Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics

People’s Liberation Army: 

Army Campaign Doctrine 

in Transition

KEVIN McCAULEY

KNOWLEDGE ISMERETEK KENNTNISSE 3HAHИE W EI DZA OC HN MI CE

ANZ OTNE OL TS I OC NOC MI EI NTO POZNAVANJE CONNAISSANCE

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition

By Kevin McCauley 

Contents 

BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................................. 3

PLA ARMY CAMPAIGNS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT AREAS .............................................................. 3

AREA OF OPERATIONS ................................................................................................................................... 5

THE PLA’S CURRENT VIEW OF WARFARE ................................................................................................ 6

PLA DOCTRINE IN TRANSITION: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 

FUTURE WARFARE .......................................................................................................................................... 8

EMERGING AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ............................................................................................................ 9

HYBRID WARFARE...................................................................................................................................................10

POTENTIAL ROADBLOCK TO DOCTRINAL IMPLEMENTATION: CULTIVATING TALENT..............................................11

CURRENT ARMY CAMPAIGN DOCTRINE ................................................................................................. 12

COMMAND, INTELLIGENCE, AND PLANNING ............................................................................................................12

Command Posts ..................................................................................................................................................12

Campaign Intelligence........................................................................................................................................13

Campaign Plans..................................................................................................................................................13

CAMPAIGN FORCES AND ORGANIZATION .............................................................................................. 14

CAMPAIGN DISPOSITION ..........................................................................................................................................16

TACTICAL GROUPINGS.............................................................................................................................................17

CAMPAIGN ACTIONS ................................................................................................................................................18

Campaign Firepower..........................................................................................................................................18

Campaign Maneuver...........................................................................................................................................19

Information Operations ......................................................................................................................................19

Special Operations..............................................................................................................................................21

Air Defense .........................................................................................................................................................21

OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS .............................................................................................................................. 22

OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN PREPARATION......................................................................................................................22

Offensive Campaign Planning and Coordination...............................................................................................24

Advance Operational Actions.............................................................................................................................25

Offensive Campaign Implementation..................................................................................................................25

Campaign Termination .......................................................................................................................................26

MANEUVER OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN .........................................................................................................................26

POSITIONAL OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN.........................................................................................................................27

LANDING CAMPAIGN ...............................................................................................................................................28

URBAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ................................................................................................................................30

BORDER COUNTERATTACK CAMPAIGN....................................................................................................................31

ANTI-AIRBORNE CAMPAIGN ....................................................................................................................................33

DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS .............................................................................................................................. 34

2
DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN COMMAND, PLANNING AND COORDINATION ......................................................................35

DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN SUPPORT .............................................................................................................................36

DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN PREPARATION .....................................................................................................................36

Defensive Deployment and Formations..............................................................................................................36

Firepower System ...............................................................................................................................................38

Obstacle System ..................................................................................................................................................39

MANEUVER DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN .........................................................................................................................39

POSITIONAL DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN.........................................................................................................................40

COASTAL DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN.............................................................................................................................40

URBAN DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ................................................................................................................................40

CAMPAIGNS UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS............................................................................................ 41

MOUNTAIN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS..............................................................................................41

HIGH ALTITUDE PLATEAU OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS ......................................................................43

DESERT GRASSLAND OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS...............................................................................45

TROPICAL MOUNTAIN AND JUNGLE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS ........................................................46

RIVER NETWORK OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS ....................................................................................48

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 49

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Background

This monograph examines current People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army campaign 

doctrine, with a discussion of PLA theorists’ vision of the evolutionary development of warfare 

to provide context for current doctrine as well as potential future direction. The PLA develops 

doctrinal joint and service campaign scenarios for possible offensive and defensive operations. 

PLA campaigns represent the operational level of war between strategic operations and tactical 

combat. The PLA’s current focus on specific campaigns provides insight into Beijing’s 

perception of potential conflict scenarios. The campaign scenarios provide commanders and staff 

data on command and control, coordination, combat actions, support, and other critical campaign 

elements for specific operational environments. The description of each campaign’s operational 

environment and combat actions provides valuable support to operational planning and a context 

for staff and unit training for their specific operational mission. The Army campaigns are 

executed as components of a joint campaign, or as a primarily independent Army campaign with 

support from other services. 

PLA Army Campaigns and Potential Conflict Areas 

The Science of Campaigns published by the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU) 

in 2006 highlighted four Army campaigns and a counterinsurgency operation as follows: 

maneuver campaign, mountain offensive campaign, positional offensive and defensive

campaigns, and anti-terrorist stability operations.0F

1 The Lectures on the Science of Army 

Campaigns published by the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in 2013 is the most recent 

PLA publication on Army campaigns and provides an expanded examination of the total 

inventory of potential PLA Army campaigns. This book represents an authoritative doctrinal 

publication by the AMS which is responsible for developing PLA doctrine, and conducting 

research on military art, joint operations, and foreign militaries. This monograph examines all 

possible Army campaigns discussed in the AMS book. The AMS book also includes campaigns 

under special conditions that were not included in the Science of Campaigns.1F

2

The 2006 Science of Campaigns short list of PLA campaigns represents what the PLA 

considered the most likely Army campaigns to be conducted at that time. The anti-terrorist 

stability operation does not appear in the later AMS Army campaign book and has likely been 

dropped as the People’s Armed Police has been reformed and further militarized to take primary 

responsibility for large-scale internal control and counterinsurgency operations. The AMS 

publication highlights the importance of the maneuver, urban, and border counterattack 

1 Zhang Yuliang (张玉良) editor-in-chief, 战役学 (Science of Campaigns), Beijing, National Defense University Press, 

2006, pp. 351-499

2 Fu Bingzhong (傅秉忠), 陆军战役学教程 (Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns), Beijing: Military Science 

Press, 2013, hereafter referenced as LSAC. 

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campaigns. A 2014 publication by the former Nanjing Army Command College Informationized 

Army Operations examines landing and on-island operations, offensive operations against 

coastal islands, as well as border defense and counterattacks highlighting these as potential Army 

operations. Based on an examination of these PLA authoritative publications, the Army 

campaigns considered most likely in a future conflict include the following:2F

3

• Maneuver campaign

• Mountain offensive campaign

• Positional offensive and defensive campaigns

• Landing campaign, and offensive operations against smaller islands 

• Border defense and counterattack campaign

• Urban offensive and defensive campaigns 

These campaigns suggest that the PLA Army expects to operate in two primary conflict 

scenarios. The landing, mountain offensive, urban offensive and defensive, and positional 

offensive campaigns are targeted at a Taiwan scenario, either an assault on Taiwan or Taiwan 

held islands (See Figure 1 for map of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and border areas, 

theater commands and Group Army locations). The border defense-counterattack campaign is 

focused on an Indian conflict scenario. Additionally, the border defense campaign could be 

intended for a Korean peninsula crisis scenario to seal the border against North Korean refugees 

as well as defend the Northern Theater region. The maneuver and positional campaigns are 

operations that could apply to either the Taiwan, Indian or North Korean scenarios. The 

maneuver campaign, desert grassland, and mountain campaigns could be applicable to operations 

in Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO 

Peace Mission series of exercises have focused on larger scale counterinsurgency operations to 

maintain stability within Central Asia.

3 Cao Zhengrong (曹正荣) et al editor-in-chief, “信息化陆军作战 (Informationized Army Operations),” Beijing: 

National Defense University Press, 2014

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Area of Operations

The Army campaigns represent potential operations within the PRC or near its borders. The 

newer AMS publication frequently discusses support by local forces and the militia which would 

only occur within the PRC. The PLA would currently have difficulty transporting and supporting 

a Group Army far from its borders. PLA theorists are discussing force projection and 

expeditionary operations supported by expanding strategic delivery capabilities and the 

establishment of overseas naval and air bases. The PRC believes a force projection capability is 

required to safeguard Beijing’s increasing global interests expressed in the “Going Out (走出

去)” strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These expanding global interests require 

new military capabilities. The PLA currently lacks the logistics, strategic delivery, overseas 

support facilities and prepositioning required to transport and sustain the large force required to 

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conduct an Army campaign. Some PLA sources have described current logistics problems 

supporting a peacekeeping battalion. Strategic delivery and logistically supporting overseas 

operations by a regiment or brigade size force would currently stress PLA capabilities without 

foreign support. However, the PLA’s strategic air transport and maritime delivery capabilities are 

increasing, and expansion of overseas support bases combined with the establishment of 

prepositioning could support expeditionary forces of increasing size in the future. At that point, 

these Army campaigns could become applicable to overseas operations; especially the 

campaigns in special conditions that are comparable to foreign terrain and climate conditions 

where the PLA might be called upon to operate in support of the PRC’s global interests.3F

4

The PLA’s Current View of Warfare

The Science of Strategy published by the NDU in 2017 states that wars will represent a 

“system of systems confrontation (体系对抗).” The PLA envisions warfare conducted on the 

tangible and intangible battlefields. The tangible battlefield includes land, sea, air, and space 

domains, while the intangible battlefield includes the electromagnetic spectrum, cyber space, and 

psychological cognition. Operations are characterized as highly dynamic, decentralized, with a 

blurring between front and rear areas, and rapid transitions between offense and defense. 

Characteristics include non-contact, non-linear, and asymmetric operations.4F

5

The PLA defines non-contact, non-linear, and asymmetric operations as follows:5F

6

• Non-contact: Compared to contact operations, striking enemy weapons systems outside 

their effective counterattack range. This concept is based on analysis of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation ALLIED FORCE. 

• Non-linear: Compared to linear operations, the irregular deployment, and dispersion of 

forces throughout the depth of the battlefield with no fixed combat locations. This

concept was developed by various militaries to mitigate the effects of precision 

munitions. 

• Asymmetric: Compared to symmetric operations, the employment of forces, means and 

methods against dissimilar opposing forces; and conducting cross-domain attacks. An 

example includes using the Air Force against enemy ground forces, launching a surprise 

attack, or outmaneuvering an enemy to gain advantage. The PLA stresses that both 

symmetric and asymmetric operations should be employed. The PLA attributes the 

concept of asymmetric operations to the US military. 

4 Kevin McCauley, “China’s Logistic Support to Expeditionary Operations,” Testimony before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, February 20, 2020, available at 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony_0.pdf, accessed May 9, 2020

5 Xiao Tianliang (肖天亮) editor-in-chief, 战略学 (Science of Strategy), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 

2017, pp. 32 and 182-183

6 ; All Army Terminology Management Committee (全军军事术语管理委员会), 中国人民解放军军语 (Chinese 

PLA Military Terminology), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011, p. 72

7
The PLA currently views warfare as multidimensional with forces dispersed across an 

expanded battlespace encompassing multi-domains. The distinctions between strategic

operations, campaigns and tactical combat become blurred as tactical actions can have strategic 

effect. Operations are non-linear, synchronized, and conducted throughout the enemy’s depth 

simultaneously. Forces are organized for specific operations and committed to combat according 

to the formation’s mission and the operational phase. Modular units with plug and play 

capability allow the campaign or tactical formation to reorganize as needed to adapt to changing 

battlefield situations. An integrated command information system supports command and 

coordination of dispersed forces and synchronizing multiple operations. Command posts will 

dynamically adjust tasks while controlling operational deviations from the operational plan to 

ensure objectives are achieved. Firepower and information warfare combine as a key capability

to destroy or paralyze enemy forces.6F

7

Army campaigns in transition feature a mix of mechanized and informationized warfare. 

The Army campaigns examined in the Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns are updated 

with elements of informationized warfare compared to the older Science of Campaigns. 

However, the campaign actions continue to reflect characteristics of the mechanized warfare era. 

Army campaigns and campaign actions are reminiscent of the Soviet Deep Battle concept 

upgraded with informationized communications, modern reconnaissance and precision strike 

systems that have been integrated into the force. This should not be surprising since the threestage military modernization plan’s goal for 2020 is a fully mechanized force with important 

progress incorporating information technologies. The Army likely trails the other services in 

informationized modernization. Army operations still discuss breakthrough operations even 

though PLA doctrine emphasizes non-linear and non-contact operations. Campaign doctrine does 

call for specialized force groupings to move through gaps or rapidly overcome enemy weak 

points to develop the battle into the enemy’s rear area. Deep attack groups or deep thrust and 

detour combat groups exploit frontal operations to strike key targets in the enemy depth in 

coordination with special forces and airborne or air assault landings. There is greater reliance on 

precision firepower destruction and paralysis, information operations to seize information 

superiority, employment of vertical envelopment and special forces to attack key targets in the 

enemy rear area, informationized communications to control dispersed forces, and high-tech 

reconnaissance and surveillance equipment to provide situational awareness and targeting. The 

PLA believes that firepower support is a critical component of operations, and modern command 

systems, satellite positioning systems, and advanced reconnaissance systems can shorten the kill 

chain in what the PLA calls “detection equals destruction (发现即摧毁).’ The PLA is fielding an 

integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4ISR) - command information system in PLA parlance - providing greater 

situational awareness and a common operating picture to command posts down to the battalion 

level. The command information system includes a digitized battlefield situation map with

7 Zhang Zilian (张自廉), “把握好构建作战部署的新要求 (Grasp the new requirements of constructing operational 

deployment),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-05/21/content_234192.htm, accessed on 

May 15, 2020; Wang Wei (王崴), “未来陆战方式将向哪里演进 (Where will the future land warfare approach 

evolve?),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-08/20/content_241241.htm, accessed on May 16, 

2020

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layered information input from different intelligence and reconnaissance assets and includes 

databases and normative combat data to support planning. The digital map display includes basic 

geographic information, enemy and friendly force disposition, operational plan information, 

electronic environment, air, and maritime situation, as well as video feeds. Units can query the 

intelligence database for information. The PLA has also fielded aerial, ground, and maritime 

unmanned vehicles for reconnaissance, strike, electronic warfare, and communication into the 

force down to the tactical level. The PLA routinely uses the Beidou satellite navigation system 

for location and positioning, as well as its communication capability during training and non-war 

operations The Beidou system achieved a global network in 2020.7F

8

PLA Doctrine in Transition: The Impact of Technology and 

Characteristics of Future Warfare

An examination of the PLA’s views on the evolution of warfare and future warfare 

provide a clearer understanding of where Army doctrine is currently as well as the future

direction. The PLA views technology revolutions as the key driver for evolution in the patterns 

of warfare and operational methods. Mechanized warfare was enabled by the industrial era, 

transitioning into informationized warfare brought about by developments in information 

technologies. The PLA has been attempting to catch up with the world’s advanced militaries

since surprised by the revolution in military affairs based on information technologies 

demonstrated during Operation DESERT STORM. PLA doctrine evolves albeit slowly. 

Although PLA academicians and theorists discuss the newest technological, force structure, and 

operational concepts, it can take several decades for the integration of these theories into official 

doctrine and operationalized into the force. Examples include the recent establishment of theater 

8 Zhu Kuiyu (朱奎玉) editor-in-chief, 信息系统作战运用 (Operational Use of Information Systems). Beijing: Military 

Science Press, 2011, pp. 32-34 and 58; Liu Xuanzun, “Robot Warriors joint Chinese military arsenal, will free 

soldiers from dangerous missions,” Global Times, April 14, 2020; Liu Xuanzun, “China’s homemade Wing Loong 

drones hit battlefield targets with 90 percent accuracy,” Global Times, April 1, 2019; Ding Zhenyi (丁朕义) and 

Yang Yujie (杨宇杰), “透视“军事时间” (Perspective on "military time"),” available at 

http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-03/26/content_257499.htm, accessed on May 12, 2020; Zhao Xiangang 

(赵先刚) and Xiao Jianxiang (肖建湘), “无人作战仍须“以人为主” (Unmanned combat still needs to be "human 

oriented"),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/04/content_230915.htm, accessed on May 

13, 2020; Kevin McCauley, “PLA Theater Intelligence: Organization and Operations,” available at 

https://jamestown.org/program/pla-theater-joint-intelligence-organization-operations/, accessed on May 15, 

2020; Cai Heyang (蔡禾阳) editor, “Focus on being able to participate in good work, Focus on winning the battle,” 

available at http://news.mod.gov.cn/pla/2014-11/17/content_4551641.htm, accessed on May 15, 2020; Kevin 

McCauley, “Putting Precision in Operations: Beidou Satellite Navigation System,” available at 

https://jamestown.org/program/putting-precision-in-operations-beidou-satellite-navigation-system/, accessed on 

May 15, 2020; Huang Yanghai (黄杨海), “中央军委颁发《军队建设发展“十三五”规划纲要》 (The Central 

Military Commission issued the "Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Army Construction and Development"),” 

available at http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-05/12/content_7054416.htm, accessed on June 14, 2020

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commands and combined arms battalions that were theoretically discussed by academicians for 

several decades before implementation.8F

9

Emerging and disruptive technologies are important research areas for PLA military. The 

PLA believes that a combination of technological developments and strategic requirements based 

on national security interests shape the evolutionary pattern of future warfare. Strategic 

objectives determine the overall military capability requirements. Technology determines tactics 

as it drives fundamental changes in the form of warfare and engagement means. While the PLA

continues to integrate information technologies into weapons and equipment, and revises 

operational methods, theorists are examining what many believe is the next revolution in military 

affairs based on intelligent technologies. Informationized warfare represents a shift from kineticbased warfare to warfare based on information systems and from the physical domain to the 

information and cognitive domains. The PLA believes that seizing information superiority has 

become a dominant factor determining the outcome of operations. As warfare shifts from 

platform confrontation to system of systems confrontation, the command information system 

becomes critical integrating service and branch forces, weapons, and equipment into an 

operational system of systems which will conduct hard and soft strikes on key nodes in the 

enemy’s operational system of systems to gain victory. Combat is transitioning from large-scale 

operations to limited-scale precision operations supported by intelligent technologies. Precision 

operations include command, planning, strike, reconnaissance, maneuver, and logistics. The 

timely initiation of precision strikes on the opponent’s key points can achieve initiative and 

control in combat and can decisively determine the victory or defeat.9 F

10 

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies 

Warfare will continue to evolve based on emerging and disruptive technologies leading to 

a new revolution in military affairs. PLA theorists believe the current informationized warfare 

will incorporate intelligent technologies transitioning the digital battlefield into “intelligent 

warfare (智能化战争).” Many new operational methods discussed by PLA sources are 

acknowledged to have originated with the U.S. military such as drone swarm operations, multidomain warfare, algorithmic warfare viewed as “intelligent + warfare,” and concepts for the 

central employment of unmanned and autonomous systems. New disruptive technological 

innovations such as biotechnology, brain science, new manufacturing technologies, new 

materials, and new energy technologies are triggering revolutions in military affairs identified by 

PLA theorists as follows: the perception revolution is triggered by the internet of things; the 

computing revolution triggered by cloud computing; the predictive revolution initiated by big 

9 Guo Anhua (郭安华) editor-in-chief, 合同战术学教程 (Lectures on the Science of Combined Arms Tactics), 

Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000, p. 114; Wang Guangzhou (王光宙) editor-in-chief, 作战指挥学

(Science of Operational Command), Beijing: PLA Press, 2000, pp. 118-123

10 Qi Jianguo (戚建国), “把握战争形态演变的时代特征 (Grasp the Characteristics of the Times in the Evolution of 

War),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-01/16/content_252325.htm, accessed on May 10, 

2020; Liu Weiqi (刘玮琦), “信息化战争应有怎样的设计观 (What kind of design concept should be adopted in 

informationized warfare?),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-05/07/content_260624.htm, 

accessed on May 13, 2020

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data; the communication revolution initiated by quantum technologies; the material revolution 

initiated by nanotechnology; the behavioral revolution triggered by artificial intelligent 

technology; and the strike revolution triggered by military aerospace, electromagnetic, directed 

energy, unmanned and autonomous combat systems, and smart ammunition developments. 

Warfare’s method of confrontation will change from the current system of systems confrontation 

to an algorithmic competition with the side that best masters the advantages of algorithms 

achieving a cognitive advantage. The PLA believes the intelligent technologies will speed up 

decision making by greatly improving the accuracy and timeliness of battlefield information by 

more precisely searching, identifying, and transmitting battlefield information to allow the 

location, identification, and monitoring of key targets, guiding strikes, and assessing the strikes’ 

effect. The enhanced information sharing, situational awareness, and planning capabilities on the 

integrated battlefield will compress time and space. The kill chain will be shortened with “cloud” 

sharing of information and assisted decision-making to plan, launch and guide a strike. The 

maturity and development of technologies such as big data, cloud computing and quantum 

computing will speed up the decision-making cycle, as well as improve multi-domain linkage 

and synchronize multi-dimensional operations.10 F

11

Autonomous Operations: Humans vs. Technology 

The PLA believes that unmanned operational systems in intelligent warfare will become 

deeply integrated with the manned system to form an organic symbiosis. The result will be a 

manned-unmanned operational system. The PLA believes that many factors decide victory or 

defeat, and that weapons and technology are core factors in warfare. A key factor in intelligent 

warfare is the autonomy of unmanned systems. However, PLA theorists continue to believe that 

humans are the decisive factor determining victory or defeat. Intelligent weapons and systems 

will execute operational intentions and achieve operational objectives determined by humans. 

Humans will continue to plan, organize, and execute wars, deciding on the command and 

operational methods employed, assisted by intelligent technology.11 F

12

Hybrid Warfare

11 Gao Kai (高 凯), “未来战争应怎样“打” (How to "fight" in future wars),” available at 

http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-07/30/content_239590.htm, accessed on May 15, 2020; Qi Jianguo (戚

建国), “把握战争形态演变的时代特征 (Grasp the Characteristics of the Times in the Evolution of War),” available 

at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-01/16/content_252325.htm, accessed on May 10, 2020; Yang Caixia 

(杨彩霞) and Jia Daojin (贾道金), “什么在推动战争形态不断演进 (What is driving the evolution of war?),” 

available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-12/12/content_249722.htm, accessed on May 16, 2020; Li 

Shihua (李诗华) et al, “深刻把握战争形态智能化演进特点 (Profoundly grasp of wars morphological evolutionary 

characteristics),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-01/23/content_252841.htm, accessed on 

May 30, 2020

12 Fu Wanjuan (傅婉娟), Yang Wenzhe (杨文哲) and Xu Chunlei (许春雷), “智能化战争,不变在哪里 (Intelligent 

Warfare, What does not change?),” available at http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-

01/14/content_252163.htm, accessed on May 16, 2020

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PLA theorists are analyzing “hybrid warfare (混合战争)” based on U.S. military writings 

on the subject, Hezbollah tactics during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, and Russian military 

operationalization of the concept in the annexation of Crimea and operations in Syria. The PLA 

views hybrid warfare as integrating and closely coordinating regular and irregular forces in the 

same combat space. Irregular forces become the main force assisted by regular units. The 

concept is not alien to the PRC. The PRC waged a victorious guerilla war against the Nationalist 

forces and Japanese occupation. “Strategic guidance (战略方针) remains People’s War and the 

PLA integrates local, militia and paramilitary forces into military operations. Maritime militia 

and paramilitary forces are employed in grey zone operations to harass other countries in the 

South China Sea. In the future the PLA could copy the Russian employment of private military 

contractors to conduct operations supported by regular units. Chinese private security firms 

protect overseas enterprises. The employment of irregular forces can lower the cost of employing 

regular military units, and lower risks by providing plausible deniability. In operations abroad 

irregular forces can include opposition political groups, tribal militias, mercenaries, or even 

terrorists, religious extremists, criminal gangs, and other violent groups. Hybrid warfare also 

incorporates the full spectrum application of military and non-military means to achieve a 

political goal. Political, economic, diplomatic, and other national means are employed 

comprehensively with military force to achieve victory. Combat styles are diverse and flexible 

on a hybrid battlefield including intense, high-tech regular combat, covert employment of special 

forces, modern guerilla warfare, cyber warfare, and psychological warfare. Hybrid warfare is 

based on achieving political objectives with minimal cost and risk while disintegrating the 

enemy from the inside out with the use of irregular forces acting as a fifth column. Cognitive 

warfare will attack the enemy’s will to resist using public opinion, psychological and legal 

warfare to confuse the enemy and disrupt the decision-making process. Hybrid warfare creates 

new, low risk confrontational choices against major opponents.12F

13

Potential Roadblock to Doctrinal Implementation: Cultivating Talent 

PLA theorists are discussing new military revolutions and types of operations leading to 

intelligent warfare, algorithm warfare, and other novel forms of conflict. However, there are 

several systemic problems the PLA needs to resolve before advancing from its current hybrid 

mechanized and informationized warfare force to incorporate the next revolution in military 

affairs. Military education reforms have been stymied by corruption, obsolete courses and 

teaching materials, and problems attracting and retaining quality professors to name a few 

problems. Reforms of military education to cultivate a cadre of quality military talent required to 

plan, organize, and lead a modernized force with innovative operational methods has been 

ongoing for over twenty years with serious problems unresolved. The PLA is continuing to play 

13 Chen Hanghui (陈航辉) and Deng Xiumei (邓秀梅), “是新瓶旧酒,还是别开生面——浅析混合战争理论的特

点 (Old Wine in a New Bottle or a Fresh Start? – Primary Analysis of Hybrid Warfare Theory Characteristics),” 

available at http://www.81.cn/jwgd/2019-05/16/content_9504939.htm, accessed on May 15, 2020

12
catch up addressing the need to educate officers on information technologies that could adversely 

impact incorporating the next RMA into the force.1 3F

14

Current Army Campaign Doctrine 

This section examines the full list of Army offensive, defensive and special condition 

campaigns discussed in the AMS publication. The PLA believes that future local wars will occur 

in the primary operational environments of large and medium cities, in territorial waters, on 

islands, and oceans. Currently, Army campaigns will be conducted within the PRC or in regions 

along its periphery. Delivering and sustaining a Group Army or large force beyond regions near

the PRC’s borders currently are beyond the PRC’s capabilities. As the PRC enhances its strategic 

delivery and logistics, expeditionary capabilities will increase to support growing global interests 

and security requirements.

Command, Intelligence, and Planning 

Whether conducted as part of a joint campaign or a relatively independent campaign, the 

Army campaign is under the direction of an Army main command post. The Army main 

command post would include staff attached from supporting services. The campaign command is 

centralized and would be subordinate to a theater command’s joint operation command center.14 F

15

Army campaign command under informationized conditions has become complex with

increased span of control over widely dispersed forces. Diversified operations in a multidimensional non-linear space with frequent combat transitions place greater requirements on 

command and control. Command confrontation has become fierce with a focus on destroying or 

paralyzing the opponents command information system by means of electronic warfare, cyber 

warfare, or firepower destruction.15F

16

Command Posts 

The Army campaign command normally deploys main, alternate, rear, and forward or 

directional command posts. The main command post (CP) plans, coordinates and controls the 

entire operation, and is located along the main operational direction. The alternate command post 

acts as a reserve CP to take command if the main CP is destroyed or needs to transfer to a new 

location. The forward CP is deployed in the main operational direction to provide greater control 

over fast paced operations and changing battlefield situations. The rear CP is mainly responsible 

for logistics and equipment support as well as rear area security. Subordinate units would deploy 

a similar command post structure. Some PLA theorist suggest that fewer CPs could be employed 

14 Kevin McCauley, “Cultivating Joint Talent,” draft paper delivered to an Army War College conference in October 

2018 and a chapter in a forthcoming Army War College publication

15 LSAC, pp. 32-39 16 LSAC, pp. 79-80

13
in future operations depending on the situation. Options discussed include establishing only a 

main CP; a main and rear CP; or a main, alternate, and rear CP.16F

17

Command post organization is not uniform and depends on the situation. A command 

post contains multiple functional centers or departments to direct specific aspects of a campaign. 

These functional centers could include the following centers and departments: command and 

control center; intelligence center; communication center; information operations center, air 

defense operations center; special operations center; comprehensive support department; military 

affairs mobilization department; firepower coordination center; and political work department. 

The alternate and forward CPs would likely mirror the main CP’s organization. The rear CP 

might contain a comprehensive plan and coordination department, a logistics and equipment 

support department and a “local supporting the front” department to coordinate logistics and 

equipment support with civilian organizations. A rear CP would have to be prepared to take 

control of an operation if the other CPs ceased functioning. The PLA’s operational 

communication system is the command information system composed of the command and 

control, intelligence and reconnaissance, comprehensive support, and administrative subsystems.17 F

18

Campaign Intelligence 

Intelligence support is based in the command post’s intelligence center at each echelon. 

The Central Military Commission’s Strategic Support Force will provide strategic intelligence

through the theater joint operation command center’s intelligence center. The theater intelligence 

center provides support from theater assets to the Army command post and campaign formation. 

The Army command post’s intelligence center will collect and process intelligence and 

reconnaissance from subordinate assets, neighboring units, and theater to disseminate as needed 

to subordinate units. As mentioned above, the battlefield situation map depicts available 

intelligence down to battalion level. A key intelligence development is the intelligence database 

that units can query for required information. The status, capabilities, and functioning of this 

intelligence database system is unknown. In the intelligence process, the intelligence centers at 

each echelon collect, process, and disseminate information to subordinates. In addition, units can 

query the database for information required for operations.18 F

19

Campaign Plans 

PLA sources are not consistent on the types of plans developed for a campaign. The chief 

of staff prepares the operational plan based on the commander’s intent. The operational plan will 

17 LSAC, pp. 83-87; Tan Son (檀松) and Su Yongpeng (穆永朋) editors, 联合战术学 (Science of Joint Tactics), 

Beijing: Military Science Press, 2014, pp. 132-134

18 Ni Tianyou (倪天友) editor-in-chief, 指挥信息系统教程 (Lectures on the Command Information System), Beijing: 

Military Science Press, 2013, pp. 21-22; Tan Son (檀松) and Su Yongpeng (穆永朋) editors, 联合战术学 (Science of 

Joint Tactics), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2014, pp. 134-136 19 Kevin McCauley, “PLA Theater Joint Intelligence: Organization and Operations,” available at 

https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-western-theater-command/, accessed on June 12, 2020

14
delineate the campaign purpose, main operational direction, main objectives, division of 

campaign phases, force deployment, campaign actions, command organization, and main 

campaign actions. Alternate actions are evaluated using computer simulation, sand table or map 

deduction if time allows. The operational plan also includes an operational action plan and 

support plan. The operational action plan delineates the overall operational actions and includes 

an operational action master plan, an operational action branch plan and a coordination plan. 

Branch plans include reconnaissance, counter-surveillance, firepower, information operations, 

and rear area defense plans. The support plan includes operational, logistics and equipment 

support. The coordination plan includes coordination procedures and methods between forces 

during operational stages, responses to possible enemy actions, coordination of support, and 

recovery measures if coordination is disrupted.19F

20

Campaign Forces and Organization

Army campaigns would be conducted by one or more Group Army with support from 

other services as required. Group Armies were reorganized in 2017 into a standard structure (see 

Figure 2). The tactical force has reorganized into combined brigades and combined arms 

battalions. These brigades and battalions are organized as heavy (tracked armor vehicles), 

medium (wheeled armor vehicles), and light (high mobility wheeled vehicles) brigades and 

battalions with tanks, tracked and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, and light vehicles 

providing mobility to the ground force. The PLA Army also has independent divisions, brigades, 

and regiments primarily in the Western Theater Command. Campaign forces would be task 

organized into one or more Army “campaign formation (军团)” which could include subordinate 

“tactical formations (兵团)” (see Figure 3). A campaign or tactical formation is an integrated 

task force that contains various modular operational elements20 F

21 such as command and control, 

maneuver, fire support, reconnaissance and intelligence, and comprehensive support to allow for 

independent operations. A campaign formation would be a group army size task force, while a 

tactical formation would be a division or multi-brigade size force depending on the operational 

requirements. Campaign and tactical formations represent “operational system of systems (作战

体系).” An operational system of systems is a joint or service integrated task force at the 

strategic, campaign or tactical echelon capable of independent operations. The operational 

system of systems is part of the terminology the PLA has developed to explain “system of 

systems operations (体系作战).” System of systems operations is the integrated command 

information system that will enable the PLA’s transition to an integrated joint operations 

20 Zhang Peigao (张培高) editor-in-chief, 联合战役指挥教程 (Lectures on Joint Campaign Command), Beijing: 

Military Science Press, 2012, pp. 114-116; Tan Son (檀松) and Su Yongpeng (穆永朋) editors, 联合战术学 (Science 

of Joint Tactics), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2014, pp. 147-151; All Army Terminology Management Committee

(全军军事术语管理委员会), 中国人民解放军军语 (Chinese PLA Military Terminology), Beijing: Military Science 

Press, 2011, pp. 116, 180-181 21 The PLA defines operational elements as capabilities similar to warfighting functions.

15
capability. The operational system of systems is composed of multiple “operational systems (作

战系统)” that represent a single system type such as reconnaissance systems. In addition to the 

capability to conduct independent operations, a key characteristic of an operational system of 

systems is the ability to recombine modular components to optimally meet changing operational 

phases or new operational requirements. The PLA’s system of systems operational theory was 

influenced by the US military’s network centric warfare and systems theory. 21 F

22

22 Kevin McCauley, System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations, Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, 2017; Zhang Hui (张晖), 信息时代军事训练论 (On Military Training in the Information Age), Beijing: 

National Defense University Press, 2016, p. 287

16
Central Military Commission subordinate forces that will support an Army campaign 

include the Strategic Support Force and Rocket Force. The unique Strategic Support Force (SSF) 

was established in December 2015 consolidating strategic aerospace reconnaissance, warning, 

communication, navigation, and offensive and defensive information warfare assets to support 

all the services. Theater supporting units include Air Force, Navy (Northern, Eastern and 

Southern Theater fleets), and Joint Logistic Support Forces assigned to the theater. In September 

2016, the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) was established under the CMC Logistic Support 

Department consisting of the Wuhan Joint Logistic Support Base with subordinate centers in 

each of the five theater commands. The JLSF provides logistics support to theater forces. Service 

logistics provides specialized support to their units. Since logistics facilities are located within 

China apart from the Djibouti Support Base that supplies the Guld of Aden anti-piracy escorts 

and peacekeeping forces. The Rocket Force remains under CMC command but provides 

firepower support to theater forces as needed. Rocket Force personnel are assigned to the theater 

commands to support planning and coordinate operations. It is likely that SSF personnel are 

attached to each theater for coordination.22 F

23

Campaign Disposition 

23 Qiu Yue (邱越), “我军战略支援部队是一支什么样的军事力量? (What kind of military force is our strategic 

support force?),” available at http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-01/05/content_6844493.htm, accessed on June 12, 

2020; Yao Jianing, “China establishes Joint Logistic Support Force,” available at 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7256636.htm, accessed on June 12, 2020; Kevin 

McCauley, “Himalayan Impasse, How China Would Fight an Indian Border Conflict,” available at 

https://jamestown.org/program/himalayan-impasse-how-china-would-fight-an-indian-borderconflict/?mc_cid=aff8a73ad5&mc_eid=938966a4d0, accessed on June 12,2020

17
A Group Army or campaign formation’s frontage and depth would be influenced by 

terrain and operational requirements. Typically, a Group Army would have a frontage as wide as 

60 kilometers (km) and a depth of 65-70 km. The PHL-03 300mm Multiple Rocket Launcher 

(MRL) with a range estimated at 130-150 km is the longest-range artillery system in a Group 

Army. The Army Aviation brigade would establish a forward base approximately 40-60 km from 

the front lines, with standby areas designated at approximately 15-20 km from the front. 

Campaign tactical missile positions could be established approximately 65-70 km from the front 

to support the campaign formation. The campaign formation can include various tactical 

formations equivalent to a division or brigade in size and capabilities. 

Tactical Groupings 

The tactical formations would organize subordinate forces into various offensive functional 

tactical groupings and can include the following:2 3F

24

• Forward attack group: main and secondary forward attack groups are formed to attack 

enemy forward defensive positions 

• Frontal attack groups: in mountain combat frontal attack groups are formed to attack 

enemy defensive positions in coordination with detour attack groups attacking the 

enemy’s flanks and weak points 

• Deep attack group: responsible for conducting attacks on enemy in-depth defensive 

positions 

• Detour attack group: in mountain combat this group attacks enemy in-depth defensive 

positions in coordination with frontal attack groups

• Deep thrust and detour combat group: responsible for attacking important enemy 

objectives in depth in coordination with the main forces attacking from the front 

• Airborne/airlanding group: seize and control key points in the enemy depth or attack 

enemy units from the rear in coordination with main forces attacking from the front. 

• Advance attack group: responsible for forward reconnaissance, expelling or annihilating 

enemy troops, cover, or screen enemy units, and seize key points to create favorable 

conditions for main force operations 

• Storming attack group: responsible for attacking enemy fortified positions, strong points, 

defended buildings or underground facilities 

• Assault landing group: responsible for attacking and occupying enemy coastal defensive 

positions; usually divided into main direction and secondary direction assault landing 

groups 

• Barrier breaching and clearing detachment: responsible for opening passages and clearing 

obstacles

• Raiding group: special operations groups to attack important enemy targets such as 

command posts, airports, ports, transportation hubs, important weapon systems, and 

logistics sites

24 All Army Military Terminology Management Committee (全军军事术语管理委员会), 中国人民解放军军语

(Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011 (hereafter cited as 

Military Terms), pp. 147-149

18
Tactical defensive groups and areas include the following:24F

25

• Forward defense group: Defense of forward positions and usually divided into a main 

direction defense group and a secondary direction defense group 

• Deep defense group: responsible for defense of in-depth positions to counter enemy 

penetrations and encirclement operations 

• Mobile annihilation group: responsible for mobile attacks to wipe out enemy forces 

conducting penetrations or encirclements during defensive combat

• Covering group: employed in defensive combat to block enemy reconnaissance, resist, or 

delay enemy advances, or force the enemy to deploy early

• Reconnaissance and sabotage raid team: responsible for reconnaissance and raids during 

defensive combat to determine the enemy’s offensive intentions, attack important enemy 

targets or harass and delay an enemy’s advance

Other tactical groups in offensive or defensive combat include the following:25 F

26

• Anti-armor group: responsible for attacking enemy armor and fortified positions during 

offensive or defensive combat

• Combat reserve unit: unit for mobile combat missions to respond to emergency and 

unexpected situations 

• Anti-airborne reserve unit: unit mainly composed of armor, mechanized infantry, 

infantry, artillery, air defense and engineering forces to respond to enemy airborne or 

airmobile landings 

Campaign Actions

Army campaigns include important actions whether offensive, defensive or under special 

conditions. These include the army campaign formation’s maneuver to the operational area, 

information operations, special operations, and air defense operations. Considering the 

importance attributed by the PLA to firepower for the success of operations, it is surprising it is 

not included. A short discussion of campaign firepower support is added to the PLA list of 

campaign actions.

Campaign Firepower 

The campaign firepower plan will include a layered employment of artillery, rocket, 

conventional missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and aircraft. The Group Armies contain 

artillery brigades whose major artillery and rocket systems include 122 mm and 155 mm 

howitzers, and PHL-03 300 mm MRL. Conventional missiles would support Army campaigns 

striking targets in the deep rear area of the enemy. These missiles and ground launched cruise 

missiles are controlled by the Rocket Force. The Air Force provides attack against ground

targets. Usually a specified number of sorties are assigned to a ground unit. Target guidance 

25 Military Terms, pp. 149-150 26 Military Terms, pp. 149-150

19
teams or special operations teams provide strike guidance. Service liaisons are attached to 

firepower coordination centers in command posts during operations. 

Campaign Maneuver 

The campaign formation’s maneuver to the operational area is conducted during the 

preparatory stage of a campaign to the area where the campaign is launched. Command and 

control of maneuvering forces is complex and relies on mobile command posts. The Beidou 

satellite navigation system allows command posts to track unit locations in real time, and the 

communications capability provides secure communications during movement that is employed 

extensively by PLA units. The main command post closely monitors the situation and provides

timely updates to subordinate units on enemy activity and reconnaissance, the battlefield 

environment, and guidance on adjusting routes. Movement is carried out under threat of enemy 

reconnaissance and during combat under threat of enemy long and medium-range precision 

strikes. Denial and deception, air cover and air defense are important force protection methods 

on the modern battlefield. Warfare under informationized conditions has accelerated operational 

tempo and shortened operational processes forcing rapid response times during movement to the 

combat area. The mechanization of the PLA ground forces supports increased mobility. The 

delivery of forces can employ multiple means such as road, rail, air and by waterways. China’s 

infrastructure and transportation modernization supports force deployment as part of civilmilitary integration programs.26F

27

Long-range delivery of forces is increasingly important, in particular to support 

expeditionary operations. The PLA Air Force and Navy’s long-range transportation capabilities

currently are limited, although growing. Reliance on civilian shipping and airlines are important 

means for PLA expeditionary force deployment and sustainment. However, the PLA currently 

considers civilian capabilities as inadequate. Civil military integration and the 2017 National 

Defense Transportation Law provide for the mobilization of civilian assets and integration of 

military requirements into the construction of civilian transportation infrastructure. The ability to 

move forces and supplies will continue to expand based on military modernizations and civilian 

integration of military requirements into transportation systems.27 F

28

Information Operations 

Information defense and offense are important to protect friendly information capabilities

and suppress, destroy, or infiltrate the enemy’s information systems. Seizing and maintaining 

information superiority is critical to a successful campaign. Information operations in wartime 

represents the continuation of peacetime information operations. Information reconnaissance in 

peacetime identifies the technical parameters of the enemy information system critical to support 

wartime information operations. Targets in the operational area are selected in peacetime.

27 LSAC, pp. 184-187 28 Kevin McCauley, “China’s Logistics Support to Expeditionary Operations,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission “China’s Military Power Projection and U.S. National Interests,” 

February 20, 2020, available from 

ttps://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony_0.pdf, accessed on Marcy 20, 2020 

20
Specialized and non-specialized military and civilian forces are employed, although army 

campaign formations include limited specialized information operations forces, and must rely on 

non-specialized forces or superior headquarters for support. The Strategic Support Force can 

provide strategic information warfare and reconnaissance support. Forces are concentrated along 

the main operational direction to conduct decisive offensive actions against key enemy systems 

and sub-systems. Cyber, electronic warfare, and firepower strikes are the primary components of 

information operations. Hard destruction and soft kill are combined to attack the enemy’s 

information system.28 F

29

Key areas that require protection include Army command posts, communications hubs, 

relay stations, satellite ground stations, and battlefield computer local area network (LAN) nodes 

for example. Facilities require camouflage, concealment, and engineering protection. 

Electromagnetic spectrum management and control are employed to thwart enemy detection and

ensure friendly communications. Information feints are employed to deceive enemy 

reconnaissance and protect important facilities.29F

30

Operational information reconnaissance includes electronic countermeasure 

reconnaissance and network warfare reconnaissance. Methods include radio technical

reconnaissance using various means to discover the composition, configuration, key target 

locations and technical parameters of the equipment and facilities of the enemy information 

system. Radar reconnaissance is employed to intercept electromagnetic signals radiated by 

enemy radar and determine their position. Network reconnaissance identifies the characteristics 

and vulnerabilities of enemy network systems.30F

31

Information attack is employed to suppress, destroy, or penetrate enemy information 

systems. At a key operational juncture electronic warfare forces conduct electronic interference

to deceive the enemy or conduct feints with false electromagnetic signals to lead the enemy to 

false analysis of the battlefield situation. Computer network attacks adopt various technical 

means to control or destroy the enemy’s computer network. Computer network intrusion 

includes obtaining, modifying, or destroying information on the enemy’s computer network 

systems. Computer virus attack place viruses on enemy computers for activation when required. 

Physical destruction of enemy information systems includes anti-radiation weapons and 

electromagnetic pulse weapons, as well as the employment of firepower strikes and special 

operations forces.31 F

32

Information defense includes anti-electronic interference, protection of friendly computer 

systems, and protection from physical destruction. Cyber security software, intrusion detection, 

and electromagnetic shielding are some of the methods to defend against enemy attacks.32 F

33

29 LSAC, pp. 193-195 30 LSAC, pp. 195-197 31 LSAC, pp. 197-198 32 LSAC, pp. 198-199 33 LSAC, pp. 199-200

21
Special Operations 

Each group army contains a special operations brigade to provide reconnaissance and 

conduct direct action against key enemy targets. The PLA believes that special operations forces 

can have significant impacts on the battlefield when employed on the main operational direction 

and at a key point in the operation. Special forces conduct operations that other forces cannot 

accomplish. Reconnaissance is the primary mission, but other actions are emphasized to include 

guiding fire strikes including by aircraft or helicopters, attacking key objectives, and rescue 

operations. Special forces brigades’ field unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance or 

strikes.33F

34

Special forces infiltrate the enemy rear through multiple means. Air delivery includes 

transport aircraft, helicopter or autogyros. Teams can be delivered by ships, fishing boats or 

submarines. Special forces can also infiltrate by foot or using light all-terrain vehicles.34 F

35

Special reconnaissance is conducted against key enemy targets that other assets cannot 

monitor. Reconnaissance teams employ the special intelligence report transmission network or 

the emergency communication network to provide timely transmission of critical intelligence.

Special forces provide guidance to long-range precision strikes by aircraft or other fire support 

means. The guiding unit employs advanced observation, calculation, and communication 

equipment to transmit precise location of the enemy target and the frequency of the target’s 

electronic equipment. The targeting team can also employ smoke, illumination, laser designation

or other markers to identify the target. The targeting team will maintain observation and provide 

updates of the target until the strike. The special forces team will also provide battle damage 

assessments after the strike. Direct action includes attacking, harassing, or seizing key targets.

These missions include placing mines or obstacles at key targets such as airports, ports, or 

transportation hubs. Special forces employ electronic countermeasures to disrupt enemy 

communications in the rear area; conduct psychological harassment against enemy forces; and 

rescue and evacuate personnel or prisoners from the enemy rear area.35 F

36

Air Defense

The PLA considers the modern air threat more seriously than ever before. Air defense

operations include organizing air reconnaissance and protection against enemy air raids to 

support force deployment, protect important objectives, and campaign operations. The PLA 

believes that its long-range systems such as campaign tactical missiles, multiple rocket launchers 

and attack helicopters are insufficient to conduct strikes against enemy air assets, and that the 

capabilities of enemy air forces has increased in range and lethality, placing the campaign’s air 

34 Kevin McCauley, “PLA Special Operations: Forces, Command, Training and Future Direction,” available at 

https://jamestown.org/program/pla-special-operations-forces-command-training-and-futuredirection/#.VdSq1Wum3h4, accessed March 21, 2020; Kevin McCauley, “PLA Special Operations: Combat Missions 

and Operations Abroad,” available at https://jamestown.org/program/pla-special-operations-combat-missionsand-operations-abroad/#.VeoMYWum3h4, accessed March 21, 2020; LSAC, pp. 200-202 35 LSAC, p. 203 36 LSAC, pp. 204-210

22
defense operations in a passive mode. Enemy electronic countermeasures and other suppression 

of air defenses before air strikes will further complicate air defense operations and early warning 

capabilities of the campaign formation. Campaign air defenses will focus on protecting

command posts, artillery groups, concentrations of forces, transportation hubs and important rear 

area facilities. During operations within the PRC, civil air defense units will support the 

campaign formation. Aerial obstacles such as balloons or cables are set up in likely air corridors 

to defend against low-altitude penetrations. Denial and deception are important components for 

force protection as well as consuming enemy weapons systems against decoy targets.36 F

37

Offensive Campaigns

An Army campaign formation will plan operational objectives, direction, timing, and 

attack methods to impose its will on the enemy and achieve campaign or even strategic 

objectives. Information and firepower attacks, combined with encirclements, are main operations

to annihilate enemy forces. They are conducted by the centralized employment of new type 

operational forces equipped with high-tech weapons and equipment. Depending on the PLA 

source, new type operational forces include electronic warfare, special operations, army aviation, 

cyber warfare, and space forces. Ground assaults are dominated by armor units acting in 

coordination with Army aviation forces. The objective of combat is to annihilate the enemy’s 

effective strength and paralyze the operational system of systems by attacking key nodes. The 

PLA believes that future campaigns could include the use of nuclear weapons, and thus 

campaigns are considered conventional operations under the threat of nuclear employment.37 F

38 

Basic operational methods are dependent on the development of science and technology 

effecting weapons and equipment development, combined with the geographical environment. 

Different historical periods have different campaign styles and operational methods. Modern 

campaigns under informationized conditions are characterized by full-dimensional operations, 

maneuver, concentration of quantity and quality aimed at annihilating and paralyzing the 

enemy’s operational system of systems. The flexible employment of multi-dimensional 

encirclement, deep thrusts to destroy the enemy’s cohesion, and combinations of hard and soft 

kills are designed to capture key areas or objectives and destroy the enemy’s will to resist.38F

39

Offensive Campaign Preparation 

The offensive campaign under informationized conditions is complex, with high 

requirements for timely campaign preparation. Peacetime reconnaissance and intelligence are 

critical to commanders and their staff to ensure accurate knowledge of the battlefield 

environment and enemy situation. Important preparation requirements include planning 

coordination of forces and phases of the campaign, ensuring subordinate commands understand 

37 LSAC, pp. 210-217 38 LSAC, pp. 97-98 39 LSAC, p. 98

23
the campaign plan and are fully prepared, and establishing an informationized command 

structure to ensure command efficiency.39 F

40

Offensive campaign formations will establish a command structure composed of a main, 

forward, and rear command post with clear delineation of responsibilities. An alternate command 

post can be established to ensure stable and uninterrupted command. Coordination teams are 

established and usually located in the main command post to ensure coordination with 

subordinates and other forces such as neighboring forces or supporting services.40F

41

A main task is to correctly understand the superior headquarters’ operational intent, 

understand the campaign formation’s mission as well as the missions and cooperative 

relationship with neighboring forces. The campaign staff analyzes and assesses the enemy 

situation, topography, meteorology, hydrology, and other factors that could impact the campaign.

The campaign commander must also listen to reports and recommendations from subordinate 

commanders, logistical and technical support personnel, and in particular his chief-of-staff. The 

chief-of-staff is probably the most important staff position in the PLA command system with 

multiple responsibilities. Important factors to analyze are the military and political qualities of 

friendly troops, the quantity and technical status of weapons and equipment, the assessment of 

the capability to accomplish operational missions, and coordination problems that need to be 

resolved by superior headquarters. If possible, terrain surveys of critical areas should be 

conducted.41 F

42

Determining the campaign guidelines includes planning and preparing the main campaign 

actions, the basic means and methods to achieve objectives, campaign directions, key area for 

annihilating the enemy, main campaign actions and use of forces, campaign phases and the 

changing operational requirements during transitions to new phases, and timing of launching the 

campaign. Seizing information and air superiority are key campaign objectives. The main 

campaign direction is determined by the superior headquarters based on the operational 

environment and campaign objectives. The main operational direction can change as 

requirements change due to the situation or transitions in campaign phases. Use of force is 

usually dependent on striking weak enemy forces first, and later dealing with strong formations. 

Key enemy targets for strikes are determined based on destroying the enemy’s overall 

operational system of systems. These key targets are command and control systems, operational 

support systems, logistics and other targets that will disrupt and collapse the enemy’s structure 

and combat effectiveness. When strong enemy forces must be engaged, destroying key targets in 

their formation are critical to achieving operational success.42 F

43

Force deployment is carefully planned based on the situation. Forces can be based on 

groups, echelon, or a combination. Currently, The PLA appears to prefer employing functional 

groups during offensive operations. In general, the deployment of forces should be flexible and 

40 LSAC, pp. 117-118 41 LSAC, p. 118 42 LSAC, p. 118 43 LSAC, pp. 119-121

24
capable of reconfiguration as required. Campaign deployment should be concealed, in-depth, 

multi-dimensional and capable of adapting to changing situations.43F

44

Offensive Campaign Planning and Coordination 

Based on the superior headquarters’ operational intent, the campaign commander makes 

decisions on the offensive campaign and instructs his chief-of-staff to prepare the offensive 

campaign plan. This mainly includes the operational plan, the political work plan, and rear work 

plan. The operational plan is the core of the offensive campaign plan and is the focus of the 

chief-of-staff. Based on the superior headquarters’ intent, the operational plan formulates the 

main direction, stages, campaign formation missions, coordination with neighboring forces, and 

unit boundaries. Firepower preparation and support is planned to include the employment of 

special weapons. Special weapons are not further defined but an examination of the PLA’s use of 

the term can include weapons of mass destruction.4 4F

45

Political and rear area work are important components of the offensive campaign plan. 

The political, logistics and technical departments formulate their respective multi-faceted support 

plans. The PLA believes that future informationized warfare will be intense with high levels of 

destruction and consumption leading to complex support requirements. Political work is 

responsible for ideological work, unity, and loyalty within the military with an emphasis on 

building morale, and actions to erode enemy morale employing the three warfares: 

psychological, public opinion, and legal warfare. Wartime political work also includes ensuring 

security and the implantation of orders and intentions of superior headquarters.45 F

46

The operational plan attempts to analyze and project possible developments and changes 

that could occur during the campaign. The plan must be flexible with multiple potential courses 

of action planned. The plan should be concise, outlining the general campaign actions to allow 

for adjustments or change in reaction to dynamic situations.46F

47

Offensive campaign coordination is based on instructions by the superior headquarters, 

the operational plan, and campaign phases to enable the subordinate tactical formations to 

conduct the main actions in a coordinated manner at the planned time and place to ensure 

success. Coordination is planned between the various campaign and tactical formations, groups, 

and services within a campaign, and neighboring forces. Coordination includes planning 

communication and liaison methods for different tasks, times, and areas. Coordination 

instructions are concise and precise. If unforeseen situations disrupt the coordination plan during 

the campaign, new coordination instructions are rapidly issued to all forces to ensure successful 

operational progress.47 F

48

44 LSAC, pp. 120-121 45 LSAC, pp. 121-122 46 LSAC, pp. 121-123 47 LSAC, p. 122 48 LSAC, pp. 122-123

25
Advance Operational Actions 

Advance operational actions prepare for the smooth implementation of the campaign.

Force protection measures include guarding against sudden attacks, air strikes, and firepower

assaults, and conducting counter reconnaissance while deploying and assembling forces. Actions 

to compete with the enemy for initiative include conducting extensive reconnaissance, 

engineering mobility and counter mobility support, special operations, and firepower 

preparation. Actions to seize electromagnetic and air superiority are critical during this phase.4 8F

49 

Offensive Campaign Implementation 

The initiation of the campaign should be concealed, sudden, and proactive. The campaign 

formation can initiate the offensive campaign from the march, after temporary occupation of a 

departure area, or from state of confrontation. Information warfare, firepower strikes, and special 

operations are early actions to seize information and air superiority striking key targets to disrupt 

the enemy defenses.49 F

50

Initial campaign actions include penetration of the enemy’s defenses, deep thrusts, 

breaking up the enemy’s defensive system, bypassing strong points, enveloping and annihilating 

important targets, repulsing and smashing enemy counterattacks, resisting and supporting 

actions, annihilating encircled enemy forces, and pursuing retreating forces.50F

51

Information warfare includes information reconnaissance by various means to identify 

the battlefield situation, enemy intentions, terrain, communications, reconnaissance, electronic 

warfare, and other key systems. Information reconnaissance can identify the enemy’s command 

structure, campaign tactical missile positions, air defense and artillery positions, support and 

transportation hubs, heavy enemy groupings, and other key targets. Information attack includes 

psychological warfare, tactical deception, electronic warfare, direct action, and other means to 

prevent the enemy from accessing and using information. Psychological warfare can include 

propaganda, deception, and deterrence to influence the enemy’s morale and will to fight. Tactical 

deception can confuse or deceive the enemy using information countermeasures to ensure 

successful operations. Electronic warfare includes electronic interference, deception and feints, 

and protection. Electronic jamming is conducted against enemy sensors, guidance systems and 

communications. Electronic deception and feints include actions to confuse the enemy and 

conceal friendly intentions by providing false information, establishing false targets and signals, 

conducting reconnaissance to mislead the enemy while controlling friendly electronic emissions.

Direct attacks are hard kills against enemy targets through electronic attack, firepower strikes, 

anti-radiation missiles, nuclear electromagnetic pulse or directed energy weapons.51 F

52

Air defense actions are intended to defend the campaign formation and ensure air domain 

initiative. Air defense includes repulsing enemy strikes, conducting counterattacks, and 

49 LSAC, p. 124 50 LSAC, p. 124 51 LSAC, p. 124 52 LSAC, pp. 125-127

26
protective measures. Repulsing enemy air strikes is based on thorough reconnaissance to forecast 

enemy intentions, main attack direction and targets, and timing of strikes. Counterattacks against 

enemy air offensive formations initially target enemy electronic jamming, early warning and 

aerial refueling aircraft. Friendly air and air defense forces organize to intercept enemy air 

formations as early and forward as possible using a layered structure and with continuous 

attacks. Interceptor aircraft form an initial defensive layer, with integrated air defense missiles 

and artillery barriers based on range and capabilities to the rear. Army aviation is also employed 

to carry out concealed attacks on the flanks of enemy air corridors and against the rear of enemy 

air formations. A system of air obstacles can also be established over or near important targets to 

block enemy aircraft or even destroy them. Counter attacks are intended to seize favorable 

battlefield opportunities to fight against the enemy’s air strikes and seize air superiority. Army 

aviation, campaign tactical missiles, long-range artillery and forces operating in the enemy’s rear 

area are employed to attack air bases, weapons storage, command and control, and other key 

targets. Protection includes maneuvering forces and weapons to avoid strikes, concealment, 

camouflage, creating false targets, and electronic interference to enhance force protection. Rapid 

battlefield repair can effectively eliminate the effects of enemy air strikes.52 F

53

Joint firepower strikes are conducted by artillery, campaign tactical missiles, aircraft and 

helicopters, armored vehicles, and infantry weapons. Firepower assets integrate fires against key 

enemy targets including command centers, communication hubs, electronic warfare units, 

transportation hubs, fire support, ground air defense, logistics, heavy ground forces and other 

objectives near the front lines as well as deep in the enemy rear.53F

54

Campaign Termination 

The campaign commander decides on ending a campaign based on the superior 

headquarters’ intent and the battlefield situation. The decision is determined by achieving the 

campaign objectives or when the battlefield situation has changed fundamentally to one’s 

disadvantage. In some situations where the original campaign’s objectives have been achieved,

battlefield opportunities can result in new operational objectives assigned by the superior 

headquarters. Ending an offensive campaign can lead to a transition to defensive operations to 

consolidate campaign objectives. The termination of a campaign can also result in withdrawing 

forces from the battlefield in a planned and organized manner to designated areas. 54 F

55

Maneuver Offensive Campaign 

The maneuver or mobile offensive campaign is an offensive campaign of quick decision 

by an Army campaign formation against an enemy in an unstable or mobile defensive posture. 

Ground force modernization has fielded a mobile force with tracked and wheeled armor vehicles 

and high mobility vehicles to enhance maneuver. A maneuver offensive campaign intends to 

annihilate enemy forces rapidly, transform the correlation of forces and favorably change the 

battlefield situation. The focus is to concentrate on destroying the enemy’s high-tech weapons 

and key nodes in the operational system of systems. A maneuver offense maintains initiative and 

53 LSAC, pp. 128-129 54 LSAC, pp. 129-130 55 LSAC, pp. 141-142

27
can achieve strategic objectives. The PLA believes that Army maneuver offensive campaign is 

an effective method to rapidly destroy key enemy forces and the cohesion of the enemy 

operational system of systems. In high-tech informationized wars multi-dimensional maneuver 

and firepower create battlefield opportunities to efficiently destroy the enemy’s vital forces. 

However, force protection, command and support become more difficult on the informationized 

battlefield.55F

56

The fast paced, dispersed battlefield can create opportunities for commanders to employ 

initiative during maneuver operations. The campaign commander must carefully plan

communications, engineering, and logistics support during the maneuver campaign. Careful 

selection of the main operational direction and objectives is critical based on the superior 

commander’s intention, the enemy deployment, and battlefield analysis. Campaign objectives 

can include the enemy’s high-tech weapons and equipment, logistics sites, transportation hubs 

and command centers. Armor, mechanized infantry, and Army Aviation forces conduct the main 

offensive tasks. The initial stage of the operation can be decisive and determine the success of 

the campaign.56 F

57

Positional Offensive Campaign 

The positional offensive campaign is conducted by an Army campaign formation against 

an enemy in a positional defensive posture. The main tasks are to annihilate key enemy defensive 

groups and seize key objectives on the battlefield. The enemy’s defensive positions can be field 

defenses employing defensive lines and in-depth multi-dimensional defensive systems consisting 

of constructed defensive positions, a firepower system, and obstacles. Conducting a 

breakthrough of the defensive system is the key campaign action. Offensive force deployment 

emphasizes flexibility, fierce offensive and defensive combat, and can include high damage and 

loss rates, with difficult support requirements. The PLA assesses that enemy forces will 

concentrate on implementing early countermeasures to destroy logistics capabilities. Combat 

areas outside of the PRC will increase logistics difficulties as the current logistics infrastructure 

is in the five theaters. The PLA notes that the First Gulf War was relatively large scale, long 

duration (approximately 7 months), with high consumption rates.57F

58

Positional offensive campaigns require well prepared forces, planning, and analysis of 

enemy weaknesses and the battlefield environment. The PLA will conduct pre-combat training

on similar terrain as the operational area if possible, as well as political training to ensure high 

morale during the complex operations. Campaign preparations are accomplished rapidly, and in a 

concealed manner to protect against enemy countermeasures to disrupt the operation. Forces are 

deployed in a deep echelon formation to maintain offensive capabilities and ensure success. The 

campaign formation is divided into first and second echelons with a reserve team. The campaign 

formation can establish a rapid assault group to enhance the capability to exploit initial 

56 LSAC, pp. 105-106 57 LSAC, pp. 106-108 58 LSAC, pp. 108-109

28
operations and continue the assault into the enemy’s depth. Continuous command is required to 

deploy the echelons into combat at the correct time and in quick succession.58F

59

Concentration of superior forces is required to ensure the breakthrough operations. This

concentration includes firepower and air strike forces in the main operational direction to support 

the breakthrough. The campaign formation focuses on intermingling with the enemy forces, 

dividing them, and annihilate them one after the other. The PLA identifies flexible operational 

methods to include the following:59F

60

• Single or multi-point penetration of the enemy’s defensive position 

• Penetration with twin pincer assaults concentrated on the enemy’s flanks to open a gap in 

the enemy’s defensive position 

• In-depth encirclement with forces penetrating the enemy position from multiple 

directions to engage and destroy the enemy from all sides

• Parallel penetration attacking the enemy in two areas at once

• Splitting the enemy’s forces and defeating them in detail

• Roll up both enemy flanks after the penetration to expand the breakthrough and 

coordinate with follow-on forces to destroy the enemy

• Concentric assault on enemy forces from multiple directions, normally employed against 

an enemy defending an urban area

• Full-depth simultaneous attack against enemy forces throughout the defensive system at 

the same time

Landing Campaign 

The Army landing campaign is normally conducted as a component of a joint landing 

operation against a large enemy held island, such as an invasion of Taiwan. The landing 

campaign could be a relatively independent Army operation against a medium or small enemy 

held island such as Taiwan held islands off the PRC’s coast and in the Taiwan Strait. The Army 

does contain amphibious combat units and small amphibious landing craft but would require 

additional support from the other services. The landing campaign consists of breaking through 

the enemy beach defenses, destroying the defensive system, seizing a campaign landing base for 

the landing of the follow-on Group Army to initiate on-island operations. The “Annual Report to 

Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2019” states that the PLA does not currently have the amphibious assault shipping to 

successfully land the required force for an invasion of Taiwan. This would include the 

employment of civilian shipping to supplement the landing operation.60 F

61

59 LSAC, pp. 109-110 60 LSAC, p. 110 61 LSAC, pp. 110-111; Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” available from 

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf, 

accessed April 3, 2020

29
Support from the other services is critical for a successful landing operation to seize

electromagnetic, air, maritime, and information superiority whether the landing is small or large. 

Meteorological and hydrology information is important for the embarkation, sea crossing, and 

landing phases of the operation. The main characteristics of a landing campaign include the 

following:61 F

62

• Destruction or paralysis of the enemy’s landing defense system of systems to create 

conditions for a successful beach assault and establish a landing base. The establishment 

of a landing base by the first echelon Group Army supports the landing of logistical 

support and a second echelon Group Army to conduct on-island operations. Firepower 

strikes, electromagnetic attacks, mine and obstacle clearance are critical supporting 

actions. 

o The campaign formation first focuses on destroying the enemy’s beach defenses, 

and as the landing forces expand the landing site assaults shift to enemy artillery 

positions, transportation hubs, ports, airports, and other important objectives in 

the rear of the beaches. The campaign formation annihilates the enemy’s effective 

strength and destroys key defensive positions. 

• Superior forces are concentrated, and a weak point in the enemy’s defensive system of 

systems is chosen for the main landing direction and landing area. If possible, the landing 

area should have a low enemy force density, units with weak combat effectiveness, weak 

firepower and obstacles, and weak counterattack or reinforcing units. Fire strikes, 

electronic warfare and psychological operations would play key components in 

destroying beach defenders and their will to resist.

• A multi-dimensional landing is conducted to achieve a breakthrough of the beach 

defenses. A conventional landing can be combined with irregular landings of infantry 

heavy forces from fishing boats to fix enemy forces, and vertical landings by air assault 

or airborne forces. Special forces can infiltrate by sea or air to attack key targets and 

guide strikes. The PLA believes multi-dimensional landings can accelerate the seizing of 

the landing site.

• Joint forces combine firepower strikes, attacks against the enemy’s front and flanks, and 

deployment of obstacles to defeat the enemy counterattack. 

The Eastern Theater represents the main operational direction against Taiwan, supported by 

the Southern Theater and other theaters as needed. The Northern Theaters 80th Group Army has 

conducted amphibious landing exercises in the past on the Liaoning Peninsula. The Eastern 

Theater has four amphibious brigades, and the Southern Theater two amphibious brigades. The 

Marine force is in the process of expanding from the two Marine brigades to four or five

additional Marine brigades, a special operations brigade, and an aviation brigade. These units 

could form the first operational assault echelon of an amphibious landing on Taiwan. These 

theaters also contain light brigades that could conduct unconventional landings with primarily 

infantry using civilian shipping. The heavy and medium brigades could be landed using civilian 

shipping once the first assault echelon seizes a port or establishes wharves for offloading civilian 

vessels. Based on open sources – offering contradictory information - the PLA Navy’s estimated 

amphibious assault vessels could land the combat elements of about four brigades in the first 

62 LSAC, pp. 111-112

30
wave. PLA doctrine calls for a first operational echelon Group Army to establish a landing base 

to support the landing of the second echelon Group Army to initiate on island operations. The 

first operational echelon would need at least two and probably three Group Armies to secure 

landing bases and fix Taiwan Army units in support of the main landing. Second echelon Group 

Armies would land at the secured landing base to initiate on island operations. 

Urban Offensive Campaign 

The PLA considers the urban offensive campaign as an important campaign against an 

enemy defending urban and outlying areas. Many regions including Taiwan’s coastal areas 

contain concentrations of built up areas. The PLA recognizes that damage to the city and civilian 

casualties can be high in such an operation. The main tasks include paralyzing the enemy’s 

defensive system of systems, destroying the enemy’s will to resist, destroying or expelling 

enemy forces and seizing control of the city. Large and medium cities often represent a country’s 

political, economic, and cultural centers as well as communication and transportation hubs. 

Capturing key enemy cities can not only annihilate enemy forces, weaken the enemy’s war 

potential, and disrupt the national defensive system, but also win the war.62 F

63

Modern large and medium cities contain communications facilities, developed 

transportation systems, many tall buildings in dense concentration, and underground facilities 

that facilitate defensive operations. Urban warfare involves combat along roadways, buildings, 

and tunnel warfare. Breakthrough of the enemy defenses is difficult. Operations focus on seizing 

key objectives. Command and control are complex and should maintain flexibility. Multidimensional operations are employed including the employment of special operations forces, 

Army Aviation, and air assault landings within the city.63 F

64

The basic requirements and methods of an urban offensive campaign include the following:6 4F

65

• Offensives are fully prepared with strong assaults including firepower strikes. The 

campaign formation must accurately identify the enemy’s defenses and select the main 

attack direction and deployment of forces. Campaign coordination and support are critical 

for a successful operation. 

• Concentrate superior forces and conduct enveloping attacks on the city defenses. Siege 

warfare, and employment of precision weapons and engineering troops are important. 

Enemy forces are blocked from breaking through the besieging forces to escape. 

Operations focus on achieving a quick decision and complete annihilation of enemy 

forces.

• Concentric assaults from multiple directions and breakthroughs in key areas split the 

defenses and allow destruction of enemy forces one after the other. However, the PLA 

recognizes that penetrating strong defenses is difficult. Assaults are conducted in three 

phases consisting of first blockading and isolating the city, breaking through the outlying 

63 LSAC, p. 112 64 LSAC, pp. 112-113 65 LSAC, pp. 113-114

31
defenses on the city’s periphery, and then directly assaulting the city advancing to 

eventually occupy the entire city.

• Combat operations are combined with psychological disintegration of the enemy’s will to 

fight. Blocking relief forces is part of this strategy.

The PLA has no recent urban warfare experience. The last major urban combat the PLA 

conducted was in the Second Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945 and the Chinese Civil War 1927-

1949 with the Nationalists. Some urban combat occurred during the Chinese invasion of Vietnam 

in 1979. Major PLA training bases often contain urban warfare training areas, with the largest at 

the Zhurihe Combined Arms Tactical Training Base located in the Northern Theater Command. 

Units from other theaters rotate through this training base. The PLA has extensively studied

Soviet World War II urban warfare operations as well as more recent combat in Mogadishu, 

Fallujah, and Grozny. 

Border Counterattack Campaign 

The PLA considers a border counterattack to expel a localized enemy invasion as an 

important offensive campaign in local wars under informationized conditions. The campaign 

formation concentrates elite forces in the border region to counterattack the enemy and regain 

occupied territory. Mountainous and high-altitude plateaus in areas disputed with India represent

the most likely areas for a border counterattack campaign (See Figure 4; also see the high 

altitude plateau campaign under special conditions for additional terrain and climate conditions 

impacting a border counterattack campaign). Border defensive or sealing operations could be 

employed along the North Korea border during a crisis. In such terrain forces are channelized 

and required to conduct relatively independent operations. Command, coordination, and logistics 

support are difficult. Combat areas contain sparse populations, lack transportation and other 

infrastructure, and are characterized by underdeveloped economic conditions providing limited 

capabilities for local support or maintenance. Forces must rely on organic support with the

theater assisting from distant logistics depots. The harsh environment increases non-combat 

casualties as well as high maintenance and repair requirements for weapons and equipment.65 F

66

66 LSAC, p. 114

32
32

THIS FMSO STUDY IS EXCLUSIVELY DEVELOPED FROM UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES;

HOWEVER, PLEASE LIMIT DISTRIBUTION AS IT IS AWAITING CLEARANCE AND PUBLICATION

Source: https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_india_border_88.jpg 

33
The border counterattack campaign can be restricted by political and diplomatic

considerations. The basic operational requirements and tactics for border counterattack 

campaigns include the following:66F

67

• Defensive combat and counterattacks are combined to annihilate and expel the enemy.

Initial operations defend against the enemy invasion followed by a transition to

counterattack operations to annihilate and expel the enemy. Forces in some sectors can

conduct primarily defensive operations while those in other areas conduct assaults on

enemy forces.

• Forces are concentrated against the enemy from several operational directions. Key

counterattack operations are concentrated along the main operational direction. Key

target objectives are the enemy command systems, transportation hubs, airports, longrange strike weapons and logistics bases supporting the enemy offensive.

• Operations should be flexible and fast combining ground and air combat. Tactical

operations flexibly employ frontal blocking, flank attacks, encirclements, ambush, longrange raids, firepower assaults and other combat actions. Flexible command includes

both basic command through the command chain and delegated command to subordinate

commanders in secondary directions.

• The terrain requires relatively independent combat and close coordination by forces

separated by terrain and operating along independent axes.

• Support operations are fully prepared and reinforced in response to the harsh isolated

terrain and environment.

Anti-Airborne Campaign 

The anti-airborne campaign is conducted by a campaign formation, local troops such as 

border defense, coastal defense, garrison troops, reserve and militia forces as well as People’s 

Armed Police as required to destroy a large-scale enemy airborne landing in the campaign or 

strategic depth as well as to defend important objectives and facilities against enemy airborne 

troops. The PLA considers this an important campaign under conditions of informationization, 

although it is difficult to grasp what country would be conducting a large-scale airborne landing

within the PRC. The PLA believes an enemy could unexpectedly launch an airborne landing. 

Seizing and maintaining air superiority, at least local superiority over the air corridor, is essential 

to defeat an airborne operation. Preemptive operations are conducted such as attacking enemy 

airports prior to launching an airborne operation.67F

68

Campaign commanders identify potential drop zones to defend. Local forces, reserves 

and militia, and People’s Armed Police units in the area initially respond to an enemy landing, 

along with an anti-airborne reserve force. Friendly forces should attack the airborne force before 

they are able to assemble and organize in the drop zone, divide the enemy force, and destroy 

them one after the other with superior forces.68 F

69

67 LSAC, pp. 114-116 68 LSAC, p. 143 69 LSAC, p. 116-117

34
Defensive Campaigns

Defensive campaigns can include offensive operations as part of an offense defense by 

the campaign formation. Defensive campaigns are intended to preserve forces, destroy, and 

defeat the enemy, gain time, protect regions, or create conditions for conducting counterattacks 

and transitioning to offensive operations. In local wars under informationized conditions Army 

campaign formations usually conduct defensive campaigns as a component of a joint campaign 

formation, but sometimes independently.69F

70

Defensive campaigns are relatively passive compared to offensive campaigns with the 

attacking enemy determining the main operational direction and timing of the campaign. 

Defensive force mobility and operational area are usually limited. Even maneuver or mobile 

defensive campaigns are restricted to a designated operational area. The defensive area is 

selected by the superior headquarters based on the assessment of the direction of the enemy’s 

main attack and cannot be vacated by the defending campaign formation. Defensive 

deployments, fortifications and obstacles, firepower distribution and support forces are 

determined based on the enemy and terrain. When defending forces conduct offensive actions, 

they are limited in scope and range. Favorable terrain is used to improve the defensive system 

and protect forces. Defensive areas are chosen to cover important strategic directions, stabilize 

the war situation, thwart the enemy’s offensive momentum, and safeguard important political, 

economic, military and transportation centers. The defensive deployment should allow for 

protecting and cooperating with campaign reserves and maneuver groups in launching attacks 

against the enemy.70 F

71

The PLA notes new features to defensive campaigns based on the rapid development of 

science and technology with its application to improving weapons and equipment. Specifically,

the PLA believes that intelligence and reconnaissance, command and control, firepower assault, 

battlefield maneuver, and various support capabilities have significantly improved. An active 

defense remains a valid guiding principle. While defensive operations are relatively passive, 

offensive actions are required to disrupt an enemy’s offensive and create conditions for a 

transition to a counterattack to regain the initiative. Defensive campaigns will be conducted in a 

full depth multi-dimensional battlespace opposing enemy omni-directional attacks on multiple 

defensive key points. Defensive operations must cope with an enemy’s long-range weapons and 

deep attack forces to ensure the stability of the defensive system of systems. The campaign 

formation will need to establish an extensive, deep, and all-round defensive system that will 

enable offensive actions against an enemy’s attack. The defensive forces will strike the enemy’s 

forces prior to their launching an attack as they move forward or occupy assembly areas. Fire 

strikes, electronic warfare, and operations in the enemy rear area are critical to disrupting enemy 

operations.71 F

72

The defensive system will feature defensive areas and lines in the main defensive 

direction with obstacles and mines, concentration of electronic warfare units, and comprehensive 

70 LSAC, p. 116 71 LSAC, p. 144-145 72 LSAC, pp. 145-150

35
protection with camouflage, concealment, fortifications, and use of favorable terrain. Campaign 

formations will organize effective counterattacks emphasizing air forces, campaign tactical 

missiles, long-range artillery, and special forces to attack the enemy’s firepower capability.

Coordination of services and branches is critical, and adjustments to the tasks and actions of 

various operations groups should be made to meet changes to the situation during combat. 72F

73

Defensive Campaign Command, Planning and Coordination 

The PLA assesses that the campaign formation’s command faces new problems including 

analyzing large amounts of information, responding to complex and changing battlefield 

situations, and providing force protection on a dynamic battlefield. The campaign formation will 

usually establish a main, alternate, and rear command post in preparation for the campaign.7 3F

74

The campaign intention formulated by the superior headquarters establishes the strategic 

purpose of the campaign, missions, use of forces and basic actions, terrain considerations, and 

enemy situation. The campaign determination establishes the main defensive direction and key 

points, defensive deployment, establishment and positions of command posts, and time limit for 

defensive preparation. The campaign commander can also dispatch inspection teams to ensure 

the campaign preparations of subordinates are implemented according to instructions as well as 

discover and resolve problems before the initiation of the campaign.7 4F

75

The commander of the campaign formation establishes a campaign resolution that 

includes analysis and judgment of the situation and the campaign actions to include 

understanding the superior headquarters’ intentions, missions and tasks, the missions and 

boundaries with neighboring units, and coordination methods. Pre-battle training on similar 

terrain or simulations can support campaign planning and operational preparations. The

campaign formation commander listens to reports and suggestions from his staff to accurately 

assess the situation and make determinations. If the situation is not clear an advance 

determination can be made, and a final decision issued when the situation clarifies. 

Modifications can be issued during the campaign if changing situations require revisions to the 

operational plan. However, the PLA stresses following the original operational plan unless 

forced to make changes.75 F

76

Defensive campaign plans include the operational plan, operational support plan, political 

work plan, and comprehensive support plan. The campaign commander provides instructions 

based on superior headquarters’ intent to his chief-of-staff who formulates the plans aided by the 

command post staff. The operational plan provides direction for the campaign stages, direction 

of operations, missions, operational environment and describes the assessed operational 

characteristics of the enemy. It includes the expected actions the campaign formation will 

73 LSAC, pp. 151-153 74 LSAC, pp. 159-160 75 LSAC, pp. 166-167 and 170-171 76 LSAC, pp. 167-168

36
execute including advance strikes against the enemy, countering enemy assaults, breakthroughs, 

encirclements, anti-airborne response, and ending the campaign.76 F

77

Coordination methods are planned for the duration of the campaign to ensure all 

participating forces act in accordance with the unified plan. Coordination instructions are issued 

in conjunction with the operational orders. Coordination between the various operations groups 

is based on the main force according to missions, objectives, time, and location. Coordination 

includes use of special weapons if required (not further described but likely refers to weapons of 

mass destruction).77 F

78

Defensive Campaign Support 

Campaign support includes operational, logistics, equipment and political work 

supporting actions. Reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and force protection are considered 

important missions. Engineering support for defensive campaigns is especially important in 

preparing defensive fortifications and camouflage for the campaign formation’s command posts, 

assembly areas, artillery, air defense, campaign tactical missiles and major force groupings.

Engineering forces make full use of favorable terrain for protection and concealment. 

Engineering work is prioritized to ensure the most important projects are completed on time.

Engineers prepare forces and materials in reserve to ensure the rapid repair and restoration of 

damaged and destroyed facilities.78F

79

Defensive Campaign Preparation 

The defensive system of systems is established as an organic whole comprising campaign 

deployment, formation of defensive positions and obstacles, and a firepower system. The 

defensive system should proceed from the campaign formation’s organization and capabilities, 

main tactics, the enemy’s likely offensive actions, and the geographic environment. The defenses 

are required to be multi-dimensional, flexible, diverse, with strong concealment and 

survivability, and capable of supporting maneuver and offensive actions to defeat the enemy’s 

omni-directional assault.79 F

80

Defensive Deployment and Formations 

The campaign deployment or layout is based on the missions and configuration of the 

campaign formation that gives full play to the overall combat power of the various services and 

arms. Sufficient forces are required on the main defensive direction and main defensive 

campaign area to achieve the necessary force density to survive the enemy’s firepower strikes

and defeat the offensive. The PLA describes two forms of campaign deployment under modern 

conditions or employment of a combination of the two deployment types: group deployment or 

echelon deployment. A combination of the two deployment types can be used, with one method 

77 LSAC, p. 168 78 LSAC, pp. 168-169 79 LSAC, pp. 169-170 80 LSAC, pp. 160-162

37
employed in one direction and the other deployment method in a secondary direction depending 

on terrain and operational requirements.80 F

81

The campaign formation can establish subordinate operations groups to conduct specific 

defensive and offensive tasks. The PLA believes establishment of groups is more flexible, 

provides for greater mobility, and conducive to combining defensive and offensive actions. 

Group deployment is also suitable for large, complex terrain areas; organizing defense over a 

broad front; or defending an important area independently. Operations groups can include 

maneuver, cover, enemy rear area, special, ground firepower, air defense, campaign rear area, 

electronic countermeasures and other operations groups as required.81 F

82

Echelon deployment is usually organized for employment in defensive zones with a 

layered defense in depth configuration providing for a resilient defensive system. This 

deployment is suitable for establishing defensive zones with great depth. A mixed echelon and 

group deployment can be employed with a first and second echelon, campaign reserve, cover 

operations group, enemy rear area operations group, special operations group, ground firepower 

group, air defense firepower group as well as electronic countermeasures group and various 

branch reserve groups. When the defensive depth is extensive a third echelon can be formed.82 F

83

The defensive system is based on several operational areas, including the enemy rear 

area, cover sabotage, main defensive, and campaign rear operational zones. A larger scale 

defensive campaign on a theater or multi-group army scale usually establishes these four 

operational zones. A positional defensive campaign is usually divided into three operational 

zones: a cover sabotage, main, and campaign rear area. An urban defensive campaign generally 

establishes a periphery defense zone and an urban defense zone. An Army campaign formation 

conducting a maneuver defensive campaign establishes a harassment and cover zone, an 

impedance operational zone, a predetermined anti-assault zone and a rear defense zone. 83 F

84

Irregular operations and firepower strikes are conducted against important enemy targets 

in the enemy rear area operational zone. Targets include logistics bases, missile launch sites, 

command systems and heavy force groupings. Attacks are intended to disrupt, delay and attrite 

enemy forces thereby weakening the overall combat capability and derail enemy plans. When the 

PLA is conducting operations within the PRC, areas have been chosen and developed during 

peacetime to prepare the battlefield for guerrilla operations with conceal weapons, supplies and 

fortifications.84 F

85

A campaign formation may establish a cover sabotage zone near the front of the main 

defensive area. The area is occupied by irregular forces to ambush, block, attrite and delay the 

enemy to cover and cooperate with main forces. One to two cover sabotage operational areas can 

be established for large and medium defensive campaigns based on the situation.85F

86

81 LSAC, p. 160 82 LSAC, p. 161 83 LSAC, p. 161 84 LSAC, pp. 162-163 85 LSAC, p. 162 86 LSAC, p. 162 

38
The establishment of the main defensive operational zone can take two forms: A regional 

position is formed when the main defensive area’s terrain is complex, has a wide front, or the 

defense is based on an urban area. The main defensive area is divided into several defensive 

zones of different sizes based on a transportation axis and taking advantage of terrain. The 

defensive zones can include a frontline defensive group and a deep defensive group to defend 

important objectives and control the main attack direction. The defensive zones include blocking, 

ambush, mobile enemy annihilation, anti-tank, anti-airborne and troop sheltering positions as 

well as areas controlled by firepower and obstacles. Depending on the terrain a regional position 

is usually defended by a division-size force or brigade.86 F

87

The other form of a main defensive operational zone is a belt type position. This method 

was widely employed in the past but can still be used. The main defensive operational area is 

divided into 2-3 defensive lines (zones) from the front to the rear, with each defensive line 

divided into 2-3 defensive zones (positions) to form a multi-zonal multi-position defensive 

system of systems. Additional defensive positions can be placed between the main defensive 

zones and positions to prevent the enemy from developing an offensive into the depth or support 

offensive actions by friendly forces. Flank positions are established to prevent enemy attempts to 

envelop or turn the defenses. Multi-level anti-tank forces are deployed along likely routes of 

enemy armor assaults and anti-airborne defenses are setup in likely drop zones.87F

88

The campaign rear area operational zone is occupied by logistics, campaign tactical 

missile launch positions and bases, aviation forces, units conducting training, or rear security 

forces. Campaign reserve forces can be deployed in this area to cover logistics units, conduct 

rear area operations, or reinforce forces in the main defensive operational area. The campaign 

rear area includes anti-tank and anti-airborne.88 F

89

Firepower System

The firepower deployment system is an important means to destroy significant numbers 

of enemy forces, maintain stability of the defensive system, and achieve victory. The campaign 

formation deploys artillery, campaign tactical missiles, aviation, attack helicopters, and air 

defense forces based on missions, topography, system performance and enemy operational 

characteristics. A full depth, layered, multi-directional and multi-dimensional firepower system 

integrated with obstacles is established to combat the enemy’s ground, air and maritime strikes 

focusing on enemy attack helicopters, cruise missiles and stealth aircraft.89 F

90

Firepower is usually deployed in the four operational zones as described above.

Campaign tactical missiles and air forces units provide support to irregular and special forces 

operating in the enemy rear operational zone. Long-range artillery, campaign tactical missiles, 

air forces and attack helicopters support friendly forces in the cover sabotage operational zone by 

87 LSAC, pp. 162-163 88 LSAC, p. 163 89 LSAC, p. 163 90 LSAC, pp. 163-164

39
attacking enemy forces entering standby areas, preparing, or deploying to launch attacks. The 

campaign formation’s main firepower forces support the main defensive operational zone to stop 

the enemy’s breakthrough operations and flank attacks as well as support friendly mobile groups. 

Firepower to support the campaign rear area operational zone conducts strikes against enemy 

airborne operations, mobile groups, or penetrating forces into the friendly rear area.90 F

91

Air defense and fighter aviation form a counter air operational firepower system. Civil air 

defense forces support operations within the PRC. The ground air defense and aviation fighters 

provide regional cover supplemented by mobile cover to form an integrated air defense system 

network to seize and maintain air superiority over the defensive area.91 F

92

Obstacle System

An effective layered obstacle system using advantageous terrain can cover defensive 

positions, improve firepower effectiveness, isolate, or restrict enemy movement, destroy enemy 

armor, and enhance the stability of the defensive system. The obstacle system for a positional 

defensive campaign poses high organizational and engineering requirements and should be 

established as far in advance as possible. Obstacle systems can incorporate urban areas and 

explosive barriers integrating defensive regions and firepower.92 F

93

Specific obstacles systems are established to support each defensive operational zone. 

Unconventional forces can setup obstacles in the enemy rear area and cover sabotage operational 

zones. Obstacles in the main defensive operational zone support the defensive lines, zones and 

positions, front, flanks, intervals between positions, and key areas. The rear command post is 

responsible for establishing the obstacle system in the campaign rear area operational zone to 

protect key facilities, logistics sites and key campaign areas. In coastal defense campaigns 

obstacles are set up on land, beaches and in the coastal waters at possible enemy landing sites, 

and airborne landing zones. Obstacle emplacement forces are established to rapidly set up 

obstacles in the event of unforeseen situations and defend threatened areas.93 F

94 

Maneuver Defensive Campaign 

The PLA considers a maneuver defensive campaign as a basic defensive campaign 

method in future informationized local wars. The maneuver or mobile defensive campaign

combines defensive resistance in certain areas with mobile counterattacks as the primary action 

to defeat the enemy’s offensive. The goal is to eventually transition to offensive operations while 

cooperating with other campaign directions. A maneuver defensive campaign is usually based on 

an emergency situation with short preparation time and featuring an extensive defensive area 

with gaps between defenders emphasizing maneuver and non-linear combat.94F

95

91 LSAC, p. 164 92 LSAC, pp. 164-165 93 LSAC, p. 165 94 LSAC, pp. 165-166 95 LSAC, pp. 154-155

40
Positional Defensive Campaign 

The PLA still considers a positional defensive campaign where the campaign formation

relies on construction of in-depth defensive positions as a basic campaign method. This

campaign appears at variance with the stated objective of non-linear and non-contact operations 

and appears more of a legacy form of combat. A positional defensive campaign requires 

extensive preparation time to construct field positions using favorable terrain to defend important 

areas and objectives to defeat the enemy’s attack; provide cover for the maneuver of the main 

force conducting offensive operations; and to consolidate occupied areas and defend against 

enemy counterattacks.95 F

96

Positional defensive campaigns are important to defend border areas, resist and stop an 

enemy invasion, gain time, and protect the main force. Defenses should be omni-directional and 

in-depth but concentrated in the main direction. An extensive defensive posture is combined with 

counterattacks to cause heavy enemy losses. Defending forces should be prepared to take 

advantage of battlefield opportunities to transition to offensive actions to defeat the enemy.96 F

97

Coastal Defensive Campaign 

A campaign formation in a coastal defense campaign relies on positional defensive 

positions to fight against an enemy’s landings and is normally part of an anti-landing campaign. 

The PLA notes the PRC’s long coastline and that much of the economically developed and 

strategically important areas are along the coast. As with the anti-airborne campaign, it is

difficult to imagine what country would conduct a large-scale amphibious landing against the 

mainland PRC. The coastal defensive campaign includes multi-dimensional resistance, 

comprehensive attack, and counterattacks to annihilate the enemy at the coast or during sea 

crossing operations. If the campaign formation cannot stop the enemy from establishing a 

beachhead, then counterattacks must annihilate or expel the enemy from their positions. The 

campaign requires effective reconnaissance of the enemy situation as well as hydrological, 

meteorological, and topographic conditions to prepare defenses, concentration of forces and 

firepower on the main direction, and strike the enemy when vulnerable and exposed during 

transport.97F

98

The PLA does maintain a number of reorganized coastal defense brigades in addition to 

Navy cruise missile units. Several coastal defense units have been converted to Marine brigades. 

The coastal defense brigades field the PHL-03 300mm MRL, Type 81 122mm self-propelled 

(SP) MRL, PLZ-45 Type-88 155mm SP howitzer, as well as towed artillery and air defense 

systems.

Urban Defensive Campaign 

96 LSAC, pp. 155-156 97 LSAC, p. 156 98 LSAC, pp. 156-157

41
An urban defensive campaign is conducted in cities and surrounding areas. It is usually a 

component of a large-scale positional or anti-landing campaign but can be conducted 

independently. The main task is to defend important cities or use an urban defense to destroy or 

fix large enemy forces, defeat an enemy’s seizure of the city, cooperate with forces on other 

directions, or create favorable conditions for future operations. An urban defense within the PRC

can rely on the urban population to supplement the military in defending the city, peripheral 

areas, and towns forming a strong defensive system of systems in depth. Tall buildings and 

underground facilities can provide strong defense points, while cities can contribute medical,

material support, communications, transportation, and other means to support defensive 

operations. Engineers and technical forces reinforce the defensive system of systems. The 

defense of important large and medium-sized cities that are important political, economic, 

cultural centers and transportation hubs are important to controlling strategic positions, 

protecting national war potential, maintaining civilian morale, as well as significantly affecting

the war situation.98 F

99

Urban defense combines internal and external defensive positions. Priority is given to 

defending strong points and key lines of communication on the city’s periphery employing 

favorable terrain and obstacles. Defensive efforts combine campaign forces and civilians 

defending the city against enemy air strikes, assaults, and blockades in an integrated in-depth

circular defensive system under a centralized command. Tenacious defense is combined with 

offensive actions to defeat the enemy at the city’s periphery.9 9F

100

Campaigns under Special Conditions

Campaigns under special conditions are implemented in areas with special terrain or 

weather conditions requiring modifications to combat and support operations. The PRC and its 

periphery contain the environmental conditions discussed by the PLA as special conditions. As 

the PLA increases strategic delivery and support capabilities for missions abroad these special 

combat conditions can provide the basis for planning and training for expeditionary operations in 

areas with these special terrain and climate conditions. These special conditions can be added 

according to the circumstances to the other campaigns such as the border defense and 

counterattack campaign to improve detailed planning, provide specialized operational 

requirements, and tailor training to meet these special environments. 

Mountain Offensive and Defensive Campaigns 

Various PLA sources provide differing definitions of mountainous terrain. The PLA 

considers mountainous areas as undulating terrain with a height of greater than 200 meters above 

the general terrain in the area with a slope of 30-50 degrees. Other PLA sources define 

mountainous terrain as more than 500 meters above sea level; low mountains as 500-1000 

meters; medium mountains as 1000 to 3500 meters; high mountains as 3500 to 5000 meters; and 

99 LSAC, pp. 157-158 100 LSAC, p. 158 

42
extremely high mountains above 5000 meters. The latter two categories would fall under the 

high-altitude plateau special conditions. The mountain offensive and defensive campaigns

generally are focused on mountainous regions in the 200 to 1000-meter range. Roads are few, in 

poor condition and usually located along valleys, through gaps or along ridge lines. Mountains 

can have steep slopes, rivers, and lush vegetation. Rain can cause erosion and floods. The 

population is generally small, relatively poor with few supplies available to support 

operations.100 F

101

Mountain terrain favors the defense with natural barriers, shelter, concealment, and 

camouflage providing force protection with secure concealed deployment and disposition. 

Formations are deployed over a wide front with a large defensive system of systems. Force 

deployments are usually along primary valleys and lines of communications. Heavy equipment is 

limited to movement along valleys with offensive and defensive forces competing for control of 

choke points along lines of communications. Informationized equipment such as reconnaissance, 

communications, navigation, and positioning capabilities provide important support during 

mountain operations although they at times display limitations. Command and coordination of 

dispersed forces can prove difficult. Mutual support is difficult with forces dispersed over wide 

areas. Logistics support is difficult with increased consumption, repair, and loss rates. 

Concealment features of mountainous terrain can benefit the offense with concealed deployment 

and surprise attacks featuring multi-dimensional maneuver combined with feints.101F

102

Combat is focused on controlling key points, roads, choke points and high ground. 

Operations require the flexible employment of heavy and light equipment to play to their 

strengths. Heavy forces can maneuver on relatively flat terrain and plateaus as well as provide 

cover and support to infantry and lighter forces. Defensive forces are often isolated which can 

allow the offensive side to penetrate, split, isolate, and outflank the defense while employ 

firepower strikes to destroy key defensive positions. Airborne, air assault and special operations 

units’ vertical envelopments along the main attack direction are important actions to disrupt the 

defensive system, attack key targets and isolate defensive forces.10 2F

103

An Army defensive campaign is based on establishing a multi-zone in depth defensive 

system centered on the main defensive direction with key defensive points and lines established. 

Accurate assessments are required of the enemy’s main attack direction and operational intent. 

Defensive points are often isolated with limited support or reinforcement. Units are 

psychologically prepared to fight in isolation and to hold on to their positions. A strong reserve is 

established to take advantage of battlefield opportunities to launch attacks against isolated 

offensive forces or initiate a counterattack. Ambushes are set up to block penetrations.103 F

104

101 LSAC, pp. 218-219; All Army Military Terminology Management Committee (全军军事术语管理委员会), 中国

人民解放军军语 (Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011 

(hereafter cited as Military Terms), p. 364 102 LSAC, pp. 219-220 103 LSAC, pp. 220-222 104 LSAC, pp. 222-224

43
High Altitude Plateau Offensive and Defensive Campaigns 

High altitude cold mountain terrain is found in the PRC’s southwest border area near 

India mainly in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Operations in this area would primarily feature border 

defense operations. The PLA defines high and extremely high-altitude mountains as 3500 to over 

5000 meters. The harsh weather includes severe cold, lack of oxygen, great differences between 

day and night temperatures, high intensity ultraviolet radiation, and long periods of snow. The 

complex terrain features steep mountains, limited trafficability, few airports and poor roads. 

Concealment is difficult, the population sparse, and economic backwardness provides few 

material and other support within the region.104F

105

High altitude plateaus have significant impact on Army campaigns due to the adverse 

environmental effect on personnel and equipment. High altitude terrain features thin air, low 

temperatures and air pressure significantly decreasing combat effectiveness of units. The 

environment adversely effects troops physically and mentally leading to pulmonary problems, 

frostbite, snow blindness and other health issues. Vehicles are difficult to start, fuel consumption 

increases, power is reduced with increased weapon and equipment breakdowns. Fire support 

systems have increased maintenance and repair requirements, increased munition dud rates, and 

deviation for missiles. The thin air increases the range of firepower weapons and shrapnel radius. 

Optical, rubber and leather products age more quickly affecting equipment life and performance.

The climate limits the timing of a campaign with snow and ice affecting the terrain for

approximately six months per year. The rainy season causes flash floods and increases the rivers 

water level creating mobility problems. The terrain limits force deployment and mobility 

reducing the scale of campaign. The terrain especially effects armor, large caliber fire support, 

and other heavy equipment. Air Force employment usually is limited to June through September. 

The climate usually reduces the time to conduct ground operations to September through 

November.10 5F

106

The PLA has a number of units specializing in combat in disputed border regions with 

India in Tibet and the Aksai Chin area. The 77th Group Army and several independent units 

including two mountain brigades are stationed in Tibet. The 6th Mechanized Division based in 

Western Xinjiang is trained to conduct operations in the Aksai Chin disputed area. A number of 

combined brigades in the Western Theater have been reorganized into light brigades suitable for 

high altitude mountain combat. Border defense regiments and battalions patrol the border and 

provide a first line of defense. The PLA has been deploying specialized equipment for high 

altitude operations. These include a new Type 15 light tank, light self-propelled wheeled artillery 

systems such as the truck mounted PCL-09 122mm SP howitzer and PCL-181 155 mm SP 

howitzer, and the Z-20 transport helicopter. The PLA recently has tested an upgraded AR500C 

unmanned helicopter for high plateau operations with a flight ceiling of 6,700 meters. The 

unmanned helicopter reportedly can be configured for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, or 

strike missions.106F

107

105 LSAC, p. 224 106 LSAC, pp. 224-225 107 Zhao Lei, “Unmanned helicopter conducts first test flight,” available from 

http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202006/02/WS5ed5ab35a310a8b24115a179.html, accessed on June 7, 2020

44
In preparation for offensive campaigns, troops are politically motivated by propaganda 

and education to ready them for the difficult operational environment. Troops receive adaptive 

training to strengthen and acclimate them to the harsh terrain and climate. Equipment must be 

prepared for operating in the difficult environment. Training in similar terrain and climate 

conditions, and wargame exercises are conducted to test and perfect the operational plan.10 7F

108 The 

Qingtongxia Combined Arms Training Base in the Western Theater contains a large-scale

mockup of the Aksai Chin disputed border region with India (see Figure 5). This mockup could 

be used to orient staff or intended as messaging to India. 

Command and control are affected by the environment. Forces are greatly dispersed and 

separated by mountains increasing the difficulty of coordination and support between forces. 

Radio communications are attenuated by the terrain. Decentralized command is employed on 

independent directions to increase command flexibility. Decentralized command allows greater 

initiative to commanders on secondary directions within the bounds of campaign objectives.108 F

109

The PLA places greater emphasis on employing firepower to make up for smaller force 

deployment and decreased mobility. The campaign formation will contain a greater than normal 

108 LSAC, p. 226 109 LSAC, pp. 226-227

45
amount of firepower units to support ground force seizing and holding key terrain and destroying

enemy forces. Strengthened coordination between the Army, Air Force and Rocket Force is 

important to ensure the destruction of key enemy targets in the enemy depth. Ground force 

operations concentrate on seizing and holding key terrain such as mountain passes, bridges, 

valleys, and choke points along crucial lines of communications and in the depth of the enemy’s 

defensive system. The main force rapidly seizes key objectives while follow-on forces occupy 

and hold the positions to prevent the enemy from regaining the objectives.109 F

110

Logistics and equipment support are more difficult. Supplies, weapons, and equipment 

should be prepositioned to reduce movement requirements. Roads should be maintained and 

improved to support motor transport. Rail and air transport are also used when possible. The 

campaign formation will rely on specialized and non-specialized logistics forces as well as 

coordinating with local support to increase the combat units’ accompanying logistics.

Accompanying, fixed-point and support from superior headquarters from rear area logistics 

depots are combined to provide comprehensive support to campaign forces. 110F

111

Defensive operations are relatively passive. Logistics support is vulnerable to interdiction 

by enemy offensive operations or weather conditions requiring prepositioning of supplies, 

weapons, and equipment. The in-depth defensive system requires flexibility to defend fortified 

key points based on mountain passes, favorable terrain, and lines of communications. Defensive 

actions are combined with maneuver and offensive actions. The active defense combines 

ambushes and the capability to conduct small scale attacks to stabilize the defense or take 

advantage of battlefield opportunities. Defenses are prepared against the enemy’s multidimensional attack and form a campaign reserve to support the defensive positions along the 

enemy’s main attack direction. Defensive zones are prepared for relatively independent 

operations with limited support from other forces. Reinforcements from other regions could take 

a long time to respond. The objective is to hold defensive positions and destroy large numbers of 

enemy forces, eventually leading to the transition toward a counterattack. The defensive force is 

composed of infantry, mechanized infantry, artillery, air defense and engineers as the main force.

Reconnaissance is critical to determining the enemy’s main attack direction and intent.111F

112 

Desert Grassland Offensive and Defensive Campaigns 

Desert grasslands are mainly found in the north and northwestern regions of the PRC. 

The environment features flat terrain and few trees with good observation, making concealment

and camouflage difficult; a dry climate with large sandstorms and scarce water resources; many 

sand dunes and soft soil; rapid weather changes with large temperature difference between day 

and night; and low population density consisting mainly of ethnic minorities and a poor 

economy. The terrain is favorable for large scale operations and maneuver. 1 12F

113

110 LSAC, pp. 226-227 111 LSAC, pp. 226-227 112 LSAC, pp. 227-229 113 LSAC, p. 229 

46
Operations feature armor force maneuvering and large-scale airborne operations. The 

open terrain makes it difficult to achieve surprise and the defensive side has difficulty using 

terrain for concealment or construction of fortifications. Support to personnel and equipment is 

difficult, with water support difficult and fuel consumption high. The windy and sandy desert 

environment contributes to arduous equipment support tasks. Medical support requirements and

non-combat attrition are high with difficulties treating and evacuating casualties.113F

114

An Army desert grassland offensive campaign begins with seizing air and 

electromagnetic superiority as well as extensive firepower strikes. Air, air defense, and 

electronic warfare forces are concentrated along the main attack axis. Special forces, along with 

irregular forces such as militia, conduct operations in the enemy rear area attacking key targets 

such as command and control, airfields, fuel depots and other support facilities to reduce the 

enemy’s combat potential. Armor and mechanized forces conduct rapid mobile operations along 

multiple directions attacking the enemy’s flanks and rear area. The objective is penetrating the 

depth to split up the defensive deployment and strike the enemy’s center of gravity, destroying

defensive cohesion. Logistics and equipment support forces are increased, particularly water and 

fuel supply, and medical support. Rear bases are established to enhance and provide flexible 

logistics support.114 F

115

Army defensive campaigns require special attention to concealment, camouflage, and 

fortifications for force protection against enemy firepower strikes, even though protection is 

difficult in the terrain. False targets are established as part of the deception plan. Campaign 

reconnaissance assets are strengthened to determine the enemy’s main attack direction and 

intentions. Electronic countermeasures are employed to blind or destroy enemy reconnaissance 

and weaken the accuracy and intensity of the enemy’s firepower strikes. Terminal air defense is 

strengthened to defend against cruise missiles and other precision strike weapons. The defensive 

system incorporates three-dimensional depth and flexible response. The defensive positions 

control water resources, towns and residential areas, transportation and other important areas and 

key objectives. Defensive actions focus on countering and restricting the enemy’s maneuver and 

mobility with the use of firepower, anti-tank and anti-helicopter systems, electronic interference, 

mobile obstacle emplacement, air interdiction, and attacks on the enemy’s rear area. Firepower, 

ambushes, and obstacles are employed to restrict enemy maneuver on the flanks.115F

116

Tropical Mountain and Jungle Offensive and Defensive Campaigns 

Tropical mountains and jungles are concentrated on the PRC’s southern borders. The 

terrain and climate in these areas are extremely complex and pose serious challenges during 

Army border defense campaigns. These regions have hilltops, steep slopes, and deep valleys, 

with many natural caves. The region has a limited road system mostly in poor condition. 

Vegetation is dense with interwoven vines. The climate is hot and humid with heavy rain and 

fog. There are many insects, bacteria, and many prevalent diseases increasing medical support 

requirements. The population is sparse, consisting largely of ethnic minorities with complex 

114 LSAC, pp. 229-230 115 LSAC, pp. 230-231 116 LSAC, pp. 231-232

47
languages, different beliefs, and taboos that need to be taken into consideration. Local material 

support is limited.116F

117

The terrain and climate have significant impact on operations and reducing the overall 

effectiveness of weapons and equipment. The climate and terrain are conducive to concealed 

concentration of small force groupings and small-scale independent engagements. Neither the 

offensive nor defensive side can conduct large-scale mobile warfare. The terrain, vegetation, and 

climate block the line-of-sight reconnaissance and reduce the technical performance of high-tech 

reconnaissance equipment. Armor, artillery, and other heavy equipment are limited to movement 

along roads with reduced speeds negating high operational tempo or rapid concentration of 

forces. The mountains and steep slopes limit direct fire systems. Small defensive groups can 

effectively control roads and key points relying on natural obstacles and establishing positions on 

steep mountain terrain. The terrain and vegetation will limit the defensive side’s ability to launch 

large-scale counterattacks. Command and coordination are difficult. The terrain and vegetation 

weaken and absorb radio signals, shortening the distance. The rough terrain and vegetation make 

the placement and maintenance of wired communications difficult. The terrain leads to dispersed 

small force groupings that have difficulty coordinating actions. The terrain and climate make it 

difficult for ground forces to indicate targets for air force firepower support and make it difficult 

for aircraft to identify ground targets. Determining artillery firing data is difficult combined with 

reduced effectiveness of reconnaissance and surveillance equipment. High-tech weapons and 

equipment capabilities in general are degraded. Support, including engineering construction, 

logistics transport, weapons, and equipment are onerous and prone to failure. Maintenance and 

repair are difficult and non-combat combat casualties increase. The enemy’s employment of 

biological or chemical weapons would complicate operations to a greater extent compared to 

other terrain and climate conditions.117F

118

Army offensive campaigns require careful preparation. Accurate reconnaissance along 

the main attack direction needs to identify road and terrain conditions, the defensive deployment, 

fire support positions, obstacles, key targets including informationized weapons, population 

centers, weather, and evidence of epidemics. Pre-battle training is required to strengthen troops 

and improve combat capabilities for the complex terrain and climate.118 F

119

Offensive operations are conducted along maneuver corridors to maintain initiative and 

operational tempo as much as possible to achieve a successful campaign. Combat is focused on 

controlling high ground and key targets, and rapidly seizing lines of communications to allow the

deployment of follow-on forces. Light forces, supported by artillery and armor, are employed. 

Flexible tactics, combining frontal attacks with envelopments by special forces and air assault 

units, are employed. Special forces attack key targets, such as transportation, command and 

control and logistics as well as guide air strikes, in the rear area. Command is flexible and 

coordination carefully planned to overcome the dispersion of forces and the environmental 

impact on operations. Coordination between various force groupings, forces and firepower 

support, and ground-air support require careful planning. A combination of centralized and 

117 LSAC, pp. 232-233 118 LSAC, pp. 233-234 119 LSAC, p. 234 

48
delegated command is employed. A commander assigns delegated command to a deputy 

commander or subordinate commander to conduct an operation or action within the context of 

the operational plan’s objectives, usually in a secondary direction. If unforeseen battlefield 

situations develop, subordinate commanders are provided more freedom of action and decision 

making to respond to the altered conditions as long as the assigned objectives are achieved. The 

difficult climate, complex terrain, and poor transportation require augmenting campaign support 

to include the following: medical support to overcome non-combat attrition, engineer support to 

ensure mobility; and timely and accurate meteorological and hydrological information.119F

120

Tropical mountain and jungle defensive campaigns are focused along roads, rivers, and 

valleys to block enemy offensive operations. Defensive positions are concealed on either side of 

mobility corridors and occupy key points where the enemy is expected to launch a main attack.

The defensive system should take advantage of the terrain as well as allow for maneuver and 

concentration of defensive forces. Main forces coordinate with local forces and militia units. 

Firepower and obstacles are used to control and defeat enemy units. An operational reserve acts 

as a mobile force to support any operational direction as needed. Ambushes, local offensive 

action, and counterattacks provide defensive stability. Poor visibility caused by terrain, 

vegetation and climate aid defensive ambushes and attacks. The rear area defense is strengthened 

against enemy infiltration and employment of special forces operating against friendly follow-on 

forces, reserves, command posts, logistics, and important facilities. Accurate reconnaissance is 

required to detect enemy intentions and movement.120F

121

River Network Offensive and Defensive Campaigns 

Areas with river networks are found primarily in southern China and Taiwan’s coastal 

areas. These areas include interwoven river networks, lakes, reservoirs, and paddy fields. The 

areas are usually found in plains with only a few mountainous areas. The regions typically have a 

high level of urbanization including small villages with corresponding population density. The 

climate is warm and humid with a rainy season adding to the ground water level. The ground can 

be muddy and rains can destroy road networks, limiting mobility.12 1F

122

The rivers provide natural defensive lines, although it is difficult to establish a defense in 

depth. The rivers, lakes, and ditches found in these regions form natural obstacles to maneuver 

and ground assaults. Armor, artillery, and other heavy equipment are particularly affected by the 

terrain. The flat open terrain exposes forces to ground and air firepower attacks. The flat open 

terrain makes hiding operational intentions and force deployments difficult. The PLA also 

considers it difficult to employ camouflage and false targets against enemy reconnaissance in 

this environment. Movement is heavily dependent on roads and bridges. Campaign formations 

are split by the terrain resulting in command and coordination difficulties. Engineering support 

for mobility and counter mobility is difficult.122 F

123

120 LSAC, pp. 234-235 121 LSAC, pp. 235-236 122 LSAC, pp. 236-237 123 LSAC, pp. 237-238

49
Army offensive campaigns in river and water networks require engineering support to 

improve ground and water transportation to overcome obstacles and enable sudden attacks. The 

transportation assets requiring maintenance, repairs or construction include main roads, 

emergency roads, bridges, ferries, and passages along rivers. Operational plans need to include 

forced river crossings and organizing water transportation. Pre-battle training can enhance 

combat effectiveness in this type of terrain. Main attacks should be planned along longitudinal 

roads with few river crossings. Airmobile operations can overcome river barriers and support 

river crossings to increase operational tempo. Amphibious armor can form rapid assault groups 

along the main attack direction. Comprehensive firepower combined with electronic warfare and 

special forces can strike throughout the defensive depth destroying key points to support rapid 

assaults. Unified command and close coordination are required to overcome divided forces, 

restricted ground mobility and enemy counterattacks.123F

124

Army defensive campaigns take advantage of natural obstacles to construct forward 

defensive positions. The defensive line should use larger rivers taking advantage of towns and 

natural obstacles. Defenses are strengthened where the enemy main attack is expected with 

multiple defensive zones and lines supported by fortifications and obstacles. Engineering support 

is critical to ensure friendly mobility and logistics support to forward units while obstructing 

enemy movement. A strong reserve is positioned along the main defensive direction with the 

ability to maneuver through the restrictive terrain to reinforce the forward defenses or respond to 

enemy attacks. An offensive defense is employed to attack enemy forces separated by the river 

system and complex terrain using ambushes, firepower strikes and counter attacks.124 F

125

Conclusions

The PLA’s Army campaign doctrine provides valuable information on terrain, climate,

operational methods, and requirements to support planning and unit training for specific 

operational missions. Army campaign doctrine is evolving to integrate informationized weapons 

and equipment capabilities, although this is occurring slowly. Current Army campaigns are in a 

transition between mechanized warfare and fully informationized warfare. This is not surprising 

since the Army has only recently achieved full mechanization with the modernization goal of 

making important progress incorporating information and computer technology by 2020. 

The PLA maintains a menu of potential offensive and defensive campaigns, and 

campaigns under special terrain and climate conditions. An analysis of the emphasis placed on 

certain campaigns in recent PLA publications provides a shorter list of campaigns that are 

highlighted providing insight into what the PLA Army considers likely conflict scenarios. The 

highlighted Army campaigns are applicable to operations against Taiwan or Taiwan held islands 

and to an Indian border conflict. The border defense and positional defense campaigns could also 

respond to a crisis on the Korean peninsula to secure the border and block an influx of refugees.

The maneuver, mountain, and desert grassland campaigns could be applicable to operations in 

Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

124 LSAC, pp. 238-239 125 LSAC, pp. 239-240

50
The Army campaigns represent operations within the PRC or along its periphery. The 

campaign discussions refer to coordination and support from local and militia forces which 

would only occur within the PRC or near the borders. The PRC has adopted the Going Out 

Strategy to support the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s increasing overseas interests. 

These global interests require a new force projection capability to protect overseas interests and 

lines of communications. However, the PLA currently does not have the strategic delivery, 

foreign bases, prepositioning, or logistics capability to transport and sustain a large expeditionary 

force operating far from the mainland support base. As the PLA’s capabilities to deliver and 

sustain an expeditionary force continue to grow, these campaigns could become applicable to 

overseas operations, particularly in foreign operational environments like those described in the 

special conditions section. 

The PLA is becoming increasingly informationized and adopting new concepts. Doctrinal 

development, military modernization and training are focused on developing an operational 

system of systems capable of supporting more advanced operations in general and specifically 

integrated joint operations. The operational system of systems capability represents an integrated 

command information system seamlessly linking forces, weapons, and equipment. At the 

campaign level the operational system of systems is the campaign formation representing an 

integrated task force of modular units capable of reorganization to meet changing requirements.

The PLA envisions future warfare as a system of systems confrontation focused on destroying or 

paralyzing key nodes or forces to disrupt the enemy’s operational system of systems. Non-linear, 

non-contact, and asymmetric operations will be the norm. While the PLA is incorporating these 

concepts into the force, anomalies and seemingly outdated concepts remain. 

An examination of Army campaigns displays an operational doctrine that is a mixture of 

mechanized and informationized warfare. Informationized modernization within the PLA has 

contributed to changes in campaign doctrine from past iterations with the fielding of more 

modern and integrated communications, precision firepower, and reconnaissance systems. The 

PLA envisions a dynamic and dispersed battlefield integrated by an advanced command 

information system to command, coordinate, and synchronize multi-dimensional operations. 

There is greater reliance on precision firepower support, employment of vertical envelopment, 

special forces, informationized communications to control dispersed forces, and high-tech 

reconnaissance and surveillance equipment to provide situational awareness and targeting. Noncontact operations employing precision firepower and information attack are now viewed as the 

primary offensive capabilities. The PLA believes that timely initiation of precision strikes on the 

opponent’s key points can achieve initiative and control in combat while decisively determining

victory or defeat.

Current PLA doctrine emphasizes the importance of achieving information and air 

superiority. These are achieved through hard and soft kills to destroy or paralyze key enemy 

forces. Maneuver, information operations, air defense and special operations are considered key 

campaign actions. While some current campaigns incorporate aspects of modern operations, 

some campaigns do not, while several campaigns appear out of touch with reality. Some 

observations on the PLA campaigns include the following: 

51
• Some campaign actions such as deep echeloning of forces and breakthrough operations 

during the positional offensive campaign appear to contradict the lessons of 

informationized wars featuring non-linear and non-contact operations. 

• The landing campaign would most likely be part of a joint landing campaign against 

Taiwan or could be launched against Taiwan held islands. While the PLA has sufficient 

amphibious assault lift to seize Taiwan held islands, this lift is not sufficient even 

augmented with civilian shipping to land the requisite forces for a successful large 

amphibious assault against Taiwan. An operation to seize a contested island in the South 

China Sea would most likely involve the expanding Marine force or special forces. 

• The PLA views the maneuver campaign as a means to achieve a quick decision 

conducted against an enemy in an unstable or mobile defensive posture. 

• The PLA views the urban offensive campaign as an important campaign. This campaign 

is applicable to operations on Taiwan with its heavily urbanized terrain along the coast. 

The PLA understands the destructiveness of such combat. 

• While the PLA considers the anti-airborne campaign important, it is difficult to imagine 

what country would conduct large scale airborne landings within China. 

• Defensive campaigns contain new features based on informationized modernization 

within the PLA including intelligence and reconnaissance, command and control, 

firepower assault, battlefield maneuver, and logistics support. The PLA advocates an 

active defense featuring limited offensive combat to stabilize a defensive system and 

conduct counterattacks. 

• The PLA’s continued inclusion of a positional defensive campaign relying on extensive 

construction of in-depth defenses appears to fail to consider non-linear and non-contact 

operations. 

• The inclusion of a campaign level costal defense relying on positional defensive positions 

leaves one wondering what country would conduct a large-scale amphibious landing on 

mainland China. 

PLA doctrine evolves slowly, with theorists discussing new developments for decades before 

implementation in the force. The PLA believes technology drives changes in warfare. The Army

campaigns depict a transitional period with current doctrine reflecting aspects of both 

mechanized and informationized warfare. The PLA continues to play catch up to the revolution 

in military affairs based on information technologies. Despite reform efforts for twenty years or 

longer, systemic problems remain retarding military education and training efforts to build an 

officer corps with a deep understanding of information technologies and the military capabilities 

they represent. Currently PLA military theorists are discussing the next revolution in military 

affairs based on intelligent technologies and its possible impact on military modernization and 

warfare. Meanwhile, the Army’s campaign doctrine remains in a mix of mechanized and

informationized warfare. The longer it takes the PLA to fully implement critical personnel and 

training reforms retarding advancements in the operationalization of new doctrinal concepts, the 

military risks falling further behind the worlds advanced militaries.

Analysis of future warfare concepts discussed by PLA sources provides a benchmark for 

where PLA doctrine is today, and its future direction. PLA theorists believe that intelligent 

warfare will feature a manned-unmanned integration forming an organic symbiosis that can 

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revolutionize warfare. Eventually PLA theorists believe unmanned systems will represent a large 

component of the military force. While most theorists believe unmanned systems will operate 

with some autonomy within the constraints of assigned mission and objectives, humans will 

monitor and intervene as needed. These theorists believe that technology and weapons represent 

core capabilities, but most continue to believe that humans are the decisive factor determining 

victory or defeat in war. Intelligent weapons and systems will execute operational intentions and 

achieve operational objectives determined by humans. Humans will continue to plan, organize, 

and execute wars, deciding on the command and operational methods employed, assisted by 

intelligent technology.

PLA theorists continue examining foreign military operations for lessons learned, and some 

analyze the potential of hybrid warfare. They believe hybrid operations integrate irregular and 

regular forces in the same combat space with irregular forces becoming the main force. Hybrid 

combat styles are diverse and flexible including intense, high-tech regular combat, covert 

employment of special forces, modern guerilla warfare, cyber warfare, and psychological 

warfare. Hybrid warfare is based on achieving political objectives with minimal cost and risk 

while disintegrating the enemy from the inside out. Cognitive warfare will attack the enemy’s 

will to resist using public opinion, psychological and legal warfare to confuse the enemy and 

disrupt the decision-making process. Hybrid warfare creates new, low risk confrontational 

choices against major opponents. The hybrid warfare concept is not new to the PLA whose 

history includes successful guerilla warfare transitioning to more conventional operations. Today 

the PLA incorporates maritime militia and paramilitary forces into harassment operations against 

other nations to gain maritime control.

The PLA avidly researches military theory, foreign operations, emerging and disruptive 

technologies, and development trends in future warfare for guiding principles to incorporate into 

their doctrine. The PLA is making strides in modernization and is not recognizable from the PLA 

twenty years ago. However, doctrine has evolved at a slow pace, and critical reforms in military 

education and training have been slow to gain traction. Until the PLA can build up an officer and 

noncommissioned officer corps knowledgeable in informationized warfare, the military risks 

playing catch up in the next revolution in military affairs based on intelligent technologies.

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