1

The Chinese Way of War: How Has it 

Changed? 

Author: Timothy Thomas

June 2020

Sponsor: US Army Futures and 

Concepts Center

Dept. No.: P622

Contract No.: W56KGU-19-F0004

Project No.: 0720A150-MD

The views expressed in this 

document are those of the 

author and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of 

MITRE, the Department of 

Defense, or the US 

government.

Approved for Public Release, 

Distribution Unlimited. Public 

Release Case Number 20-1450.

©2020 The MITRE 

Corporation. 

All rights reserved.

McLean, VA
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Executive Summary

The title of this paper is “The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed?” The answer is 

that it has changed dramatically from what it was 20 years ago, but that does not mean that 

everything is new. There are some components of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) thinking 

(deception, stratagems, etc.) that remain as important elements of China’s way of war and they are 

being integrated into technologies. Such issues offer an overall sense of historical continuity in 

China’s approach to warfare that is based on a thought process going back thousands of years, to 

include the transcendent impact of Sun Tzu, Marx, and Mao on strategic and tactical issues. The 

number of articles and discussions in the journal China Military Science (CMS) over the past 20 

years devoted to these three men fully support this contention. On the other hand, China’s 

intelligentization of operations and focus on joint and all-domain capabilities (to include domains 

not currently under consideration in the US) create new challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI) is 

now being used to help design warfare—repeat, help design warfare—to further provide control 

over conflicts and to ensure the PLA has a future deterrent force with which to confront other 

nations.

The report notes that the PLA is examining a host of topics to support its way of war, to 

include: AI topics regarding future war; a specific Chinese method of defining strategy; the PLA’s 

continued use of historic concepts; the move from informatized to intelligentized warfare; China’s 

continued use of cyber spying and reverse engineering; the focus of “strategic directors” on the 

use of various control mechanisms; and the PLA’s focus on “designing future battlefields” in 

peacetime. Appendix Four develops the basics of the PLA’s thought process that help further 

indicate how they will fight. Other important points to keep in mind include the following: 

1. There is a continual goal of creating a strategic advantage or shi on the battlefield, 

in diplomatic relations, geostrategic settings (through considerations of numerous 

factors, such as distance attenuation, etc.), supply chains, and any area in which it 

China has an interest. A strategic advantage is the goal of any manipulation of the 

strategic environment, and it is probably the most important Chinese concept to 

keep in mind.

2. Today there may exist a slight change in focus from system-of-systems to 

combatting AI algorithms, but the system sabotage issue will continue to play an 

important role.

3. There is a higher reliance on the offensive aspect of active defense in the cyber 

age, where the first battles will establish who has attained the strategic initiative in 

war. Once the armed conflict is inevitable, no effort should be spared to strive for 

strategic initiative, one author noted. Conflict will proceed quickly once unleashed 

and involve all domains.

4. Critical infrastructure targets must be uncovered and planned in peacetime, the 

PLA notes, for special operations.

5. There is a growing focus on the use of swarm operations (wolves, wasps, and 

fish [or land, air, and sea] robotics) and their potential applicability to all domains 

of an opponent.
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6. Military strategy starts with national interests and the overall interests of war as 

the goals to pursue. Strategic fulcrums must be established in advance.

7. Strategic psychological warfare will employ numerous means to force an 

opponent to submit without a fight. Five specific types of information topics were: 

information deterrence, blockades, deception, disruption, and attacks (computer 

viruses, hacking, etc.).

8. Regarding asymmetric operations, making use of favorable temporal and spatial 

factors and the consequent environmental condition are important aspects of 

designing asymmetric battlefields.

9. There is a focus (32 articles in the journal CMS from 2013-2018) on various 

aspects of ‘civil-military integration,’ with titles addressing power projection, 

power grid advantages, economic construction, science and technology, and 

integration strategies.

10. And, as a final warning, pay attention to China’s methods to manipulate others 

with deceptive stratagems. It is easy to fall into traps the PLA lays for opponents. 

For example, “appear weak when strong” would certainly apply to the PLA’s 

current attempts to downplay its AI and quantum prowess. The country’s 2019 

Defense White Paper titled China’s National Defense in the New Era stated that 

China was only now coming out of its period of mechanization, a total fabrication 

of its current advanced competencies. 

Strategically, the reach of the PLA and other nations into another country’s infrastructure, 

independent of that nation’s distance from China, with cyber, space, or physical (ports, 5G, etc.) 

means, has increased. S&T developments can be very influential when integrated with deception 

or stratagem techniques and will influence campaigns. The intelligentization of warfare appears to 

be taking center stage, with flames being stoked in the cognitive domain to light up innovation and 

produce products that enable commanders to see and assess the battlefield condition in front of 

him before an opponent can do so and then act first. 

China will continue to probe and penetrate the infrastructure of any opponent. After all, 

China sees no difference between war and peace since confrontation and competition are consistent 

and eternal. Regarding the reigns of the past three presidents, the latest, Xi Jinping, has been the 

most creative in regard to the use of reforming the military with new S&T and implementing grand 

strategy. He has reached out across Europe and Central Asia with his Belt and Road Initiative, 

focused on expanding Chinese ports worldwide, used his close relationship with President Putin 

of Russia to gain access to the Arctic (and perhaps consequently buy more oil and gas from Russia), 

and constructed a significant infrastructure of influence (transport, communications, natural 

resource exploitation, etc.) in both Africa and Latin America. His way of war must be closely 

watched, for in addition to the development of a grand strategy and Armed Forces reform, Xi 

appears to have an insatiable appetite for natural resources and a desire to make China the most 

powerful nation on earth. Recent legislation aimed to quell dissent in Hong Kong is but one 

example. When combined with China’s historic legacy of deception and stratagem use, he will 

remain a formidable opponent for many years to come.
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Contents of the Report

China’s way of war is a topic that has been a focus of interest for centuries, both for the 

value of its military inheritance from warriors of ancient dynasties to the continued application of 

these and other military measures of contemporary Chinese origin. For example, the ancient sage 

who developed the stratagem of “loot a burning house” would be intrigued to know that the 

Chinese journal National Defense (Guofang) used the concept in 2008 to discuss how the Soviet 

Union took advantage of (looted) a weak situation in Afghanistan (the burning house, a country 

plagued at the time by political instability), to begin its occupation of that nation.1 Today, Chinese 

planners are combining technology with stratagems to continue this tradition. One author noted in 

2015 that system-of-system operational methods will be enriched with “fantastic stratagems.” 

China clearly will continue to live by the phrase “you fight in your way and we fight in ours,” and 

it is this rather unique Chinese way of conceptualizing (to include even designing!) war that is the 

focus of this analysis.

The report examines the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) way of war over the past 20 

years. This methodology only looks at military sources and ignores the diplomatic, economic, and 

other sectors that China has penetrated with similar tactics and techniques. It is divided into three

sections that coincide with the reigns of China’s last three presidents: Jiang Zemin (1993-2003); 

Hu Jintao (2003-2013); and Xi Jinping (2013-present). Jiang’s reign was an agenda setter. While 

it did not result in many innovative concepts or developments, discussions set the stage for later 

and more diverse topics. Strategy, deterrence, psychological warfare, and the use of stratagems

were particular topics of coverage, and his reign witnessed the release of the 2001 Science of 

Military Strategy. Hu’s reign is where innovation starts rolling, as it introduced several

technological concepts and achievements, such as an interest in system of systems and further 

advanced the development of information technologies. Hu’s reign also produced the 2013 book 

Science of Military Strategy. Xi’s reign has clearly been the most dynamic, interesting, and 

progressive. It has focused on restoring the “China dream” of a reformed military. Science and 

technology (S&T) advancements have been significant and these developments, such as those in 

artificial intelligence and quantum issues, were integrated into the military realm and resulted in a 

host of robotic and other capabilities. His reign has witnessed the release of a White Paper on 

Strategy. 

The discussion of each reign will include a selection over the past 20 years of appropriate 

topics (by years of Presidential reign, with only the last four years of Jiang’s reign used2

) from the 

journal China Military Science (CMS), which provides PLA officers strategic, historical, and 

numerous other subjects of military importance. The topics stressed in the journal, which is

somewhat like the US’s Joint Force Quarterly or Parameters, help point out new vectors of 

interest (war control, civil-military integration, etc.) that are relevant to the time periods “way of 

war.” Over 400 titles were perused, and those reflecting change or stability in the Chinese way of

 1 Liang Shoulei, “Loot a Burning House—Fifth of the Thirty-Six Stratagems,” Guofang, No. 7, 2008. 2 China Military Science was not available to this author before the year 1999, so for that reason Jiang’s articles are 

limited to four years. The issue number and year follow the title of the article in parenthesis, for example, issue 5 of 

2000 would be (5/2000).
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war are highlighted below. Further, each time period offers a description of “a” way to war (hightech local war, local war under information conditions, etc.). Perhaps of value are the “black 

swans” of importance that sometimes appear.3

The report contends that the Chinese way of war has changed dramatically from what it 

was 20 years ago, but that does not mean that everything is new. On the one hand, there are some 

components of PLA thinking (deception, stratagems, etc.) that remain as important today as in the 

past and they are being integrated into modern-day technologies. On the other hand, China’s 

intelligentization of operations and focus on joint and all-domain capabilities (to include domains 

not currently under consideration in the US) create new challenges. 

In addition, the report offers four Appendixes. The first offers a list of important military 

articles that appeared in CMS during the Presidency of Jiang Zemin. Appendix Two does the same 

for Hu Jintao, and Appendix Three for Xi Jinping. Appendix Four offers a comparison of Russian 

and Chinese military thought, which provides a way to consider where similarities lie in the

thought processes of the two nations. 

Introduction

True icons of early Chinese military thought include Sun Zi (Sun Tzu), Wu Qi, Sima 

Rangju, and Sun Bin (among many others). They were associated with various aspects of Chinese 

military thought, especially the development of stratagems and deceptive techniques, to achieve a 

strategic advantage or shi (this concept is the foundational principle behind almost any PLA action 

[trade, diplomacy, battlefield positions, etc.]). Much later, the accomplishments of China’s historic 

icons became the strategic bedrock of thought for important leaders of the past century in China, 

such as Zhu De, Liu Zhidan, Ren Bishi, Ye Jianying, and Su Yu, all of whom used ancient military 

thought to achieve success in battle and enhance their leadership capabilities and image. Chinese 

history, H. R. McMaster noted in regard to his travels to China as President Trump’s national 

security advisor, is used to convey their messages.4 In contemporary PLA publications, entire 

articles repeat historical episodes that relate to current affairs, whether it be strategy, indirect 

operations, or some other topic of interest. Finally, the thoughts of Karl Marx on war and the 

achievements of Mao Zedong on the battlefield continue to play prominent roles in contemporary 

Chinese publications due to the praise and support both receive from President Xi Jinping. 

These thinkers and leaders have left an impressive cultural tradition for 21st century officers 

in the PLA to follow and build on. This tradition is being further supplemented with new future 

war concepts (quantum computing, cognitive warfare, etc.) and weapons (hypersonic weaponry, 

cognitive neuroscience, terahertz technologies, etc.) that are under study in China. These new 

concepts and weapons are affecting and perhaps slightly changing the content of traditional topics 

such as People’s War, active defense, and frontier defense. Another “traditional” focus that appears 

to be changing is China’s former belief in Engels statement that “technology determines tactics.” 

The constant focus of PLA theorists on strategy indicates it may now be more correct to assert that 

 3 A black swan is understood for this report as something that comes as a surprise, uses hindsight for rationalization, 

or influences something.

4 H. R. McMaster, “How China Sees the World,” The Atlantic, May 2020, Internet edition.
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“technology determines strategy” due to the current emphasis on ways that information 

technologies (cyber incursion, for example) can capture the initiative for friendly forces at the start 

of a conflict and thereby dramatically construct immediate strategic advantages. China’s increased 

access to advanced weaponry, focus on system sabotage techniques, and reliance on different

deterrence options (space, etc.), among other issues, have sharpened the PLA’s focus on strategy 

and lessened the focus on campaigns and combat according to some, as discussed below. Concepts 

are adapting and changing. While these adaptations may not yet be locked in stone, they are playing

an important role in contemporary thought and are worth following.

Jiang Zemin Era

Jiang Zemin served as the President of China from 1993-2003. During Jiang’s Presidency 

the military took some initial steps to improve its capabilities and ensure that the regime did not 

suffer the same disintegration fate as did the Soviet Union. Traditional concepts, such as the work 

of Marx, Mao, and Sun Tzu in particular, continued to dominate the pages of journals. Views on 

strategy and geostrategy were of interest throughout Jiang’s reign. 

A 2001 comprehensive discussion of strategy in CMS noted that important components 

were planning and war guidance issues. More ominously the article stated that non-war forms of 

struggle are now only the extension of warfare actions and that the two are not different, indicating 

there was no separation between war and peace, only constant competition. Other initial thoughts 

in the CMS article included the following:

• Mao Zedong was quoted for his adherence to locating a “focal point” or “overall 

situation” principle.

• It was noted that Jiang’s “winning local wars under high-tech conditions” is the 

period’s focal point as was keeping war under “control.” Preparing for war and 

keeping its outbreak under control was a peacetime function, while controlling 

war’s expansion and restraining its escalation was its wartime function. 

• War’s outcome, according to Mao, is the result of the military, economic, 

political, and natural condition of the two sides and their war-guiding abilities. 

• The design of war depends on three issues: safeguarding national interests; 

paying attention to new forms of war; and building up new concepts 

(stratagems, asymmetries, etc.) and channels for preparing for war.5

In 2001 the book The Science of Military Strategy was released. The diagram below

describes the contents of the book in outline form.6 Of special interest are the last two entries, 

which discuss “high-tech local war” in two parts, the development of modern high-tech wars and 

strategic guidance on high-tech local war. This was, at the time, the type of war for which China 

was prepared to fight. 

 5 Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi, “The Generalization, Conservation, and Development of ‘Strategy’,” China Military 

Science, No. 4 2001, pp. 120-127. 6 This diagram is this author’s conceptual understanding of strategy, constructed based on the book’s outline.
7

High-tech warfare thus became a very popular topic and was discussed in 21 articles in 

CMS from 1999-2003. Most likely there were many more at the beginning of Jiang’s reign. The 

most significant titles (as they appeared in the English table of contents of CMS) of the 21 are 

listed below (the entire list is at Appendix One): 

• Furthering the Study of the Features and Laws of High-Tech Local War and 

Improving Guidance in Winning High-Tech Local War (1/1999)

• On Features and Laws of Local War under High-Tch Conditions (1/1999)

• Views on Early Warning in High-Tech Local War (1/1999)

• Views on Problems of Preparations of High-Tech Local War (1/1999)

• Prompt Decision-An Important Principle of War Guidance in High-Tech Local 

War (1/1999)

• On Psychological Warfare in Recent High-Tech Local Wars (6/2000)

• Science and Technology: The First Decisive Factor in High-Tech Local Wars 

(6/2000)

• Main Issues of Defense of Logistics in Regional Wars under High-Tech

Conditions (1/2001)
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• Understanding the Fundamentals Affecting the Outcome of High-Tech Local 

Wars (3/2001)

When the total number of 21 articles are contrasted against the one article on People’s War and 

the three articles on active defense over the same time period, the implication is that the PLA’s 

focus had switched from non-conflict traditional themes to “how” to win a contemporary conflict.

PLA strategy expert Li Bingyan wrote an important article on an important ingredient of 

winning contemporary conflicts, one that had been ignored in the past. He wrote that the PLA’s 

historical focus on stratagems failed to integrate them into technology. Instead, China’s cultural 

heritage of trickery and lack of emphasis on science and technology stood in the way of progress. 

Li stated that China must “boldly collect cultural genes from Western military science and its 

emphasis on technology. We should make traditional strategy merge with modern science and 

technology and scientific methods, to restore the original intent of ‘Sun Tzu strategy.’”7

Written in 2002, Li and other PLA strategists were reacting to the perception that China 

was behind in the revolution in military affairs, which was under serious study in China at the 

time. Li paraphrased Engels as noting that warfare evolves due to the development of weapons 

and equipment, which determine changes in the forms of combat, a change that China was not 

following as closely as the West. Chinese strategists in the past felt war was simply a battle of wits 

(therefore the focus on trickery through the years) and not a contest of force. Li was out to change 

that, and his focus on combining stratagems with technology is apparent today in the work of 

leading theorists. For example, another China Military Science article a year later, in support of 

Li’s notion, stated that the PLA needed to change its main operating means from using quantitative 

superiority to “using stratagems and technical means to win victories.”8 Stratagems must progress 

along with the times, and if the PLA cannot combine stratagems with high-tech weapons then it 

will be hard to win victories in military struggles.9

Another important article answered many questions about how China views grand strategy

and perhaps the logic behind how and why decisions are made today. In 2002 author Wu Chunqiu, 

in his CMS article “Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy: A Chinese View,” wrote that, 

officially at the time, China had never used the term “grand strategy.” It had been, however, used 

in Chinese academic circles, according to Wu, since the 1980s. Academicians considered grand 

strategy as a system of knowledge, a special mode of thought for decision-makers, like national 

strategic management. Grand strategy included all elements of “comprehensive national strength” 

and was described as a combination of national security and national development, applicable to 

wartime or peacetime and a guide to domestic policy and foreign affairs. It was the overall strategy 

of the state and thus above military strategy. The concept of grand strategy may even influence the 

 7 Li Bingyan, “Emphasis on Strategy: Demonstration of Oriental Military Culture,” China Military Science, No. 5 

2002, pp. 80-85. 8 Niu Li and Wu Jifeng, “On the New Concepts of Chinese Military Strategy in the 21st Century,” China Military 

Science, No. 2 2003, pp. 85-90. 9 Ibid.
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decision-making criteria behind why China may have purchased the Panama Canal, why it 

establishes ports and telecommunication links worldwide, and why it has instituted the Belt and 

Road Initiative. 

Wu then went on to make the important point that strategy is made up of objective reality 

and subjective initiative at a high level.10 The essence of strategy was defined in the following 

way:

By objective reality we mean the objective world [the strategic environment] which 

exists independently of man’s will and has its own law of development. By 

subjective initiative [a leaders use of stratagems, etc.] we mean man’s ability to 

comprehend the objective world and consciously transform it to achieve certain 

purposes. The two constitute the unity of opposites. Fundamentally speaking 

objective reality as material base is first and primary, whereas subjective initiative 

is secondary but the most active of the two.

11

If subjective initiative was the lone way to make strategy it would indicate that man’s “will”

decides everything. If objective reality were the lone way to make strategy, leaders would become 

fatalists. It is only when the two are considered together that strategy is understandable,12 when

objective reality is the strategic environment before planners and subjective initiative is the ability 

of leaders to think and manipulate the environment to one’s benefit (of interest is that a few years 

later a PLA text defined military strategy in the same way, as described during Hu’s reign).

The subjective initiative of a grand strategic plan, therefore, must agree with the relative 

stability of objective reality. If the latter experiences a partial or even a fundamental qualitative 

change, then the initial objective reality under consideration will have to be replaced with a new 

one so that the correct subjective initiative can be applied against it. The director of grand strategy 

must understand such information feedback from reality and have a strong sense of strategic 

opportunity or foresight that can be exploited.13 

Wu also listed what he described as the basic principles of grand strategy, for which at the 

time there was no consensus. They were the overall situation (of which the principle of systems 

was the most critical point in studying grand strategy); the goal of serving politics; the use of 

comprehensive national strength (CNS, the most important content of grand strategy, an estimation 

of a country’s strength based on the economy, education, science and technology, defense, and so 

on); strategic focal points (where basic interests of a party lies); use of winning victory without 

war (creating favorable conditions); the unity of goals and means (the use of CNS and the policies, 

ways, methods, approaches and other elements for employing and developing CNS); and the use 

 10 Wu Chunqiu, “Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy: A Chinese View,” China Military Science, No. 3 2002, 

pp. 144-145. 11 Ibid., p. 146. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
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of relative stability. In the latter case, unstable factors usually exist, which subjective initiatives 

must address.

14

Wu added that right and wrong directions can be considered when deciding about one’s 

objective reality. Japan (after World War II), Switzerland, Israel, and Singapore successfully

understood their strategic environment and adapted accordingly (Japan slowly emerged on the 

world market while emphasizing trade and education and benefiting from US protection;

Switzerland used tourism, technical prowess, and the concept of everyone a soldier to maintain 

stability, etc.) whereas Gorbachev did not understand his strategic environment and it resulted in 

the collapse of the Soviet Union.

With strategy in mind, it is instructive to see what was written about geostrategy during 

Jiang’s reign, as it was even the focus of one CMS issue’s “subject discussion” section of the 

journal. Six articles were listed in that publication:

• Post-Cold War World Geostrategic Changes and China’s Geostrategy 

(4/2000)

• Two Shifts of Focus in 20th Century World Geopolitics and a Look into 21st

Century World Geostrategic Patterns (4/2000)

• The Development and Future Trend in Post-Cold War Geostrategic 

Relations (4/2000)

• Post-Cold War World Geostrategic Situation and China’s Geostrategic 

Choices (4/2000)

• Views on China’s Geostrategic Environment (4/2000)

• US Geostrategic Thinking and Its Effect on US Military Strategic Decisions 

(4/2000)

• Interpreting Geostrategy by Historical Materialism (6/2000)

Due to the emphasis in Jiang’s period on local war under high-tech conditions, it is 

important to examine at least one article of the period in which a local war was under discussion. 

In 2002 one such article was titled “Chinese Modern Local War and US Limited War: A 

Comparative Study” (2/2002). It was noted that “local” describes the status of a war, relative to 

the “whole” war. Modern local war is based on the changing contemporary international political 

order and the tension between war and peace. Deng Xiaoping decided that the inevitability of a 

large war between the US and the USSR had lost importance and that forces of peace were stronger 

than for war. This change shifted the focus of military strategy toward countering possible local 

wars and military conflicts.15

 14 Ibid., pp. 148-153. 15 Chen Zhou, “Chinese Modern Local War and US Limited War: A Comparative Study,” China Military Science, 

No. 2 2002, pp. 146, 150.
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The author added that modern local war is a defensive strategic theory, aimed at defending 

the national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests of China. He noted:

Of course, defense in Chinese modern local war theory is an active, not a passive 

defense, one that includes both counterattack and attack. Our strategic principle of 

‘striking only after the enemy has struck’ certainly does not exclude sudden ‘first 

strikes’ in campaign battles or counterattacks in self-defense into enemy territory.16

Modern local war is based on People’s War and defeating a superior enemy with inferior 

equipment, the author added. The concepts flexible forms go along with its adherence to 

independence and autonomy.17 Distinctions in the theory of modern limited war include the 

following: it emphasizes a People’s War using inferior equipment to defeat superior equipment; it 

stands for independence from political or military groups; and it adheres to the flexible strategy 

and tactics of Mao in that “you fight your battles, and I’ll fight mine.”18 The article ended with 

several things that China needs to do: stick to traditional combat forms of mobile, positional, and 

guerrilla war; insist on the basic guiding ideology of war annihilation, emphasizing under certain 

circumstances it may be required to rout an opponent or conduct wars of attrition; strive for quick 

victory, while being prepared for protracted war; and make active war preparations.19

Hu Jintao Era

Hu Jintao was General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 2002-15 

November 2012. He stepped down as President of China on 14 March 2013. As during the reign 

of Jiang Zemin, numerous traditional concepts, such as the works of Marx, Mao, and Sun Tzu in 

particular, continued to appear on the pages of CMS. The focus of the Jiang era on local war under 

high-tech conditions changed under Hu (high-tech was used only three times in a title), replaced

with the concept of local wars under informationized conditions. That concept was listed as titles 

of articles, however, only three times. They were “On Air Superiority in Local Wars under 

Information Conditions” (4/2009), “On Main Operational Forms of Local Warfare under 

Informationized Conditions” (2/2010), and “Accomplishing Diversified Military Tasks with 

Winning Local Wars under Informationized Conditions as the Core” (6/2011). But the term 

“information” was used some 102 times in CMS titles during the period 2004-2012.

20 

The 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy (hereafter SMS) was researched and 

written during Hu’s reign but published only in late 2013 (the writing team signed the preface to 

this version on 24 September 2013). It contained a separate chapter on “local wars under 

informationized conditions.” Other sections of this chapter were to control the goals of war; 

conduct integrated joint operations; persist in asymmetric operations, seize the initiative in war, 

 16 Ibid., p. 152. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., p. 154. 19 Ibid., p. 155. 20 The information term, or on occasion the terms “soft power” or “network warfare,” was used 12 times on 2004, 18 

times in 2005, 7 times in 2006, 8 times in 2007, 11 times in 2008, 9 times in 2009, 11 times in 2010, 14 times in 

20111, and 12 time in 2012.
12

and appropriately conclude war. Several important topics of the 2013 edition were the transition 

from territorial to the forward edge defense model under informationized conditions and the focus 

on the system of systems topic with Chinese characteristics. The diagram below [proposed by this 

author] of the book’s chapters is offered here.

The 2013 Science of Military Strategy did not utilize the same template as the 2001 

publication. The latter broke that publication into basic and applied sections [thus, the 2013 

breakdown in the diagram above is this author’s interpretation, not that of the book’s authors]. The 

2013 book’s preface indicated that four parts make up the most recent book, those being basic 

theory, circumstance analysis, strength application, and strength building. The book did not 

indicate which chapters fell in which parts. Changes in the world’s science and technology sphere 

caused this “new look” at the strategic environment, resulting in the development of new ways to 

conduct conflict.21

The 2013 SMS publication noted that strategy is “the planning and guidance of the overall 

situation of the armed forces building and use, centered on war.”22 Two pages later it was noted 

that strategic guidance takes the overall situation under consideration when preparing for war, and 

it “fully brings into play the dynamic role of strategic guidance, so that subjective guidance 

corresponds to objective reality,” which relates to Wu’s definition of grand strategy in the Jiang 

era. It was stated that it is impossible to hope that subjective judgement will always completely 

correspond to objective reality. This situation implies that only by grasping contradictions and 

changes in conditions can judgments be made that largely correspond to objective conditions.

The comments about objective reality and subjective guidance in the 2013 SMS were 

discussed earlier during Hu’s reign in the National Defense University 2007 book The Theory of 

 21 Sun Zhaoli, copy editor, The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlue Xue, hereafter SMS), 2013 edition (2013 

Nianban), Academy of Military Science, Military Strategy Studies Department, pp. 1-2. 22 Ibid., p. 4.
13

Military Strategy. There it was noted that “Military strategy consists of planning and guidance for 

the situation of military struggles as a whole; it means taking an objective approach with subjective 

matters.”23 The paragraph in which this definition was located then states that objectivity refers to 

the strategic environment, that is, “the basic international and domestic situation in the areas of 

politics, economics, military affairs, science and technology, and geography”24 as well as the 

situation shaped by trends and experiences in war and peace. The relationship between the 

strategic environment and military strategy, the authors note, is a relationship between objective 

reality and subjective guidance.25 Thus the definition of grand strategy from Wu closely aligns 

with both the 2007 definition and with information offered in the 2013 SMS document.

Grasping contradictions and changes in conditions was the focus of one of the most 

important CMS articles of the Hu reign, that being “On the Change in the Relationship between 

Strategy and Campaign-Combat Operations in Modern War (4/2008).” The article, the real 

initial “black swan” of importance, made the following important contributions to the 

understanding that changes in the strategic environment were directing the PLA’s way of war:

• There is a new change in the relationship among strategy, campaigns, and 

combat. Strategy now is in the lead, consuming the other two who have lost 

their independence in organizing and implementing operations. Now, the 

highest military and political leaders can interfere with operations on the 

battlefield. Strategy has become the stratagem for directing local war under 

informatization conditions.

• War goals in the information era have expanded beyond military factors, and 

now include shaking, isolating, limiting, striking, and paralyzing an opponent’s 

political core, seeking to force an opponent into giving in politically.

• The intellectual economic era has made mastering science, technology, and 

knowledge more important than plundering resources as in the past. 

Information technology makes it more convenient to put wars under control, to 

scout and detect important strategic targets and destroy them from long 

distance.

• Strategic guidance needs to be enhanced and the integration of joint operations 

needs to be reinforced as strategy consumes campaigns and combat. The 

structure of services and arms needs to be adjusted. 

• The ‘assassin’s mace’ of long-distance precision strikes must be focused on 

hitting vital points, quickly reaching strategic goals, and wrecking an 

opponent’s will to resist. 

• Priority must be given to light weapons and to increasing the mobility and the 

strategic projection of the capabilities of operational platforms.

• Sensing and detection, navigational positioning, intelligent computing, and data 

transfers must be integrated to expedite the development of comprehensive 

 23 Fan Zheng Jiang and Ma Bao An, The Theory of Military Strategy, National Defense University Publishing 

House, 2007, p. 59. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.
14

operational platforms incorporating target captures, mobile strikes, and the 

efficient evaluation of information transfer capabilities.26

This article implies without saying in no uncertain terms that Engels’s concept that technology 

determines tactics has been superseded with the concept of “technology now determines 

strategy.”

An aspect of Chinese strategy mentioned in Chinese publications is the use of acupuncture 

war or hitting vital points of an opponent’s force. The article above clarified that the destruction 

of focal or vital points can affect a situation. These vital points were defined further in the 2013 

SMS as strategic command, strategic strengths, and strategic support, and where the weak links in 

systems exist. Important nodes include those in information network space, centers of strategic 

command and major directions of operations, crucial operational platforms, and areas of strategic 

support.27 These, it would seem, are the targets of Hu’s informationized warfare.

Understanding new trends and making new forecasts of future struggles ensures that the 

PLA will not passively adapt to future warfare but will actively design it and provide support for 

innovating and drafting military strategy.28 The objective process must study military matters from 

the angle of “uncovering what things that are inevitable, what have cause and effect, and what 

have patterns.”29 This enables friendly forces to create situations instead of allowing an opponent 

to determine where and when a clash might occur.30 Finally, it seems that the authors of the 2013 

SMS believed that informationization would continue into the near future, as they noted:

For a period of time in the future, the state of informationized warfare will become 

increasingly mature and, as regards military strategy, it will need to organically 

combine innovations in science and technology, innovations in combat methods, 

and innovations in the military’s organizational system, as it strives to find the path 

to victory in future wars.31

There were other CMS articles of importance in the Hu era. Summarized below are five 

such articles: war control situations in informationized war; informationized warfare fighting 

styles; and strategic psychological warfare under informationized conditions. Two articles, one on 

strategic deterrence (which also had a separate chapter in the 2013 SMS) and a second article on 

war control, were special topics of the Academy of Military Science (no specific author listed) and 

are also summarized here. 

The authors of “On the Art of Controlling War Situations in Informatized Warfare” 

noted that such control is different from the use of arms control, crisis situations, and other types 

 26 Cui Yafeng, “On the Change in the Relationship between Strategy and Campaign-Combat Operations in Modern 

War,” China Military Science, No. 4 2008, pp. 27-37. 27 SMS, p. 10. 28 Ibid., pp. 23-27. 29 Ibid., p. 19. 30 Ibid., p. 22. 31 Ibid., p. 17.
15

of control designed to deter war’s outbreak. War control is guided by what the PLA refers to as a 

“war director,” which would be the leader offering subjective guidance to the war effort. The 

concept is defined in the following manner:

The art of controlling war situations refers to the supple and superior skills as well 

as creative ways and methods revealed in the war director’s use of various kinds of 

means, primarily military means, to master and control the whole war situation or 

a series of engagements in a certain war theater in order to form a certain kind of 

expected state of the battlefield and military situation in a war.32

Reconnaissance assets, precision-guided and non-lethal weaponry, and “soft kill” capabilities are 

conditions that enable effectiveness. Their use is part of the subjective effort of the war directors’ 

flexible use of the art of controlling war situations. At times, the war director’s control can be 

delegated to subordinates in complicated situations. War control helps remove the uncertainty of 

war to some extent as objective conditions change. This also requires the war director’s use of 

stratagems, described as the method of using weapons and as a trump card in the PLA’s arsenal.33

In the opening stages of war, the authors note it is important to focus on fighting well but 

to place equal emphasis on psychological deterrence, as combining the two helps control war 

situations. This can enable victory with minimal fighting. War directors must ensure military and 

political consistency both before and during war. Original military objectives may be modified in 

the event of dramatic changes in the war’s political situation. Control can be attained through 

seizing information dominance, thereby winning the initiative on the battlefield. In fact, to seize 

the initiative, the art of war control in the opening stages of conflict requires active offense. 

Otherwise forces will get trapped in a passive position where counter-attack options would be 

limited.34

This capability relies on the support of networked C4ISR systems to create advantageous 

asymmetric information dominance and is equal in importance with past advantages, such as fire 

power superiority. Information dominance, the authors add, is the center of gravity for a war 

director’s plans to control war situations. Informatized warfare requires the use of military 

operations and non-military means such as political struggles, trade embargoes, diplomatic 

struggles and the active shaping of international public opinion. Informatized warfare is a system 

of systems confrontation, where the focus must be on an opponent’s critical links and 

vulnerabilities. The center of gravity for military strikes should be targets such as battlefield 

detection and reconnaissance systems, command control systems, high technology weapon 

systems, rear support systems, critical transport hubs, industries and energy bases supporting the 

national economy and war potential, and other critical and vulnerable targets. Ending informatized 

 32 Zhang Yu, Liu Sihai, and Xia Chengxiao, “On the Art of Controlling War Situations in Informatized Warfare,” 

China Military Science, No. 2 2010, pp. 24-31. 33 Ibid. Of interest is that the authors use the objective-subjective process. They note that “to close the quantitative 

and qualitative gap with the enemy on objective conditions, we must, on subjective guidance, proceed ...and create 

conditions for turning around the war situation and ultimately defeating the enemy.” Creating conditions implies the 

use of stratagems, asymmetric methods, and so on.

34 Ibid.
16

wars requires bringing the war back on a political track, requiring a combination of fighting and 

negotiations to end war. For war directors, this should be based on whether objectives have been 

achieved and whether the battlefield situation is favorable.

35

In the article “An Analysis of Fighting Styles in Informationized Warfare,” it was stated

that changes to the strategic environment were brought on by network technologies, artificial 

intelligence, new material technologies, and precision guidance technologies. Still, the fact 

remains that fighting styles are influenced using initiative, discipline, willpower, and innovation, 

that is, man is still in the background guiding and controlling things. Man does that with nonlinear, non-contact, and asymmetric forms of combat using the features of informationized 

warfare, such as those that make the battlefield more transparent. When facing an opponent with 

superior weapons, the use of these assets (asymmetry, etc.) help offset such inferiority. Such a 

fighting style uses science and resource agility to control the initiative and to find new ways to win 

in a system on system confrontation.36

War is becoming a contest of time and speed, where fighting style is reflected in combat 

efficiency and thinking. It becomes necessary to step back and view the difference between limited 

situations and the overall situation. Only in this way can the overall interest of the state be 

guaranteed. Properly training the force for such confrontations is now not only necessary but 

required. Creating war-fighting environments in war games is important, as it ties testing to the 

capabilities needed to win informationized wars.37 

Regarding asymmetric thought, the concept figures often into PLA considerations. One 

2007 article, “Asymmetric Factors in Asymmetric Operations,” divided asymmetry into four factors 

that are constantly developing and changing. First is the strength factor, which has two aspects, 

“being stronger or weaker” in terms of quantity and ‘being stronger or weaker” in terms of quality. 

The second factor, time, offers ways to overcome unfavorable conditions created by the other 

factors. Time enables wins by techniques such as “forestalling the enemy,” which stresses a 

protracted tendency, and “taking preemptive actions,” which favors winning as quickly as possible. 

Space is the third factor, which this article qualified as a contest between tangible domains (land, 

sea, air, outer space) and intangible domains (electromagnetic and psychological warfare). Outer 

space and three-dimensional space were other areas where the quest for asymmetric superiority 

has now been extended. Finally, there is the battle method factor, which was designated as the 

most active factor. It utilizes the “adept employment of stratagems” in operational command, 

where the ultimate objective is to make the best use of one’s favorable conditions and expose 

unfavorable conditions of an adversary. This is the factor that “brings about full energy release of 

 35 Ibid. Of interest is that in the comments section of the article it was noted that the paper failed to convince readers 

that the plan was workable, since inadvertent escalation and studies on difficulties in ending war were not 

mentioned. The focus on an increasingly offensive posture was stated to be a hint at the need for reinterpretation of 

“post-emptive moves,” or active defense. 36 Shi Daoxiang, Wang Junxue, Li Qu, et. al, “An Analysis of Fighting Styles in Informationized Warfare,” China 

Military Science, No. 2 2011, pp. 9-12. 37 Ibid.
17

the strength factor, the time factor, and the space factor” with battle methods such as decapitation 

warfare, structure paralyzing warfare, and nodal-point sabotage warfare.38

In the article “Important Issues Covering Strategic Psychological Warfare (SPW)

under Informationized Conditions,” it was noted that the concept is playing a role in a nation’s 

international, domestic, and military strategy. It will aim to force an enemy to submit without a 

fight based on the use of preemptive attacks that indicate strength and influence designed to 

overpower an opponent mentally. Political, economic, military, diplomatic, technical, and cultural 

channels can be used to demonstrate China’s comprehensive national strength. The combination 

of destruction and soft influence may be used together. Destruction involves attacks on centers of 

gravity and vital points of an enemy’s strength, while soft influence relies on collecting, 

processing, and controlling capabilities to attack or disturb the attitudes and behavior of 

opponents.39

Of special interest were five types of SPW, all of which are based on using information 

systems or media influence to affect the psyche of citizens and leaders. The first, information 

deterrence, uses political, military, and economic superiority to deliver accurately, effectively, and 

sufficiently information about one’s superiority over the enemy side, making an opponent scared 

and unsure of war’s outcome. The use of war games, weapon exhibitions, and public weapon 

development plans are, in a certain sense, a form of a psychological deterrence strategy. The 

second, information blockades, uses information superiority to cut off an adversary’s information 

sources and place an adversary in the dark and at a loss to take any effective countermeasures, 

making them feel helpless, nervous, and panic-stricken. The third, information deception, spreads 

false information and disrupts an adversary’s awareness, causing confusion, hesitation, and 

misgivings. The fourth, information disruption, causes congestion and confusion through the 

interruption of information circulation channels via jamming and the disruption of information 

systems. Finally, the use of computer viruses, logic bombs, and hacking techniques can disrupt, 

destroy, or attack information networks and cause harm to people’s psychology due to a hacker’s 

ability to cause financial or other crises.40

Psychological warfare armaments have advanced, the article notes, and includes ways that 

high-tech equipment (for example, unmanned aerial vehicles distributing leaflets, audio leaflets, 

etc.) can conduct soft warfare today. Computer viruses, stealth technologies, satellite television, 

and the use of operational platforms with high mobility have the capability to neutralize the other 

sides use of information through jamming, deception, and other means. Finally, it was noted that 

the destruction component of psychological operations was advanced with laser, microwave, 

particle beam, and dynamic energy weapons that can indirectly affect the war process due to the 

cognitive impact of their killing power. SPW requires the integrated participation of both military 

and civilian expertise. Informationized warfare has blurred the line between war and peace and 

 38 Xian Hongxing, Xie Pingwen, and Zhao Rongchun, “Asymmetric Factors in Asymmetric Operations,” National 

Defense News, 20 December 2007. 39 Chang Yan’e and Ou Lishou, “Important Issues Covering Strategic Psychological Warfare under Informationized 

Conditions,” China Military Science, No. 3 2005, pp. 77-83. 40 Ibid.
18

encouraged the so-called “civilianization” of war, resulting in the recruitment of society’s 

information experts to reinforce SPW forces.41

As noted above, there were two articles on topics directed by the Academy of Military 

Science that did not list authors. They were on strategic deterrence and war control, two topics 

which have already figured in the discussion above. In the article “Strategic Deterrence” 

deterrence was defined in the following manner:

What is termed deterrence is the military conduct of a state or a political group in 

displaying force or showing the determination to use force to compel the enemy to 

submit to one’s volition and to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating the 

hostility. As part of military strategy, strategic deterrence refers to strategic 

behavior performed for deterrence on the overall strategic situation.42

The objective of strategic deterrence is to contain war’s outbreak or limit its scope and escalation, 

with a strategic objective of using non-fighting means or fighting only a small war. This requires 

an adequate strategic force (military strength, economic strength, scientific and technological 

strength, etc.); the determination and volition to employ a strategic deterrent force, an objective 

material reality; and transmitting these two points to an opponent and making him believe them.43 

Strategic deterrence in peacetime revolves around the containment of war using military, 

political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic means. The goal when war becomes imminent is to 

strive to gain the initiative, so that an initial favorable military posture is created. In wartime, 

strategic deterrence focuses on demonstrating to an opponent his perilous position. The article 

noted that in a local war, for example, a “surgical operation” strike would demonstrate the 

employment of strategic deterrence. An offensive deterrent strategy compels an opponent to give 

up, while a defensive deterrent strategy demonstrates to an opponent that his attack may fail or 

lead to losses outweighing gains. It was noted that the role of China’s strategic deterrence concept 

is to deter foreign invasion; defend the nation’s rights, interests, and sovereignty; and deter 

conspiracies of internal or external rivals.44

Types of deterrence are nuclear, conventional, space, and information. The focus here is 

on the latter two. Space forces and weaponry serve as deterrents. They can serve as offensive 

weapons systems, offer high security communication support for the requirements of command, 

coordination, intelligence, and communication, and provide real-time navigation. With such 

capabilities it can bring the effects of shock and awe to an opponent. Its methods are flexible and 

can utilize interference, disruption, and destruction, restrained only by space law and regulations 

and international opinion. 

Information deterrence includes the disruptive effects and features of permeability, 

ambiguousness, and diversity. The permeability factor, for example, means that it is transmissible, 

 41 Ibid. 42 AMS Research Group of Strategic Science, “Strategic Deterrence,” China Military Science, No. 5 2004, p. 143. 43 Ibid., pp. 143-145. 44 Ibid., pp. 145-147.
19

shareable, and can thus permeate both military and civilian (to include social) fields. Information 

can, however, have unreliable results that include deterring oneself as well as an opponent through 

unexpected consequences. 

China intends to use these types of deterrence to develop an integrated strategic deterrence 

concept with comprehensive national power as its base, conventional forces as the mainstay, 

nuclear forces as conventional force’s backup, and the reserve force as support. The article stated 

that, in summing up, there are three deterrent postures to utilize: “creating momentum by military 

preparation,” “demonstrating momentum by showing the disposition of strength to the enemy,” 

and “augmenting momentum by military strike.”45 Deterrence decisions must be made cautiously 

since China and its opponents can use stratagems and tricks that might not be clearly obvious. This 

requires leaders to possess the talent and ability to use them and to uncover them when opponents 

employ them. Strategic deterrence operations must be directed against an opponent’s defects and 

give play to one’s own strength while concealing one’s weakness. Understanding an opponent’s 

mentality is important along with the risks he might take. A nation’s objective must be highlighted

to force an opponent to give something up, to demand his action be restrained, or to press him to 

take other activities. Multiple deterrent means (diplomatic, economic, science and technology, 

etc.) should be integrated and complement each other. Leaders should focus on grasping the 

initiative throughout a struggle and on changing the opponent’s psychology if possible and offering

compromise and concession when needed. In the end, due to the difficulty of predicting an 

opponent’s response, “one should examine the worst and the toughest scenarios and be well 

prepared in advance, so as to steadily and effectively cope with the opponent in case of the failure 

of deterrence.”46

The article “War Control” defined the term as the war conductor’s behavior to limit and 

consciously restrain the occurrence, development, intensity, and outcome of a war. The article was 

divided into four parts: arms control, crisis control, armed conflict control, and strategic guidance 

control. 

Regarding arms control, five features were listed, which were its political nature, indirect 

violence nature (use of military strength with peaceful means), limited effect, balance of interest 

and strength, and relevance. One important issue was the strategic conductors (a term used to 

reference those in charge of war control, which may be the same as the before mentioned war 

director) use of military strength to “influence an opponent’s cognition and information system 

and even to change the will and action of an opponent, and thereby to realize the expected strategic 

objective.”47 The objectives of arms control were stated to be adjusting strategic relations among 

nations, adjusting the scale, speed, and level of arms development, and restraining the growth of 

“war inducing” factors. They can be affected by new weapons technology, an assessment of 

strategic stability, and the evolving international and political situations. Verification of arms 

control agreements take three forms: desk control (reconnaissance from common intelligence 

devices); national technical reconnaissance, such as satellites; and on the spot inspections. Vertical 

 45 Ibid., pp. 148-151. 46 Ibid., pp. 152-156. 47 AMS Research Group of Strategic Science, “War Control,” China Military Science, No. 6 2005, pp. 129-130.
20

arms control involves reducing the scope of military potential, while horizontal arms control 

involves limiting their proliferation. Specific aspects of arms control involve prohibiting some 

weapon systems, limiting quantities or qualities of some weapons, ensuring non-proliferation, 

limiting some geographical locations (outer space, seabed, etc.), and using confidence building 

measures (direct communication lines, air and ground observations, exchanging military missions, 

etc.).48

Regarding crisis control, the term refers to dangers which could result in confrontation or 

conflict among nations. They are usually caused by contradictions among or between nations and 

by lopsided military balances. Crises can be controlled by confidence-building measures, increased 

transparency, enhanced personnel exchanges and contacts, joint disarmament or arms control 

initiatives, and the establishment of “supervision organizations.” If these measures fail, then 

negotiations are the final chance for preventing the crisis from spilling over into conflict. In the 

end, China’s fundamental and long-term interests must be followed, communication must be 

continuous, compromise appropriate for the situation, and specific coercive measures should be 

implemented for crisis containment (weapon embargos, economic sanctions, military blockades, 

etc.). In conclusion, it was stated that dialogue is better than confrontation, political settlement is 

better than settlement by force, and preventive control is better than coercive ones.49

Regarding armed conflict control, items a strategic conductor must contend with are the 

aim, means, targets, methods, duration, and space of the conflict. The aim should be restrained by 

political aims and by the norms of the United Nations Charter. Means should be focused on 

minimizing casualties and material damage and targets should be based on the law of war. Damage

should be limited to the natural environment and issues to be avoided are the indiscriminate 

bombing of cities, industrial centers, and so on, and the scope of the battlefield should be limited

due to the increased space of modern war. Strategic conductors should constantly be on high alert 

and prepared for unexpected incidents, which implies the use of strategic intelligence collection 

assets to look for indications of any potential outbreak of conflict.50 Of particular interest was the 

following statement which indicates the more likely offensive use in armed conflict control of 

“active defense,” a statement made 15 years ago:

Once the armed conflict is inevitable, no effort should be spared to strive for 

strategic initiative. As armed conflict is a struggle pattern much limited by the time 

factor, a quick decision is the key to taking the strategic initiative. When conflict 

occurs, the side that acts quickly often seizes the opportune moment to act swiftly 

and compels the opponent to submit before he has enough time to react.51

Finally, there were thoughts on strategic guidance. It was noted that strategic conductors 

must “give full play to subjective initiative.” War control will be based on national interests, and 

these interests will determine the degree of military strength and selection of war means to be used 

 48 Ibid., pp. 130-132. 49 Ibid., pp. 133-137. 50 Ibid., pp. 137-138. 51 Ibid., p. 139.
21

as appropriate to the needs of the moment. With objectives and means in mind, the strategic 

conductor can control the tempo and intensity of a war. However, war control is also closely related 

to a nation’s national comprehensive power, that is, the strength of its economy and the other 

necessary factors (adequate science and technology capability, industrial capacity, etc.) that allow 

a nation to support conflict in a capable manner. Strategic conductors must comprehensively 

employ the military and non-military means at their disposal to carry out war control. Naturally, 

the person used to demonstrate capability in this area was Mao Zedong.52

Xi Jinping Era

Xi Jinping has served as the General Secretary of China from 2012 to the present time and 

as President since the fall of 2013. Under his reign China has reemerged as a powerful nation in 

both an economic and military sense. He has worked closely with President Vladimir Putin of 

Russia and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, pushed his Belt and Road Initiative 

across Central Asia, and increased China’s presence in Africa and South America. He supported 

Italy with doctors and equipment during the Coronavirus outbreak in that nation and was one of 

the first to respond to disaster-stricken areas of the Caribbean during hurricane season. In a 

geostrategic sense he has developed a series of Chinese ports that offer presence and influence on 

many continents, not to mention China’s growing list of military facilities on the reefs of the South 

China Sea.

From a strictly military planning focus, while Jiang’s focus was local war under high-tech 

conditions and Hu’s was local war under informationized conditions, Xi’s team of experts offered 

a focus somewhat like Hu’s, namely “winning informatized local wars.” This indicated that the 

concept of informatized war was playing a prominent role in PLA preparations for conflict under 

Xi, whereas under Hu it was a “condition.” In the analysis that follows, the Xi era’s important 

2015 White Paper on China’s military strategy will be examined first. It is followed by an article 

in CMS that, in this author’s opinion, outlined the strategic concepts that will influence the PLA’s 

way of war beyond the concepts expressed in the White Paper. Finally, there are descriptions of 

China’s development of informatized war and artificial intelligence, quantum surprises on the 

battlefield, use of drones, and other topics. More importantly the discussion causes one to ask if 

Xi’s “winning informatized wars” slogan has metamorphosized into “preparing for and winning 

AI- and intelligentized-enhanced battles” based on these new S&T developments.

The 2015 White Paper on military strategy is a public document and most likely includes

some external propaganda intended to shape the opinion of international observers. The document 

initially noted that there was a change in the balance of power worldwide, in the Asia-Pacific 

geostrategic landscape, and in the international economic, scientific, technological, and military 

fields. When discussing the theory of active defense, the White Paper began offering hints that it 

was more likely to become an offensive theory due to changes in weaponry and the importance of

gaining the initiative in order to succeed in future conflicts. Other items of initial interest in the 

document were in the section titled “National Security Situation.” Two statements of importance 

were that China’s national interests had grown (no explanation of how or what these interests 

 52 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
22

were); and that strategic sea lines of communication were important due to the need to protect the 

security of overseas interests in energy and resources. A final point of interest was that outer space 

and cyber space have become commanding heights in strategic competition among all states, with 

the “form” of war accelerating and evolving toward informationization.53

In the White Paper’s section on “Missions and Strategic Tasks” it was noted that upholding 

a holistic view of national security was necessary (this view was expressed two more times later 

in the paper, which aligns with the necessity of viewing objective reality holistically). A holistic 

view requires the innovative development of military strategy and the necessity to work harder to 

create a favorable strategic posture. Armed Forces reform ensures that the path of closer civilmilitary integration will continue, with the important strategic tasks of safeguarding interests in 

new domains and maintaining strategic deterrence.54 During the Hu and Xi eras, the journal CMS

wrote on the civil-military integration topic nearly 50 times. This integration is, according to H.R. 

McMaster, the most totalitarian of the three policies China is establishing in its attempts to create 

a new tributary system (the other two being the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China

2025).55

The section on the “Strategic Guideline of Active Defense” stated that active defense was 

the essence of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) military strategic thought. It was stated that 

the concept helps create a favorable posture, helps manage crises, and helps deter and win wars. 

The preparation for winning informationized local wars will focus on maritime preparations and 

the employment of system-vs-system operations that focus on attaining information dominance

and the use of precision strikes and joint operations. Important principles that were stressed 

included taking a holistic view of national security; fostering a favorable strategic posture;

maintaining security and stability along China’s periphery (a precursor to forward edge defense?); 

employing People’s War as an ace weapon; and endeavoring to seize the strategic initiative.

56 The 

last point implies that the essence of the CPC’s strategic thought is changing out of necessity due 

to S&T developments from active defense to a more proactive one.

In the section on “Building and Developing” the Armed Forces the aim was stated to be 

building an informationized military and winning informationized wars. The PLA Army will 

reorient from theater defense to trans-theater mobility. The PLA Navy will combine offshore water 

defense with open sea protection, and the traditional mentality of land outweighing the sea must, 

the paper noted, be abandoned. The PLA Air Force will shift from territorial air defense to both 

defense and offense and build an adequate air-space defensive force.

57 It was also stated that

As cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the 

development of a cyber force and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situational 

awareness, cyber defense, support for the country’s endeavors in cyberspace, and 

 53 Information Office of the State Council, “White Paper on China’s Military Strategy,” China Daily Online (in 

English), 26 May 2015.

54 Ibid. 55 McMaster. 56 White Paper on China’s Military Strategy. 57 Ibid.
23

participation in international cyber cooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, 

ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security 

and social stability.58

This will require the multi-domain and cost-efficient use of civil-military integration. The 

approach includes joint training, weaponry development, outsourced logistics, and joint 

infrastructure building as well as the exploration of the sea, outer space, and air and the shared use 

of resources.59

The section on “Preparations for Military Struggle (PMS)” stated that capabilities for 

system-vs-system operations based on information systems need to be enhanced. Reconnaissance, 

early-warning, command and control, precision-strike, and support systems all need to be 

strengthened. Battlefield dispositions and strategic prepositions must be upgraded, and borders and 

coastal defenses better organized. Finally, in the section on “Military and Security Cooperation” 

it was noted that China is working with Russia and the US to foster new models of military 

relationships. It was also stated that China will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping 

missions.60

A critique of the White Paper a month later titled “Correctly Locate the Basic Point for the 

Preparation for Military Struggles” noted that the term “informatized war” indicated that this type 

of war is playing a dominant role in the Xi era rather than serving as only an important condition, 

as it did in the Hu era. Informatized war is described as a strategic judgement that has moved 

beyond initial descriptions of information war featuring “mechanization plus informatization” to 

an advanced state featuring “smart manipulation plus all-area coverage plus long-range precision 

operations.” Grasping the initiative is based on information acquisition and fusion, and war’s 

outcome is determined by the mastery and use of information which, again, harkens to more 

emphasis on the offensive nature of future war. The author noted that China can no longer adapt 

to war but must design it. This requires “designing war in accordance with the mechanism for 

winning wars,” causing the PLA to plan even the potential process of war’s development. The 

PLA must “enrich system-of-system combat operational methods” that defeats the enemy with the 

application of “fantastic stratagems” (which reminds one of Li Bingyan’s 2002 statement that 

technology must be combined with stratagems); and the author writes that the integration of 

striking only after an opponent has struck should be combined with taking a “preemptive action to 

seize the initiative.” In this manner China will continue to live by the phrase “you fight in your 

way and we fight in ours.61” 

In a 2016 CMS article titled “An Analysis of the Impact of Modern Biological Technology on 

Future Forms of War,” a new spin was provided to the topic of control. In the article, a medical 

university doctoral advisor and student wrote on the impact of modern biological technology and 

its effect on future forms of war. The article noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin had 

 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Wen Bing, “Correctly Locate the Basic Point for the Preparation for Military Struggles,” Xuexi Shibao (website of 

the weekly CPC Central Party School newspaper) Online, 8 July 2015 at http://www.studytimes.cn..
24

approved a new weapon nicknamed the “zombie Gun,” which is used to attack the central nervous 

system of the human body. The US DARPA organization was said to have invested money to 

develop a battlefield illusion weapon to control an adversary’s sensing organs and to develop 

friendly “super soldiers.” 

With such weapons in mind, the authors stated that biological warfare operations were 

deemed to become the commanding height in future battlefield competitions, with “biological 

control warfare the main mode of combat operations.”62 The following points were made: 

• Information warfare’s objective is to exert influence on the epistemic 

domain through information flows in the physical and information domains.

Influence on the outer man affects the inner man but cannot go deep inside 

man.

• When bioscience reveals microorganism mysteries between different races, 

groups, and individuals and explains mechanisms of memory, emotion, 

decision, and thinking functions, then it is possible to filter out targets at the 

biomolecular level with a weapon system attacking biological functions that 

de-capacitate forces. When genetic roots and cognitive space are 

understood, commanders will be able to weaken the will of people and 

control people’s consciousness from the “inside of people.”63

Returning to Russian weapons, the authors noted that the Kremlin’s mind-control weapon uses 

low-frequency electromagnetic waves to affect human brain cells, transmit psychological 

suggestions, and control target behavior. War will evolve from firepower war, to information war, 

to “biological control warfare.”64 The article ended noting that whoever understands biological 

ramifications first will take the lead in actions and will occupy the commanding height in military 

transformation and seize the initiative in war.65

In 2017 an article appeared in CMS titled “Guidelines for Armed Forces Building and 

Preparations for Military Struggle—Understanding of the Military Strategic Guidelines in the New

Situation.” It appeared to summarize and expand on Xi’s military 2015 White Paper focus, serving 

as a guiding light for PLA planners to follow. While not as dramatic and design oriented as the 

earlier summary of author Wen Bing above, the article did expand somewhat on the meaning of 

the White Paper. The article was penned by Luo Derong, a senior colonel and associate professor 

at the Basics Department of the PLA Nanjing Political Science Academy. 

Luo noted that the White Paper was designed to serve as a strategic guideline for the new 

situation in which China finds itself. He stated that the Central Military Commission formulated 

these guidelines, adjusting preparations for military struggle to be “winning informatized local 

wars.” The core content of the strategy included “innovating the basic operational doctrine, 

 62 Guo Jiwei and Li Hongjun, “An Analysis of the Impact of Modern Biological Technology on Future Forms of 

War,” China Military Science, No. 3 2016, pp. 31-36. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.
25

optimizing the military strategic layout, and adhering to the strategic guiding principle.” It 

developed the content of active defense and stressed long-term preparedness and molding a 

favorable posture, comprehensively bringing crises under control, and resolutely deterring and 

winning wars,

66 which are almost the identical words in the White Paper’s section on active 

defense.

Luo proceeded to call Xi’s guidance the “New Guideline,” which has three characteristics. 

The first is innovation, which shapes military strategic guidance and is synchronized with national 

security developments. The second is flexibility, which ensures that offense is combined with 

defense.67 Strategic defense is combined with offensive actions at the campaign and tactical levels. 

More importantly, after the outbreak of a war, “the first battle should grasp the strategic pivot 

and the center of gravity in a campaign to launch decisive operations.”68 Luo added that

The New Guideline requires adherence to the principle of maneuvering flexibly and 

fighting independently according to the security threats...Combat should be fought 

in our own way no matter how the opponent may act. Integrated combat forces of 

multiple services should be used to fight system-of-system operations with 

information playing a dominating role, with precision strikes being delivered to the 

opponent’s vital parts, with flexible means used to win victories.69

The paragraph resembles a combination of Mao’s thinking and current strategic thought in the 

cyber age. It was noted that it is also necessary to create new forms of People’s War, again taking 

a phrase from the White Paper.

The third characteristic of the New Guideline is activities that help seize the initiative. 

Seven themes were listed, to include the following:

1. Move forward strategic guidance’s center of gravity

2. Give prominence to military struggle’s preparations in the maritime domain

3. Effectively control major crises

4. Appropriately cope with chain reactions

5. Resolutely safeguard national territorial sovereignty, unity, and security

6. Actively cope with threats in space, cyberspace, and other new security domains

7. Strengthen international security cooperation in regions related to China’s 

overseas interests, safeguard these overseas interests, and so on.70

 66 Luo Derong, “Guidelines for Armed Forces Building and Preparations for Military Struggle—Understanding of 

the Military Strategic Guidelines in the New Situation,” China Military Science, No. 1 2017, pp. 88-96. 67 A December 2019 article noted that the PLA lacks flexibility due to an environment that neither encourages 

innovation nor tolerates failure. See Yan Xiaofeng, “How to Shape a More Flexible Army,” Jiefangjun Bao, 5 

December 2019, as summarized by Ms. Cindy Hurst in OE Watch, January 2020, p. 31. 68 Luo Derong. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid.
26

Luo added that the contemporary context, marked by S&T developments and geopolitical changes, 

has resulted in adaptations to China’s security environment and changed its comprehensive 

national power and military power capabilities. 

While the basic spirit of active defense remains unchanged, the New Guideline emphasizes 

“the necessity of actively creating a favorable situation and seizing the strategic initiative.” As has 

been underscored on many occasions, creating a favorable situation is the basis of shi, and seizing 

the strategic initiative indicates, in the cyber age, the offensive portion of China’s active defense. 

This is accomplished using the appropriate stratagems, Luo noted. Further, he writes that “The 

military strategic capability is not only based on objective conditions but is also contingent on 

decision-makers’ strategic thinking level.” Seizing information dominance is the way to seize

comprehensive battlefield control and integrated joint operations are now a basic form of military 

operations.71

Later in the paper, Luo stated that bringing crises under control, deterring the outbreak of 

war, and winning wars is the goal of the New Guideline. Control includes control over operational 

targets, over the beginning of a war, over the process of war, over war’s ending, and over chain 

reactions in other directions. Strategic deterrence was defined as the integration of nuclear and 

conventional armament and the integration of deterrence with war fighting. The New Guideline 

is deemed to be the “orientation star” for winning informatized local wars in the new historical 

period. The pivot for seizing battlefield initiative in informationized local war is reliant on 

achieving all-dimensional battlefield control, with information control as the core. There was also 

an emphasis on sea power as an important factor determining the destiny of the state and the 

nation.72

Formal and regular war fighting methods should be avoided, Luo adds, and the creation 

and development of asymmetric combat forms and methods implemented. The following quote 

sums up much of the New Guideline:

Implementing information dominance, delivering precision strikes at vital parts,

and winning victories through joint operations are taken as the basic combat 

methods of operational guidance. The New Guideline consistently takes integrated 

joint operations as a basic form of our military’s military operations in an 

informatized local war, with system-of-systems operations based on information 

systems being a basic combat method, with systems sabotage warfare being the 

core combat method for achieving the objective of battle.73

Finally, in regard to system sabotage, Luo added that it is both a destructive type of warfare and a 

type of warfare that paralyzes an opponent; and that the New Guideline offered a prominent pivot 

of strategic guidance from land to the maritime domain.74

 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid.
27

Asymmetric combat forms and methods was the focus of attention in another 2018 article, 

one which did not provide an author. The article stated the following:

The temporal and spatial environment of military operations may augment or lessen 

combat power...Reevaluating and making use of favorable temporal and spatial 

factors and the consequent environmental condition is an important aspect of 

designing asymmetric battlefields. An important task in operational guidance is to 

choose a form and a method in keeping with the specific battlefield environment to 

win victories in asymmetric operations.75 

Of interest is that the article bears much resemblance to the 2007 article on asymmetry noted above

in the Hu era, indicating how consistent the PLA has been over the years regarding the concept. 

For example, the writeup indicated it was necessary to control time and space, seize the battle 

initiative as well as moments favorable to the PLA and unfavorable to an opponent, attack vital 

points, and create favorable postures (shi), through the use of stratagems that can hinder the enemy 

from using his asymmetric superiority. 

There were several additions to the asymmetric concept that indicated a slight expansion 

of the concept. It was stated that there now appears to be no division between front and rear, 

meaning the significance of fronts will decline; that a close examination must be made of enemy 

methods to restrict PLA advantages; that it is necessary to fight according to the PLA’s design; 

and that it is necessary to shape a non-linear posture through campaign-level outflanking, 

encirclement, infiltration, and full-depth strike capability against an opponent’s vital targets. The 

careful use of crucial technical and tactical means in unconventional and extraordinary ways was 

advised to boost the effectiveness of asymmetric operations.76

Two years later, in 2019, China’s Defense White Paper titled China’s National Defense in 

the New Era was published. The paper turned out to be a disappointment for many reasons, not 

the least of which was the absence of the phrase “winning informatized local wars.” Unless the 

PLA’s focus has changed (which the rest of the article did not indicate with anything new), such 

oversights made the paper appear to be a propaganda overview instead of a detailed and serious 

discussion of contemporary matters in China’s military. The impression one received was that the

political department oversaw the writing of this document, but it was prepared by The State 

Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Thus, it is even difficult to ascertain 

just which military officials, if any, participated in the paper’s development.

The terms active defense and People’s War were used once each in the Defense White 

Paper, whereas the important terms civil-military integration and forward edge defense were never 

used. In 2015 author Wen Bing had noted that strategic judgement had moved beyond initial 

descriptions of information war as “mechanization plus informatization” to an advanced state that 

features “smart manipulation plus all-area coverage plus long-range precision operations,” yet the 

White Paper some four years later resorted back to stating that China was seriously behind in 

 75 No author or title provided, Jiefangjun Bao Online, 28 August 2018, p. 7. 76 Ibid.
28

technology compared to other nations and that the nation was still striving to achieve 

mechanization. No doubt, this was an attempt to “appear weak when strong.” The rest of the world, 

the paper asserts, is conducting intelligent warfare, and applying artificial intelligence, quantum 

information, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things in their military affairs, all 

topics that CMS previously had written about between 2013 and 2018 (see Appendix one for actual 

titles) on more than one occasion. The Defense White Paper attempted instead to make China a 

beacon in search of peace and prosperity, working in accordance with United Nation regulations. 

Apparently such cooperation only occurs when decisions are in China’s favor, for the Defense

White Paper ignored how China rejected UN decisions regarding the South China Sea that did not

fit the Middle Kingdom’s aspirations. The paper used the term system of system only once and the

concept of “create a strategic advantage” twice. Military operations other than war, a topic in all 

previous discussions of military operations, was missing entirely.

77

By comparison, in a 2019 Jamestown Foundation writeup of a China book titled Winning 

Mechanisms of Electronic Countermeasures, Chinese authors indicated that the PLA is one of the 

world’s leading militaries and plans to conduct electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) conflicts in the 

future. The text notes that the winning mechanism of EMS conflicts is “the inherent basis and path 

to realizing electromagnetic dominance through electronic offense and defense by way of 

electromagnetic energy, directed energy, sound energy, and other technical means.”78 This is 

accomplished in the following ways:

• Careful Preparation: pre-war preparations; ability to react to ever-changing 

battlefield conditions; having accurate intelligence of enemy capabilities ahead 

of battle

• Multi-level integration: supplying friendly forces with timely intelligence data 

collected from platforms and tied together to guide the reconnaissance-target 

guidance-strike-assessment loop

• Precise release of energy: strike critical nodes with anti-radiation, directed 

energy or electromagnetic pulse weapons against the following targets: 

reconnaissance and early warning, wireless communications, guidance and fire 

control systems, navigation and positioning systems, and friend-or-foe 

identification.79

The main areas in which the PLA will confront an opponent are through deterrence (jamming or 

firepower displays), deception (confusion or misleading types), or destruction (use of precision 

 77 No authors provided, 2019 Defense White Paper: China’s National Defense in the New Era, State Council 

Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019.

78 Zi Yang, “PLA Stratagems for Establishing Wartime Electromagnetic Dominance: An Analysis of ‘The Winning 

Mechanisms of Electronic Countermeasures,’” OE Watch, March 2019, pp. 18-19, republished in collaboration with 

the Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 3, dated 1 February 2019.. 79 Ibid.
29

strikes against high valued targets to demonstrate PLA capabilities to stun the enemy into 

submission).

80 Clearly this report varies dramatically from the Defense White Paper. 

To further demonstrate the weak character of the previous document, listed next are 

sections on artificial intelligence and quantum computing that appeared in the Chinese military 

press, with a short summation of important items in each. They demonstrate that the PLA is 

thinking well beyond mechanization and are well-positioned in science and technology fields to 

match US capabilities. These sections primarily rely on information from Jiefangjun Bao Online, 

since there were no table of contents available for CMS after Issue 6 of 2018 and there were very 

few translations of 2018 CMS articles available. 

Artificial Intelligence (AI), Intelligentcized Warfare, and Wasps, Fish, and Wolves

The focus of competition between the two warring sides will be shifted to the 

cognition domain. The side that can be the first to gain control of this domain 

will be able to seize the strategic initiative in war...The AI-enabled decisionmaking support system is...making sure that commanders may rapidly and 

accurately judge and predict the development of a war situation to make 

operational decisions and gain decision-making superiority over the adversary.81

The following discussion of AI and intelligentcized warfare thinking in China proceeds 

chronologically from March 2018 to March 2020. The focus shifts back and forth from AI to 

intelligent warfare and back again, as various authors arrive at their conclusions from different 

sources and angles. Overall, though, the authors make it clear that while both concepts are very 

important to the thinking and planning process that goes into future war operations, AI is currently 

central to the PLA’s crafting of future war scenarios. However, there are already clear indications 

that AI is beginning to play a supporting role to intelligentcized or “smart” warfare. 

AI, intelligentcized warfare concepts, quantum computing, and other issues are supporting 

concepts to China’s way of war. They will influence the design and conduct of future war in 

conjunction with specific and important concepts imbedded in the PLA’s military culture. In the 

discussion that follows, important components of military thought are placed in bold.

A March 2018 article noted that power, whether from fire strikes, information, mobility, 

or defense, must be discharged at the most appropriate time and place. A combat power generation 

chain was proposed, consisting of a “posture sharing-synchronized collaboration-focused energy 

unleashing” chain designed to take shape around a unified operational objective. The author stated 

that a machine’s cognitive element should never go beyond human control. The human-machine 

integration effort is important, naturally, and could include the following components:

Along with the appearance and implementation of neural network computers,

optical computers, biological computers, and other types of new-concept 

computers, being supported by AI technologies for voice, text, and image 

 80 Ibid. 81 Niu Yujun, Cao Zhi, “Deeply Transform the Contemporary War System,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 8 November 

2018, p. 7.
30

recognition, the human-machine interface of the command information system will 

become highly intelligent. The art of command and the employment of military 

stratagems will be deeply merged into the human-machine interactive relationship 

and will be applied through the expert knowledge repository system and smart 

weapon-guided systems.82

This article was followed a month later with a discussion titled “Intelligence War is 

Coming: Are You Ready?” It stated that AI is generating new combat modes such that the 

“intelligent factor” can “radiate from military hardware” and make a breakthrough regarding army 

building. New combat theories such as “distributive killing,” “multi-field combat,” “wasp colony 

technology,” and “intelligent safety combat” have been proposed. The goal is to cut off an 

opponent’s information and decision-making control with friendly advantages gained after 

intelligent technology and information-led theory are combined. The intelligentization of the 

command information system is, the article notes, “the key to the enhancement of the means of 

operational combat and the formation of decision-making advantages.”83 The intelligent element,

infiltrated into the process of war and applied in a clustered and planned way, utilizes innovation 

in areas such as intelligent perception, intelligent decision-making, intelligent control, and 

unmanned platforms. 

Intelligent perception was described as intelligent sensing and networking technology. 

Intelligent decision-making was said to be based on a “command brain” possessing machine 

learning, neural networks, and other technologies. It will assist commanders making rapid 

decisions based on in-depth calculations and reasoning. Intelligent unmanned combat systems are 

a “new trend of future wars,” with targeting requirements such as “full coverage” and “quick 

response.” No further explanation of intelligence control was offered.84 The intelligent combat 

power system was described as follows:

The intelligent new combat power system is a comprehensive product of artificial 

intelligence technology development, the formation of emergent combat 

effectiveness, and the evolution of war for—a ‘trump card’ used to win the active 

fight in the future global operational space, the key to constituting an integrated 

joint combat system, and a new growth point of our combat effectiveness.85

The new battlefield and operational space will consist of the following: space, the Internet, 

all fields of human activities and ideologies, quick response satellites, autonomous network 

security, brain control weapons, gene weapons, and other emerging combat power integrated into 

combat systems. The field supporting military intelligence, such as big data, the military Internet 

of Things, and so on, will be enhanced. Finally, civil-military integration, the collaborative 

 82 Wang Yonghua, “A Study of the Key Points for Winning Intelligentized Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 29 

March 2018, p. 7.

83 Yin Junsong and Cheng Gang, “Intelligence War is Coming: Are You Ready?” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 24 April 

2018, p. 7.

84 Ibid. 85 Ibid.
31

industry-university-research innovation system, will open society’s innovative power and promote 

the development of military intelligence.86 For example, China’s State Council has provided the 

impetus for AI and intelligent warfare growth in Chinese universities. In May 2018, the State 

Council’s plan for AI included the desire to make the nation the world’s center and leader for AI 

innovation by 2030. A survey conducted by the Chinese Institute of New Generation Artificial 

Intelligence Development Strategies (CINGAIDS) indicated that intelligent technologies are “the 

endogenous driving force for China’s economic development.”87 Further, over 70 domestic 

universities and colleges now have AI-related majors. More colleges and universities are also 

planning for AI-focused courses. Tsinghua University is developing cross-disciplinary research

and other universities are developing intelligent systems.88

Three authors wrote that the use of intelligent systems in the military enhances attempts to 

seize intelligence superiority. It is equally important to strip away an opponent’s use of intelligence 

in combat operations. New forms and methods of intelligent combat operations must be created.

Key research must focus on the use of intelligent perception, intelligent decision-making, 

intelligent control, intelligent attack, and intelligent support; and the further development of 

intelligent reconnaissance and perception systems, command and control systems, weapons and 

equipment systems, combat support systems, and other weapons and equipment. Intelligent war 

will use people and machines working together to prosecute war, and new ways must be explored 

to generate combat power.89

A September 2018 article stated that the mode of warfare had shifted from informatized to 

intelligentcized (having a smart component) combat operations. Big data, cloud computing, and 

AI offer the technological support that enable the opportunity to act independently. Such 

information uses algorithms to generate intelligence that helps analysts differentiate between true 

and false information and ascertain adversary weaknesses. The move to intelligent operations is 

also enabled by an artificial neural network with deep learning capability and the ability to attain 

general independent wisdom. Brains and machines interact to identify vital points and weak links. 

Intelligence in hardware guides information-firepower attacks and attacks on system-of-systems 

structures. Battlefield superiority is reliant on a system’s intelligence superiority relative to an 

opponent, since destroying or paralyzing an opponent’s system-of-systems structure is what helps 

ensure success.90

A month later an author noted that in intelligentized warfare, AI-powered smart equipment 

and intelligent command, maintenance, and combat forms are now imaginable. AI-produced “fake 

news” will be ubiquitous. The chain of observation, judgment, decision-making, and action 

(probably the OODA [observe, orient, decide, act] loop with other words) will shorten 

 86 Ibid. 87 Xinhua, 18 May 2018, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the July 2018 Issue of OE Watch, p. 27. 88 No author provided, “Universities Begin Recruiting AI Undergraduate Students for the First Time,” Caijing, 19 

June 2018, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the July 2018 Issue of OE Watch, p. 27. 89 Li Shijiang, Yang Ziming, and Chen Fenyou, “Use New Concepts to Meet the Challenges of Intelligent War,” 

Jiefangjun Bao Online, 26 July 2018, p. 7. 90 Xuo Dengyun, Gong Jia, and Huang Peirong, “Why Informatized Combat Operations Are Becoming Intelligent 

Combat Operations,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 20 September 2018, p. 7.
32

substantially due to the increased tempo of fighting. Intelligent power will become the most crucial 

factor in determining war’s outcome. Battlefield control, deterrence theory, and arms negotiations 

will all need new analysis and consideration. Further 

Attrition warfare launched with intelligent swarms, cross-domain mobile warfare, 

and cognition control warfare will become basic types of combat operations. 

Offensive and defensive operations characterized by scattered human and 

equipment deployments, automatic coordination, and energy concentration will 

become the basic forms of cross-domain, whole-area operations.91

Chinese writers believe that bold innovations are needed if one is to learn about the new 

form of warfighting. AI systems may replace humans in warfare and information dominance 

appears to be replaced by AI-based smartness and automation. Smart intelligent technologies, as 

others have also noted, include cloud computing, machine learning, bionic technology, big data, 

and the mobile Internet. AI will separate humans from their direct physical contact with weapons, 

and command and control will be more independent. The latter will be able to gather information, 

judge situations, make decisions, and respond to contingencies. Conflicts will involve clusters of 

unmanned systems. Battlefield positions will be automatically sensed, automatic exchanges will 

occur during operational design, automatic planning will determine operational missions, and the 

automatic execution of actions will occur. This will result in the interaction of the information, 

cognition, and action domains as operations are coordinated. Destruction effects will be provided 

by technical reconnaissance means.92 The four forms of smart operations in AI warfare will be as 

follows: 

• Wasp swarm operations—enhanced effects with massive quantities, turning 

quantity superiority into qualitative superiority

• Trojan operations—based on stealthy deployment ahead-of-time and the 

activation of systems only when needed

• Self-determined operations—those without human command whose actions use 

a quick rhythm moving under cover, which requires automatic sensing, 

decision-making, and actions

• And incapacitation operations—those that destroy points and neutralize bodies, 

taking aim at nodes, hubs, and other vital parts of an opponent’s operational 

system.93

To effectively respond to various risks and challenges in the change of war patterns, it was 

noted that China must “free its mind from traditional concepts about military operations, discern 

and grasp the attributes of AI warfare, play the game well by taking the initiative proactively, so 

 91 You Guangrong, “Artificial Intelligence Will Deeply Change the Outlook of War,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 17 

October 2018, p. 4. 92 Lu Zhisheng, “A Profile of AI Warfare in the Future,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 18 October 2018, p. 7. 93 Ibid.
33

as to stay invincible on the future battlefield.”94 Structural functions and organizational models 

and forms of the Armed Forces will undergo disruptive changes due to the “symbiotic 

combination” of humans and machines and smart equipment’s “self-adaptation” capabilities. 

Civilian forces and means will deliver attacks on vital nodes of an opponent’s operational system 

and further cripple his capabilities and will. Intelligentization will cause the development of new 

management models for defense technology and the war industry. These models will be based on 

the big data that is gathered and processed before being sent to intelligentized operations.95

AI superiority is believed to have surpassed information superiority in importance. The 

man-machine combination means that intelligence superiority is now most important in terms of 

thinking speed and planning as follows:

• Regarding thinking speed, Chinese military theorists are considering the 

importance of direct control of the other sides automatic operational

systems through controlling the other side’s personnel or incapacitating 

them through brain control technology or sentiment control technology. 

• Regarding planning, there are four types of operations under consideration. 

First, smart ambush (Trojan type) operations will use offensive or cyber 

weapons with bionic or stealth features to sneak into an opposing side’s core 

facilities, sea routes, equipment, vital parts, or systems, where they lie 

dormant and are only activated when war or conflict breaks out. Second, 

smart clustered operations are ‘wolf pack or wasp swarm’ saturated attacks 

that break through enemy defenses and destroy major targets. Third, 

precision second-killing operations are supersonic and ultrasonic weapons 

that enable high-speed instant strikes against important facilities. Finally, 

cognition control operations disrupt an enemy’s smart operational systems 

and undermine an opponent’s thinking and cognition.96

Battle domains will gradually expand into the two extreme limits of macroscopic and 

microscopic fields, where domains are transformed by the technical domain. The latter will 

combine with various conventional physical domains to form a cross-domain battlefield. Advances 

in brain and cognitive technologies will give rise to the cognition domain of war which, together 

with other domains, will forge a mega-domain operational system. This could make warfare 

more “humane” and mitigate responsibility and political pressure for launching war. Even war’s 

definition may change, as it could be redefined as the violation of another side’s sovereignty in 

one or all domains.97

 94 Wu Baiyi, “The Age of Artificial Intelligence Calls for ‘Newer and Braver Human Brains,’” Jiefangjun Bao 

Online, 6 November 2018, p 9.

95 Ibid., Niu, Cao. 96 Chou Hao and Liang Kui, “The Winning Mechanism of Conventional Warfighting Will Be Disrupted,” Jiefangjun 

Bao Online, 8 November 2018, p. 7.

97 Ibid. 
34

The level of military intelligentization of a nation (or terrorist group!) may be the new 

measure of a great power, and not a population’s size or its economic underpinning. Integrated and 

parallel operations will be a new combat model in future war. Cyber wars will be encouraged in 

the age of intelligentization.98 Command decision-making will be based on battlefield posture 

sensing, produced with data mining, deep learning, and smart networking technologies (maps, 

posture elements, operational process deductions, etc.). Simulated rehearsals of operational 

programs based on real-time battlefield posture data (simulating MDO, for example!) enhance the 

capabilities for predicting operations and matching them with tactical actions. Unmanned combat 

clusters such as wasp swarms in the air, fish schools underwater, and wolf packs on land, 

coordinated with manned equipment, will become important forms of warfare (some Chinese

analysts have proposed that robots resembling butterflies, dragonflies, flies, locust and other 

insects will appear in large batches).99 During training for the conduct of campaigns, holographic 

projections, virtual realities, and smart algorithms will enable commanders to observe and analyze 

force deployments and battlefield situations to more reliably formulate procedures and shape 

decision-making superiority.100

A January 2019 AI article noted that the form of military engagements will change from

system confrontations to algorithm competition, due to the use of AI. It was noted that “algorithms 

are stratagem mechanisms for resolving various issues.”101 They determine cognition superiority 

and help to do three things: disperse battlefield fog, enable speed superiority, and determine 

decision-making superiority. They enable the PLA to “come up with flexible and diverse 

operational programs and response options according to changes on the enemy side.”102 In this 

way they disrupt an opponent’s intentions and deployments. Decision-making in war will 

eventually change from purely human decision-making to include the following: man-machine 

combined decision-making; cloud brain AI decision-making [as written]; and neural network 

decision-making.103

AI-based planning computations are transforming war from its informatized state to AI 

warfare. Those with “more calculations” prevail over those with “less calculations,” and 

“intelligent calculations” defeat “quantitative calculations.” Smart guidance systems can defeat a 

system-of-systems. Even world naval powers are attaching importance to devices such as cognitive 

computers, biological computers, and quantum computers. Superior AI, especially that unknown 

to an opponent and using asymmetric AI strategic supremacy, allows the weak to defeat a strong 

system-of-system based opponent. To gain such supremacy, efforts must begin in peacetime to 

 98 Xu Lin and Wang Xingwang, “Military Security Sees New Dynamics and New Challenges,” Jiefangjun Bao

Online, 8 November 2018, p. 7.

99 See, for example, Li Minghai, “Deducing the Look of AI-Based Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 2 April 2019. 100 Zhang Lu, Tang Yao, Wang Jianfei, “Firmly Take Hold of the Strategic Initiative in Crucial Domains,” 

Jiefangjun Bao Online, 8 November 2018, p. 7. 101 Li Minghai, “Where Exists the War-Winning Mechanisms of AI Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao, 15 January 2019. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid.
35

find weaknesses in an opponent, with “algorithm experiments and confrontation exercises 

unfolding against the vulnerabilities of an opponent’s operational system.”104

A focus on maritime operational design in peacetime noted that:

Deep, precise, meticulous calculation should be performed ahead of time over the 

objective of war, the goal of the campaign, the probabilities of success and risks, 

personnel casualties, material, and ammunition consumption. A war-fighting 

pattern should be designed independently. The concepts of AI-driven maritime 

operations should be tested and validated so that battles can be fought according to 

the programs, and victories can be won based on the algorithms.105

Presently, AI cannot replace human intelligence in the military domain, but it can be 

integrated with it. On occasion, theorists must be reminded that the art of military command is 

often based on inspiration or intuition, and we have no way currently to train robots to produce 

such concepts. AI cannot resolve uncertainty during military operations caused by war stratagems, 

deception, and disinformation. Errors and mistakes may occur in judgments and decisions if made 

by systems alone.106

In April 2019 it was noted that artificial intelligence, information networks, unmanned 

systems, big data, cloud computing, human-machine interface, and additive manufacturing are all 

21st century cutting-edge technologies, but that AI is the strategic area developing the fastest. A 

system of “smart warfare systems” is being built where AI is the brain, operational networks the 

nerves, and operational big data the blood of this system. Counters to an adversary’s use of smart 

wars must also be considered, and topics such as algorithmic and anti-algorithmic warfare must be 

researched in depth.107

However, AI’s use of automatic decision-making in areas such as reconnaissance, strikes, 

and damage evaluation contain several risks, and each should be dealt with discreetly. Once an 

opponent figures out a certain algorithmic logic behind an AI system, the latter could be led into 

making erroneous judgements. Counters must be considered. AI systems also have no human 

emotion at present and can “hardly be restricted by morals and ethics” and this entails another 

element of risk in their use. Decisions must still be reached with discretion.108

Humans possess a unique subjective initiative, intellect, and creativity, while machines 

have precision, rapidity, and repetition on their side. Humans implement stratagems with an artistic 

capability and are war designers and decision-makers. AI-weapons search, identify, and attack but 

 104 Zuo Dengyun, “Where Lies the Course of AI-Driven Transformation in Maritime Operations,” Jiefangjun Bao

Online, 12 February 2019. 

105 Ibid. 106 Wang Chunfu, “Bring Military AI Implementation onto the Track of Scientific Development,” Jiefangjun Bao

Online, 26 March 2019, p. 7.

107 Li Dapeng, “How We Should Handle the Challenge of Smart Wars,” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Online, 4 April 

2019, p. 11.

108 Gu Jingchao and Liu Kui, “Be Discreet about ‘Autonomous Decision-Making’ in AI-Based Military Command,” 

Jiefangjun Bao Online, 26 March 2019, p. 7.
36

have limited capacity of “initiative.” Achieving superiority in algorithm confrontation is a key to 

seizing control, and the employment of stratagem mechanisms using algorithms is a method for 

resolving issues. AI warfare aims to seize intelligent superiority through “controlling the 

adversary’s brain and paralyzing its body.”109 At the level of military art, or tactics, campaigns and 

strategy, it was noted that “most aspects of tactical command authority are being transferred to AI” 

at a fast rate; “some campaign command authority will be transferred to AI”; and as regards 

strategic command authority, it “must remain firmly in human hands.”110

Algorithms were the specific focus of a June 2019 article, which stated that intelligentized 

warfare and operational control will be won by means of computation and computer commands.

Military powers worldwide, the author noted, are trying to change military operations with brandnew algorithms and programming codes. For this reason, data and computing capacity, the 

integration of platforms into a system capable of crashing an opponent’s operational systems, and 

the integration of transmissions and decision-making speed to outperform opponents have 

increased in importance. A human’s creativity, flexibility, and initiative can, in a reasonable and 

logical manner, conceal real data, concoct fake data, or increase the amount of useless data in an 

opponent’s system; and can develop hard or soft strikes to retard an opponent’s computing 

efficiency or reduce the operational effectiveness of adversary algorithms. Humans, in other 

words, remain more important than machines in their ability to counter an opponent’s AI.111

In October 2019 it was noted that as AI infiltrates into the military domain, it will change 

how combat power manifests itself. The cognitive domain will become a battle domain, human 

fighters will fade away, and intelligent equipment will be brought onto the battlefield. Crossdomain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting will be the new normal, and intelligence 

control will replace territorial control as the center of gravity in war. Intelligentized warfare is 

expected to reshape the rules of engagement and restructure combat forces such that machine-onhuman or machine-on-machine warfare will be the new “traditional.”112 

Finally, in March 2020, the term intelligentized warfare appeared to represent a 

combination of AI’s capabilities combined with mankind’s intuition and creativity for planning 

and operations. In an article on UAVs, drone swarm operations (the term wasp swarm was not 

used) were stated to be an important form of intelligentized warfare. They could even become the 

advance guard of battle between two armies. Advantages over conventional operations include the 

following: 

• Drone swarms can flexibly organize into different units

• A swarm formation can have multiple functions, from reconnaissance to hard 

strikes

 109 Wang Ronghui, “A Look at the Features of AI Warfare in the Future,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 30 April 2019. 110 Yuan Yi, Gao Dongming, and Zhang Yujun, “Also Discuss ‘Autonomous Decision-Making’ in Intelligent 

Command,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 18 April 2019. 111 Chai Shan, “Grasp the Key Links of Winning Intelligentized Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 4 June 2019. 112 Yang Wenzhe, “How to Win Intelligentized Warfare by Analyzing What Has Changed and What Has Not 

Changed,” Jiefangjun Bao, 22 October 2019.
37

• Swarm operations can transmit battlefield information so that a commander’s 

intentions can be accurately implemented

• Individual drones are small targets and can hide near the battlefield

• Swarm operations eliminate human-operations machine limitations

• And swarm operations logistic support is low.113

Most important for China is that drone swarms fight across all domains:

The basic method of multi-domain attacks is to use a drone swarm platform to carry 

many individual drones. During battle, drones are launched or deployed through 

the platform as battle groups to achieve data sharing, flight control, situational 

awareness and intelligentized decision-making, so that the drone can flexibly 

respond to battlefield contingencies and conduct various combat missions, such as

swarm reconnaissance, fighting, and attacks.114

Not only can drone swarms be configured with various modules, but they can form a large assault 

formation that can penetrate deep into enemy territory and strike high-risk targets.115

Thus, to summarize this 2018-2020 discussion, the following are some key takeaways from 

the PLA’s understanding of how AI and smart weaponry are affecting operational planning:

• The technical domain will combine with various conventional physical domains 

to form a cross-domain battlefield. Advances in brain and cognitive 

technologies will give rise to the cognition domain of war which, together with 

other domains, will forge a mega-domain operational system

• Drone swarm operations will attempt to overload an opponent’s defensive 

systems and responses. Swarms will be used in the air, sea, and land domains. 

One huge drone swarm could involve reconnaissance, jamming, attack, and 

other capabilities that fulfill multiple missions.

• A group of ‘smart warfare systems’ is being built where AI is the brain, 

operational networks the nerves, and operational big data the blood. Counters 

to an adversary’s use of smart wars must also be considered, and topics such as 

algorithmic and anti-algorithmic warfare must be researched in depth.

• The focus of military engagements will change from system confrontations to 

algorithm competition, due to the use of AI. It was noted that algorithms are 

stratagem mechanisms for resolving various issues.

• Intelligent power will become the most crucial factor in determining war’s 

outcome. It will utilize innovation in areas such as intelligent perception, 

 113 Xu Weiwei and Li Huan, “The Main Types of Drone Swarm Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao, 23 January 2020, as 

provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the March 2020 Issue of OE Watch, p. 28. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid.
38

intelligent decision-making, intelligent control, and unmanned platforms. The 

intelligence factor radiates from military hardware.

• Cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting will be the new 

normal, and intelligence control will replace territorial control as the center of 

gravity in war—and perhaps this will cause the definition of war to be 

redefined.

• Attrition warfare launched with intelligent swarms, cross-domain mobile 

warfare, and cognition control warfare will become basic types of combat 

operations.

• Civil-military integration, which involves the collaborative industry-universityresearch innovation system, will open society’s innovative power, and promote 

the development of military intelligence. The development of CINGAIDS is 

but one civilian development that will be integrated with the military response.

Quantum Operations

On 13 April 2020, the Wall Street Journal published a special section titled “5G: What’s 

Next.” The journal offered an estimate of “who leads who” in crucial areas in the US-China 

competition: 5G (China leads), AI (US leads, but barely), semi-conductors (US), and autonomous 

vehicles (US). Surprisingly, the US was said to lead China in quantum computing, but China leads 

the US in quantum communications. China’s Pan Jian-Wei, the nation’s “father of quantum,” has 

led the charge to develop quantum communications, sensors, and radars, which all have potential 

military applications. In 2016 the nation launched the Micius satellite, which uses quantum state 

photon beams to make transmissions that are impervious to interception. Further, China has 

“exponentially increased the number of quantum information technology (QIT) patents,” largely 

in the realm of software.116 US concerns, of course, are that 5G and quantum capabilities could let 

the Chinese government intercept communications, sabotage military networks, infrastructure, or 

economies, or even turn Internet connected items into weapons.

China’s military entered the game long ago. State Councilor and CPC Central Committee 

Political Bureau member Liu Yandong noted in 2011 that quantum communications have made 

“fresh contributions to scientific development.”117 One 2011 report stated that the University of 

National Defense Science and Technology had conducted quantum information technology 

research since the 1990s; and that the PLA’s University of Science and Technology (PLAUST) 

had been studying quantum communication technologies since at least 2011.118 Other Chinese 

 116 Asa Fitch and Stu Woo, “The US vs China: Who’s Winning the Key High-Tech Battles?” The Wall Street 

Journal, 13 April 2020, pp. A2-A3. 117 Liu Yandong, “Striving to Break New Ground in Fundamental Research,” Qiushi Online, 1 August 2011, No. 15. 118 See, for example, He Shuyuan, Chen Ming, Li Zhi, and Qiao Tianfu, “Join Forces and Pool Wisdom to Forge 

National-Defense Equipment and Facilities—An Outline of Endeavors Made by the University of National Defense 

Science and Technology’s Autonomous Innovation Teams to Bravely Scale New Heights in Science and 

Technology,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 26 July 2011, p. 8; and Yang Zhijun, Yang Daichun, and Ma Shengwei, 

“PLAUST Promotes Integrated Development of Interdisciplinary Research,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 11 October 

2011.
39

reports on the expanded use of quantum information discussed topics such as quantum science 

projects and quantum mechanics experiments in space.119

In 2012 PLAUST opened up new areas of study, to include military information grid 

networking, quantum communications, cloud computing, and military logistics networking.120

China’s Academy of Space Technology (CAST) has started preparatory work to establish China’s 

first quantum remote-sensing laboratory. The aerospace community believes that remote sensing 

is an important area for the application of quantum information technology, and it has been 

designated as one of the four key areas of scientific research in the next fifteen years.121

Also, in 2012 it was stated that quantum communication technology has important strategic 

significance in ensuring the safety of state information. These remarks were made at a ceremony 

to launch the financial information quantum communication verification network.122 With such 

high-level cover, it is not surprising that China’s rapid science and technology developments have

been tied to quantum information, as well as neutrino oscillation, nanotechnology, and stem cell 

studies, among others.123 Another report the same year discussed breakthroughs in information 

technology, to include intelligent optic networks, high-speed satellite communications, space 

optical communications, and quantum communications.124

The PLA has capitalized on quantum achievements and used them to train the force. In 

2013, for example, during an exercise the following was reported:

In less than 10 minutes, the detachment completed the setting up of a quantum 

communications network and opened a command organ quantum video 

communication system, and the battlefield situation was clearly indicated on the 

screen of the command vehicle.125

Chinese scientists also state that they have made the first experimental observation of the 

quantum anomalous hall (QAH) effect. The discovery, still a long way from practical application, 

is thought to enhance the information technology revolution through the development of lowpower-consumption electronics. The QAH effect “describes how a voltage appears at both 

semiconductor edges when the electrons on a current-carrying semiconductor experience a force 

while being kept in a magnetic field.”126

 119 See, for example, “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” Xinhua (in English), 29 December 2011. 120 Yang Zhijun and Ma Shengwei, “PLA University of Science and Technology Promotes Cross-Disciplinary 

Fusion, Intensifies Military-Civilian Joint Endeavors—More than 740 Innovative Achievements Help Enhance 

Combat Capabilities of the Armed Forces,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 18 March 2012, p. 1. 121 Zhongguo Hangtian Bao Online, 25 July 2012. 122 Xinhua Domestic Service, 21 February 2012. 123 Cheng Yingqi, “Tianjin Meeting a Hotbed of Scientific Exchange,” China Daily Online (in English), 18 

September 2012.

124 Zeng Weihua and Lin Bo, “Information Support: The Fresh Force Leaps into the Foreground of Informatized 

Battlefields,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 9 February 2012. 125 Gao Feng, Li Yuanxin, and Hu Guangfei, “Militiamen’s ‘Double Responses’ Bid Farewell to ‘Human Wave 

Tactics’—Record of What One Hears and Thinks about an Actual-Combat-Oriented Exercise of the Hefei Garrison 

Command of Anhui Province,” Jiefanjun Bao Online, 18 November 2013, p. 9 126 “Chinese Scientists Observe IT-Advancing Phenomenon,” Xinhua (in English), 10 April 2013.
40

An important 2016 report out of Singapore examined China’s quantum satellite 

experiments for both strategic and military implications. The report noted that on 16 August 2016 

the Chinese launched the Micius satellite, named after an ancient Chinese philosopher, and tasked 

it to establish a hack-proof communication line. By 2030 China hopes to have a network of 

quantum satellites to augment its ground-based quantum computer network. The network would 

establish a strategic asset to enable the PLA’s capacity for power projection through a 

“constellation of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms; tactical 

warning and attack assessments; command, control, and communications; navigation and 

positioning; and environmental monitoring.”127 Information dominance is not possible, in the 

PLA’s opinion, without space dominance. Quantum communication satellites could be used as 

“data relay satellites to securely transmit targeting data to and from command centers, while

evading cyber interceptions.” 

In 2017, it was reported that China is building the world’s biggest quantum research 

facility, useful in the military for code-breaking or employment on stealth submarines. The 

National Laboratory for Quantum Information Science will be built next to a lake in Hefei, Anhui 

Province.128 Pan Jian-Wei noted that China is now a world leader in encrypted quantum 

communications. He cited three achievements in 2017, with two attributed to Micius: satellite-toground quantum key distribution and ground-to-satellite quantum teleportation. China also 

achieved the construction of the first 1000-km-level Beijing-Shanghai quantum fiber link and first 

private intercontinental quantum communication, supported by a satellite-ground chain, between 

Beijing and Vienna.129 A 2018 report stated that China can monitor data transmissions along the 

quantum communications network connecting Beijing and Shanghai. Pan Jian-Wei was identified 

as the chief researcher of China’s quantum satellite and Peng Chengzhi was said to be the chief 

designer of China’s quantum satellite application system.130

Other Thoughts

In late 2018, PLA hawk Luo Yuan, in a speech at the 2018 Military Industry Awards

Ceremony and Innovation Summit, described asymmetric attacks that China could use to defeat 

the US. First, he discussed attacks that an enemy fear, an example of which would be to sink US 

aircraft carriers. Second, he suggested internationalizing the RMB to cause the dollar to stumble. 

Third, develop China’s high-tech industry with independent intellectual property rights. Fourth, 

strike at the US’s agricultural sector (especially soybeans) with import penalties since this is where 

President Trump’s strength is located. Finally, make more friends which will make more enemies

for the US.131

 127 Michael Raska, “China’s Quantum Satellite Experiments: Strategic and Military Implications,” S. Rajaratnam 

School of International Studies (in English) 4 September 2016. 128 Stephen Chen, “China Building World’s Biggest Quantum Research Facility,” South China Morning Post, 11 

September 2017, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the May 2018 issue of OE Watch, p. 42. 129 No broadcaster identified, “The Future is Coming—the Advent of the Era of Quantum Communications,” CCTV 

News, 26 December 2017, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the May 2018 issue of OE Watch, p. 42. 130 No broadcaster or title noted, CCTV News (in English), 4 January 2018. 131 Luo Yuan, “Speech at the 2018 Military Industry Awards Ceremony and Innovation Summit,” Sina.com, 23 

December 2018, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the February 2019 issue of OE Watch, pp. 23-24.
41

In 2019, several new types of drones were explained in the press or shown at parades. The 

Type 001A aircraft carrier was said to deploy the Sharp Sword Stealth Drone, which would help 

close the technology gap with the US Navy. At an October 2019 parade the DR-8 drone was shown 

and described as a high-altitude, high-speed reconnaissance UAV that could fly at supersonic 

speed. The GJ-11 stealth drone was also shown. Both may be able to fight in the invisible 

electromagnetic domain. The HSU-001 Underwater Unmanned Vehicle is reportedly able to sail 

long distances and collect data and spy on enemy vessels.132 A few days after the National Day 

parade ended, China launched a Gaofen 10 high-resolution Earth Observation System, which joins 

12 other Gaofen satellites in orbit. It can provide data support for major national strategies and 

national defense modernization, to include Belt and Road countries that are part of China’s transEurasian Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

133 In addition to 

Gaofen satellites, the Beidou satellite navigation system is nearing completion. The newer Beidou3 satellite’s precision has implications for defense and civilian applications. Of the 39 Beidou 

satellites in orbit, 21 are Beidou-3 satellites. The system deeply integrates the Internet, the Internet 

of Things, 5G, big data, and so on and currently covers 30 Belt and Road countries.134

Regarding future war, it was noted in February 2020 that cyber-electronic warfare will 

continue to evolve in the information age and that it is of crucial importance for seizing the 

initiative in future war. It was noted that “Practice shows that whoever takes the lead in gaining 

dominance in a new battle domain will seize the initiative and win victory in rivalry and 

confrontation.”135 Cyber-electronic operations as a battle domain will potentially surpass fire 

strikes in capabilities and will perform the following:

The means of cyber-electronic operations will not only effectively combat the 

enemy’s electronic targets such as those for reconnaissance, early warning, 

command and control, weapon guidance, navigation and identification, but also 

mount strikes on the enemy’s information infrastructure facilities and such potential 

war targets as energy, power, and transportation information networks.136

The author added that cyber-electronic attacks will be “the core means of destroying the enemy’s 

combat system.”137 A cyber-electronic force can find an enemy’s vital nodes or weak links easier 

 132 Minnie Chan, “China to Deploy Sharp Sword Stealth Drone for New Type 001A Aircraft Carrier,” South China 

Morning Post, 17 September 2019; Ouyang Hao, “The Third Unmanned Warfare Formation,” 21East.com, 1 

October 2019; and Liu Zhen, “China Stakes Claim on Unmanned Warfare with National Day Show of Drone 

Force,” South China Morning Post, 3 October 2019, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the November 2019 issue of 

OE Watch, p. 28. 133 No author provided, “China Successfully Launches Gaofen-10 Satellite,” Xinhua, 5 October 2019, as provided by 

Peter Wood in the November issue of OE Watch, p. 32. 134 No author provided, “China’s Beidou System Now Has 39 Satellites in Orbit, System Will Be Completed Next 

Year,” Guangming Daily, 12 September 2019, as provided by Peter Wood in the November 2019 issue of OE 

Watch, p. 31. 135 Wang Feiqiu, “How Will Cyber-Electronic Warfare Evolve in the Information Age,” Jiefangjun Bao, 19 

December 2019, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the February 2020 issue of OE Watch, p. 22. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid.
42

in the cyber realm than in physical geographic space. Cyber-electronic defense, on the other hand, 

is a key to ensuring the stability of joint operations systems.138

In March 2020 it was noted that the ground battlefield will no longer be restricted to its 

former geographical sense due to informatized conditions that exist. It will be necessary to learn 

how to conduct close combat on such a battlefield. A strong enemy can now detect and acquire 

targets at long range, execute precise attacks from beyond the line of sight, and conceal his intent. 

Using firepower as cover and seeking ways to evade and use flexible deception are important. It 

was noted that for a weaker side to be victorious you must get close to the enemy and fight at close 

quarters. This threatens his use of long-range firepower and other weapon platforms for fear of 

friendly casualties. It will be necessary to take aim at weak points of a strong enemy’s informatized 

platforms and conduct close combat against him.139

Thus, the unfolding reality of the PLA’s battlefield construction goes well-beyond Xi’s 

“winning informatized local wars.” Many other issues are in vogue, such as the cognitive domain, 

the issue of intelligentized warfare, quantum issues, and so on. “Preparing for and winning AIand intelligentized-enhanced battles” sounds more appropriate as a description of how China sizes 

up the contemporary battlefield.

Conclusions

In strategy, when we do not know the true intent of our opponent, we can also 

make some actions locally where there will be no decisive impact on the overall 

strategic interests; or we can create some false information that does not involve 

our own strategic intent. Then we can make the correct judgment or decision by 

observing the corresponding reaction of our opponent so that the true intention of

our opponent can be found out.140

The title of this paper is “The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed?” The answer is 

that it has changed dramatically from what it was 20 years ago, but that does not mean that 

everything is new. There are some components of PLA thinking (deception, stratagems, etc., as in 

the quote above) that remain as important elements of China’s way of war and they are being 

integrated into technologies. Such issues offer an overall sense of historical continuity in China’s 

approach to warfare that is based on a thought process going back thousands of years, to include

the transcendent impact of Sun Tzu, Marx, and Mao on strategic and tactical issues. The number 

of articles and discussions in China Military Science over the past 20 years devoted to these three 

men fully support this contention. On the other hand, China’s intelligentization of operations and 

focus on joint and all-domain capabilities (to include domains not currently under consideration in 

the US) create new challenges. AI, as mentioned above in several locations, is now being used to 

 138 Ibid. 139 Ye Huabin and Ai Zhengson, “How to Conduct ‘Close Combat’ in the Information Age,” Jiefangjun Bao (PLA 

Daily), 16 January 2020, as provided by Ms. Cindy Hurst in the March 2020 issue of OE Watch, p. 26. 140 Zhou Xiaoyu, “Strategic Thinking in the Game of Go,” China Military Science, No. 6 2015, pp. 54-60..
43

help design warfare—repeat, help design warfare—to further provide control over conflicts and to 

ensure the PLA has a future deterrent force with which to confront other nations.

More recently, one can even see this cultural influence on the actions surrounding the 

Covid-19 outbreak. The primary goal of the PLA and diplomats is to gain a strategic advantage or 

shi that could be exploited in case of conflict. Several authors (only one is footnoted here) have 

stated that there are speculations that Xi Jinping, aware of the serious potential economic situation 

in which the virus had placed his nation, decided to make sure that other countries weren’t spared 

the problem, thereby keeping China from being at a disadvantage. Secrecy is reflexive for a regime 

whose survival is threatened with explosive situations, so other nations were not warned about it 

in time to begin mitigation or collecting medical supplies (on which Xi cornered the market). Xi 

allowed international air travel from Wuhan to other nations to ensure the spread.

141 We should 

wonder how his good friend in the Kremlin is taking this news now that his nation too is under 

covid-19 siege.

Peter Navarro, an advisor to President Trump and Director of the Office of Trade and 

Manufacturing Policy and National Coordinator for the National Defense production Act Policy, 

stated on 22 April that China kept the virus secret and first hoarded all protective gear months 

before the virus hit other nations and then resold it at a significant profit. Such deception indicates 

it is past time for the US to bring its supply chains home142 (pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, 

etc.) and stop placing them in the hands of others, who use them to gain an advantage. On Fox 

News on 25 April, Navarro added that a Chinese delegation met with President Trump on 14 

January, which was seven days after Xi Jinping allegedly took control of the situation and weeks 

after the virus had begun to circulate in China.

143 Of interest to Americans, of course, is whether 

the delegation’s members actually knew if they were at that time infected or not.

Thus, it may be a good time to reexamine China’s way of war internationally as well as 

militarily. Science and technology (S&T) are affecting not only the balance of power among 

nations but also the strategy, campaigns, and tactics of not only trade and diplomacy but militaries 

in ways never expected. 

There are some general conclusions to draw from this short report that should provide a 

few ways of assessing the Chinese military way of war. What follows is a final look at important 

concepts to keep in mind. They include an examination of AI topics regarding future war; a specific 

Chinese method of defining strategy; the PLA’s continued use of historic concepts; the move from 

informatized to intelligentized warfare; China’s continued use of cyber spying, reverse 

engineering, and other issues; the focus of “strategic directors” on the use of various control

mechanisms; the basics of the PLA’s thought process that help indicate how they will fight; and 

the PLA’s focus on “designing future battlefields” in peacetime.

 141 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. “China’s Coronavirus Culpability,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 April 2020, p. A19. 142 No author provided, “President’s Advisor Peter Navarro Accuses China of ‘Four Kills’ against the US in the 

Pandemic,” EIRNS, 22 April 2020. Downloaded from https://larouchepub.com/pr/2020/20200422_navarro.html 143 “Neil Cavuto Interview with Peter Navarro,” Fox News, 25 April 2020.
44

First, and perhaps most important, is the way that AI and other S&T developments are 

changing PLA concepts and their potential wartime focus. Priority concepts included the following

main areas:

1. Intelligent power will become the most crucial factor (all bolding is to stress 

emphasis of actual Chinese wording) in determining war’s outcome. Battlefield 

control, deterrence theory, and arms negotiations will all need new analysis and 

consideration. Attrition warfare launched with intelligent swarms, crossdomain mobile warfare, and cognition control warfare will become basic types 

of combat operations. Cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical 

fighting will be the new normal, and intelligence control will replace 

territorial control as the center of gravity in war.

2. The four forms of smart operations in AI warfare will be as follows: wasp 

swarm operations; Trojan operations; self-determined operations; and 

incapacitation operations. A system of “smart warfare systems” is being built 

where AI is the brain, operational networks the nerves, and operational big data 

the blood of this system. Counters to an adversary’s use of smart wars must also 

be considered, to include topics such as algorithmic and anti-algorithmic 

warfare. The form of military engagements will change from system 

confrontations to algorithm competition, due to the use of AI. It was noted 

that “algorithms are stratagem mechanisms.”

3. The goal in future war is to cut off an opponent’s information and decisionmaking control with friendly advantages gained after intelligent technology and 

information-led theory are combined. The intelligentization of the command 

information system is “the key to the enhancement of the means of operational 

combat and the formation of decision-making advantages” and includes 

intelligent perception, intelligent decision-making, intelligent control, and 

unmanned platforms. The level of military intelligentization of a nation (or 

terrorist group!) may be the new measure of a great power.

4. New battlefield and operational space will consist of the following: space, 

the Internet, all fields of human activities and ideologies, quick response 

satellites, autonomous network security, brain control weapons, gene weapons, 

and other emerging combat powers that will be integrated into combat systems. 

5. Brains and machines will interact to identify vital points and weak links.

Intelligence in hardware will guide information-firepower attacks and attacks 

on system-of-systems structures. Battlefield superiority will be reliant on a 

system’s intelligence superiority relative to an opponent, since destroying or 

paralyzing an opponent’s system-of-systems structure is what helps ensure 

success.

Second, it is important to consider the definition of strategy that several strategists have 

proposed. Perhaps most important is that it offers US strategists another way to consider the 

concept instead of just through the lens of ends, ways, and means. The objective-subjective method
45

helps us understand better how the PLA may be planning operations and why, based on a leader’s 

observation of the situational environment (objective reality) before him and how he applies

subjectivity to manipulate these conditions to his advantage. The situational environment 

presented to leaders/commanders at all levels (the economy, diplomacy, geography, level of 

science and technology, troop dispositions and capabilities of an opponent, etc.) forms objective 

reality. Leaders/commanders then manipulate these realities or strategic situations to their 

advantage through specific subjective guidance which, naturally, may include the use of 

stratagems or other devices. This enables the PLA to fight “its way” and the definition and methods

can apply to both grand and military strategy. This definition of strategy was cited in four places 

above (Wu’s grand strategy article in CMS in 2000, the 2007 Military Strategy book, the 2013 

book The Science of Military Strategy, and Luo Derong’s explanation of Xi’s New Guideline).

Mao was an adherent of the concept as well. He noted that strategy in war is a contest of subjective 

capabilities between two military commanders vying for dominance and initiative when military 

strength, financial resources, and other material conditions (objective reality) serves as the basis 

for their decisions.144

Third, it is important to consider the PLA’s focus on utilizing ancient thought today, 

because it continues to appear on the pages of CMS (as the Appendixes for each period under 

examination clearly show) and in the numerous books and conferences that support its theories. 

This includes ancient theories from the use of stratagems and acupuncture war to vital point 

warfare and the use of shi, among many others. It is important to fully take into consideration the 

works of Sun Tzu, Marx, and Mao, as their works continue to be developed on the pages of CMS. 

Li Bingyan, for example, showed how Sun Tzu’s writings in Chapter Four (dispositions) of the 

Art of War can apply to assessments of the situation even today. That chapter states that wars 

elements include measuring space, estimating quantities, calculations, comparisons, and chances 

of victory. Li added the following about contemporary conditions: 

The mathematical line of thought used by a commander in executing tactics is: 

based on how dangerous or favorable, broad or narrow the terrain is make 

judgments on its use [space]; determine the holding capacity for the battlefield 

[quantity estimation]; based on holding capacity, estimate the number of troops the 

two sides could commit [calculations, comparison, and thus chances of victory].145

The question for today might be what will be the impact of a technological Sun Tzu or 

a technological Mao Zedong? How has the mathematical line of thought changed in accordance 

with the use of AI and quantum? Will we be able to recognize when the PLA wants to “appear 

weak when strong” as they “hide in plain sight” on our cyber networks? China will focus on

developing a strategic advantage with deception and other asymmetric applications of stratagems

to demonstrate ways to manipulate the strategic environment. It is important to remember Mao’s 

concept that “you fight your way and I’ll fight mine” has remained as a key aspect of China’s way 

 144 Yao Youzhi and Ma Debao, “Sun Zi’s Art of War and Mainstream Contemporary Chinese Theories of War,” 

China Military Science, No. 6 2004, pp. 9-13. 145 Ibid.
46

of war (the concept was even expressed in the New Guideline). The important point is that the 

PLA has its own way of warfare that does not include hybrid, gray zone, or other US concepts.

We must come at the China problem from the angle of confronting the PLA’s actual thought mode 

and not trying to integrate what is going on in the PLA into our concepts.

Fourth, it is important to consider the “focal points” of interest to each leader of China. The 

focus of Jiang was on high-tech warfare while Hu and Xi focused on informationized local warfare,

demonstrating their keen interest in information systems and ways to conduct system sabotage 

warfare through targeting vital points of strength in systems. It is here where the concept of 

acupuncture warfare finds its utility, where taking out key nodes can upset or control an entire 

system’s infrastructure. However, Xi’s era has witnessed a greater concern for AI and quantum 

issues than past leaders. This indicates that it might be more likely to characterize Xi’s era as

“preparing for and winning AI-and intelligentized-enhanced battles.” Xi’s concerns, Luo 

Derong stated in the New Guideline, underscored the importance of the principles of innovation, 

flexibility, and the activeness of offense and defense. Innovative thought is encouraging work on 

Li Bingyan’s concept of combining technology with stratagems. Further, cyber spying and reverse 

engineering are being used to put the PLA beyond the possibility of defeat by knowing what their 

opponent plans to do. Collecting operational data provides real-time support for combat 

operations, serving as the foundation for operational calculations and control.146

Fifth, the CPC’s focus on domestic control has clearly extended to the military leadership’s 

focus on various types of battlefield control mechanisms. Not only does the term refer to command 

and control issues but also war, biological, battlefield, cognitive, intelligent, decision-making, 

brain, crisis, arms, conflict, strategic guidance, and other types of control. Many indicate an 

interest in non-warfare types of control. However, the person in charge of war control, known as 

the strategic conductor, was a specific focus. 

• The strategic conductor uses military strength to ‘influence an opponent’s 

cognition and information systems and even to change the will and action of an 

opponent, and thereby to realize the expected strategic objective.’

• The strategic conductor must comprehensively employ both military and nonmilitary means to carry out war control. 

• War control is the war conductor’s behavior to limit and restrain consciously 

the occurrence, development, intensity, and outcome of a war. Armed conflict 

control must, however, spare no effort to strive for the strategic initiative if

armed conflict becomes inevitable. 

Control, naturally, extends to China’s domestic environment in numerous ways. For example, in a 

recent Economist article, it was noted that domestically social control is the most important method 

the communist party has in its efforts to ensure compliance with its internal laws and regulations.

 146 Sun Cuijuan and Yin Chengyou, “The Curtain of the ‘Era of Machine Warfare’ is Being Pulled Open,” 

Jiefangjun Bao Online, 4 May 2017.
47

This is not social control on the Internet but the concept of hukou or household registration that 

makes it difficult to move one’s home from place to place without party permission.147

Sixth, many of the concepts mentioned in the discussion above must be considered in any 

assessment of how the military might be planning actions. They included forms and methods of 

warfare, the use of asymmetric concepts, preemption and pre-practice concepts, and many others. 

Familiarity with these terms is important for anyone studying China’s way of war. 

It is equally important, in accordance with the PLA’s focus on strategy, to reconsider 

Engels concept that “technology determines tactics,” since it has been overcome with the planetary 

reach of the cyber, AI, and quantum age (and in CMS articles) to foster the expectation that 

“technology now determines strategy.” While not explicitly stated by the PLA, theorists imply that 

the first nation to grasp this concept may be the best prepared both offensively and defensively for 

the future, as the thoughts of one officer above so indicated: 

• There is a new change in the relationship among strategy, campaigns, and 

combat. Strategy now is in the lead, consuming the other two who have lost 

their independence in organizing and implementing operations. Now, the 

highest military and political leaders can interfere with operations on the 

battlefield. Strategy has become the stratagem for directing local war under 

informatization conditions. Priority must be given to light weapons and to 

increasing the mobility and the strategic projection of the capabilities of 

operational platforms.

• The intellectual economic era has made mastering science, technology, and 

knowledge more important than plundering resources as in the past. 

Information technology makes it more convenient to put wars under control, to 

scout and detect important strategic targets, and to destroy them from long 

distance. Sensing and detection, navigational positioning, intelligent 

computing, and data transfers must be integrated to expedite the development 

of comprehensive operational platforms incorporating target captures, mobile 

strikes, and the efficient evaluation of information transfer capabilities.148

Other concepts (some were only mentioned briefly in the discussion above but not defined) 

were covered in the paper “Concepts Influencing the Thought of a Chinese Officer,” which is 

attached as Appendix Four. The discussion first lists concepts that coincide with Russian concepts 

of the same type, sometimes using the same words. Then specific Chinese concepts are listed, such 

as war engineering; turning points in war; capabilities index; and combat power development, 

among others. 

Seventh, it is important to consider how the US’s MDO concept and the concepts of other 

regional nations affect China’s design of conflict and way of war. PLA theorists study US concepts 

 147 No author provided, “Caught in the Middle,” The Economist, 14 December 2019. 148 Cui Yafeng, “On the Change in the Relationship between Strategy and Campaign-Combat Operations in Modern 

War,” China Military Science, No. 4 2008, pp. 27-37.
48

and their conclusions are reflected in the PLA’s Blue Force, the training element that uses US 

operations and conducts conflict against friendly Red Forces at training areas. Fights against the 

Blue Force indicate ways the PLA can potentially seek advantages against the West and are 

included in the future design of their battlefield planning and preparations. The PLA is continuing 

to update its design scenarios based on new developments in S&T, new adjustments they perceive 

in the US’s MDO theory, and new ways of considering how to reorganize or manipulate the 

situational environment to the PLA’s advantage and an opponent’s disadvantage. Among them 

would be attempts to paralyze enemy systems, based on the discussion above.

Finally, there are a few other important points to keep in mind in a consideration of China’s 

way of war. They include the following (some refer to points covered above): 

1. There is a continual goal of creating a strategic advantage or shi on the battlefield, 

in diplomatic relations, geostrategic settings (through considerations of numerous 

factors, such as distance attenuation, etc.), supply chains, and any area in which it 

China has an interest. A strategic advantage is the goal of any manipulation of the 

strategic environment, and it is probably the most important Chinese concept to 

keep in mind.

2. Today there may exist a slight change in focus from system-of-systems to 

combatting AI algorithms, but the system sabotage issue will continue to play an 

important role.

3. There is a higher reliance on the offensive aspect of active defense in the cyber 

age, where the first battles will establish who has attained the strategic initiative in 

war. Once the armed conflict is inevitable, no effort should be spared to strive for 

strategic initiative, one author noted. Conflict will proceed quickly once unleashed 

and involve all domains.

4. Critical infrastructure targets must be uncovered and planned in peacetime, the 

PLA notes, for special operations.

5. There is a growing focus on the use of swarm operations (wolves, wasps, and 

fish) and their potential applicability to all domains of an opponent.

6. The overall situation in terms of military strategy is to start with national interests 

and the overall interests of the war as the goals to pursue. Strategic fulcrums must 

be established in advance.

7. Strategic psychological warfare will employ numerous means to force an 

opponent to submit without a fight. Five specific types of information topics were: 

information deterrence, blockades, deception, disruption, and attacks (computer 

viruses, hacking, etc.).

8. Regarding asymmetric operations, making use of favorable temporal and spatial 

factors and the consequent environmental condition are important aspects of 

designing asymmetric battlefields.

9. There is a focus (32 articles from 2013-2018) on various aspects of ‘civil-military 

integration,’ with titles addressing power projection, power grid advantages, 

economic construction, science and technology, and integration strategies.
49

10. And, as a final warning, pay attention to China’s methods to manipulate others 

with deceptive stratagems. It is easy to fall into traps the PLA lays for opponents. 

For example, “appear weak when strong” would certainly apply to the PLA’s 

current attempts to downplay its AI and quantum prowess. The country’s 2019 

Defense White Paper titled China’s National Defense in the New Era stated that 

China was only now coming out of its period of mechanization, a total fabrication 

of its current advanced competencies. 

Just as the ancient sage at the start of this article would marvel today at how his stratagems 

are used in conjunction with diplomatic issues, another sage may marvel in ten years at how his or 

some other philosophers stratagems are utilized to manipulate advances in artificial intelligence or 

quantum computing. There will be new applications of ways to deter opponents, new methods to 

conduct war control or psychological operations (with biological means?), and new types of 

fighting styles. China’s strategic and campaign templates will be altered to fit the circumstances 

and technologies at hand, just as active defense is leaning toward an offensive posture to ensure 

that China can gain the initiative in a future conflict (while offering a peaceful outer appearance). 

The ever-growing integration of civilian agencies with military ones offer new attack means 

against the vital nodes of an opponent’s infrastructure. Chinese leaders will adjust to contradictions 

and changing conditions when assessing objective reality, to include the causes and effects of 

conditions such as these above and will plan comprehensively/holistically for many eventualities.

Strategically, the reach of the PLA and other nations into another country’s infrastructure, 

independent of that nation’s distance from China, with cyber, space, or physical (ports, 5G, etc.)

means, has increased. S&T developments can be very influential when integrated with deception 

or stratagem techniques and will influence campaigns. With regard to tactics, robotic 

developments have changed how wars will be fought from a distance through their detailed ability 

to conduct reconnaissance ahead of time (use of miniature unmanned aerial or under water vehicles 

for land or maritime warfare) and to prepare precision fires. Traditional methods of warfare are 

available but will be used less often. Rather, the intelligentization of warfare appears to be taking 

center stage, with flames being stoked in the cognitive domain to light up innovation and produce 

products that enable commanders to see and assess the battlefield condition in front of him before 

an opponent can do so and then act first. 

Thus, China’s way of war is continually being updated in accordance with the manner in 

which nation state relations change and evolve; the discoveries of weak links in an opponent’s way 

of war and strengths in the PLA’s new concepts; and the way stratagems can be used in conjunction 

with technology to deceive opponents and lure them into disadvantageous positions. It is clear,

then, that there are specific factors to consider when looking at China’s way of war: attaining a 

strategic advantage; establishing control of all types; use of stratagems and deception; the design 

of war; psychological actions (blockage, disruptions, deterrence, etc.); asymmetries (time, space, 

environments, etc.); system sabotage aimed at vital points; swarm operations; taking the strategic 

initiative instead of active defense; a focus on AI and quantum communications; and a specific 

way to define strategy are among the most important of them.
50

China will continue to probe and penetrate the infrastructure of any opponent. After all, 

China sees no difference between war and peace since confrontation and competition are consistent 

and eternal. With regard to the reigns of the past three presidents, Xi has been the most creative in 

regard to the use of reforming the military with new S&T and implementing grand strategy. He 

has reached out across Europe and Central Asia with his Belt and Road Initiative, focused on 

expanding Chinese ports worldwide, used his close relationship with President Putin of Russia to 

gain access to the Arctic (and perhaps consequently buy more oil and gas from Russia), and 

constructed a significant infrastructure of influence (transport, communications, natural resource 

exploitation, etc.) in both Africa and Latin America. His way of war must be closely watched, for 

in addition to the development of a grand strategy and Armed Forces reform, Xi appears to have

an insatiable appetite for natural resources and a desire to make China the most powerful nation 

on earth. Recent legislation aimed to quell dissent in Hong Kong is but one example. When 

combined with China’s historic legacy of deception and stratagem use, he will remain a formidable 

opponent for many years to come.
51

APPENDIX ONE: ARTICLES IN CHINA MILITARY SCIENCE (CMS) DURING JIANG’S 

REIGN (1999-2003 were covered; no earlier issues were available for analysis)

Articles on General and Special Topics, Active Defense, People’s War, Frontier Defense, Sun 

Tzu, Mao Zedong, Chinese Military Culture, and Special Topics of Interest

There were many general topics along with those on information and strategy in CMS in 

the Jiang era: The Current Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Asia-Pacific Security 

(4/2000); On Psychological Warfare against the Background of Grand Strategy (5/2000); A 

Comparison of Psychological Warfare between China and the West (6/2000); On Defense in 

Modern Psychological Warfare (6/2000); On Psychological Warfare in Recent High-Tech Local 

Wars (6/2000); A Comparative Study between the Art of War and On War (1/2001); Psychological 

Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy (4/2001); The Generalization, Conservation, and 

Development of ‘Strategy’—Acquiring a Scientific Conception of Strategy (4/2001); China and 

the Revolution in Military Affairs (4/2001); The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient 

China (5/2001); ‘Victory without War’ and Modern Deterrence Strategy (5/2001); Mao Zedong’s 

Theory and Practice of Guerrilla Warfare (1/2002); On the Strategy of Psychological Warfare 

(2/2002); Emphasis on Strategy: Demonstration of Oriental Military Culture (5/2002); Battles of 

Changping-Handan: Ancient Chinese Grand Strategy in Action (5/2002); On the New Concepts 

of Chinese Military Strategy in the 21st Century (2/2003); The Theoretical Value and Practical 

Significance of the System (Compiling) of the Chinese Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition) 

(6/2003). Special topics of interest do not have titles, just the number of times they appeared, 

which included the following: numerous ancient/dynasty examples; Deng Xiaoping (17); Marx 

(25); reunification with Taiwan (15); information war/information operations (13); RMA (13); 

campaign (10); political officers (12); deterrence (4); Korea (11); Kosovo (13); psywar/psyops (9); 

space (9); Iraq (5); science and technology increase combat power (3); and (1) each for asymmetry, 

nanotechnology, stand-off war, war control, foresight, and non-war issues. There were also 34 

articles (6/2000 x 6; 3/2002 x 6; 4/2002 x 9; 5/2002 x 5; and 6/2002 x 7) on Chinese Military 

Culture. Many of these were summarized in Chapter Three (pp. 56-89) of the 2009 book titled 

The Dragon’s Quantum Leap.

In addition, the following articles were available on the topics of active defense, local war 

under high-tech conditions, People’s War, frontier or border defense, Sun Tzu, and Mao Zedong.

Active defense was only discussed briefly in the time period in the following 

manner: Mao Zedong’s Strategic Thought of Active Defense and Chinese Classical Culture 

(3/2001); The Evolution and Development of the Content of Active Defense Strategy 

(6/2001); and The Development and Revision of China’s ‘Active Defense’ Strategy 

(1/2002).

Local war under high-tech conditions included the following 21 articles: Furthering the 

Study of Features and Laws of High-Tech Local War and Improving Guidance in Winning HighTech Local War (1/1999); On Features and Laws of Local War under High-Tech Conditions 

(1/1999); Views on Early Warning in High-Tech Local War (1/1999); Views on Problems of 

Preparations of High-Tech Local War (1/1999); Prompt Decision—An Important Principle of War 
52

Guidance in High-Tech Local War (1/1999); Views on Countering High-Tech Weaponry with 

Conventional Weaponry (1/1999); Analysis of Opposition in Operational Command in High-Tech 

Conditions (3/1999); The Development of High Technology and Changes in War Form (3/2000); 

Planning and Application of Strategies of Information Operations in High-Tech Local War 

(4/2000); New Changes in War Economic Mobilization in High-Tech Conditions (5/2000); On 

Psychological Warfare in Recent High-Tech Local Wars (6/2000); Science and Technology: The 

First Decisive Factor in High-Tech Local Wars (6/2000); Main Issues of Defense of Logistics in 

Regional Wars under High-Tech Conditions (1/2001); Understanding the Fundamentals Affecting

the Outcome of High-Tech Local Wars (3/2001); The Emergence of High-Tech War and its 

Position in History (6/2001); Developing the Spiritual Motivations of the Members of the Armed 

Forces under the Conditions of High-Tech War (6/2001); Views on the Construction of 

Transportation Battlefields in High-Tech Wars (3/2002); Rationally Understand the Human Factor 

in High-Tech Wars (4/2002); On Modern High-Tech Wars and the Law of War (6/2002); HighTech Warfare and the Transformation of Military Thinking Methods (1/2003); Developments in 

Military High-Tech and an Update on Military Strategic Thinking (4/2003).

People’s War was barely mentioned, with the only published article being “Studies in the 

Dominant Theory of People’s War” (2/2003). 

Frontier Defense (forward edge defense was not mentioned) was discussed in 2003. The 

articles were: 50 Years of Theory and Practice in Border Defense Construction in New China 

(4/1999); Analysis of the Border Defense Crises in the Late Qing Dynasty (2/2000); China’s 

Frontier Defense Facing the New Century (3/2003); Deliberation of the Issues of Establishing the 

Science of Frontier Defense (3/2003); New China’s Theory of Frontier Defense and Strategy of 

Frontier Management (3/2003); Develop China’s Superior Frontier Defense Culture and Enhance 

the Construction of Advanced Frontier Defense Culture (3/2003); Major Strategies of Western 

Frontier Defense Construction by China’s Feudal Dynasties of Past Ages and their Inspirations 

(3/2003); Information Frontier Defense: Prospects for Future Frontier Defense (3/2003); Mao 

Zedong Thought of Governing Frontiers and the Modernization of Border Defense (6/2003).

Sun Tzu was mentioned often, with the following 19 titles devoted to him: Sun Tzu 

Thinking of ‘Disrupting His Alliances Through Diplomatic Means’ and Settlement of International 

Disputes by Peaceful Means (2/1999); Views on the Cultural Heritage of The Art of War and 

International Security at the Turn of the Century (2/1999); On the Concept of National Strategy in 

The Art of War and China’s State Security Strategy (2/1999); The Art of War and the Study of the 

Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence (2/1999); On the ‘Relations between War and the Economy’ by 

Sun Tzu (2/1999); ‘Subduing the Enemy without Fighting’ and ‘Information Warfare’ (2/1999); 

Exchanging Views on The Art of War and Discussing Prospects for International Security 

(2/1999); China’s Ancient Military Science and The Art of War (6/2000); Carry Forward the 

Quintessence of Sun Zi’s Art of War and Promote Peace and Security in the New Century (1/2000); 

Open a New Chapter in the Study of Sun Zi’s Art of War in the 21st Century (1/2001); Sun Zi’s 

Conception of Prudence in Fighting and the National Security Strategy of China (1/2001); On 

Issues of War at the Beginning of the New Millennium (1/2001); An Analysis of Sun Zi’s 
53

Conception that ‘A Triumphant Army Will Not Fight with the Enemy until the Victory is Assured’

and the Strategic Decision in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1/2001); A 

Comparative Study between The Art of War and On War (1/2001); Face New Challenges and Open 

Up a New Prospect—Study of Sun Zi in the New Century 1/2001); The Military and Cultural 

Characteristics of the Seven Military Classics and the Confucianization of Military Art in Ancient 

China (4/2001); Cultural Features and Spirit of the Times of the Art of War in the Qi and Lu of the 

Zhou Dynasty (2/2003); ‘Knowledge’—The Essence and Implication of Sun Tzu’s Art of War

(4/2003); Characteristics of Sun Tzu’s Simple Information Thinking (4/2003).

Naturally, Mao Zedong was another focus of attention, with 30 articles devoted to him. 

Articles focused on his teachings and included the following: Strategies of Mao Zedong and Zhou 

Enlai in their Military Struggles against the Guomindang in Taiwan (1/2000); Mao Zedong, Deng 

Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin and their Strategies of Military Talent Development (1/2000); Mao 

Zedong’s Strategic Plan of Liberating Taiwan and Other Offshore Islands (3/2000); Two EpochMaking Theoretical Achievements in Marxist Military Dialectics—Comparison of Essentials in 

Lenin and Mao Zedong Military Dialectics (5/2000); Mao Zedong and Chinese Military Culture 

(6/2000); Mao Zedong’s Strategic Thought of Active Defense and Chinese Classical Culture 

(3/2001); The Dynamic Theoretical Character of Mao Zedong’s Military Thought (6/2001); A 

Comparative Study of the Main Ideas of Mao Zedong’s and Clausewitz’s Military Strategic 

Thought (6/2001); Mao Zedong’s Theory and Practice of Guerrilla Warfare (1/2002); Mao Zedong 

Military Strategies, a book on Mao Zedong Military Art (3/2002); Theoretic Essence of Keeping 

Up with the Times in Mao Zedong Military Thought (5/2002); Mao Zedong’s Creative 

Contribution to Proletarian Military Science (1/2003); The Red Sun Rises in the East—On the 

Historic Position of Mao Zedong (5/2003); On Mao Zedong Thought of the Military Legal System 

(5/2003); Speech at the opening Ceremony of the PLA Forum of Mao Zedong Military Thought 

Marking the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Comrade Mao Zedong (6/2003); Brilliant Thinking 

and Scientific Guidance—Speech at the PLA Forum of Mao Zedong Military Thought Marking 

the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Comrade Mao Zedong (6/2003); Carrying Forward and 

Advancing Mao Zedong Military Thought and Promoting the RMA with Chinese Characteristics 

(6/2003); Mao Zedong Thought of Political Struggle in Warfare and National Security in the 21st

Century (6/2003); On the Characteristics of Mao Zedong Strategic Thinking (6/2003); On the 

Characteristics of the Scientific System of Mao Zedong National Defense Thought (6/2003); Mao 

Zedong Thought of the People’s Air Force Construction and Its Creative Development (6/2003); 

Scientific Guidance for the Modernization of the PLA Navy in the New Century (6/2003); Mao 

Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin on PLA Logistic Construction with Chinese 

Characteristics (6/2003); The Development of Missiles, Atomic Weapons, and Man-Made 

Satellites in China and their Inspiration to Weaponry Development in the New Period (6/2003); 

Mao Zedong Strategic Thought of State Reunification and Its Practical and Immediate 

Significance (6/2003); Mao Zedong Thought of Governing Frontiers and the Modernization of 

Border Defense (6/2003); Mao Zedong Thought of the Construction of the Armed Police Forces 

and Its Creative Development (6/2003); The Outline of Mao Zedong Thought of the Strategic 

Offense (6/2003); A New Analysis of Mao Zedong Thought of the “Two Musts” (6/2003).
54

APPENDIX TWO: CMS DURING HU’S REIGN (2004-2012)

Articles on General and Special Topics, Active Defense, People’s War, Frontier Defense, Sun 

Tzu, Mao Zedong, Chinese Military Culture, and Special Topics of Interest

There were many topics along with those on information and strategy in CMS in the Hu 

era: On Strategic Thinking (3/2004); Developing the Theory of Strategic Deterrence with Chinese 

Characteristics (3/2004); A Study of the Theory of Marxist Strategic Psychological Warfare 

(4/2004); On the Basic Features of Strategic Psychological Warfare (4/2004); Developing Trends 

of Psychological Warfare in Grand Strategy (4/2004); Direct Manifestation of the Operational 

Role of Political Work—On Media Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Law Warfare (4/2004); 

Characteristics of Information Mobilization (4/2004); Prevalence of Clausewitz’s ‘On War’ in 

China (5/2004); Sun Zi’s Art of War and Mainstream Contemporary Chinese Theories of War 

(6/2004); Sun Zi’s Art of War: Gem of Chinese Strategic Culture (6/2004); Summary of the 

Symposium on the Study and Application of Sun Tzu’s Art of War in the Information Age 

(1/2005); Strategic Political Work and Strategic Psychological Warfare (3/2005); Important Issues 

Concerning Strategic Psychological Warfare in Informationalized Conditions (3/2005); Contrast 

and Analyze Sun Zi’s Art of War and the Thirty-Six Stratagems (3/2005); A Study of the 

Operational Mechanism of Psychological Warfare (4/2005); Concepts and Characteristics of 

Strategic Psychological Warfare (4/2005); National Interests and Military Security (6/2005); 

Military Strategic Thinking and Scientific Decision-Making (1/2006); The Development of CPLA 

Psychological Warfare Thinking in War Times (1/2006); Ensure Historical Orientation and 

Promote All-Round Innovation of Army Informationalization (1/2007); A Study of Urban Terrain 

Operations (2/2007); On the Unity of an Army of the Party, of the People, and of the Nation 

(2/2007); Views on Guiding the Creation of Military Strategic Theory with the Scientific 

Development Concept (2/2007); Marx and Engels and Clausewitz’s ‘On War’ (5/2007); 

Connotations, Nature, and Characteristics of Strategy (6/2007); Promote a Better and Faster 

Scientific Development of Informationalization in Political Work (1/2008); China’s Strategic 

Cultural Evolution Ideas and the Orientation of its Values (2/2008); A Study of Non-War Military 

Operations (3/2008); On the Fundamental Issues of Complex Electromagnetic Environments

(4/2008); Creative Development of the Party’s Military Guidance Theory since the Reform and 

Opening-Up (5/2008); A Study of the Laws in Ethnical and Religious Issues Involved in Armed 

Conflicts (2/2009); An Analysis of the New Changes in the Principles of Informatized Warfare 

(3/2009); Relations between Military Soft Power and Comprehensive National Power Plus State 

Soft power (5/2009); Characteristics and Trends of the Development of Special Forces (5/2009); 

The Nature of Psychological Warfare, ‘Spiritual Warfare’ as Opposed to War of Flesh and 

Blood—a Philosophical Perspective on the Nature of Psychological Warfare (6/2009); Innovative 

Development in Compiling and Revising PLA’s Operational Doctrines and its Implications 

(6/2009); A Preliminary Study of Compressed Operations in Modern Warfare (1/2010); On the 

Development of National Interests and the Development of Military Strategy (3/2010); 

Characteristics of China’s Traditional Strategic Thought (3/2010); An Analysis of the Laws of Sea 

Powers Contending for and Controlling Strategic Maritime Passage Ways (5/2010); PLA 

Informationization and the Development of a Space Military Force (6/2010); Fundamental 

Strategy for Building the PLA into a Powerful Iron Army—Studying the Newly Revised 
55

Regulations of the People’s Liberation Army on Political Work (6/2010); An Explorative Study of 

the Laws in Developing Capabilities for Systems Operations Based on Information Systems 

(1/2011); A Study of Basic Issues on Systems Operations Based on Information Systems (1/2011); 

Thoughts on Building Military Force Structure Based on Information Systems (1/2011); Clearly 

Understand the Laws, Master the Direction, Speed Up Promoting the Change of the Formation 

Mode of War-Fighting Capabilities (3/2011); Hu Jintao’s Important Instructions on National 

Defense and Army Building As Creative Development of the Party’s Military Guidance Theory 

(4/2011); Unified Planning for Weapons and Equipment Mobilization under the Guidance of 

Scientific Development Methodology—Views on Studying Hu Jintao’s Mastering and Applying 

the Fundamental Methods of Overall Planning and All-Round Consideration (4/2011); On the 

Problem of Cultural Development for Joint Operations with PLA Characteristics (4/2011); An 

Exploration of Hu Jintao’s Strategic Thinking on Strengthening the Military by Means of Science 

and Technology (5/2011); Strategic Considerations of the Army in Speeding Up Transforming 

the Mode of Generating Warfighting Capabilities (1/2012); Scientifically Judge the New Situation 

and Calmly Respond to New Challenges—An Interview on ‘The Strategic Review 2011’ with 

Major General Chen Zhou, Director of the AMS Center for National Defense Policy (3/2012); 

Basic Issues in Speeding Up Transforming the Mode of Generating Warfighting Capabilities 

(5/2012); A Study of Systemic Warfighting Command Based on Information Systems (6/2012); 

Reflections on the Methodology to Further Advance the Transformation of PLA Military Training 

(6/2012); Leadership of the CPC and the Development of National Defense Science and 

Technology (6/2012); Explorations into the Issues of Advancing the Training of Military 

Personnel (6/2012). No titles are listed for special topics, just general subject areas for which there 

may or may not be translations available. Special topics of interest do not have titles, just the 

number of times they appeared, which included the following: historical/ancient experiences; war 

guidance; RMA (25); strategic deterrence (2); system of systems; Marx (29); psychological war 

(13); 3 warfares; geostrategy/geographical (14); nature of war; war theory; space warfare/power 

(8); war control; national interests (6); urban operations; Hu on the military (42); military guidance 

(17); non-war military operations (8); military pre-practice (6); warfighting capabilities (21); 

advanced military culture (starts in 2012, 18). 

In addition, the following articles were available on the topics of active defense, People’s 

War, frontier or border defense, Sun Tzu, and Mao Zedong. 

Active defense was only discussed in one article in the time period: 60 Years of 

Sticking to Active Defense Military Strategy in New China (5/2009).

People’s War was mentioned several times: Adapting to the Changed War Forms and 

Inventing New Ways of People’s War (3/2004); Fundamental Theoretical Issues on People’s War 

under Modern Conditions (6/2008); Recent Development in the Study of People’s War Thought 

under Information Conditions (2/2009); Great Unprecedented Undertaking of People’s War 

(4/2010); Zhou Enlai on People’s War (5/2010); and A New Explanation of the Historical 

Development of Theories of People’s Warfare (1/2011). 
56

Civil-Military Integration is first mentioned during Hu’s time frame. It was highlighted 

14 times: A Study of the Strategy of Building Up a Civil-Military Integrated Support System with 

Chinese Characteristics (5/2008); The Cut-in Point for Civil-Military Integration (5/2008); 

Military and Civil Integrated Development: Important Strategic Thinking for Overall Planning in 

National Defense and Economic and Social Development (1/2009); Retrospect and Enlightenment 

of the Development of a Military and Civil Integration Concept (1/2009); Strategic Consideration 

of Military and Civil Integrated Development with Chinese Characteristics (1/2009); Construction 

of the Mobilization Preparation Mode of ‘Virtual Combined Military-Civilian Integration’ for 

Defense-Related Science, Technology, and Industry (2/2010); A Preliminary Analysis of Risk 

Management against the Breaking of Integrated Military-Civilian Supply Chain of Emergency 

Logistics (2/2010); Mechanism of Coordinating Integrated Military-Civilian Investment Based on 

an Economic Perspective (5/2010); On an Exploration into the Road for Joint Military-Civilian 

Development in the New Situation (6/2010); Enforce Civil-Military Integration of the Innovative 

System for the Defense of Science and Technology in Innovative National Construction (2/2011); 

Exploration and Practice of the Path of Integrated Civilian-Military Development by the 

Communist Party of China (3/2011); On the Construction of Driving Mechanisms for MilitaryCivilian Integrated Development (5/2011); Hu Jintao’s Important Instructions on the Integrated 

Civilian-Military Development with Chinese Characteristics (6/2011); Civil-Military Integrated 

Development in Terms of Strategy (3/2012).

Frontier or Border Defense (forward edge defense was not mentioned) was seldom 

discussed. The articles were: Relations to be Correctly Handled in Strengthening Border Defense 

(2/2006); Sun Zi’s Art of War and Modern Frontier Defense Construction (5/2006); Historical 

Experience of the Border Defense of Northwest China (3/2007); A Study of China’s Coastal 

Defense Strategy (5/2007); Policy and Practice of Resolving Frontier Minority Nationality Issues 

in the Qing Dynasty (3/2008); Considerations on Building Up Frontier Defense in the New 

Situation (5/2010); Frontier Troops Should Play an Important Role in Promoting Economic and 

Social Development and Guaranteeing Lasting Stability (5/2012).

Sun Tzu was mentioned often, with the following 37 titles devoted to him: Important 

Issues in Correctly Handling the Study of Sun Zi’s Art of War—Commentary on Lu Yunchang’s 

Recent Study of Sun Wu (2/2004); On Sun Zi’s Strategy of ‘Attacking their Alliances’ (5/2004); 

Study Sun Zi’s Art of War and Bring Benefit to Mankind (6/2004); Push Forward the Study of Sun 

Zi into New Range and Quality (6/2004); Features and Modern Inspirations of Military Thinking 

in Sun Zi’s Art of War (6/2004);Continue to Promote the Study of Sun Zi’s Art of War along a 

Scientific and Healthy Road (6/2004); Sun Zi’s Art of War and Mainstream Contemporary Chinese 

Theories of War (6/2004); Sun Zi’s Art of War: Gem of Chinese Strategic Culture (6/2004); The 

Theoretic Structure and Actual Significance of Sun Zi’s Strategic Thinking (6/2004); Push 

Forward the Study of Sun Zi’s Art of War with Strategic Culture in the Lead (6/2004); The Peace 

Views of ‘Preventing Wars’—On the Main Points of the Ancient Chinese Art of War Culture 

(6/2004); On Comprehensive Understanding of the Military thinking of Sun Zi’s Art of War 

(6/2004); Sun Zi’s ‘Winning Conception’ and Air-Space Power of the Information Age (6/2004); 

An Analysis of the Paradox of Sun Zi’s Art of War (6/2004); Sun Zi’s Art of War and Modern 
57

Logistics (6/2004); Sun Zi’s View of War Effectiveness and Its Actual Significance (6/2004);

Summary of Symposium on the Study and Application of Sun Zi’s Art of War in the Information 

Age (1/2005); Contrast and Analyze Sun Zi’s Art of War and the Thirty-Six Stratagems (3/2005); 

Fundamental Scientific Spirit Contained in Sun Zi’s Art of War (5/2005); Peaceful Development 

and National Defense Modernization in China (5/2006); Further the Study of Sun Zi’s Art of War

for Harmony, Peace, and Development in the World (5/2006); Sun Zi’s Art of War and the Road 

of Peaceful Development (5/2006); Sun Zi’s Art of War and Modern Frontier Defense 

Construction (5/2006); On ‘Neutralization’ Culture and Strategic Management (5/2006); On War 

Ethics of Confucianism in the Early Qin Dynasty (5/2006); Orientation of Interest in Sun Zi’s War 

Theory (5/2006); A Comparative Study of Chinese and US Literature on Sun Zi’s Art of War

(6/2006); Why Sun Zi’s Art of War Can Become a Lasting Work of Military Art (1/2007); On the 

Weak Defeating the Strong under Information Conditions (1/2008); Works of a Painstaking Effort 

and Gold Uncovered Below the Dust—After Reading Wu Rusong’s New Interpretation of Sun 

Zi’s Art of War (3/2008); A Review of ‘Criticism on Sun Tzu from Clausewitz’s Perspective’ 

(1/2010); New Gains in Sorting Out and Studying Sun Tzu’s Art of War—A Review of Thirteen 

Chapters of Sun Tzu (Rectified Bamboo Slips Version) (1/2010); On the Thoughts of Quantitative 

Analysis in Sun Tzu’s Art of War (4/2010); Studies of Sun Zi’s Art of War during the Republic of 

China (1912-1949) (6/2010); Another Interpretation of ‘Subduing the Enemy without Fighting’ 

(1/2011); Swedish Art of War and Sun Tzu’s Art of War (2/2011); An Analysis of the Military 

Thought in ‘Extraordinary and Normal Art of Operations' from the Yinqueshan Han Bamboo Slips 

(4/2012); 

Naturally Mao Zedong was another focus of attention with 29 articles focused on his 

teachings that included the following: On the Characteristics of Strategic Thinking of Mao Zedong 

in War Guidance (1/2004); Mao Zedong Thought of International Strategy (1/2004); Mao Zedong 

Geostrategic Thought and the Security and Development of New China (1/2004); Mao Zedong’s 

Concept of War and Modern War (1/2004); Essentials of Mao Zedong’s Art of War Guidance 

(1/2004); Mao Zedong’s Military Strategies and their Practical Value (1/2004); An Outstanding 

Masterpiece with Philosophic Truth (1/2004); Inspiration of the Methodology of Mao Zedong 

Thought of Army Building (1/2004); Mao Zedong and PLA Modernization and Regularization in 

the 1950s (1/2004); Mao Zedong Military Thought and Chinese Advanced Culture (1/2005); 

Creative Development of Mao Zedong Military Thought in the Period of the Anti-Japanese War 

(4/2005); New Annotations of Mao Zedong’s Study of On War (1/2006); Mao Zedong’s Theory 

and Practice in Handling Relations between Economic Building and National Defense Building 

(2/2006); Historic Outstanding Strategic Planning—Commentary on Mao Zedong and the War to 

Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (3/2006); Zhu De and the Creation and Development of Mao 

Zedong Military Thought (6/2006); On Mao Zedong’s Serviceman Values and their Modern Value 

(6/2007); Mao Zedong’s Theory and Practice of Containing War and Maintaining Peace (2/2008); 

Mao Zedong Strategic Thought is a Treasure of Wisdom to Conquer the Enemy (4/2008); Basic 

Experience of Mao Zedong in Handling Military Crises after the Founding of the People’s 

Republic of China (6/2009); A Re-study of Mao Zedong’s Theory on Defeating the Strong by the 

Weak (3/2010); New Developments in Mao Zedong Military Thought after the Founding of the 

People’s Republic of China—Views on the Compilation and Studying of Mao Zedong’s Military 

Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC (4/2010); An Analysis of Mao Zedong Thought of 
58

‘Luring the Enemy in Deep’ after the Founding of the PRC (5/2010); A Study of Mao Zedong 

Thought on Strategic Transformation for Army Building after the PRC Was Founded in 1949 

(6/2010); Scientific Methodology of Mao Zedong in his Study of Wars and Its Practical 

Significance (2/2011); An Outline of Profound Development in Mao Zedong Military Thought 

after the Founding of the People’s Republic of China—Notes on Editing The Military Manuscripts 

of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China (3/2011); Mao Zedong’s 

Views on War and Peace since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China (3/2011); 

Innovative Development of Mao Zedong’s Operational Modes of Annihilation Warfare in the War 

to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (2/2012); A Study of Maritime Strategic Thoughts of Mao 

Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin (2/2012); An Exploration of Mao Zedong Thought on 

War Judgment after the Founding of the People’s Republic China (4/2012).
59

APPENDIX THREE: CMS DURING XI’S REIGN (2013-Present; No CMS issues were 

available for 2019 and 2020)

Articles on General Topics, Active Defense, People’s War, Frontier Defense, Sun Tzu, Mao 

Zedong, Chinese Military Culture, and Special Topics of Interest

There were many topics along with those on information and strategy in CMS in the Xi era: 

A Study of Basic Operational Theories for New-Types of PLA Army Combat Forces (1/2013); 

Considerations on Understanding and Seizing the Turning Point in the Transformation of the Form 

of Warfare (2/2013); An Analysis of Vital Points in Operations (2/2013); Strategic Considerations 

on Promoting the Building of the PLA’s New-Type Operational Forces (3/2013); Geographical 

Distance, Law of Distance Attenuation, and Overseas Military Bases (3/2013); On Control and 

Management of Military Crises (4/2013); Understanding of and Consideration on Improving 

Warfighting Capabilities of the PLA Infantry Forces (4/2013); A Review of Research on the 

Concept of Strategic Preposition (5/2013); Considerations Triggered by Cyber Warfare on the Law 

of Armed Conflict—A Case Study and Nomological Exploration (5/2013); The Theory and 

Practice of Target-Centric Warfare (5/2013); Considerations on the Construction of a Modern 

Land Battlefield (5/2013); A Strategic Consideration on Battlefield Construction for Joint 

Operations under Informationized Conditions (6/2013); On War Control—A Study from the 

Perspective of Military Thought (2/2014); On Warfighting Experimentation (4/2014); Further on 

War Control (4/2014); On the Innovative Development of the Science of Strategy (4/2015); 

Strategic Thinking in the Game of Go (6/2015); An Exploration of Future War and Environmental 

Security Issues (4/2015); An Analysis of the Impact of Modern Biological Technology on Future 

Forms of War (3/2016); Main Experiences of Russia’s Military Operations in Syria (3/2016); 

Guidelines for Armed Forces Building and Preparations for Military Struggle—Understanding of 

the Military Strategic Guidelines in the New Situation (1/2017); Building Informatized Support 

for Army Weaponry in the New Era (2/2018). Special topics of interest do not have titles, just the 

number of times they appeared, which included the following: warfighting capability (9); Marx 

(7); space (4); vital points (1); turning points (1); total war (1); law of distance attenuation (1); 

military crises (2); cloud operations (3); strategic preposition (1); battlefield construction (2 in 

2013, 1 in 2016); target centric warfare (1); MOOTW (1); psychological warfare (1); war control 

(2 in 2014); local war under informationized conditions (1); holistic view of national security (2); 

Nansha Islands (1); South China Sea (4 in 2016); protracted war (3); future war (1); all-domain (2 

in 2015, 1 in 2016; 3rd offset in 2017); biotechnology and the RMA (1 in 2015) and biological 

technology and Future forms of war (1 in 2016); peacekeeping (4); game of go (3); decisionmaking (1 in 2016, 1 in 2017); just war (1); fair trial principle in armed conflicts (1); time 

dominance (1); new intelligence era challenges (1); proxy wars (1); deterrence (2); strategic 

projection systems (1); algorithm war (1); understanding war (1); polar rights (1); information 

operations/warfare (23); cyber issues (11); US light footprint to intervention (1); modernized 

military theories (2); use AI to dispel the fog of war (1); AI and law of armed conflict (2/2018); 

UAVs (3); BRI for Africa (1); Autonomous weapons systems (robots, 1); big data (4).
60

In addition, the following articles were available on the topics of active defense, People’s 

War and civil-military integration, frontier or border defense, Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, and Xi 

Jinping.

Active defense was only discussed in one article in the time period in the following 

manner: On China’s Strategy of Active Defense and Its Innovative Development (1/2014).

People’s War was mentioned a few times, most often in reference to China’s war with 

Japan: Democratic Revolution is the Only Path to Victory of the Chinese People’s War of 

Resistance against Japanese Aggression—Two Principles of the CPC’s Military Economic Policy 

and their Practices (4/2015); The Great Spirit of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against 

Japanese Aggression is a Strong Driving Force to Achieve the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation 

(4/2015); A Historical Review of the Basic Experience of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War 

of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (5/2015); On People’s War on Terror (1/2017). Civilmilitary integration, on the other hand, was mentioned 32 times as follows: A Survey of 

Integrated Military-Civilian Development (1/2013); On Further Boosting the Integrated MilitaryCivilian Development (5/2013); A Study of Deepening Civilian-Military Integration (1/2014); On 

Building Strategic Projection Power with Deepened Civilian-Military Integration (1/2014); 

Considerations on Deepening Military-Civilian Integration (3/2014); On the Establishment of a 

Policy System for In-Depth Development of Civil-Military Integration (3/2015); Meet the 

Requirements of In-Depth Development of Civil-Military Integration and Enhance the 

Development of Reserve Forces for National defense (3/2015); Bring the Integrative Advantages 

of Power Grid Enterprises into Full Play and Promote In-Depth Development of Civil-Military 

Integration (3/2015); Promote Further Development of Military-Civilian Integration on a New 

Historical Start (5/2015); Benefit from International Experience and Promote Further 

Development of Military-Civilian Integration (5/2015); Implement the National Strategy for CivilMilitary Integration and Promote the Integrated Development of Economic Construction and 

National Defense Building (1/2016); Considerations on Establishing a Project System with 

Chinese Characteristics for Civil-Military Integration (1/2016); In-Depth Civil-Military 

Integration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (1/2016); A Summary of 

the Fourth Military-Civilian High-End Strategic Forum (1/2016); The Role of National Guidance 

in Deepening Civil-Military Integration (5/2016); On Building the System and Mechanism for InDepth Development of Civil-Military Integration (5/2016); On the Four Principal Points in the 

Strategy of Civil-Military Integrated Development (6/2016); Xi’s Thoughts on Military-Civil 

Integration (2/2017); Firmly Grasp the General Landscape of Civil-Military Integration Strategy 

(3/2017); Enhance Strategic Support for Civil-Military Integration (3/2017); Strategic Framework 

for Civil-Military Integrated Development in China (4/2017); Start from the Management 

Mechanism for Equipment Procurement and Promote In-Depth Civil-Military Integration in Key 

Areas (4/2017); Vigorously Advance the In-Depth Civil-Military Integration of the Armed Police 

Force under the Guidance of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Civil-Military Integration (6/2017); Develop 

a System of Laws and Regulations for In-Depth Civil-Military Integration (6/2017); Management 

Mechanisms for the Network of Civil-Military Integrated Technological Innovation and Their 

Realization (6/2017); Resolutely Implement the Civil-Military Integration Strategy and Strive to 

Create a New Situation for Equipment Development (1/2018); Give Full Play to the Role of 
61

Strategic Assessment and Scientifically Promote In-Depth Civil-Military Integration (1/2018); 

The Course of and Basic Experience in Civil-Military Integration over the 40 Years of Reform and 

Opening-up (3/2018); Development in Civil-Military Integration of National Defense 

Mobilization (5/2018); Historical Progress of and Basic Experience in China’s Civil-Military 

Integration since the Reform and Opening Up (6/2018); China’s Rule of Law of Civil-Military 

Integration since the Reform and Opening Up (6/2018); Modes of Civil-Military Integration with 

Chinese Characteristics and their Game Features (6/2018).

Forward edge defense was not mentioned. There were articles on borders (5) and coastal 

defense (1). Three articles mentioned both together in the title.

Sun Tzu was mentioned often, with the following titles: A Scripture for Military Strategists 

and A Reader for Wise Men—From Sun Tzu’s Art of War to the Strategies for World Peaceful 

Development (5/2014); On Sun Tzu’s Prudence, Pacifism, and Prevention of War (5/2014); Sun 

Tzu’s Thought of Complete Victory and Peaceful Reunification of China (5/2014); The 

Significance of Comparative Studies on Sun Tzu and Jean Monnet Thoughts (1/2015); The Present 

and Future of Research on Sun Tzu’s Art of War (6/2015); A Summary of the Academic 

Symposium on ‘The Status Quo and Development of Research on Sun Tzu’s Art of War’ (6/2015); 

Sun Tzu’s Thought on ‘Attacking the Troops’ (1/2016); On the Academic Status of Sun Tzu’s Art 

of War (4/2016); A New Understanding of Research on Sun Tzu’s Art of War (4/2016); Several 

Issues on Innovative Research on Sun Tzu’s Art of War (2/2017); Research on Sun Tzu’s Art of 

War and the Cultivation of Martial Virtue with Chinese Characteristics (2/2017); Thoughts on the 

Heritage and Innovation of Sun Tzu Culture (2/2017); A Summary of the Symposium on Research 

on Sun Tzu’s Art of War: Innovation and Development (2/2017); Nothing on Sun Tzu in 2018, 

which is odd.

Mao Zedong continued to be a focus of attention. In Issue’s 5 and 6 of 2016 there were 11 

articles on the “Long March,” but the titles did not mention Mao specifically, so they are not in 

the listing below. Articles focused on his teachings included the following: On the Development 

of Mao Zedong Military Thought after the Founding of the PRC in 1949 (2/2013); On Mao Zedong 

Thought on Armed Forces Building (2/2013); On the Historical Evolution of Guerrilla Warfare 

and Mao Zedong’s Theoretical Contributions (2/2013); On Mao Zedong’s Way of Thinking on 

Military Affairs (4/2013); On the Relationship between the CPC Innovations in Military Guidance 

Theory and Mao Zedong Military Thought (4/2013); Correctly Understanding the Scientific Value 

of Mao Zedong Military Thought (5/2013); Mao Zedong Military Thought and the Innovative 

Development of the Military Guiding Theory of the CPC since the Reform and Opening Up in 

1978 (5/2013); Mao Zedong Thought on the Development of National Defense Science and 

Technology and of Weapons and Equipment (5/2013); On Mao Zedong Thought on Building the 

Military through Diligence and Frugality (5/2013); On Mao Zedong’s Wisdom, Stratagem, and 

Sentiments (6/2013); On Mao Zedong’s View on War in Time and Space (6/2013); A Study of 

Mao Zedong Thought on Building a Powerful People’s Air Force (6/2013); On Mao Zedong 

Thought on Building a Powerful People’s Navy (6/2013); A Study of Mao Zedong’s Art of 

Operational Guidance in the Early Phase of the War of Liberation (1945-1949)—A Case Study of 

Mao Zedong’s Operational Guidance for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Theater (6/2013); Mao Zedong 
62

Thought on Party Building in the Army and its Current Value (1/2014); Mao Zedong Art of Local 

Warfare Guidance (1/2014); A Model of Voluntarily Applying Military Dialectics—New 

Review of Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War (2/2015); An Exploration into Mao Zedong’s 

Military Research Methods (3/2015); Mao Zedong’s Strategy and Tactics for a Full-Scale Civil 

War in the Transition Stage of the Liberation War (1/2017); 

Xi Jinping was noted in association with numerous topics. Some may seem repeated, but 

they are simply other analysts using Xi’s thoughts and underscoring them with their own 

interpretations. The titles, due to their length, are abbreviated: National Defense modernization 

(1/2014); Promoting the National Defense Economy (2/2014); The Standard of Warfighting 

Capability (2/2014); Strategic Thinking on Planning and Managing Maritime Affairs (4/2014); 

Strengthening the Role of the Communist Party of China in the Armed Forces (4/2014); 

Developing the CPC’s Military Guidance Theory (6/2014); Strategy for Governing the Armed 

Forces (1/2015); Building Grass Root CPC Branches in the New Situation (2/2015); Value of 

Military Personnel in the New Situation (2/2015); Military Institutional Education (2/2015); On 

Deepening Reform (3/2015); Global Community of a Shared Community (4/2015); National 

Defense and Armed Forces Building (4/2015); On National Defense and Armed Forces Building 

(5/2015); Deepening National Defense Reform (6/2015); Deepen National Defense and Armed 

Forces Reform (1/2016); On Scientific Thinking (2/2016); Building World-Class Armed Forces 

(4/2016); World-Class Armed Forces are a Strategic Requirement (4/2016); Building World-Class 

Armed Forces (4/2016); Strategy for Building the Armed Forces Politically (5/2016); Thoughts on 

Improving Warfighting Capabilities (5/2016); Military Dialectic Thinking (6/2016); Building 

World-Class Military Academies (1/2017); Building a Human Community of Shared Destiny for 

China’s Military Strategy (2/2017); Xi’s Thoughts on Military-Civil Integration (2/2017); On 

Governing the Military by Law (2/2017); On Military Strategy (3/2017); Thoughts on Military 

Dialectics (3/2017); Create a New Situation of Strengthening and Revitalizing the Armed Forces 

(4/2017); 6 articles in the issue on the topic of Strengthening the Military (4/2017); On 

Strengthening the Military (5/2017); Mobilization Improvements for Strengthening the Military 

(5/2017); New-Era Weapons to Strengthen the Military (5/2017); Innovative Developments in 

Strengthening the Military (5/2017); Vigorously Advance the In-Depth Civil-Military Integration 

of the Armed Police Force under the Guidance of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Civil-Military 

Integration (6/2017); On Building Up the Modern Armed Police Force (6/2017; Cultivating FirstClass Military Personnel (6/2017); Outlook on War (6/2017); Governing the Armed Forces by 

Law in the New Era (6/2017); Modernize PLA Weaponry (1/2018); Develop Strong Joint 

Operations (1/2018); Revitalize the Military with Science and Technology (1/2018); Thoughts on 

Strengthening the Military (1/2018); Cultivate High-level Talents (1/2018); Govern the Armed 

Forces by Law (1/2018); National Security Strategy (1/2018); On Military Training and 

Accelerating Innovation (1/2018); Military Personnel Modernization (2/2018); Adhere to the 

CPC’s Strategy of Absolute Leadership over the Armed Forces (2/2018); New Era Scientific 

Systems (3/2018); Innovative Development of Military Education (3/2018); Build a Community 

with a Shared Future (3/2018); Build a Community with a Shared Future (4/2018); On Cyber 

Security (5/2018); Three Meanings Build a Community with a Shared Future (5/2018); Enhancing 
63

Political Loyalty of the Armed Forces (5/2018); Structure of Xi’s Thought for Strengthening the 

Military (5/2018); CPC Military Guidance Theory to Strengthen the Military (5/2018). 
64

APPENDIX FOUR: RUSSIAN VERSUS CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT

One of the most important elements of understanding China’s way of war is to understand 

how members of the PLA utilize specific thought constructs to plan military operations. This 

section initially discusses similarities in military thought concepts used by Russia and China. That 

section is followed by a few specific terms in the PLA’s lexicon that do not appear in Russia’s.

Similarities

Trends:

Russia: In the 21st century there are three significant trends in the “nature of armed struggle.”149

First is the shift toward aerospace (longer range, greater power and accuracy, possibility of

consecutive and simultaneous attacks across the entire theater of operations by piloted and

pilotless aerial vehicles)150; Second is the move from positional confrontations to the evolution

of exchanging fire from a distance (precision guided munitions, etc.) with critical infrastructure

(control, economic, and logistic systems) targeting priorities in the IPW;151 Third is the role

played by information superiority, special operations forces, and EW (to disorganize control);

network-centric methods used to control actions, which are characterized by increased operational

speed and efficiency; and the use of special forces to achieve strategic goals [destroy launchers,

destroy air defenses, capture oil platforms, PSYOP, etc.].152

China: Describing future trends has long been a PLA tradition. For example, in the book Chinese 

Views of Future Warfare, author Gao Heng, a research fellow at the Institute of World Economics 

and Politics (Beijing, Academy of Social Sciences) authored a chapter in 1995 on “Future Military 

Trends.”153 In the 2013 version of the PLA’s The Science of Military Strategy (hereafter SMS), it 

was stated that it is necessary to study evolutionary trends in the international strategic setup and 

trends in world military developments.154 It is important to reveal the contradictions in military 

practices, which require that trends, stages, and characteristics in future military conflicts be 

revealed in an accurate manner.155 It is important to study developmental trends in wars in other 

countries, with SMS noting the following:

Practices before a war happens are a scientific method for designing a war in 

advance, planning national defense and the military’s long-term development and 

building, and winning the initiative in future wars, all based on developmental 

 149 S. V. Kuralenko, “Tendenciesin the Changing Character of Armed Strugglesin Military Conflictsin the First Half

of the 21st Century,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 2012, pp. 40-46. 150 Ibid., p. 41. 151 Ibid., p. 43. 152 Ibid., pp. 43-45. 153 Michael Pillsbury, editor, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. 

McNair, Washington DC, 1997, pp. 85-94 154 Sun Zhaoli, copy editor, The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlue Xue, hereafter SMS), Military Science Press, 

2013 edition (2013 Nianban), p. 23. 155 SMS (2013), p. 21.
65

trends in future warfare. Their essence is to face the future, to design the future, and 

to win the future.156

Forecasting:

Russia: In a 1975 Russian book on forecasting,157 authors Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov

stated that a forecast “was what may occur,” while a plan was defined as “what is supposed to

occur.”7 Forecasting was more specifically defined as “the study of the military-political situation,

the pattern of future war, the prospects of developing strategy, operational art, and tactics, the

qualitative and quantitative composition of the means of armed conflict (one’s own and the

enemy’s), the prospects for the development of the war economy in the future, and also the

forecasting of the enemy’s strategic and tactical plans.”158 All of these are linked. Four types

of military forecasting were described: military-strategic, operational-tactical, militaryeconomic, and military-technical.

China: Foresight means predicting the characteristics of the age and developments and changes in 

the international and domestic strategic environment. The more accurate the foresight, the better 

the planning and guidance. The following foresight predictions were listed as needed:

• Predicting trends in military matters and military science and technology.

• Predicting potential strategic opponents and operational targets;

• Predicting potential changes in the ratios between an enemy’s strength and 

China’s;

• Predicting the nature, direction, and levels of potential threats;

• Predicting possible opportunities, forms, direction, scale, process, and 

outcome of future wars;

• And revealing the features and laws of future wars, providing an objective 

basis for determining strategy and defense building.159

Strategic thought: 

Russia: General Staff Chief Gerasimov noted regarding strategy that “each conflict has a logic all 

its own.” It is also a part of military art, a system regarding the nature of modern warfare’s 

preparations to resist invasion; and the methods and forms to carry out total warfare on a strategic 

scale.160

 156 SMS (2013), p. 27. 157 Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs, Moscow 1975, translated into English by the

DGIS Multilingual Section, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa Canada, Published under the auspices of the United

States Air Force. 158 Ibid., p. 14. 159 SMS (2013), pp. 11-12. 160 A. C. Skvoltsov, Course on Military Strategy, Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the 

Russian Federation, 1995, p. unknown
66

China: In SMS 2013, it was stated that there is no strategy where “one size fits all”161 and that, like 

water, “war has no permanent situation.”162 Strategy was further described as the guidelines and 

ploys for planning and guiding the overall war situation, divided into offensive strategy and 

defensive strategy. It is high-level and long-term.163 It manifests in a commander’s subjective 

ability to manipulate the objective reality before him.

Forms and Methods:

Russia: Forms are organizations or operations, and methods are the weapons and military art that 

will be used. In 1971, General Major Aleksandr A. Strokov wrote in the book Military History

that war’s fierce character will predetermine its goals and the methods and forms of waging it.164

In 1984, in Military Thought, author N. N. Kuznetsov noted that “the laws of armed struggle 

include the dependence of the course and outcome of an armed struggle on the correlation of 

combat power of the forces of the opposing sides ... the dependence of forms and methods of 

operations on weapons, equipment, and personnel, and the interdependence of the forms and 

methods of operations being conducted at different levels.”165 In 1991, Colonel General I. N. 

Rodionov wrote that the successful conduct of strategic operations is “impossible without a 

knowledge of the objective laws of warfare, correct foresight of the development of operations, 

and choice of the most effective forms and methods of military operations.”166 In 1997, S. A. 

Komov stated that the forms and methods of attaining information superiority over an enemy are 

key elements of the information warfare discipline.167 In 2002, Colonel General V. V. Bulgakov 

wrote on “Armed Conflict: Forms and Methods of Troop Operations.”168 In 2011, A. V. 

Dolgopolov and S. A. Bogdanov penned “The Evolution of the Forms and Methods for Waging 

Armed Struggle under Network-Centric Conditions.”169 In 2016, A. P. Korabelnikov composed 

“Promising Trends in the Development of Aerospace Defense Forms and Methods in the Russian 

Federation.”170This short summary only represents a small sampling of the number of articles and 

presentations that include the concept of forms and methods. It is obviously a standard approach 

to implementing strategy and operational art in both Soviet as well as contemporary times.

 161 SMS (2013), p. 11. 162 Ibid., p. 12. 163 Ibid., p. 2-3. 164 A. A Strokov, “Changes in the Methods and Form of conducting Military Operations,” Voyennaya Istoriya 

(Military History) Moscow: Voyenizdat 1971, pp. 340-345, excerpts, cited in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. 

Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 222-223. 165 N. N. Kuznetsov, “On the Categories and Principles of Soviet Military Strategy,” Military Thought, No. 1 1984, 

p. 34.

166 I. N. Rodionov, “On Certain Problems of the Development of Military Science,” Military Thought, No. 11-12, 

1991, pp. 46-51. 167 S. A. Komov, “On the Methods and Forms for the Conduct of Information War,” Military Thought, No. 4 1997, 

p. 18.

168 V. V. Bulgakov, “Armed Conflict: Forms and Methods of Troop Operations,” Military Thought, No. 1 2002, pp. 

39-43. 169 A. V. Dolgopolov and S. A. Bogdanov,” The Evolution of the Forms and Methods for Waging Armed Struggle 

under net-work-Centric Conditions,” Military Thought, No. 2 2011, pp. 49-58. 170 A. P. Korabelnikov, “Promising Trends in the Development of Aerospace Defense Forms and Methods in the 

Russian Federation,” Military Thought, No. 1 2016, pp. 70-78.
67

China: The following forms and methods were offered in one Chinese article addressing the 

transformation to new-type operations:

• Forms and methods of long-range operations include ways to defeat the enemy 

far away from one’s borders to capture key points and stage strategic sabotage.

• Forms and methods of information-firepower integrated operations combine 

soft attacks with hard strikes that include information-fire deterrence, 

information-fire raids, information-fire targeted attacks, information-fire 

blockades, and information-fire encirclement and annihilation. 

• Forms and methods of precision operations include precisely conducting 

battlefield sensing, command and control, fire-strike effects evaluations, and 

comprehensive support, thereby shaping the closed cycle of reconnaissancecontrol-striking-evaluation-support.

• Forms and methods of low-altitude operations include air-ground integrated 

assaults and vertical speed-based attacks.171

In the work SMS it was noted that studying the enemy’s forms and methods of operations was 

important, as well as establishing the basic guiding thought for friendly operations and its main 

forms and methods.172 A strategic concept includes determining not only opponents and targets of 

operations but also the basic forms of operations and main combat methods to be used.173 Studying 

contemporary wars conducted in other countries enable the PLA to grasp the current forms of 

operations, the basic feature of methods of operations, and better understand the contemporary 

laws of war.174

Active defense

Russia: In his 2019 presentation at the Academy of Military Science, Russian General Staff Chief 

noted the following: “For the past few years military scholars, together with the General Staff, 

have been developing conceptual approaches regarding the neutralization of aggressive actions by 

probable enemies. The basis of ‘our response’ is the ‘strategy of active defense,’ which, taking 

into consideration the defensive nature of Russian Military Doctrine, envisions the conduct of a 

set of measures for the preemptive neutralization of threats to the security of the state. It is namely 

the validation of the measures being developed that should comprise the activities of military 

scholars. This is one of the priority trends for safeguarding the security of the state. We must 

outstrip the enemy in the development of military strategy and move ‘one step ahead.’”175

China: It was stated that active defense is manifested in the following: adhering to a position of 

self-defense and striking back, which does not preclude preemptive strikes as regards campaigns 

and combat; combining strategic defense with campaign and tactical offense, since active defense 

 171 Lu Zhisheng, “Make Giant Strides into the New Epoch of All-Area Operations—Some Thoughts on the 

Transformation of the New-Type Army’s Military Operations,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 14 September 2017, p. 7. 172 SMS (2013), p. 5. 173 SMS (2013), p. 24. 174 SMS (2013), p. 25. 175 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Development of Military Strategy under Contemporary Conditions. Tasks for Military 

Science,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2019, p. 7.
68

is an offensive defense and not an exclusively defensive defense; operations are based upon fully 

taking the initiative; do not fight a battle for which you are not prepared, meaning first be sure of 

victory and only then seek a fight; restrain war from starting with preparations but if unavoidable, 

resolutely make your opening move to use war to stop war; and soldier and the people are the 

source of victory.176 The PLA’s July 2019 Defense White Paper, in regard to strategic guidance, 

noted that:

The military strategic guideline for a new era adheres to the principles of defense, 

self-defense and post-strike response, and adopts active defense. It keeps to the 

stance that ‘we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely 

counterattack if attacked,’ places emphasis on both containing and winning wars, 

and underscores the unity of strategic defense and offense at operational and tactical 

levels...China’s armed forces give full play to the overall power of the people’s 

war by innovating in its strategies, tactics, and measures.

177

Thus, the active defense concept continues to occupy a special place in Chinese military theory. 

In 2015 China produced a White Paper titled “China’s Military Strategy” that mentioned active 

defense twelve times. Section III discussed the concept the most and, in addition to calling active 

defense the essence of strategy, offered the following definition:

From the long-term practice of revolutionary wars, the people’s armed forces have 

developed a complete set of strategic concepts of active defense, which boils down 

to: adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational and tactical offense; 

adherence to the principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and 

adherence to the stance that ‘We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will 

surely counterattack if attacked.’... China's socialist nature, fundamental national 

interests, and the objective requirement of taking the path of peaceful development 

all demand that China unswervingly adhere to and enrich the strategic concept of 

active defense.178

The implementation of the active defense concept will include the following: 

• The basic point for the preparation for military struggle (PMS) will be 

placed on winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military 

struggle, and maritime PMS. 

• China's armed forces will innovate basic operational doctrines. Integrated 

combat forces will prevail in system-vs-system operations featuring information 

dominance, precision strikes, and joint operations.

• China's armed forces will optimize the military strategic layout. In view of 

China's geostrategic environment, the armed forces will make overall planning for 

 176 SMS (2013), pp. 48-50. 177 China’s National Defense in the New Era, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of 

China, July 2019. As cited at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/o7/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas 178 “China’s Military Strategy,” Xinhua (in English), 26 May 2015.
69

strategic deployment and military disposition, clearly divide areas of responsibility 

for their troops, and enable them to support each other and act as an organic whole.

• China's armed forces will uphold nine basic principles (see Appendix 

One).179

New type:

Russia: In February 2015 Colonel-General Kartapolov, at the time the head ofthe Main Operations

Directorate of the General Staff, discussed Western actions as built on a foundation of hybrid

actions which “include both measures of a military nature and measures without the

employment of military force.”180 He o utlined a new-type war being fought against Russia that

associated indirect actions with hybrid ones. Further, in October 2015 in Issue 10 of Military

Thought, two Russian officers who write often for the journal, Colonel (retired) S. G. Chekinov

and General (retired) S. A. Bogdanov, used the new-type warfare terminology often in an article

on forecasting.

China: PLA authors note that new-type operational forces must have special characteristics, to 

include timeliness, high efficiency, and the ability to be relative to the contemporary situation. 

Future war will be based on the “three no’s” of warfare: “nobody” (unmanned weapons such as 

robots or drones), “no-see” (invisible, such as stealth fighters), and “no-hear” (silent, such as 

infrasound weapons that create psychological havoc). The new-type operational forces must

protect friendly operational systems while “at the same time finding the ‘acupuncture points’ and 

‘floating ribs’ of enemy operational systems.”181 These systems must be paralyzed. Further, the 

author notes that it remains necessary to continue to use self-criticism as a methodology and to 

integrate both civilian and military forces into the new-type operational force.182

IPW vs prepositioning:

Russia: the Initial Period of War (IPW) was defined as when warring states “conduct military

operations involving groups of their armed forces that were deployed before the start of the

war to achieve their short-range strategic objectives or to create favorable conditions for

committing their main forces and continuing with more operations;”183 the IPW has new

political, economic, and military conditions that are changing its parameters, which accords

with history’s lessons that each war appears as a special case with different factors affecting

the IPW;184 the projected speed of future wars may not allow countries time to put their

economies on a war footing, making it even more important to prevent potential adversaries from

achieving military and technological superiority [note: there appear to be three phases to an

IPW plan: commit forces in secret before war begins; create conditions for the main force; and

 179 Ibid. 180 A. V. Kartapolov, “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Means and Methods of

Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in Contemporary International Conflicts,” Vestnik Akademii

Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, pp. 28-29. 181 Lu. 182 Ibid. 183 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and Their Impact on a Country’s Preparations for a

Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 2012, pp. 14-27. 184 Ibid., p. 17.
70

be aware that new conditions will continuously change the initial parameters].185

China: The modern battlefield was described by Wei Daiqiang, a PLA lecturer, in 2013 as a place 

where the strategic prepositioning of forces and materials must be studied in order to attain a 

strategic advantage and reduce uncertainty. Wei, a lecturer in the Department of Military Thinking 

and Military History at the Nanjing Political College, noted that the official 2011 book Military 

Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army defined strategic prepositioning as the 

arrangement or distribution of troops, material, and equipment made in preparation for satisfying 

future strategic needs. Wei added that the noted PLA strategist, retired General Li Jijun, had 

defined strategic prepositioning as a practice of military strategy that enables the seizure of 

strategic opportunity; and that a principle of war is to use battlefield creation and strategic 

prepositioning as a means for gaining strategic and battle initiative. The authors of the 2001 version 

of The Science of Military Strategy noted that all strategic thoughts are embodied in foresight and 

prepositioning. Another author wrote that strategy is essentially a strategic prediction and strategic 

prepositioning.186 As Wei notes, it is similar to the Western idea of prepositioning with regard to 

the Trojan horse.187 A strategic advantage is established through strategic prepositioning.188

Asymmetry:

Russia: Asymmetric operations are defined in Russia as a strategy of the struggle of a weak side 

against a strong one, a strategy employed in conflicts between enemies’ unequal with respect to 

economic development or their level of military force.189 However, that is the soft side to the term’s 

definition. Asymmetric means discussed in Russian publications include what is described as 

“nonstandard” forms and methods of operations and the use of prohibited means. Clearly, 

something nonstandard and prohibited imply the use of illegal means as an asymmetric method, 

and such examples represent the hard side of the term’s definition.

China: Differences in weapons, numbers of personnel, structure, thoughts, cultural background, 

behavioral criteria, temporospatial conditions, and operations activities constitute asymmetric 

relations.190 Asymmetric operations require specific analyses of specific situation and the 

exploitation of them for all variable factors along with flexible application. The subjective qualities 

(creative thought) of officers should be fully brought into play. Exploit all conditions (weather, 

geography, etc.) and adopt irregular, nontraditional operational models, methods, and means as 

required. Methods should not be limited to established practices.191

Reflexive control versus stratagems:

 185 Ibid., p. 18. 186 Wei Daiqiang, “A Review of Research on the Concept of Strategic Prepositioning,” China Military Science, No. 

5 2013, pp. 147-154. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 N. N. Tyutyunnikov, Military Thought in Terms and Definitions, Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), Volume 

One, Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 2018, p. 29. This definition was translated by Dr. Harold Orenstein. 

190 SMS (2013), p. 127. 191 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
71

Russia: Reflexive control is the ability to get an opponent to do something for themselves they are 

really doing for you. RC is essentially information and psychological effects against persons on 

the opposing side who are making decisions. It is “a set of measures, interconnected with respect 

to goal, place, and time, aimed at...forcing the enemy to reject his initial plan and accept 

knowingly a decision that is disadvantageous for him...”192 Another author noted that: 

This instrument is reflexive analysis, the content of which is the 

reproduction of the enemy’s probable goals, methods of achieving them, 

the logic of his thinking, and assumed methods of obtaining the necessary 

information about the situation. Reflexive analysis is a mirror of complex 

military thinking, which determines the degree of practically implementing 

a systemic approach and the basis of a creative approach to accomplishing 

the tasks assigned to commanders in combat.193

China: There are many types of stratagems, located at all levels of military art. The Chinese have 

written entire books on these topics, such as the 2002 volume Campaign Stratagems. In that 

volume, it was noted that a campaign stratagem is when 

The commanding officer, on the basis of certain strength, fully performs his 

subjective initiative, and manipulates and drives the enemy in the confrontation of 

intelligence, so as to create a situation that is favorable to his own troops but 

unfavorable to the enemy.194

The aim is to control the intelligence-judgement-decision cycle of an opposing force, that is, the 

intelligence processing procedures of an opponent.

According to Michael Pillsbury, a stratagem is closely aligned with the concept of shi, or the 

alignment of forces, where one studies an opponent’s psychology and manipulates them into acting 

according to a friendly plan. Pillsbury noted that a feature of shi is called wu wei, “which means 

to get other nations to do your work for you.”195 Another long time China analyst stated that 

stratagem is “creating the enemy’s perception.”196 All told, the concept is very similar to Russia’s 

concept of reflexive control.

COF versus CNP:

Russia: When constructing strategy against a potential adversary, the latter’s “political, economic,

scientific and technical, military, ideological, demographic, psychological, geographic, and other

factors” are considered as part of the correlation of forces (COF), according to a 1968 Military

 192 Stanislav Ermak and Aleksandr Raskin, “Are All Methods Good in Battle? On Some Aspects of Reflexive 

Control of the Enemy,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 7 2002, p. 44. The author would like to thank Dr. 

Harold Orenstein for his translation of this article from Russian to English. 193 F. Chausov, “Command and Control of Battle on the Basis of a Reflexive Analysis of the Situation,” Morskoi 

Sbornik (Navy Journal), No. 6 2017, p. 53. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation 

of this article from Russian to English. 

194 Li Qi, “Introduction to Campaign Stratagems,” in Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems, 

National Defense University, 2002, p. 9.

195 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon, Henry Holt and Company, 2015, p. 42. 196 E-mail correspondence with Dr. William W. Whitson, 13 April 2004.
72

Thought article, in order “to uncover intentions, plans, capabilities, concepts, and methods.”19

Strategy requires a continuous reassessment of the capabilities of potential adversaries and

results in updated modeling of the correlation of forces between nations. Superiority is

nothing but a favorable opportunity. A 1969 Military Thought article noted that the decisive

role in battle is played by the commander’s skill which, in author S. Tyushkevich’s assessment,

is another aspect of the COF.197 He added that timely logistic deliveries are “most essential” to

COF; an effective change in the COF comes about through the offensive; forecasts should be

prepared ahead of time to anticipate events and facilitate corrections to plans; and, in addition to

evaluating quantitative and qualitative factors, commanders can uncover hidden factors that

have the capability of influencing the COF.198

With conventional forces, the COF changes slowly. Nuclear weapons change the COF

immediately, according to Tyushkevich. With capabilities changing, the COF also depends on the

function of time. The methods and means of using the time factor are interrelated with the element

of surprise, which can change the COF quickly when properly employed. In addition to evaluating

quantitative and qualitative factors, commanders can also uncover hidden factors that have the

capability of influencing the COF.199 All of the above objective opportunities are dependent on

a commander’s use of his subjective factor to take advantage of them.

China: Huang Shuofeng, perhaps China’s leading expert on comprehensive national power (CNP), 

writes, “Comprehensive National Power research is done in order to accurately analyze the 

international strategic situation and evaluate the comprehensive power of enemy states, allies, and 

one’s own country for the purpose of scientifically planning one’s own national strategic decision 

making.”200 He uses theoretical research, systems theory, and mathematical methods to develop 

his qualitative and quantitative analysis. CNP represents an objective reality assessment of the 

strategic environment.201 CNP is a dynamic process but establishing superiority in CNP does not 

automatically spell success, as things change over time, and the subjective input of commanders, 

leaders, or scientists can dramatically change earlier calculations. Qualitative factors impacting on 

CNP include technological advancements, economics, strategy, population, national territory, and 

international influence.

Huang describes CNP as a system composed of many levels or subsystems. The four major index 

subsystems of his assessment are material, spiritual, coordinated, and environmental power. 

Material power includes the sub elements of natural resources, economics, science and technology, 

and national defense. Spiritual power includes politics, foreign affairs, culture, education, and 

psychological and intellectual soft power factors. They help determine material power’s 

effectiveness. Coordinated power includes organizational, command, management, and decision-

 197 S. Tyushkevich, “The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War,” Military Thought, No. 6 1969, as

translated and printed in Selected Readings from Military Thought: 1963-1973 (in English), Volume 5, Part II, pp. 57-

71.

198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 200Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, 

Washington DC, 2000, p. 222.

201 Ibid., p. 212.
73

making criteria. Finally, environmental power assesses international (balance of power), natural 

(geography, ecology, etc.), and social (stability, etc.) factors. Altogether more than 18 factors are 

under consideration. Huang’s CNP index system is multilayered with subsystems and subsubsystems. 

Huang further states that CNP continually evolves. CNP changes with time and with changes in 

the world’s structure. He writes that CNP changes with the interchange of energy flows, material 

flows, and information flows of science and technology (he believes a type of “motion equation” 

is needed to explain this flow). Huang adds that his equations are “in keeping with the universal 

relations principle in the Marxist materialist dialectics theory system.”202 Pillsbury offered a 

detailed description of Huang’s CNP “function” and CNP “system” equations, both of which are 

beyond the scope of this paper.203

Operational design versus campaign design:

Russia: Operational design is a broad outline of forthcoming combat operations. It includes the 

direction or axis of the main attack and other thrusts (area of concentration of main efforts); 

sequence and modes of accomplishing the adversary’s defeat; procedure of delivery of fire for 

effect and, in a nuclear war, nuclear weapons as well; force groupings and tactical order of battle 

(disposition).

China: It was noted that the form of planning had changed from schematic designs which are 

primarily qualitative to what was termed “meticulous” design that combine man and machine. 

Design is focused on overall planning more than on single items, and on top-level designs to 

implement strategic objectives.204 The term top-level design indicates that this design is more 

likely at the strategic level than Russia’s operational design.

Some Differences in Chinese Thought from Russian Thought

The following terms offer a more specific Chinese method for visualizing warfare to 

include its preparation and conduct. 

Turning point: An analyst with a broad strategic view and sense of innovation is needed to identify 

a turning point. Science and technology are the main elements for analysts to consider, as they 

help distinguish the form of warfare (mechanized, information, nuclear, etc.) from one era to 

another.205 A turning point is a strategic opportunity whose value is often inversely proportional 

to the clarity of the transformation. That is, the technological transformation may not be clear to 

others and thereby offers friendly forces a strategic opportunity for reform. The army that survives 

is the one constantly seizing strategic opportunities. Benefits are directly proportional to the 

timeliness of decisions.206 It was stated that the “key to exploiting the turning point is to base it on 

 202 Ibid., p. 234. 203 Ibid., p. 233. For this detailed description of the Academy of Military Sciences dynamic equation, see Pillsbury, 

pp. 232-238. 204 SMS (2013), p. 24. 205 Zheng Zonghui, “Considerations on Understanding and Seizing the Turning Point in the Transformation of the 

Form of Warfare,” China Military Science, No. 2 2013, pp. 72-79. 206 Ibid.
74

the condition of the country and army and to seize the timely opportunity subjectively and 

objectively.”

War engineering: In 2007, Hu Xiaofeng, a professor in the Information Operations and Command 

Training-Teaching and Research Department at China’s National Defense University, stated that 

war engineering is “a method of systems engineering that studies, designs, tests, controls, and 

evaluates war systems and that is guided by systematic thinking, based on information 

technology.”207 The most important element of war engineering is to maintain control of war 

systems, through which control of the course of operations is possible.208 The concept takes all of 

war space and time into consideration, as well as politics, military affairs, economics, and 

diplomacy, to obtain the best results overall. Hu wrote that the path to victory depends on making 

innovations, which means creating asymmetries in the shape of warfare, methods of operations, 

and in war methods and training methods. Only then is war control possible.209 The concept was 

mentioned in 2013 in an article on the construction of a battlefield under informatized conditions. 

Capabilities Index: An information network linking fighting forces, fire control systems, 

reconnaissance assets, and communication capabilities becomes a way to measure a “capability 

index” when constructing a battlefield.210 Most likely these capabilities would be measured against 

those of a potential opponent in a specific area. Another article noted that developments must be 

able to provide an asymmetrical advantage over an opponent and the full use of China’s advantages 

must be used in the creation of asymmetrical developments. Examples of such forces include 

cyber-warfare, space warfare, remote warfare, and unmanned warfare. Combat standards will be 

developed in the form of capability indexes.211

Acupuncture war: The Chinese call key node attacks “acupuncture war” since key points on the 

network become targets. Net points are of crucial importance to the survivability of a network, 

since Metcalfe’s Law notes “the value of a network is the square of the number of net points.’ 

Destroying net points enable twice the results with half the effort in geometric terms.212 The topic 

was brough up again in a Taiwanese publication, where Lin Chin-Ching, director of the 

Telecommunications Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, citing electronic warfare theory, 

noted that China would use “acupuncture-point-prodding,” the ancient Chinese martial art theory 

of taking out an enemy with a strike on a pressure point.213 In 2013, in a discussion of new-type 

operational forces, it was noted that forces must protect friendly operational systems while “at the 

same time finding the ‘acupuncture points’ and ‘floating ribs’ of enemy operational systems.”214

 207 Hu Xiaofeng, “The Basics of War Engineering,” China Military Science, No. 3 2007, pp. 13-21. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 210 Pan Zhaonian, “Strategic Thinking for Battlefield Construction in Joint Operations under Informatized 

Conditions,” China Military Science, No. 6 2013, pp. 39-46. 211 Jia Xiaowei, “Strategic Considerations on Promoting the Building of the PLA’s New-Type Operational Forces,” 

China Military Science, No. 3 2013, pp. 92-98. 212 Su Size, “Kosovo War and New Military Theory,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 1 June 1996. 213 Maubo Chang, Taiwan Central News Agency, 21 May 1999. 214 Ibid.
75

System sabotage: The SMS (2013) noted that operational thought had broken through the model 

of mechanized warfare and proposed the idea of a “sabotage and strike warfare against systems” 

that corresponds to the basic laws of local wars under informationized conditions.215 It was noted 

that system of system sabotage methods would be used against nodes and vital sites when 

conducting integrated joint operations. Targets would include command, signal, software, and 

space systems. A 2007 book was even more assertive, noting that “the key to achieving the 

strategic requirement of destroying the enemy as a whole and paralyzing the enemy’s systems is 

carrying out focused precision attacks against strategic enemy targets, especially strategic vital 

points.”216 This makes it necessary to establish a complete target system and the vital points 

therein.217 The authors added the following:

System sabotage warfare is targeted at the enemy’s system as a whole, to include 

all the functional systems and the individual platforms that play a supporting role. 

Sabotage must destroy the enemy’s information flow and also damage physical 

enemy targets and annihilate the enemy’s effective strength...Use composite hard 

and soft attacks in the information domain and the physical domain to confuse the 

enemy’s perception and break down his psychological defenses, creating an 

‘avalanche’ effect that destroys and paralyzes the enemy’s combat systems.218

MOOTWA: Military operations other than war (MOOTWA) has been a consistent theme of 

Chinese thought in the recent past. Chapters on the topic have appeared in publications since 2007 

or earlier, and they reflect the focus of the PLA on earthquake, hurricanes, and other security 

responses within the nation. The PLA has not fought a war in some time and thus MOOTWA has 

become the way to foster interest in the military in the meantime and a way to offer realistic 

practice and scenarios for rescue operations. Chapter Eight of the SMS (2013) is titled “Strategic 

Guidance of Non-War Military Activities,” and the three sections under that title discuss the 

practice, characteristics, and strategic guidance for MOOTWA. The chapter noted that 

counterterrorism, maintenance of stability, disaster relief, protecting rights and interests, security 

alerts, international peacekeeping, and international rescues all fall under MOOTWA.219

Combat Power development: In 2012 six articles appeared on comber power generation in CMS. 

One of the first articles defined the topic of CPGM in the following way:

CPGM is a military state in which a military system that is composed of man, 

weapons and equipment, and other combat resources generates certain combat 

functions. The structure, actions, and state of the military system are in a dynamic 

stability within certain time and spatial scope, therefore, the combat power 

 215 SMS (2013), p. 47. 216 Fan Zheng Jian and Ma Bao An, The Theory of Military Strategy, National Defense University Publishing House, 

2007, p. 288.

217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 SMS (2013), p. 154.
76

generation model can be described using a military system’s features, such as 

elements, structures, environment, and functions.220

The military system’s features were then further explained. System elements were defined as man, 

weapons and equipment, and other combat resources. System structures were defined as the 

quality, quantity, time, and spatial structures among the system elements, and the connection 

among information, materials, and energy. A system environment was defined as the natural 

environment, human environment, operational objects, and so on, that exist outside of the military 

system under study and congregate with things associated with them. A military system’s 

management level, information level, and science and technology level have become main factors 

for generating combat power. CPGM combines intelligence with human intelligence plus 

information systems and information energy plus various service and arms combinations. A man’s 

intelligence replaces skills in an information-dominated environment, the latter a critical node in 

the generation of combat power. Since man’s creative actions are key, subjective and objective 

efforts must be made to create the necessary condition to turn possibility into reality.221

Another key article discussed the PLA’s combat power mode from the vantage point of former 

President Hu Jintao’s major strategic thinking. Hu’s ideas were used to push the scientific 

development of the armed forces, accelerate the informatization process, and improve the SoS 

capability of the armed forces.222 The result would be a transformed CPGM. The latter is viewed 

as a complex system engineering project that involves various levels and various fields in national 

defense and armed forces building.

Hu’s thoughts on the CPGM reflects the evolution of warfare’s mode of development, where 

informatized weapons and equipment are key material factors for combat power; information 

capability becomes the engine and multiplier for combat power generation; and the CPGM 

transforms from a mechanized platform model to one dominated by information capabilities. The 

CPGM determines the level and strength of combat power and the breadth and depth of its 

scientific development. Initial measurements of the PLA’s CPGM’s efficiency indicate it is not 

commensurate with the requirement of winning local wars under informatized conditions. Much 

work remains to be done to transform the PLA from a quantity—to a quality—driven force and 

from a manpower-intensive force to one that is science and technology intensive, especially where 

combat power is no longer linear but based on a SoS’s capability. The PLA’s indigenous 

innovation of weapons and equipment based on information technologies is vital to success. Newtype operational forces include strategic early-warning, air defense anti-missile troops, information 

attack and defense priorities, strategic projection, and digitized units. All are required elements of 

the transformation process. 223

 220 Guo Ruobing, Zhang Xi, and Li Jingwei, “Study on Basic Issues of Accelerating the Transformation of the 

Combat Power Generation Model,” China Military Science, No. 1 2012, pp. 36-43. 221 Ibid. 222 Shi Zhongwu, “Scientific Guidance for Promoting the Transformation of the Armed Forces’ Combat Power 

Mode—a Study on Hu Jintao’s Important Exposition on Accelerating the Transformation of the Combat Power 

Generation Model,” China Military Science, No. 1 2012, pp. 3-13. 223 Ibid.
77

Shi: Noted Western Sinologist Roger Ames has called the concept of shi “the key and defining 

idea in Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War.” Ames translates the term as “strategic advantage.” He notes 

that shi “is a level of discourse through which one actively determines and cultivates the leverage 

and influence of one’s particular place.”224 Retired Chinese general Tao Hanzhang defines shi in 

a similar manner, noting that it is “the strategically advantageous posture before a battle that 

enables it to have a flexible, mobile, and changeable position during a campaign.”225 Chinese 

expert Michael Pillsbury has cited the following as an example of shi:

Shi assesses your side’s potential, the enemy side’s potential, weather, and 

geography to identify the moment in a campaign when an advantage can be gained 

over an opponent. Shi is a certain moment in the campaign when you could take the 

advantage from the enemy.

226

In the case cited by Pillsbury, shi sounds like the ratio of capabilities between two forces that at 

some point will signal the superiority or advantage of one side over the other.

Chinese strategy contains a constant search to achieve a strategic advantage (which is also a goal 

of the popular Chinese strategic game of Weiqi or Go) over an opponent. Shi is sought everywhere, 

whether it be with the use of forces, electrons, or some other force. The Chinese 2015 White Paper 

on Strategy discussed this concept in four places: 

• China’s Armed Forces will lay stress on farsighted planning and 

management to create a favorable posture, comprehensively manage 

crises, and resolutely deter and win wars.

• China’s Armed Forces will work harder to create a favorable strategic 

posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and 

means

• A principle of active defense is to foster a strategic posture favorable to 

China’s peaceful development

• China will strive to establish fair and effective security mechanisms...and 

create a security environment favorable to its peaceful development.

227

SMS Thought Section: One section of the 2013 SMS described “The orientation of thought in 

drafting military strategy.” It stated that forward thinking (reveal trends, stages, and characteristics 

for the future state of warfare), holistic thinking (relationship among military, political, economic, 

and other aspects of conflict), active thinking (creating situations), and thinking through hardships 

(take precautions) were all required measures of thought.228

 224 The Book of War, The Modern Library, New York, 2000, p. 50. 225 Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation, Sterling Innovation, 2007, p. 124. 226 He Diqing, Campaign Course Materials, China’s Academy of Military Science, 2001, as quoted from Timothy 

Thomas, The Dragon’s Quantum Leap, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009, p. 255. 227 “China’s Military Strategy,” Xinhua (in English), 26 May 2015. This information was provided to the author by 

Dr. Michael Pillsbury.

228 SMS (2013), pp. 20-22.