UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JASWINDER SINGH, Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 21-9553 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , BALDOCK , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Jaswinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA) affirming the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Exercising juri sdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petition.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 15, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 12 BACKGROUND I. Underlying Facts Mr. Singh, a Sikh, is from the Indian state of Punjab and a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal or Akali Dal Mann pa rty (the Mann party). The Aklai Dal Badal party (the Badal party) controlled the government. While Mr. Singh and another man were hanging posters for the Mann party, they were approached by four or five men who identified themse lves as members of the Badal party. The men had regular clothes on, with their faces covered. They told Mr. Singh and his companion to stop hangi ng the posters. Although the other man was able to run away, the Badal party members threw Mr. Singh to the ground and punched and kicked him. One kick came n ear his eye. He was close to passing out, but he regained his senses and some boys helped him home. He did not go to a hospital because he was afraid of the Badal pa rty. Instead he stayed for ten to twelve days with his grandmother, who treate d him with traditional remedies, including putting turmeric on some of his wounds and using hot and cold treatments. Mr. Singh did not have any br oken bones, but he experien ced pain from his injuries, including pain in his eye area. A couple of days after the attack, Mr. Singh went to a shop for some medicines for pain and trouble sleeping. He later took more pills for the pa in, but he never had any other medical treatment. At one point he also went to file a police report, but the police would not take his re port and gave him the impression that they did not care about the attack. Mr. Singh le ft India about two months af ter the beating. His wife Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 23 and parents, who remained in India, have told him that people have come to inquire about him. II. Legal Standards For asylum, a petitioner must establish he is a refugee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a person who is “unable or unwilling to return to the country of origin ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder , 666 F.3d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(42)(A)) (emphasis omitte d). “Persecution is the infliction of suffering or ha rm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive and mu st entail more than ju st restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” Ritonga v. Holder , 633 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[ P]ersecution may be inflicted by the government itself, or by a non-governmental group that the government is unwilling or unable to control.” Id. (quotations omitted). The standard for withholding of rem oval is “more stringe nt” than that for asylum. Zhi Wei Pang v. Holder , 665 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2012). “To be eligible for withholding of removal, an a pplicant must demonstrate that there is a clear probability of persecution because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social gr oup, or political opinion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[t]o be eligib le for relief under the CAT, an individual must establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 34 proposed country of removal.” Id. at 1233-34 (quotations omitted). Such torture must be by a government official or with governmental consent or acquiescence.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). III. Agency Proceedings Mr. Singh’s Notice to Appear (NTA) had not specified the date and time of his hearing, but a second notice provided that information. The immigration judge (IJ) rejected Mr. Singh’s contention that the i mmigration court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings because of the de fective NTA. He found Mr. Singh to be “a generally credible witness” and assigned “full evidentiary weight” to his testimony. Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 87. But he denied the applications for as ylum and withholding of removal, finding that the incident and in juries Mr. Singh descri bed did not rise to the level of persecution a nd did not involve government actors, placing on him the burden to show that it would be unreasonable for him to relo cate within India. The IJ further held that he had not satisfied that burden. As for the CA T, the IJ found that Mr. Singh had failed to show th e attack rose to the leve l of torture or involved a governmental official or governmental acquiescence. He also found that Mr. Singh could relocate within India to avoid fear of torture. The Board rejected Mr. Singh’s contenti on that the IJ lack ed jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings because the NTA was defective. It upheld the IJ’s findings that Mr. Singh failed to show past pe rsecution or a well-founde d fear of future persecution, holding that the attack in India did not ri se to the level of persecution; the IJ did not clearly err in finding the at tackers were private actors; and the IJ Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 45 committed no legal or clear factual error in determining that Mr . Singh could relocate within India. The Board therefore upheld the denial of asylum and withholding of removal. Further, it held that Mr. Singh had waived his CAT claims by failing to brief them on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review “Because a three-member panel issued the BIA’s opinion, we review that opinion rather than the IJ’s oral decision.” Kabba v. Mukasey , 530 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008). With rega rd to asylum and withholding of removal, we review legal questions de novo a nd findings of fact for substantial evidence. Id. And we review the denial of CAT relie f for substantial evidence. Nasrallah v. Barr , 140 S. Ct. 1683, 16 92 (2020). Under the substan tial-evidence standard, “[t]he agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). II. Notice to Appear Mr. Singh asserts that because his NTA did not specify the date and time of the hearing, the IJ lacked ju risdiction to conduct his remova l proceeding. This court, however, has held that a defective NTA doe s not present a jurisdictional issue.
See Martinez-Perez v. Barr , 947 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2020); Lopez-Munoz v.
Barr , 941 F.3d 1013, 1015-18 ( 10th Cir. 2019). One panel of this court is bound by the decisions of other panels absent an intervening Supreme Court or en banc decision. See Ting Xue v. Lynch , 846 F.3d Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 56 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017). The only potentially re levant decision that Mr. Singh identifies is Niz-Chavez v. Garland , 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021). But Niz-Chavez addressed the effect of a defective NTA on the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal, not the agency’s jurisdiction. See id. at 1478-79. We therefore cannot conclude that it overruled Martinez-Perez and Lopez-Munoz

. See, e.g. , Chery v. Garland , 16 F.4th 980, 987 (2d Cir. 2021); Ramos Rafael v. Garland , 15 F.4th 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2021). To the extent that Mr. Singh is arguing th at the agency failed to comply with a properly invoked claims-proces sing rule, he did not make that argument before the Board, see Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 34-36, and ther efore we lack jurisdiction to consider it, see Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder , 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010). III. Asylum
A. Due Process Mr. Singh first argues that the Board viol ated his right to due process because it did not adequately consider the evidence in the record. He complains that the Board referred only to certain exhibits, and he asserts that he “had a right to an analysis of the supporting documents incl uding current event articles submitted.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 14. But “a quarrel about the level of detail required in the BIA’s analysis does not implicate due process.” Birhanu v. Wilkinson , 990 F.3d 1242, 1252 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The BIA is not required to write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decisi on in terms sufficient to en able a reviewing court to Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 67 perceive that it has heard and th ought and not merely reacted.” Maatougui v. Holder , 738 F.3d 1230, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2013) (b rackets and internal quotation marks omitted). That standard was satisfied here.
B. Past Persecution Mr. Singh next argues that the Board erre d in determining the attack did not rise to the level of past persecution. Alth ough he asserts this is a question of law reviewed de novo, see Pet’r Opening Br. at 15, in this circuit past persecution is a finding of fact that is reviewed only for substantial evidence, see Ritonga , 633 F.3d at 974. This standard is restrictive: “[t] he BIA’s determination that the applicant is not eligible for asylum must be upheld if supported by reasonabl e, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Yuk v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not weigh the evidence or evaluate the witnesses’ credibility.” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). The record does not indicate that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find past persecution. As the Board recognized, Mr. Singh was beaten, which resulted in a convalescence peri od and treatment with over-the-counter medications but not in hospitalization. And the Board acknowledged the testimony of Mr. Singh’s expert witness that he suffe rs from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). But considering the attack cumulatively with the threats Mr. Singh received, the Board further cited caselaw from this co urt upholding a finding of no past persecution in circumstan ces similar to this case. See Ting Xue , 846 F.3d Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 78 at 1107; Witjaksono v. Holder , 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Ci r. 2009). Moreover, other Tenth Circuit cases also have found no pa st persecution despite petitioners’ suffering injuries from beatings, ev en repeated beatings. See Sidabutar v. Gonzales , 503 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10t h Cir. 2007); Tulengkey v. Gonzales , 425 F.3d 1277, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2005); Kapcia v. INS , 944 F.2d 702, 704-05, 708 (10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Singh argues that the Board did not pr operly consider his expert’s opinion, but this court cannot re weigh the evidence. See Yuk , 355 F.3d at 1233. He further complains that that the Board cited onl y the State Departme nt country condition reports. But there is “nothing improper in [relying] on the State Department Reports,” and they constitute substantial ev idence supporting the agency’s decision. Id. at 1235-36. And although Mr. Singh asserts that eviden ce in the record supports his position, that does not necessarily mean that the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 1236.
C. Government Actors With regard to whether his attackers were government acto rs, Mr. Singh points out that the Board cited to a ca se that is no longer good law, Matter of A-B- ( A-B- I ), 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). After the Board’s decision in this case, the Attorney General clarified A-B- I, see Matter of A-B- ( A-B- II ) , 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021), and then subsequently vacated both A-B- I and A-B- II , see Matter of
A-B- ( A-B- III ), 28 I. & N. Dec. 307, 307 (A.G . 2021). But Mr. Singh makes only bare assertions that the ove rruling requires remand; he fail s to show how it may have affected his case. No tably, the Board cited A-B- I as a “see also” cite after citing the Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 89 well-established (and unchanged) rule in this circuit that “the persecution must have been imposed by the government or by gr oups which the govern ment is unwilling or unable to control,” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Singh also disputes the IJ’s conc lusion that the attackers were “rogue elements who support the [Badal] party,” id. at 90, asserting that the IJ misinterpreted the term “miscreant” in the documentary evidence, id. at 299, as being synonymous with “rogue,” when it is not. This argum ent essentially asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the agen cy, which we will not do. See Woldemeskel v. INS , 257 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Ci r. 2001). Mr. Singh’s positi on boils down to proposing that when a member of th e same political party as th e ruling government attacks a member of a rival party, the attack must be considered to be sponsored or condoned by the government. We disagree that a reasonable adjudicator would always be compelled reach that conclusion. Mr. Singh further argues that the poli ce’s refusal to take a report from him establishes that the government condoned and perhaps aide d the attack. But again, this court’s review is for substantial evidence, not de novo, and we do not reweigh the evidence. The Board cons idered the fact that the po lice did not take Mr. Singh’s report, but was not persuade d by it. We cannot conc lude that every reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find government invol vement in these circumstances. Cf. Granada-Rubio v. Lynch , 814 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that petitioner’s te stimony that the police sometimes did not help was insufficient to support a claim th at the government acquiesced to torture). Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 910 D. Future Persecution Mr. Singh asserts that the Board improperl y failed to afford him a presumption of future persecution and to shift the burden to the government to show that relocation was reasonable. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). But the presumption of future persecution rests on a finding of past persecution, see id. , which did not exist here. Further, the finding th at his attackers were not gove rnmental actors means that he retained the burden regarding relocation. See Tulengkey , 425 F.3d at 1281. Mr. Singh further objects to the Boar d’s conclusion that he could avoid persecution by relocating within India, and th at such relocation w ould be reasonable. He equates this determination with “the idea that petitione r could abandon his adherence to the Akali Dal Mann party and his advocacy for a separate state, Khalistan,” because “relocati on outside of the Punjab w ould make it impossible for [him] to engage in his political—religious advocacy.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 26. We are not convinced, however, that reloca tion would require him to relinquish his political beliefs. The constitution of th e Mann party, which is part of the administrative record, e xplicitly provides for memb ers outside of Punjab. IV. Withholding of Removal Because Mr. Singh fails to satisfy the burden of proof for asylum, he also necessarily fails to satisfy the higher st andard for withholding of removal. See Zhi Wei Pang , 665 F.3d at 1233. Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 1011 V. Relief under the CAT Mr. Singh argues that the CAT does not re quire him to show it is impossible to avoid torture by relocating. But he did not make this ar gument before the Board.
See Admin. R. at 3 n.1 (deeming CAT issu es waived because Mr. Singh had “not meaningfully challenged [the] denial [of CAT relief]”). In the context of a CAT claim, failure to exhaust admi nistrative remedies does not di vest us of jurisdiction.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requi ring exhaustion of remedies with regard to “a final order of removal”); Nasrallah , 140 S. Ct. at 1691, 1694 (recognizing that an order denying CAT relief is not “a fi nal order of removal”). Ev en without a jurisdictional bar, however, our general rule is that we do not entertai n arguments for reversing an agency decision that are raised fo r the first time in this court. See Garcia-Carbajal , 625 F.3d at 1237. Mr. Singh gives us no reason to disregard that rule here.
CONCLUSION The petition for review is denied.

Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 11