban-born Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS) official with 35 years 

of service and high security clearance, was caught in a 

sting operation and later sentenced to 5 years in prison. 

During his years of spying, Faget most likely provided 

false papers, classified information, and illegal entry to 

Castro’s operatives. Two Cuban diplomats associated 

with the case were expelled from the United States for 

espionage activities. Earlier, from 1983 to 1998, 15 members 

of the Cuban mission to the United Nations (UN) were 

expelled for espionage activities, including three who 

were handlers for the Wasp Network in 1998.21

An intriguing recent case is that of Alberto Coll, a 

Cuban-born lawyer who served in the first George W. 

Bush administration as an assistant secretary of defense 

and became the Dean of the Strategic Studies Division 

at the Naval War College. Like Ana Montes, he, too, 

consistently declared that Cuba presented no security 

threat, favoring dialogue with Castro and ending the 

embargo. As part of his job, he visited Cuba frequently 

and was caught making a false statement about his 

last visit in 2004. There is no proof that he was a covert 

operative, but on July 25, 2005, he was convicted, fined, 

and placed on 1-year probation. Coll lost his security 

clearance and agreed not to seek work that would involve 

classified information. He is now at DePaul University 

Law School teaching International law and organizing 

academic visits to Cuba. It is conceivable that Coll, a 

member of the Council on Foreign Relations, fell into a 

traditional “honey trap” operation to recruit him as an 

agent of influence.22

Finally, on January 2006, Carlos M. Alvarez Sanchez 

and his wife, Elsa Prieto Alvarez, two Cuban exiles 

prominent in Miami academic, intellectual, and religious 

circles, were arrested and charged with spying since 
9

the 1970s. Assigned by the DGI to infiltrate the Cuban 

community, they became close friends with Florida 

International University president and community 

leader Modesto Maidique and conducted psychological 

screening for the Miami-Dade police department.23

From all his spying activities, Castro has gained 

invaluable and tradable intelligence about American 

military plans, capabilities, sources, methods, and 

operations affecting Cuba and other countries. He plays 

defense and offense against the United States, his main 

enemy, a country to which he dedicates his primary 

attention and energy.24 So he probably is well aware of the 

ongoing policy shift in the Bush Doctrine. Thus, on May 

16, 2006, the U.S. Government announced that it would 

restore diplomatic relations with Libya after 27 years of 

conflict. Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, knowing that a 

nuclear program was unfeasible and fearing that after 

Afghanistan and Iraq he was next in line, dismantled 

his WMD program and closed terrorist training camps, 

opening his files to reveal the A. Q. Khan network in 

exchange for an end to sanctions, security guarantees, 

and removal from the Department of State list of states 

sponsoring terrorism. The U.S.-Libya rapprochement, 

however, began in 2003 when Libya agreed to pay 

restitution to the families of 270 people who died aboard 

Pan Am Flight 103, which Libyan agents were responsible 

for bombing. Libya agreed that year to end its nuclear and 

other WMD programs and allow America and Britain to 

verify the process.25

Castro, unlike Qadhafi, had received a promise not 

to invade the island from President Kennedy as part of 

the deal with the Soviet Union that ended the Missile 

Crisis of 1962. While Operation MONGOOSE, led by 

Attorney General Robert Kennedy with his brother’s 

approval, sought to eliminate Castro, the United States 
10

has kept its promise not to invade the island.26 Since 

that time, and despite regular pressure from Cuban 

exiles for an armed intervention, the United States 

never has desired to invade Cuba nor truly committed 

the diplomatic, military, and economic resources 

required for the violent overthrow of Castro. In fact, 

Secretary of State Condolezza Rice insisted on August 

6, 2006, on NBC’s Meet the Press, that an invasion was 

not in the works. “I want to lay one thing to rest,” she 

said. “The notion that somehow the United States is 

going to invade Cuba because there are troubles in 

Cuba is simply far-fetched. And it’s simply not true. 

The United States wants to be a partner and a friend 

for the Cuban people as they move through this period 

of difficulty.”

Since the global war on terror, the Iraqi muddle, 

and the nuclear proliferation issues raised by Iran and 

North Korea are the current foreign policy priorities 

of the Bush administration, the United States would 

need to feel directly threatened before considering 

the use of force against Cuba. So Castro knows, that

notwithstanding U.S. Government official rhetoric, 

he is treated as a distraction and will be allowed to 

remain in charge as long as he does not cross the red 

line--namely, aiding, abetting, harboring, planning, 

or conducting acts of terrorism against the American 

homeland.27

A Peaceful Transition to Democracy

and a Free Market Economy.

While the Castro brothers are alive, this is doubtful. 

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was 

hope that Cuba might undergo something similar to the 

“color” or “flower” revolutions that transformed many 
11

of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Unlike Eastern and 

Central Europe, however, Cuba’s dissident groups are 

small in numbers, thoroughly penetrated by the internal 

security forces, betrayed by spies, and embarrassed by 

accusations of external support. They seek dialogue as a 

means to achieve the regime’s peaceful transformation 

but lack access to the masses.28

The University of Miami’s Institute for Cuban and 

Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS) Cuba Transition 

Project supported by a grant from the Agency for 

International Development (AID) has been examining 

the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua 

to determine what lessons it might hold for Cuba.29 Two 

identified weaknesses of the European model are the 

geographic proximity of Cuba to its main opponent, 

the United States, and the unique internal historic 

conditions existing in Cuba, specifically, five decades 

of personalistic authoritarian leadership. Moreover, the 

Cuban Communist Party (CCP) remains loyal, there 

is no charismatic opposition leader with a solid plan, 

no significant anti-Castro student activism in Cuba, 

no working class solidarity movement, and the few 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) allowed to 

operate in the country are highly restricted.

Adding to the practical problem of stimulating a 

peaceful transition is the ambivalent Cuban policy of the 

Bush administration. While its official pronouncements 

give the impression that it seeks regime change in Cuba, 

in fact, it is planning to deal with a post-Castro succession 

scenario. On October 10, 2003, Bush established the 

Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC), an 

interagency group chaired by then Secretary of State 

Colin Powell. The Commission was directed to report 

to the President by May 1, 2004, with recommendations 

for developing a comprehensive program to achieve the 

mission. The five recommendations proposed were:
12

1. Bring about a peaceful, near-term end to the 

dictatorship;

2. Establish democratic institutions, respect for 

human rights, and the rule of law;

3. Create the core institutions of a free economy;

4. Modernize infrastructure; and,

5. Meet basic needs in the areas of health, education, 

housing, and human services.30

Bush formed the U.S. Commission for Assistance to 

a Free Cuba “to explore ways we can help hasten and 

ease Cuba’s democratic transition.”31 Yet, on December 

4, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State Robert F. Noriega 

announced that Bush is committed to the “liberation of 

Cuba” during the next 4 years. What did he mean by 

“liberation”? Certainly not a military intervention or 

covert operation to achieve regime change while Cuba 

is under Castro. Noriega stated that Washington had a 

blueprint of plans for providing social, economic, and 

other types of assistance to Cuba in the post-Castro era to 

prevent Castro’s supporters from retaining control of the 

country after his death. He said that Washington wants 

to “ensure that vestiges of the regime don’t hold on.”32

In July 2005, Secretary Rice, who now co-chairs 

the Commission together with Commerce Secretary 

Carlos Gutierrez, announced the appointment of Caleb 

McCarry, a former Republican staff member of the 

House International Relations Committee, as Cuba 

transition coordinator--or point man on regime change 

in Cuba. McCarry has a $59 million budget to “hasten the 

transition” and prevent Raul Castro, Carlos Lage, Perez 

Roque, and other leaders from continuing the current 

system.33
13

On July 5, 2006, the Commission issued a second 

updated report that indicates extensive strategic 

planning on the part of the U.S. Government to promote 

a full transition to democracy after Castro dies or is 

ousted. It is based on the expectation that the Cuban 

transition government would be inclined to request 

American assistance and unrealistically assumes that 

pro-democracy forces within the island would be 

bolstered and emboldened by U.S. willingness to provide 

assistance. The report considers the first 6 months after 

Castro’s demise to be critical if a democratic transition is 

going to succeed. A whole range of assistance programs 

are included in the planning, ranging from $80 million for 

a “democratic fund” for 2 years to help strengthen civil 

society to legal experts for election and judicial training, 

an aid package, and technical and health assistance. The 

report also includes a classified annex of measures to 

destabilize the regime which begs the crucial question of 

what specific actions might be undertaken to prevent Raul 

and others from succeeding Fidel. The report’s credibility 

is weakened by the underlying assumption that Castro 

will not survive within the next years, the hope for 

popular protests and demonstrations in the future, and 

the presumption of an American readiness to intervene 

directly in internal Cuban affairs upon his death.34

Juan J. Lopez argues that Cuba’s failure to undergo 

a transition to democracy is due to a “lack of belief 

in political efficacy.” But Cuban exiles and dissidents 

have sought international support for Castro’s peaceful 

departure from the island into exile in Spain. Castro did 

not give any serious consideration to the plan. Then Pope 

John Paul II visited Cuba on January 21-25, 1998, and 

called for democratic change. The Pope’s visit raised the 

hopes of those who wanted to dialogue their way into 

a transition, but Castro disregarded his plea and soon 
14

thereafter stepped up prosecutions and harassment of 

dissidents. It is not a lack of political efficacy on the part 

of Cuban people, but the diabolically effective repressive 

machinery of the regime that kept them from emulating 

their European counterparts.35

Edward Gonzalez has suggested that one of three 

regime types that might follow after Castro is a democratic 

transition regime drawn from the ranks of dissidents and 

opponents.36 However, in 1996 Manuel Marin, a special 

European Union (EU) representative, brokered a deal 

between the United States and Castro. Under the proposal, 

Castro would allow dissidents organized as the Concilio 

Cubano the opportunity to meet openly in Havana, and, 

in exchange, the United States would provide new loans 

and credits. After finding all he needed about the group, 

Castro ordered a crackdown on the Concilio members. 

This action confirms Aguirre’s view that a democratic 

transition regime in unlikely to replace the one-party 

rule any time soon because the authoritarian institutions 

remain strong and stable.37 James Cason, former Chief 

of Mission of the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba from 

2002-05, met openly with the dissidents and consistently 

denounced Castro through his 3-year stint. But overt or 

covert support for dissidents oftentimes amounted to the 

kiss of death as the events of March and April of 2003 

demonstrated. In that year, European and American 

intellectuals saw their support for Castro shaken 

and hopes for a peaceful transition dashed when the 

government again ordered a crackdown against the prodemocracy opposition. Seventy-five people, including 

27 independent journalists, 10 independent librarians, 

and signature collectors for the Varela Project--a citizens’ 

initiative to hold a national referendum on civil liberties-

-were sentenced to an average of 20 years in prison 

following a 1-day trial. Jose Saramago, a Portuguese 
15

writer who won the 1998 Nobel Prize for literature and 

considered himself a close friend of Castro, said Cuba 

“has lost my confidence, damaged my hopes, and cheated 

my dreams.” Even hardcore supporters joined in signing 

a statement issued by the leftist Campaign for Peace and 

Democracy entitled “Anti-War, Social Justice, and Human 

Rights Advocates Oppose Repression in Cuba.”38

A June 29, 2006, report by the Coordinadora Nacional 

de Presos y Ex-Presos Politicos (CNPP), an umbrella 

organization of 85 human rights groups in Cuba, revealed 

that there are 347 political prisoners in Cuba, of which 

121 are prisoners of conscience. In addition, the report 

warned about a great new wave of arrests and repressive 

measures (“gran ola represiva”) against dissidents and 

opponents in the coming months in advance of the 

forthcoming Fourteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned 

Movement (NAM) in Havana on September 15-16.39

Hoover scholar Bill Ratliff has examined the similarities between post-Mao China and a post-Castro Cuba 

and suggested the innovative argument that the Chinese 

transition model of development first, then democracy 

might be adopted by Cuba. As he notes, however, Fidel has 

rejected the Chinese model of socialist capitalism despite 

his brother’s open admiration of it.40 It is reasonable to 

assume that Cuba can draw many useful lessons from 

China to the extent that the two are comparable. Unlike 

Cuba, China occupies a vast continental mass inhabited 

by a huge population with a history of regional warlords 

and linguistic differences. Whether a successor regime 

in Cuba might choose to follow the Chinese road is an 

open question, however, since the Chinese “model” itself 

is still a work in progress. In fact, there is an ongoing 

debate among China watchers over whether China will 

collapse, democratize, remain authoritarian, or achieve 

what Minxin Pei calls “partial reform equilibrium.”41
16

Irving L. Horowitz alternatively has suggested 

that the Cubans might adopt a Turkish model of 

nationalistic military/civilian authoritarian control to 

drive development.42 Turkey has developed democratic 

traditions over several generations and is accelerating its 

transformation into a modern nation in order to achieve 

integration with the EU. Turkey has been presented as a 

model to the Middle Eastern countries; as a blend of Islam 

and democracy, a Muslim country fulfilling European 

cultural criteria. It also is a Muslim country with strong 

generals in a tough neighborhood and historic conflicts 

with Greece. Like Cuba, Turkey occupies a geographically 

strategic position; like China and unlike Cuba, Turkey 

was once a proud empire. The Turkish military acts 

as the guarantor of national legitimacy and secular 

republicanism. Since single-party rule ended in 1950, they 

intervened in civilian politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980, to 

maintain the democratic process. Whether Cuba’s FAR 

could become the main driver of a democratic transition 

after Castro’s departure is an intriguing question. Their 

role certainly would be easier than the Turkish military 

since in Cuba there are no tribal, ethnic, or religious 

conflicts that the armed forces would have to ameliorate, 

mediate, or eliminate. The sole historic cleavage from 

the pre-Castro era is racial tensions between white and 

black Cubans. Since the Revolution, a new one appeared 

between the Party “haves” and the “have nots” rest of the 

population.

The FAR, nonetheless, is not only the most efficient 

and effective nonsectarian institution in the country but 

also the main institutional stakeholder with multiple 

tasking ranging from national defense, internal security 

and repression, to tourism, mining, aviation, and the sugar 

industry. Equally important, the FAR has maintained the 

revolutionary tradition and has never fired on the people 
17

since the government came to power. No other military 

in Latin America, except the Ejercito Popular Sandinista/

Ejercito Nicaraguense which the FAR helped to create, 

has behaved in such a manner.43

Since the FAR will continue to play a most critical role 

in any Cuban political system, U.S. policy initiatives could 

integrate military-to-military security cooperation and 

confidence-building components along the lines of the 

U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security program of the Center 

for Defense Information (CDI). But, the 1989 purge of 

Minister of the Interior (MININT)General Jose Abrantes 

and the show trial and execution of General Arnaldo 

Ochoa Sanchez made it clear to the military and security 

services that Fidel and Raul will eliminate rivals ruthlessly 

and severely suppress any organized movement within 

the armed forces toward liberalization or transition 

to democracy.44 Against that historic background and

concerned about the possibility of a bloodbath, exile 

leader Carlos Montaner has suggested that, to effect a 

peaceful transition, reformers and democrats must form 

an alliance after Castro’s death.45

The reality is that no color, flower, or cedar revolution 

will occur because Castro and his closest lieutenants have 

studied those events very closely, anticipated the relevant 

contingencies, and contemplated how to deal with 

them. Dominguez argues that they learned four specific 

lessons from the fall of Eastern European Communism: 

undertake as few political reforms as possible; get rid 

of deadwood in the Communist party early on; deal 

harshly with potential or evident disloyalty; and do not 

allow a formal opposition to organize.46 Julia Sweig, in 

turn, identified six elements in Castro’s survival strategy: 

alliances at home; a diverse supply network; cultivating 

sympathy in the international community; astute use of 

the press; manipulating the activities of the Diaspora; 
18

and taking advantage of its geographic proximity to the 

United States.47 Whether they learned four lessons or 

used six strategic elements, it is obvious that they have 

been doing whatever is necessary to survive and stay 

in power. As Bueno de Mesquita notes, authoritarians 

are good at limiting strategic coordination activities 

by the opposition--such as disseminating information, 

recruiting and organizing members, choosing leaders, 

and developing strategy to increase power and influence. 

Thus, they usually are able to prevent democratization.48

Cuba, the strategic “Key to the Gulf,” the Pearl of the 

Antilles, has been a global crossroads of people and 

ideas since it was first discovered and settled by Spain 

in 1492. In addition to its geopolitical position, Cuba also 

has valuable natural resources--nickel, cobalt, iron ore, 

copper, manganese, salt, timber, and possibly oil--to trade 

in the global economy.49 If there is going to be a transition 

in the land of tropical socialism, it characteristically 

might be Cuban. To wit, Cuba would not have a so-called 

“peaceful transition to democracy” as desired by the 

United States and the exiles, but rather at best a transfer 

of authoritarian rule devoid of Castro’s personalism.

From a public policy standpoint, moreover, we 

must reassess the desirability of pressing for a rapid 

Cuban transition to democracy in light of recent findings 

indicating that democratizing states are more prone to 

start wars than mature democracies or authoritarians. 

However, since Cuba is unlikely to start a war with its 

neighbors, these studies draw into question the soundness 

of the democratic peace hypothesis as applied to the 

Cubans.50

A Succession Regime.

A regime based on collective leadership is the most 

likely scenario since Fidel himself already has set the 
19

process in motion. It is anchored on the assumption 

that his brother, Raul, who turned 75 on June 3, would 

survive Fidel. Raul plays a pivotal role in Fidel’s regime 

by occupying four key positions--first vice-president of 

the council of state and of the council of ministers, as well 

as the general of the army and minister of the FAR. Under 

current law, the first vice-president will assume the duties 

of the president, and in 1997 Raul was recognized formally 

as Fidel’s successor. The Castro clan also includes Fidel’s 

firstborn son, Fidel Castro Diaz Balart (“Fidelito”) and five 

other sons with his common-law wife, Dalia Soto del Valle, 

but apparently no one else has been groomed to replace 

Raul. Two overlapping camps of elites loosely identified 

as Fidelistas or Raulistas and divided between historicos

(the “barbudos” or “bearded ones” of the revolution) and 

the post-revolutionary generations of new Socialist men 

and women constitute the winning coalition below the 

Castro brothers.51

Fidelistas are mostly historicos in the party and 

economic sectors who take a hard line position on 

security issues and preservation of the socialist tradition. 

Raulistas largely are composed of newer generation 

military and technocratic personnel who are strong on 

security issues but willing to experiment with economic 

development short of a full free market mechanism. They 

represent the competing civilian leadership and military 

organization aspects of the regime along generational 

and ideological fault lines. In addition to Fidel and Raul, 

and absent the unknown factor of a dark horse or hidden 

clique, the leading players in implementing the strategy 

are historico General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, General 

Alvaro Lopez Miera, Vice-president Carlos Lage Davila, 

Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, National Assembly 

President Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, Government 

Ministers Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz and Yadira Garcia, and 
20

historicos General Jose Ramon Machado Ventura and 

General Juan Almeida in his role as the symbol of the 

Afro-Cubans.52

Fidelistas and Raulistas alike are found distributed 

throughout the cadres in the FAR, MININT, and security 

services, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 

(CDRS), ministries, state enterprises, and managerial 

bureaucracy. The Catholic and Protestant church, AfroCuban sects like the santeros, and human rights groups 

will play a tertiary role. All these elements will either 

coalesce to protect their interests in a post-Castro Cuba 

or clash as the collective leadership group vies to retain 

power.

The reasons behind Castro’s succession strategy are 

pragmatic and understandable. Longevity runs high 

among the Castro clan and the possibility remains of 

both brothers surviving into the next decade. But what if 

events do not follow that order? A collective leadership 

approach will cement elite cooptation and maintain the 

loyalty of critical elements within the regime.

Castro, the absolute ruler, wants to retain personal 

power for as long as he can to protect his dominant 

position and interests. Bueno de Mesquita suggests that 

for an authoritarian, staying alive politically is a measure 

of success; by that measure, Castro is incomparably 

successful.53 The Castros not only enjoy the use and abuse 

of power but have profited from it. The recent financial 

revelations regarding the wealth amassed by Castro over 

the decades have put a dent on his façade and have raised 

the stakes for survival. Accordingly, the May 5, 2006, issue 

of Forbes magazine estimated Fidel Castro’s personal 

worth at $900 million, ranking him as the world’s seventh 

richest leader. In a speech of May 25, 2006, a visibly upset 

Castro challenged Forbes to prove it.54

Forbes’ estimate is imprecise due to Cuban economic 

reporting practices and the way it was calculated. They 
21

assumed that Castro owns about 10 percent of the 

country’s gross domestic product (GDP) based on his 

partial ownership of state enterprises such as Havana’s 

Convention Center, Medicuba, Cimex, and a few others. 

Cuban defectors have been quite consistent over the years 

about the extent of Castro’s financial interests in state 

enterprises. Major Aspillaga, mentioned above, revealed 

that Castro has Swiss bank accounts. The real amount 

probably is higher, according to Eugenio Yanez, if one 

were to include the larger state enterprises like Artex, 

Cubatabaco, Acemex, Cubatour, Caribat, Cubatecnica, 

and others.55

The charges of personal corruption at the highest levels 

of government are very significant because corruption 

is now so endemic that some consider Cuba one of the 

world’s most corrupt states. In fact, Castro’s personal 

money-making activities in his capacity as Cuba’s ruler 

date as far back as a 1960 deal with Nikita Khrushchev, 

whereby he would receive honoraria for the publication 

of his lengthy speeches and articles in Russian. Unless 

proper measures are taken to address corruption, it will 

hinder any future regime by inviting increased organized 

crime activity and turning the country into a mirror image 

of pre-Castro Cuba.56

Castro needs to maintain domestic control and 

guarantee external security to secure his position. The 

state security and intelligence apparatus are ruthlessly 

efficient and constantly monitor and intimidate the 

opposition. The historical record since the early beginning 

shows that Castro seldom has hesitated to eliminate 

suspected or potential rivals and enemies. In 1959, 

after the defeat of Batista, for instance, the country was 

swamped with popular playing cards (“postalitas”) with 

the faces and biographies of revolutionary leaders. Those 

of Commander Camilo Cienfuegos were more valuable 
22

than those of Fidel--i.e., 10 of Camilo traded for 1 of Fidel. 

Camilo disappeared early that year in a mysterious plane 

accident. Since those days, the growing list of erstwhile 

Castro collaborators who were pushed aside or disposed 

of has included President Manuel Urrutia, Commander 

Hubert Matos, Comandante Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, 

General Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio De La Guardia, General 

Jose Abrantes, Carlos Aldana, and Roberto Robaina. In 

Ratliff’s pointed words, “it is fatal to be popular in Cuba 

unless you are already dead, like Che Guevara.”57

External actors with significant interests in the 

ongoing succession process that will be contesting their 

agendas in a post-Castro regime include both states 

and nonstate actors. The main stakeholder in Cuba’s 

future is the United States. China, Venezuela, and Iran 

are countries with strategic, security, commercial, and 

ideological interests; the European Union, in particular 

Spain and England; as well as Canada, Mexico, Bolivia, 

and Brazil also have important commercial and financial 

interests on the island. Beyond their bilateral foreign 

policy considerations with Cuba, these countries also 

partake in the global competition for natural resources, 

markets, and access to a skilled labor force. Cuba, Bolivia, 

and Venezuela also are joined by the Bolivian Alternative 

for the Americas (ALBA), a trade and cooperation 

agreement in opposition to the unsuccessful U.S. Free 

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Nonstate American 

groups with direct or indirect interests in Cuba include 

the exiles, business, educational, artistic, and agricultural 

groups; NGOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, 

and Human Rights Watch; think tanks like the Center for 

Defense Information; and news media outlets.58

A critical element of Castro’s strategy to retain power 

and maintain external security has been the use of Cuban 

soft power. Joseph S. Nye has defined soft power as 
23

“. . . the ability to get what you want by attracting and 

persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from 

hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of 

economic and military might to make others follow your 

will.”59

Castro’s manipulation of soft power is global, 

sophisticated, and very effective in creating a multiplier 

effect. Hal Klepak notes that “Castro’s influence in the 

region is subtle. His revolution has survived for almost 50 

years, and there are lessons that may be useful for other 

national leaders.”60 After almost 5 decades of dictatorship, 

repression, and human rights violations, Castro’s media 

image as a symbol of defiance remains not only in the 

developing world but among so-called “progressive” 

circles in the United States and Europe. News media 

manipulation of the revolutionary mythology dates back 

to the famous Herbert Matthews reports from the Sierra 

Maestra in the 1950s, perhaps the classic example of 

Cuban disinformation, and has continued to the present 

day.61

The success of Cuban soft power strategies also is 

manifested in the omnipresent Che Guevara t-shirts, 

posters, and berets worn by youths;62 tourist campaigns 

touting Cuba as a travel destination; the Venceremos 

brigades; globalization of Cuban music, films, theater 

productions and cuisine; performances by Cuban ballet 

dance troupes, musicians, and salsa bands in global 

venues; touring baseball teams; front organizations for 

educational and academic exchanges; offers of free medical 

education programs and biotechnological training; 

medical diplomacy by cadres of volunteer physicians and 

health care providers; etc.63 In fact, the regime’s ability to 

shape global perceptions has been so effective that former 

CIA Cuban specialist Brian Latell failed to recognize 

that Castro was truly anti-American for over a decade. 

Latell reveals that he had been enthralled with Castro for 
24

many years and became “disenthralled” in 1976 after “I 

finally came to understand that Fidel was pathologically 

hostile to the U.S.”64 How this failure to see and clearly 

understand Castro for so long might have affected or 

biased his analysis, estimates, and recommendations 

remains unanswered, however.

Following, I briefly outline the contours of five possible 

succession scenarios. They are merely suggestive of 

future developments since events in Cuba, whether slow 

or sudden, may occur in a drastic manner and we need to 

avoid being caught by surprise. One thing that must be kept 

in mind, however, is that Castro is a strategic thinker, and 

many of his seemingly arbitrary or ad hoc decisions are, 

in fact, carefully calculated. It is quite plausible, therefore, 

that, like the U.S. Government, the Castro brothers and 

their closest lieutenants have held periodic continuity of 

government exercises to deal with future contingencies. 

For instance, the late General Manuel “Barbarroja” 

Piñeiro, the first MININT minister, explained that when 

news first arrived about Che Guevara’s death in Bolivia, 

the Cuban leader demanded confirmation and then began 

to work on the death announcement. In Piñeiro’s words, 

“We knew it would have a terrible psychological effect 

on our people, all revolutionaries, and people all over the 

world--which was why it was important to give them the 

news carefully . . .”65

Scenario 1: Fidel and Raul both survive for the 

next 3-5 years with declining physical abilities but 

functioning mental faculties. The likely course of events 

would include minimal changes in external policies and 

tactical and strategic rotation of personnel within the 

FAR, critical ministries, and the security apparatus to 

discourage disloyalty. Problems managing the economy 

will remain with increased discontent over housing, 

electrical shortages and blackouts, corruption, and 

internal repression of dissidents and potential rivals.
25

The governing coalition group becomes more Raulista 

in membership with the increasing militarization of the 

country. Repression is tightened to maintain control, 

prevent instability, and demoralize the internal opposition. 

Stronger ties are sought with China, Venezuela, Bolivia, 

and Iran as countervailing forces against U.S. pressure to 

democratize.

Scenario 2: Fidel dies suddenly. This leadership 

vacuum leads to the immediate accession to power of 

Raul Castro and his minions coupled with a de facto 

state of martial law and high military alert. Public 

announcement of Fidel’s death might be delayed until 

internal security arrangements are in place, and key 

military installations, airports, and harbors have been 

secured. An official month-long mourning period begins 

during which the special purges of potential rivals 

and challengers to Raul in the party apparatus and 

bureaucracy begin to take place. The sanctification of Fidel 

begins in earnest with popular mobilization in staged 

events, parades, monument dedications, etc. Pockets of 

dissenters and opponents are imprisoned or eliminated 

after being activated by agent provocateurs. Unlike the 

engineered migrations used by the regime in the past, a 

regulated emigration to Florida is allowed as Raul seeks 

to avert American intervention and obtain international 

acceptance by appearing statesmanlike, poised, and 

reassuring in public. Militarized socialism becomes more 

institutionalized as loyal Raulistas are inserted in the key 

ministries and state enterprises. The University of Miami 

Cuba transition group, led by Jaime Zulicki and Brian 

Latell, in a simulation of decisionmaking under Raul 

immediately after Fidel Castro’s death, concluded the 

succession would be smooth and quick.66 

Scenario 3: Fidel becomes severely incapacitated or 

declines faster than his younger brother. The succession 
26

process set in motion by Fidel on July 31 was a test run 

for a Raulista takeover. After redeploying the armed 

forces throughout the island, Raul begins the process of 

succession by removing, jailing, or eliminating Fidelistas 

to consolidate power. A sort of cultural revolution 

to emphasize discipline and purge the ranks begins. 

Fidel’s public appearances diminish and are replaced 

by broadcast of prepackaged videotaped speeches and 

exhortations for special occasions. The transition from 

public to electronic appearances will resemble that of 

Osama Bin Laden from hiding. Raul increases his personal 

public appearances to fill the open spaces vacated by 

Fidel. The governing group becomes more firmly Raulista 

and less Fidelista, with the consequent militarization of 

key civilian ministries. General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, 

Minister of the Interior and Raul’s closest friend, leads 

the process. Closer military ties with China are sought to 

counterbalance American interventionism and provide 

an opportunity to play the Cuba-Taiwan card, that is, 

trading Chinese penetration of Cuba for U.S. withdrawal 

of support for Taiwan.67 Venezuelan commitment to 

subsidize oil supplies in exchange for continued health 

and educational support are sought. 

Scenario 4: Raul dies suddenly, and Fidel is aging 

physically but mentally in full faculty. A major 

succession crisis occurs as Fidel and his closest lieutenants 

might face an internal power struggle. Raulistas in the 

military and security services might move quickly to 

purge Fidelistas in the Communist Party and CDRs. 

An attempted purge of military ranks led by General 

Abelardo Colome Ibarra, Raul’s closest friend and a 

historico, leads threatened Raulistas to defect, while 

others appeal to the United States for intervention. Elite 

groups within the military and entrepreneurial sectors 

claiming ability to lead and maintain stability and order 
27

clash with Fidelistas seeking to mobilize the masses on 

patriotic and ideological grounds. Castro loyalists seek 

external support from Venezuela and China to retain 

control. There is an increased possibility of a bloodbath 

initiated by an attempt on Castro’s life coupled by a 

military coup.

Scenario 5: Raul becomes severely incapacitated, 

and Fidel is aging with reduced mental faculty.

General Abelardo Colome Ibarra and the succession 

command conduct purges to maintain control and 

prevent internal dissension from spreading to the general 

population. Increased defections, an attempted coup, 

and assassinations are possible. Repressive machinery is 

tightened while elites vie for power. A very dangerous 

and unstable situation develops as both brothers might 

be kept alive temporarily to be displayed as symbols of 

unity or eliminated followed by a declaration of regime 

change and appeals for external help and support. A 

potential bloodbath might follow as loyal military units 

move to establish order, clashing with popular groups on 

the streets. A military junta assumes control but is unable 

to garner popular support or mobilize the population. 

As dissension spreads, the tourist industry comes to a 

standstill, and the economy begins to tilt toward collapse. 

Waves of mass emigration ensue, and an international 

crisis develops as the United States moves to blockade the 

island and interdict vessels. The possibility of a military 

confrontation with the FAR increases as members of the 

regime seek to divert attention from the internal struggle 

by unifying the population against a common enemy 

threatening the national sovereignty.

Implications. 

Cuba has undergone a nontransition from 

Communism. Altogether, the succession scenarios 
28

outlined above highlight a set of issues facing both 

the United States and the Cubans regarding security, 

authoritarian control, stability, leader indispensability, 

institutionalization, and elite cooptation. They confirm 

that we currently are engaged in a Castro death watch, 

waiting for the so-called “biological solution” and the 

aftermath of a succession process leading to some sort of 

collective leadership. In the meantime, we need to search 

for a clear understanding of the internal rivalries, factions, 

and shifting balance of power within the present regime. 

For decades, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been 

dominated by a policy of isolation through an embargo 

on trade and travel restrictions. Wayne Smith, who once 

wrote that Castro may be the best guarantor of Cuba’s 

peaceful transition to a market-oriented economy and 

more democratic government, has long argued that lifting 

the embargo would deprive Castro of the U.S. threat and 

open up the system to transformation.68

Bill Ratliff and Roger Fontaine want a policy of 

engagement by lifting the embargo because, from their 

perspective, Castro has more to gain from the sanctions 

as they provide him with a scapegoat for his own 

repression and economic failures.69 Castro would never 

let engagement happen, however, because, as Carlos 

Fuentes accurately noted, “he needs his American enemy 

to justify his own failings.”70 Ratliff and Fontaine make 

that point themselves when they note that “whenever 

Washington has lightened up, Castro has tightened up 

and effectively prevented further improvements.”71

Paradoxically, the unconditional lifting of the embargo 

might even strengthen Castro’s hold by providing him 

with another victory over the United States and raising 

his global standing once more.72

James Petras, a hardcore Marxist supporter of 

Castro who once called the dissidents American-paid 
29

propagandists, reluctantly has admitted six obvious 

failures of the Cuban government unrelated to the 

embargo.73 He listed them as being a huge housing crisis 

(one million units needed), a health system infrastructure 

that is worse than some African countries, a failed energy 

policy leading to “apagones” or blackouts that people 

use to write graffiti against the government, high level 

corruption, racial discrimination after 40 years of social 

revolution, and an egocentric Castro leadership that 

permeates all sectors.74Likewise, leftist Maurice Halperin, 

who began visiting Cuba in 1935 and as an octogenarian 

returned to the country for 1 month in the 1990s, blamed 

Castro for the problems of the country.75 In sum, Castro 

needs the embargo to sustain his totalitarian regime and 

will not cooperate effectively in its elimination, while the 

United States will not lift the embargo unconditionally 

without a move toward democracy and a market 

economy. Whether a succession regime would be 

more willing to cooperate with the United States is an 

open question ultimately to be answered by the type of 

unfolding scenario. 

We have an opportunity to observe and test-run 

for how long, how well, and in what manner a postCastro successor regime might exercise power. On 

July 31, the radio broadcast statement read by Carlos 

Valenciaga, Castro’s secretary, announced the dictator’s 

provisional delegation of seven different power positions 

to 11 different functionaries due to an “acute intestinal 

crisis, with sustained bleeding, that obliged me to face a 

complicated surgical operation.” 

To his brother and official successor, Raul Castro, 

he delegated his three functions as First Secretary of 

the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCP), 

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (FAR), and 

President of the Council of State and Government. 
30

His roles as “principal promoter” of national and 

international public health programs, education, and 

energy were delegated respectively to Dr. Jose Ramon 

Balaguer Cabrera, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, 

Esteban Lazo Hernandez, and Carlos Lage Davila, all 

members of the CCP Political Bureau. Since Castro also 

personally managed and prioritized the funding of the 

three programs, in his absence a three-man commission 

composed of Carlos Lage Davila; Felipe Roque, Minister 

of Foreign Relations; and Francisco Soberon Valdes, 

Minister-President of the Central Bank, was established 

to disburse the monies. 

In proclaiming this power distribution, Castro 

disclosed to the world the possible contours of his 

succession plan. As expected, Raul assumed the mantle 

of power in a collective leadership system composed of 

Fidelistas in charge of the economic and social programs 

and Raulistas in charge of the armed forces. In the mix, 

we find older generation Machado Ventura and AfroAmerican Lazo Hernandez, and Lage Davila and Felipe 

Roque of the younger generation. 

In a well-choreographed show of humility, the 

proclamation presented this arrangement as a “task 

recommended” to the Communist Party and it “begs” the 

postponement of the dictator’s 80th birthday celebration 

until December 2, Cuban Armed Forces Day and the 50th 

anniversary of the Cuban Revolution.

CONCLUSION

For better or for worse, Castro’s place in history already 

has been established. For almost 50 years, the Cuban 

people have suffered political repression and tyranny 

under his one-man rule. On the other hand, the UN 

Human Development Index (HDI) Report for Year 2005, 
31

relying on data from 2003 and before, ranks Cuba (with an 

HDI of 0.817) at No. 52 out of 177 countries--above Mexico 

and Panama, but below Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and 

Argentina.76 Whether history will absolve or condemn 

him will depend on what happens to the long-suffering 

Cuban people after his demise. Fidelismo/Castroism, not 

being a true ideology like Marxism or even Al-Qa’idism, 

will probably dissipate and die with him. It is quite likely 

that his political legacy might be a return to traditional 

Latin American politics of military rule or weak civilian 

governments beholden to military leaders. In that regard, 

De Mesquita’s useful insight that authoritarian regimes 

are difficult to dislodge because they are growing more 

sophisticated and that authoritarianism leads to stability 

is quite apropos.77

In a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), post-Saddam 

Hussein world, the United States can ill afford a Cuban 

collapse and attendant instability. An authoritarian 

successor regime might be preferable to a failed state. 

This is the reason why an American military intervention 

to depose Castro or his successor is neither advisable nor 

likely. While Castro is alive, American foreign policy 

toward Cuba will remain the choreographed pas de deux

of the past 5 decades. An uncomfortable and conflictual 

relationship is one whose organizing principle is Cuban 

anti-Americanism and American isolation of Cuba 

encouraged by Fidel Castro’s dictatorial “kakistocracy”

(rule of the worst citizens).

The inevitable passing of Castro will constitute 

good and transformative news for Cuba if progress is 

made along a range of issues from development of true 

and honest representative institutions of governance 

to improvement of the Cuban people’s quality of life. 

Cubans will have to overcome the long shadow cast by a 

culture of authoritarian one-man rule where, for decades, 
32

individual initiatives have not been allowed to surface 

and prevail because Castro, the micromanager par 

excellence, had to either approve or direct them all. The 

overall post-Castro American foreign policy objective 

should be to engage the succession regime and encourage 

a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally-generated 

democratization, the rule of law, and transparency 

in exchange for an across-the-board normalization of 

relations with the island. U.S. military command will need 

to perform regular and timely updating of contingency 

planning to interdict vessels to and from the island and to 

protect and evacuate American diplomatic personnel and 

tourists in case of violent unrest.78 As the 2006 report of 

the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba reflects, we 

must be at the ready to propitiate the process, since in the 

final denouement, the vested military and civilian elites 

will inexorably begin a struggle for power postponed by 

Castro’s longevity, and they will seek powerful allies. 

When that time arrives, in cauda venenum, preventing a 

bloodbath, avoiding a total economic collapse, foreign 

intervention, and massive uncontrolled migration to 

Florida will be the biggest challenges we will face from 

Cuba since January 1, 1959.

ENDNOTES

1. The Cuban economy began its last recovery in 1995 

following a series of measures aimed to reduce the budget deficit, 

shore up the peso, and promote tourism and foreign investments. 

One important measure was to introduce the dollar as a parallel 

currency to take advantage of the visits and remittances by the 

exiles. After the 2003 crackdown on dissidents, however, the 

Bush administration tightened the 4-decades-old U.S. embargo 

of the island, increased Radio Marti news broadcasts into Cuba, 

curtailed visits home by Cuban-Americans, and limited the 

amount of money Cuban-Americans can send to relatives. See 

Carmelo Mesa Lago, “The Cuban Economy in 2004-2005,” and 

Jorge A. Sanguinetty, “The Cuban Economy,” Cuba in Transition: 
33

Vol. 15, Miami: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy 

(ASCE), August 4-6, 2005; Jorge I. Dominguez, Omar Everleny, 

Perez Villanueva, and Lorena Barberia, eds., The Cuban Economy 

at the Start of the Twenty First Century, Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American 

Studies (DRCLAS), 2005. On the axis of evil countries, see “Axis 

of Evil,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_evil. In May 2006, the United 

States agreed to drop Libya from the list. Condoleezza Rice, 

the incoming Secretary of State, in her prepared remarks before 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 18, 2005, 

elaborated on the concept “Outposts of Tyranny” and gave a list 

of six countries deemed most dangerous and anti-American. It 

included the two remaining “Axis of Evil” members, Iran and 

Syria, as well as Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar. On the 

legislation, see “Cuban Democracy Act of 1992” at congress.nw.dc.

us/cubanclaims/legislation_3cuban_demo.htm, and “Cuban Liberty 

and Democracy Solidarity Act (Libertad) of 1996” at congress.

nw.dc.us/cubanclaims/legistation_5cuban_liberty_htm.

2. Brian Latell, “Fidel Castro and the Media,” The Latell Report, 

Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami’s Institute 

for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS), May 2006. 

On Castro’s realist pragmatism, see Michael H. Erisman, Cuba’s 

Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World, Gainesville: University 

Press of Florida, 2000.

3. He turned 80 years old on August 13, 2006. See Mark Falcoff,

Cuba The Morning After--Confronting Castro’s Legacy, Washington, 

DC: AEI Press, 2003.

4. Castro returned to his roots on July 26, 2006, by holding the 

commemorative event in the historic city of Bayamo, the capital 

of the Granma province. In an interview with Ignacio Ramonet, 

Castro responded to the November 2005 CIA claim that he had 

Parkinson’s, by replying: “Well, it doesn’t even matter if I have 

Parkinson’s. Pope John Paul II had Parkinson’s disease and 

he went around the world for years while suffering from the 

disease.” Ignacio Ramonet, “Fidel Castro: The Revolution is Based 

on Solidarity,” May 2, 2006, www.ahoracu/english/SECTIONS/

special/2006/abril/07-04-06.htm. Cuba hosted the annual meeting of 

the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) on September 15-16, 2006.

5. This popular quote by Danish Physicist Niels Bohr is 

mistakenly ascribed to Yogi Berra.
34

6. Lee Lockwood, Castro’s Cuba, Cuba’s Fidel: An American 

Journalist’s Inside Look at Today’s Cuba in Text and Picture, New 

York: Vintage Books, 1967. The voluminous list of publications on 

Castro includes Jules Dubois’ early Fidel Castro: Rebel, Liberator or 

Dictator? Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1st edition, 1959; Edward 

Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma, Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1974; Andres Oppenheimer, Castro’s Final 

Hour, Washington, DC: Touchstone, 1992; Leycester Coltman, The 

Real Fidel Castro, New York: New York Free Press, 2003; Eugene 

Robinson, Last Dance in Havana--The Final Days of Fidel and the 

Start of the New Cuban Revolution, New York: New York Free 

Press, 2004; and Brian Latell, After Fidel, New York: New York 

Free Press, 2006.

7. Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter, “Studies for a PostCommunist Cuba” D(L)-11060-ISA, Santa Monica: RAND Classics, 

February 25, 1963; “On Dealing With Castro’s Cuba: Part I,” D(L) 

17906-ISA, Santa Monica: RAND Classics, January 16, 1965.

8. Cuba is the least free country in the Americas followed by 

Haiti. Freedom in the Americas Today, Freedom House, 2006, www.

freedomhouse.org. Countries currently on the DOS list of state 

sponsors of terrorism are Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, 

and Libya. On May 16, the U.S. government announced that 

Libya would be removed from the list, www.state.gov. On April 

26, 2003, Carlos Fuentes wrote in a letter published by Mexico 

City’s Reforma newspaper: “As a Mexican, I wish for my country 

neither the dictates of Washington on foreign policy nor the Cuban 

example of a suffocating dictatorship.”

9. See Cuba’s Repressive Machinery--Human Rights Forty Years 

After the Revolution, Human Rights Watch, June 1999; and Rosa 

Ferre “Repression In Cuba: A Battle Against the People,” Cubanet, 

English translation, 2004. On the connection between civil society 

and exile, see Juan Carlos Espinosa, “Civil Society in Cuba: 

The Logic of Emergence in Comparative Perspective,” Cuba in 

Transition, ASCE, 1999, pp. 346-367; and Holly Ackerman, “Mass 

Migration, Non-Violent Social Action, and the Cuban Raft Exodus, 

1959-1994: An Analysis of Citizen Motivation and International 

Politics,” Ph.D. dissertation, Coral Gables: University of Miami, 

1996.

10. Holly Ackerman, “Incentives and Impediments to Cuban 

National Reconciliation,” in Eloise Linger and John Walton 

Coltman, eds., Cuban Transitions at the Millennium, Largo, MD: 
35

International Development Options, 2000; Volker Skierka, Fidel 

Castro: A Biography, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004, p. 356 and its 

footnotes; and Brett Heindl, From Miami with Love: Transnational 

Political Activism in the Cuban Exile Community, Syracuse: The 

Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Campbell Public Affairs 

Institute, Sawyer Law and Politics Program, November 19, 2004.

11. Interview with Major Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, 

Radio Marti, August 7, 1987.

12. CNN, October 20, 1998.

13. Fact Sheet, Cuba: Espionage, Bureau of Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, 7/30/2003, www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/22895.htm. The 

DGI was created in 1961, later to be absorbed by the Ministry 

of the Interior (MININT). It conducts external intelligence and 

counterintelligence operations.

14. Wayne S. Smith, “Our Cuba Diplomacy: A Critical 

Reexamination,” May 22, 2003, Washington, DC: Center for 

International Policy.

15. Bolton stated, 

The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited 

offensive biological warfare research and development 

effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to 

other rogue states . . . With the third largest biotechnology 

industry in the third world and as a major exporter of 

related infrastructure, products and expertise, Cuba 

could have an offensive biological weapons program.

John R. Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Heritage Lecture #743, May 6, 2002, 

www.heritage.org. According to the Mitrokhin Archive, Lourdes 

became one of the most important bases for KGB SIGINT stations 

codenamed TERMIT-P after an April 25, 1975, secret Soviet 

government decree. Christopher Andrew and Vasili N. Mitrokhin, 

The World Was Going Our Way, The KGB and the Battle for the 

Third World, Cambridge: Basic Books, 2005, p. 92. See also Ratliff’s 

article, “Cuba and China,” Latin Business Chronicle, January 2006; 

China Reform Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 87, American Foreign Policy 

Council, Washington, DC: March 3, 2003; and Lourdes Facility, 

Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/

irp/imint/c80_04.htm.

16. Fact Sheet, Cuba: Espionage, Bureau of Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, July 30, 2003, www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/22895.htm.
36

17. See his famously revealing letter to confidant Celia 

Sanchez, “A Letter to Celia Sanchez” in Rolando E. Bonachea and 

Nelson P. Valdes, eds., Revolutionary Struggle 1947-1958: Volume 1 

of The Selected Works of Fidel Castro, Cambridge: The MIT Press, p. 

379.

18. Hans de Salas-del-Valle “Cuba and Iran: a Growing 

Alliance,” Cuban Affairs, Vol. 1, Issue 2, April 2006; “Iran and Cuba 

Zap U.S. Satellites,” The Nation, September 19, 2003; Kathleen 

Parker, “Romance Anew between Cuba and Iran,” San Francisco 

Chronicle, February 13, 2006, p. B5. Castro also is a close ally of 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, with whom he signed the 

October 30, 2000, Caracas Accord. Cuba now receives subsidized 

Venezuelan oil. Chavez was protected by Castro following a 

failed coup in 1992, and the Cuban intelligence services have now 

penetrated Venezuela’s critical institutions. On Thursday, June 1, 

2006, during an OPEC meeting, Chavez called infamous terrorist 

Carlos, the Jackal, a “good friend” and has written him a letter of 

solidarity. Carlos’s real name is Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, and he 

led an attack against a 1975 OPEC meeting in Vienna, Austria, 

during which 70 persons were seized, including the Venezuelan 

oil minister, and three persons were killed. At the time, he said 

that “to get anywhere, you have to walk over the corpses.” 

Carlos was captured by French authorities in 1994 in Sudan and 

is now serving a life sentence in France. See Aleksander Boyd, 

“An Overview on the Dynamics of Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro, 

Terrorism, and Its International Supporters,” www.proveo.org.

19. Interview with the late Colonel John D. Macartney, USAF 

(Ret.), former Commandant of the DIA Defense Intelligence 

College, October 2001. For the Ana Montes spy case, refer to 

“United States v. Ana Belen Montes,” September 2001, and the 

affidavit of Stephen A. McCoy, FBI special agent. See www.files.

findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/montes/usmontesaff901.

pdf. Curiously, former CIA officer Brian Latell cooperated with 

Montes in drafting the report but did not disagree with her 

analysis. Indeed, the analysis by the spy would be correct if Cuba 

poses a negligible threat.

20. The Miami Herald, on September 3, 2001, reported the arrest 

of two additional alleged Cuban spies, George and Marisol Gari, 

known in their intelligence-gathering cell as Luis and Margot, 

who reported to at least two of the five convicted members 

of the Red Wasp Network. See also www.latinamericanstudies.

org/cuban-espionage.htm. In testimony at the Hearing Before the 
37

Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary House 

of Representatives, July 1999, Castro was charged with giving the 

order to shoot; see also FBI press release of September 14, 1998.

21. www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-espionage-htm.

22. Ibid. 

23. Alfonso Chardy and Oscar Corral, “Cuban Americans 

Foresee Rise of a ‘Climate of Fear’,” The Miami Herald, January 15, 

2006. See also Lydia Martin, “Spy Culture Takes Toll on Exiles’ 

Psyche,” The Miami Herald, February 8, 2006, p. 1A.

24. Irving Louis Horowitz, “One Hundred Years of AmbiguityU.S.-Cuban Relations in the 20th Century,” The National Interest, 

Spring 2002, pp. 56-64. Stephen Kinzer’s analysis of American 

involvement in regime change suggests that the United States 

failed to overthrow the Castro regime in its infancy because it did 

not timely reframe it as a geostrategic threat. And when it did, it 

was either too late or unable to justify it on ethical or idealistic 

reasons. See Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: American’s Century of 

Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, New York: Times Books, April 

4, 2006.

25. Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who 

‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications 

for Theory and Policy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3, 

Winter 2005/06, pp. 47-86; Mark P. Sullivan, “Cuba and the State 

Sponsors of Terrorism List,” CRS Report for Congress, May, 13, 

2005.

26. See “Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy: The 

Missile Crisis,” www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/cuba.htm; “People & 

Events: Operation Mongoose: the Covert Operation to Remove 

Castro from Power” in RFK, American Experience, PBS, 2002;

and Tomás Diez Acosta, October 1962: The Missile Crisis as Seen 

from Cuba, New York: Pathfinder Press, 2002. See also Gerald K. 

Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,” www.

cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art07.html. In 1975, Senator Frank 

Church (D-Idaho) led the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study 

Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 

also known as the Church Committee. Representative Otis Pike 

(D-New York) led parallel Committee Hearings in the House. 

The hearings exposed U.S. involvement in the assassination 

and attempted assassination of foreign leaders and led to the 

establishment of permanent intelligence committees in both 

chambers to conduct oversight.
38

27. Daniel Pletka and Michael Rubin, “The Tyranny Doctrine,” 

Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2006: “. . . announced resumption of full 

U.S. diplomatic relations with Libya . . . marks an effective end to 

the Bush Doctrine.” See also, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Transformational 

Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 

2006, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 139-148.

28. Karen DeYoung estimated that there were no more 

than 500 active dissidents. See “For dissidents in Cuba, a lonely 

crusade,” International Herald Tribune, July 18, 2000. In 1999, the 

Cuban National Assembly passed Law 88 popularly known as the 

“gag law” which was so repressive of political thought that it was 

not enforced until 4 years later.

29. Cuba Transition Project, “Transition from Communism: 

Lessons Learned, Challenges Ahead for Cuba,” Conference 

Proceedings, ICCAS, Coral Gables: University of Miami, 2005.

30. Mission of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,

www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/c12238.htm.

31. Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, 

May 6, 2004, stategov/p/wha/rt/cuba/.

32. “Top Official: U.S. Wants Cuba ‘Liberation’,” www.

newsmax.com/archives.ic/2004/12/4/180552.shtml.

33. “Announcement of Cuba Transition Coordinator Caleb 

McCarry,” Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Treaty Room, Washington, 

DC, July 28, 2005, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/50346.htm.

34. Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, 

July 5 , 2006.

35. Juan J. Lopez, Democracy Delayed, The Case of Castro’s Cuba, 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 66. See also 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS, Annual 

Report, 1998, Chapter IV, “Human Rights Developments in The 

Region, Cuba.”

36. Edward Gonzalez, “After Castro: Alternative Regimes and 

U.S. Policy,” Cuba in Transition Project, Coral Gables: University of 

Miami, 2002.

37. B. E. Aguirre, “The Stability of the Institutions of the Cuban 

State During the Transition,” Cuba in Transition, ASCE, 2002, pp. 

486-492. See also Richard A. Nuccio, “It’s Castro Who Keeps His 

Country in Isolation,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1998.
39

38. For more details on Saramago and other intellectuals, 

see dc.indymedia.org/newswire/display/66958/index.php. See also 

William Ratliff, “Why El Jefe Cracked Down,” Hoover Digest, No. 

3, Summer 2003. For a window on the heated dispute among 

leftists, see Joanne Landy, “James Petras Goes Over the Top on 

Cuba and the Left,” New Politics, Vol. 9, No.3 (new series), whole 

No. 35, Summer 2003; Letter, “Repression in Cuba,” New York: 

The New York Review of Books, Vol. 50, No. 19, December 4, 

2003. A critic of U.S. involvement with the dissidents is Julia E. 

Sweig, “American Meddling Keeps Castro in Charge,” Financial 

Times, April 30, 2003.

39. June 29, 2006, La Habana, EFE. In 1979, Castro made 

the opening speech in Havana as the Chairman of NAM and 

denounced both the United States and China. Since then, China 

and Cuba have developed significant strategic, military, economic, 

and political ties adverse to the United States. See “Cuba-China 

Relations,” Cuba Facts, Issue 21, May 2006, Cuba in Transition

Project, Coral Gables: University of Miami. On September 2006, 

Cuba will assume the chair of NAM for the next 3 years. See NonAligned Movement Secretariat, “About NAM,” www.e-nam.org.

my/main.php?pg=h1, accessed August 2006.

40. William Ratliff, “China’s Lesson for Cuba’s Transition?” 

Cuba in Transition Project, Coral Gables: University of Miami, 

2004.

41. Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of 

Developmental Autocracy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

2006. For a useful review of recent works on China’s future, 

see Andrew J. Nathan, “Present at the Stagnation,‘Is China’s 

Development Stalled?’,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, Vol. 

85, No. 4, pp. 177-182.

42. Irving Louis Horowitz, “Transition Scenarios for a PostCastro Cuba: Military Outcomes or Civil Prospects?” Human 

Rights Review, October/December 2004, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 27-34.

43. Juan Carlos Espinoza, “Vanguard of the State: The Cuban 

Armed Forces in Transition,” Problems of Post-Communism, 

November/December, 2001.

44. General Sanchez was a decorated hero of the Revolution 

very popular within the armed forces, who seemingly favored 

internal regime reform along the lines of Gorbachev in the 

USSR. See the Center for Defense Information, www.cdi.org. For 

more on Ochoa, see Andres Oppenheimer, Castro’s Final Hour, 
40

Washington, DC: Touchstone, 1992; and Volker Skierka, Fidel 

Castro: A Biography, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004.

45. Carlos Alberto Montaner, “The Alliance Between 

Reformists and Democrats: The Key to a Peaceful Transition in 

Cuba After Castro’s Death,” Cuban Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 3, July 

2006.

46. Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Secrets of Castro’s Staying 

Power: How Cuban Communism Survives,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

72, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 97-107.

47. Julia Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution, Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 184-185.

48. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Political Instability as a Source 

of Growth,” Hoover Essay in Public Policy, March 2000, p. 4. See also 

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Development 

and Democracy--The Rise of Sustainable Autocracy,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, September/October 2005, pp. 77-86.

49. Patrice Hill, “Cuba Drills for Oil Off Florida,” The 

Washington Times, July 24, 2006. See also Mike Blair, “China Starts 

Oil Drilling Off Florida,” American Free Press, Issue 22, May 29, 

2006, americanfreepress.net/html/china_starts_oil_drilling.html.

50. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: 

Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Cambridge: MIT Press, 

2005.

51. On the Castro clan, see Oliver Stone, “Comandante: 

An Interview with Castro,” www.cbc.ca/passionateeyessunday/

comandante/timeline.html. The concept of a “winning coalition” is 

derived from the “selectorate theory” advanced by Bruce Bueno 

de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James 

D. Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival, Cambridge: MIT 

Press, 2003. The theory operates on two fundamental groups, 

the Winning Coalition and the Selectorate, both drawn from the 

overall populace in a state. The Winning Coalition is a proportion 

of the Selectorate sufficient to choose and sustain a leader in office. 

The Selectorate, a subset of the overall population, is simply put 

those within the state that have a say in policy outcomes. See 

also Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Hoover Essay on Public Policy, 

p. 7. On the ongoing succession see Skierka’s interview with 

Federico Mayor Zaragoza, pp. 373-375. Edward Gonzalez divides 

the relevant groups into three groupings: Fidelistas hardliners, 

Raulistas centrists, and Reformers. Although we acknowledge 
41

their presence, the Reformers are a sort of cohesively organized 

grouping who exist so precariously in the repressive environment 

that it is practically impossible for them to operate in a meaningful 

way. Edward Gonzalez, Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters? Santa 

Monica: Rand Corp., 1996. 

52. Daniel P. Erikson, “Charting Castro’s Possible Successors,” 

SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter-Spring, 2005, pp. 89-103; and 

Eusebio Mujal-Leon and Joshua W. Busby, “Much Ado About 

Something? Regime Change in Cuba,” Cuba in Transition, Vol. 11, 

Miami: ASCE, August 2-4, 2001, pp.459-475.

53. Mesquita, “Political Instability,” p. 7.

54. During a May 15, 2006, panel speech at the Round Table, a 

daily program broadcast on radio and television, an angry Castro 

challenged Forbes to prove the allegation of wealth. He repeated 

the challenge on May 24.

55. See “La riqueza de Fidel Castro: Mito y Realidad,” The 

New Cuba, August 17, 2005; and Maria C. Werlau, “Fidel Castro 

Inc.: A Global Conglomerate,” Cuba in Transition, Vol. 15, Fifteenth 

Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban 

Economy (ASCE), Washington, DC, August 4-6, 2005. Major 

Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, Interview in Radio Marti, Florida, 

August 7, 1987.

56. Andrew and Mithrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 

p. 36. See also Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez,

Corruption in Cuba: Castro and Beyond, Austin: University of Texas 

Press, August 2006.

57. Actually, Castro encouraged Che’s foreign interventions 

in order to be rid of him, too. William Ratliff, “No One Should 

Be Baffled by Castro’s Predictability,” The Miami Herald online, 

February 7, 2003. Ratliff was in Cuba during the 2003 dissident 

crackdown. 

58. The acronym ALBA also translates as “dawn” and allows 

the three countries to trade some products with zero tariffs. The 

U.S.-backed FTAA failed in 2005, and the United States resorted 

to bilateral free trade agreements with nine Latin American 

countries. In addition to ALBA, Cuba and Venezuela have other 

programs such as Operation MIRACLE that offers free eye surgery 

to needy Latin Americans. See also Lindsay Fortado, “U.S. Law 

Firms Set Their Sights on Cuba After Castro,” The National Law 

Journal, February 28, 2006.
42

59. “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power,” International 

Herald Tribune, January 10, 2003.

60. Hal Klepak, “Cuban Foreign and Security Policy in Latin 

America,” Washington, DC: National Defense University, INSS, 

June 12, 2006. For more on Cuba’s posture on nuclear proliferation, 

see Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin, “Cuba’s 

Nuclear Power Program and Post-Cold War Pressures,” The 

Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, p. 19; Jean Du Preez, 

“Cuba’s Accession to the NPT: A Step Toward Strengthening the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Washington, DC: Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, September 20, 2002, cns.miis.edu/pubs/

week/020916.htm. 

61. Anthony DePalma, The Man Who Invented Fidel: Castro, 

Cuba, and Herbert L. Matthews of The New York Times, Cambridge, 

MA, Perseus Book Group, 2006.

62. On the mythology of Che Guevara and socialism, refer 

to Alvaro Vargas Llosa, The Che Guevara Myth and the Future of 

Liberty, Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute, 2006; and “The 

Killing Machine: Che Guevara, from Communist Firebrand to 

Capitalist Brand,” The New Republic, August 11, 2005.

63. “Cuba’s Pro-Life Heroine,” The American Thinker online, 

April 9, 2005; Julie Feinsilver, Healing the Masses: Cuba Health 

Politics at Home and Abroad, Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1993; Antonio M. Gordon, Jr. M.D., “Living Inside Cuba’s 

Health Services: The Reality of Castro’s Power and Influence 

Inside and Outside of the Island,” Medical Sentinel 2000; 5(5):163-

166; “Acclaimed Cuban Medical Care A Sham,” Newsmax, April 

10, 2005.

64. Latell began work on the CIA’s Cuba desk in 1964. His 

work focused on becoming a Fidel Castro specialist through 

“remote leadership assessment.” He appears not to have met 

either Fidel or Raul Castro before or after he became the National 

Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Lattell, After Fidel, p. 205.

65. Manuel Piñeiro, Che Guevara and the Latin American 

Revolution, edited by Luis Suarez, New York: Ocean Press, 2006, 

p. 287.

66. “Cuba Without Fidel Castro, ‘A Simulation’,” ICCAS, 

Coral Gables: University of Miami, February 3, 2006; Jose Basulto’s 

BTTR group plans to seek indictment of Raul as a narcotrafficker 

and planner of the plane shooting in order to throw a monkey 
43

wrench on the succession, “Exile to Reveal Plan for Post Castro 

Cuba,” The Washington Post, May 25, 2005, p. A3.

67. William Ratliff, “Mirroring Taiwan: China and Cuba,” 

China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, January 18, 2006, www.

Jamestown.org. 

68. On the embargo, see Wayne S. Smith, “An Ocean of 

Mischief. Our Dysfunctional Cuban Embargo,” Orbis, Vol. 42, 

Issue 4, Autumn 1998. pp. 533-554. For a different perspective on 

the embargo, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, “The Cuban Illusion: 

Keeping the Heat on Castro,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May/

June 1996. On Castro, see Wayne S. Smith, “Cuba’s Long Reform,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996. See also Skierka, 

pp. 373-375.

69. William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine, “A Strategic Flip- Flop 

in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba,” Hoover Essay on 

Public Policy, March 6, 2000, www.hoover.org/publications/epp/100/

100a.html.

70. Carlos Fuentes, April 26, 2003, AP News.

71. Ratliff and Fontaine, “A Strategic Flip- Flop,” Executive 

Summary.

72. Edward Gonzalez, “Cuba: Perilous Waters?” Santa 

Monica: Rand Corp., MR-673-OSQ Ser, 1996, p. 6.

73. James Petras, “Cuba and Venezuela Face US and 

Colombia,” Counterpunch online, March 22, 2005; for a critique 

of Petras, see “An Anarchist Commentary About Cuba,” Miami 

Independent Media Center, March 24, 2006.

74. James Petras’ interview, CX 36 Radio Centenario of 

Montevideo, Uruguay, on February 20, 2006, www.lahaine.org.

75. Maurice Halperin, Return to Havana: The Decline of Cuban 

Society Under Castro, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1st 

ed., 1994. 

76. The HDI is a worldwide comparative measure of poverty, 

literacy, education, life expectancy, childbirth, and other factors. 

It was developed in 1990 by Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul Haq, 

and used since 1993 by the UN Development Program. For many, 

it is a measure of whether a country belongs in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd 

world. A country with an HDI of 0.8 and above is considered high 

in human development.
44

77. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Democracy and Development,”

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, September/October 2005, p. 78.

78. Regarding the absence of a true rule of law in Cuba, see 

Edward Gonzalez, “Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and 

Impediments,” Appendix A, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation TR131-RC, May 2004, pp. 46-51. See also Cuban Migration, “Averting 

a Crisis,” The American Immigration Law Foundation, www.ailf.

org/ipc/policy_reports_2003_CubanMigration.asp.