Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

May 2006 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Better Acquisition 

Strategy Needed for 

Successful 

Development of the 

Army’s Warrior 

Unmanned Aircraft 

System 

GAO-06-593 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-593.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact John Hutton at 

(202) 512-7773 or huttonj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-593, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate 

May 2006

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for 

Successful Development of the Army’s 

Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System 

The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned aircraft 

system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with existing 

systems such as the Air Force’s Predator A. The Army believes that using 

the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming with other Army 

assets; using common ground control equipment; and allowing soldiers in 

the field to operate it. Warrior’s key technical features include a heavy fuel 

engine; automatic take-off and landing system; faster tactical common data 

link; ethernet; greater carrying capacity for weapons; and avionics with 

enhanced reliability. The Army projects that Warrior will offer some cost 

savings over Predator A. 

In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, the 

Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy 

for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior’s critical technologies were 

immature at the contract award for system development and demonstration 

and remain so in early 2006, and the mature technologies still have some risk 

associated with them because neither has previously been fully integrated 

onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior schedule allows 32 months from 

award of the development and demonstration contract to the initial 

production decision. Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of 

technology and product development, testing, and production. Once 

developmental aircraft are available for testing, the Army plans to fund 

procurement of long-lead items in August 2007. Experience shows that 

these concurrencies can result in design changes during production that can 

prevent delivery of a system within projected cost and schedule. The Warrior 

program faces these same risks. 

 Best practices approach

Warrior approach

Technology Development System Development and Demonstration Production

Development

Start

Production

Start

Technology Development

System Development and Demonstration

Aircraft Prototype Deliveries

Testing

Production

?

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Integration

Through 2011, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 

billion on unmanned aircraft 

systems, including the Army’s 

“Warrior.” Because of 

congressional concerns that some 

systems have been more costly and 

taken more time to produce than 

predicted, GAO reviewed the 

Warrior program. This report (1) 

describes the Army’s requirements 

underlying its decision to acquire 

Warrior instead of existing systems 

such as the Air Force’s Predator, 

and (2) assesses whether the Army 

has established a sound acquisition 

strategy for the Warrior program. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Secretary of 

the Army ensure that a sound, 

knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy guide the Warrior 

program. Specifically, GAO 

recommends that the Army not 

approve long-lead items for Warrior 

low-rate initial production until it 

can clearly demonstrate that the 

program’s technologies are mature 

and its design stable. DOD states 

that delaying procurement of longlead items will increase program 

costs and delay fielding of Warrior. 

GAO’s past work shows that 

programs proceeding without 

needed knowledge on technologies 

and design ultimately take longer 

and cost more money. 
Page i GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3 

Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders’ 

Needs 6 

Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practices 10 

Conclusions 17 

Recommendations for Executive Action 17 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18 

Scope and Methodology 19 

Appendix Comments from the Department of Defense 21 

Table 

Table 1: Comparison of Warrior and Predator A Technical Features 9 

Figures 

Figure 1: Time Line for Warrior Program 5 

Figure 2: Concurrency in Warrior’s Technology Development, 

Product Development, Testing, and Production Compared 

to Best Practices Model 15 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

SDD System Development and Demonstration 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

Contents 

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Page 1 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

May 19, 2006 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

Unmanned aircraft systems1

 are being developed and fielded in growing 

numbers and the diversity of designs and applications is also increasing. 

Through 2011, the Department of Defense plans to spend $20 billion to 

develop, procure, and support a rapidly increasing inventory of such 

systems. Among the new developments is the Army’s Extended Range 

Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System, also known as “Warrior.” The 

Army intends for Warrior to fill what it terms a capability gap for an 

unmanned aircraft system at the division level. Warrior is being developed 

and produced by the contractor also involved in the Air Force’s Predator A 

and Predator B unmanned aircraft systems. Warrior is to some degree 

similar to those systems, a fact recognized by the Air Force and Army. In 

January 2006, both services signed a memorandum of understanding that 

recognized that complementary/joint requirements exist between the 

Predator and Warrior systems, and they committed to reaching agreement 

on how to develop and use these capabilities. 

Because of the growth in requirements and new technologies for 

unmanned aircraft systems and your concerns that some unmanned 

aircraft systems have not produced the expected cost and schedule 

outcomes, you asked us to review the Army’s Warrior program. 

Specifically, this report (1) describes the Army’s requirements underlying 

its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air 

Force’s Predator; and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a 

sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program. 

To address the first objective, we reviewed Army requirements documents 

as well as compared key technical features of the planned Warrior and 

 1

 Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as “unmanned aerial vehicles.” “Unmanned 

aircraft” is consistent with the Federal Aviation Administration’s classification and 

emphasizes other components of the aircraft system, such as payload, ground stations, and 

communications equipment. 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

Predator. We also reviewed the process the Army used to select the 

Warrior system. To address the second objective, we reviewed the Warrior 

acquisition strategy and evaluated it according to best practices criteria 

utilizing GAO’s “Methodology for Assessing Risks on Major Weapons 

Systems Acquisition Programs.” We also analyzed budget-related, 

programmatic, and planning information to determine the soundness of 

the Army’s acquisition strategy. For both objectives, we interviewed Army 

officials and obtained information on Army requirements and acquisition 

strategy for Warrior. We also leveraged other recent GAO work on the Air 

Force’s Predator system2

 and our overall body of work on best practices of 

leading companies. We conducted our review from September 2005 to 

April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

The Army has determined that the Warrior is the best option available to 

meet its operational requirement, which requires an unmanned aircraft 

system dedicated to direct operational control by its field commanders. 

The Army believes that the Predator A is operationally and technically 

mismatched with its needs. The Army intends to use Warrior to enhance 

overall force capability by teaming it with other of its assets such as the 

Apache helicopter, using common ground control equipment to network 

with other unmanned aircraft systems, and allowing soldiers in the field to 

operate the aircraft. The Army expects Warrior to have several key 

technical features that the Army believes will better meet its operational 

needs, including a heavy fuel engine that uses a single Army-wide fuel, an 

automatic take-off and landing system to improve safety, a faster tactical 

common data link for interoperability with other Army assets, an ethernet 

for quicker communications within the Warrior system, greater carrying 

capacity for weapons, and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army 

estimates that each Warrior aircraft and associated basic equipment will 

cost about $4.4 million, less than the aircraft and similar equipment for the 

Predator A at $4.8 million. While the Predator B system is expected to 

meet or exceed some of the Warrior’s capabilities, it is estimated to cost $9 

million for similar equipment. 

 2

 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to 

Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

15, 2006). 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, 

the Army has not established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best acquisition practices. The 

Army contracted for Warrior system development and demonstration in 

August 2005 even though two of four critical technologies were not 

mature. These two critical technologies still are not mature as of early 

2006, and the two that are mature have some risk associated with them 

because neither has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned 

aircraft. The Army does have backups in place for the two immature 

critical technologies, but use of these would result in a less capable 

system. It is uncertain if the Army will be able to complete maturation of 

technologies and achieve Warrior’s overall design stability by the time of 

the planned design readiness review in July 2006. Overall, the Warrior 

schedule is very aggressive, with 32 months from the award of the 

development and demonstration contract to the initial production 

decision. Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of technology 

and product development, testing, and production. For example, the Army 

is establishing production capabilities while the first 17 developmental 

aircraft are being designed and fabricated. Within months of these aircraft 

becoming available for developmental testing, the Army plans to commit 

funding for procurement of long-lead items as early as August 2007. 

Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes 

during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected 

cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of the Army take action to ensure 

that a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy guides the future of the 

Warrior program. Specifically, we recommend that the Army not approve 

long-lead items for Warrior low-rate initial production until it can clearly 

demonstrate that the program is proceeding based on accumulated 

knowledge such as technology maturity and design stability. 

DOD concurred with only one part of our recommendation and did not 

concur with the other two parts. DOD stated that delaying the 

procurement of long-lead items will increase program costs and delay 

fielding of Warrior. Our prior work shows that proceeding into the latter 

stages of acquisition without needed knowledge on technologies and 

design ultimately takes longer and costs individual programs more money. 

Currently, DOD has five major unmanned aircraft systems in use: the Air 

Force’s Predator A and Global Hawk, the Marine Corps’ Pioneer, and the 

Army’s Hunter and Shadow. The services also have developmental efforts 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

underway, for example, the Air Force’s Predator B, the Army and Navy’s 

vertical take-off and landing system, and the Army’s Warrior. Overall, DOD 

now has about 250 unmanned aircraft in inventory and plans to increase 

its inventory to 675 by 2010 and 1,400 by 2015.3

 The 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review reached a number of decisions that would further expand 

investments in unmanned systems, including accelerating production of 

Predator and Global Hawk. It also established a plan to develop a new 

land-based, long-strike capability by 2018 and set a goal that about 45 

percent of the future long-range strike force be unmanned. 

DOD expects unmanned aircraft systems to transform the battlespace with 

innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as take on the socalled “dull, dirty, and dangerous missions” without putting pilots in 

harm’s way. Potential missions for unmanned systems have expanded 

from the original focus on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to 

limited tactical strike capabilities. Projected plans call for unmanned 

aircraft systems to perform persistent ground attack, electronic warfare, 

and suppression of enemy air defenses. 

Unmanned aircraft fly at altitudes ranging from below 10,000 feet up to 

50,000 feet and are typically characterized by approximate altitude—“low 

altitude” if operating at 10,000 feet or less, “medium altitude” if flying 

above 10,000 but below 35,000 feet, and “high altitude” if operating above 

35,000 feet. The Army’s classifies Warrior as a medium-altitude system, in 

the same category as its Hunter system, its Warrior prototype known as IGNAT, and the Air Force’s Predator A. The Air Force’s Predator B is 

expected to operate at both medium and high altitudes. 

The Warrior as envisioned by the Army shares some similarities with the 

Air Force’s Predator A and B models. First, all three systems share the 

same contractor, General Atomics. Second, Predator A and Warrior are 

expected to be somewhat similar in physical characteristics. In particular, 

the build of the main fuselage, the location of fuel bays, and design of the 

tailspar are alike. According to Army program officials, the Predator B and 

Warrior are expected to share the same flight controls and avionics. 

Predator A and Warrior are anticipated to perform some similar missions, 

including reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition and attack. 

 3

 These numbers are the larger systems and do not count numerous small and handlaunched systems used by ground forces. 
Page 5 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

The development of the Warrior program began in late 2001 when the 

Army started defining requirements for a successor to its Hunter system. 

In September 2004, the Army released a request for a “systems capabilities 

demonstration” so that companies could demonstrate the capabilities of 

their existing aircraft. In December 2004, the Army awarded 

demonstration contracts worth $250,000 each to two contractors, 

Northrup Grumman and General Atomics. Subsequently, the Army 

evaluated, among other things, the demonstrated capabilities of the 

competitors’ existing aircraft in relation to Warrior technical requirements. 

The Army did not perform a formal analysis of the alternatives comparing 

expected capabilities of Warrior with current capabilities offered by 

existing systems; rather, its rationale was that the Warrior is needed nearterm for commanders’ missions and considered this competition to be a 

rigorous analysis of available alternatives. 

Based on the competition, the Army concluded that General Atomics’ 

proposal (based on Warrior) provided the best value solution. In August 

2005, the Army awarded the system development and demonstration 

(SDD) contract to General Atomics. The contract is a cost plus incentive 

fee contract with an award fee feature. It has a base value of about $194 

million, with approximately another $15 million available to the contractor 

in the form of incentive fees, and about an additional $12 million available 

as award fees. The time line in figure 1 illustrates the sequence of past and 

planned events for the Warrior program. 

Figure 1: Time Line for Warrior Program 

December

2004

Capabilities

Demonstration

Contract

Demonstration SDD

Contract

Award

Design

Readiness

Review

Low-Rate

Production

Decision

Full-Rate

Production

Decision

February/March

2005

August

2005

July

2006

April

2008

November

2009

    

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
Page 6 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

The Army plans for a full Warrior system to entail 12 aircraft as well as 5 

ground control stations, 5 ground data terminals, 1 satellite 

communication ground data terminal, 12 air data terminals/air data relays, 

6 airborne satellite communication terminals, 2 tactical automatic take-off 

and landing systems, 2 portable ground control stations, 2 portable ground 

data terminals and associated ground support equipment. The Army 

expects to buy 1 developmental system with 17 aircraft and 11 complete 

production systems with a total of 132 production aircraft through 2015. 

However, the Army has not yet decided on the number of systems it might 

buy beyond that date. 

The Army is employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy to produce 

Warrior. The Army expects the current Warrior program of record to 

provide for immediate warfighting needs and plans to build on the 

capabilities of this increment as evolving technology allows. 

The Army has an operational requirement, approved by the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council, for an unmanned aircraft system 

dedicated to direct operational control by Army field commanders. The 

Army has determined that the Warrior was the best option available to 

meet this operational requirement. Army program officials believe that the 

Predator is operationally and technically mismatched with Army needs. 

The Army expects Warrior to offer key technical features that will better 

meet Army operational needs than Predator A. 

According to the Army, the Predator is operationally mismatched with its 

division-level needs. Army program officials noted that one of the Army’s 

current operational difficulties with Predator is that frontline commanders 

cannot directly task the system for support during tactical engagements. 

Rather, Predator control is allocated to Theater and Joint Task Force 

Commands, and the system’s mission is to satisfy strategic intelligence, 

reconnaissance, and surveillance needs as well as joint needs. Army 

programmatic and requirements documents maintain that Army division 

commanders in the field need direct control of a tactical unmanned 

aircraft asset capable of satisfying operational requirements for dedicated 

Warrior Capability Is 

Targeted to Support 

Army Commanders’ 

Needs 

Army Operational 

Requirement Focuses on 

Control by Commanders in 

the Field 
Page 7 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, communications relay, 

teaming with other Army assets, and target acquisition and attack.4

 

Army program officials also indicated that Predator’s time is apportioned 

among various users, and the Army typically does not receive a large 

portion of that time. According to Warrior program documents, the Army 

has historically been able to draw only limited operational support from 

theater assets such as Predator. For example, a program office briefing 

noted that overall Iraq theater-level support was neither consistent nor 

responsive to Army needs, and that division level support was often 

denied or cancelled entirely. The briefing also said that the shortfall was 

expected to continue, even with the addition of more Predators and Global 

Hawks. 

Army program officials also told us that they expect Warrior to enhance 

overall force capability in ways that Predator cannot. Specifically, the 

Army expects Warrior to support teaming with Army aviation assets and 

aid these assets in conducting missions that commanders were previously 

reluctant to task to manned platforms. Under this teaming concept, 

manned assets, including the Apache helicopter, Army Airspace Command 

and Control system, and Aerial Common Sensor, would work jointly with 

Warrior to enhance target acquisition and attack capabilities. The Army 

plans for the manned platforms to not only receive data and video 

communications from Warrior but also control its payloads and flight. The 

Army also plans to configure Warrior for interoperability with the Army 

One System Ground Control Station, an Army-wide common ground 

control network for unmanned aircraft systems. According to Army 

documents, Warrior’s incorporation into this network will better support 

the Army ground commander by allowing control of Warrior aircraft to be 

handed off among ground stations, provide better battlefield coverage for 

Joint Forces, and ensure common operator training among unmanned 

aircraft systems, including the Army’s Warrior, Shadow, and Hunter and 

Marine Corps’ unmanned aircraft systems. Additionally, Army program 

officials pointed out that Warrior will be physically controlled by an 

enlisted soldier deployed in the theater where Warrior is being used. They 

contrast this with Predator, which is typically flown from a location within 

the continental United States by a pilot trained to fly manned aircraft. 

 4

 The Army requirements document for Warrior was approved by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council in April 2005. The Council, among other responsibilities, conducts 

requirements analyses and validates mission needs and performance objectives and 

thresholds. 
Page 8 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

The Army believes that the Warrior design will offer key technical features 

to address Army operational requirements and maintains that these 

features will better meet its operational needs than those found on 

Predator A. The technical features include: 

• multi-role tactical common data link, 

• ethernet, 

• heavy fuel engine, 

• automatic take-off and landing system, 

• more weapons, 

• interoperability with Army One System Ground Control Station, and 

• dual-redundant avionics. 

Table 1 shows the respective purpose of each technical feature, describes 

whether or not a particular feature is planned for Warrior and exists now 

on Predator A, and provides the Army’s assessment of operational impact 

provided by each feature. 

Army Expects Warrior to 

Address Operational 

Needs with Key Technical 

Features 
Page 9 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

Table 1: Comparison of Warrior and Predator A Technical Features

Technical 

Feature Purpose Warrior Predator A

Army’s

Assessment of 

Operational 

Impact 

Tactical 

Common 

Data Link 

• Communications 

between ground 

control station and 

aircraft 

• Interoperability with 

Army aviation 

platforms 

Yes – digital Kuband data linka

No – 

analog Cband data 

link 

• Faster 

external data 

transmission 

• Improved 

control of 

aircraft 

• Teaming with 

Army aviation 

Ethernet • Real-time internal 

communications, 

including among 

avionics, payloads, 

weapons 

Yes No • Faster internal 

data 

transmission 

Heavy Fuel 

Engine 

• Powers aircraft Yes No • Single Army 

fuel on 

battlefield 

• Improved 

endurance 

and take-off 

weight 

Automatic 

Take-off and 

Landing 

• Launch and 

recovery 

Yes No - pilot 

using 

manual 

controls 

• Safer 

• Reduced 

chance for 

operator error 

Weapons • Target attack Yes – 4 Hellfire Yes – 2 

Hellfire 

• Prosecute 

more targets 

DualRedundant 

Avionics 

• Improve 

airworthiness 

Yes No • More reliable 

Ground 

Control 

Station 

• Control of 

unmanned aircraft 

system 

Yes –common 

with other 

Army/Marine 

Corps systems 

Yes – 

unique to 

Predator 

• Single control 

of several 

unmanned 

aircraft 

systems 

• Broader 

battlefield 

coverage 

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

a

Ku-band and C-band are ranges of radio frequencies used in wireless communications. 

A February 2006 Warrior program office comparison of costs for Warrior 

and Predator A projects that Warrior’s unit cost will be $4.4 million for 
Page 10 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

each aircraft, including its sensors, satellite communications, and Hellfire 

launchers and associated electronics. The cost comparison indicates that 

Predator A’s unit cost for the same elements is $4.8 million. Although the 

Air Force’s Predator B is planned to be more capable than Warrior in such 

areas as physical size and payload and weapons capacity, the Warrior 

program office estimates that it will have a unit cost of $9.0 million—about 

double the anticipated cost for Warrior. The Army’s cost estimates for the 

Warrior are, of course, predicated on Army plans for successful 

development and testing. 

In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, 

the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best practices for successful 

acquisition. Warrior is expected to rely on critical technologies that were 

not mature at the time of the system development and demonstration 

contract award in August 2005 and were still not mature in March 2006. 

Furthermore, it appears that the Army may be unable to complete 

development of these technologies and achieve overall design stability by 

the time of the design readiness review scheduled for July 2006. Moreover, 

the Warrior schedule is very aggressive and overlaps technology 

development, product development, testing, and production. For example, 

the Army plans to consider awarding a contract for procurement of longlead items at a time when it is still unclear if Warrior will be 

technologically mature and have a stable design. Such concurrency adds 

more risk, including the potential for costly design changes after 

production begins, to the already compressed schedule. 

In the last several years, we have undertaken a best practices body of 

work on how leading developers in industry and government use a 

knowledge-based approach to develop high-quality products on time and 

within budget. A knowledge-based approach to product development 

employs a process wherein a high level of knowledge about critical facets 

of a product is achieved at key junctures known as “knowledge points.”5

This event-driven approach, where each point builds on knowledge 

 5

 Best practices for successful product development include three knowledge points (KP). 

Knowledge Point 1 should occur at development start and is attained when a technologies 

and resources match requirements; KP 2 should occur at the mid-point between 

development and production and is attained when product design performs as expected; 

and KP 3 should occur at production start and is attained when production can meet cost, 

schedule, and quality targets. 

Warrior Acquisition 

Strategy Not 

Consistent with Best 

Practices 
Page 11 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

attained in the previous point, enables developers to be reasonably certain 

that their products are more likely to meet established cost, schedule, and 

performance baselines. A key to such successful product development is 

an acquisition strategy that matches requirements to resources and 

includes, among other elements, a high level of technology maturity in the 

product at the start of system development and demonstration, design 

maturity at the system’s design readiness review usually held about halfway through the system’s development phase, and adequate time to deliver 

the product. 

Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 

development is an important indicator that a match has been made 

between the customer’s requirements and the product developer’s 

resources in term of knowledge, money, and time. This means that the 

technologies needed to meet essential requirements—known as “critical 

technologies”—have been demonstrated to work in their intended 

environment. Our best practices work has shown that technology 

readiness levels (TRL) 6

 can be used to assess the maturity of individual 

technologies and that a TRL of 7—demonstration of a technology in an 

operational environment—is the level that constitutes a low risk for 

starting a product development program. 

As identified by the Army, the Warrior program contains four critical 

technologies: (1) ethernet, (2) multi-role tactical common data link, (3) 

heavy fuel engine, and (4) automatic take-off and landing system. Two of 

the four critical technologies—ethernet and data link—were not mature at 

the time the Army awarded the Warrior system development and 

demonstration contract in August 2005, and in early 2006 remain immature 

at TRLs of 4. Army program officials told us that they project the ethernet 

to be at TRL 6 and the data link at TRL 5 or 6 by the time of the design 

readiness review scheduled for July 2006. However, it is not certain that 

these two technologies will be as mature at design readiness review as the 

Army anticipates. Army program officials indicated that the data link 

hardware is still in development and expect its integration with other 

Warrior components to be a challenge. As such, they rated data link 

integration status as a moderate risk to the Warrior program. While they 

 6

 Technology readiness levels characterize the readiness of technologies for hand-off to 

project implementers. Nine levels are defined, representing concepts from fundamental 

research level (TRL 1) through technologies fully qualified and demonstrated in flight 

(TRL 9). 

Some Warrior Critical 

Technologies Have Yet to 

Reach Maturity 
Page 12 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

stated that use of the ethernet has been demonstrated on Army helicopters 

and should not be a technical integration challenge, the officials also said 

that neither the ethernet nor specific data link technologies to be used on 

Warrior has been integrated previously onto an unmanned aircraft 

platform. Further, if the technologies are demonstrated at TRL 6 by design 

readiness review, they will meet DOD’s standard for maturity 

(demonstration in a relevant environment) but not the best practices 

maturity standard of TRL 7 (demonstration in an operational 

environment). 

The Army has technologies in place as backups for the data link and 

ethernet, but these technologies would result in a less capable system than 

the Army originally planned. According to Army program officials, there 

are several potential backups for the data link that could be used on the 

Warrior aircraft. Among the backups they cited is the same data link used 

on the Predator A–analog C-band. However, as we noted in a report last 

year, C-band is congested, suffers from resulting delays in data 

transmission and relay, and the Department of Defense has established a 

goal of moving Predator payloads from this data link.7

 Similarly, the other 

data link backups cited by the officials either had slower data transmission 

rates or also were not yet mature. Program officials indicated that the 

backup for the ethernet is normal ground station control of the on-board 

communication among such components as the payloads, avionics, and 

weapons. While they stated that there would be no major performance 

penalty if the backup was used, they did note that the ethernet would 

significantly improve ease of integrating payloads and of integrating with 

other Army assets that might need control of a Warrior payload to support 

missions. 

The other two critical technologies, the automatic take-off and landing 

system and the heavy fuel engine, are mature at respective TRLs of 7 and 

9. Nevertheless, some program risk is associated with these technologies 

as well. The contractor has never fielded an automatic take-off and landing 

component on an unmanned aircraft system. Army program officials told 

us that they are confident about the take-off and landing system because a 

similar landing system had been fielded on the Shadow unmanned aircraft, 

but they also indicated that the take-off component has not been fielded 

 7

 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49 (Washington, D.C.; 

Dec. 13, 2005). 
Page 13 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

on an unmanned aircraft. The officials also expressed confidence in the 

heavy fuel engine because it is certified by the U.S. Federal Aviation 

Administration and is in use on civilian manned aircraft. However, like the 

complete take-off and landing system, it has not previously been 

integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. 

Best practices for successful acquisition call for a program’s design 

stability to be demonstrated by having at least 90 percent of engineering 

drawings completed and released to manufacturing at the time of the 

design readiness review. If a product’s design is not stable as 

demonstrated by meeting this best practice, the product may not meet 

customer requirements and cost and schedule targets. For example, as we 

reported previously, the Army’s Shadow unmanned aircraft system did not 

meet best practices criteria because it had only 67 percent of its design 

drawings completed when the system entered low-rate production. 

Subsequent testing revealed examples of design immaturity, especially 

relating to system reliability, and ultimately the Army delayed Shadow’s 

full-rate production by about 6 months.8

The Warrior program also faces increased risk if design drawings do not 

meet standards for best acquisition practices. The Warrior program office 

projects that Warrior’s design will be stable and that 85 percent of 

drawings will have been completed and released to manufacturing by the 

time of the design readiness review in July 2006. However, it seems 

uncertain whether the Warrior program will meet this projection because 

percentages of drawings complete for some sub-components were still 

quite low in early 2006 and, in some cases, have declined since the system 

development and demonstration contract award. For example, according 

to an Army program official, the percentage of completed design drawings 

for the aircraft and ground control equipment dropped after contract 

award because the Army made modifications to the planned aircraft and 

also decided that it needed a larger transport vehicle for the Warrior’s 

ground control equipment. 

 8

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-04-248 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004). 

Warrior Design Stability 

Uncertain 
Page 14 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

The Warrior program appears driven largely by schedule rather than the 

attainment of event-driven knowledge points that would separate 

technology development from product development. The latter approach 

is characteristic of both best practices and DOD’s own acquisition policy. 

Warrior’s schedule is compressed and aggressive and includes 

concurrency among technology development, product development, 

testing, and production. Concurrency—the overlapping of technology and 

product development, testing, and production schedules—is risky because 

it can lead to design changes that can be costly and delay delivery of a 

useable capability to the warfighter if testing shows design changes are 

necessary to achieve expected system performance. As shown in figure 2, 

the Warrior schedule overlaps technology development, product 

development, testing, and production. 

Aggressive Schedule and 

Concurrent Activities 

Increase Program Risk 
Page 15 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

Figure 2: Concurrency in Warrior’s Technology Development, Product Development, Testing, and Production Compared to 

Best Practices Model 

 Best practices approach

Warrior approach

Technology Development System Development and Demonstration Production

KP 1

and PDR

KP 2

and DRR

KP 3

Development

Start

Production

Start

Technology Development

System Development and Demonstration

Aircraft Prototype Deliveries

Testing

Production

?

    

SDD

Contract

Award

PDR DRR LRIP

LL

Milestone

C

Initial

Production 

Decision

August 2005

February 2006

July 2006

August 2007

April 2008

KP1: (Knowledge Point 1): technologies and resources match requirements

KP2: (Knowledge Point 2): design performs as expected

KP3: (Knowledge Point 3): production can meet cost, schedule, and quality targets

PDR: Preliminary Design Review

DRR: Design Readiness Review

SDD: System Development and Demonstration

LRIP LL: Low-Rate Initial Production Long Lead

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Integration
Page 16 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

The following examples highlight some of the concurrency issues within 

the Warrior program: 

• Thirty-two months have been allotted from the system development 

and demonstration contract award in August 2005 to the low-rate 

production decision in April 2008. Out of that, 10 months—from July 

2006 to May 2007—are set aside for integrating system components 

(including all four critical technologies) into the aircraft. Two of these 

technologies are not yet mature (as of early 2006); none of the specific 

technologies as planned to be used on Warrior have previously been 

fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Army plans to continue 

integration through May 2007 would seem to undermine the design 

stability expected to be achieved at the July 2006 design readiness 

review. Ideally, system integration is complete by that time. 

• Delivery of 17 developmental aircraft is to take place within a 12-month 

period from April 2007 to April 2008, and the Army plans for them to 

undergo developmental testing as they are delivered. It is unclear 

whether all components will be fully integrated for this testing, but the 

results of some tests should be available when the Army considers 

approval of long-lead items for the first lot of low-rate initial 

production in August 2007. The Army is requesting about $31 million in 

fiscal 2007 to procure long-lead items, including items associated with 

the automatic take-off and landing system, heavy fuel engine assembly, 

and ground control. Prior to the planned approval of the first lot in 

fiscal 2008, the developmental aircraft will be evaluated in a limited 

user test. 

The Warrior program office acknowledges that the schedule is high-risk. 

Additionally, according to Army program officials, both the program office 

and contractor recognize that there are areas of moderate to high risk 

within the program, including integration of the tactical common data link 

as well as timely availability of a modified Hellfire missile and synthetic 

aperture radar used for visibility in poor atmospheric conditions. Army 

program officials told us that they are trying to manage Warrior as more of 

a knowledge-based, event-driven rather than schedule-driven program. As 

an example, they stated that the contractor is currently building two offcontract aircraft to help mitigate risk by proving out design, development, 

and manufacturing. However, they also told us that these two aircraft 

would not include the tactical common data link, Hellfire missile, 

synthetic aperture radar, or satellite communications used for relay 

purposes. They noted that some of these items are still in development so 

are not expected to be available, but they do plan for the two aircraft to 
Page 17 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

have the ethernet, heavy fuel engine, and automatic take-off and landing 

system. 

In concept, the Army has determined that the Warrior will meet its 

operational requirements better than available alternatives such as the 

Predator. In practice, however, the Warrior might very well encounter 

cost, schedule, and performance problems that would hinder it from 

attaining the Army’s goals. Half of its critical technologies are not yet 

mature, and its design is not yet stable. Compounding this, its aggressive 

schedule features extensive concurrency among technology development 

and demonstration, design integration, system demonstration and test, and 

production, leaving little time to resolve technology maturity and design 

stability issues by testing. If the Warrior program continues forward prior 

to attaining adequate technology and design, it may well produce underperforming Warrior aircraft that will not meet program specifications. The 

program may then experience delays in schedule and increased costs. 

The next key program event with significant financial implications is the 

scheduled approval of long-lead items for the initial lot of Warrior low-rate 

initial production in August 2007. That will be the first use of procurement 

funding for Warrior. We believe that is a key point at which the Army 

needs to demonstrate that the Warrior program is knowledge-based and 

better aligned to meet program goals within available resources than it 

currently appears. 

We recommend that the Army not approve long-lead items for Warrior 

low-rate initial production until it can clearly demonstrate that the 

program is proceeding based on accumulated knowledge and not a 

predetermined schedule. In particular, we recommend that, prior to 

approving the Warrior long-lead items for low-rate initial production, the 

Secretary of the Army require that 

• critical Warrior technologies are fully mature and demonstrated; 

• Warrior design integration is complete and at least 90 percent of design 

drawings be completed and released to manufacturing; and 

• fully-integrated Warrior developmental aircraft are fabricated and 

involved in development testing. 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 18 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments are reprinted in Appendix I. DOD concurred with one part of 

our recommendation but not with the other two parts. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

DOD concurred with the part of our recommendation that it should seek 

to have at least 90 percent of design drawings completed and released to 

manufacturing prior to procuring long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate 

initial production. However, DOD also said that the decision to procure 

long-lead items will not be based solely on the percentage of drawings 

completed, but also on the schedule impact of unreleased drawings. 

DOD did not concur with the rest of our recommendation that, prior to 

approval of long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate initial production, the 

Secretary of the Army needed to ensure (a) critical Warrior technologies 

are fully mature and demonstrated and (b) fully-integrated Warrior 

developmental aircraft are fabricated and involved in development testing. 

Although DOD agreed that two critical technologies are less mature than 

the others within the Warrior system, it also stated that these technologies 

are at the correct levels to proceed with integration. However, the Warrior 

program is nearing the end of integration and is about to begin system 

demonstration, signified by the July 2006 design readiness review. In that 

review, the design is set to guide the building of developmental aircraft for 

testing. These developmental aircraft will be used to demonstrate the 

design in the latter half of System Development and Demonstration. While 

DOD stated that risk mitigation steps are in place, including possible use 

of back-up technologies, if either of the two critical technologies is not 

ready for integration, the decisions on whether to use back-up 

technologies in the design would ideally have been made by the design 

readiness review. Even if the two critical technologies mature by that 

point, they would still have to be integrated into the design, as would the 

back-up technologies if DOD chose to use those instead. To the extent 

that technology maturation and integration extend beyond the design 

readiness review, the program will incur the risk of integrating the design 

at the same time it is attempting to build developmental aircraft to 

demonstrate the design. Our recommendation to make the technology 

decision before committing to long-lead items provides a reasonable 

precaution against letting the technology risks proceed further into the 

demonstration of the developmental aircraft and into the purchase of 

production items. Making the technology decision as early as possible is 

particularly important given that the program schedule allows no more 

than a year to demonstrate the design with the developmental aircraft 

before committing to production. Our past work has shown that 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 19 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

increased costs and schedule slippages may accrue to programs that are 

still maturing technologies well into system development when they 

should be focused on stabilizing system design and preparing for 

production. 

With regards to the part of our recommendation that fully integrated 

development aircraft are fabricated and involved in developmental testing 

prior to approval of long-lead items, DOD indicated that modeling and 

simulation, block upgrades, early operational deployments, and early 

testing will enable the Department to mitigate design and performance 

risks while remaining on schedule. While we agree that these activities 

help reduce risk, the most effective way to reduce risk is to verify the 

design through testing of fully-integrated developmental aircraft before 

committing to production. Our recommendation underscores the value of 

conducting such testing, which can still be done if technology decisions 

are made early. 

Our work over the past several years has shown that a knowledge-based 

acquisition strategy consistent with best practices can lead to successful 

outcomes. Specifically, proceeding without mature technologies 

and a stable design can lead to costly design changes after production is 

underway and negatively impact funding in other Department programs, 

ultimately affecting DOD’s ability to respond to other warfighter needs. 

To address the first objective, to identify the requirements that led to the 

Army’s decision to acquire Warrior, we reviewed Army operational 

requirements, acquisition strategy, and other programmatic documents 

and briefings. We did not assess the validity of the Army’s requirements for 

Warrior. We also reviewed the process the Army used in selecting 

Warrior. In comparing Warrior to existing unmanned systems in the 

inventory, we limited our review to comparable medium-altitude systems 

within the military services. To assess differences in operational 

capabilities for Warrior and Predator, we reviewed operations-related 

documents for Predator A and B. We also reviewed critical technologies as 

well as other key technical features of the respective systems that 

highlighted differences in Warrior and Predator A capabilities. 

To address the second objective, whether the Army established a sound 

acquisition strategy for Warrior, we reviewed planning, budget, and 

programmatic documents. We also utilized GAO’s “Methodology for 

Assessing Risks on Major Weapon System Programs” to assess the Army’s 

acquisition strategy with respect to best practices criteria. The 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 20 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

methodology is derived from the best practices and experiences of leading 

commercial firms and successful defense acquisition programs. We also 

used this methodology to review risks within the Warrior program, but we 

did not focus our assessment on all risk areas the Army and Warrior 

contractor identified within the program. Instead, we focused on those 

risk areas that seemed most critical to the overall soundness of the Army’s 

acquisition strategy. 

To achieve both objectives, we interviewed Army officials and obtained 

their views of the Army’s requirements and soundness of the Army’s 

acquisition strategy. We also incorporated information on Warrior from 

GAO’s recent Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.9

We performed our review from September 2005 to April 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. Additionally, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me on 202-512-7773. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Principal contributors to this report were William R. 

Graveline, Tana Davis, and Beverly Breen. 

John Hutton 

Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

 9

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, 

GAO-06-391 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 
Appendix: Comments from the Department of 

Defense 

Page 21 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 

Appendix: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix: Comments from the Department of 

Defense 

Page 22 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy 
Appendix: Comments from the Department of 

Defense 

Page 23 GAO-06-593 Warrior Acquisition Strategy (120485) 
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