APOLLO 

--A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS~--

by 

Roger D. Launius 

NASA History Office 

Code IQ 

Office of External Relations 

NASA Headquarters 

Washington, DC 20546 

MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY NUMBER 3 

NASA SP-2004-4503 

Reprinted July 2004 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

PREFACE 

The program to land an American on the Moon and return safely to Earth in the 1960s has been called by 

some observers a defining event of the twentieth century. Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Arthur M. 

Schlesinger, Jr., even suggested that when Americans two centuries hence study the twentieth century, they will 

view the Apollo lunar landing as the critical event of the century. While that conclusion might be premature, 

there can be little doubt but that the flight of Apollo II in particular and the overall Apollo program in general 

was a high point in humanity's quest to explore the universe beyond Earth. 

Since the completion of Project Apollo more than twenty years ago there have been a plethora of books, studies, reports, and articles about its origin, execution, and meaning. At the time of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 

the first landing, it is appropriate to reflect on the effort and its place in U.S. and NASA history. This monograph 

has been written as a means to this end. It presents a short narrative account of Apollo from its origin through its 

assessment. That is followed by a mission by mission summary of the Apollo flights and concluded by a series 

of key documents relative to the program reproduced in facsimile. The intent of this monograph is to provide a 

basic history along with primary documents that may be useful to NASA personnel and others desiring information about Apollo. 

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of those individuals who aided in the preparation of 

this monograph. Lee D. Saegesser, William S. Skerrett, and Jennifer M. Hopkins were instrumental in obtaining documents and photographs used in this study; J.D. Hunley edited and critiqued the text; Patricia Shephard 

helped prepare the manuscript; the staffs of the NASA Headquarters Library and the Scientific and Technical 

Information Program provided assistance in locating materials; Ellwood Anaheim laid out the monograph; and 

the NASA Headquarters Printing and Graphics Office handled printing. Portions of the manuscript have been 

published in a different form in Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (1994 ), 

and Space Flight: The First Thirty Years (1991). 

This is the third publication in a new series of special studies prepared by the NASA History Office. The 

MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY series is designed to provide a wide variety of studies relative to 

the history of aeronautics and space. This series' publications are intended to be tightly focused in terms of 

subject, relatively short in length, and reproduced in an inexpensive format to allow timely and broad dissemination to researchers in aerospace history. Suggestions for additional publications in the MONOGRAPHS IN 

AEROSPACE HISTORY series are welcome. 

ROGER D. LAUNIUS 

July 1994 

Acknowledgments for the Reprinted Version 

Special thanks go to a variety of people who helped make this publication possible. First, thanks to Nadine 

Andreassen in the NASA History Office for suggesting that we reprint this monograph for the 35th anniversary 

of Apollo 11. Also in our office, Jennifer Troxell assembled the necessary materials and oversaw this project. In 

the Headquarters Printing and Design Office, Shelley Kilmer updated the layout of this monograph and 

designed a new, very attractive cover, and Michelle Cheston carefully edited this publication. Jeffrey McLean 

and James Penny expertly handled the printing process. Steven Johnson capably oversaw the work of these 

Printing and Design professionals. Last and certainly not least, we still owe a special debt of gratitude to Roger 

D. Launius, the former NASA Chief Historian and the author of this continually useful and popular publication. 

Stephen J. Garber 

NASA History Office 

July 2004 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

PREFACE ......................................................................................................................................................................... .iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................ v 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 1 

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 

The Kennedy Perspective on Space ........................................................................................................................ 1 

The Soviet Challenge Renewed .............................................................................................................................. 2 

Reevaluating NASA's Priorities .............................................................................................................................. 3 

The NASA Position ................................................................................................................................................... .4 

Decision ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

An Assessment of the Decision .............................................................................................................................. 5 

Gearing Up for Project Apollo .............................................................................................................................. 7 

The Program Management Concept ...................................................................................................................... 8 

How Do We Go to the Moon? .............................................................................................................................. 10 

Prelude to Apollo: Mercury .................................................................................................................................. 12 

Bridging the Technological Gap: From Gemini to Apollo .............................................................................. 13 

Satellite Support of Apollo .................................................................................................................................... 13 

Building Saturn ........................................................................................................................................................ 14 

The Apollo Spacecraft ............................................................................................................................................ 15 

The Lunar Module .................................................................................................................................................. 17 

Trips to the Moon .................................................................................................................................................... 17 

A Meaning for Apollo ............................................................................................................................................ 19 

Notes .......................................................................................................................................................................... 21 

THE MISSIONS OF APOLLO .................................................................................................................................... 27 

APOLLO STATISTICS .................................................................................................................................................. 31 

KEY DOCUMENTS IN APOLLO HISTORY ........................................................................................................ 33 

INDEX ............................................................................................................................................................................ 113 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

APOLLO 

A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

INTRODUCTION 

On 25 May 1961 President John F. Kennedy announced to the nation a goal of sending an American 

safely to the ~1oon before the end of the decade. This 

decision involved much study and review prior to 

making it public, and tremendous expenditure and 

effort to make it a reality by 1969. Only the building of 

the Panama Canal rivaled the Apollo program's size as 

the largest non-military technological endeavor ever 

undertaken by the United States; only the Manhattan 

Project was comparable in a wartime setting. The human spaceflight imperative was a direct outgrowth of it; 

Projects Mercury (at least in its latter stages), Gemini, 

and Apollo were each designed to execute it. It was 

finally successfully accomplished on 20 July 1969, 

when Apollo ll's astronaut Neil Armstrong left the 

Lunar Module and set foot on the surface of the Moon. 

THE KENNEDY PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE 

In 1960 John F. Kennedy, a Senator from Massachusetts between 1953 and 1960, ran for president as 

the Democratic candidate, with party wheelhorse 

Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. Using the 

slogan, "Let's get this country moving again," Kennedy 

charged the Republican Eisenhower Administration 

with doing nothing about the myriad social, economic, 

and international problems that festered in the 1950s. 

He was especially hard on Eisenhower's record in 

international relations, taking a Cold Warrior position 

on a supposed "missile gap" (which turned out not to 

be the case) wherein the United States lagged far 

behind the Soviet Union in ICBM technology. He also 

invoked the Cold War rhetoric opposing a communist 

effort to take over the world and used as his evidence 

the 1959 revolution in Cuba that brought leftist dictator Fidel Castro to power. The Republican candidate, 

Richard M. Nixon, who had been Eisenhower's Vice 

President tried to defend his mentor's record but when 

the results were in Kennedy was elected by a narrow 

margin of 118,550 out of more than 68 million popular 

votes cast.I 

Kennedy as president had little direct interest in 

the U.S. space program. He was not a visionary enraptured with the romantic image of the last American 

frontier in space and consumed by the adventure of 

exploring the unknown. He was, on the other hand, a 

Cold Warrior with a keen sense of Realpolitik in foreign 

affairs, and worked hard to maintain balance of 

power and spheres of influence in American/Soviet 

relations. The Soviet Union's non-military accomplishments in space, therefore, forced Kennedy to 

respond and to serve notice that the U.S. was every bit 

as capable in the space arena as the Soviets. Of course, 

to prove this fact, Kennedy had to be willing to commit 

national resources to NASA and the civil space program. The Cold War realities of the time, therefore, 

served as the primary vehicle for an expansion of 

NASA's activities and for the definition of Project 

Apollo as the premier civil space effort of the nation. 

Even more significant, from Kennedy's perspective 

the Cold War necessitated the expansion of the military space program, especially the development of 

ICBMs and satellite reconnaissance systems.2 

While Kennedy was preparing to take office, he 

appointed an ad hoc committee headed by Jerome B. 

Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

to offer suggestions for American efforts in space. 

Wiesner, who later headed the President's Science 

Advisory Committee (PSAC) under Kennedy, concluded that the issue of "national prestige" was too 

great to allow the Soviet Union leadership in space 

efforts, and therefore the U.S. had to enter the field in a 

substantive way. "Space exploration and exploits," 

he wrote in a 12 January 1961 report to the presidentelect, "have captured the imagination of the peoples of 

the world. During the next few years the prestige of the 

United States will in part be determined by the leadership we demonstrate in space activities." Wiesner also 

emphasized the importance of practical non-military 

applications of space technology--communications, 

mapping, and weather satellites among others-and 

the necessity of keeping up the effort to exploit space 

for national security through such technologies as 

ICBMs and reconnaissance satellites. He tended to 

deemphasize the human spaceflight initiative for very 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

practical reasons. American launch vehicle technology, he argued, was not well developed and the potential of placing an astronaut in space before the Soviets 

was slim. He thought human spaceflight was a highrisk enterprise with a low chance of success. Human 

spaceflight was also less likely to yield valuable scientific results than, and the U.S., Wiesner thought, should 

play to its strength in space science where important 

results had already been achieved.3 

Kennedy only accepted part of what Wiesner 

recommended. He was committed to conducting a 

more vigorous space program than had been 

Eisenhower, but he was more interested in human 

spaceflight than either his predecessor or his science 

advisor. This was partly because of the drama 

surrounding Project Mercury and the seven astronauts 

that NASA was training. 4 Wiesner had cautioned 

Kennedy about the hyperbole associated with human 

spaceflight. "Indeed, by having placed the highest 

national priority on the MERCURY program we have 

strengthened the popular belief that man in space is the 

most important aim for our non-military space effort," 

Wiesner wrote. "The manner in which this program 

has been publicized in our press has further crystallized 

such belief."s Kennedy, nevertheless, recognized the 

tremendous public support arising from this program 

and wanted to ensure that it reflected favorably upon 

his administration. 

But it was a risky enterprise-what if the Soviets 

were first to send a human into space? what if an 

astronaut was killed and Mercury was a failure?-and 

the political animal in Kennedy wanted to minimize 

those risks. The earliest Kennedy pronouncements 

relative to civil space activity directly addressed these 

hazards. He offered to cooperate with the Soviet Union, 

still the only other nation involved in launching satellites, in the exploration of space. In his inaugural 

address in January 1961 Kennedy spoke directly to 

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and asked him to 

cooperate in exploring "the stars."6 In his State of the 

Union address ten days later, he asked the Soviet 

Union "to join us in developing a weather prediction 

program, in a new communications satellite program, 

and in preparation for probing the distant planets of 

Mars and Venus, probes which may someday unlock 

the deepest secrets of the Universe." Kennedy also 

publicly called for the peaceful use of space, and the 

limitation of war in that new environment. 7 

In making these overtures Kennedy accomplished 

several important political ends. First, he appeared to 

the world as the statesman by seeking friendly cooperation rather than destructive competition with the 

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Soviet Union, knowing full well that there was little 

likelihood that Khrushchev would accept his offer. 

Conversely, the Soviets would appear to be monopolizing space for their own personaL and presumably 

military, benefit. Second, he minimized the goodwill 

that the Soviet Union enjoyed because of its own 

success in space vis-a-vis the U.S. Finally, if the Soviet 

Union accepted his call for cooperation, it would 

tacitly be recognizing the equality of the U.S. in space 

activities, something that would also look very good 

on the world stage.s 

THE SOVIET CHALLENGE RENEWED 

Had the balance of power and prestige between the 

United States and the Soviet Union remained stable in 

the spring of 1961, it is quite possible that Kennedy 

would never have advanced his Moon program and the 

direction of American space efforts might have taken 

a radically different course. Kennedy seemed quite 

happy to allow NASA to execute Project Mercury at a 

deliberate pace, working toward the orbiting of an 

astronaut sometime in the middle of the decade, and to 

build on the satellite programs that were yielding 

excellent results both in terms of scientific knowledge 

and practical application. Jerome Wiesner reflected: 

"If Kennedy could have opted out of a big space 

program without hurting the country in his judgment, 

he would have."9 

Firm evidence for Kennedy's essential unwillingness to commit to an aggressive space program came 

in March 1961 when the NASA Administrator, James 

E. Webb, submitted a request that greatly expanded his 

agency's fiscal year 1962 budget so as to permit a 

Moon landing before the end of the decade. While the 

Apollo lunar landing program had existed as a longterm 

goal of NASA during the Eisenhower administration, 

Webb proposed greatly expanding and accelerating it. 

Kennedy's budget director, David E. Bell, objected to 

this large increase and debated Webb on the merits of an 

accelerated lunar landing program. In the end the president was unwilling to obligate the nation to a much 

bigger and more costly space program. Instead, in good 

political fashion, he approved a modest increase in the 

NASA budget to allow for development of the big 

launch vehicles that would eventually be required to 

support a Moon landing. 10 

A slow and deliberate pace might have remained 

the standard for the U.S. civil space effort had not two 

important events happened that forced Kennedy to act. 

The Soviet Union's space effort counted coup on the 

United States one more time not long after the new 
president took office. On 12 April 1961 Soviet 

Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human in 

space with a one-orbit mission aboard the spacecraft 

Vostok 1. The chance to place a human in space before 

the Soviets did so had now been lost. The great success 

of that feat made the gregarious Gagarin a global hero, 

and he was an effective spokesman for the Soviet 

Union until his death in 1967 from an unfortunate 

aircraft accident. It was only a salve on an open wound, 

therefore, when Alan Shepard became the first 

American in space during a 15-minute suborbital flight 

on 5 May 1961 by riding a Redstone booster in his 

Freedom 7 Mercury spacecraft. 11 

Comparisons between the Soviet and American 

flights were inevitable afterwards. Gagarin had flown 

around the Earth; Shepard had been the cannonball 

shot from a gun. Gagarin's Vostok spacecraft had 

weighed I 0,428 pounds; Freedom 7 weighed 2,100 

pounds. Gagarin had been weightless for 89 minutes; 

Shepard for only 5 minutes. "Even though the United 

States is still the strongest military power and leads in 

many aspects of the space race," wrote journalist 

Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times not long after 

Gagarin's flight, "the world-impressed by the spectacular Soviet firsts-believes we lag militarily and technologically."J2 By any unit of measure the U.S. had not 

demonstrated technical equality with the Soviet Union, 

and that fact worried national leaders because of what 

it would mean in the larger Cold War environment. 

These apparent disparities in technical competence had 

to be addressed, and Kennedy had to find a way to 

reestablish the nation's credibility as a technological 

leader before the world. 

Close in the wake of the Gagarin achievement, the 

Kennedy Administration suffered another devastating 

blow in the Cold War that contributed to the sense that 

action had to be taken. Between 15 and 19 April 1961 

the administration supported the abortive Bay of Pigs 

invasion of Cuba designed to overthrow Castro. 

Executed by anti-Castro Cuban refugees armed and 

trained by the CIA, the invasion was a debacle almost 

from the beginning. It was predicated on an assumption 

that the Cuban people would rise up to welcome the 

invaders and when that proved to be false, the attack 

could not succeed. American backing of the invasion 

was a great embarrassment both to Kennedy personally 

and to his administration. It damaged U.S. relations 

with foreign nations enormously, and made the communist world look all the more invincible.u 

While the Bay of Pigs invasion was never mentioned explicitly as a reason for stepping up U.S. efforts 

in space, the international situation certainly played a 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

role as Kennedy scrambled to recover a measure of 

national dignity. Wiesner reflected, "I don't think anyone can measure it, but I'm sure it [the invasion] had an 

impact. I think the President felt some pressure to get 

something else in the foreground." 14 T. Keith Glennan, 

NASA Administrator under Eisenhower, immediately 

linked the invasion and the Gagarin flight together as 

the seminal events leading to Kennedy's announcement 

of the Apollo decision. He confided in his diary that "In 

the aftermath of that [Bay of Pigs] fiasco, and because 

of the successful orbiting of astronauts by the Soviet 

Union, it is my opinion that Mr. Kennedy asked for a 

reevaluation of the nation's space program."I5 

REEVALUATING NASA's PRIORITIES 

Two days after the Gagarin flight on 12 April, 

Kennedy discussed once again the possibility of a 

lunar landing program with Webb, but the NASA 

head's conservative estimates of a cost of more than 

$20 billion for the project was too steep and Kennedy 

delayed making a decision. A week later, at the time of 

the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy called Johnson, 

who headed the National Aeronautics and Space 

Council, to the White House to discuss strategy for 

catching up with the Soviets in space. Johnson agreed 

to take the matter up with the Space Council and to recommend a course of action. It is likely that one of the 

explicit programs that Kennedy asked Johnson to consider was a lunar landing program, for the next day, 20 

April 1961, he followed up with a memorandum to 

Johnson raising fundamental questions about the project. In particular, Kennedy asked 

Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by 

putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip 

around the moon, or by a rocket to go to the 

moon and back with a man? Is there any other 

space program that promises dramatic results 

in which we could win?J6 

While he waited for the results of Johnson's investigation, this memo made it clear that Kennedy had a 

pretty good idea of what he wanted to do in space. He 

confided in a press conference on 21 April that he was 

leaning toward committing the nation to a large-scale 

project to land Americans on the Moon. "If we can get 

to the moon before the Russians, then we should," he 

said, adding that he had asked his vice president to 

review options for the space program. 17 This was the 

first and last time that Kennedy said anything in public 

about a lunar landing program until he officially 

unveiled the plan. It is also clear that Kennedy 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

approached the lunar landing effort essentially as a 

response to the competition between the U.S. and the 

U.S.S.R. For Kennedy the Moon landing program, conducted in the tense Cold War environment of the early 

1960s, was a strategic decision directed toward advancing the far-flung interests of the United States in the 

international arena. It aimed toward recapturing the 

prestige that the nation had lost as a result of Soviet successes and U.S. failures. It was, as political scientist 

John M. Logsdon has suggested, "one of the last major 

political acts of the Cold War. The Moon Project was 

chosen to symbolize U.S. strength in the head-to-head 

global competition with the Soviet Union."1x 

Lyndon Johnson probably understood these circumstances very well, and for the next two weeks his 

Space Council diligently considered, among other 

possibilities, a lunar landing before the Soviets. As early 

as 22 April, NASA's Deputy Administrator Hugh L. 

Dryden had responded to a request for information 

from the National Aeronautics and Space Council 

about a Moon program by writing that there was "a 

chance for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the 

moon and return him to earth if a determined national 

effort is made." He added that the earliest this feat 

could be accomplished was 1967, but that to do so 

would cost about $33 billion, a figure $1 0 billion more 

than the whole projected NASA budget for the next ten 

years.' 9 A week later Wernher von Braun, director of 

NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center at 

Huntsville, Alabama, and head of the big booster program needed for the lunar effort, responded to a similar 

request for information from Johnson. He told the vice 

president that "we have a sporting chance of sending a 

3-man crew around the moon ahead of 

the Soviets" and "an excellent chance of beating the 

Soviets to the first landing of a crew on the moon 

(including return capability, of course.)" He added that 

"with an all-out crash program" the U.S. could achieve 

a landing by 1967 or 1968.zo 

After gaining these technical opinions, Johnson 

began to poll political leaders for their sense of the 

propriety of committing the nation to an accelerated 

space program with Project Apollo as its centerpiece. 

He brought in Senators Robert Kerr (D-OK) and 

Styles Bridges (R-NH) and spoke with several 

Representatives to ascertain if they were willing to 

support an accelerated space program. While only a 

few were hesitant, Robert Kerr worked to allay their 

concerns. He called on James Webb, who had worked 

for his business conglomerate during the 1950s, to 

give him a straight answer about the project's feasibility. Kerr told his congressional colleagues that Webb 

was enthusiastic about the program and "that if Jim 

Webb says we can a land a man on the moon and bring 

him safely home, then it can be done." This endorsement secured considerable political support for the 

lunar project. Johnson also met with several businessmen and representatives from the aerospace industry 

and other government agencies to ascertain the consensus of support for a new space initiative. Most of 

them also expressed support.21 

Air Force General Bernard A. Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command that 

developed new technologies, expressed the sentiment 

of many people by suggesting that an accelerated 

lunar landing effort "would put a focus on our space 

program." He believed it was important for the U.S. to 

build international prestige and that the return was 

more than worth the price to be paid.22 Secretary of 

State Dean Rusk, a member of the Space Council, was 

also a supporter of the initiative because of the Soviet 

Union's image in the world. He wrote to the Senate 

Space Committee a little later that "We must respond 

to their conditions; otherwise we risk a basic misunderstanding on the part of the uncommitted countries, 

the Soviet Union, and possibly our allies concerning 

the direction in which power is moving and where 

long-term advantage lies.""' It was clear early in these 

deliberations that Johnson was in favor of an expanded 

space program in general and a maximum effort to 

land an astronaut on the Moon. Whenever he heard 

reservations Johnson used his forceful personality to 

persuade. "Now," he asked, "would you rather have us 

be a second-rate nation or should we spend a little 

money?"24 

In an interim report to the president on 28 April 

1961, Johnson concluded that "The U.S. can, if it will, 

firm up its objectives and employ its resources with a 

reasonable chance of attaining world leadership in 

space during this decade," and recommended committing the nation to a lunar landing.zs In this exercise 

Johnson had built, as Kennedy had wanted, a strong 

justification for undertaking Project Apollo but 

he had also moved on to develop a greater consensus 

for the objective among key government and business 

leaders. 

THE NASA POSITION 

While NASA's leaders were generally pleased with 

the course Johnson was recommending-they recognized and mostly agreed with the political reasons for 

adopting a determined lunar landing program-they 

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wanted to shape it as much as possible to the agency's 

particular priorities. NASA Administrator James Webb, 

well known as a skilled political operator who could 

seize an opportunity, organized a short-term effort to 

accelerate and expand a long-range NASA master 

plan for space exploration. A fundamental part of 

this effort addressed a legitimate concern that the 

scientific and technological advancements for which 

NASA had been created not be eclipsed by the political 

necessities of international rivalries. Webb conveyed the 

concern of the agency's technical and scientific community to Jerome Wiesner on 2 May 1961, noting that 

"the most careful consideration must be given to the 

scientific and technological components of the total 

program and how to present the picture to the world 

and to our own nation of a program that has real 

value and validity and from which solid additions to 

knowledge can be made, even if every one of the specific so-called 'spectacular' flights or events are done 

after they have been accomplished by the Russians." He 

asked that Wiesner help him "make sure that this component of solid, and yet imaginative, total scientific and 

technological value is built in."26 

Partly in response to this concern, Johnson asked 

NASA to provide for him a set of specific recommendations on how a scientifically-viable Project Apollo, 

would be accomplished by the end of the decade. What 

emerged was a comprehensive space policy planning 

document that had the lunar landing as its centerpiece 

but that attached several ancillary funding items to 

enhance the program's scientific value and advance 

space exploration on a broad front: 

1. Spacecraft and boosters for the human flight to 

the Moon. 

2. Scientific satellite probes to survey the Moon. 

3. A nuclear rocket. 

4. Satellites for global communications. 

5. Satellites for weather observation. 

6. Scientific projects for Apollo landings. 

Johnson accepted these recommendations and passed 

them to Kennedy who approved the overall plan.27 

The last major area of concern was the timing for 

the Moon landing. The original NASA estimates had 

given a target date of 1967, but as the project became 

more crystallized agency leaders recommended not 

committing to such a strict deadline.2K James Webb, 

realizing the problems associated with meeting target 

dates based on NASA's experience in space flight, suggested that the president commit to a landing by the end 

of the decade, giving the agency another two years to 

solve any problems that might arise. The White House 

accepted this proposa}.29 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

DECISION 

President Kennedy unveiled the commitment to 

execute Project Apollo on 25 May 1961 in a speech on 

"Urgent National Needs," billed as a second State of the 

Union message. He told Congress that the U.S. faced 

extraordinary challenges and needed to respond 

extraordinarily. In announcing the lunar landing commitment he said: 

If we are to win the battle that is going on 

around the world between freedom and tyranny, 

if we are to win the battle for men's minds, the 

dramatic achievements in space \Vhich 

occurred in recent weeks should have made 

clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the 

impact of this adventure on the minds of men 

everywhere who are attempting to make a determination of which road they should take . . . 

We go into space because whatever mankind 

must undertake, free men must fully share. 

Then he added: "I believe this Nation should commitment itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is 

out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him 

safely to earth. No single space project in this period 

will be more impressive to mankind, or more important 

for the long-range exploration of space; and none will 

be so difficult or expensive to accomplish."3o 

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DECISION 

The President had correctly gauged the mood of 

the nation. His commitment captured the American 

imagination and was met with overwhelming support. 

No one seemed concerned either about the difficulty 

or about the expense at the time. Congressional debate 

was perfunctory and NASA found itself literally pressing to expend the funds committed to it during the 

early 1960s. Like most political decisions, at least in 

the U.S. experience, the decision to carry out Project 

Apollo was an effort to deal with an unsatisfactory situation (world perception of Soviet leadership in space 

and technology). As such Apollo was a remedial 

action ministering to a variety of political and emotional needs floating in the ether of world opinion. 

Apollo addressed these problems very well, and was a 

worthwhile action if measured only in those terms. In 

announcing Project Apollo Kennedy put the world on 

notice that the U.S. would not take a back seat to its 

superpower rival. John Logsdon commented: "By 

entering the race with such a visible and dramatic 

commitment, the United States effectively undercut 

Soviet space spectaculars without doing much except 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

President John F Kennedy addressing a joint session of Congress on 25 May 1961, on "Urgent National Needs." In this speech he 

announced the Apollo decision to land an American safely on the Moon before the end of the decade. NASA Photo #70-H-1 075. 

announcing its intention to join the contest."3J It was 

an effective symbol, just as Kennedy had intended. 

It also gave the U.S. an opportunity to shine. The 

lunar landing was so far beyond the capabilities of 

either the United States or the Soviet Union in 1961 

that the early lead in space activities taken by the 

Soviets would not predetermine the outcome. It gave 

the U.S. a reasonable chance of overtaking the Soviet 

Union in space activities and recovering a measure of 

lost status. 

Even though Kennedy's political objectives were 

essentially achieved with the decision to go to the 

Moon, there were other aspects of the Apollo commitment that require assessment. Those who wanted to 

see a vigorous space program, a group led by NASA 

scientists and engineers, obtained their wish with 

Kennedy's announcement. An opening was present to 

this group in 1961 that had not existed at any time during the Eisenhower Administration, and they made the 

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most of it. They inserted into the overall package supporting Apollo additional programs thatthey believed 

would greatly strengthen the scientific and technological return on the investment to go to the Moon. In 

addition to seeking international prestige, this group 

proposed an accelerated and integrated national space 

effort incorporating both scientific and commercial 

components. 

In the end a unique confluence of political necessity, personal commitment and activism, scientific and 

technological ability, economic prosperity, and public 

mood made possible the 1961 decision to carry out a 

forward-looking lunar landing program. What perhaps 

should be suggested is that a complex web or system 

of ties between various people, institutions, and interests allowed the Apollo decision.32 It then fell to 

NASA and other organizations of the Federal 

Government to accomplish the task set out in a few 

short paragraphs by President Kennedy. 
GEARING UP FOR PROJECT APOLLO 

The first challenge NASA leaders faced in meeting the presidential mandate was securing funding. 

While Congress enthusiastically appropriated funding 

for Apollo immediately after the president's 

announcement, NASA Administrator James E. Webb 

was rightly concerned that the momentary sense of 

crisis would subside and that the political consensus 

present for Apollo in 1961 would abate. He tried, 

albeit without much success, to lock the presidency 

and the Congress into a long-term obligation to support the program. While they had made an intellectual 

commitment, NASA's leadership was concerned that 

they might renege on the economic part of the bargain 

at some future date.33 

Initial NASA estimates of the costs of Project 

Apollo were about $20 billion through the end of the 

decade, a figure approaching $150 billion in 1992 

when accounting for inflation. Webb quickly stretched 

those initial estimates for Apollo as far as possible, 

with the intent that even if NASA did not receive its 

full budget requests, as it did not during the latter half 

of the decade, it would still be able to complete 

Apollo. At one point in 1963, for instance, Webb came 

forward with a NASA funding projection through 

1970 for more than $35 billion. As it turned out Webb 

was able to sustain the momentum of Apollo through 

the decade, largely because of his rapport with key 

members of Congress and with Lyndon B. Johnson, 

who became president in November 1963.34 

Project Apollo, backed by sufficient funding, was 

the tangible result of an early national commitment in 

response to a perceived threat to the United States by 

the Soviet Union. NASA leaders recognized that while 

the size of the task was enormous, it was still technologically and financially within their grasp, but they 

had to move forward quickly. Accordingly, the space 

agency's annual budget increased from $500 million 

in 1960 to a high point of $5.2 billion in 1965.35 The 

NASA funding level represented 5.3 percent of the 

federal budget in 1965. A comparable percentage of 

the $1.23 trillion Federal budget in 1992 would have 

equaled more than $65 billion for NASA, whereas the 

agency's actual budget then stood at less than 

$15 billion. 

Out of the budgets appropriated for NASA each 

year approximately 50 percent went directly for 

human spaceflight, and the vast majority of that went 

directly toward Apollo. Between 1959 and 1973 NASA 

spent more than $25 billion on human spaceflight, 

exclusive of infrastructure and support, of which nearly 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

$20 billion was for Apollo.36 In addition, Webb sought 

to expand the definition of Project Apollo beyond just 

the mission of landing humans on the Moon. As a 

result even those projects not officially funded under 

the Apollo line item could be justified as supporting 

the mission, such as the Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, and 

Surveyor satellite probes. 

For seven years after Kennedy's Apollo decision, 

through October 1968, James Webb politicked, 

coaxed, cajoled, and maneuvered for NASA in 

Washington. A longtime Washington insider-the former director of the Bureau of the Budget and 

Undersecretary of State during the Truman 

Administration-he was a master at bureaucratic politics, understanding that it was essentially a system of 

mutual give and take. For instance, while the native 

North Carolinian may also have genuinely believed in 

the Johnson Administration's Civil Rights bill that 

went before Congress in 1964, as a personal favor to 

the President he lobbied for its passage on Capitol 

Hill. This secured for him Johnson's gratitude, which 

he then use to secure the administration's backing of 

NASA's initiatives. In addition, Webb wielded the 

money appropriated for Apollo to build up a constituency for NASA that was both powerful and vocal. 

This type of gritty pragmatism also characterized 

Webb's dealings with other government officials and 

members of Congress throughout his tenure as administrator. When give and take did not work, as was the 

case on occasion with some members of Congress, 

Webb used the presidential directive as a hammer to 

get his way. Usually this proved successful. After 

Kennedy's assassination in 1963, moreover, he sometimes appealed for continued political support for 

Apollo because it represented a fitting tribute to the 

fallen leader. In the end, through a variety of methods 

Administrator Webb built a seamless web of political 

liaisons that brought continued support for and 

resources to accomplish the Apollo Moon landing on 

the schedule Kennedy had announced.37 

-7-

Funding was not the only critical component for 

Project Apollo. To realize the goal of Apollo under the 

strict time constraints mandated by the president, personnel had to be mobilized. This took two forms. First, 

by 1966 the agency's civil service rolls had grown to 

36,000 people from the 10,000 employed at NASA in 

1960. Additionally, NASA's leaders made an early 

decision that they would have to rely upon outside 

researchers and technicians to complete Apollo, and 

contractor employees working on the program 

increased by a factor of 10, from 36,500 in 1960 to 

376,700 in 1965. Private industry, research institu-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

tions, and universities, therefore, provided the majority 

of personnel working on Apollo.Js 

To incorporate the great amount of work undertaken for the project into the formal bureaucracy never 

seemed a particularly savvy idea, and as a result during the 1960s somewhere between 80 and 90 percent 

of NASA's overall budget went for contracts to purchase goods and services from others. Although the 

magnitude of the endeavor had been much smaller 

than with Apollo, this reliance on the private sector 

and universities for the bulk of the effort originated 

early in NASA's history under T. Keith Glennan, in 

part because of the Eisenhower Administration's mistrust of large government establishments. Although 

neither Glennan's successor, nor Kennedy shared that 

mistrust, they found that it was both good politics and 

the best way of getting Apollo done on the presidentially-approved schedule. It was also very nearly the 

only way to harness talent and institutional resources 

already in existence in the emerging aerospace industry and the country's leading research universities.39 

In addition to these other resources, NASA moved 

quickly during the early 1960s to expand its physical 

capacity so that it could accomplish Apollo. In 1960 

the space agency consisted of a small headquarters in 

Washington, its three inherited NACA research centers, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Goddard Space 

Flight Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center. 

With the advent of Apollo, these installations grew 

rapidly. In addition, NASA added three new facilities 

specifically to meet the demands of the lunar landing 

program. In 1962 it created the Manned Spacecraft 

Center (renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 

in 1973 ), near Houston, Texas, to design the Apollo 

spacecraft and the launch platform for the lunar lander. This center also became the home of NASA's 

astronauts and the site of mission control. NASA then 

greatly expanded for Apollo the Launch Operations 

Center at Cape Canaveral on Florida's eastern seacoast. Renamed the John F. Kennedy Space Center on 

29 November 1963, this installation's massive and 

expensive Launch Complex 39A was the site of the 

Apollo 11 launch. Additionally, the spaceport's Vehicle Assemble Building was a huge and expensive 36-

story structure where the Saturn/ Apollo rockets were 

assembled. Finally, to support the development of the 

Saturn launch vehicle, in October 1961 NASA created 

on a deep south bayou the Mississippi Test Facility, 

renamed the John C. Stennis Space Center in 1988. 

The cost of this expansion was great, more than 2.2 

billion over the decade, with 90 percent of it expended 

before 1966.40 

-8-

THE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONCEPT 

The mobilization of resources was not the only 

challenge facing those charged with meeting President 

Kennedy's goal. NASA had to meld disparate institutional cultures and approaches into an inclusive organization moving along a single unified path. Each 

NASA installation, university, contractor, and research 

facility had differing perspectives on how to go about 

the task of accomplishing Apollo.41 To bring a semblance of order to the program, NASA expanded the 

"program management" concept borrowed by T. Keith 

Glennan in the late 1950s from the military/industrial 

complex, bringing in military managers to oversee 

Apollo. The central figure in this process was U.S. Air 

Force Major General Samuel C. Phillips, the architect 

of the Minuteman ICBM program before coming to 

NASA in 1962. Answering directly to the Office of 

Manned Space Flight at NASA headquarters, which in 

turn reported to the NASA administrator, Phillips created an omnipotent program office with centralized 

authority over design, engineering, procurement, testing, construction, manufacturing, spare parts, logistics, training, and operations.42 

One of the fundamental tenets of the program 

management concept was that three critical factorscost, schedule, and reliability-were interrelated and 

had to be managed as a group. Many also recognized 

these factors' constancy; if program managers held 

cost to a specific level, then one of the other two factors, or both of them to a somewhat lesser degree, 

would be adversely affected. This held true for the 

Apollo program. The schedule, dictated by the president, was firm. Since humans were involved in the 

flights, and since the president had directed that the 

lunar landing be conducted safely, the program managers placed a heavy emphasis on reliability. 

Accordingly, Apollo used redundant systems extensively so that failures would be both predictable and 

minor in result. The significance of both of these factors forced the third factor, cost, much higher than 

might have been the case with a more leisurely lunar 

program such as had been conceptualized in the latter 

1950s. As it was, this was the price paid for success 

under the Kennedy mandate and program managers 

made conscious decisions based on a knowledge of 

these factors.43 

The program management concept was recognized as a critical component of Project Apollo's success in November 1968, when Science magazine, the 

publication of the American Association for the 

Advancement of Science, observed: 
In terms of numbers of dollars or of men, 

NASA has not been our largest national 

undertaking, but in terms of complexity, rate 

of growth, and technological sophistication it 

has been unique ... It may turn out that [the 

space program's] most valuable spin-off of all 

will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate, and 

monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.44 

Understanding the management of complex structures 

for the successful completion of a multifarious task 

was an important outgrowth of the Apollo effort. 

This management concept under Phillips orchestrated more than 500 contractors working on both large 

and small aspects of Apollo. For example, the prime 

contracts awarded to industry for the principal components of just the Saturn V included the Boeing 

Company for the S-IC, first stage; North American 

Aviation-S-11, second stage; the Douglas Aircraft 

Corporation-S-IVB, third stage; the Rocketdyne 

Division of North American Aviation-J-2 and F-1 

engines; and International Business Machines (IBM)-

Saturn instruments. These prime contractors, with more 

than 250 subcontractors, provided millions of parts and 

components for use in the Saturn launch vehicle, all 

meeting exacting specifications for performance and 

reliability. The total cost expended on development of 

the Saturn launch vehicle was massive, amounting to 

$9.3 billion. So huge was the overall Apollo endeavor 

that NASA's procurement actions rose from roughly 

44,000 in 1960 to almost 300,000 by 1965.45 

Getting all of the personnel elements to work 

together challenged the program managers, regardless 

of whether or not they were civil service, industry, or 

university personnel. There were various communities 

within NASA that differed over priorities and competed 

for resources. The two most identifiable groups were 

the engineers and the scientists. As ideal types, engineers usually worked in teams to build hardware that 

could carry out the missions necessary to a successful 

Moon landing by the end of the decade. Their primary 

goal involved building vehicles that would function 

reliably within the fiscal resources allocated to Apollo. 

Again as ideal types, space scientists engaged in pure 

research and were more concerned with designing 

experiments that would expand scientific knowledge 

about the Moon. They also tended to be individualists, 

unaccustomed to regimentation and unwilling to concede gladly the direction of projects to outside entities. 

The two groups contended with each other over a great 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

variety of issues associated with Apollo. For instance, 

the scientists disliked having to configure payloads so 

that they could meet time, money, or launch vehicle 

constraints. The engineers, likewise, resented changes 

to scientific packages added after project definition 

because these threw their hardware efforts out of kilter. Both had valid complaints and had to maintain an 

uneasy cooperation to accomplish Project Apollo. 

The scientific and engineering communities within 

NASA, additionally, were not monolithic, and differences among them thrived. Add to these groups representatives from industry, universities, and research 

facilities, and competition on all levels to further their 

own scientific and technical areas was the result. The 

NASA leadership generally viewed this pluralism as a 

positive force within the space program, for it ensured 

that all sides aired their views and emphasized the honing of positions to a fine edge. Competition, most people concluded, made for a more precise and viable 

space exploration effort. There were winners and losers 

in this strife, however, and sometimes ill-will was harbored for years. Moreover, if the conflict became too 

great and spilled into areas where it was misunderstood, 

it could be devastating to the conduct of the lunar program. The head of the Apollo program worked hard to 

keep these factors balanced and to promote order so that 

NASA could accomplish the presidential directive.46 

-9-

Another important management issue arose from 

the agency's inherited culture of in-house research. 

Because of the magnitude of Project Apollo, and its 

time schedule, most of the nitty-gritty work had to be 

done outside NASA by means of contracts. As a result, 

with a few important exceptions, NASA scientists and 

engineers did not build flight hardware, or even operate missions. Rather, they planned the program, prepared guidelines for execution, competed contracts, 

and oversaw work accomplished elsewhere. This 

grated on those NASA personnel oriented toward 

research, and prompted disagreements over how to 

carry out the lunar landing goal. Of course, they had 

reason for complaint beyond the simplistic argument 

of wanting to be "dirty-handed" engineers; they had to 

have enough in-house expertise to ensure program 

accomplishment. If scientists or engineers did not 

have a professional competence on a par with the 

individuals actually doing the work, how could they 

oversee contractors actually creating the hardware and 

performing the experiments necessary to meet the rigors of the mission?47 

One anecdote illustrates this point. The Saturn 

second stage was built by North American Aviation at 

its plant at Seal Beach, California, shipped to NASA's 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, 

and there tested to ensure that it met contract specifications. Problems developed on this piece of the 

Saturn effort and Wernher von Braun began intensive 

investigations. Essentially his engineers completely 

disassembled and examined every part of every stage 

delivered by North American to ensure no defects. 

This was an enormously expensive and time-consuming process, grinding the stage's production schedule 

almost to a standstill and jeopardizing the Presidential 

timetable. 

When this happened Webb told von Braun to 

desist, adding that "We've got to trust American industry." The issue came to a showdown at a meeting where 

the Marshall rocket team was asked to explain its 

extreme measures. While doing so, one of the engineers produced a rag and told Webb that "this is what 

we find in this stuff." The contractors, the Marshall 

engineers believed, required extensive oversight to 

ensure they produced the highest quality work. A compromise emerged that was called the 10 percent rule: 

10 percent of all funding for NASA was to be spent to 

ensure in-house expertise and in the process check 

contractor rcliability.4s 

How DO WE GO TO THE MOON? 

One of the critical early management decisions 

made by NASA was the method of going to the Moon. 

No controversy in Project Apollo more significantly 

caught up the tenor of competing constituencies in 

NASA than this one. There were three basic approaches that were advanced to accomplish the lunar mission: 

1. Direct Ascent called for the construction of a huge booster that launched a spacecraft, sent it on a course directly to the Moon, 

landed a large vehicle, and sent some part of it 

back to Earth. The Nova booster project, 

which was to have been capable of generating 

up to 40 million pounds of thrust, would have 

been able to accomplish this feat. Even if 

other factors had not impaired the possibility 

of direct ascent, the huge cost and technological sophistication of the Nova rocket quickly 

ruled out the option and resulted in cancellation of the project early in the 1960s despite 

the conceptual simplicity of the direct ascent 

method. The method had few advocates when 

serious planning for Apollo began. 

2. Earth-Orbit Rendezvous was the logical 

first alternative to the direct ascent approach. It 

called for the launching of various modules 

required for the Moon trip into an orbit above 

the Earth, where they would rendezvous, be 

assembled into a single system, refueled, and 

sent to the Moon. This could be accomplished 

using the Saturn launch vehicle already under 

development by NASA and capable of generating 7.5 million pounds of thrust. A logical 

component of this approach was also the establishment of a space station in Earth orbit to 

serve as the lunar mission's rendezvous, 

assembly, and refueling point. In part because 

of this prospect, a space station emerged as part 

of the long-term planning of NASA as a jumping-off place for the exploration of space. This 

method of reaching the Moon, however, was 

also fraught with challenges, notably finding 

methods of maneuvering and rendezvousing in 

space, assembling components in a weightless 

environment, and safely refueling spacecraft. 

3. Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous proposed 

sending the entire lunar spacecraft up in one 

launch. It would head to the Moon, enter into 

orbit, and dispatch a small lander to the lunar 

smiace. It was the simplest of the three methods, both in terms of development and operational costs, but it was risky. Since rendezvous 

was taking place in lunar, instead of Earth, 

orbit there was no room for error or the crew 

could not get home. Moreover, some of the 

trickiest course corrections and maneuvers 

had to be done after the spacecraft had been 

committed to a circumlunar flight. The Earthorbit rendezvous approach kept all the options 

for the mission open longer than the lunarorbit rendezvous mode.49 

Inside NASA, advocates of the various approaches 

contended over the method of flying to the Moon 

while the all-important clock that Kennedy had started 

continued to tick. It was critical that a decision not be 

delayed, because the mode of flight in part dictated the 

spacecraft developed. While NASA engineers could 

proceed with building a launch vehicle, the Saturn, 

and define the basic components of the spacecraft-a 

habitable crew compartment, a baggage car of some 

type, and a jettisonable service module containing 

propulsion and other expendable systems-they could 

not proceed much beyond rudimentary conceptions 

without a mode decision. The NASA Rendezvous 

Panel at Langley Research Center, headed by John C. 

Houbolt, pressed hard for the lunar-orbit rendezvous 

as the most expeditious means of accomplishing the 

mission. Using sophisticated technical and economic 

-10-
arguments, over a period of months in 1961 and 1962 

Houbo1t's group advocated and persuaded the rest of 

NASA's leadership that lunar-orbit rendezvous was 

not the risky proposition that it had earlier seemed.so 

The last to give in was Wernher von Braun and his 

associates at the Marshall Space Flight Center. This 

group favored the Earth-orbit rendezvous because the 

direct ascent approach was technologically unfeasible 

before the end of the 1960s, because it provided a logical rationale for a space station, and because it 

ensured an extension of the Marshall workload (something that was always important to center directors 

competing inside the agency for personnel and other 

resources). At an all-day meeting on 7 June 1962 at 

Marshall, NASA leaders met to hash out these differences, with the debate getting heated at times. After 

more than six hours of discussion von Braun finally 

gave in to the lunar-orbit rendezvous mode, saying 

that its advocates had demonstrated adequately its feasibility and that any further contention would jeopardize the president's timetable.s' 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

With internal dissention quieted, NASA moved to 

announce the Moon landing mode to the public in the 

summer of 1962. As it prepared to do so, however, 

Kennedy's Science Adviser, Jerome B. Wiesner, raised 

objections because of the inherent risk it brought to 

the crew. As a result of this opposition, Webb backpedaled and stated that the decision was tentative and 

that NASA would sponsor further studies. The issue 

reached a climax at the Marshall Space Flight Center 

in September 1962 when President Kennedy, Wiesner, 

Webb, and several other Washington figures visited 

von Braun. As the entourage viewed a mock-up of a 

Saturn V first stage booster during a photo opportunity 

for the media, Kennedy nonchalantly mentioned to 

von Braun, "I understand you and Jerry disagree about 

the right way to go to the moon." Von Braun acknowledged this disagreement, but when Wiesner began to 

explain his concern Webb, who had been quiet until 

this point, began to argue with him "for being on the 

wrong side of the issue." While the mode decision had 

been an uninteresting technical issue before, it then 

President John F Kennedy visited Marshall Space Flight Center on 11 September 1962. Here President Kennedy and Dr. Wernher 

von Braun, MSFC Director, tour one of the laboratories. NASA MSFC Photo #9801807. 

-11-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

became a political concern hashed over in the press for 

days thereafter. The science advisor to British Prime 

Minister Harold Macmillan, who had accompanied 

Wiesner on the trip, later asked Kennedy on Air Force 

One how the debate would turn out. The president told 

him that Wiesner would lose, "Webb's got all the 

money, and Jerry's only got me."sz Kennedy was right, 

Webb lined up political support in Washington for the 

lunar-orbit rendezvous mode and announced it as a 

final decision on 7 November 1962.53 This set the 

stage for the operational aspects of Apollo. 

PRELUDE TO APOLLO: MERCURY 

At the time of the announcement of Project Apollo 

by President Kennedy in May 1961 NASA was still 

consumed with the task of placing an American in 

orbit through Project Mercury. Stubborn problems 

arose, however, at seemingly every turn. The first 

space flight of an astronaut, made by Alan B. Shepard, 

had been postponed for weeks so NASA engineers 

could resolve numerous details and only took place on 

5 May 1961, less than three weeks before the Apollo 

announcement. The second flight, a suborbital mission 

like Shepard's, launched on 21 July 1961, also had 

problems. The hatch blew off prematurely from the 

Mercury capsule, Liberty Bell 7, and it sank into the 

Atlantic Ocean before it could be recovered. In the 

process the astronaut, "Gus" Grissom, nearly drowned 

before being hoisted to safety in a helicopter. These 

suborbital flights, however, proved valuable for NASA 

technicians who found ways to solve or work around 

literally thousands of obstacles to successful space 

flight.54 

As these issues were being resolved, NASA engineers began final preparations for the orbital aspects of 

Project Mercury. In this phase NASA planned to use a 

Mercury capsule capable of supporting a human in 

space for not just minutes, but eventually for as much 

as three days. As a launch vehicle for this Mercury capsule, NASA used the more powerful Atlas instead of 

the Redstone. But this decision was not without controversy. There were technical difficulties to be overcome 

in mating it to the Mercury capsule to be sure, but the 

biggest complication was a debate among NASA engineers over its propriety for human spaceflight.'s 

When first conceived in the 1950s many believed 

Atlas was a high-risk proposition because to reduce its 

weight Convair Corp. engineers under the direction of 

Karel J. Bossart, a pre-World War II immigrant from 

Belgium, designed the booster with a very thin, internally pressurized fuselage instead of massive struts and 

a thick metal skin. The "steel balloon," as it was sometimes called, employed engineering techniques that ran 

counter to a conservative engineering approach used by 

Wernher von Braun for the V-2 and the Redstone at 

Huntsville, Alabama.s6 Von Braun, according to 

Bossart, needlessly designed his boosters like 

"bridges," to withstand any possible shock. For his 

part, von Braun thought the Atlas too flimsy to hold up 

during launch. He considered Bossart's approach much 

too dangerous for human spaceflight, remarking that 

the astronaut using the "contraption," as he called the 

Atlas booster, "should be getting a medal just for sitting on top of it before he takes off!"S7 The reservations 

began to melt away, however, when Bossart's team 

pressurized one of the boosters and dared one of von 

Braun's engineers to knock a hole in it with a sledge 

hammer. The blow left the booster unharmed, but the 

recoil from the hammer nearly clubbed the engineer.ss 

Most of the differences had been resolved by the 

first successful orbital flight of an unoccupied 

Mercury-Atlas combination in September 1961. On 

29 November the final test flight took place, this time 

with the chimpanzee Enos occupying the capsule for a 

two-orbit ride before being successfully recovered 

in an ocean landing. Not until 20 February 1962, however, could NASA get ready for an orbital flight with 

an astronaut. On that date John Glenn became the first 

American to circle the Earth, making three orbits in 

his Friendship 7 Mercury spacecraft. The flight was 

not without problems, however; Glenn flew parts of 

the last two orbits manually because of an autopilot 

failure and left his normally jettisoned retrorocket 

pack attached to his capsule during reentry because of 

a loose heat shield. 

Glenn's flight provided a healthy increase in 

national pride, making up for at least some of the earlier Soviet successes. The public, more than celebrating the technological success, embraced Glenn as a 

personification of heroism and dignity. Hundreds of 

requests for personal appearances by Glenn poured 

into NASA headquarters, and NASA learned much 

about the power of the astronauts to sway public opinion. The NASA leadership made Glenn available to 

speak at some events, but more often substituted other 

astronauts and declined many other invitations. 

Among other engagements, Glenn did address a joint 

session of Congress and participated in several tickertape parades around the country. NASA discovered in 

the process of this hoopla a powerful public relations 

tool that it has employed ever since.s9 

Three more successful Mercury flights took place 

during 1962 and 1963. Scott Carpenter made three 

-12-
orbits on 20 May 1962, and on 3 October 1962 Walter 

Schirra flew six orbits. The capstone of Project 

Mercury was the 15-16 May 1963 flight of Gordon 

Cooper, who circled the Earth 22 times in 34 hours. 

The program had succeeded in accomplishing its purpose: to successfully orbit a human in space, explore 

aspects of tracking and control, and to learn about 

microgravity and other biomedical issues associated 

with spaceflight.60 

BRIDGING THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP: 

FROM GEMINI TO APOLLO 

Even as the Mercury program was underway and 

work took place developing Apollo hardware, NASA 

program managers perceived a huge gap in the capability for human spaceflight between that acquired 

with Mercury and what would be required for a Lunar 

landing. They closed most of the gap by experimenting and training on the ground, but some issues 

required experience in space. Three major areas 

immediately arose where this was the case. The first 

was the ability in space to locate, maneuver toward, 

and rendezvous and dock with another spacecraft. The 

second was closely related, the ability of astronauts to 

work outside a spacecraft. The third involved the collection of more sophisticated physiological data about 

the human response to extended spaceflight.6t 

To gain experience in these areas before Apollo 

could be readied for flight, NASA devised Project 

Gemini. Hatched in the fall of 1961 by engineers at 

Robert Gilruth's Space Task Group in cooperation 

with McDonnell Aircraft Corp. technicians, builders 

of the Mercury spacecraft, Gemini started as a larger 

Mercury Mark II capsule but soon became a totally 

different proposition. It could accommodate two astronauts for extended flights of more than two weeks. It 

pioneered the use of fuel cells instead of batteries to 

power the ship, and incorporated a series of modifications to hardware. Its designers also toyed with the 

possibility of using a paraglider being developed at 

Langley Research Center for "dry" landings instead of 

a "splashdown" in water and recovery by the Navy. 

The whole system was to be powered by the newly 

developed Titan II launch vehicle, another ballistic 

missile developed for the Air Force. A central reason 

for this program was to perfect techniques for rendezvous and docking, so NASA appropriated from the 

military some Agena rocket upper stages and fitted 

them with docking adapters. 

Problems with the Gemini program abounded 

from the start. The Titan II had longitudinal oscillaAPOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

tions, called the "pogo" effect because it resembled 

the behavior of a child on a pogo stick. Overcoming 

this problem required engineering imagination and 

long hours of overtime to stabilize fuel flow and maintain vehicle controL The fuel cells leaked and had to 

be redesigned, and the Agena reconfiguration also suffered costly delays. NASA engineers never did get the 

paraglider to work properly and eventually dropped it 

from the program in favor of a parachute system the 

one used for Mercury. All of these difficulties shot an 

estimated $350 million program to over $1 billion. 

The overruns were successfully justified by the space 

agency, however, as necessities to meet the Apollo 

landing commitment.62 

By the end of 1963 most of the difficulties with 

Gemini had been resolved, albeit at great expense, and 

the program was ready for flight. Following two unoccupied orbital test flights, the first operational mission 

took place on 23 March 1965. Mercury astronaut 

Grissom commanded the mission, with John W. 

Young, a Naval aviator chosen as an astronaut in 1962, 

accompanying him. The next mission, flown in June 

1965 stayed aloft for four days and astronaut Edward 

H. White II performed the first extra-vehicular 

activity (EVA) or spacewalk.63 Eight more missions 

followed through November 1966. Despite problems 

great and small encountered on virtually all of them, 

the program achieved its goals. Additionally, as a technological learning program Gemini had been a success, with 52 different experiments performed on the 

ten missions. The bank of data acquired from Gemini 

helped to bridge the gap between Mercury and what 

would be required to complete Apollo within the time 

constraints directed by the president.64 

SATELLITE SUPPORT OF APOLLO 

In addition to the necessity of acquiring the skills 

necessary to maneuver in space prior to executing the 

Apollo mandate, NASA had to learn much more about 

the Moon itself to ensure that its astronauts would 

survive. They needed to know the composition and 

geography of Moon, and the nature of the lunar 

surface. Was it solid enough to support a lander, was it 

composed of dust that would swallow up the spacecraft? Would communications systems work on the 

Moon? Would other factors-geology, geography, 

radiation, etc.-affect the astronauts? To answer these 

questions three distinct satellite research programs 

emerged to study the Moon. The first of these was 

Project Ranger, which had actually been started in the 

1950s, in response to Soviet lunar exploration, but had 

-13-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

been a notable failure until the mid-1960s when three 

probes photographed the lunar surface before crashing 

into it. 65 

The second project was the Lunar Orbiter, an 

effort approved in 1960 to place probes in orbit around 

the Moon. This project, originally not intended to 

support Apollo, was reconfigured in 1962 and 1963 to 

further the Kennedy mandate more specifically by 

mapping the surface. In addition to a powerful camera 

that could send photographs to Earth tracking stations, 

it carried three scientific experiments-selnodesy (the 

lunar equivalent of geodesy), meteoroid detection, and 

radiation measurement. While the returns from these 

instruments interested scientists in and of themselves, 

they were critical to Apollo. NASA launched five 

Lunar Orbiter satellites between 10 August 1966 and 

1 August 1967, all successfully achieving their objectives. At the completion of the third mission, moreover, the Apollo planners announced that they had 

sufficient data to press on with an astronaut landing, 

and were able to use the last two missions for other 

activities.66 

Finally, in 1961 NASA created Project Surveyor 

to soft-land a satellite on the Moon. A small craft with 

tripod landing legs, it could take post-landing photographs and perform a variety of other measurements. 

Surveyor 1 landed on the Moon on 2 June 1966 and 

transmitted more than 10,000 high-quality photographs 

of the surface. Although the second mission crash 

landed, the next flight provided photographs, measurements of the composition and surface-bearing 

strength of the lunar crust, and readings on the thermal 

and radar reflectivity of the soil. Although Surveyor 4 

failed, by the time of the program's completion in 1968 

the remaining three missions had yielded significant 

scientific data both for Apollo and for the broader lunar 

science community.67 

BUILDING SATURN 

NASA inherited the effort to develop the Saturn 

family of boosters used to launch Apollo to the Moon 

in 1960 when it acquired the Army Ballistic Missile 

Agency under Wernher von Braun.6B By that time von 

Braun's engineers were hard at work on the first 

generation Saturn launch vehicle, a cluster of eight 

Redstone boosters around a Jupiter fuel tank. Fueled 

by a combination of liquid oxygen (LOX) and RP-1 (a 

version of kerosene), the Saturn I could generate a 

thrust of 205,000 pounds. This group also worked on 

a second stage, known in its own right as the Centaur, 

that used a revolutionary fuel mixture of LOX and 

liquid hydrogen that could generate a greater ratio of 

thrust to weight. The fuel choice made this second 

stage a difficult development effort, because the mixture was highly volatile and could not be readily handled. But the stage could produce an additional90,000 

pounds of thrust. The Saturn I was solely a research 

and development vehicle that would lead toward the 

accomplishment of Apollo, making ten flights 

between October 1961 and July 1965. The first four 

flights tested the first stage, but beginning with the 

fifth launch the second stage was active and these missions were used to place scientific payloads and 

Apollo test capsules into orbit.69 

The next step in Saturn development came with 

the maturation of the Saturn IB, an upgraded version 

of earlier vehicle. With more powerful engines generating 1.6 million pounds of thrust from the first stage, 

the two-stage combination could place 62,000-pound 

payloads into Earth orbit. The first flight on 26 

February 1966 tested the capability of the booster and 

the Apollo capsule in a suborbital flight. Two more 

flights followed in quick succession. Then there was a 

hiatus of more than a year before the 22 January 1968 

launch of a Saturn IB with both an Apollo capsule and 

a lunar landing module aboard for orbital testing. The 

only astronaut-occupied flight of the Saturn IB took 

place between 11 and 22 October 1968 when Walter 

Schirra, Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham, 

made 163 orbits testing Apollo equipment. 10 

The largest launch vehicle of this family, the 

Saturn V, represented the culmination of those earlier 

booster development and test programs. Standing 363 

feet tall, with three stages, this was the vehicle that 

could take astronauts to the Moon and return them 

safely to Earth. The first stage generated 7.5 million 

pounds of thrust from five massive engines developed 

for the system. These engines, known as the F-1, were 

some of the most significant engineering accomplishments of the program, requiring the development of 

new alloys and different construction techniques to 

withstand the extreme heat and shock of firing. The 

thunderous sound of the first static test of this stage, 

taking place at Huntsville, Alabama, on 16 April 1965, 

brought home to many that the Kennedy goal was 

within technological grasp. For others, it signaled the 

magic of technological effort; one engineer even characterized rocket engine technology as a "black art" 

without rational principles. The second stage presented 

enormous challenges to NASA engineers and very 

nearly caused the lunar landing goal to be missed. 

Consisting of five engines burning LOX and liquid 

hydrogen, this stage could deliver 1 million pounds of 

-14-
Apollo 11 third stage (S-1 VB) is being raised for mating to the 

second stage. NASA Photo #69-H-321. 

thrust. It was always behind schedule, and required 

constant attention and additional funding to ensure 

completion by the deadline for a lunar landing. Both 

the first and third stages of this Saturn vehicle development program moved forward relatively smoothly. 

(The third stage was an enlarged and improved version 

of the IB, and had few developmental complications.)71 

Despite all of this, the biggest problem with 

Saturn V lay not with the hardware, but with the clash of 

philosophies toward development and test. The von 

Braun "Rocket Team" had made important technological contributions and enjoyed popular acclaim as a result 

of conservative engineering practices that took minutely 

incremental approaches toward test and verification. 

They tested each component of each system individually and then assembled them for a long series of ground 

tests. Then they would launch each stage individually 

before assembling the whole system for a long series of 

flight tests. While this practice ensured thoroughness, it 

was both costly and time-consuming, and NASA had 

neither commodity to expend. George E. Mueller, the 

head of NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, disAPOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

agreed with this approach. Drawing on his experience 

with the Air Force and aerospace industry, and shadowed by the twin bugaboos of schedule and cost, 

Mueller advocated what he called the "all-up" concept 

in which the entire Apollo-Saturn system was tested 

together in flight without the laborious preliminaries.72 

A calculated gamble, the first Saturn V test launch 

took place on 9 November 1967 with the entire ApolloSaturn combination. A second test followed on 4 April 

1968, and even though it was only partially successful 

because the second stage shut off prematurely and the 

third stage-needed to start the Apollo payload into 

lunar trajectory-failed, Mueller declared that the test 

program had been completed and that the next launch 

would have astronauts aboard. The gamble paid off. In 

17 test and 15 piloted launches, the Saturn booster family scored a 100 percent launch reliability rate.73 

THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT 

Almost with the announcement of the lunar landing 

commitment in 1961 NASA technicians began a crash 

program to develop a reasonable configuration for the 

trip to lunar orbit and back. What they came up with was 

a three-person command module capable of sustaining 

human life for two weeks or more in either Earth orbit 

or in a lunar trajectory; a service module holding oxygen, fuel, maneuvering rockets, fuel cells, and other 

expendable and life support equipment that could be jettisoned upon reentry to Earth; a retrorocket package 

attached to the service module for slowing to prepare for 

reentry; and finally a launch escape system that was discarded upon achieving orbit. The tear-drop shaped command module had two hatches, one on the side for entry 

and exit of the crew at the beginning and end of the 

flight and one in the nose with a docking collar for use 

in moving to and from the lunar landing vehicle.74 

Work on the Apollo spacecraft stretched from 28 

November 1961, when the prime contract for its development was let to North American Aviation, to 22 

October 1968 when the last test flight took place. In 

between there were various efforts to design, build, and 

test the spacecraft both on the ground and in suborbital 

and orbital flights. For instance, on 13 May 1964 

NASA tested a boilerplate model of the Apollo capsule 

atop a stubby Little Joe II military booster, and another 

Apollo capsule actually achieved orbit on 18 September 

1964 when it was launched atop a Saturn I. By the end 

of 1966 NASA leaders declared the Apollo command 

module ready for human occupancy. The final flight 

checkout of the spacecraft prior to the lunar flight took 

place on 11-22 October 1968 with three astronauts.7s 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

As these development activities were taking place, 

tragedy struck the Apollo program. On 27 January 

1967, Apollo-Saturn (AS) 204, scheduled to be the 

first spaceflight with astronauts aboard the capsule, 

was on the launch pad at Kennedy Space Center, 

Florida, moving through simulation tests. The three 

astronauts to fly on this mission-"Gus" Grissom, 

Edward White, and Roger B. Chaffee-were aboard 

running through a mock launch sequence. At 6:31 

p.m., after several hours of work, a fire broke out in 

the spacecraft and the pure oxygen atmosphere intended for the flight helped it burn with intensity. In a 

flash, flames engulfed the capsule and the astronauts 

died of asphyxiation. It took the ground crew five minutes to open the hatch. When they did so they found 

three bodies. Although three other astronauts had been 

killed before this time-all in plane crashes-these 

were the first deaths directly attributable to the U.S. 

space program. 76 

Shock gripped NASA and the nation during the 

days that followed. James Webb, NASA Administrator, told the media at the time, "We've always khown 

that something like this was going to happen sooner or 

later .. . who would have thought that the first tragedy 

would be on the ground?"77 As the nation mourned, 

Webb went to President Lyndon Johnson and asked 

that NASA be allowed to handle the accident investigation and direct the recovery from the accident. He 

promised to be truthful i,n assessing blame and 

pledged to assign it to himself and NASA management as appropriate. The day after the fire NASA 

appointed an eight member investigation board, 

chaired by longtime NASA official and director of the 

Langley Research Center, Floyd L. Thompson. It set 

out to discover the details of the tragedy: what happened, why it happened, could it happen again, what 

was at fault, and how could NASA recover? The members of the board learned that the fire had been caused 

by a short circuit in the electrical system that ignited 

combustible materials in the spacecraft fed by the oxygen atmosphere. They also found that it could have 

been prevented and called for several modifications to 

the spacecraft, including a move to a less oxygen-rich 

environment. Changes to the capsule followed quickly, 

and within a little more than a year it was ready for 

flight.78 

Webb reported these findings to various 

Congressional committees and took a personal grilling 

at every meeting. His answers were sometimes evasive 

and always defensive. The New York Times, which was 

usually critical of Webb, had a field day with this situation and said that NASA stood for "Never a Straight 

The Apollo 11 spacecraft and booster at Launch Complex 39A 

in preparation for the first lunar mission in July 1969. NASA 

Photo #69-H-1051. 

Answer." While the ordeal was personally taxing, 

whether by happenstance or design Webb deflected 

much of the backlash over the fire from both NASA as 

an agency and from the Johnson administration. While 

he was personally tarred with the disaster, the space 

agency's image and popular support was largely 

undamaged. Webb himself never recovered from the 

stigma of the fire, and when he left NASA in October 

1968, even as Apollo was nearing a successful completion, few mourned his departure. 79 

The AS 204 fire also troubled Webb ideologically 

during the months that followed. He had been a high 

. priest of technocracy ever since coming to NASA in 

1961, arguing for the authority of experts, well-organized and led, and with sufficient resources to resolve 

the "many great economic, social, and political problems" that pressed the nation. He wrote in his book, 

Space Age Management, as late as 1969 that "Our 

Society has reached a point where its progress and 

-16-
even its survival increasingly depend upon our ability 

to organize the complex and to do the unusual."so He 

believed he had achieved that model organization for 

complex accomplishments at NASA. Yet that model 

structure of exemplary management had failed to 

anticipate and resolve the shortcomings in the Apollo 

capsule design and had not taken what seemed in 

retrospect to be normal precautions to ensure the safety 

of the crew. The system had broken down. As a result 

Webb became less trustful of other officials at NASA 

and gathered more and more decisionmaking authority 

to himself. This wore on him during the rest of his time 

as NASA Administrator, and in reality the failure of the 

technological model for solving problems was an 

important forecaster of a trend that would be increasingly present in American culture thereafter as technology was blamed for a good many of society's ills. That 

problem would be particularly present as NASA tried 

to win political approval of later NASA projects.s1 

THE LUNAR MODULE 

If the Saturn launch vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft were difficult technological challenges, the third 

part of the hardware for the Moon landing, the Lunar 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Module (LM), represented the most serious problem. 

Begun a year later than it should have been, the LM 

was consistently behind schedule and over budget. 

Much of the problem turned on the demands of devising two separate spacecraft components-one for 

descent to the Moon and one for ascent back to the 

command module-that only maneuvered outside an 

atmosphere. Both engines had to work perfectly or the 

very real possibility existed that the astronauts would 

not return home. Guidance, maneuverability, and spacecraft control also caused no end of headaches. The landing structure likewise presented problems; it had to be 

light and sturdy and shock resistent. An ungainly vehicle emerged which two astronauts could fly while 

standing. In November 1962 Grumman Aerospace 

Corp. signed a contract with NASA to produce the LM, 

a!}d work on it began in earnest. With difficulty the LM 

was orbited on a Saturn V test launch in January 1968 

and judged ready for operation.s2 

TRIPS TO THE MOON 

After a piloted orbital mission to test the Apollo 

equipment on October 1968, on 21 December 1968 

Apollo 8 took off atop a Saturn V booster from the 

Mission control at the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas, during Project Apollo. NASA Photo #S-69-39593. 

-17-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Kennedy Space Center with three astronauts aboardFrank Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., and William A. 

Anders-for a historic mission to orbit the Moon.s3 At 

first it was planned as a mission to test Apollo hardware in the relatively safe confines of low Earth orbit, 

but senior engineer George M. Low of the Manned 

Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas, and Samuel C. 

Phillips, Apollo Program Manager at NASA headquarters, pressed for approval to make it a circumlunar 

flight. The advantages of this could be important, both 

in technical and scientific knowledge gained as well as 

in a public demonstration of what the U.S. could 

achieve.s4 So far Apollo had been all promise; now the 

delivery was about to begin. In the summer of 1968 

Low broached the idea to Phillips, who then carried it 

to the administrator, and in November the agency 

reconfigured the mission for a lunar trip. After Apollo 

8 made one and a half Earth orbits its third stage began 

a bum to put the spacecraft on a lunar trajectory. As it 

traveled outward the crew focused a portable television camera on Earth and for the first time humanity 

saw its home from afar, a tiny, lovely, and fragile "blue 

marble" hanging in the blackness of space. When it 

arrived at the Moon on Christmas Eve this image of 

Earth was even more strongly reinforced when the 

crew sent images of the planet back while reading the 

first part of the Bible-"And God created the heavens 

and the Earth, and the Earth was without form and 

void"-before sending Christmas greetings to humanity. The next day they fired the boosters for a return 

flight and "spashed down" in the Pacific Ocean on 27 

December. It was an enormously significant accomplishment coming at a time when American society 

was in crisis over Vietnam, race relations, urban problems, and a host of other difficulties. And if only for a 

few moments the nation united as one to focus on this 

epochal event. Two more Apollo missions occurred 

before the climax of the program, but they did little 

more than confirm that the time had come for a lunar 

landing.ss 

Then came the big event. Apollo 11 lifted off on 

16 July 1969, and after confirming that the hardware 

was working well began the three day trip to the 

Moon. At 4:18p.m. EST on 20 July 1969 the LMwith astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. 

Aldrin-landed on the lunar surface while Michael 

Collins orbited overhead in the Apollo command mod-' · 

ule. After checkout, Armstrong set foot on the surface, 

telling millions who saw and heard him on Earth that 

it was "one small step for man-one giant leap for 

mankind." (Neil Armstrong later added "a" when 

referring to "one small step for a man" to clarify the 

first sentence delivered from the Moon's surface.) 

Aldrin soon followed him out, and the two plodded 

around the landing site in the 1/6 lunar gravity, planted 

an American flag but omitted claiming the land for the 

U.S. as had been routinely done during European 

exploration of the Americas, collected soil and rock 

samples, and set up scientific experiments. The next 

day they launched back to the Apollo capsule orbiting 

overhead and began the return trip to Earth, splashing 

down in the Pacific on 24 July.s6 

The footprint on the Moon, July 1969. NASA Photo #69-H-1259. 

These flights rekindled the excitement felt in the 

early 1960s with John Glenn and the Mercury astronauts. Apollo 11, in particular, met with an ecstatic 

reaction around the globe, as everyone shared in the 

success of the mission. Ticker tape parades, speaking 

engagements, public relations events, and a world tour 

by the astronauts served to create good will both in the 

U.S. and abroad. 

Five more landing missions followed at approximately six month intervals through December 1972, 

each of them increasing the time spent on the Moon. 

Three of the latter Apollo missions used a lunar rover 

vehicle to travel in the vicinity of the landing site, but 

none of them equaled the excitement of Apollo 11 . 

The scientific experiments placed on the Moon and the 

lunar soil samples returned through Project Apollo 

have provided grist for scientists' investigations of the 

Solar System ever since. The scientific return was significant, but the Apollo program did not answer conclusively the age-old questions of lunar origins and 

evolution.s7 

In spite of the success of the other missions, only 

Apollo 13, launched on 11 April 1970, came close to 

matching earlier popular interest. But that was only 

because, 56 hours into the flight, an oxygen tank in the 

-18-
Apollo service module ruptured and damaged several 

of the power, electrical, and life support systems. 

People throughout the world watched and waited and 

hoped as NASA personnel on the ground and the crew, 

well in their way to the Moon and with no way of 

returning until they went around it, worked together to 

find a way safely home. While NASA engineers 

quickly determined that air, water, and electricity did 

not exist in the Apollo capsule sufficient to sustain the 

three astronauts until they could return to Earth, they 

found that the LM-a self-contained spacecraft unaffected by the accident-could be used as a "lifeboat" 

to provide austere life support for the return trip. It 

was a close-run thing, but the crew returned safely on 

17 April1970. The near disaster served several important purposes for the civil space program-especially 

prompting reconsideration of the propriety of the 

whole effort while also solidifying in the popular mind 

NASA's technological genius.ss 

A MEANING FOR APOLLO 

Project Apollo in general, and the flight of Apollo II 

in particular, should be viewed as a watershed in the 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

nation's history. It was an endeavor that demonstrated 

both the technological and economic virtuosity of the 

United States and established technologically preeminence over rival nations-the primary goal of the 

program when first envisioned by the Kennedy 

administration in 1961. It had been an enormous undertaking, costing $25.4 billion (about $95 billion in 1990 

dollars), with only the building of the Panama Canal 

rivaling the Apollo program's size as the largest nonmilitary technological endeavor ever undertaken by the 

United States and only the Manhattan Project to build 

the atomic bomb in World War II being comparable in 

a wartime setting. 

There are several important legacies (or conclusions) about Project Apollo that need to be remembered. First, and probably most important, the Apollo 

program was successful in accomplishing the political 

goals for which it had been created. Kennedy had been 

dealing with a Cold War crisis in 1961 brought on by 

several separate factors-the Soviet orbiting of Yuri 

Gagarin and the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion only 

two of them-that Apollo was designed to combat. At 

the time of the Apollo II landing Mission Control in 

Houston flashed the words of President Kennedy 

announcing the Apollo commitment on its big screen. 

A ticker-tape parade for the Apollo II astronauts in New York City. NASA Photo #69-H-I420. 

-19-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Those phrases were followed with these: "TASK 

ACCOMPLISHED, July 1969." No greater understatement could probably have been made. Any 

assessment of Apollo that does not recognize the 

accomplishment of landing an American on the Moon 

and safely returning before the end of the 1960s is 

incomplete and innaccurate, for that was the primary 

goal of the undertaking.s9 

Second, Project Apollo was a triumph of management in meeting enormously difficult systems engineering, technological, and organizational integration 

requirements. James E. Webb, the NASA 

Administrator at the height of the program between 

1961 and 1968, always contended that Apollo was 

much more a management exercise than anything else, 

and that the technological challenge, while sophisticated and impressive, was largely within grasp at the 

time of the 1961 decision.9o More difficult was ensuring that those technological skills were properly managed and used. 

Webb's contention was confirmed in spades by the 

success of Apollo. NASA leaders had to acquire and 

organize unprecedented resources to accomplish the 

task at hand. From both a political and technological 

perspective, management was critical. For seven years 

after Kennedy's Apollo decision, through October 

1968, James Webb maneuvered for NASA in 

Washington to obtain sufficient resources to meet 

Apollo requirements. More to the point, NASA personnel employed the "program management" concept 

that centralized authority and emphasized systems 

engineering. The systems management of the program 

was critical to Apollo's success.91 Understanding the 

management of complex structures for the successful 

completion of a multifarious task was a critical outgrowth of the Apollo effort. 

Third, Project Apollo forced the people of the 

world to view the planet Earth in a new way. Apollo 8 

was critical to this fundamental change, as it treated 

the world to the first pictures of the Earth from afar. 

Writer Archibald MacLeish summed up the feelings of 

many people when he wrote at the time of Apollo, that 

"To see the Earth as it truly is, small and blue and 

beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see 

ourselves as riders on the Earth together, brothers on 

that bright loveliness in the eternal cold-brothers 

who know now that they are truly brothers."92 The 

modem environmental movement was galvanized in 

part by this new perception of the planet and the need 

to protect it and the life that it supports.93 

Finally, the Apollo program, while an enormous 

achievement, left a divided legacy for NASA and the 

During a later Apollo flight, astronauts employed the Lunar 

Rover. This photograph is from the Apollo 15 mission of 

July-August 1971. NASA Photo #71-H-1286. 

aerospace community. The perceived "golden age" of 

Apollo created for the agency an expectation that the 

direction of any major space goal from the president 

would always bring NASA a broad consensus of support and provide it with the resources and license to 

dispense them as it saw fit. Something most NASA 

officials did not understand at the time of the Moon 

landing in 1969, however, was that Apollo had not 

been conducted under normal political circumstances 

and that the exceptional circumstances surrounding 

Apollo would not be repeated.94 

The Apollo decision was, therefore, an anomaly in 

the national decision-making process. The dilemma of 

the "golden age" of Apollo has been difficult to overcome, but moving beyond the Apollo program to 

embrace future opportunities has been an important 

goal of the agency's leadership in the recent past. 

Exploration of the Solar System and the universe 

remains as enticing a goal and as important an objective for humanity as it ever has been. Project Apollo 

was an important early step in that ongoing process of 

exploration. 

-20-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

NOTES 

' Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy 

and Khrushchev, Jg6o-l963 (New York: Harper, 1991), 

p. 28; U.S. Senate, Joint Appearances of Senator John 

F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1961); U.S. Senate, The Speeches of Senator John F. 

Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961). 

2 See John M. Logsdon, "An Apollo Perspective," 

Astronautics&Aeronautics. December 1979, pp.112-17. 

3 Jerome B. Wiesner, "Report to the President-elect 

of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space," 12 January 1961, 

p. 16, Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy 

Presidential Library, Boston, MA. 

4 On this see Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. 

Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: 

A History of Project Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP-4201, 1966), 129-32. 

s Wiesner, "Report to the President-elect," 12 

January 1961, p. 16. 

6 "Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961 ," in 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 

John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1-3. 

7 "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of 

the Union, January 30, 1961," in ibid., pp. 19-28, quote 

fromp. 26. 

8 Arnold W. Frutkin oral history, April4, 1974, by 

Eugene M. Emme and Alex Roland, pp. 28-29, and 

Arnold W. Frutkin oral history, July 30, 1970, by John 

M. Logsdon, pp. 17-18, both in NASA Historical 

Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. See also Arnold W. Frutkin, International 

Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1965). 

9 Quoted in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go 

to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest 

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), p. 111. 

10 David Bell, Memorandum for the President, 

"National Aeronautics and Space Administration Budget Problem," 22 March 1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection; U.S. Congress, House, Committee 

of Science and Astronautics, NASA Fiscal rg62 Authorization, Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st. sess., 1962, pp. 

203, 620; Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, pp. 

94-100. 

11 Leonid Vladimirov, The Russian Space Bluff: 

The Inside Story of the Soviet Drive to the Moon (New 

York: Dial Press, 1973), trans. David Floyd, pp. 86-

97; Pravda, 17 April 1961, 12 May 1961; Walter A. 

McDougall, ... The Heavens and The Earth: A 

Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic 

Books, 1985), pp. 243-49; Brian Harvey, Race into 

Space: The Soviet Space Programme (London: Ellis 

Horwood, 1988), pp. 38-59; Swenson, Grimwood, and 

Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 341-81. 12 New York Times, 17 April 1961, p. 5. 13 On this invasion see, Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: 

The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1979); Haynes Bonner Johnson, The Bay of Pigs: The 

Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506 (New York: W.W. 

Norton and Co., 1964); Albert C. Persons, Bay of Pigs: 

A Firsthand Account of the Mission by a U.S. Pilot in 

Support of the Cuban Invasion Force in I961 (Jefferson, 

NC: McFarland, 1990). 14 Quoted in Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, 

pp. 111-12. 

15 T. Keith Glennan, The Birth of NASA: The Diary 

of T. Keith Glennan, edited by J.D. Hunley 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993), pp. 314-

15. This is essentially the same position as set forth in 

Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, pp. 111-12, 

although McDougall, ... Heavens and the Earth, p. 8, 

also includes a "growing technocratic mentality" as a 

reason for the decision. 16 John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Vice 

President, 20 April 1961, Presidential Files, John F. 

Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA. 17 New York Times, 22 April1961. 18 Logsdon, "An Apollo Perspective," p. 114. 19 Hugh L. Dryden to Lyndon B. Johnson, 22 April 

1961, Vice Presidential Security File, box 17, John F. 

Kennedy Library; Logsdon, Decision to Go to the 

Moon, pp. 59-61, 112-14. 20 Wernher von Braun to Lyndon B. Johnson, 29 

April1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 21 Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the 

Politics of Space," in Robert A. Divine, ed., The 

Johnson Years: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 

pp. 231-33. 

22 Quoted in Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, 

p. 115. 

23 This letter is printed in U.S. Congress, Senate, 

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA 

Authorization for Fiscal Year I962, 87th Cong., 1st 

sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

1961), p. 257. 

-21-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

24 Edward C. Welsh Oral History, pp. 11-12, 

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX. 25 Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President, 

Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of Space 

Program," April 28, 1961, Presidential Papers, 

Kennedy Presidential Library. 26 James E. Webb to Jerome B. Wiesner, 2 May 

1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 27 James E. Webb and RobertS. McNamara to John 

F. Kennedy, May 8, 1961, John F. Kennedy Library. 28 There is evidence to suggest that the 1967 date 

was hit upon because it was the fiftieth anniversary of 

the communist revolution in the Soviet Union and that 

U.S.leaders believed the Soviets were planning something spectacular in space in commemoration of the 

date. Interview with Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 23 

February 1994, Washington, DC. 29 See original excerpts from "Urgent National 

Needs," Speech to a Joint Session of Congress, 25 May 

1961, Presidential Files, Kennedy Presidential Library. 30 John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs," 

Congressional Record-House (25 May 1961), p. 8276; 

text of speech, speech files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, Washington, 

DC. 31 Logsdon, "An Apollo Perspective," p. 115. 32 John Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous 

Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion," pp. 

111-34; and Donald MacKenzie, "Missile Accuracy: A 

Case Study in the Social Processes of Technological 

Change," pp. 195-222, both in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social 

Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology 

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987). 33 As an example see the 1963 defense of Apollo by 

the vice president. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to 

the President, 13 May 1963, with attached report, John 

F. Kennedy Presidential Files, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection. 34 Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data 

Book, Vol II: Programs and Projects, 1958-1968 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4012, 1988), pp. 122-23. 35 Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 

1988 Activities (Washington, DC: NASA Annual 

Report, 1990), p. 185. 36 Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Vol II, 

2:122-32. 37 On Webb see, W. Henry Lambright, Powering 

Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA (Baltimore, MD: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 

38 On this subject see ArnoldS. Levine, Managing 

NASA in the Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA SP4102, 1982), Chapter 4. 39 See Sylvia K. Kraemer, "Organizing for 

Exploration," in John M. Logsdon, editor. Exploring 

the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the 

U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I, Organizing for 

Exploration (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1995), 

chapter4. 40 On these see, Virginia P. Dawson, Engines and 

Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4306, 

1991); James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A 

History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-

1958 (Washington, DC: NASA SP- 4305, 1987); Elizabeth A. Muenger, Searching the Horizon: A History of 

Ames Research Center, 1940-1976 (Washington, DC: 

NASA SP-4304, 1985); Richard P. Hallion, On the 

Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4303, 1984); Alfred 

Rosenthal, Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard 

Space Flight Center (Washington, DC: NASA SP4301, 1968); Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

1982); Henry C. Dethloff, "Suddenly Tomorrow Came 

. . . ":A History of the Johnson Space Center (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4307; and Charles D. Benson and 

William Barnaby Faherty, Moonport: A History of 

Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations (Washington, 

DC: NASA SP-4204, 1978). 41 On the NASA organizational culture see, 

Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. 

Space Program (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1993). 42 Albert F. Siepert, memorandum to James E. 

Webb, 8 February 1963, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection; Sarah M. Turner, "Sam Phillips: One Who 

Led Us to the Moon," NASA Activities, 21 (May/June 

1990): 18-19. 43 Aaron Cohen, "Project Management: JSC's 

Heritage and Challenge," Issues in NASA Program 

and Project Management (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP-6101, 1989), pp. 7-16; C. Thomas Newman, "Controlling Resources in the Apollo Program," Issues in 

NASA Program and Project Management (Washington, DC: NASA SP-6101, 1989), pp. 23-26; Eberhard 

Rees, "Project and Systems Management in the Apollo 

Program," Issues in NASA Program and Project Management (Washington, DC: NASA SP-6101 (02), 

1989), pp. 24-34. 

-22-
44 Dael Wolfe, Executive Officer, American 

Association for the Advancement of Science, editorial 

for Science, 15 November 1968. 45 Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980),passim, and 

Appendix E. 46 McCurdy, Inside NASA, pp. 11-98. 47 See the discussion of this issue in Sylvia Doughty 

Fries, "Apollo: A Pioneering Generation," International 

Astronautical Federation, 37th Congress, 9 October 

1986, Ref. No. IAA-86-495; Sylvia Doughty Fries, 

NASA Engineers and the Age of Apolio (Washington, 

DC: NASA SP-4104, 1992), passim. 48 Eberhard Rees, memorandum, 9 December 1965, 

quoted in Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, p. 227; interview 

with John D. Young by Howard E. McCurdy, 19 August 

1987, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 49 This story has been told in John M. Logsdon, 

"Selecting the Way to the Moon: The Choice of the 

Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Mode," Aerospace Historian, 18 (Summer 1971): 63-70; Courtney G. Brooks, 

James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft 

(Washington: NASA SP-4205, 1979), pp. 61-86; 

Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, pp. 57-68; and James R. 

Hansen, "Enchanted Rendezvous: The Genesis of the 

Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept," 1993, unpublished 

historical manuscript, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection. 

so John C. Houbolt, "Lunar Rendezvous," International Science and Technology, 14 (February 1963): 

62-65. 51 "Concluding Remarks by Dr. Wernher von 

Braun about Mode Selection given to Dr. Joseph F. 

Shea, Deputy Director (Systems), Office of Manned 

Space Flight," 7 June 1962, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

52 Quoted in Charles A. Murray and Catherine Bly 

Cox, Apollo, the Race to the Moon (New York: Simon 

and Schuster, 1989), pp. 142-43. 53 Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for 

Apollo, pp. 106-107. 54 Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New 

Ocean, pp. 341-79. 55 Wernher von Braun, "The Redstone, Jupiter, and 

Juno," in Eugene M. Emme, ed., The History of Rocket 

Technology: Essays on Research, Development, and 

Utility (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 

pp. 107-22. 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

56 See Richard E. Martin, The Atlas and Centaur 

"Stee!Balloon" Tanks: A Legacy of Karel Bossart 

(San Diego, CA: General Dynamics Space Systems 

Division, 1989). 57 Interview with Karrel J. Bossart by John L. 

Sloop, 27 April1974, quoted in John L. Sloop, Liquid 

Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, I945-1959 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4404, 1978), pp. 176-77. 58 Martin, Atlas and Centaur "Steel Balloon" 

Tanks, p. 5. 59 Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New 

Ocean, pp. 422-36. 60 Ibid., pp. 446-503. 61 Barton C. Hacker, "The Idea of Rendezvous: 

From Space Station to Orbital Operations, in SpaceTravel Thought, 1895-1951 ," Technology and Culture, 

15 (July 1974): 373-88; Barton C. Hacker, "The 

Genesis of Project Apollo: The Idea of Rendezvous, 

1929-1961," Actes 10: Historic des techniques (Paris: 

Congress of the History of Science, 1971), pp. 41-46; 

Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4203, 1977), pp. 1-26. 62 James M. Grimwood and Ivan D. Ertal, "Project 

Gemini," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 81 (January 1968): 393-418; James M. Grimwood, Barton C. 

Hacker, and Peter J. Vorzimmer, Project Gemini Technology and Operations (Washington, DC: NASA SP4002, 1969); Robert N. Lindley, "Discussing Gemini: 

A 'Flight' Interview with Robert Lindley of 

McDonnell," Flight International, 24 March 1966, pp. 

488-89. 63 Reginald M. Machell, ed., Summary of Gemini 

Extravehicular Activity (Washington, DC: NASA SP149, 1968). 

64 Gemini Summary Conference (Washington, DC: 

NASA SP-138, 1967); Ezell, NASA Historical 

Data Book, Vol. //, pp. 149-70. 

65 On this project see, R. Cargill Hall, Lunar 

Impact: A History of Project Ranger (Washington, DC: 

NASA SP-4210, 1977). 

66 On this project see, Bruce K. Byers, Destination 

Moon: A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program 

(Washington, DC: NASA TM X-3487, 1977). 67 Surveyor's history has yet to be written, but a start 

is contained in Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. 

II, pp. 325-31. 68 U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and 

Space Sciences, NASA Authorization Subcommittee, 

Transfer of Von Braun Team to NASA, 86th Cong., 2d 

-23-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

1960); Robert M. Rosholt, An Administrative History 

of NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington, DC: NASA SP4101, 1966), pp. 46-47, 117-20. 69 Bilstein, Stages to Saturn, pp. 155-258; Ezell, 

NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. II, pp. 54-61. 70 Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. II, pp. 

58-59. 71 Roger E. Bilstein, "From the S-IV to the S-IVB: 

The Evolution of a Rocket Stage for Space Exploration;' Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, 32 

(December 1979): 452-58; Richard P. Hallion, "The 

Development of American Launch Vehicles since 

1945," in Paul A. Hanle ad Vol Del Chamberlain," eds., 

Space Science Comes of Age: Perspectives in the 

History of the Space Sciences (Washington, DC: 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981), pp. 126-32. 72George E. Mueller, NASA, to Manned Spacecraft 

Center Director, et al., 31 October 1963; Eberhard 

Rees, Marshall Space Flight Center Director, to Robert 

Sherrod, 4 March 1970, both in "Saturn 'All-Up' 

Testing Concept" File, Launch Vehicles, NASA 

Historical Reference Collection; Bilstein, Stages to 

Saturn, pp. 348-51; McCurdy, Inside NASA, pp. 94-96, 

Murray and Cox, Apollo, pp. 160-62. 73 Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. II, p. 61; 

Space Flight: The First Thirty Years (Washington, DC: 

NASA NP-150, 1991), pp. 12-17. 74 A lengthy discussion of the development of the 

Apollo spacecraft can be found in Ivan D. Ertal and 

Mary Louise Morse, The Apollo Spacecraft: A 

Chronology, Volume I, Through November 7, 1962 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4009, 1969); Mary 

Louise Morse and Jean Kernahan Bays, The Apollo 

Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume II, November 8, 

1962-September 30, 1964 (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP-4009, 1973); Courtney G. Brooks and Ivan D. Ertal, 

The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume Ill, 

October I, 1964-January 20, 1966 (Washington, DC: 

NASA SP-4009, 1973); and Ivan D. Ertal and Roland 

W. Newkirk, with Courtney G. Brooks, The Apollo 

Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume IV, January 21, 

1966-July 13, 1974 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4009, 

1978). A short developmental history is in Ezell, NASA 

Historical Data Book, Vol. II, pp. 171-85. 75 Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. II, pp. 

182-85. 76 On this subject see, "The Ten Desperate Minutes," 

Life, 21 Aprill967, pp. 113-114; ErikBergaust, Murder 

on Pad 34 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1968); Mike 

Gray, Angle of Attack: Harrison Storms and the Race to 

the Moon (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1992); 

Erlend A. Kennan and Edmund H. Harvey, Jr., Mission 

to the Moon: A Critical Examination of NASA and the 

Space Program (New York: William Morrow and Co., 

1969); Hugo Young, Bryan Silcock, and Peter Dunn, 

Journey to Tranquillity: The History of Man's Assault 

on the Moon (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970); 

Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, 

pp. 213-36. 

77 Quoted in Bergaust, Murder on Pad 34, p. 23. 78 United States House, Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, 

Investigation into Apollo 204 accident, Hearings, 

Ninetieth Congress, first session (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1967); United States 

House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 

Apollo Program Pace and Progress; Staff Study for the 

Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Ninetieth Congress, 

first session (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1967); United States House, Committee on 

Science and Aeronautics, Apollo and Apollo 

Applications: Staff Study for the Subcommittee on 

NASA Oversight of the Committee on Science and 

Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninetieth 

Congress, Second Session (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1968); Robert C. 

Seamans, Jr., and Frederick I. Ordway III, "Lessons of 

Apollo for Large-Scale Technology," in Frederick C. 

Durant III, ed., Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New 

Perspectives on American Astronautics (San Diego: 

Univelt, 1981), pp. 241-87. 79 Administrative History of NASA, chap. II, pp. 

47-52, Administrative Files, Lyndon B. Johnson 

Presidential Library, Austin, TX; Lyndon B. Johnson 

interview by Walter Cronkite 5 July 1969, LBJ Files, 

Johnson Presidential Library; Senator Clinton P. 

Anderson by Robert Sherrod, 25 July 1968; Sherrod to 

John B. Oakes, May 24, 1972, RSAC; Edward C. Welsh 

interview by Eugene M. Emme, 20 February 1969, all 

in NASA Historical Reference Collection; Lambright, 

Powering Apollo, chapter 9. 80 James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The 

Large Scale Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 

Co., 1969), p. 15. 81 Interview with Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 23 

February 1994, Washington, DC. 82 Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. II, pp. 

173-76, 187-94. 83 Space Flight: The First 30 Years, p. 14. 84 NASA, Apollo Program Director, to NASA, 

Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, 

"Apollo 8 Mission Selection," 11 November 1968, 

Apollo 8 Files, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

-24-
85 Rene Jules Dubas, A Theology of the Earth 

(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1969), pp. 

1-3; Oran W. Nicks, ed., This Island Earth 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-250, 1970), pp. 3-4; R. 

Cargill Hall, "Project Apollo in Retrospect," 20 June 

1990, pp. 25-26, R. Cargill Hall Biographical File, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection. 

~6 Neil A. Armstrong, eta/., First on the Moon: A 

Voyage with Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and 

Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., Written with Gene Farmer and 

Dora Jane Hamblin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Neil 

A. Armstrong, et al., The First Lunar Landing: 2oth 

Anniversary/as Told by the Astronauts, Neil Armstrong, 

Edwin Aldrin, Michael Collins (Washington, DC: 

NASA EP-73, 1989); John Barbour, Footprints on the 

Moon (Washington, DC: The Associated Press, 1969); 

CBS News, w:s6:2o PM EDT, 7!2o/6g: The Historic 

Conquest of the Moon as Reported to the American 

People (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 

1970); Henry S.F. Cooper, Apollo on the Moon (New 

York: Dial Press, 1969); Tim Furniss, "One Small 

Step"- The Apollo Missions, the Astronauts, the 

Aftermath: A Twenty Year Perspective (Somerset, 

England: G.T. Foulis & Co., 1989); RichardS. Lewis, 

Appointment on the Moon: The Inside Story of 

America's Space Adventure (New York: Viking, 1969); 

John Noble Wilford, We Reach the Moon: The New 

York Times Story of Man's Greatest Adventure (New 

York: Bantam Books, 1969). 87 On these missions see, W. David Compton, 

Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo 

Lunar Exploration Missions (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP-4214, 1989); Stephen G. Brush, "A History of 

Modern Selenogony: Theoretical Origins of the Moon 

from Capture to Crash 1955-1984," Space Science 

Reviews, 47 (1988): 211-73; Stephen G. Brush, "Nickel 

for Your Thoughts: Urey and the Origin of the Moon," 

Science, 217 (3 September 1982): 891-98. 88 United States Senate, Committee on 

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo I 3 Mission. 

Hearing, Ninety-first Congress, second session. April 

24, 1970 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1970); United States Senate, Committee on 

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo 13 Mission. 

Hearing, Ninety-first Congress, second session. June 

30, 1970 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1970); Henry S.F. Cooper, Jr., Thirteen: The 

Flight that Failed (New York: Dial Press, 1973); "Four 

Days of Peril Between Earth and Moon: Apollo 13, IllFated Odyssey," Time, 27 April1970, pp. 14-18; "The 

Joyous Triumph of Apollo 13," Life, 24 April1970, pp. 

28-36; NASA Office of Public Affairs, Apollo 13: 

APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

"Houston, We've Got a Problem" (Washington, DC: 

NASA EP-76, 1970). 89 John Pike, "Apollo-Perspectives and Provocations," address to Cold War History Symposium, 11 

May 1994, Ripley Center, Smithsonian Institution, 

Washington, DC. 90 See Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the 

Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4102, 1982); 

Sylvia D. Fries, NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo 

(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4104, 1992); Sylvia K. 

Kraemer, "Organizing for Exploration." 91 This seems to be a genuine strength of American 

engineering in general. See, Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological 

Enthusiasm (New York: Viking, 1989). 92 Quoted in Nicks, ed., This Island Earth, p. 3. 93 Hall, "Project Apollo in Retrospect," pp. 25-26. 94 As an example, see the argument made in George 

M. Low, Team Leader, to Mr. Richard Fairbanks, 

Director, Transition Resources and Development 

Group, "Report of the NASA Transition Team," 19 

December 1980, NASA Historical Reference Collection, advocating strong presidentia1leadership to make 

everything right with the U.S. space program. 

-25-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

The Missions of Apollo 

Dates: 1967-1972 

Vehicles: Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles 

Apollo command/service module 

Lunar module 

Number of People Flown: 33 

Highlights: First humans to leave Earth orbit 

First human landing on the Moon 

Apollo 7 

October 11-22, 1968 

Crew: Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Donn F. Eisele, Walter Cunningham 

Apollo 7 was a confidence-builder. After the January 1967 Apollo launch pad fire, the Apollo command module 

had been extensively redesigned. Schirra, the only astronaut to fly Mercury, Gemini and Apollo missions, commanded this Earth-orbital shakedown of the command and service modules, With no lunar lander, Apollo 7 was 

able to use the Saturn IB booster rather than the giant Saturn V. The Apollo hardware and all mission operations 

worked without any significant problems, and the Service Propulsion System (SPS)-the all-important engine 

that would place Apollo in and out of lunar orbit-made eight nearly perfect firings. Even though Apollo's larger cabin was more comfortable than Gemini's, eleven days in orbit took its toll on the astronauts. The food was 

bad, and all three developed colds. But their mission proved the spaceworthiness of the basic Apollo vehicle. 

Apollo 8 

December 21-27, 1968 

Crew: Frank Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., William A. Anders 

The Apollo 8 astronauts were the first human being to venture beyond low Earth orbit and visit another world. 

What was originally to have been an Earth-orbit checkout of the lunar lander became instead a race with the 

Soviets to become the first nation to orbit the Moon. The Apollo 8 crew rode inside the command module, with 

no lunar lander attached. The were the first astronauts to be launched by the Saturn V, which had flown only 

twice before. The booster worked perfectly, as did the SPS engines that had been checked out on Apollo 7. 

Apollo 8 entered lunar orbit on the morning of December 24, 1968. For the next 20 hours the astronauts circled 

the Moon, which appeared out their windows as a gray, battered wasteland. They took photographs, scouted 

future landing sites, and on Christmas Eve read from the Book of Genesis to TV viewers back on Earth. They 

also photographed the first Earthrise as seen from the Moon. Apollo 8 proved the ability to navigate to and from 

the Moon, and gave a tremendous boost to the entire Apollo program. 

-27-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Apollo 9 

March 3-13, 1969 

Crew: James A. McDivitt, David R. Scott, Russell L. Schweickart 

Apollo 9 was the first space test of the third critical piece of Apollo hardware-the lunar module. For ten days, 

the astronauts put all three Apollo vehicles through their paces in Earth orbit, undocking and then redocking the 

lunar lander with the command module, just as they would in lunar orbit. For this and all subsequent Apollo 

flights, the crews were allowed to name their own spacecraft. The gangly lunar module was "Spider," the command module "Gumdrop," Schweickart and Scott performed a spacewalk, and Schweickart checked out the new 

Apollo spacesuit, the first to have its own life support system rather than being dependent on an umbilical connection to the spacecraft. Apollo 9 gave proof that the Apollo machines were up to the task of orbital rendezvous 

and docking. 

Apollo 10 

May 18-26, 1969 

Crew: Thomas P. Stafford, John W. Young, Eugene A. Ceman 

This dress rehearsal for a Moon landing brought Stafford and Ceman's lunar module-nicknamed "Snoopy"-

to within nine miles of the lunar surface, Except for that final stretch, the mission went exactly as a landing 

would have, both in space and on the ground, where Apollo's extensive tracking and control network was put 

through a dry run. Shortly after leaving low Earth orbit, the LM and the command service module separated, 

then redocked, top to top. Upon reaching lunar orbit, they separated again. While Young orbited the Moon alone 

in his command module "Charlie Brown," Stafford and Ceman checked out the LM's radar and ascent engine, 

rode out a momentary gyration in the lunar lander's motion (due to a faulty switch setting), and surveyed the 

Apollo 11 landing site in the Sea of Tranquility . This test article of the lunar module was not equipped to land, 

however. Apollo 10 also added another first-broadcasting live color TV from space. 

Apollo 11 

July 16-24, 1969 

Crew: Neil A. Armstrong, Michael Collins, Edwin E. "Buzz" Aldrin, Jr. 

Half of Apollo's primary goal-a safe return-was achieved at 4:17 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on July 20, 

when Armstrong piloted "Eagle" to a touchdown on the Moon, with less than 30 seconds worth of fuel left in 

the lunar module. Six hours later, Armstrong took his famous "one giant leap for mankind." Aldrin joined him, 

and the two spent two-and-a-half hours drilling core samples, photographing what they saw and collecting 

rocks. After more than 21 hours on the lunar surface, they returned to Collins on board "Columbia," bringing 

20.87 kilograms of lunar samples with them. The two Moon-walkers had left behind scientific instruments, an 

American flag and other mementos, including a plaque bearing the inscription: "Here Men From Planet Earth 

First Set Foot Upon the Moon. July 1969 A.D. We came in Peace For All Mankind." 

-28-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Apollo 12 

November 14-24, 1969 

Crew: Charles "Pete" Conrad, Jr., Richard F. Gordon, Jr., Alan L. Bean 

The second lunar landing was an exercise in precision targeting. The descent was automatic, with only a few 

manual corrections by Conrad. The landing, in the Ocean of Storms, brought the lunar module "Intrepid" within walking distance-182.88 meters--or a robot spacecraft that had touched down there two-and-a-half years 

earlier. Conrad and Bean brought pieces of the Surveyor 3 back to Earth for analysis, and took two Moon-walks 

lasting just under four hours each. They collected rocks and set up experiments that measured the Moon's seismicity, solar wind flux and magnetic field. Meanwhile Gordon, on board the "Yankee Clipper" in lunar orbit, 

took multispectral photographs of the surface. The crew stayed an extra day in lunar orbit taking photographs. 

When "Intrepid's" ascent stage was dropped onto the Moon after Conrad and Bean rejoined Gordon in orbit, 

the seismometers the astronauts had left on the lunar surface registered the vibrations for more than an hour. 

Apollo 13 

Aprilll-17, 1970 

Crew: James A. Lovell, Jr., Fred W. Haise, Jr., John L. Swigert, Jr. 

The crew's understated radio message to Mission Control was "Okay, Houston, we've had a problem here." 

Within 321,860 kilometers of Earth, an oxygen tank in the service module exploded. The only solution was for 

the crew to abort their planned landing, swing around the Moon and return on a trajectory back to Earth. Since 

their command module "Odyssey" was almost completely dead, however, the three astronauts had to use the 

lunar module "Aquarius" as a crowded lifeboat for the return home. The four-day return trip was cold, uncomfortable and tense. But Apollo 13 proved the program's ability to weather a major crisis and bring the crew back 

home safely. 

Apollo 14 

January 31-February 9, 1971 

Crew: Alan B. Shepard, Jr., Stuart A. Roosa, Edgar D. Mitchell 

After landing in the Fra Mauro region-the original destination for Apollo 13-Shepard and Mitchell took two 

Moon-walks, adding new seismic studies to the by-now familiar Apollo experiment package, and using a "lunar 

rickshaw" pull-cart to carry their equipment. A planned rock-collecting trip to the 1,000-foot-wide Cone Crater 

was dropped, however, when the astronauts had trouble finding their way around the lunar surface. Although 

later estimates showed that they had made it to within 30.48 meters of the crater's rim ,the explorer had become 

disoriented in the alien landscape. Roosa, meanwhile, took pictures from on board command module "Kitty 

Hawk" in lunar orbit. On the way back to Earth, the crew conducted the first U.S. materials processing experiments in space. The Apollo 14 astronauts were the last lunar explorers to be quarantined on their return from 

the Moon. 

-29-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Apollo 15 

July 26-August 7, 1971 

Crew: David R. Scott, James B. Irwin, Alfred M. Worden 

The first of the longer, expedition-style lunar landing missions was also the first to include the lunar rover, a 

carlike vehicle that extended the astronauts' range. The lunar module Falcon touched down near the sinuous 

channel known as Hadley Rille, Scott and Irwin rode more than 27.36 kilometers in their rover, and had a free 

hand in their geological field studies compared to earlier astronauts. They brought back one of the prize trophies of the Apollo program-a sample of ancient lunar crust nicknamed the "Genesis Rock." Apollo 15 also 

launched a small subsatellite for measuring particles and fields in the lunar vicinity. On the way back to Earth, 

Worden, who had flown solo on board Endeavour while his crewmates walked on the surface, conducted the 

first space-walk between Earth and the Moon to retrieve film from the side of the spacecraft. 

Apollo 16 

April 16-27, 1972 

Crew: John W. Young, Thomas K. Mattingly II, Charles M. Duke, JR. 

A malfunction in the main propulsion system of the lunar module "Orion" nearly caused their Moon landing to 

be scrubbed, but Young and Duke ultimately spent three days exploring the Descartes highland region, while 

Mattingly circled overhead in "Casper." What was thought to have been a region of volcanism turned out not to 

be, based on the astronauts' discoveries. Their collection of returned specimens included a 11.34 kilograms 

chunk that was the largest single rock returned by the Apollo astronauts. The Apollo 16 astronauts also conducted performance tests with the lunar rover, at one time getting up to a top speed of 17.70 kilometers per hour. 

Apollo 17 

December 7-19, 1972 

Crew: Eugene A. Ceman, Ronald E. Evans, Harrison H. "Jack" Schmitt 

One of the last two men to set foot on the Moon was also the first scientist-astronaut/geologist Harrison 

Schmitt. While Evans circled in "America," Schmitt and Cernan collected a record 108.86 kilograms of rocks 

during three Moon-walks. The crew roamed for 33.80 kilometers through the Taurus-Littrow valley in their 

rover, discovered orange-colored soil, and left behind a plaque attached to their lander Challenger, which read: 

"Here Man completed his first exploration of the Moon, December 1972 A.D. May the spirit of peace in which 

we came be reflected in the lives of all mankind." The Apollo lunar program had ended. 

-30-
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Apollo Statistics 

Spacecraft 

Apollo 1 

Launch Date Crew 

Jan. 27, 1967 Virgil I. Grissom 

Edward H. White II 

Roger Chafee 

Flight Time 

( days:hrs:min) 

There were no missions designated as Apollo 2 and Apollo 3. 

Apollo 4 Nov. 9, 1967 Unmanned 0:9:37 

Apollo 5 Jan. 22, 1968 Unmanned 0:7:50 

Apollo 6 Apri\4, 1968 Unmanned 0:9:57 

Apollo 7 Oct. 11, 1968 Walter M. Schirra, Jr. 10:20:9 

Donn F. Eisele 

R. Walter Cunningham 

Apollo 8 Dec. 21, 1968 Frank Borman 6:3:1 

James A. Lovell, Jr. 

William A. Anders 

Apollo 9 Mar. 3, 1969 James A. McDivitt 10:1:1 

David R. Scott 

Russell L. Schweickart 

Apollo 10 May 18, 1969 Thomas P. Stafford 8:0:3 

John W. Young 

Eugene A. Cernan 

Apollo 11 July 16, 1969 Neil A. Armstrong 8:3:9 

Michael Collins 

Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. 

Apollo 12 Nov. 14, 1969 Charles Conrad, Jr. 10:4:36 

Richard F. Gordon, Jr. 

Alan L. Bean 

Apollo 13 Apr. 11, 1970 James A. Lovell, Jr. 5:22:55 

Fred W. Haise, Jr. 

John L. Swigert, Jr. 

Apollo 14 Jan. 31, 1971 Alan B. Shepard, Jr. 9:0:2 

Stuart A. Roosa 

Edgar D. Mitchell 

Apollo 15 July 26, 1971 David R. Scott 12:7:12 

Alfred M. Worden 

James B. Irwin 

Apollo 16 Apr. 16, 1972 John W. Young 11:1:51 

Charles M. Duke, Jr. 

Thomas K. Mattingly II 

Apollo 17 Dec. 7, 1972 Eugene A. Cernan 12:13:52 

Harrison H. Schmitt 

Ronald E. Evans 

-31-

Highlights 

Planned as first manned Apollo Mission; fire during ground test 

on 1/27/67 took lives of astronauts; posthumously designated as 

Apollo I. 

First flight of Saturn V launch vehicle. Placed unmanned Apollo 

command and service module in Earth orbit. 

Earth orbital flight test of unmanned Lunar Module. 

Not recovered. 

Second unmanned test of Saturn V and Apollo. 

First U.S. 3-person mission. 

First human orbit(s) of Moon; first human departure from 

Earth's sphere of influence; highest speed attained in human 

flight to date. 

Successfully simulated in Earth-orbit operation of lunar module 

to landing and takeoff from lunar surface and rejoining with 

command module. 

Successfully demonstrated complete system including lunar 

module to 14,300 m. from the lunar surface. 

First human landing on lunar surface and safe return to Earth. 

First return of rock and soil samples to Earth, and human 

deployment of experiments on lunar surface. 

Second human lunar landing Explored surface of Moon and 

retrieved parts of Surveyor 3 spacecraft, which landed in Ocean 

of Storms on Apr. 19, 1967. 

Mission aborted; explosion in service module. Ship circled, 

Moon, with crew using LM as "lifeboat" until just before 

reentry. 

Third human lunar landing. Mission demonstrated pinpoint 

landing capability and continued human exploration. 

Fourth human lunar landing and first Apollo "J" series mission, 

which carried Lunar Roving Vehicle. Worden's inflight EVA of 

38 min. 12 sec was performed during return trip. 

Fifth human lunar landing, with Lunar Roving Vehicle. 

Sixth and final Apollo human lunar landing, again with roving 

vehicle. 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANAL YS/S 

John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for VIce President, 20 Aprll1961, Presidential Flies, John F. 

Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 

ThiS memorandum led directly to the Apollo program. By posing the question "Is there any ... space 

program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?" President Kennedy set in motion a review 

that concluded that only an effort to send Americans to the Moon met the criteria Kennedy had laid out. This 

memorandum followed a week of discussion within the White House on how best to respond to the challenge 

to U.S. interests posed by the 12 April 1961 orbital flight of Yuri Gagarin. 
I I I 1·. \\ Ill T 1. II< l I ~ !-

April 2.0, IC)&l 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

VICE PH.ESIDENT 

ln accurdar\ct! with our conversation [would like 

for you as Chairman o( the Space Council to be in charge of 

making an overall survey of where we stand in space. 

I. Do we have a c hanc c of beating the Soviets by 

putting a. laboratory in space, or by a. tr-ip 

;..round the moon, or by a rocket to la.nd.on the 

moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and 

back with a man. Is there any other space 

program which prom1ses dramatic results in 

which we could win? 

2.. How much additional would it cost? 

J. Are we working 2 4 hours a day on ex.is ting 

programs. lf not, why not? I! not, wi.ll you 

make r ec ornmendations to me as to how 

work can be speeded up. 

4. In building large boosters should we put out 

emphasis on nuclear, chemical or liquid fuel, 

or a comb ina cion of these three? 

5. Are we making maximwn eC!ort? Are we 

achieving necessary results? 

I have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Weisner, Secretary 

McNamara and other responsible officials to cooperate with 

you fully. I would appreciate a report on this at the 

earllest possible moment. 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANAL YS/S 

Lyndon B. Johnson, VIce President, Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of Space 

Program," 28 Aprll1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

This memorandum, prepared by Edward C. Welsh, Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Council, and signed by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, was the first report to President Kennedy on 

the results of the review he had ordered on 20 April. The report identified a lunar landing by 1966 or 1967 as 

the first dramatic space project in which the United States could beat the Soviet Union. The Vice President 

identified "leadership" as the appropriate goal of U.S. efforts in space. 
\ 

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRES I CENT 

WAStUNGTON, D. C. 

April 28, 1961 

Subject~ Evaluntion of Spncc Program. 

Reference is to your April 20 memorandum asking certain questions 

re~;arding thir: country's space pt·ograrn. 

A detailed survey hns not been completed in this time period. The 

ex ami nation wi 11 continue. llowcv:,cr, what we have obtained so !nr 

from knowJ edgeable and responsible persons makes this summary 

reply possible . 

.Among those v;ho have participnted in our deliberations have been the 

Secretiiry and Deputy Sccret&u·y o£ Defense; General !:Jchricver (AF); 

Adrriir.U Hayward (Navy): Dr. von Braun (NA.SA}; the .Adrro.lnistrator, 

Deputy Adn"lini!>trator, and other top ofiici:1.l~ of NASi\; the Special 

Assistant to. the President on 5cicnr.e and Technology; rcprc:::cntatiYCS 

of the Director of the Dureau of the Dudgct; and three outstz.nding nonGoverrunent citizens of the general public: ~[r. George Drown 

(Brown l:. Root, Houston, Texas); Mr. Donald Cook (Amcricc::m Electric 

Power Service, New York, N.Y.}; ~nd lv{r. FranJ<:. Stanton (Columbia 

Broadcasting System, New York, N.Y.). 

The following general conc-lusions can be reported: 

a. Largely due to their concentrated efforts and their 

earlier emphasis upon the development of large rocket 

engines, the Soviets arc ahead o! the United States in. 

world prestige attnined throut;h impressive technolot!ical 

accornplishmcntll in space. 

b. The U.S. has greater resources th<ln the USSR for - ~ attaining space leadership but has failed to m~l;e the 

necezs;u·y hard decisions and to rnar shal those resources 

to achieve such leaden~hip. 
- zc. This c·ountry should be realistic and recognize that 

;ther nations, regardless of their appreciation of our 

idealistic values·, will tend to align themselves with the 

country which they believe will be the world leader --

the winner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments 

in apace are being increasingly identiiied as a major 

indicator of world leadership. 

d. The U.S. can, if it will, firm up its objectives and 

;mploy its resources with a reasonable chance of attaining world leadership in space during this decade. This 

will be difficult but can be made probable even recognizing 

the head start of the Soviets and the likelihood that they 

will continue to move forward with iinpressive successes. 

In certain areas, such as communications, navigation, 

weather, and mapping, t·he U.S. can and should exploit 

its existing advance position. 

e. II we do not make the strong effort now, the time wili 

soon be reached when the r:1.argin of control over space and 

over men's minds through space accomplishments will have 

swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to 

catch up, let alone assume leadership. 

f.. Even in those areas in which the Soviets already have -

the capability to be first and are likely to improve upon 

such capability, the United States should make aggressive 

efforts as the technological gains as well as the international 

rewards are essential steps in eventually gairdng leadership. 

The danger of lor:g lags or outright omissions by this country 

is substantial in view of the possibility of great technological 

·breakthroughs obtained from space exploration. 

_&· Manned exploration of the moon, for example, is not 

only an achievement with great propaganda value, but it is 

essential as an objective whether or not we are first in its 

accomplishment -- and we may be able to be first. We 

cannot leapfrog such accomplishments, as they are essential 

sources of knowledge and experience for even grc~tcr successes in space. We cannot expect the Russians to transier 

the benefits of their experiences or the advantages of their 

capabilities to us. We must uo these things ourselves. 
. ·------------------------------

- 3 -

h. The American public should be given the facts as to 

how we stand in the space race, told of our determination 

to lead in that race, and advised of the importance of such 

leadership to our future. 

i. More resources and more e!Iort need to be put into our 

space program as. soon as possible. 'Ve should move forward 

with a bold program, while at the same time taking every 

·practical precaution for the safety of the persons actively 

participating in space flights. 

******* 

As for the specific questions pose·d in your memorandum, the following brief answers develop from the studies made during the past few 

days. These conclusions are subject to expansion and more detailed 

exanlination as our survey continues. 

Q. 1 - Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting 

a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by 

a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the 

moon and back with a man. Is there anr other space program 

which promises dramatic res~ts in which we could win? 

A.l - The Soviets now have a rocket capability for putting 

a multi-manned laboratory into space and have already 

crash-landed a rocket on the moon. They. also ~ave the 

booster capability of making a soft landing on the moon 

...yith a payload of iiJ.StrumentS, although we do not know how 

much preparation they have made for such a project. As· 

!or a manned trip around the moon or a safe landing and 

return by a man to the moon, neither the U.S. nor the USSR 

has such capability at this time, so far as we know. The 

Russians have had more experience with large boosters and 

with flights of dogs and man. Hence they might be conceded 

a time .advantage in circumnavigation o{ the moon and also 

in a manned trip to the moon. However, with a strong 

effort, the United States could conceivably be first in those 

two accomplishments by 1966 or 1967. 
- 4-

There are a numb~r of programs which the United States 

could pursue immediately and which promise significant 

world-wide advantage over the Soviets. Among these :ue 

communications satellites, meteorological and weathe • 

satellites, and navigation and mapping satellites. These 

are all areas in which we have already developed somt 

competence. We have such programs and believe that the 

Soviets do not. Moreover, they are programs which C")uld 

be made operational and effective within reasonably shnt 

perfuds of time and could, ii properly programmed with 

the interests o! other nations, make useful strides tow.\rd 

world leadership. 

Q. 2 - How much additional would it cost? -

A. 2 - To start upon an accelerated pr-ogram with the afore· 

mentioned objectives clearly in mind, NASA has submi~·ted 

an analysis indicating that about $500 million would be 

needed for FY 1962 over and above the amount currentl~r 

requested of the Congress. A program based upon NA~ A 1s 

analysis would, over a ten-year period, average appro::imately 

$1 billion a year above the current estimates .of the existing 

NASA program. 

While the Department of Defense plans to make a more 

detailed submission to me within a few days, the Secretary 

has taken the position that there is a need for a strong 

effort to develop a large solid-propellant booste• and· that 

his Department is interested in undertaking such a projec:t. 

It was understood that this would be prograrnrned in acc.ord 

with the existing arrangement fo~ close cooperation with 

NASA, which Agency is undertaking some research in this 

field. He estimated they would need to employ approxim:\tely 

', $50 million during FY 1962 for this work but that this could 

1 be financed through management of funds already requested 

/ in the FY 1962 budget. Future defense budgets would include 

requests for additional funding for this purpos.e; a preliminary 

estimate indicates that about $500 million would be net'd.ed in 

total. 
- 5-

.Q!.l_- Are we working Z4 hours a day on existing programs. 

U .not, why not 7 U not, will you make recommendations to 

me as to how work can be speeded up. 

A. ~ - There is not a 24-hour-a-day work schedule on existing NASA space programs except for selected areas in 

Project Mercury, the Saturn-C-1 booster, the Centanr engines 

and the final launching phases of most flight mission!>. They 

advise that their sc hedulcs have been gc!!L~d to the availability 

of facilities and financial resource:s, and that hence their overtime and J,shift arrangements exist only in those activities 

in which th.~re are particular bottlenecks or which are holding 

up operations in other parts of the programs. For example, 

they have a 3-shift 7 -day-week operation in certain work at 

Cape Canaveral; the contractor for Project Mercury has 

averaged a 54-hour week· and employs two or three shifts in 

some areas; Saturn C-1 at Huntsville is working around the 

clock during critical test periods while the remaining work 

on this project averages a 47-hour week; the Centaur hydrogen 

engine is on a 3-shift basis in some portions of the contractor's 

plants. 

This work can be speeded up throu_g_h firm decLsio!!_s_to go 

ahead faster if accompanied by additional funds need·~d for 

the acceler-a~ti-o-n-.----~--------~-------------------------

Q. 4 - In building large boosters should we put- our ernphas-is 

on nuclear, chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these 

three? 

A. 4 - It was the consensus that liquid, solid and nuclear 

boosters should all be accelerated. This conclusion is 

based not only upon the necessity for back-up methods, but 

also because of the advantages of the different types o£ 

boosters for different missions. A program of such emphasi~ would meet both so-called civilian needs and defense 

requirements. 
- 6-

0. 5- Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results? 

A. 5 - We are neither making maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a position 

of leadership. 

t 

• J_,, !<!~-~·~~--) 

~ 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Wernher von Braun to the Vice President of the United States, 29 Aprll1961, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Of all those consulted during the presidentially-mandated space review, no one had been thinking longer 

about the future in space than Wernher von Braun. Even when he had led the development of the V-2 rocket 

forGennany during World War II, von Braun and his associates had been planning future space journeys. After 

coming to the United States after World War II, von Braun was a major contributor to popularizing the idea of 

human spaceflight. As he stressed in his letter, von Braun had been asked to panicipate in the review as an 

individual, not as the Director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center. Von Braun told the Vice President in 

his letter that the United States had "an excellent chance" of beating the Russians to a lunar landing. 
April 29, 19 6l 

Tho Vico Prosidont o! the·Unitcd SUtaa 

Thg Whito HouG o 

WQ.Qhington 25. D. C. 

My doar Mr. Vice :Proaidont1 

This is an o.ttompt to answer some o£ tho qucstiono about our 

xution:U space progra.rn :raised by Tho President in his memorandum 

to you dated April 20, l96l. I nhould liko to emphasize that the following comments o.ro ~;trictly my own and do not ncccoaa.rily reflect 

tho official position o! the Nation.:U Aeronautics o.nd Sp;,.ca A.drnin.iatration in which I have the honor to £crvc. 

Oucstion 1. Do we have a. chance o£ bcatin::c tho Sovioto by 

putting a laboratory in space. or. by a trip arolL'"ld ::ho moon, or by 

~ rockot to land on the moon, or by o. rocket to r;o to the moon and 

back with a man..? Ia there any other spaco prozram whkh p:;-omiaos 

dra.xnatic resulta in which wo could win 7 

Answer: With .their recent Venus shot, tho Soviets demon• 

strated that they holvo a rocket at their diopo&al which can place 

14, 000 pounds o! payload in orbit. Whon one considors that our own 

ono-m4.n Mercury spaco ca.paule weighs only 3900 pounds, it ".J.:;co::nOQ 

roadUy P.pparont that ·tho Soviet carrier rocket should bo capab!o of 

• launching several' astronauts into orbit aiinultaneounly. 

{Such an enlarged multi-man capsule· could bo con&idorgd 

and could serve as a. small "laboratory in apace".) 

• ~;oft-landins a substantial payload on tho moon. My 

estimate of tho maxiinwn &oft-landed net paylo.ad weight 

the Soviet rocket is capable of is about 1400' pounds 

{ono-tcnth of its low orbit payl~ad}. Tnia w.9ight capability is~ sufficient to include a rocket for tho return 

flight to earth of a. man. landed on the moon. But it is 

entirely adequate for a powerful radio transmitter which 

would relay lunar data hack to earth and which would be 

abandone-d on the lunar sur£aca aitar completion o! this 
Tho Vico Prosidont o! tho United [·tatoo Apr!.l 2.9, l9~: 

mi.o tdon. A oimil~r mias!on is planncc! :o-: our 

-=------=~"~,!;or" projoct. w~1kh \.1nos ~ .At!=.!l-Asc~::3 

booot :rocket. Tho ''scmi-h:l.rd" l:l.ndcd portion 

o! tho R.an~or pack;lgc wcicho 293 :youndo. 

~unchlnc ia ocho~ulcd !or J~nu:l.:ry 1962.. 

~he c:::d&~i~.z Soviet ::.-oc!tct could !u.::::-thc:;;-xno-::-c hu::.-1 

~ 4000 to 5000 pound C:l..i)Gulo ~round the moo=1 wi~ ~nGu ing rc-c~~ry 

into the a:l.rth. atmoophorc. This \-:ci::;ht ::1.llo~z::.cc ~.-..\:.st be consico-::-od 

m:l.r~~l !or a one-~ round-tho-:r."lOOn voya~c. S?cci.fic~lly, it 

would not ~uHicc to p:ro-v-ido tho capsule and it!O occupa...""lt Vl-i.::.h ~ "au.!o 

~bert ~ return" C:l.pability. - a feature w!"lich -:..:...J.ciC;:.· XP.5A s;~ou..J.d 

rules !or pile: a;llcty iD considered mand:l.tory !o~ all .r...anr..cci ;:p:l.co 

!light micH>iona. Ono :~hould not ovo:.-look tho po3oibili:'h :-.vwcvor. 

th:lt tho Sovicta m.::l.Y a;·ubstantially facilitate their ta10k oy :..~.-:.~l:r 

~~ ving this requirement. 

A rodc;:et ;::bout ten tin1c6 :l.G T>O"\"te::-i"ul c::.~ tl:c .So-v-i-::~ 

Venus l::J..unch roc~cot is required to la::d a rn:tn 0n ~:c r::oo:: ;::.::.G. o!:~:-.<7 

l:.im b::1.clc. to earth. Davclo~:;ncnt of nuch :l. coupor J:oclcc~ C:l.r.. bo c.:.;;;-

cu.rnvcntod by orbit:U rcndezvouG ~d refueling- o! .c;mallcr rockc~.:: .. ::.~~ 

tho dovclo?mont o! thio technique by tho Soviets woUld not bo hi<!cica 

!rom our eyes and would undoubtedly rcquira .c;cvoral. ye-;;.~o {poG.c;ib::r 

n.11 lono or oven longer than tho dcvoloprnc=1t o£ a la.rgv cli:;-oct-ilich~ 

liOUpel:' rocket). 

a) we do~ have a eood cll:~ncc of bcati~"lci tho Sovioto 

to ;1. manned 1'1::1.boratory i~ 69d.Cc. 11 ThG Rus:.i.a.A:l:;. 

could place it in orbi~ thic year while we cocld 

establish a (somewhat he~vier) laboratory only 

a!tcr the availability o! a. rolia.blo Satu:;-n. C-! "whlc"b. 

b in 1964. 

b) wo ha vc a. sportin~ chance of beatinG t.'"l.~ Soviet a to 

a oo!t-lanclinet of a. radio tran:Jmittor Gtatiu;: on t~o 

moon_ It is hard to sa.y whcthor this objective i::: on 

tneir program. but as far as tho launch rocket io 

concornod, . they could do it at any time. W o plan 

to do it with tho Atlas-Ana~ B-boostcd Raneor {}3 

in early 1962.. 
Tho Vica _Prouidont o£ tho Unitod Stntos 

c) wo hnvo a sportin~ cha.nco o! &cndin!! a 3-r:lo:::. 

crow around U1o :-:1oon c.."hoad o!" the Sovl.c.ta 

(1965/ 66). Howovor, tho Soviota ~ould conduc~ 

o. round-tho--moon voy.7-zo o::~.rlior i£ thoy ~:.·.:J 

ready to w:~.ivo cort..a.in cmor~cncy oa!oty !c:l.-

turoo .n.nd lilnit tho vo~go to ono rnUl.. }viy 

ooti.rna.to is that they could perform t.hi., 

ailnpliiiod task in l96:Z. or 1963. 

d) wo havo an '?xccllent chance o! beating L'.c 

Soviets to tho first lo.ndinr! of a crew on the 

moon (includinG roturn capability, of co~rnc). 

The reanvn is that a performance ju...-np ·oy :. 

!actor 10 over their prosont rocket~ i::: r.cc.::.:;-

oary to accompli.6h thiz !o~t. Whilo toci.ay wo 

do not havo ouch a rocket, it ia unlil~cly th:1: 

tho Soviets ha vo it. Thcrc!o.-o, wo would l:.Ot 

have to enter the race toward this obV:c.".J.;; nc:::-.; 

goal in space exploration again::ot hopolo:Ja oci~o 

fn.voring the Soviets. Wit..'l. an all-out cr:,.oh 

program I think wo could accomplish thio 

obJ?ctivo in 1967/68. 

0 uestion 2. How much addition.a.l would i~ caGt? 

An!:.wcr: 1 think 1 should not attempt to anGwor t.'-.::. 

, 0 '·' . ~ ""'• 

question boforo tho exact objoctives and tho t~-no pl~""l :for~ accoloratod United Statos space procra.zn have been <ioto .. ~l!..nc~. 

Howovor, I can aay with some degree o! ccrta~ty ~~~ ~•a nocosoa..-/ 

funding increase to meet objective d) a.bovo would bo woll over 

$1 Billion !or FY 62., and th.a.t tho required !=.c:;.:~zca io;:- s;o~i)_?oqu~ 

liacQJ. yoara DlllY run twico as high or mora. 
Tho. Vico Proddant o! tho United Statog AprU 29. 11)61 

0uot~tion 3. Aro wo wo:rkinc 24 hou:ra :1.. day on cxictinJ! :>rograma ·1 l! not, why not 1 II not, vrill you nUko ;-ccorn.rncndationa 

to me lUI to how work cn.n bo opoodod up. 

Ano,vor: Vlo a.ro not wor1dn"Y 2/, hou~·c a d:~.y on oxiotinc - ... proa:rn.rna • ..At prco'Cnt, work o:::l. NA~-.A o ~~~rn p~ojcct ?rococd:l O::l. 

=-a ba.sic ono-ahift ba~is, with ovortimo and multi?lo .:::hiit opc:l:atio;J..~ 

approved in critical •'bottleneck" nroa.o. 

March 1961 .. NASA'& George C. Marshall S;>a.co ::?Eght Cc:::1~c-..· .. 

which ho.s sy.ctomo ma~comcnt !or the entire s~:urn vchiclo ~.d 

dovelopg tho largo ilrat &taciO aa an in."louse project, haG worked ~ 

a.vora.go o! 46 hour5 a wook. This include a all adminic~:;:-:.ti vo ~-ui 

clerical o.ctivities. In tho areas critical !o;- the s~turn ?::ojoc~ 

(design ~ctivitioa, assembly. i.nspcctin3, tor;ting}. c.vo:-ago wo:.-i~~ 

time !or tho s::uno period was 47. 7 hou::& a. week,. w~t:1. ~:ldivid.::J. 

po~a up to 54 hou:ra par week. 

Experience indic~tca tha.t i:u. RaGearc:~ ~ D.::;vdopmont work longer houro arc not co::1ducivo to prozrooo boc;;.u::;.:: .::.::: 

ha:ta.:rda introduced by fatigue. In tno aforcn>cntionod cr~tic;:U ~: . .-cd.o, 

a aocond shift would eroatly allaviatc tho tight schociulb.::; Gituatio:~.­

However, additional funds and perDO!U'\Ol itpacco aro 'roquireci to n~;-c 

n. second t~hi!t, ;;).nd neither aro available at iliio time. I:-. this arc2., 

help would bo moat effective. 

Introduction of J. tl-.ird ·shift cannot bo roco::-:1.-

rnendod for Re!learch & Development work. L>d\!Gt.:::-y-wido CJC?Odcnco indicatoa that a two-shift operation with modcr~:o ~ut not 

excoaaive ovortin1e produces thebes~ ro&ulta. 

In induatrial plants engaged in tho Saturn p.:::-ogr;un tho gituD..tlon is approxiinately tho sa:rno. Modor~tcly inc.:::-c;::.Ged 

!unding to permit !Iroator uaa of prernium p3.id ovor~L~o,. pl.·udcn~ly 

applied to rg;U ''bottleneck" aro~a, ca.n do!Wtoly Gpood -c:;;::. tho p;-o2;l'Q.Xn. 
.'rho Vico Prosida.nt o£ tho United St;~.toa .t .. prll 29, l96l 

Question 4. In building lar~o boostcrc nhocld wo p1.:.t ou~ 

<:rnph.aDio on nucloar. chomic~l or liquid fuel. Ol." n. cornoi.&..::..~on· 

of thcs o thrco 1 

Anowor: It is tho concc:1cuc o! opi.-.ion ~--none rr.oe>t :-oc~cc~ 

:tnon :~.nd roactCJr o:>.-porto l!\~t tho ~uturo o! t.l-.c !"luclo:~.4· roc~cu~ La.::; !.;o. 

cloop- upaco operations (uppor ot:q;eo of chcmieu.lly-'";)oo:J~cd 1.-oc!-:.d.:.; 

or nucloa.r spaco vchicloa dcpa.rtinc !'rom an orb~:. ar<lund t!'lo c.;:;.rtl-_) 

rather than in launchinea (under nuclear pc.wor) irorn t.."-lo grou..-.d. L-.. 

o.ddition, thoro can bo little doubt thnt the b~&ic toch...•ology of r.uclea.r 

,rockets iii still in ·its oa.rly infancy. T=..e nuclo«:u.· rocket :;no~<! t:-.c:;-o-

!oro bo looked upon ao a promioinG mennc to c.x:::ond ~nd OX?~.d t.'-.o 

ocopo o£ our space operations in the. yoars beyond 196 7 or 1968. l~ 

=-unould no.t bo con1ddorod as a. sorioua contondo.- in tho bia oooo~~•· 

problorn oi 1961. 

Tho foregoing comment rc.fo:-o to tho ::~i...-nplc:;t and 

mogt gtraight.forward typo of nuclear rocket, viz. the "hc;J..~ tra...~.:::;fo:..-" 

or '.'blow-down" typo, wnereby liquid hydro[!en is O~?o:;;:-~tod ~nd 

Gupcrhontod in a very hot nuclear reactor ~..d. cu~soqucntly CA-;>.J...::;.cod 

through a nozzle. 

Thoro is also a !~-"ld;uncntally ciii!'o:-on~ type: o..: 

nuclear roclcot propulvion system in tho works w~ch i.::l uc;u~l y 

referred to an 11 ion rockot 11 or "ion propulsion11• Here:. t..'-.c ;:.uclG;:_:..-

cncrgy is first converted into cloct::-ical power which is ~!:len uGcG. .:c 

o.xpcl 1'1onized11 (i. o .• electrically ·ci.l:l.rged) pa::ticloe i.--:.!o tho v;:_ct.:.u=:.-:.. 

o! outer spaao at extremely high s?eeds. The rcsulti.-:.z rcac~oa 

!orco is tho ion rocket's 1thruGt 11 • It is in the very naturu oi. nuclc.:>.::-

ion propulsion systems that they cannot be usod in the attnocphero. 

Vr"bilo very efficient in propellant economy. t!:loy ;:_ro capable only o£ 

vary small thru~>t !orccc. Therefore they do not qualify ao "booster~" 

at· all. The future of nuclear ion propulsion lies in ~t:; z.:;.::;.licatio:1 fv_-.:-

low-thru&t. high-economy cruise power for L-"lte:;-pl~e~::-y v.:>yag~.:.. 

As to 11chernica.l or liquid fuel" r.i·h~ Pro~ident D 

queotion undoubtedly refero to a comparison betwo~n 11 iio:£.<i 11 a:.:..d 

''liquid" rocket !uela. both o! which involve chemic~ roac~ions. 

At the present time, our moat powerful ::-oc:<ot 

boostora (hlas. first gUgo o! Titan. first sta.go o£ Saturn) ~o ;;.il 
Tho Vico Prooidont o! tho Ucltcd Sutoa April :.<), 1961 

liquid !uol rockot& ;lnd 4lll ~v~ilablo ovidcnco indicatoo tna~ tho Sov:!.ota 

:4l"O Al.loo uoinc; liq_uid !uolc !or thoir ICr..M'.u ::u.d cp~co uc.nch~"l(!C. T'l:.'o 

larsoot solid fuel rocketa in existence today (Nil<a Zeus boosto::.-, ii::c: 

ot~;o Minutcm.an, firot at~(!C Pob.riu) aro aubG::an~ially om~lc:: ~"ld 

lea o powor!ul.. Thoro ig no quoGtion. in my m~6\.d that, 'Wn')::\. it comoQ 

to buildina vary powerful boootor rockot oyotcmo. tho body o! cxpor• 

icnca .c.vallo.blo today with liquld !ucl cy&to..~~a ~rcn.tly oxcoodo tho.t 

'with Golid !uc..i rockets. -

There can bo no quostio~ t..'&..:l.~ la.rgcr a.-.d :r:.o::.-o 

powod'ui solid fuel rockets can bo built a..-'id l do not bolicvo tr .. _;; 

m-ajor breakthroughs aro required to do oo. On t."l.o o·;:bo::.- h:L.J.G. it 

should not bo ovorlookod that a casinG filled vlith Gol:Oci. :-_,repel:~•).: ::md 

~ nozzlo n.tto.chod to it, whlla entirely capaolo oi proci.uci:1g thn.:.Gt, !.a 

not yet a rocl:et ohip. A.-.d· ~lthou(;h tho reliability record o£ Goiid 

!uel rocket propulaion units, thanks to their Gim:plicity, ~:» L-r..pro~­

aivo n.nd better than that oi liquid pro?uloion units, ::.ilic; C:ooc no~ <>-?ply 

to comnloto rocket syetcrns, including guida.nco syat.::m~ .. co::.:;;:ol 

elcmentQ, stago sop;;>.ra.tion, etc. 

Another important point is that booster pc::io:::-:1.-

anco should nbt bo rnc;;>.&ured in terms oi thruot fo:;cc. ~on0, o\.:.~ ::.:-.. 

torms o! total iznpuloo; i. o., tho ?roduct oi thrust fo;-co a..-.d O?o::-

atins timo. For a number oi rea:Jons it io advant~:;.:...::.-..:.;:; ~-:c: ·;.:> c:..--t~.i 

tha burning tilno of solid !uol roc!~c~a beyond abou~ f.C ~,:,c.:>::-•0.::. _ 

~horcas moat liquid fuel boosters have burni:;1g tizr....:J~ .v: lZJ .:.oco:1d.3 

and mora. Thus, a 3-million pounC::. thrust solid ::oc:,.:~~ .:, : :..o .:-:.co~C.a 

burning timo ia actually not moro powerful th~-:. ~ !. l/ :.-..:..:..".::.::0;:.. ~:.c-...nd 

thrust liquid boostor o! lZO lileconds ournin~ t~.:.-. 
Tho Yico Frosidont o! tho United Statoa Apl·~l 2<), l'/61 

My rocommondation ia to. sub::~t~tially i::lc:;:-:_;-.u~ 

tho lovol of oUort and !undine in tho !ici.d o! oolid fuel roc:cc~o C.)"/ 

30 or 50 million dollar a !or .FY 62.) with tho immodi~tc o~; ocav.::.:; cf 

• demonstration of tho fo::.cibility a: vc-..·y ~ar~o 

oor;mcntod oolid fuel rockct!l. {Handlir • .::; .:u-.d 

shipping_ o! :nulti-million pound oolid iucl 

rockcto bocomo unma.na..~cablc unless tilo 

rocketa con.siot of smaller individual scgmon~.:. 

which can be assembled in builci..ing block fa.;;hio:l. 

at tho launching aito.) 

• dovolopmcnt o! sin1plo i:::.o~ec~ion :-::.ctaoda to 

mo.l~IJ certain that .e;uch hur;o solid iuol :.·o.;:~<;c~::. 

aro !roo of clangorous cracks or voida 

• dotonnination o£ tho moat uuitabio opor~l:ion..::..l 

methods to £~hip. handle, assemble. cl-.ccl.c ;:~..;:.c! 

l~unch very large solid fuel rockets. Thi;1 

would involve a sorica of paper studio!l ~b 

an&wcr quos-.iona such as 

~ Aro clusters of small or ;:;olid ::-ockets. o;-

imco, ai.nglo pourod-in-launcb .. ;;i-.o GoHd 

fuel rockets, pou&ibly superior to soc..-nc:1.~cd 

roclccts 7 This question must be a--:.alyzcd not 

just from the propulsion an~le, out fro~ t"ho 

operatiozial point of view for the to-:~ e>p~co 

transportation syGtom and its attc=.;d~~ ~=o"..laci 

support equipment. 

b. Launch pad safety and rango .safety c:..-!.';"_. __ 

{How ia tho total oparation at Ca?.o Ca;~v~:.-;..1 

aiiocted by the prosence of loaded multi· 

million pound solid fuel booster a?) 

<:. Land 'VB off-shore vs sea launchi.;lcis of 1;:-.rc;o 

solid fuel rockets. 

d. Requirements !or manned launchingo (How to 

shut tho boostor o!i. in cabu o! trouble to permit sa!e mis aion abort and crew capsule 

recovory? Ii thio ia difficult~ what· other 

saioty procoduro:J ohould be provided?} 
'l'ho Vice Prosi<len.t o! tho United St.atog April 2.9, 19c: 

OucGtion 5. Aro wo makin& m:J..Jd.rnwn effort? ko wo ~cni;:Jv...nz 

noC:oQa~ry rosW.t~; 7 

Anov.rors 

In my opinion. tho moot ,,f[octivo c~opa to ~=>•:--~·ova 

our 'I'Ul.tion:;U ctnturo in tho cp::~.co !iold, ;)...."'l.d ta cpccd U'li.n~o up wou.lc! 

be t.o 

• identify n !ow (tho !ower tho botto:r) goals in our op::~.ca 

progr~ ns objectives o! hichcst n..<l.tion..al p;-ior~"-Y· 

(For cxc:unple1 Lot's land a m.a.."'l. on tho moon i:a l9o7 

or 1968. } 

• idonti!y those olemcnt!l o! our p::-oscnt cpaco p::o2r;:.rn 

that would qualify as immediate co:1.tribu~ioaa to tl~i.­

objoctivo. (For ex.a..mplo, c;o!t la..~G.in~s of ouit.:.bl.:: 

instrumentation on the moon to C.cte~mo ~~ c~v::::on.­

ment~ conditions ~n will find~ • .::::{;.) 

- put all other clements o! our na.tio:;..;:J. ~~:..co ~:·.::..::::....:::.J. 

on tho "back burnor". 

f,~v,'J Pv.J 

• add another more powor!ul"boostcr to ou:..· na'~io:1~ :~a:-.c~: 

vohiclo prograr.1. The dczign par~-nc:~c:..·.:J o£ thic 't.oo::·..:~:..· 

5hould allow a cer~n flexibility fo-;; ·daoircci ?:..-oc=~ ::.:."' 

orientation as more experience i.e gathc::-oci. 

Example: Dovelop in addition to w~at i:: ~ci..-.z do:1.e today .. 

a iirat-sta.Ge.Aboocter of twice the total L-::puls~ o: S.:.·;~:..-:..:.. ~ 

first stage. designed to be used in cluc;ters i£ :.·.~-ceded. 

W.ith this booster we could 

a. double Saturn's pro Gently cnvi::~:or.~d p~yload. 

This additional payload capabili·;,;y would bo vary 

helpful for soft instrwncnt landing& Oil. tho mooa, 

for circumlunar fli:;hts and for the fincl obj oc~~ v..:~ 

o£ a manned landin:-! on the moon (if a few yca-;-o 

from now tho route via orbital -;-c-~ueli:-1g nhould 

turn out to be the n:~.oro promisina oc.o.) 

b. assemble a much lar~cr writ by ati_"appi.-.~ three 

or fou-;; boosters together into a cluster. Thia 

approach would be takca should, a iow yoara 

hence, orbital rendo:vouc n.nd ro!\!cling ::-un i_-,.~o 

diificultios and the "direct :-;;oute'' !o:-;; tllo ;n~ud 

lunar landing thua appoaro moro promising. 
The Vice Presi.dent of the United States April Z9, 1961 

Summing up, I should like to say that i.n the space 

race we are competing with a determined opponent whose peacetime 

economy is on a wartime footing. Most of our procedures are designed 

for orderly, peacetime conditions. I do not believe that we can win this 

race unless we take at least some measures which thus far have been 

cons ide red acceptable only in times of a national emergency. 

Yours respP.ctfull y, 

15/ 

Wernher von Braun 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Overton Brooks to the Vice President of the Unlted States, 4 May 1961, NASA Historical 

Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Overton Brooks (D-LA), chair of the powerful House Committee on Science and Astronautics, wrote to 

Lyndon Johnson on 4 May proposing a strong U.S. civil program in space as the best means of demonstrating 

"uneguiyocal leadership in Space Exploration." He emphasized the prestige factors involved in the U.S./ 

U.S.S.R. rivalry during the Cold War, and offered several possible options to pursue in meeting the challenge, 

among them an aggressive Apollo effort. 
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'llfiLUAM J. lilAJ'fOAI..I._ WO.. 

W1LLIAM P. RT~trore, H. "'I. 

lAND C. CDfiMAH, CAUP'. 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

May 4, 1961 

MEMORANDUM 

To: The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman, 

National Aeronautics and Space Council 

From: Overton Brooks, Chairman, 

House Committee on Science and Astronautics 

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c. on• l"lHCH 

Subject: Recommendations re the National Space Program 

General 

It is my belief -- and I think on this point that 

I can speak for our committee -- that the United States must 

do whatever is necessary to qai~ unequivocal leadership in 

Space Exploration. 

This means the procurement and utilization of sufficient scientific talent, labor and material resources as 

well as the expenditure of suffici~nt funds. This means 

working around the clock, if need be, in all areas of our 

Space program -- not just a few. 

The reason is patent. Rightly or wrongly, leadership in space research and exploration has assumed such a 

powerful position among the elements which form the political 

stature of our country in the eyes of the world that we cannot afford to slight it in any fashion whatsoever. This is 

perhaps even more true of the non-military phase of our 

national space endeavor than it is of the military. Obviously, 

neither phase can be slighted. 

According to the best information and estimates 

available to our committee, the Soviets are putting about 2% 
-2-

of their gross national product into their space effort --

possibly as much as 2~. For various reasons, this is a 

difficult thing to correlate in terms of equivalent dollars. 

But I think it is indicative of national attitudes and effort 

to contrast the R¥ssian percentage with the less than onehalf of one per ceFt of the United States gross national product 

which is going into the space program, civilian and military. 

A similar financial commitment on our part would involve some 

$10 billion a year. 

Of course, I am not suggesting anything of this 

magnitude, but I do believe we need to accelerate our space 

program to the maximum that it can be accelerated by adding 

money to it. 

I understand the restrictions and limitations imposed by our budget and by the many other legitimate demands 

for federal money. But I also am convinced that this space 

effort must be made and can be made within the flexible confines of the existing budget. 

Let me emphasize that while the recommendations to 

follow deal mainly with the augmentation of our immediate 

and short-range program, we on this committee are equally 

committed to a forceful and stepped-up long-range endeavor. 

We believe that a particular effort must be made to strengthen 

such programs as Apollo, Saturn, Rover and the solid-segmented 

and F-1 liquid engine concepts. 

I totally reject the defeatist notion that we are 

so far behind the Soviets in certain space areas that there 

is little point in trying to overtake them, nor can I accept 

the philosophy that our Space endeavor should be limited to 

a moderately-paced, purely scientific program. In today•s 

volatile world our very security is linked to a dynamic, 

operational, broad-gauged program. 
-3~ 

WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO ON A SHORT~ERM BASIS TO RAISE 

U. S. PRESTIGE WITH RESPECT TO PRACTICAL SPACE ACCOMPLISHMENTS 

1. There is no doubt that it will be five to eight 

years before we can overtake the Soviets with respect to 

operational use of very large rockets of either the nuclear or 

chemical variety~ \ 

2. If we are to do anything in the immediate future 

to regain prestige, we are intimately tied to the propulsion 

system now in being. This is basically Atlas, Titaa and Thor. 

Don't expect too much use out of Saturn until 1965. 

3. Based on Atlas, Titan, and Thor, our only hope 

for short-term payoff will be to accelerate the operational use 

of what I consider the utility packages. These are: 

(a) Worldwide communications satellites 

(b) Worldwide television satellites 

(c) Worldwide weather satellites 

(d) Worldwide navigation satellites 

4. Worldwide communications and television satellites 

I believe that we can have them as useful systems in 

three years on an experimental b~sis. They are importru!t because 

the nation that controls worldwide communications and television 

will ultimately have that nation's language become the universal 

tongue. 

5. Worldwide weather satellite systems 

We have already developed a strong and sound technological leadership in this area. It appears that we excel the 

Soviets in the development of this type of satellite. This is 

one area where we can win worldwide competitive support. The 

world could be offered a limited operational system within one 

year, and a completely operational system within three years if 

we put the money behind it. Attendant political, psychological, 

and economic benefits that would accrue can be easily measured 

against our political goals. 
-4-

6. The navigation satellit~ 

The Transit satellite is well on its way to being 

operational. Within one year you could achieve a demonstrable 

worldwide navigation system. Within three years you could 

have a fully operational system, including the development of 

ground read-out\equipment which would be relatively inexpensive and could ~ offered to all countries of the world. Such 

ground read-out equipment is already under development. Offering all nations of the world the use of this satellite will 

have an important effect with respect to the image we desire to 

project internationally. 

7. Funding of utility packages 

My staff has estimated that it would require an 

additional $100 to $150 million to accelerate the programs mentioned above to insure having them all operational within three 

years, except for the television relay satellite, which may 

only be operational on an experimental basis within that time. 

The significant reason for increased funds will not be the 

cost of payload development, but rather the procurement of 

launch vehicles, launching services, and the production of 

worldwide read-out equipment. 

8. Inflatable structures 

Current developments in inflatable structures may be 

significant, in that they represent one of the few ways in a 

relatively short time span of placing large structures in 

space with our current rocket vehicles. Inflatable structures 

make small packages ;in the nose of a rocket and in space can 

be inflated to large, complex shapes with plastic foam hardened 

in double walls to create light weight, rigid structures. They 

could be useful for placing payloads into space which we have 

previously thought could not be done until we had the Saturn 

operational. Perh~ $6 to $8 million invested in this development area might have significant short-term payoff. 
-5-

A POSSIBLE, SHORT-TERM DRAMATIC ACHIEVEMENT WITH 

RESPECT TO BASIC. SCIENCE 

THE ORBITING ASTRONOMcrCAL OBSERVATORY 

The\first nation which is able, on the basis of observation, to makk a cosmological determination of the origin, 

evolution and nature of the universe will have reached one of 

the great milestones in the history of man. 

Not only will this determination be a scientific 

achievement of the first magnitude, but it very likely will 

have a highly dramatic impact on the populations of every 

nation. All people are instinct.:i vely and deeply interested in 

how the world began and where it is going. 

Such a determination can also be expected to capture 

the fascinated at~ention of every physical scientist -- men 

and women who have been trying for years to learn the truth 

concerning the creation of the universe and who are divided 

over the conflicting Explosion, Steady-State and ExpansionContraction theories of leading cosmologists. 

Astronomers agree that the only way to make such a 

determination is through obser.ration. They also agree that 

perhaps the largest remaining obstacle to the necessary observation is acquiring the capability to observe from a point 

undisturbed by the earth's atmosphere. 

This is what the 3500-pound, unmanned Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) is designed to do. 

This is also a portion of our scientific satellite 

program which is being funded on a relative shoestring and 

without any particular urgency attached to it. 

In view of the potential drama and prestige connected 

with the OAO, and in view of the fact that it does not require 

excessive developmental time, it is suggested that this progr~u 

be provided with additional funds and assigned a high priority. 
-6-

The OAO is not dependent on undeveloped boosters. 

It contemplates use of the Atlas-Agena B, ~hich is in existence. 

The planned payload for tle first OAO, while complicated, presents no exceptionally difficult problems. The most difficult 

problem connected with the OAO ap?ears to be the very high 

order of stabilization necessary to permit an accurate charting 

of the heavens -\ but here again the basic techniques are 

known. It is a ~tter of development. 

NASA, in its 1962 recommendations, is asking about 

$5.7 million for further development of the payload and 

$12 million for launch and flight units. A request to the 

Budget Bureau for an additional$7 million for this program was 

not approved, which will slow even the present schedule. 

The first OAO is not scheduled for launch until late 

1963. Indications are, however, that the program can be 

speeded up considerably with the addition of not more than $15 

or $20 million and with the assignment of priority to it. 

priority 

moment. 

vehicles 

It is therefore recommended that: 

(1) The OAO be assigned all necessary funding and 

to get it off the grou~d at the earliest possible 

This should include adequate backups both for launch 

and for a variety of payloads. 

(2} An ad hoc Cosmology Assessment Board composed 

of about five noted astronomers {such as ~fuipple of Smithsonian, Gold of Cornell, Code of Wisconsin, Roman of NASA, 

Mayall of Kitts Peak) be formed to work out the details of the 

experiments -- and to evaluate subsequent results. 

(3) The emphasis on this program not be publicized 

until the Board is ready to release data which has significant 

cosmological meaning. 

It is recognized that important findings in this 

field will take time and study and that they will not immediately 

be conclusive. Nonetheless it is believed that results which 

may even point in the direction of the truth concerning the 

nature of the universe may carry an impact to make our scientific 

findings to date pale by comparison. We should not let Russia 

report the first important findings in this field. 
-7-

To get moving on this program we need not wait for 

the development of a Saturn, a nuclear rocket or a life support system. We can begin now and cheaply. 

WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO ON AN INTERMEDIATE-TERM BASIS TO GAIN 

AND MAINTAIN WORLD LEADERSHIP IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY 

1. We snould embark immediately upon a back-up or 

alternate for the Saturn project. All indications are that 

Saturn will slip. 

2. Industry, through NASA or DOD, or both, should 

be given an immediate go-ahead in the development of large, 

segmented, clusterable solid rocket engines to back up the 

Saturn. 

3. A family of large, first stage "space trucks" 

should be developed so that proper upper-stage rocket vehicles 

and our payload program can be effectively planned and designed. 

4. The Rover Project should be pursued vigorously; 

however, since this is one area where we may leapfrog the 

Soviets, we need insurance. We sbould immediately embark upon 

a back-up nuclear rocket development, should Rover fail to be 

the correct approach. There is a great deal of reactor "knowhow" and rocket engine "know-how", which I do not believe is 

being utilized to the fullest in achieving a successful nuclear 

rocket. We may be overlooking many bright ideas by giving 

the Rover Project group monopoly on the development of nuclear 

rockets. 

5. There is need for sustained development in the 

chemical rocket field, despite the anticipated successful 

development of nuclear rocket engines. Both li~1id and 

solid rocket developments must continue at high priority, 

since there is a place for both the chemical and nuclear 

boosters in the national program. 

6. It is important that military designed criteria 

be incorporated in NASA-developed large space trucks, because 

I do not think we can afford to have two agencies running 

parallel programs which will spend many billions of dollars 

over the x.~.ext ten to fifteen years. 
------------------ ---------------

-a7. Because ~arge space boosters are so e~pensive, 

serious thought should be given to designing both manned and 

unmanned recoverable systems. 

8. If we accelerate our space program, we will soon 

exhaust our storehouse of basic and applied research. We must 

put more emphasis\in these areas by drawing in more scientific 

talent and channe~ing more funds into tre fundamentals of basic 

space technology. 

9. We should pursue vigorously our man-in-space 

program. We cannot concede the Moon to the Soviets, for it is 

conceivable that the nation which controls the Moon may well 

control the Earth. 

10. The military aspects of space must not be overlooked. We should embark upon serious developments in the 

area of anti-satellite weapons, covert reconnaissance, and other 

offensive and defensive systems which can be done better from 

a space environment than an earth environment. These developments admittedly will be expensive, therefore we must be careful that we do not embark upon military space systems for the 

pure sake of doing them from space if they can be done more 

effectively and economically from Earth. 

11. We must start now to plan not only the exploration of the Moon, but the explora~ion of the planets if we are 

to wrest the initiative in this area from the Soviets. The 

driving force which has brought man to the level of mastery 

of the world around him has been his insatiable intellectual 

curiosity. I believe we are in the initial phase of man's 

drive to break out into the universe. 

12. Can we support a broad-based national space 

program? I have already said that the United States can sustain 

a massive space effort 1 and if carefully planned, it can be 

accomplished without creating undue imbalance in our structure 

for scientific research and in our eco11omy. A $5 billion a 

year space program represents only about 1% of our gross 

national product. even half of which offers returns crucial to 

the leadership, the prestige, and perhaps even the survival 

of the United States. 
-9-

QUESTIONS WHICH I BELIEVE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE SPACE 

COUNCIL 

1. Has there been developed a recognizable set of 

national space objectives? 

2. Are we merely reacting to Soviet accomplishments 

with space projects that parallel theirs? If so, we can never 

hope to surpass them because we will always be behind. 

3. Will the Space Council staff, as now envisioned, 

be capable of providing the information the Council will need 

make decisions on a national basis? Will the Council insure 

that its staff is made up of knowledgeable civilians, rather 

than utilizing military personnel? 

4. Will the Space Council review both DOD and NASA 

programs, assess them against the national objectives, limit 

overlap and duplication, and set plateaus of achievement? 

5. Will the Space Council have as its principal 

objective the tying together of our technological goals in 

space with our geopolitical goals? 

6. Does the Space Council intend to fix program 

responsibilities and write report cards? 

7. Will the members of the Space Council continue 

to work closely with the Committees in Congress charged with 

the legislative responsibility for the national space effort? 

8. Will the Space Council adjudicate DOD-NASA 

conflict? 

9. Since the DOD and NASA members of the Space 

Council have an understandable stake in the competition for 

dollars channeled into the national space program, will it 

be possible to make realistic program determinations between 

the two without independent staff studies by competent experts net connected with either DOD or NASA? 
-10-

10. Will the Council be sufficiently staffed to 

develop a national 5, 10, 15, 20 - year program for space 

endeavor which takes into consideration not only our technological goals in space, but the international political 

goals of the United States? 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

John F. Kennedy, Excerpts from "Urgent National Needs" speech to a Joint Session of 

Congress, 25 May 1961, Presidential Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 

This is the section of President Kennedy's "reading text" of his address to a Joint Session of Congress in 

which he called for sending Americans to the Moon "before this decade is out." President Kennedy in his own 

hand modified the prepared text of his remarks. The text as written, modified, and ultimately delivered vary 

considerably. Kennedy also ad-libbed three additional paragraphs near the end of his speech. 
63 

To this end I soon shall send to the 

congress a ~easure to est~blish a 

strengthened and enlarged Disarrn~ment 

t,dm in i strati on. ~an agency can 

intensify ~nd improv~our st~ anc 

researcn . on th" IS proo '1-"" e. /!. ioa<Jng 

f or war d t o t h e day · · e n r e ~ s o n ,., i 11 

prevail, and a 

will be pre· ared to accept a rea 

and sw~arded disarmament in a 

a~0 

IX. Space 

world 

·stic 

""-. 

world 

Finally, if we are to win the 

b~ttle for ~en's minds, 
64 

the dr~matic achievements in space 

.w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n r e c e n t y ~ e k s § h o u ld _ 1_, 

\ 6(A liJ,Id(77C:l ffL't-C7? tN v0-.4~ 

have made clear to us all.the impact ~H~; 

'-.1~ ""' 

.~ ~ t h i s n e w f ron t i e r of h u man 

f' 

adventure~ Since early in my term, 

our efforts in space h~ve been under 

r e v i e w • \'J i t h t h e ad v i c e 0 ;f, t h e r-- ( ... r /, , .... ~ ol" 

~ U,.o ~ (:_./,..(V..;o. VV'._ 'J "f;:j :\.;. w- t /~vv-w- ' 

Vice President we have examined where 

we are strong and where we are not, 

where we may succeed and where we may 

not. N OVI it Is ~-

L 1 me to take longer 

strides -- time for a great new 

American enterprise -- time for this 

n~tion to take~ cle~rly leading role 

I 

in space ach~i evement 1 ~"' fp_ ~) __ c.~r 

"""/ ~ TQ (J i<l /J1AA { t;;:;..J c- r "-' ' ~, ' 
1 believe ~e possess all the 

resources ~nd ~11 the t~lents 

necessary. But the facts of the 

1:1.:..tter o..re that \Je hz..ve never mc:de 

the national decisions or marshalled 

the n~tlonal resources required for 

~uch leadership. ~c have never 

~pecified long-range goals on an 

urgent time schedule, or man~ged our 

resources and our time so as to insure 

their fulfillment. 

Recognizing the head st~rt 

obt~ined by the Soviets with their 

large rocket engines, which gives 

them many months of lead-time, 
66 

and recognizing the likelihood that 

they will exploit this lead for some 

time to come in still more impressive 

successes, we nevertheless are 

required to make new efforts. For 

while we cannot guarantee that we 

shall one day be first, we can 

guarantee that any failure to make 

this effort will find us last. \'I e 

take an additional risk by making it 

in full v1ew of the world -- but as 

shown by the feat of astronaut Shepard, 

this very risk enhances our stature 

when we are successful. But this is 

not merely ~ race. 
------------

67 

S p a c e i s o p e n t o us n o VJ ; an d o u r 

eagerness to sh~re its ~eaning is not 

governed by the efforts of others. We 

go into sp~ce because ~hatever mankind 

must undertake, free men must fully 

share. 

therefore ask the Congress, 

above and beyond the increases I have 

earlier requested for space activities, 

to provide the funds which are needed 

to meet the following national goals: 

First, I believe that this nation 

should commit itself to achieving the 

goal, befor~ this decade is out, 

of landing a man on the moon and 

returning him safely to earth. 
68 

No single sp~ce project in this period 

wi 11 be mo~e e,.x'??~~'fl;? :er ~:~rlA--~ ;:.L··:::: \ t (V.. p,•,. ~a (.(...") 1.4 .,.,..,., -~~ .. ~., r \ t <.---~ 

impressive~ or more i mportz.nt for ths )y..-

long-r~nge exploration of space; and 

none will be so difficult or expensive 

to ace ompl ish. ~-~ ~1-atilng nece_ss~-ry 

sUJ~.J."l.OJ:-tJ-n.g-r-e·s-eat ch, _this obJec-:tf1ve 

I ~- \ wi.ll require ~n--additional $531 miilion 

t t}_\i_s_y..e.a. r:-~ar;; s t i 11 h i g h e r s u m s i n \ h e 

fu~ \'/e prop~se to accelerate 

development of the appropriate lunar 

space craft. We propose to develop 

altern~te liquid and solid fuel 

boosters of much larger than any no~ 

being devel~ped, until certain which 

is superior. 
69 

We propose additional funds for 

other engine development and for 

unmanned explorations -- explorations 

which are particularly important for 

one purpose which this nation will 

never overlook: the survival of the 

man who first makes this daring flight. 

But rn a very real sense, it will not 

be one man going to the moon it will 

be an entire nation. For all of us 

must work to put him there. 

Second. an additional ~23 million, 

together with $7 million already 

available, will accelerate development 

of the ROVER nuclear rocket. 
70 

This __.....__t............_e c.hn o log i cal - e n-t-er-p~ I s e 1 n 

0 

tl..r:-4--k-H'ila--n-, ro 9 r-e-s s -,- -a n d -w g 1 v e s 

prom1se of some day providing a means 

for even more exciting and ambitious 

exploration of space, perhaps beyond 

the moon, perhaps to the very ends of 

the solar system itself. 

Third. an additional tso million 

will make the most of our present 

leadership by accelerating ~e use of 

space satellites for world-wide 

communications. When we have ·nut into 

space a system that will enable people 

in remote areas of the earth to 

exchange messages, hold conversations, 
71 

and eventually see television programs, 

we will have achieved a success as 

b e n e f i c i al a s i t V! i 11 b e s t r i k i n g • 

Fourth, an additional t75 

million-- of which ~~53 million rs for 

the Weather Bureau -- will help give us 

at the earliest possible time a satellite system for world-wide weather 

observation. E\:" a.-system v· i 1--1-bej of : '\ ( / 

ines · le commercial scientific 

' ' I 

""" ,, . I I 

va ue; an provides 

w i 1 -be rna d e ~ely a v a · a b 1 e t o a 11 ---- t h e n a t--l--G-R-S-o+-t-h-e-~ 

Let it be clear that I am asking ~ 

the Congress and the country to accept 

a firm·commitment to a new course of 

:-.c-tior~ --
72 

\. a c o u r s e \·.r h i c h v,· i 11 1 a s t -F o r r.1 aD y c (_ 

·, ~- .5 'J ('"",. {(. ._ 

yeo.rs z..nd cz.rry very heavy costs --c(f:;:;,,_~, 

0 

an estimated !;7-9 billion c:.dditionr-.1 

over the next five ye~rs. If v:e were 

to go only halfway, or reduce our 

sights in the face of difficulty,~~ 

would be better not to go at all~ Tt/!1.J· ~ 1.--1. ~ (f._y.....c(. (v.-,/]::.;. {l; !r ('--" /T:V /)·t.-<._._ ~v;;.{f;(·•f""' 

~J.J"' t:; ~ · L e t U me s t r e s s a 1 s o t h c... t m o r e . .1 ( · (,. ~ \i..IJ I c/ r:J .. £~_.v •' I " 

i{~rf.J(~ e Y alan e w i 11 not do the job. "';~_,J I 

J rl··"./ This decision demz..nds a m~jor national ~...--' 

commitment of scientific and technical 

manpo~er, m~terial and facilities, 

and the possibility of their diversion 

from other inportant c...ctivities ~here 

they ara &lre~dy thinly sprc&d. It 

me:=: n s :;_ ci r '"',. r F 0 . ,., f ,., P r-~ ,. c- t · on - ~ __ . "' ~• - - <.- I , 
73 

organization ~nd discipline ~hich h~ve 

not always ch~racterized our rese~rch 

~nd develop~ent efforts. I t r.1 e a. n s '.'! e 

cannot afford undue work stopp&.ges, 

inflated costs of m~terial or talent, 

,., "" <"" t e -f u 1 ·, n + e ,.. '.:1 g Cl n " " ,.. i \1 ~ "'! ,.. i (:I <:: '' a ~ t _., I I ~ I """ '\J I I V J I I • - .,. I I """' ~ ' or a. 

high turnover of key personnel. 

New objectives and ne~ money 

cannot solve these problems. They 

could, in f~ct, aggravate them 

further -- unless every scientist, 

. . every engtneer, every servtcem~n, 

every technician, contractor, ind 

civil servant involved gives his . personal pledge that this nation will 

move fo~ward, ~ith the full speed of 

sr:~ce. 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

"Concluding Remarks by Dr. Wernher von Braun about Mode Selection for the Lunar Landing 

Program," 7 June 1962, Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous File, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 

NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

At the conclusion of an all-day meeting of key NASA personnel over the method of reaching the Moon on 

7 June 1962, Wemher von Braun, director of the Marshall Space Flight Center and one of the most important 

proponents of the "Earth-Orbit Rendezvous" mode, acquiesced his position in favor of a "Lunar-Orbit 

Rendezvous" concept. His reasons for doing so are presented in this text ofhis remarks at the meeting. The mode 

decision allowed the Apollo program to move forward to final hardware design, a critical component in von 

Braun's acquiescence in the "Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous" concept for without it meeting the Kennedy mandate 

to land on the Moon before the end of the decade might have been unrealizable. 
CONCLUDI~G REMARES DY Dit. W ERN!-iER VON BRAUN 

ABOUT MODE SELECTION FOH. THE Lui':AR LANDING PROGRAM 

GIVEN TO DR. JOSEPH F. SHEA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR {SYSTEMS) 

OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT 

JUN£7,1<)62. 

In the previ~us six hours we presented to you the results of some 

of the many studies we at Marshall have prepared in connection with 

the Manne.d Lunar Landing Project. The purpose of all the's-e studies 

was to identify potential technical problem areas, an~ to make sound 

and realistic scheduling estimates. All studies were aimed at assisting 

you H1 your final recommendat1on with respect· to the mode to be chosen 

for the Manned Lunar Landing Project. 

Our general conclusion is th<J.t c..ll four modes investigated are 

technically feasible and could be impicmentcd with enough time and 

money. We have, however, arrived Cit a definite list of preferences 

in the following o~de r: 

1. Lun<lr Orbit Rcnclc/.VOus .:Vi(ldc - with the strong 

recon11n~ndation (to m ... kc up for the lirnitcd 

growth potential of th1s mode) to initiate, simultaneously, the development of an unmanned, fully 

automatic, one-way C-5 logistics vehicle. 

2.. Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode (Tanking Mode}. 

3. C-5 Direct Mode with rninimwn size Command 

Module and High Energy Return. 

4. Nova or C-8 Mode. 

I shall give you the reasons behind this conclusion in just one minute. 

But first I would like to reiterate once more that it is absolutely 

mandatory that we arrive at a dcfin!.te mode decision within the next few 

weeks, preferably by the first. o1 July, 1962. We are already losing time 

in our over-all program as a result of a lacking mode decision. 

i- _).{7),; -II) 7 ;, 17l' ·. ' 

~~ .).';j ) HI/- l · _j~,.... ~!· ~ -r· 

Page 1 of 11 
11. ty!)lCC.l ex~•Jllpic 1~; the S-lVU contr.J.ct. lithe S-IVB stage is to 

serve not only as the tlnrd (c· c~;>c) stabc for the C-5, but also as the 

$econd stacc for the C-1 D necued 111 support of r.cndezvous tests, a 

flyable S-IVD will be needed <<l least one year earlier than if there was 

no C-lB Jt all. The 11np.:1ct of th1s questwn on facility planning, buildup of contractor lrvcl of effort, etc., should be obvious. 

Fur the rm ore, if we do not f rc e ze the mode now, we cannot lay out 

a definite prograrr\ with a schedule on which the budgets for F'Y -1964 and 

following can be based. Finally, if we do not make a clear-cut decision 

on the n1oclc very soon, our chances of .J.ccomplishing the first lunar expedition in this decade w1ll bde J\'·ay rapidly. 

I. WHY DO WE RECOMMEND Li..JN.'\k ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MODE PLUS 

C-5·0NE-WAY LOGISTICS VEHICLE? 

a. We believe this progr<1m oifers the highest confidence factor 

of successful accomplishment withn1 this decade. 

b. It offers an adequ<ltc pcrform.:mce margin. With storable 

propellants, both for the Service lvlodulc and Lunar Excursion Module, 

we should have J comfortable p.::.cldinc with respect to propulsion performance and weights. The ?Criormancc margin could be further increased by initiation of a back-up development aimed at a High Energy 

Propulsion System for the Service Moc.iule and possibly the Lunar 

Excursion Module. Addition2.l performance gains could be obtained 

if current proposals by Rocketdyne to increase the thrust and/or 

specific impulses of the F-1 and J -2. engines were implemented. 

c. We agree w1th the Manned Spacecraft Center that the 

designs of a maneuverable hyperbolic re-entry vehicle and of a lunar 

landing vehicle constitute the two most critical tasks in producing a 

successful lunar spacecraft. A drastic separation of these two functions 

into two separate elen1ents is bound to greatly simplify the development 

of the spacecraft system. Developmental cross-feed between results 

from simulated or actual landing tests, on the one hand, and re-entry 

tests, on the other, arc minimized if no attempt is made to include the 

Command Module into the lunar landing process. The mechanical separation of the two functions would virtua.lly permit completely parallel 

developments of the Command Module and the Lunar Excursion Module. 

While it may be difficult to accurately appraise this advantage in terms 

of months to be gained, we have no doubt whatsoever that such a procedure 

will indeed result in very substantial saving of time. 

Page 2. of ll 
d. We believe that ti1<.: ccmb:r..1t.~.on of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous 

Mode and a C-5 one-way Logistics Vc:h:.ci.: offers a great growth potential. 

After the first successful landing on the rr~oon, den1ands for follow-on 

programs will essentially center on ir.crcc.:.scd lunar surface mobility and.; 

increased rnatcrial supplies for shel~c!", food, oxygen, scientific instrumentation, etc. I~ appears that the Lu1~ar Excursion Module, when refilled 

with pr6pellants brought down by the Logistics Vehicle, constitutes £in ideal 

means for lunar surface tr<.:.:-:sportation. First estimates indicate that m 

the 1/6 G gravitational field of the moon, the Lunar Excursion Module, 

when used as a lunar taxi, would have a radi.us of action of at least 40 miles 

from arouNd the landinG point of the Logistics Vehicle. It may well be that 

on the rocky and treacherous lL.inar terrain \.he Lunar. Excursion Module will 

turn out to be a far more attractive type of a taxi than a wheeled or caterpillar vehicle. 

e. We believe the Lunar Orbii: Rendezvous ¥ode using a single 

C-5 offers a very good chance of t.!ltin:;:!.d' into a C-5 direct 

capability. At this time we recomm..:n<.l against relying on the C- uect 

Mode because of :ts need for a much ligi1t.cr command module as well as 

a high energy landing and return propulsion system. While it may be 

unwise to count on the availabi~~ty of such advanced equipment during this 

decade (this is why this mode was givf!n a number 3 rating) it appears 

entirely within reach in the long haul. 

f. Ii and when at some later time a reliable nuclear third stage 

for Saturn C-5 emerges from the RIFT program, the performance marg1n 

for the C-5 Direct Mode will become quite comfortable. 

g. Conversely, if the Ad·.,ranced Saturn C- 5 were dropped in 

favor of a Nova or C-8, it would completely upset all present plans for 

the implementation of the RIFT program. Contracts, both for the engines. 

and the RIFT stage, have already been let and would probably have to be 

cancelled until a new program could be developed. 

h. We conclude from our studiP.s that an automatic pinpoint 

letdown on the lunar surface going through a circumlunar orbit and using 

a landing beacon is entirely possible. Whether this method should be 

limited to the C-5 Logistics Ve~icle or be adopted as a secondary mode 

for the Lunar Excursion Module )_s a matter that should be carefully discussed with the Manned Spacecraft Center. It may well be that the demand 

for incorporation of an additional automatic landing capability in the Lunar 

Excursion Module buys more trouble than gains. 

Page 3 of 11 
1. The Lunar On)it l~.::ndc:;,vou~ lv1ode .J.ucmcnted by a C-5 

Logibtics Vehicle undoubtcd!y o~ier:.> the cleanest m<1nageri<1l interface!> 

between the Ma:mcd Sp;:.cecL.lft Center, ivlarshal·l Space Flight Center, 

L-'lunch Opcr<etions Center ancl <::.ll our contractors. Wh1le the precise 

effect of lhis rnay be hard to <lpprc.isc, it is a comn1only accepted faci. 

that the numb<.::r and the nature of technical and managerial interfaces 

are very :-nJjor factors in conducting a corr.plex program on a tight 

time schedule. -r:he re are already a fri;;:•tcniilG number of interfaces 

in existence in ou~· Manned Lun.:tr Landing ?rogrctm. TI1cre are interfaces between the stages of the launch vehicles, between launch vehicles 

and spacecraft, between complete space vehicles and their ground equipment, between manned and autom<.ttic checkout, and in the manage rial 

area between the Centers, the VI ashington Program Office, and the 

contractors. The plain result of too many interfaces is a continuous 

and disastrous erosion of the authority vested in the line organization 

and the need for more coordination meetings, integra.tion groups, working panels, ad-hoc committees, etc. Every effort should therefore be 

made to reduce the nun1bcr of technical and 1nanagerial interfaces to a 

bare minimum. 

J. Compared with the C-5 Direct Mode or the Nova /C-8 Mode, 

the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode offers the advantage that no cxistin~ 

contracts for stages (if we go to Nova) or spacecraft systems (if we go 

to C-5 Direct) have to be terminated; that the contractor structure in 

existence can be retained; that the contract negotiations presently gomg 

on can be finished under the existing set of ground rules; that the contractor build-up program (already in fuil swing) can be continued as 

planned; that facilities already authorized and under construction can 

be built as planned, etc. 

k. We at the Marshall Space Flight Center readily admit that 

when first exposed to the proposal of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode 

we were a bit skeptical - particularly of the aspect of having the astronauts 

execute a complicated rendezvous maneuver at a distance of 2.40, 000 miles 

from the earth where any rescue possibility appeared remote. In the 

meantime, however, we have spent a great deal of time and effort studying 

the four modes, and we have come to the conclusion that this particular 

disadvantage is far outweighed by the advantages listed above. 

We understand that the Manned Spacecraft Center was also 

quite sl<eptica.l at first when John Houbolt of Langley advanced the proposal 

of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode, and that it took them quite a while to 

subst.:.ntiate the feasibility of the method and finally endor!Je it. 

Again5 L th:s lx.ckground it can, the reforc, be concluded tho.t 

the iGsue of "ir.vented here" versus "not invented here" docs not apply to 
either the Iv1.:.mncd Spacecraft Cc:~~-.:r LIC eriC I'vlarshall Space Flight Ccr:tcr; 

that both Centers have actuaily ctniJraccd a scheme sur,gested by a third 

~- Undoubtedly, pcrsor.nel of ?.lSC <llld .f.1,5FC have by now conJuc~ed 

more det<Hlcd studies on all aspects of the four modes than any othe:,.· group. 

1.1oreovcr, it is these two Ce:1tc1·s to whicl~ the Office of Manned Spz,ce Flight 

would ultimately have to look to ''deliver the goods". I consider it fortunate 

indeed for the Manned Lunar Landing Program that both Centers, after JTluch 

soul searching, have come to identical conclusions. This should give the 

Office of Manned Space Flignt some additional assurance that our recommendations should not be too far from the truth. 

II. WHY DO WE NOT RECOMME!\ID THE EARTH ORBIT REND.E:ZVOUS MODE? 

Let me point out again that we at the Marshall Spi!.ce Flight Centc r consider the Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode entirely feasible. Specifically, we 

found the Tanking Mode substantially superior to the _Connecting Mode. Compared to the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode, i~ even seems to ofie r a somewhat 

greater pe riormance mar gin. This is true even if only the nominal two C- 5' s 

(tanke-. and manned lun;:u- vehicle) arc involved, but the penvrrnance n1arg1n 

could be further enlarged almost indefinitely by the use of additional tankers. 

VIe have spent f[!Ore time z.nd nffor.t here at 1'v1arshall on studies of the 

Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode (Tanking and Connecting ~'lodes) than vn a;1y 

other mode. This is attested to by six big volumes describing all aspects 

of this mode. Nor do we think that in the light of our final recommendation -

to adopt the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode instead - this effort was in vain. 

Earth Orbit Rendezvous as a general operational procedure will undoubtedly 

play a major role in our over-all national space flight program, and the use 

of it is even mandatory in developing a Lunar Orbit Rendezvous capability. 

The reasons why, in spite of these advantages, we moved it down to 

position number 2 on our totem pole are as follows: 

a. We consider the Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode more complex 

and costlier than Lunar Orbit Rendezvous. Moreover, lunar mission !>uccess 

with Earth Orbit Rendezvous -.cquires two consecutive successful launches. 

1£, for example, after a successful tanker launch, the manned lunar vehicle 

aborts during its ascent, or fails to get off the pad within a certain pe rmissible period of time, the first (tanker) flight must also be written off as 

useless for the mission. 

b. The interface problems ansmg between the Manned Spacecraft 

Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center, both. in the t.echnical nnd 

managcmcr.t areas, would be more difficult. if the Earth Orbit Rendcz,;ous 

Mode was adopteci. For ex.Jrnplc, if the tanker ~::; an u::-~n12nned vehicle 

was handled by MSFC, and the flight o£ the manned lunar vehicle wa3 

Page S of ll 
conduct2d by th<.: M~nr,cd SpJ.cccraft Ce.-:t-.:1·, .J. managerial int<.:dace 

arises between t.J.rcet and chaser. On t!-.t: uthe:r hand, if any one of 

the two Centers would ta.ke over the entire mission, it would prob.1bly 

bite off n1orc \.han it could chew, with the result of even more difficult 

and unpleasant interface problems. 

c. According to repeated statements <h'{ Bob Gilr~ the Apollo 

Command Module in its presently envisioned form is simply unsuited for 

lunar l.J.nding be~ause of the poor visibility conditions and the undesirable 

supine position of the astronauts during landing. 

III. WnY DO W£ NOT RECOMMEND THE C-5 DIRECT MODE? 

It is our conviction that the C-5 Direct Mode will ultimately become 

feasible - once we know more about hyperbolic re-entry, and once 'I.Ve 

have adequate high energy propulsion systems available that can be used 

conver:icntly and reliably on the surface of the moon. With the advent of 

a nuclear third stage for C-5, the margin for this capability will be substanti~lly widened, of course. 

a. Our main reason against recommending the C-5 Direct Mode 

1s its marginal weight allowance for the spacecraft and the demand for 

high energy return propulsion, combined with the time factor, all of 

which would impose a very substantial additional burden on the Manned 

Spacecraft Center. 

b. The Manned Spa.cecraft Center has spent a great deal of time 

and effort in determining reali~stic spacecraft weights. In the opinion of 

Bob Gilruth and Chuck Mathews, it would simply not be realistic to expect 

··-thal a lunar spacecraft light enough to be used with the C-S Direct Mode 

could be developed during this decade with an adequate degree of confidence. 

c. The demand for a high energy return propulsion s ys tern, which 

1s implicit in the C-5 Direct Mode, is considered undesirable by the Manned 

Spacecraft Center - at the present state-of-the-art at least - because this 

propulsion system must also double up as an extra-atmospheric abort 

propulsion system. For this purpose, MSC considers a propulsion system 

as simple and reliable as possible (storable and hypergolic propellants) as 

absolutely mandatory. We think the question of inherent reliability of 

storable versus high energy propulsion systems - and their usability in 

the lunar Gurface environment - can be argued, but as long as the requirement for "storables" stands, the C-5 Direct Mode is not feasible performancewise. 

Page 6 of 11 
d. NASA has already O(.!Cn saddled with one program (Centaur) 

where the margin between performance claims for launch vehicle and 

dem<lncls for payload weights were drawn too clo.sely. We do not consider 

it prudent to repeat this mistake. 

IV. WHY DO VIE RECOMMEND AGAINST THE NOVA OR C-8 MODE? 

It should be clearly understood that our recommendation against the 

Nova or C-8 Mod~ at this time refers solely to its use as a launch vehicle 

for the implementation of the President's commitment to put a m<J.n on the 

moon in this decade. We at Marshall feel yery strongly that the Advanced 

Satur.1 C-5 is not the end of the line as far as major .launch vehicles are 

concerned! Undoubted! y, as we shall be going about settmg up a base on 

~~ci. beginning with the manned exploration of the planets, there 

will be a great. need for launch vehicles more powerful than the C-5. But 

for these purposes such a new vehicle could be conc~ivecl. and developed 

on a more relaxed time schedule. It would be a true follow-on launch 

vehicle. All of our studies aimed at NASA's needs for a true manned 

intc rplanet<J. ry capabil,ity indicate that a launch vehicle substantially 

more powerful than one powered by eight F -1 engines would be rc guirc d. 

Our reconnnend<J.tion, therefore, should be formulated as follows: "Let us 

take Nova or C-8 out of the race of putting an American on the moon in this 

decade, but let us develop a sound concept for a follow-on 'Supernova' launch 

vehicle". 

Here are our reasons for recommending to take Nova or C- 8 out of the 

present Manned Lunar Landing Program: 

a. As previously stated, the Apollo system in its present form is 

not landable on the moon. The spacecraft system would require substantial 

changes from the presently conceived configuration. The same argument is, 

of course, applicable to the Earth Orbit Rendezvous Mode. 

b. With the S-Il stage of the Advanced Saturn C-5 serving as a 

second stage of a C- 8 (boosted by eight F -1 engines) we would have an undesirable, poorly staged, hybrid launch vehicle, with a payload capabihty 

far below the maximum obtainable with the same first stage. Pe rformanccwise, with its escape capability of only 132,000 lbs. (in lieu of the 150, 000 

lbs. demanded) it would still be too marginal, without a high energy return 

propulsion system, to land the present Apollo Command Module on the surface 

of the moon. 

c. Implementation of the Nova or C-8 program i.n addition to 

the Advanced Saturn C-5 would lead to two grossly underfunded and uP.dcrmanagcd programs with resulting abject failure of both. Implementation 

Page 7 of 11 
of the Nov.:l or (.>0 progr.~m i:l lieu of the Aclv<J.nced Saturn C-5 would h.:1ve 

an .::.bsolutcly disastrous in1pJ.c:t on o.ll our facility plans. 

The r.J.ftc r heieht of the Michoud plant is 40 feet. The di<.tmete r 

of the S-lC is :n feet. As a result, most of the assembly operatiuns for ti1e 

S-IC boosl..c: 1· oi the C-5 can tal~e place in a horizontal position. Only a relatively n.:lrnJvr high bay tower must be added to the main building for a few 

operaLi0;1S which. must be carried out in a vertico.l position. A Nova or C-8 

boostc r I howcve r, hJ.s a diameter of approximately 50 feet. This means 

that the roof of a very substantial portion. of the Michaud plant would have 

to be r2.iscd by 15 to 20 feet. Another alternative would be to build <:1 vc ry 

large high bay area where every operation involving.cun1bersome parts 

would be done! in a vertical position. In either case the very serious qucst1on 

arises whether uncle r these circumstances the Michaud plant was a good 

selection to begin with. 

The foundation situation at Michaud is so poor that cxtewilve 

pile <]riving is necessary. This did not bother us when we acquired the 

plant tcc<.1use the rnu.ny thousands of pii.cs on wh:ich it rests we rc dnvcn 

twenty years aGo by somebody else. But if we had to enter into ii maJor 

pile clz-ivinG operation now, the question would immediately anse as to 

whethc r v;c could not find other building sites where foundations could t:Jc 

prepc..recl cheaper and faster. 

Any tampering with the NASA commitment to utillze the M1cho\..'.d 

plant, however, would also affect Chrysler's S-1 program, for which tooling 

and plant preparation are already in full swing at Michoud. Raising the roof 

and driving thousands of piles in Michaud may turn out to be impossible while 

Chrysler is assembling S-I 1 s in the same hangar. 

In summary, the impact of a switch from C-5 to Nova/C-8 on 

the very concept of Michoud, would call for a careful and detailed study 

whose outcome with respect to continued desirability of the use of the 

Michaud plant appears quite doubtful. We consider it most likely th<:J.t 

discontinuance of the C-5 plan in favor of Nova or C-8 would reopen the 

entire Michoud ciecision and would throw the entire program into turmoil 

with ensuing unpredictable delays. The construction of a new plant would 

take at least 2-1 /Z years to beneficial occupancy and over 3 years to start 

of production. 

d. At the Marshall Space Flight Center, construction of a st.:1tic 

test stand for S-IC booster is well under way. In its present form this test 

stand cannot be used for the first stage of Nova OI' C-8. Studies indicate 

that a;_; L:.cr as the noise level is concerned, there will probably be no objection to firing up eight F:.Tengines at MSFC. However, the Marshall 
test ~;t:C.;Ju constructwn program would be grc.J.tly delayed, rcga.rcllcss cf 

wh.:lt C.i1tJro.:.ch we would tc1kc to accornmocbte Nova/C-8 stages. Deta.tled 

studies seem to 1nclicate that the fastest course_ of action, ii Nova or C-8 

we rc adoplc.: d, would be to build 

a brand new eight F-1 booster test stand south 

of the present S-IC test st.J.nd, and 

convert the present S-IC test st.J.nd into an N-11 

test stand. (This latter conclusion is arrived at 

because the firing of an N-Il stage at Santa Susanna 

is not possible for_safety reasons, ~he S-II propellant load being considered the absolute maximum 

permissible.) 

The Mississippi Test Facility is still a_"cow pasture that 

NASI--. doesn't even own yet", and cannot compete with any test stand availabiLty c1;,tcs in Huntsville. Developments of basic utilities (roads, waLer, 

po,ver, SCV-'<.l[;C:, canals, rail spur, etc.) at MTF will require well over a 

year, and all sc:1eduling studies indicu.te that whatever we build at MTF is 

about 18 monti1s behind comparable facilities b4ilt in Huntsville. MTF 

should, ti1crefore, be conside::-ed an acceptance firing and product improvement site fur M_1choud products rather thati a bo.sic development site. 

c. In view of the fact that the S-Il stage is not powerful enough 

for the Apollo direct flight mission profile, a· second stage powered by 

eight or nine J -2's or two M-l's is needed. Such a stage would again be 

on the order of 40 to 50 feet in diameter. No· studies have been made <:~.s 

to whether it could be built in the Downey/Seal Beach complex. It is certain, 

however, that its static testing in Santa Susanna is impossible. As a result, 

we would have to take an entirely new look at the NAA contract. 

f. I have already mentioned the disruptive effect a cancellation of 

the C-5 would have on the RIFT program. 

g. One of the strongest arguments against replacement of the 

Advanced Saturn C-5 by Nov.J. or C-8 is that such a decision would topple ---...... our entire contractor structure. It should be remembered that the temporary uncertainty about the relatively minor question of whether NAA 

should assemble at Seal Beach or Eglin cost us a delay of almost half .J. 

year. I think it should not take much imagination to realize what would 

happen if we were to tell Boeing, NAA and Douglas that the C-5 was out; 

that we are going to build a booster with eight F-1 engines, a second 

stage with cig11t or nine J- 2' s or maybe two M-1 engines; and that the 

entire problem of manufacturing and testing f.J.cilities must be rc -evaluated. 

Page 9 of 11 
VIe .J.l r e a d y b <1 v c s c "c r <:ll t h 0 cl J a n u :_; (> . : • I c n <1 c t u .J.ll y .). t w 0 :::- k 0 n u. c ::; c l h r c e 

stages and n1any of then1 ;1<1ve been cli;:;loc.:...tcd from their ho,.ne pLtnt~ in 

i:rnplcrr.ent.ltion of OUl" present C-S program. n.ather than lcavlnt.; these 

thouso.nds of men suspended (although supported by NASA dollar:.;) in a 

state of unccrlc.llnty' over an extended per1od of new sy~Lerns analysis, 

program implementation stud1es, budget reshuffles, site selection procedures, etc., it mv.y indeed turn out to be wiser to just terminate the 

exi::>ting conlraqs and advise the contractors that we will call them back 

once we have a new program plan laid out for them. We have no doubt 

that the termination costs incurring to NASA by doing this would easily 

amount to several hundred million dollars. 

I have asked a selected group of key Marshall execut1vc:s 

for their appraisal, in terms of delay of the first orbital launch, if the 

C-S was to be discontinued and replaced by a Nova or C-8. The estimates 

of these men (whose duties it would be to implement_ the new progr<tm) 

varied bet·ween 14 and 24 months with an average estimate of an ove: r-all 

delay of 19 months. 

h. In appraising the total loss to NASA, it should also r.ot be 

overlooked Ih<:lt we are suppor~ing engine development tean1s al variuus 

contractor plants <:1t the rate of many tens of millions of dollars pc r yc <:1 r 

for every stage of C-1 and C-5. If the exact definition of the stages were 

delayed by switching to Nova/C-8, these engine developrnent teams would 

have to be held on the NASA payroll for just that much longer, in order to 

as sure proper engine I stage integration. 

i. More than twelve months of past extensive effort at the Marshall 

Space Flight Center to analyze and define the Advanced Saturn C-5 system in 

a great deal of engineering detail would have to be written off as a flal. loss, 

if we abandoned the C-5 now. This item alone, aside from the tilne irretrievably lost, represents an expenditure of over one hundred mill ion dollars. 

J. The unavoidable uncertainty in many areas created by 2 switch 

to Nova or C-8 {Can we retain pre sent C-5 contractors? Where arc the new 

fabrication sites? Where are we going to static test? etc.) may easily lead 

to delays even well in excess of the estimates given above. For in view of 

the political pressures invariably exerted on NASA in connection with facility 

siting decisions, it is quite likely that even the NASA Administ:::-a.tor hunself 

will find himself frequently unable to make binding decisions without dcm;:1ndin 

from OMSF an extensive re-appraisal of a multitude of issues related with 

siting. There was ample evidence of this during the past year. 

k. For all the reasons quoted above, the Marshall Spu.cc Ftir;ht Cent 

considers .:t discontinuation o~ ~l.e Attvanceci S:.cu1·n C-S i:·. ;Lt.vor of ~o·.T;: oc· Cas the worst of the four proposed n1odes for irnplen1entation of the rnanncd lun 

landing p;:-ojcct. We at Marsha.ll would consider a ctccision in favor of thi:._~ 

to t·c <::tnl;::nOLt't -.vi!L r.ivi1:r: \lF' t\:.~ r;~cc• t•.) put ;J. n':1.n on the rnoon i!l thi:> (·<:!c~~· ---------- ----------· ----------------------------------------------- ---------

···-------------·--------------· _,. __ .,._...,__._..,__ 
-- ---------------------

IN SUMM/d{.Y I TJ-l£H.EFOH.S H.ECOMiVl.i·:ND THAT: 

a. Thr: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous 1v1ode be adopted. 

b. A development of an unmanned, fully autmnatic, 

one-way C-5 Logistics Vehicle be undertaken in 

support of the lunar expedition. 

c. The C-1 program as established today be retained 

a1-1d that] ir, accordance with progress made in 5-I\'B 

development, the C-1 be gradually replaced by the 

C-1 B. 

d. A C-1 B program be officially established and approved 

with adequate funding. 

e. The development of high energy propulsion systems 

be initiated as a back-up for the Sc rvice Module and 

possibly the Lunar Excursion Module. 

f. Supplements to present development contracts to 

Rocketdyne on the F -1 and J -2 engines be let to 

increase thrust and/ or specific impulse. 

Wernher von Braun, Director 

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 

Page 11 of ll 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

George E. Mueller to Director, Manned Spacecraft Center, et al., "Revised Manned Space Flight 

Schedule," 31 October 1963, "All-Up" Decision File, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 

NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In the fall of 1963, as this document shows, the Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight 

made a decision to drop the traditional step-by-step flight tests of rockets and spacecraft components in the 

interest of speeding the development process. Instead, George Mueller told NASA engineers to assemble all 

the stages of the Saturn V rocket along with the command and service module and conduct just two or three nonpiloted test flights of the whole system. This decision became known as the "All-Up" test procedure. It 

accelerated the program by at least several months, paying off on 9 November 1967 when NASA successfully 

launched an "all-up" Saturn/Apollo vehicle. 
,-~-

·.:.:_ ... ~· .. _ ~ -· 

·, . 

--· ·:·· 

.~ 

·-; 

OCT ~ • ·-~~, 

{)tf '\1 !"ffo~ 

TO: \Director, !;1anned Spacecr·aft Center 

;-Iou::;'con l, ':Pe:.::as 

Di~ector, Launch Operatic~s Cente~ 

Cocoa ncach, Florida 

Director, I-~arshall Space Flight Center Hunt~ville, Alabama 

FROH: Deputy Associate Ad"'lini5trator for i·ianncd 

Spa.ce Fligl:t 

SUBJECT: Revised Hanned Space FliGht Schedule 

Recent sc:·H::du.le and budget revie~J:.; !:u·,rc re;:::;ul ted in a 

deletion of the 3a'cu::'n· I manned r::~ . ..;.1'v p::•o,3r2.:n c.r.C. 

r

--ea.-l .. l~·;:,..,...,·me'n>- o··r ··'·c·..,c·(l·~·ule·-·.,. ·a· ,:;d·· flJ.',..,l'~t r,l.· •.' ·:r'1 a·,..,~l.·,..~n·~·~,.,'-<· ~-- .... Q~.t.l.b_ \.1 U ! ... ':-" _ .. _.._, ____ ."'"'. - 'IJ ~. _ ~· _...,..oJ...._V .. __ ~~~-;,., .a.••'-••V.:...J 

on the- .Sa'~ul..;I1. m·-ani Saturn V p·r02:J.'[:.i;;::;. I·i; is my dcJ:I.rc ;;-~· 'f-1 1~ ~·:r""_ ~- ~ ... : ..... ,"' -~-: ··n-'-t s ·""'!':') i~)... ,. .• ~""1-~f'! .. ~("'I ; r:, r .. "'-~ .... '1_. · ·~- ... C ..,0 ;.,J~c.. ••• a J. __ 0 u. C •• cC .... .Le o~ .• .l. ~·l nc..,u -1. u:).JQ 

proba~- .. ~y o: bei~~ met or exceeded. Acco~din3ly, I 

~ Pl'Oposinc; that a fliGht schedule ::3~;-;h a:.; ~h~:n:~1 in 

FiGure lJ with cliGht adjustments a:.; required to prevent 11 s'i;ac~c-up 11 , be accepted as the official launch scl"'.e:dule. Contr~ctor schedules for spacecraft and launch ve~ic~c 

C.eli veriez sho~ld 'ue a::> sho~m in 3'i[;Ul"C 2. This t·:oi.:.ld 

allo\·1 actual flir:;hts to talce place several months e<::..i"lier 

than the official ;:;chedule. The period after chec:cou t 

at the Caoe and orior to the official launch date should 

be designated the 11Space Vehicle Acceptance" period. 

Hi th rer;ard to flight missions for Saturn I, r{iSt sl;.ould 

indicate when they ~ill be in a posltion to propo3e a 

fi:::'!n mission and spacecraft co:!"lf:!.t;uration for Sf ... -10. 

~SFC should indicate the cost of a meteoroid payload fo~ that flight. SA-6 through SA-9 nlssions should 

renain as p~esently defined. 
,.-----:-:~ 

It i!~ r:,y C:e:1L~·c t' :.t "all-t:.p" ~:Pn.cccj,"'~ft and l[l.U.i1d1 

..,;,_..__ --:~·:(',r:> ..... ~ -

f'}·'r->'-~ .;...-.:, •• vu c UcJ. 'l~d"" \J C-•..1 ...... c--=rl"'y ·• --· ,,. ....___, J 'Jo···,...·,;,le o.J..:J-v ...._ ·in __ ~~--··.c 

p:.~a~:.~an:. To -~~:.i~ ··. ~, L.Jl~-~01 a~:(: 501 should L~.~~.li~e 

o.ll :!.ive ~-;;<..;_~c:; .:2.nd ;...i:-~oulC:. ca1•r-y c::>:-r•~)J.ctc :;~xlccc~\O!i'"C 

fo:J." th~ ~·.:., :r·c;.;pecti ':c I~.is;:;::..ons. .s~·\-_::,Ql c::1d 502 u::..:.:~..i.on::.> 

s~ould c~ ~~c~~ry tests of t~c S?acecraf~ at lunar r·ctu:~·:: vcloc:!. ty. It is r·ecogni.zcO. t:1a'~ 'chc .Su".::.u:::.•n L'l .£'li0~1'v::.> ~\ill !:~vc CE/SI-1 end C:-1/S:-~j:G:S:-I C::>:~::'ic:.;u:.·zLtion::;. ; 

Mission.pla~ning should consi~er that t~::> succc~s~ul 

f'lir;l1ts \·:o·~i.ld.. be made prio:"' to a r:la:..-.ned f'L.Gh'c. 'I·J.1us ~ 

203 could concc:i.. vably oc the f::.rs'~ man:1ed Apollc fll.:::;ht. 

Em1ever·, t:-.c c .:'ficial schedule "~:Joul<i sho~·l 'si:c :Lil~:..> t 

m~nned ~li~tt cs 207, with fliGhts 203-206 desis~atcd 

'"'"' 11m a·"'- ..... ~ t.; . ..., :r II f 1·· r.'n{· r• •'\ S -: -il·i 1 "r 1)'11 10 ~ 0p~1V \•'Q' ' 1 1 Q' (,..oU • ll .J..t..J,. ..,l..J.•u _j_U v-'• ¥ .. --il..r..-'"'"' ! - ~. ~...,. f I.A .. 

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s~own as the first manne~ flight. 

I i·Iould like yo-.:.1"' asseszmen t of th0 p::->oposcd sc:-icdt..:.lc, 

incluclinz any e:L.fec 'G o:'l resource I'CQ."t.;.irements in i!Y. 1961!, 

1965 ar.d r:..tn-o;..;.t by Kover:1ber 11 ~ 1953. :-:y ~oal :;_:; to 

have an official scheCule reflectinz the ~hiloso)hy 

outlined here by Nove~be~ 25, 1963. 

Enclo~ures: 

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• 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

"Report of Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration," 5 April 1967, Apollo Flies, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

On 27 January 1967 a fire engulfed the Apollo 204 capsule and killed three astronauts-Gus Grissom, Roger 

Chaffee, and Edward White. Immediately thereafter NASA Administrator James E. Webb appointed Floyd L. 

Thompson, director of the Langley Research Center, as the head of an investigative committee. Its repon was 

issued on 5 April 1967, the transmittal letter and findings of which are printed here. 
Of(lclal FiTl? 

Ro\urn to 1\XC 

Rttords-34988 

. ' .: . ~ .AP0LLi:>""10•.RfVIfw 80ARO 

.._ ;;! I ,, ' • Qj I c Q t _: 

The Honorable James E. Webb 

Admn11strator 

Apro15,1967 

National Aeronauttcs and Space AdmtnistratiOn 

Washtngton, D. C. 20546 

Dear Mr. Webb: 

Pursuant to your directtve as implemented by the memorandum of 

February 3, 196 7, signed by the Deputy Admtntstrator, Dr. Robert C. 

Seamans, Jr., the Apollo 204 Revtew Board herewtth transmtts tls 

fn1a I, formal report, each member concurrtng in each of the ltndtngs, 

de term •nations, and recommendattons. 

_/·~-~7;__2'~ di~ E . Barton Geer 

?P-:. ~;1. 

~t '~ 4''/it:~As'/1 Charles F. Strang, Col., :J 

Swcerely, 

II'., 

£j. ,., 7': L :L-.- L~t·-.>-1.~ Dr. Robert W. Van Dolah 

!kL.9 ~42--~.L- ofoh·n· .J0vv iII iam s 
Pan\'] 

BOARD FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

In this Review. the Board adhered to the principle that reliability of the Command Module and the 

entire system lln·oh-cd in its O!J<'I.ttllm i~ a requirement common to both safety and mission success. 

Once the Command \lodult' has lett the earth's environment the occupants arc totally dependent upon 

it for their safety It follow5 that protection from fire as a hazard involves much more than quick 

egress. The latter has ment only during test periods on earth when the Command Module is being 

readied for its mission and not during the mission itself. The risk of fire must be faced; however, 

that nsk is only one factor pcrt<tJJllng to the reltability of the Command \lodu\e that must recCived 

adequate cons1deration Des1gn katures and operating procedures that arc intended to reduce the 

fire risk must not introduce other serious risks to mission success and safety 

l. FI:\"DJ:'-JG: 

a. There ,,·as a m<l.(nentar\· po"cr failure at 23:30:~5 G\lT _ _ 

b. [,·1dence of several ;1rcs '"a" lound 111 the post f1re mvcst1gauon. 

c. '\o single ignition source ol the fire ''asrondusivelyidentified. 

DETERMI\.\1101\: 

The most probable initiator ":ts Jll electrical arc in the sector between the-' and .z spacecraft 

axes. The exact locat1on best fllting t!w total available information is ncar the floor in the lower 

forward section of the left-hand equ1pmem b~tv "·here E.nvironmemal Control System (E.CS) instrumentation power wtnng leads imo the area bet\\\Cn the Envtronmental Control Unit (EC:L) and the oxygen 

panel. '\o e\·tdcnce ,,.,h disco\-eJTd that suggested >ahotagc. 

2. Fl:\"DI:"JG 

a. The Command \loduk <Ollti!JJ!l"d :11:li1y t\ves :111d classe> ol t"llltlhustible material in areas contiguous to posstblc igntion sources. 

b. The tl'~t \"ca' r·ollduct:·d -,, ,:]! ., it,:- ;><rttlllh per "t:t:Jrl' Jilt h :o!>~"lutt·. lOll JWt<t'Jll ox,·gen atmosphere. 

DETE.R \1 I :'\.\TIO'\ 

The test condition> \\"ClT extrnm·h h .. z.ndr>us 

REC0~1\\E'\U:\"IIO'\ 

The amount and loctuon l>i C•>:nh:htibk tnatcrJ;th 111 the Command \1odu!e must be S(Terely 

restricted and controlled. 

:~. FINDL\G: 

a. The rapid spread of fu-c r a used ill! nKrcasc 1n pressure and ter11pcra 1 ure "·hich resulted in rupture 

of the Command .\-lodulc and crc:ttron t)f a toXIC atmosphen: Death of the crew was from asphyxia 

due to inhalauon of toxtc gases due to l1rc .-\ contributory cause ol death was tht'rmal hurns. 

b. :\on-uniform distribuuon of carbox\ hemoglobin "as lound by autopsy 

DETER :'-.11 '\.-\ TI< ):\" 

Autopsy Jata leads to the rncd1cal opinion that unconsciuusncs~ occurred rapidly and that death 

followed soon thereafter. 

4. FI::'-JDI:\"G 

Due to internal pressure, the Command \-1odulc inner hatch could not be opened prior to rupture 

of the Command :\1odule. 

DETERMI;\!ATIO~: 

The crew '''as never capable of effecting emergency egress because of the pressurization before 

rupture and their loss of consnousnrss soon after rupture. 

RECO~I\1 Ei\DATIO'\ • 

The time required for egress ol the ere'' br reduced ;u1d the operations necessary for egress be 

simplified. 

:,_ Fl:\"DI:--:G 

Thu~e organizatiom responsihk fm the planning. conduct .md saktv of this test failed tO identify 

it as bt:1ng hazardous_ Contingency preparations to permit escape or rescue of the crew from ao internal 

Command Module fire were not made. 

a. i\o procedures for this type of emergency had been established either for the crew or for the 

spacecraft pad work team. 

b. The emergency equipment located in the White Room and on the spacecraft "·ork levels was not 

6-1 
designed for the smoke condition resulting from a fire of this nature 

c. Emergency fire, rescue and medical teams were not in attendance. 

d. Both the spacecraft \,·ork levels and the umbilical tower access arm contain features such as steps, 

sliding doors and sharp turns in the egress paths which hinder emergency operations 

DETERMl;'I<ATIOi\: 

:\dequatc safety precautions were neither established nor observed for this test. 

RECOMMENDA TIO!\!S: 

a. Management continually monnor the safety of all test operatrons and assure the adequacy of 

emergency procedures. 

b. All emergency equipment (breathing apparatus, protecti\T clothing. deluge systems. access arm, 

etc.) be revrew ed for adequacy 

c. Personnel training and prarttrc for emergency procedures be given on a regular bas1s and reviewed 

prior to the conduct of a hazardous operation. 

d. Service structures and umbilica I towers be modified to facilitate emergency opera 11ons. 

6. Fl\:Dl:'\G: \ 

Frequent interruptiohs and failures had been experienced in the overall communica11on system during 

the operations preceding the accident. 

OETERMINATIO;\i: 

The overall communication system was unsatisfactory. 

RECO.'v1MENDA TIONS: 

a. The Ground Communication System be improved to assure reliable communications between 

all test elements as soon as possible and before the next manned flight 

b. A detailed design review be (Onducted on !he en!ire spacecraft communication svsrcm. 

7 FI:'\DING 

a. Re\IStons to the Operational Checkout Procedure for tht> test were 1ssued at :J:~~O pm EST .J.Inuarv 

26. 196/ (209 pages) and 10:00 am EST January 27, 196/ (4 pages) 

b Differences existed between the Ground Test Procedures and th<" ln·FI1ght Chnk L1'h 

DETER M I !\'ATIO:'\ 

:'\either the re,ision nor the dtfferences contributed to the accident. The late 1~suance of the 

revision. however, prevented test personnel from becoming adequately familiar w1 rh 1 he test procedure 

pnor to Its use 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

a. Test Procedures and Pilot ·s Checklists that represent the actual Command \lodulc configuration 

be published in final form and reviewed early enough to permit adequate preparation and participation 

of all rest organization. 

b. Timely distribution of test procedures and major changes be made a constramt to the beginning 

of any test. 

B. FINDING: 

The fire in Command J'vfodule 012 was subsequently simulated closely by- a test fire in a full·scale 

mock-up. 

DETERMINATION: 

Full-scale mock-up fire tests can be used to give a realistic appraisal of fire risks in flight-configured 

spacecraft. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

Full-scale mock-ups in flight configuration be tested to determine the risk of fire. 

9. FINDING: 

The Command Module Environmental Control System design provides a pure oxygen atmospht'rc . 

DETERMINATION: 

This atmosphere presents sever<' fire hazards if the amount and location of combustibles in the Command Module are not restricted and controlled. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

a. The fire safety of the reconfigured Command Module be established by full-scale mock-up tests. 

b. Studies of the use of a diluent gas be continued with particular reference to assessing the problems 

of gas detection and control and the risk of additional operations that would be required in the use 

of a two gas atmosphete. 

6-2 
10. fl:'\DI::'\iG: 

Deficiencies existed in Command Module design, workmanship and quali~ control, such as: 

a. Components of the Environmental Control System installed in Command Module 012 had a 

history of many removals and of technical difficulties including regulator failures, line failures and 

Environmental Control Unit failures. The design and installation features of the Environmental Control 

Unit makes removal or repair difficult. 

b. Coolant leakage at solder joints has been a chronic problem. 

c. The coolant is both corrosive and combustible. 

d. Deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, rework and quality control existed m the electrical wiring. 

e. :'\o vibration test was made of a complete flight-configured spacecraft. 

f. Spacecraft design and operating procedures currendy require the disconnecting of electrical connections while powered. 

g. :'\o design features for fire protection were incorporated. 

DETERMINATIG{N: 

These deficiencies (;reatcd an unnecessarily hazardous condition and their continuation would Jmperil any future Apollo operations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

a. An in-depth review of all elements, components and assemblies of the Environmental Control 

System be conducted to assure its functional and structural integrity and to minimize its contribution 

to fire risk. 

b. Present design of soldered joints in plumbing be modified to increase integrity or the joints 

be replaced with a more structurally reliable configuration. 

c. Deleterious efkcts of coolant leakage and spillage be eliminated. 

d. Review of specifications be conducted, 3-dimensional jigs be used in manufacture of w1re bundles 

and rigid inspection at all stages of wiring design. manufacture and installation be enforced. 

e. \"ibration tests be conducted of a flight-configured spacecraft 

f. The necessity for electrical connections or disconnections with power on within the crew compartment be eliminated. 

g. Investigation be made of the most effective meam of concrolling and extinguishing a spacecraft 

fire. Auxiliary breathing oxygen and crew protection from smoke and toxic fumes be provided. 

!1. Fl :\DING: 

An examination o£ operating practices showed the following examples of problem areas: 

a. The number of the open items at the time of shipment of the Command Module 012 was not 

known. There were 113 significant Engineering Orders not accomplished at the time Command Module 

012 was delivered to :'\ASA; 623 Engineering Orders were released subsequent to delivery. Of these, 

22 were recent releases which were not recorded in configuration records at the time of the accident. 

b. Established requirements were not followed with regard to the pre-test constraints list. The 

list was not completed and signed by designated contractor and NASA personnel prior to the test, 

even though oral agreement to proceed was reached. 

c. Formulation of and changes to pre-launch test requirements for the Apollo spacecraft program 

were unresponsive to changing conditions. 

d. Non-certified equipment items were installed in the Command Module at time of test. 

e. Discrepancies existed between NAA and NASA MSC specifications regarding inclusion and positioning of nammable materials. 

f. The test specification was released in August 1966 and was not updated to include accumulated 

changes from release date to date of the test. 

DETERMINATION: 

Problems of program management and relationships between Centers and with the contractor have 

led in some cases to insufficient response to changing program requirements. 

RECOMMENDATIO!'\: 

E\"ery effort must b~ made to insme the maximum claohca.tion and undetstanding of the responsi • 

bdities of all the organizations involved. the object1ve be•ng a fully coordinated and efficient program. 

6-3 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

NASA Apollo Program Director, to NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, 

"Apollo 8 Mission Selection," 11 November 1968, Apollo 8 Files, NASA Historical Reference 

Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

In the aftermath of the tragic Apollo 204 capsule fire in 1967, NASA's goal of reaching the Moon before 

the end of the decade seemed in jeopardy. It took almost twenty months after the fire, until October 1968, before 

astronauts were launched into orbit aboard an Apollo spacecraft. The success of this test flight, however, 

prompted the Apollo program manager, Air Force General Samuel C. Phillips, to suggest a bold strategy for 

regaining momentum in the lunar landing program. He recommended in November 1968 that the next Apollo 

flight be recast as a circumlunar mission. His memorandum, accepted by the NASA administrator on 18 

November 1968, made possible the dramatic mission of Apollo 8 on 21-27 December 1968. 
TO 

FROM 

0"1"~ P'"Q ..... H(). .. 

.... ..,.-~ 

eaA ........ (.t. c:r.) ll't ... UA 

UNITED-STATES GOVERNMENT 

Memorandum 

M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight 

MA/Apollo Program Director 

DATE: 

11 NOV 1968 

SUBJECT: Apollo 8 Mission Selection 

~--.. 

The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval to fly Apollo 8 

on an open-ended lunar orbit mission in December 1968. 

My recommendation is based on an exhaustive review of pertinent technical 

and operational factors and also on careful consideration of the impact 

that either a success or~ failure in this mission will have on our 

ability to carry out the manned lunar landing in 1969. 

THE APOLLO 8 C' WNAR ORBIT MISSION: 

Attachment I to this memorandum contains a detailed description of the 

Apollo 8 lunar orbit mission. Significant features of this mission plan 

are: 

Planned Schedule: 

Launch: 0750 EST, 21 December 1968 

Translunar Injection: 1040 EST, 21 December 1968 

Lunar Orbit Insertion: 

LOll Initiate: (60Xl70 NM Orbit) 0457 EST, 24 December 1968 

1.012 Initiate: (60 NM Circular Orbit) 0921 EST, 24 December 1968 

Transearth Injection: 0105 EST, 25 December 1968 

Landing: 1053 EST, 27 December 1968 

Alternate Schedule: 

Monthly Launch Windows: 21-27 December 1968 or as soon thereafter 

as possible. 

Daily Launch Windows: Approximately 5 hours duration. 

Open-Ended Mission Concept: 

A large number of abort and alternate mission options are provided 

for in the Mission Plan and associated Mission Rules. Noteworthy 

examples of the vay in which this open-ended concept could operate 

in this mission are t~e following: 

A low earth orbital mission in the event of a "no go" i.n earth 

orbit prior to translunar injecti.on. 

Buy U.S .. Yaoints &mJs Ret,ularly on the Payroll Savings Plan 
Early return to earth in event of certain malfunction conditions during translunar coast. 

A circumlunar mission in event of a "no go" during checkout 

prior to the lunar orbit insertion burn. 

APOLLO 8 MISSION SELECTION: 

On August 19, 1968, we announced the decision to fly Apollo 8 as a Saturn 

V, CSH-only mission. The basic plan provided for Apollo 8 to fly a low 

earth orbital mission, but forward alternatives were to be considered up 

to and including a lunar orbital mission. Final decision was to be reserved pending completion of the Apollo 7 mission and a series of detailed 

reviews of all elements of the Apollo 8 mission including the space vehicle, 

launch complex, operationa"l support system, and mission planning. 

Apollo 7 Mission Results: 

An important factor in_the total decision process leading to my 

recommendation has been and continues to be the demonstrated performance of the Apollo ]·Command and Service Module (CSM) subsystems, and the compatibility of the CSM with crew functions, 

and the Manned Space Flight Network. Comprehensive understanding 

of all Apollo 7 flight anomalies and their impact on a lunar 

mission is fundamental ~o arriving at a proper decision. Attachment II to this Iremoraudum provides a recap of the Apollo 7 flight 

anomalies, their disposition, and a statement of any known risk 

remaining on th~ proposed Apollo 8 mission tog~ther with the 

actions proposed. 

Apollo 4 and Apollo 6 Results: 

The results of the Apollo 4 and Apollo 6 missions, in which the 

performance of the SOl and 502 Saturn V launch vehicles was test€d, 

have been carefully analyzed. All flight anomalies rave been resolved. In particular, the two most significant problems encountered 

in Apollo 6--longitudinal oscillation or ''POGO" effect in the first 

stage of the Saturn V and the rupture of small propellant lines in 

the upper stages--have been corrected and the solutions verified in 

extensive ground tests. 

Meetings and Reviews: 

The decision process, resulting in my recommendation, has included 

a comprehensive series of reviews conducted over the past several 

weeks to examine in detail all facets of the considerations involved in planning for and providing a capability to fly Apollo 8 

on a lunar orbit mission. The calendar for and purpose of these 

meetings are presented in Attachment III. An important milestone 
3 

~as achieved ~ith successful completion of the Design Certification 

Revie~ on November 7, 1968. A copy of the signed Design Certification is appended as Attachment IV. 

Pros and Cons of a Lunar Orbital Flight: 

My objective through this period has been to bring into meaningful 

perspective the trade-offs between total program risk and gain 

resulting\from introduction of a CSM-only lunar orbit mission on 

Apollo 8 into the total mission sequence leading to the earliest 

possible successful Apollo lunar landing and return. As you know, 

this assessment process is inherently judgmental in nature. Many 

factors have been considered, the evaluation of ~hich supports a 

recommendation to p~oceed forward ~ith an Apollo 8 open-ended lunar 

orbit mission. Th-ese factors are: 

PROS: 

Mission Readiness: 

The CSM has been designed and developed to perform a 

lunar orbit mission and has performed very ~ell on 

four unmanned and one manned flights (CSM's 009, 

011, 017, 020, and 101). 

Ve have learned all that we need in earth orbital 

operation except repetition of performance already 

Jemonstrated. 

The extensive qualification and endurance-type subsystem ground testing conducted over the past 18 

months on the CSM equipments has contributed to a 

high level of system maturity, as demonstrated by 

the Apollo 7 flight. 

Performance of Apollo 7 systems has been thoroughly 

revie~ed, and no indication has been evidenced of 

design deficiency. 

Detailed analysis of Apollo 4 and Apollo 6 launch 

vehicle anomalies, follo~ed by design modifications 

and rigorous ground testing gives us high confidence 

in successful performance of the Apollo 8 launch vehicle. 

By design all subsystems affecting crew survival (Environmental Control System, Electrical Power System, 

Reaction Control System, and Guidance and Navigation 

System) are redundant and can suffer significant 

degradation ~ithout crew or mission loss. The sole 

exceptions are the injector and thrust chamber of 
PROS: 

the Service Propulsion System. These two engine 

components are of simple, rugged design, with high 

structural and thermal safety margins. (See 

Attachment V.) 

4 

Excellent consumables and performance margins exist 

for the first CSM lunar mission because of the reduction in performance requirements represented by 

omitting the weight of the lunar module. An example 

of the predicted spacecraft consumable& usage is provided below to illustrate this point: 

Total Total 

Consi.II!U\ble Usable Used Reserve 

Service Module Reaction Control 

System Propellant (Pounds) 

Command-Module Reaction Control 

System Propellant (Pounds) 

1140 

231.2 

294.5 845.5 

29.4 201.8 

Service Propulsion System 

Propellant (Pounds) 

40,013 28,987 11,026 

Cryogenic Oxygen (Pounds) 640 410 

Cryogenic Hydrogen (Pounds) 56 40 

Effect on Program Progress: 

The lunar orbit mission will: 

Provide valuable operational experience on a lunar CSM 

mission for flight and ground and recovery crews. This 

will enhance probability of success on the subsequent 

more complex lunar missions by permitting training 

emphasis on phases of these missions as yet untried. 

Provide an opportunity to evaluate the quality of MSFN 

and on-board navigation in lunar orbit including the 

effects of local orbit perturbations. This will increase anticipated accuracy of rendezvous maneuvers and 

lunar touchdown on a lunar landing mission. 

Permit validation of Apollo CSM communications and navigation systems at lunar distance. 

230 

16 
CONS: 

Serve to improve consumables requiremencs prediction 

techniques. 

Complete the final verification of the ground support 

elements and the onboard computer programs. 

Increase the depth of understanding of thermal conditions in deep space and lunar proximity. 

Confirm the astronauts' ability to see, use, and photograph landmarks during a lunar mission. 

Provide an early opportunity for additional photographs 

for ot>~·rational and scientific uses such as augmenting 

Lunar Orbiter coverage and for obtaining data for training 

crewmen on terrain identification under different lighting 

conditions. 

Mission Readiness: 

Marginal design conditions in the Block II CSM may not 

have been uncovered with only one manned flight. 

The life of the crev depends on the successful operation 

of the Service Propulsion System during the Transearth 

Injection maneuver. 

The three days endurance level required of backup systems 

in the event of an abort from a lunar orbit mission is great1 

than from an earth orbit mission. 

Effect on Program Progress: 

Validation of Colossus spacecraft software program and 

Real Time Computer Complex ground software program could 

be accomplished in a high earth orbital mission. 

Only landmark sightings and lunar navigation require a 

lunar mission to validate. 

Impact of Success or Failure on Accomplishing Lunar Landing in 1969: 

A successful mission will: 

Represent a significant new international achievement in space. 
6 

Offer flexibility to capitalize on success and advance 

the ~rogreae of the total program t?Warda a lunar landing 

vithout unreasonable risk. 

Provide a significant boost to the morale of the entire 

Apollo program, and an impetus vhich must, inevitably 

tnhance our probability of successful lunar landing in 1969. 

A mission failure will: 

Delay ultimate accomplishment of the lunar landing mission. 

Provide program critics an opportunity to denounce the 

Apollo 8 m!ssion as precipitous and unconservative. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

In conclusion, but vith ~he proviso that all open vork against the Apollo 8 

open-ended lunar orbit mission is completed and certified, I request your 

approval to proceed with tbe implementation plan required to support an 

earliest December 21, 1968, launch readiness date. 

Attachments 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

NASA, Manned Spacecraft Center, "Apollo 11 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice transcription," 

July 1969, pp. 317-19, 375-n, Apollo 11 Flies, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

After eight years of all-out effort, nearly $20 billion expended, and three astronauts' deaths, on 20 July 1969 

Apollo 11 landed on the Moon. The two astronauts who set foot on the surface, Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin 

E. Aldrin, called it in what later astronauts thought of as an understatement, "magnificent desolation." This 

document contains the radio transmissions of the landing and Armstrong's first venture out onto the Lunar 

surface. The "CC" in the transcript is Houston Mission Control, CDR is Neil Annstrong, and LMP is Buzz 

Aldrin. 
(GOSS NET 1) 

o4 o6 45 ~2 LMP 

(EAGLE} 

o4 o6 45 57 cc 

o4 o6 45 59 CDR 

(TRANQ) 

04 o6 46 04 CDR 

(TRANQ} 

o4 o6 46 06 cc 

04 o6 46 16 CDR 

(TRAHQ) 

o4 o6 46 18 cc 

04 o6 46 23 CDR 

(TRANQ) 

o4 o6 46 25 LMP 

(TRANQ} 

04 06 46 38 LMP 

(TRABQ) 

04 o6 46 52 LMP 

(TRANQ) 

04 06 47 03 LMP 

(TRANQ) 

04 o6 47 06 cc 

04 06 47 08 LMP 

(TRANQ) 

04 06 47 09 cc 

04 o6 47 12 CDR 

(TRANQ) 

04 o6 47 15 cc 

04 o6 47 20 LMP 

(TRANQ) 

413 is in. 

Tape 66/12 

Page 317 

,, . .. 

/ 

\._,.-A .. ., . ._. 

i v ~ 

/' V'- ~ . ~· _,. ' '" .. ~ .# ... _ •• J 

Ul.. --" VI 

we· copy you down. Eagle. 

Houston, Tranquility Base here. 

----~ ----

THE EAGLE HAS LANDED. \...._----- · 

.... •. ' J.J ;; .~ \NV'.. ' 

. ~-·''' ' ~ . . / ~· 

. ' _/ • ~ I ~~ . 

' .. .J 

~Y, ~r·'1 • ' . t..u. 

I ~. " f .;L.-~. 

Roger, Tranquility. \le copy you on the ground. : 

You got a brmch or guys about to turn blue. I/ 

"\let ft "lS'feathing again. Thanks a lot. 'tJI' 

Thank you. f) ,;, ~i···~ 

'1.vv1' ') -"'1" 

'yT d ;:;._.-, 

\ You're looking good here. L /.,.J_._, /r.,/ ~· 1 -·~ 8 ~to be b_us_y_fo_r_a_m_in_u_t_e_. ____ 

MASTER ARM, ON. Take care or the . . . I '11 get 

this, •.• 

Very smooth touchdown. 

Okay. It looks like ve're venting the oxidizer 

nov. 

Roger, Eagle. And you are S'l'AY f'or - -

- - T1. Over. Eagle, you are STAY for Tl. 

Roger. Understand, STAY for Tl. 

Roger. And ve 

Roger. 
o\ o6 48 ~0 

0' o6 48 19 

Olt o6 48 27 

04 06 48 31 

04 o6 48 32 

04 o6 48 58 

04 06 49 50 

ot. 06 50 28 

Oil 06 50 32 

04 06 50 59 

04 06 51 04 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

LMP 

('l'RANQ} 

cc 

CMP 

(COLUMBIA) 

cc 

LMP 

('l'IWIQ.) 

cc 

CMP 

(COLUMBIA) 

cc 

CMP 

(COLUMBIA) 

LMP 

('l'RANQ.) 

CMP 

(COLUMBIA) 

cc 

cc 

LMP 

(TRABQ) 

LMP 

('l'RANQ) 

cc 

lMP 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

circuit breaker. 

copy NOUN 6o, NOUN 43. Over. 

Roger. We have it. 

Tape 66/13 

Pe.ge 318 

Houston, how do you read Columbia on the high 

gain 'I 

Roger - -

- -We read you five-by, Columbia. He has 

landed, Tranquility Base. Ea.gle is at Tranquility. Over. 

Yes. I heard the vhole thing. 

••• good show. 

Fantastic. 

Engine STOP-RESET. 

Houston, Columbia vent UPTELEMETRY COJ.tttAND, 

RESET, to reacquire on the high gain. 

Copy. Out. 

Eagle, Houston. You loaded R2 vrong. We 

vant 10254. 

Roger. 

And do you want V horizontal 5515.2? 

That's affirmative. 

Like - AGS to PGNS align. Over. 

Sa;y e.gain T 
( QOS5 NET 1 ) 

04 o6 51 o8 

o4 o6 51 u 

0,. o6 51 41 

o4 o6 51 45 

o4 o6 :01 50 

o4 o6 51 52 

o4 o6 51 54 

o4 o6 53 37 

04 o6 55 16 

o4 o6 55 49 

ott o6 56 02 

04 o6 56 47 

()4. 06 57 00 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

cc 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

cc 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

Like an AGS to PGNS align. Over. 

Roger. We're standing by for it. 

•.. quantity •.. 

Tape 66/14 

Page 319 

Eagle, Houston. You are STAY for T2. Over. 

Correction, you're - -

Roger. f1rAY for T2. We thank. you. 

Roger, sir. 

Tranquility Base, Houston. We recommend you 

exit Pl2. Over. 

Hey, Houston, that may have seemed like a very 

long final phase. The AUTO targeting vas 

taking us right into a football-field size -

football-field sized crater, vith a large number of big boulders and rocks for about ••• 

one or two crater diameters around it, and it 

required a • • • in P66 and flying manually over 

the rock. field to find a reasonably good area. 

Roger. We copy. It was beautitul from here, 

Tranquility. Over. 

We'll get to the details of what 's around here, 

but it looks like a collection of just about 

every variety of shape, angularity, granularity, 

&bout every variety of rock you could find. 

Tbe colors - Well, it varies pretty much depending on how you're looking relative to the zerophase point. There doesn't appear to be too 

:much of a general color at &11. However, it 

looks as though some of the rocks and boulders, 

of which there are quite a fev in the near area, 

it looks as though they're going to have some 

interesting colors to them. Over. 

Roger. Copy. So\.Dlds good to us, Tranquility. 

We'll let you press on through the simulated 

countdown, and ve 'll tal.k to you later. Over. 

Roger. 
(GOSS NET 1) 

o4 13 18 14 

04 13 18 15 

04 13 18 28 

04 13 18 29 

o4 13 18 51 

04 13 18 53 

04 13 19 16 

04 13 19 20 

04 13 19 36 

04 13 19 37 

04 13 19 ~ 

04 13 19 47 

04 13 19 48 

04 13 20 38 

04 13 20 4o 

04 13 20 41 

04 13 20 56 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

IJoiP 

(TRANQ) 

CDR 

(TRABQ) 

U4P 

(TRARQ) 

~ 

(TRABQ) 

CDR 

('l'RABQ) 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

That's ok.s.yY 

Tape 70/22 

Page 375 

That's good. You've ~at plenty of room to your 

lett. It's a little close on the *** 

How am I doing? 

You're doing fine. 

Okay. Do you want those bags? 

Yes. Got it. 

Okay. Houston, I 1m an the porch. 

Roger , Neil • 

Okay. Stand b,y, Neil. 

Columbia, Columbia, this is Houston. One minute 

and 30 seccnds to LOS. All systems GO. Over. 

CMP Columbia. Thank you. 

(COLlMBIA) 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

LMP 

(TRANQ) 

Stay where you are a minute, Nei 1. 

Okay. Need a little slack 1 

You need more slack , Buzz? 

No. Hold it just a minute. 

Okay'. 

Okay. Everything's nice end straight in here. 

... Three asterisks denote clipping of vord and phrases. 
(GOSS NET l) 

o4 13 20 58 CDR 

(TRANQ) 

o4 13 21 00 LMP 

(TRANQ) 

04 12 21 03 CDR 

(TRANQ) 

04 13 21 07 LMP 

(TRANQ} 

o4 13 21 09 CDR 

(TRANQ} 

o4 13 21 18 CDR 

(TRANQ} 

o4 13 21 22 cc 

ot. 13 21 39 CDR 

(TRABQ} 

ot. 13 21 42 cc 

04 13 21 54 LMP 

(TRANQ} 

o4 13 22 00 cc 

04 13 22 09 LMP 

(TRABQ} 

04 13 22 11 cc 

ot. 13 22 28 LMP 

(TRABQ) 

04 13 22 34 cc 

04 13 22 48 cc 

04 13 22 59 CDR 

(TRANQ) 

Tape 70/23 

Page 376 

Okay. Can you pull the door open a little more? 

G. v '7 -771 /' , 0 1 > 6\.,. v --....i..-t·~~ 

All right. 

Okay. 

Did you ~t the kESA out? 

I'm going to pull it nov. 

Houston~ the MESA came down all right. 

This is Houston. Roger. We copy. And ve'!"e 

standing by for your TV. 

Houston~ this is Neil. Radio check. 

Neil~ this is Houston. Loud and clear. Break. 

Break. Buzz, this is Houston. Radio check, and 

verify TV circuit breaker in. 

Ro~r, TV circuit breaker's in~ and read you 

fi ve-squ.are. 

Roger. We're getting a picture on the TV. 

You got a good picture, huh? 

There's a great deal of contrast in it, and currently it's upside-down on our monitor, but ve can 

make out a fair amount of detail. 

Okay. Will you verif,y the position - the opening 

I ought to have on the camera? 

Stand by. 

Okay. Neil, ve can see you coming dovn the l~r 

nov. 

--Okay. I just checked getting back up to that first 

step, Buzz. It's- not even collapsed too far, but 

it's adequate to get back up. 
(GOSS NET l) 

o4 13 23 10 

o4 13 23 11 

o4 13 23 25 

o4 13 23 35 

-\ 

04 13 23 38) 

'7 

o4 13 23 cfi) 

,.,-

ol4 13 2~~-· ) 

04 13 2~) 

04 13 25 30 

04 13 25 45 

04 13 26 54 

04 13 26 59 

04 13 27 03 

cc 

CDR 

(TRABQ) 

cc 

IMP 

(TRANQ) 

CDR 

(TRAlfQ) 

CDR 

(nu\NQ) 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

CDR 

(TRANQ) 

cc 

CDR 

CDR 

LMP 

CDR 

Roger. We copy. 

It takes a pretty good little jump. 

Ta.pe T0/24 

Page 377 

• 

Buzz, this is Houston. F/2 - l/160th seco~d 

for shadow photography on the sequence camera. 

Ok~. 

I'm at the foot of the ladder. The LM footpads 

are only depr~~~ed in the surface about 1 or 

2 inches, although the surface appears to be very, 

very fine grained, as you get ciose to it. It's 

almost like a povder. Dovn there, it's very fine. 

I'm going to step off the LM nov. 

THAT'S ONE SMALL STEP FOR MAN, ONE GIANT LEAP 

FOR MANKIND. 

I 

y ~·I l~ And the - the surt'ace is fine and povdery. I j 

can - I can pick it up loosely with :;:v· tee. 

It does adhere in fine layers like powdered 

charcoal to the sole and sides of my boots. I 

only go in a small traction of an inch, maybe an 

eighth of an inch, but I can see the footprints 

ot my boots and the treads in the fine, sandy 

particles. 

Neil, this is Houston. 'We're copying. 

There seems to be no difficulty in moving around 

as we suspected. It's even perhaps easier than 

the simulations at one-sixth g that ve performed 

'in the various simulations on the ground. It's 

actual.ly no trouble to val.k around. Ckay. The 

descent engine did not leave a crater of any size. 

It has about 1 foot clearance on the ground. 

'We're essentially on a very level place here. I 

can see some evidence of r~s emanating from the 

descent engine, but a very insignificant amount. 

Okay, Buzz, ve ready to bring down the camera? 

I'm all ready. I think it's been all squared away 

and in good shape. 

Okay. 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANAL YS/S 

President Richard Nixon to Director, Apollo Program, 21 March 1972, Richard Nixon Flies, 

NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

At the conclusion of the Apollo program in 1972 Richard Nixon, who had called in 1969 the Apollo 11 the 

most significant six days in the history of Earth since the creation, wrote a letter of congratulation to the NASA 

team that had carried out the Kennedy mandate of landing on the Moon. Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program 

Director, added his own congratulation to that of the president's in this commemorative document. 
l)(f'l ( T(J 

• ~ "· (,f 

NATIO~AL AERO~~AUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTR/\ I lui< 

W~SHING fOil< 0 (_ .'0~4':, 

H.uch 24, 1972 

Fello~ H~IDbera of the Apollo Team: 

I have received che foll~ing letter from Pr~sident Nixon 

in ~o~hich he said he wanted the Apollo Team to knO\ol hn~o~ much 

thi1 nation values the 1.r0rk we have done and are doing in 

the Apollo Program. The l~tter was adrlre,aed to me but the 

President'• ~o~orda were really addre1aed to each ot you. 

I 

I am plea1ed to pass along the President'• words which eath 

of you hal done so much to earn. 

Sincerely, 

&-,6.~ Rocco A. Petrone 

Apollo Program Director 

1111 II IIIII Ill)( '>I 

\\ , ... , 111,(./ ( 1'-. 

March ll, 197l 

Dear Dr. Petrone: 

As we approach the final countdown for Apollo 16, I 

want you and all the men and womf:'n of Apnllo to know 

how much th\8 nation values your aplPndid efforts. The 

moon flight progran1 has captured the itna~inati.on of 

our times as has no other human endeavor. You and 

your team ha~·e, in fact, written the !irst chapter in 

the history of n)an's exploration of apace, and all 

fuh1re achievements must credit all of you for having 

blazed the path. 

CountleRs pe0pl<' throu)l,hout tht• world will fi<>On be 

sharing with you thf' •·xcJtt'nwnt of Apollo 16's voyaRf', anrl I Knm.1.· I Rpeal< ·•r all nf then1 in conveying 

to you rny W;!rnle!olt hcst w1shes for a 3afc and 

succes3ful flight. G-·· ·.l luck 1 

S 1 nc ere I y, 

Dr. f!.,ll·co A. }',·! r"'"' 

I h r t', t" r • A p,' II • • J' r • •,.: r , "" 

Offi,·e ,![ 1\IMHH'rl Sp.:t< t' l:lq.:ht 

1\:.<th•ll.d A,· r<•r:;\uti< :< .1!\d 

Spa,,. AdJnll\1 ~~ r.•t 1<>n 

Waslt1n"tnn. [).C . ._:tlC,-1( 
APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

INDEX 

Agena Booster: 13 

Aldrin, Edwin E.: 18, 27 

Anders, William A.: 18, 26, 30 

Apollo, Project: 1; and Apollo decision, 3-4, 5; Apollo 

I, 30; Apollo 4, 30; Apollo 5, 30; Apollo 6, 30; 

Apollo 7, 26, 30; Apollo 8, 17-18, 20, 26, 30; 

Apollo 9, 27, 30; Apollo 10, 27, 30; Apollo 11, 1, 

18, 27, 30;Apollo 12, 28, 30;Apollo 13,18-19,28, 

30; Apollo 14, 28, 30; Apollo 15, 20, 29, 30; Apoiio 

16, 29, 30; Apollo 17, 29, 30; and Apollo spacecraft 

development, 15-17; and Apollo 204 fire, 16-17; 

assessment of Apollo, 19-20; assessment of the 

Apollo decision, 5-6; budget of, 7, 19; and cold war 

attitudes, 2-3; and "contracting out," 8, 9-10; and 

Lunar Module development, 1, 17; missions of, 

17 -19; and mode decision, 1 0--12; and personnel 

of, 7-8, 9; and perspectives on space, 1-2; program 

management of, 8-1 0; and review of space program, 3-4; rivalries between personnel, 9-10; and 

Saturn launch vehicle, 8, 9, 14-15; and "Urgent 

National Needs" speech, 5, 6 

Armstrong, Neil A.: 1, 18, 27, 30 

Atlas Launch Vehicle: 12 

Baldwin, Hanson: 3 

Bay of Pigs Invasion: 3, 19 

Bean, Alan L.: 28, 30 

Bell, David E.: 2 

Boeing Co.: 9 

Borman, Frank: 18, 26, 30 

Bossart, Karel J.: 12 

Braun, Wernher von: 4, 10, 11, 12, 14-15 

Bridges, Styles: 4 

Budget, Bureau of the: 7 

Canaveral, Cape, Fla.: 8 

Carpenter, M. Scott: 12-13 

Castro, Fidel: 1, 3 

Centaur Booster: 12 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 3 

Cernan, Eugene A.: 27, 29, 30 

Chaffee, Robert B.: 16, 30 

Civil Rights Act (1964): 7 

Collins, Michael: 18, 27, 30 

Conrad, Charles, Jr.: 28, 30 

Convair Corp.: 12 

Cooper, L. Gordon: 13 

Cunningham, R. Walter: 14, 26, 30 

Direct Ascent Mode: 10--12 

Dryden, Hugh L.: 4 

Duke, Charles M., Jr.: 29, 30 

Earth-Orbit Rendezvous: 10--12 

Eisele, Donn F.: 14, 26, 30 

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 1, 2, 6, 8 

Enos: 12 

Evans, Ronard E.: 29, 30 

Freedom 7: 3 

Gagarin, Yuri: 3, 19 

Gemini, Project: 1, 13, 26 

Gilruth, Robert: 13 

Glenn, John: 12, 18 

Glennan, T. Keith: 3, 8 

Goddard Space Flight Center: 8 

Gordon, Richard F., Jr.: 28, 30 

Grissom, Virgil I.: 12, 16, 30 

Grumman Aerospace Corp.: 17 

Haise, Fred W., Jr.: 28, 30 

Houbolt, John C.: I 0--II 

Houston, Tex.: 8, 17, 18, 19-20 

Huntsville, Ala.: 4, 10, I2, 14-15 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: 

International Business Machines (IBM): 9 

Irwin, James B.: 29, 30 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL): 8 

Johnson, Lyndon B.: I, 2; and Apollo decision, 3-4, 5; 

and Apollo 204 fire, 15-I6; as president, 8-9, 

I5-l6; and support for Apollo, 7 

Johnson, Lyndon B., Space Center: 8 

Jupiter Launch Vehicle: 14 

Kennedy, John F.: 7, 8, 10, 1I, 12, I4, 19, 20; and the 

assessment of the Apollo decision, 5-6; and Apollo 

decision, 3-4, 5; cold war attitudes, 2-3; perspective on space, 1-2; orders review of space program, 

3-4; and "Urgent National Needs" speech, 5, 6 

Kennedy, John F., Space Center: 8 

Kerr, Robert: 4 

Khrushchev, Nikita: 2 

Langley Research Center: 10, 13, 16 

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APOLLO: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 

Launch Complex 39: 8 

Launch Operations Center: 8 

Liberty Bell 7: 12 

Little Joe II: 15 

Logsdon, John M.: 4, 5-6 

Lovell, James A., Jr.: 18, 26, 28, 30 

Low, George M.: 18 

Lunar Module: 1, 17, 18, 19 

Lunar-Orbit Rendevous: 10-12 

Lunar Orbiter, Project: 7, 13-14 

Lunar Rover: 18 

MacLeish, Archibald: 20 

Macmillan, Harold: 12 

McDivitt, James A.: 27, 30 

McDonnell Aircraft Corp.: 13 

Manned Spacecraft Center: 8, 17, 18 

Manned Space Flight, Office of: 8, 15 

Marshall, George C., Space Flight Center: 4, 8, 10, 11 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): 1 

Mattingly, Thomas K., II: 29, 30 

Mercury, Project: I, 2, 12-13, 18, 26 

Mercury Mark II: 13 

Minuteman ICBM: 8 

Mississippi Test Facility: 8 

Mitchell, Edgar D.: 28, 30 

Mueller, George E.: 15 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA): 1, 2; and Apollo decision, 3-5; Apollo 1, 

30; Apollo 4, 30; Apollo 5, 30; Apollo 6, 30; Apollo 

7, 26, 30;Apollo 8, 17-18,20,26, 30;Apollo 9, 27, 

30; Apollo 10, 27, 30; Apollo 11, I, 18, 27, 30; 

Apollo 12, 28, 30;Apollo 13, 18-19,28, 30; Apollo 

14, 28, 30;Apollo 15, 20, 29, 30;Apollo 16, 29, 30; 

Apollo 17, 29, 30; and Apollo spacecraft development, 15-17; and Apollo 204 fire, 16--17; assessment of Apollo, 19-20; assessment of the Apollo 

decision, 5-6; budget of, 7, 19; and cold war attitudes, 2-3; and "contracting out," 8, 9-10; and 

Lunar Module development, 1, 17; missions of, 

17-19; and mode decision, 10--12; and personnel 

of, 7-8, 9; and perspectives on space, 1-2; program 

management of, 8-1 0; and review of space program, 3-4; rivalries between personnel, 9-10; and 

Saturn launch vehicle, 8, 9, 14-15; and "Urgent 

National Needs" speech, 5, 6 

National Aeronautics and Space Council: 3-4 

New York Times: 3, 16 

Nixon, Richard M.: I 

NorthAmericanAviation: 9, 10, 15-17 

Nova Launch Vehicle: 10 

Panama Canal: 1 

Phillips, Samuel C.: 8, 9, 18 

President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC): 

Ranger, Project: 7, 13-14 

Redstone Launch Vehicle: 12, 14 

Rocketdyne Division: 9 

Roosa, Stuart A.: 28, 30 

Rusk, Dean: 4 

Saturn Launch Vehicle: 8, 9, 14-15, 16 

Schirra, Walter M., Jr.: 13, 14, 26, 30 

Schmitt, Harrison H.: 29, 30 

Schriever, Bernard A.: 4 

Schweickart, Russell L.: 27, 30 

Science Magazine: 8-9 

Scott, David R.: 27, 29, 30 

Seal Beach, Calif.: 9 

Shepard, Alan B.: 3, 12, 28, 30 

Soviet Union!U.S.S.R.: 1-3 

Space Age Management: 16--17 

Sputnik: 5 

Stafford, Thomas P.: 27, 30 

State, Department of: 4, 7 

Stennis, John C., Space Center: 8 

Surveyor, Project: 7, 13-14 

Swigert, John L., Jr.: 28, 30 

Systems Command, Air Force: 4 

Thompson, Floyd L.: 16 

Titan II: 13 

"Urgent National Needs" Speech: 5, 6 

V-2: 12 

Vehicle Assembly Building: 8 

Vostok 1: 3 

Webb, James E.: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11-12, 16--17, 20 

White, Edward H., II: 13, 16, 30 

Wiesner, Jerome B.: 1-2, 5, 11-12 

Worden, Alfred M.: 29 

Young, John W.: 13, 27, 29, 30 

-114-