Harmony and Disharmony

Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities

February 14, 2006 

Combating Terrorism Center 

Department of Social Sciences 

United States Military Academy 

1
Executive Summary 

This study, conducted by the faculty and research fellows of the Combating 

Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, serves multiple purposes, the most important of

which is contributing to the depth of knowledge about the al-Qa’ida movement. Evidence 

supporting the conclusions and recommendations provided in this report is drawn 

from a collection of newly-released al-Qa’ida documents captured during recent 

operations in support of the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of 

Defense’s Harmony database. In the text of these documents, readers will see how 

explicit al-Qa’ida has been in its internal discussions covering a range of organizational 

issues, particularly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as 

well as with tensions that emerged within the leadership. 

In the first part of the report, we provide a theoretical framework, drawing on 

scholarly approaches including organization and agency theory, to predict where we 

should expect terrorist groups to face their greatest challenges in conducting operations. 

The framework is informed as much as possible by the captured documents, and provides 

a foundation upon which scholars can build as more of these documents are declassified 

and released to the public. 

Our analysis stresses that, by their nature, terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida 

face difficulties in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of 

maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified 

political ends, and of course, preventing local authorities from degrading the group’s 

capabilities. But they also face problems common to other types of organizations, 

including private firms, political parties, and traditional insurgencies. For example, 

political and ideological leaders—the principals—must delegate certain duties to 

middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. However, differences in personal 

preferences between the leadership and their operatives in areas such as finances and 

tactics make this difficult and give rise to classic agency problems. 

 Agency problems created by the divergent preferences among terrorist group 

members present operational challenges for these organizations, challenges which can be 

exploited as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Thus, the theoretical 

framework described in this report helps us identify where and under what conditions 

organizations can expect the greatest challenges in pursuing their goals and interests. 

Understanding a terrorist organization’s internal challenges and vulnerabilities is key to 

developing effective—and efficient—responses to the threats they pose and to degrade 

these groups’ ability to kill. The captured al Qa’ida documents contribute significantly to 

this type of understanding. 

 The experiences of the “Moslem Brotherhood” and “The Fighting Vanguard” (alTali’a al-Muqatila) in Hamah, Syria are examined as a particularly relevant case study. 

The lessons learned from these groups’ efforts during the 1970s—based on the actual 

2
internal assessments of senior jihadi ideologues themselves—are summarized here. Many 

of the jihadi experiences in Syria have striking parallels to current al-Qa’ida sponsored 

operations in Iraq, and we highlight several that we believe are especially relevant. This 

case study not only expands our understanding of the al-Qa’ida network and how it 

operates under pressure from the government, it also provides a useful model for other 

researchers to follow in applying a similar theoretical framework to the study of other 

terrorist organizations and their potential vulnerabilities. 

 Leveraging our framework and historical context from the Syrian case, we assess alQa’ida’s emerging organizational challenges, internal divisions, and places where the 

network is most likely vulnerable to exploitation. Our analysis emphasizes that effective 

strategies to combat threats posed by al-Qa’ida will create and exacerbate schisms within 

its membership. Members have different goals and objectives, and preferred strategies for 

achieving these ends. Preferences and commitment level vary across specific roles 

performed within the organization and among sub-group leaders. Defining and exploiting 

existing fissures within al-Qa’ida as a broadly defined organization must reflect this intraorganizational variation in preferences and commitment in order to efficiently bring all 

available resources to bear in degrading its potential threat. While capture-kill options 

may be most effective for certain individuals—e.g., operational commanders—we 

identify a number of non-lethal prescriptions that take into account differences in alQa’ida members’ preferences and commitment to the cause. Many of our prescriptions 

are intended to induce debilitating agency problems that increase existing organizational 

dysfunction and reduce al-Qa’ida’s potential for political impact. 

To achieve long-term success in degrading the broader movement driving terrorist 

violence, however, the CTC believes the United States must begin aggressively digesting 

the body of work that comprises jihadi macro-strategy. We therefore also seek to apply 

our model to the ideological dimension of al-Qa’ida revealed in numerous instances in 

these documents, the goal being to identify ways to facilitate the ideational collapse of

this body of thought. The included documents provide insights into the points of strategic 

dissonance and intersection among senior leaders that must be better understood in order 

to be exploited. 

In sum, this theoretically informed analysis, along with assessments of the individual 

captured documents themselves, contributes to existing bodies of research on al-Qa’ida. 

It provides several tools for identifying and exacerbating existing fissures as well as 

locating new insertion points for counterterrorism operations. It presents an analytical 

model that we hope lays the foundation for a more intellectually informed approach to 

counterterrorism. And perhaps, most importantly, this assessment demonstrates the 

integral role that scholars can play in understanding the nature of this movement and in 

generating smarter, more effective ways to impede its growth and nurture the means for 

its eventual disintegration. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military 

Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 

3
Table of Contents 

Foreword...............................................................................5 

Part I

Introduction .......................................................................... 7 

Theoretical Framework: The Challenges of Organizing Terror................11 

Syria Case Study: Back to the Future.............................................25 

Organizational Vulnerabilities and Recommendations to Exploit Them.....40

Part II

Introduction...........................................................................54

Harmony Document List............................................................57 

Harmony Document Summaries ..................................................59 

4
Foreword 

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In war, traditional nation-states have specific attributes, such as territory, military 

forces, governmental structures, and economic capacity that can be the objectives of 

grand strategy and resulting military campaigns. Non-state actors, such as al-Qa’ida, do

not have these same centers of gravity. Al-Qa’ida has non-traditional strengths and 

weaknesses reflecting its own unique human personalities, structure, organization, 

processes, and procedures. The purpose of this study is to examine the internal 

characteristics of al-Qa’ida so that policymakers and analysts can develop strategies to 

focus on their key vulnerabilities and degrade their effectiveness in supporting the global 

Salafist insurgency. 

One of the best ways to learn about al-Qa’ida is to read the papers, manuals, and other 

documents which al-Qa’ida leaders have written to guide and discipline their own 

enterprise. Many of these documents have been captured by military and law 

enforcement forces and can provide insight into the way the organization works. Other 

key references are readily available on the World Wide Web. The Combating Terrorism 

Center (CTC) at West Point was given 28 recently de-classified documents from the 

Defense Department’s “Harmony” database, which consists of literally thousands of 

documents. Analyzing these documents is akin to gathering several parts of a complex 

jigsaw puzzle. The documents themselves are interesting, but to get a more complete 

picture, the CTC authors found that it was important to combine the pieces from the alQa’ida documents, other published reports, books, articles, and studies on al-Qa’ida, 

organization theory, and other similar historical cases. The resulting analysis provides a 

complex but coherent assessment of al-Qa’ida’s organization, identifying several areas of 

vulnerability and potential strategies to exploit these vulnerabilities. This analysis of

these documents, buttressed by the CTC authors’ insight and other publications 

comprises part 1 of this study. 

While Part 1 is an extremely helpful analysis, ’Part 2 of this study may be even more 

important and useful for researchers. Part 2 contains the complete original text of all of 

the documents selected from the Harmony database for this study—in both Arabic and 

English—with a useful synopsis and short analysis of each document prepared by the 

CTC authors. These documents are hyperlinked on the compact disk version of the study 

and on the CTC website at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq.asp. The intent is to provide 

open access to these documents for other researchers so that they can be analyzed and 

used to learn more about al-Qa’ida and better understand the organization. We expect that 

future research into these documents, the al-Qa’ida websites, and other newly captured 

materials will continue to advance our knowledge of al-Qa’ida and its franchises and 

imitators. In any case, the intellectual discussion about—and understanding of—the 

internal organization and functions of al-Qa’ida is critical to developing an effective 

long-term counterterrorism strategy. 

5
This project contributes to the mission of the Combating Terrorism Center at West 

Point, which is to better understand the foreign and domestic terrorist threats to U.S. 

national security, to educate leaders who will have responsibilities to combat terrorism,

and to provide policy analysis and assistance to leaders dealing with the current and 

future terrorist threat. The Combating Terrorism Center is part of the Department of 

Social Sciences of the U.S. Military Academy, and the work of its faculty and staff is 

closely integrated with the instruction of cadets and with the Academy’s outreach and 

support of projects to educate and inform current and future leaders. 

The work for this project was done by a team of associates and faculty members in 

the Combating Terrorism Center, which was led by Lieutenant Colonel Joe Felter and 

included significant work by Major Jeff Bramlett, Captain Bill Perkins and Professors 

Jarret Brachman, Brian Fishman, James Forest, Lianne Kennedy, Jacob Shapiro, and 

Tom Stocking. They have tried to make this as user-friendly as possible, with hyperlinks 

to all references throughout the documents to facilitate understanding and cross-checking 

of the source material. Additional questions about the report can be directed to LTC 

Felter at (845) 938-3247 or joseph.felter@usma.edu. 

 

WAYNE A. DOWNING MICHAEL J. MEESE 

General, U.S. Army (retired) Colonel, U.S. Army, Ph.D. 

Distinguished Chair Professor and Head 

Combating Terrorism Center Department of Social Sciences 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military 

Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 

6
Introduction 

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A proliferation of research on al-Qa’ida within the last decade has revealed much 

about the strategic objectives, ideology, members, tactics, finances and other relevant 

aspects of this organization. Scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, Rohan Gunaratna, Michael 

Scheuer, Peter Bergen and Gilles Kepel have described in great detail the nature of

political Islam and how al-Qa’ida has incorporated its own interpretation of jihad into a 

global insurgency against sectarian political regimes and symbols of western 

globalization.1

 Other researchers, like John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, have explored 

the growing incidence of networked organizations in areas of transnational crime, 

insurgency, and terrorism.2

 By integrating these areas of research into an analytical 

framework informed by organization and agency theories, this report seeks to identify 

specific vulnerabilities within the al-Qa’ida network that can be of value to combined 

efforts to combat terrorism.

A Networked Terrorist Organization 

An understanding of today’s al-Qa’ida requires an appreciation for the organization’s 

adoption of fourth generation warfare tactics.3

 The concepts of fourth generation warfare 

were first presented in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “The Changing Face 

of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” which argued that such warfare was “likely to be 

widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be

blurred to the vanishing point.”4

 The authors of this article also provide what became an 

ominous prediction of the terrorist threat we now face: The “political infrastructure and 

civilian society [will] become battlefield targets.” Adherents of fourth generation warfare 

call for the use of psychological operations (including propaganda) and terrorism to erode 

an enemy’s moral, mental and physical ability to wage war over many years until they 

eventually lose their willingness to stay in the fight. According to one well-received 

definition, fourth generation warfare is an “evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all 

available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’s 

 

1

 For example, see: Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 2002); Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qa’ida (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2002); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Translated by Anthony F. Roberts 

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama 

Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002). 2

 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996). 3

 For further definition and examples of “fourth generation warfare,” see John Arquilla and David F. 

Ronfeldt (eds.), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. (Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2002); Robert Bunker (ed.), Non-State Threats and Future Wars (Frank Cass

Publishers, 2002); Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare

(Potomac Books, 2001); and Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Dover Publications, 2002). 4

 William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The

Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989), 22-26

7
decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the 

perceived benefit.”5

The advantages of this approach for any sub-national or transnational group are fairly 

obvious: decentralized, networked terrorist organizations are less vulnerable to the 

traditional counterterrorism measures used by the hierarchically organized security forces 

of a national government. In February 2002, the Middle East Media Research Institute 

(MEMRI) reported that an al-Qa’ida document posted to the Internet embraced fourthgeneration warfare. “This new type of war presents significant difficulties for the 

Western war machine” the publication said. “Fourth generation wars have already 

occurred and . . . the superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been 

proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations.”6

 AlQa’ida’s adoption of fourth generation warfare tactics offer a useful case study for 

understanding networked terrorist organizations. 

According to most counterterrorism analysts today, al-Qa’ida has evolved from a 

centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks.7

 Indeed, 

since the war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded bin Laden’s command and 

control, al-Qa’ida has become increasingly decentralized, and is seen by some as more of 

a “movement” than any other form of organization. Experts involved in counterterrorism 

have observed “a growth in this global Sunni extremist movement, partly driven by Iraq, 

but also by other events, which is much more difficult to track, follow and ultimately 

disrupt. So as we’re doing really well against what was al-Qa’ida, we’ve got a new 

threat—this movement, which is much more of a challenge.”8

As inspirational leaders of this movement, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have provided 

ideological guidance, while leaving planning and financing of operations to the local 

commanders of allied but autonomous organizations. The March 2004 attack in Madrid, 

which killed 191 people, is often cited as the key turning point in the evolution of this 

global Islamist extremist movement. Initially, Spanish and U.S. counterterrorism officials 

sought to identify organizational links between al-Qa’ida and the Madrid bombers, but 

quickly they realized those connections were tenuous at best. The Madrid attack was 

organized and implemented within eight weeks, using stolen explosives and cell phone 

detonators assembled by one of the conspirators. It required no central direction from the 

mountains of Pakistan, simply a charismatic leader with links to men trained in the war in 

 

5

 See Armed Forces Journal, November 2004, as cited in Myke Cole, “From The Military: Applying 4GW 

Theory to The Intelligence Community,” Defense and the National Interest (10 August 2005). Available 

online at: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/cole_lessons_from_the_military.htm 6

 Scott Wheeler, “Expert Links Probing Attacks to ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’” CNS News (16 August 

2004). Online at: 

http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewSpecialReports.asp?Page=/SpecialReports/archive/200408/SPE20040816

a.html 7

 Peter Grier, “The New Al Qa’ida: Local Franchiser,” Christian Science Monitor (11 July 2005). Online 

at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html. 8

 Robert Windrem, “The Frightening Evolution of al-Qa’ida,” MSNBC.com, (24 June 2005). Online at: 

http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8307333. 

8
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. For motivation, though, they had Spanish help for 

the U.S. war in Iraq, and for inspiration they had bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks. 

Since the March 2004 Madrid bombings, other groups have followed this model. For 

example, there is no evidence to suggest the attacks that killed dozens of westerners in 

Casablanca, Morocco, were carried out with the knowledge of al-Qa’ida leadership. 

Further, investigators do not believe al-Qa’ida played any role in the July 2005 mass 

transit attack in London, although a videotape produced afterward by al-Zawahiri 

applauded the suicide bombers. In essence, al-Qa’ida is becoming what its earliest 

architects had hoped it would be: a support “base” for Islamist radicals around the world. 

Even “al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” the new name for Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s group, does not take 

orders from bin Laden or his No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri—rather, the Iraqi insurgents 

draw inspiration, technical support and military guidance.9

From a strategic perspective, it makes sense that Osama bin Laden and his colleagues 

would seek to nurture a loosely-organized terrorist movement. Indeed, several years ago 

al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives 

required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the 

Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in 

detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean 

of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in 

Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the 

Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in 

Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other 

counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the 

mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in 

Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the 

mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi. In response to the loss 

of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in 

November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could 

no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network 

and move its operations out over the entire world.10 By evolving in this way over the past 

few years, al-Qa’ida is demonstrating the type of adaptive flexibility that has become a 

hallmark of networked terrorist organizations. 

The Vulnerabilities of Networked Terrorist Organizations 

By their unique nature, terrorist organizations face difficult challenges in almost any 

operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, 

controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends, and of course, 

preventing the authorities from degrading the group’s capabilities. But, as Jacob Shapiro 

 

9

 For more on this, please see James Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist (Vol. 2: Training) (Westport, 

CT: Praeger Security International, 2005); and James Forest, ed., Teaching Terror: Strategic and

Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; forthcoming, May 

2006). 10 Robert Windrem, 2005. 

9
describes in the next chapter of this report, they also face problems common to other 

types of organizations, including private firms, political parties, social movements, and 

traditional insurgencies. For example, political and ideological leaders—the principals—

must delegate certain duties to middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. But 

because of differences in personal preferences, as well as the need to maintain operational 

secrecy, terrorist group leaders cannot perfectly monitor what their agents are doing. 

Thus, preference divergence creates operational challenges which can be exploited to 

degrade a terrorist group’s capabilities. 

Overall, the goal of this analysis is to provide a framework which can help us identify 

where and under what conditions organizations can expect the greatest challenges in 

pursuing their goals and interests. Understanding a terrorist organization’s internal 

challenges and vulnerabilities is key to developing effective strategies to combat the 

threats they pose and degrade these groups’ ability to kill. 

Summary 

 

As explored in greater detail throughout the remainder of this report, a networked 

terrorist organization like al-Qa’ida has vulnerabilities that can be exploited. We begin 

Part 1 of this report by developing a robust theoretical framework that helps us identify 

and understand these vulnerabilities. When combined with an assessment of what is 

known about the current characteristics of the al-Qa’ida network, this analysis reveals 

emerging organizational challenges, internal divisions, and an appreciation for where, 

and under what conditions, the network is most vulnerable to exploitation. 

This theoretical analysis is followed by a case study which highlights the challenges 

faced by various jihadist movements in Syria during the 1970s and 1980s, providing a 

historical precedent for discussing current al-Qa’ida organizational challenges and 

associated network vulnerabilities. A number of interesting parallels between the jihadi’s’ 

experience in Syria and contemporary challenges faced by Zarqawi’s “al-Qa’ida in 

Mesopotamia” are incorporated into this fascinating and relevant case analysis. This case 

study not only expands our understanding of the al-Qa’ida network, it also provides a 

useful model for other researchers to follow in applying a similar theoretical framework 

to the study of other terrorist organizations and their potential vulnerabilities. 

Part 1 of this report concludes with policy-relevant findings inspired by the captured 

al-Qa’ida documents supporting this study and suggests opportunities to exploit alQa’ida’s inherent organizational vulnerabilities. A number of prescriptions, both lethal 

and non-lethal, are presented here that respond more efficiently to al-Qa’ida’s diversity in 

preferences and commitment to its cause, in an effort to induce debilitating agency 

problems that increase existing organizational dysfunction. 

In Part 2 of our report we describe the methodology used to generate the document 

sample and present summaries and cursory analysis of all 28 captured al-Qa’ida 

documents used in this study. The full text translated to English as well as the original 

Arabic are accessible through hyperlinks in the document summaries. 

10
The Challenges of Organizing Terror 

A Theoretical Framework for Analysis11

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This section uses a combination of economic and sociological organization theory to 

identify where and under what conditions terrorist organizations have faced, and continue 

to face the greatest challenges in pursuing their goals. Evidence from declassified 

Harmony documents (the full text of which is provided in part 2 of this report) and open 

source material suggest al-Qa’ida faces a number of these same organizational trade-offs 

and operational constraints. This theoretical frame provides a way of thinking about 

groups that starkly highlights where we expect to see terrorist limitations and 

vulnerabilities along with corresponding opportunities governments have to make the 

terrorists’ goals more difficult to achieve. 

Introduction

Terrorist organizations face difficult tasks in a hostile operational setting. First, they 

must execute a controlled use of violence as a means to achieving their specified political 

ends. Doing too much can be just as damaging to the cause as doing too little.12 Second, 

they must maintain this calibrated use of force in an environment where becoming known 

to government equals operational failure.13

 

These challenges lead to several recurring themes in terrorists’ organizational 

writings. We see a consistent focus on how to achieve the appropriate use of violence 

when the rank and file often clamor for more violence than is useful, or seek to enrich 

themselves in the course of their duties. Groups also struggle with the problem of 

maintaining situational awareness while staying covert, so that members understand 

which actions will support the political goal, and which will be counterproductive. 

Finally, there is regular concern with balancing the need to control operational elements 

with the need to evade government attention and limit the consequences of any 

compromise.

Problems of control in terrorist organizations first enter into the organizational 

writings of early Russian Marxist groups which had regular problems with local cells 

 

11 Jacob N. Shapiro, the primary author of this section, is a Fellow at the Center for International Security

and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University and an Associate of the Combating Terrorism Center at

West Point. 12 For example, the Real IRA (RIRA) bombing in Omagh in August 1998 proved hugely problematic for 

both the RIRA and the larger Republican movement. The attack killed 29 people, arousing intense public

outrage at the RIRA. Since 1998, support for the group has withered and they have not conducted any 

significant attacks since June 2003. 13 For example, a plot to attack tourist hotels in Morocco was compromised in November 2005 because the 

operational cell included former inmates at Guantanamo, individuals who were well-known to Moroccan

security forces. 

11
conducting revenge attacks that could not be justified by Marxist theory.14 In like fashion,

a 1977 “Staff Report” for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) General 

Headquarters (GHQ) details reorganization plans intended to minimize security 

vulnerabilities while maintaining sufficient operational control.15 Islamist groups are not 

immune from these concerns, though maintaining situational awareness seems more 

problematic for them. A lessons learned document from the Harmony database describing 

the failed jihad waged against the Assad regime in Syria from 1976-1982, includes a 

discussion of the problem of becoming detached from the masses because of the 

exigencies of maintaining security.16 This same document contains a discussion of how to 

emulate the Italian Red Brigades’ to better compartmentalize information while 

maintaining operational effectiveness. Finally, captured letters between al-Qa’ida 

members released from Harmony discuss how planning and conducting too many attacks 

can become counterproductive, bringing unwanted government attention toward the 

group.17 

The key insight is that terrorist groups, and other covert organizations, face two 

fundamental trade-offs. The first is between operational security and financial efficiency. 

Here problems of trust and control—agency problems—create inefficiencies in resource 

allocation. Strategies to mitigate these problems all entail security costs. The second 

tradeoff is between operational security and tactical control. Here agency problems and 

other group dynamics lead to counterproductive violence. Strategies to mitigate these 

problems through greater control entail security costs for groups as a whole. We will 

explain the enduring importance of these tradeoffs for developing counter-terrorism

strategies using theoretical insights developed from the study of firms, political parties,

social movements, and traditional insurgencies. There are strong theoretical reasons to 

believe these problems are inescapable for all terrorist groups; evidence from the 

Harmony documents and open source accounts reinforce our assessment that al-Qa’ida 

struggles with similar trade-offs and challenges. Developing a better understanding of 

how to take advantage of these problems will help government more effectively degrade 

al-Qa’ida’s (and other terrorist groups’) lethality. 

The Terrorists’ Challenge 

The terrorists’ challenge is simple to describe. For security reasons, political and 

ideological leaders, the principals, have to delegate certain duties—planning attacks, 

soliciting funds, recruiting, and the like—to middlemen or low-level operatives, their 

agents. Such delegation poses no problem if all the agents are perfectly committed to the 

 

14 Anna Geifman, “Aspect of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist-Revolutionary 

Combat Organization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 2 (1992): 23-46. 15 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional

Structure,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (1997): 1-32. 21. 16 Harmony AFGP-2002-600080. 17 In the June 2002 Al Adl Letter from Harmony, Abd-al-Halim Adl, a member of Al-Qa’ida vigoroulsy 

challenges Osama bin Laden’s leadership. He argues that the group needs to take an operational pause to

regroup following setbacks in East Asia, Europe, America, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, the Gulf, and 

Morocco. Continuing to engage in “foreign actions” is described as bringing excessive pressure to bear

on the organization. 

12
cause and agree with leaders on how best to serve the cause. Under those conditions, the 

preferences of the principals and their agents will be perfectly aligned, and the agents will 

act exactly as the principals would like. 

 

However, preferences aren’t always aligned. When they are not, the covert nature of

terrorist groups necessarily implies that agents can take advantage of delegation to act as 

they prefer, not as their principals would like. We see this type of problem repeatedly 

among members of al-Qa’ida who exhibit differing levels of commitment to the cause. 

Thus, L’Hussein Kherchtou, a member of al-Qa’ida’s operational cell in Nairobi during 

the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, testified for the prosecution because he disagreed with 

the spending priorities of the senior members of his team.

18 He saw their priorities as unIslamic, essentially charging them with embezzlement. We see this same dynamic in alQa’ida’s affiliate organizations. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has recurring 

problems with local leaders engaging in counter-productive violence. In October 2003, 

senior JI leaders had made a decision to develop Poso, in Central Sulawesi, as a safe 

haven and area for ideological outreach. However, local motivations led to a series of 

sectarian attacks against Christians, against the leadership’s preferences. These attacks 

attracted government attention to the area, destroying its value as a safe-haven.19 

Thus, terrorist leaders have a problem. Security concerns mean they cannot perfectly 

monitor what agents are doing.20 Moreover, the nature of the operational environment 

means that it is hard to punish agents, even when leaders do catch them taking 

unauthorized actions. In terrorist groups, the agents hold an implicit threat over group 

principals—they can go to the government. For example, Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl, who 

testified in the Embassy bombing trial, stole money from al-Qa’ida, got caught, went on 

the run, and approached the U.S. government in an attempt to save himself and his 

family. Moreover, the agents are often operational elements that specialize in violence, so 

leaders cannot wield a credible threat against them. This problem plagued the leadership 

of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Alliance (UDA), protestant 

paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, who could not put a stop to the politically damaging 

mafia-style activities of their operational cells.21

 

18 L’Hussein Kherchtou testimony: Direct examination, U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et. al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, 

pp. 1280 – 1284; 1307 – 1316; 1383-1385; 1492-1494; 1536. 19 International Crisis Group, “Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi.” ICG Asia Report 74

(2004). 20 Leaders of Al-Qa’ida have attempted to use auditing to check up on their agents, as illustrated in a 1999 

e-mail from Ayman al-Zawahiri to a Yemei cell leader. In that e-mail, al-Zawahiri complains that the 

Yemeni leader is spending too much money and is not properly reporting his expenses. Clearly, such

communications are a huge security risk. See Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qa’ida’s Hard Drive,” The

Atlantic Monthly, September 2004. Similar issues arise in a June 2005 letter reportedly from Ayman alZawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In that letter, Zawahiri allegedly notes that the leadership in

Afghanistan “do not know the full truth” of the situation in Iraq. He also argues that some of Zarqawi’s

most violent activities may be politically counterproductive. 21 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One: 

Extortion and Blackmail,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21 (1998): 331-361; Andrew Silke, “Drink, 

Drugs, and Rock ‘n Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part Two.” Studies in

Conflict and Terrorism 23 (2000): 107-127. 

13
The problems outlined above fall into the larger category of “agency problems.” Such 

problems arise when three conditions exist: (1) a principal needs to delegate certain 

actions or decisions to an agent: (2) the principal can neither perfectly monitor the agent’s 

actions, nor punish him with certainty when a transgression is identified; and (3) the 

agent’s preferences are not aligned with the those of the principal’.22 The framework of 

agency theory has been used with great success to explore a wide range of issues 

including corporate governance, pork-barrel spending in Congress, the behavior of 

regulatory agencies, civil-military relations, and problems of tactical control in insurgent 

organizations.23 Here we use it to frame our discussion of vulnerabilities within the alQa’ida network, many of which are revealed by captured jihadi documents in the 

Harmony database. Understanding why groups face preference divergence, and when 

preference divergence creates operational challenges, facilitates government actions 

intended to exacerbate internal organizational problems of the terrorists. Doing so 

multiplies the impact of other counterterrorism efforts. 

The remainder of this section looks at two specific areas of conflict within terrorist 

groups: resource allocation and tactics. In the first area, agency problems create 

inefficiencies in how resources are allocated. Methods to mitigate these problems create 

operational vulnerabilities. Thus, groups face a security-efficiency tradeoff. In the second 

area, agency problems lead to cells undertaking politically suspect behaviors. Groups can 

mitigate this by exercising tighter control, which reduces group security. Thus, groups 

face a trade-off between security and control. In both cases, there are a number of actions 

that governments can take to make the trade-off harder for the terrorists. 

Why Preference Divergence? 

Open-source analyses of terrorist organizations generally begin from the perspective 

that members of these groups are uniformly motivated by the cause, are equally willing to 

sacrifice for the cause, agree on what the cause is, and see eye-to-eye on the best tactics 

to achieve their strategic end.24 However, substantial evidence has accumulated to 

indicate this is not the case. The Harmony documents reveal a surprising level of 

infighting and conflict, even within highly capable groups such as al-Qa’ida (Al Adl 

Letter, Harmony AFGP-2002-600080). Historically, terrorist groups have repeatedly 

 

22 David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Chapters 16 & 17 provide an excellent general development of agency theory. 23 On civil military relations, see: Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military 

Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). On problems of tactical control in insurgent 

organizations, see: Scott G. Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion.” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1): 111-130. On motivations for violence against civilians by insurgent

organizations, see: Lucy Hovil and Eric Werker, “Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An account of rational,

sub-optimal violence in western Uganda.” Rationality and Society 17, no. 1 (2005): 5-34. 24 The following are examples of this approach. William F. Weschler and Lee S. Wolosky, “Terrorist 

Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,” 

(Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); “Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 

Typologies,” (Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2004); Jean-Charles Brisard, “Terrorism Financing:

Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing,” Report Prepared for the President of the United

Nations Security Council (New York: JCB Consulting, 2002); and “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and

the Threat of Terrorism,” White Paper (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003).

14
splintered into different factions because of differences of opinion about how to conduct 

the struggle. For example, the Irish Republican Army has spawned at least 6 splinter 

groups since the mid-1970s, including the Provisional IRA, Official IRA, Real IRA, 

Continuity IRA, Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and the Catholic Reaction Force 

(CRF). Several documents from our sample provide additional evidence to suggest that 

the cohesion of Islamist terrorist groups is similarly tenuous. The Harmony documents 

reveal strong evidence of significant disagreements over strategic focus and conflicts 

over arcane points of doctrine.25 We next examine why there is such divergence in 

preferences over spending and tactics. 

Preference Divergence over Spending 

 

The primary cause of preference divergence over spending is a natural selection 

process that occurs over the course of terrorists’ career paths. Within the population of 

new terrorist recruits, there is a distribution of commitment to the cause.

26 Even though 

all may seem quite committed to us, some are always more willing to sacrifice than 

others.27 Over the course of many years in the jihad, the most committed members are the 

most likely to volunteer for risky or inherently fatal assignments. As members of a cohort 

move into finance and logistics oriented positions, the proportion of less committed 

members will increase because those more committed remain in comparatively more 

dangerous assignments and are more prone to be selected out of the population. Note that 

terrorist organizations typically use individuals who have been around for some time to 

handle logistical and management tasks.28 What this career progression means is that, on

average, those handling financial and logistical tasks will be more risk-averse and less

committed than the leadership or rank-and-file. 

These selection dynamics are exacerbated by the fact that participants in terrorist 

support networks face dramatically lower levels of risk than tactical operatives. Beyond 

not being asked to participate in risky or inherently fatal ventures, they are less likely to 

 

25 See for example Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. 26 Here, a more discrete notion of commitment to the cause is useful. We can array potential supports or a

group along a seven-point scale running from –3 to 3. Those at –3 are die-hard supporters of the terrorist 

group, willing to sacrifice everything. Those at 3 are die-hard supporters of the government. Those at 0

are neutral between the sides. We believe individuals’ roles within the network are highly correlated with

their level of commitment. Senior leadership and operational elements are at –3, and can only be selected

out by violent action i.e. captured or killed. Individuals filling logistical and outreach roles will generally 

be at –2. Tacit supporters of a group, those who attended training camps in Afghanistan as a kind of

summer holiday, can be placed at –1 on this scale. The lower an individual’s commitment, the greater the 

additional inducements required for them to take a given level of risk. This variation in commitment 

requires different mechanisms for selecting out individuals or shifting them “right” along the spectrum of

commitment to the cause. For a full treatment of this idea, see Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion:

Lessons From Eastern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Studies in Rationality and

Social Change, 2001). 27 For example, those who facilitate suicide bombings in Iraq are not so committed as to send their own

children to conduct attacks. See Aparisim Ghosh, “Professor of Death,” Time (17 October 2005). 28 The logic for groups is simple. Those who’ve been around know the business, but are also more likely to

be known to government, and so are less likely to be able to successfully conduct operations. On the 

IRA, see Horgan and Taylor (1997). On Hamas, see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian

Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 

15
be dealt with by government forces. When they are dealt with, support personnel are less 

likely to be killed. And when arrested, they face more lenient treatment. Using 

biographical and network data on 366 members of al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, we 

found that financiers’ have rarely been killed and that their survival rate has been 

consistently better than that of operators.29 The capture rate for financiers also tends to be 

lower than that faced by tactical operatives. 

When governments do succeed in capturing logisticians and other support network 

members, they face dramatically lower consequences than operators. Only one of the 32 

financiers and logisticians removed from the global Salafi jihad between January 2001 

and December 2003 was killed. A particularly telling example is the Jemmaah Islamiyah 

cell which was broken up in Singapore in late 2001. The cell provided fund-raising 

services to JI and was engaged in making logistical arrangements for an al-Qa’ida attack 

in Singapore. Of the 30-plus people arrested, the 13 engaged in direct logistical support 

each received two years in prison.30 Those engaged in fundraising activities were released 

but not permitted to leave the country.31 This risk differential exacerbates the selection

effects, as those who take operational jobs because they are extremely committed are 

more likely to be removed. This process makes it even more likely that those tasked with 

managing funds and distributing them to operational cells will have different preferences 

than the leadership. 

Even without this adverse selection process, there is reason to expect preference 

divergence. The lenient treatment observed for support network members means that the 

threshold level of risk acceptance and commitment required for participation in support 

activities is much lower than for participation in tactical roles. Thus, individuals with a 

given level of commitment might participate in support activities while balking at other 

roles within the organization. Seeking to maximize operational capability, terrorist groups 

would concentrate such individuals in support roles, freeing up the true believers for 

riskier operational duties. These personnel decisions would then lead to consistent 

variance between levels of the organization. 

Harmony documents suggest al-Qa’ida has formally encouraged such preference 

divergence within their ranks early on in the accessions and recruitment process. For 

example, one captured document describes the roles and responsibilities of the various 

committees al-Qa’ida members can serve on. In this document the Military Committee 

lists the following goals: Preparation of freedom fighting young men, their training, and 

organizing them for combat; Organization and supervision for combat participation on 

the battlefield; Preparation of programs and military procedures; Offering what is 

needed of military mechanics for combat. Compare this with the four listed goals of the 

Administrative and Financial Committee included in the same document: Offering the

best of administrative services for all the group members and their families; Undertake 

 

29 Data generously provided by Marc Sageman. Used originally in Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror 

Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 30 A corollary to this line of argument is that lenient punishment for financiers may not be bad as it creates 

the conditions for inefficiency and conflict in terrorist organizations. 31 Maria A. Ressa, Seeds of Terror (New York: Free Press, 2003): 158-160. 

16
the work of hospitality for the guests of different kinds in the most generous possible 

manner of hospitality; Undertaking the work of accounting, keeping books on the front, 

which safeguards the group’s general funds; Undertaking the financial work for the 

group.

32 Clearly, the preferences of individuals attracted to supporting requirements such 

as “providing hospitality” and “keeping books” are likely to differ substantively from

those who select into positions responsible for organization and supervision for combat 

participation on the battlefield. 

Groups may even refrain from centrally-directed personnel movements because they 

create connections between cells, yet still suffer preference divergence. Because of 

security considerations, some terrorist organizations recruit directly into specific 

positions with little opportunity for movement. Terrorist organizations often fill positions 

using a strategy of recruitment through existing social ties.33 Any member tasked with the 

recruitment and early ideological training of potential members will have access to a 

limited population. From this population, he will need to fill various spots. Commitment 

to a group’s ideology follows a bell-shaped distribution—with the purely ideological or 

purely venal individuals being rarer than those who place moderate weight on the 

cause—meaning that it will be harder for the recruiter to find potential tactical operatives 

than logisticians. Unless the recruiter knows a huge number of potential members, he will 

place individuals in the riskiest position they will accept. Thus, individuals will rarely be 

more ideologically motivated than is necessary given the risk level of their occupation,

leading to preference divergence by position. 

Preference Divergence Over Tactics 

 

The causes of preference divergence over tactics in terrorist organizations are 

somewhat more straightforward, stemming from the very nature of terrorist operations. 

The first cause is that people who are good at violence, who make ideal recruits as far as 

their ability to conduct operations, often seek more violence than is politically desirable.34

For example, al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia’s campaign of beheadings in 2004 significantly 

damaged the foreign insurgents’ reputation among Iraqi Sunnis.35 Early Marxist militants 

were the first to document this problem. Lenin and others noted repeatedly that those 

recruited for their ability to conduct military operations often pushed for such activities 

even when not politically advantageous.36 In like fashion, the PIRA suffered repeated 

problems with Active Service Units (ASU), made up of combat specialists, pushing for 

 

32 Harmony AFGP-2002-000078 and Harmony AFGP-2002-000080 list various roles individuals can aspire

to within these committees along with job descriptions and compensation. 33 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), an Algerian terrorist organization, uses just

such a recruitment system in expatriate Algerian communities in France. See Mohamed Sifaoui’s 

journalistic account of his penetration of a GSPC fundraising and recruiting cell in Paris, in Mohamed

Sifaoui, Inside Al-Qa’ida: How I Infiltrated the World’s Deadliest Terrorist Organization (New York: 

Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2003). 34 Jemaah Islamiyah has suffered numerous problems of this type related to recruitment of preman, career 

criminals, to fill out its paramilitary units. International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East 

Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous.” ICG Asia Report 63 (2003). 35 Zawahiri letter. 36 Newell, David Allen. 1981. The Russian Marxist Response to Terrorism: 1878-1917. PhD Dissertation,

Stanford University. 262-3, 267, 269-272, and others. 

17
violence when the organization as a whole wanted to lay low. There is something of a

trap here for organizations that adopt limited non-terrorist uses of violence in response to 

government pressure. Such organizations are often forced to adopt more violent tactics 

than the strategic situation demanded in order to retain the allegiance of their most radical 

cells.37 This trap also affected Italian and German left wing militants. These groups’ 

dependence on violent factions for survival, given the tactics of state police, pushed them 

into higher levels of violence against civilians, even when such violence was not 

politically ideal.38 

The second cause of preference divergence over tactics is that the cognitive dynamics 

of an underground organization—isolation from the outside, negative physical incentives 

to external contacts, excessively strong affective ties, and the like—mean that operational 

cells often become divorced from reality, seeking to do more violence than those 

removed from the situation would like.39 Islamist groups suffered deeply because of this 

problem in Syria, where Harmony documents reveal local cells repeatedly made attacks 

that the outside leadership opposed.40 The Italian Red Brigades suffered this problem as

well. Over time the group had to devote an ever-larger portion of its energies to attacks 

that appealed only to the membership, attacks that were costly in terms of outside 

support.41 In larger groups, where the leadership is organizationally isolated from

operational cells, or where it is geographically separated from them, these cognitive 

dynamics will lead to preference divergence between leaders and operators.42 

Finally, competition for prominence within a movement often leads to more violence 

then political leaders would like. Here, the best example is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

Hamas began promoting terrorist events largely due to competition with the Palestinian 

Islamic Jihad (PIJ), even though such actions ran counter to the preferences of the larger 

Muslim Brotherhood movement.43 Before the second intifada, suicide missions were 

intended to undermine not only the peace process but also the legitimacy of Palestinian

Authority.44 After November 2000, in the second intifada, Hamas and other radical 

organizations relied on the success of suicide missions as a key to gaining popular 

 

37 Newell (1985). 38 Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A comparative analysis of

Italy and Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 39 For a summary of these dynamics informed by the Northern Ireland case see J. Bowyer Bell, 

“Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiencies of the Underground,” Terrorism and Political

Violence 2 (1990): 193-211. 40 Harmony AFGP-2002-600080. 41 Della Porta (1985), 120, 174. 42 Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 highlights this well in the context of the Syria as does the Zawahiri letter 

dated June 2005. 43 Mishal and Sela (2000). 44 Mia M. Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Mia M. Bloom, 

“Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” Political Science 

Quarterly, 119, no. 1 (2004): 61-88. See also, Matthew Levitt, “Hamas Social Welfare: In the Service of 

Terror,” in The Making of a Terrorist (Vol. 1: Recruitment), edited by James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: 

Praeger Security International, 2005); and R. Kim Cragin, “Learning to Survive: The Case of the Islamic 

Resistence Movement (Hamas),” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist

World, edited by James J.F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; forthcoming, May 2006). 

18
support. Fatah then invested in suicide attacks to stem the growing popularity on the 

street of Hamas rather than to win concessions from Israel. It was therefore the dynamics 

of the factionalized internal politics within the Palestinian movement that prompted 

suicide missions.45 In essence, the Palestinian Authority could only reestablish its 

authority by showing the population that it could play the suicide mission game.

However, as the subsequent destruction of Palestinian Authority resources by Israel

shows, this was tremendously counter-productive with respect to larger political goals. 

So we see three internal dynamics leading to preference divergence over tactics: (1) 

individuals recruited because of their skills in violence will tend to seek more action than 

leaders would prefer; (2) cognitive dynamics of underground organizations will lead 

operational units to see the world differently than their leaders; and (3) competition for 

prominence within the movement will lead factions to engage in politically unnecessary 

actions. All three result in agency problems. 

How Groups Respond to Preference Divergence 

 This analysis reveals a number of terrorist group strategies for responding to agency 

problems, all of which create specific security vulnerabilities—the type of tradeoff we 

highlight throughout this report. One strategy applies primarily to the handling of funds, 

while other strategies apply more generally. 

Providing funds only on a need-to-have basis is a very effective way in which 

principals can prevent less-committed individuals from taking advantage of their control 

over funds. The Embassy bombings in Africa, the Bali bombings, and the 9/11 attacks 

were funded in this fashion, with operators receiving a certain amount of funds, burning 

through it, and having to request more from the central leaders. By increasing the 

frequency of transfers and reducing their size, leaders build up better knowledge about 

the nature of the relationship between what they spend and the success rate they observe.

This reduces the scope of what the agents can get away with. However, because each 

additional transfer entails communications and financial transactions, there is a security 

cost to this strategy. 

Auditing strategies are another option for developing better information about what 

agents are doing. This entails requiring agents to provide periodic, detailed reports on 

their activities, as al-Qa’ida used to do.

46 These reports effectively make it easier for 

leaders to know when their agents are behaving differently than they would like. 

However, this additional efficiency comes at the cost of additional communications 

traffic, which entails an increased risk of compromise. To the extent that groups believe 

 

45 Luca Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 1981-2003.” In Making Sense of Suicide Missions edited by Diego Gambetta 

(London: Oxford University Press, 2005): 77-129. 46 These communications were revealed in great detail on the hard drive of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s laptop, 

which was purchased in a Kabul computer shop by Wall Street Journal reporter Alan Cullison shortly 

after the fall of Kabul. For summaries, see the series of four Wall Street Journal articles by Alan Cullison

and Andrew Higgins on 20 December 2001, 30 December 2001, 31 December 2001, and 16 January 

2001. 

19
they have secure communications channels, these strategies will be more likely to be 

employed. 

Punishing agents who do not behave as the principals would like depends on both 

identifying such behavior and being able to wield a threat over agents. There are both 

efficiency and security costs to using punishment. The efficiency cost is that engaging in 

punishment diverts resources from the struggle. For example, as Hezbollah moved into 

Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, it encountered efforts by Israeli proxies to penetrate 

the organization, and had to create a security bureaucracy to police the organization. 

While this provided better security, it diverted significant resources from the struggle 

with Israel. The security challenge is that punished agents can always follow the example 

of Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl and go to the government. This security cost is especially hard 

for transnational groups who have agents in areas where they lack operational 

capabilities, and hence the means to violently punish their agents. 

Another common way to deal with agency problems is to encourage members to enter 

into trust-inducing relationships such as marriage within their group.47 Those who enter 

into marriages within the movement face a larger cost if they are caught behaving against 

their leaders’ wishes. Not only do they lose a future income stream, but familial and 

community connections as well. Such a strategy is central to the success of the hawala

funds transfer system.

48 Of course, if a member embedded in a dense network of strong 

ties is captured, myriad opportunities for compromise are created. A second problem for 

terrorists groups whose members live far away is that they will enter into close 

relationships outside the network which can dilute commitment, as competing social 

costs become important. This dynamic was observed in the Syrian case, as the foreign 

jihadis who married locals often lost their motivation and left the struggle.49 Thus, 

government counterterrorism efforts naturally involve scrutiny and attention toward a 

terrorist’s personal and social network—attention which creates security vulnerabilities

for the group. For example, Hamas had to cut ties with a generation of trusted, 

experienced operational leaders because they were easily traced.50

Terrorist leaders may also reduce preference divergence by requiring initiation rights 

that either prove their members’ commitment or make it hard to leave the group. The 

Japanese Red Army followed this strategy, making prospective members commit violent 

crimes.51 Some accounts suggest that the training program in Afghanistan served as such 

 

47 For example, JI recruits within existing social networks and encourages intermarriage among members’ 

families. “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia,” in Indonesia 

Briefing (International Crisis Group, 2002). See also “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged

but Still Dangerous,” and Zachary Abuza, “Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment 

in Southeast Asia,” in The Making of a Terrorist (Vol. 1: Recruitment), edited by James J.F. Forest 

(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005) 48 Lisa C. Caroll, “Alternative Remittance Systems Distinguishing Sub-Systems of Ethnic Money

Laundering in Interpol Member Countries on the Asian Continent,” (Interpol, 2004). 49 Harmony AFGP-2002-600080. 50 Mishal and Sela (2000). 51 Sun-Ki Chai, “An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence.” Comparative 

Politics 26, no. 1 (1993).

20
a screening process for al-Qa’ida.52 The problem for groups is that these strategies create 

predicate offenses that can identify individuals to the government. Former trainees in 

Afghanistan have received significant scrutiny around the world, with those who evince 

even tangential ties being arrested in the United States.53 The lengthy ideological debates 

that are a critical part of the recruiting process in European Islamic expatriate 

communities fulfill this function. Indeed, lengthy ideological discussions are an old 

screening tactic of militant organizations, one practiced by GSPC, the Red Brigades, 

ETA, and others. However, this strategy may weed out people with useful skills who do 

not have the patience for lengthy doctrinal debates. 

Overall, strategies to reduce agency problems entail security costs. It is vital for 

government counterterrorism officials to identify ways for raising theses costs. 

The Difficult Challenge of Balancing Security with Efficiency and Control 

Organizations configure themselves and operate in ways that maximize their utility. 

For businesses, this utility is normally measured by profit. For terrorist organizations, it is 

most accurately determined by political impact. The maximum political impact a terrorist 

group can have is constrained by the security environment in which it operates, the 

efficiency with which it disburses its resources and the degree to which it can control its 

members. 

As introduced earlier, terrorist organizations face two tradeoffs that create internal 

discord. The security-efficiency tradeoff creates conflicts over spending when three 

conditions exist: (1) preferences over spending are not perfectly aligned;54 (2) principals 

cannot perfectly monitor their agents’ uses of money or cannot credibly punish them; and 

(3) resources are constrained so that leaders won’t just accept the financial inefficiencies 

created by agency problems. 

 The security-control tradeoff creates conflict over tactics when three similar 

conditions are present: (1) preferences over tactics are not perfectly aligned, so that some

agents want to attack different targets or want to conduct more or fewer attacks than 

leaders want; (2) principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents’ tactical planning and 

cannot wield a threat of violence over them; and (3) political goals are being placed at 

risk by the freelancing of operational elements. Under either of these sets of conditions, 

terrorist organizations will face significant internal tension. 

These tradeoffs are illustrated in Figure 1 below. This figure places the level of 

security on the y-axis, and the level of efficiency or control on the x-axis.55 Given the 

 

52 “Testimony of FBI Agent John Anticev on Odeh,” United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et. al.,

5 (7) 98 Cr. 1023, 27 February 2001, 1630-1638. See also Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al-Qa’ida

(Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 5. 53 See for example the arrest and prosecution of the Lackwanna Six. 54 For example, some middlemen want to take a larger cut for themselves than is authorized. 55 Control and financial efficiency have important distinctions. Placing them here does not imply they are 

the same but that the potential utility available to terrorist groups in terms of political impact is 

21
level of government security pressure, and the level of preference divergence within a

group, we can define a line expressing the feasible security-control tradeoffs. This line, 

labeled C, starts at the maximum level of security, achieved when the leadership has no 

control over operations and is decreasing to the maximum level of control or efficiency 

where a group is operating openly with no security or without any concern for fiscal 

accountability respectively. 

Figure 1: The Security-Efficiency Tradeoff

Security

Control/

C Efficiency

Utility

(Political Impact)

U3

U2

U1

There is a set of tradeoffs between security and efficiency as well as security and 

control that are acceptable given the level of discrimination in the use of violence that 

groups must exercise to achieve their political goals. These tradeoffs define a series of 

indifference curves where the nature of this tradeoff is represented by the shape of the

dashed, solid, dotted curves (U1, U2, U3) presented on the chart.56 Higher curves—those 

moving “up” and “right” in this graph—mean greater utility measured in terms of 

political impact.57 The terrorists, seeking greater political impact, will prefer to increase 

their security, control and efficiency—move towards U3, the dotted line indifference 

curve as shown here. Government efforts intended to degrade terrorist capacity can do so 

by reducing security, control and/or efficiency—moving the group “down” to U1, the 

 determined by the possible combination of security and control as well as the possible combinations of

security and financial efficiency—both depicted in this case by line C. 56 The following development is similar to an analysis of the choices a firm has to make when allocating

resources between two producing two goods. 57 Although not necessarily more attacks since too much violence can be damaging. 

22
dashed line indifference curve, and its corresponding reduction in potential political 

impact. 

Government agencies can impact both ends of C. Interventions that reduce the level 

of security for the terrorist group will force them to accept lesser utility given their 

preferences for maintaining control and financial efficiency. Figure 2 below depicts this 

in graphic form. Here the government has taken actions that reduce the maximum

feasible level of security from S to S’, and the group has had to respond by moving to a 

lower indifference curve—U’. 

Figure 2: The Impact of Constraining Organizational Security

Security

Control

S

S’

U

U’

Alternatively, a government can encourage agency problems that reduce terrorist 

groups’ ability to control its operatives or finance its operations. Reducing either or both 

of these shifts down the maximum possible level of political impact for the terrorist 

group. This dynamic is represented in Figure 3 below. In this case, the line C represents 

the possible combinations of security and control, or security and efficiency that a 

terrorist group can choose from before government intervention. 

Here, the line C′ represents the case where government has taken actions to reduce 

the level of control its leaders can exercise, such as by increasing internal dissension 

within the group. As demonstrated in this illustration, the best feasible tradeoff for the 

group has shifted down from U to U’, meaning the group has less capability to achieve 

political impact. Now the group has to accept much less control than before in order to 

maximize political impact. A similar tradeoff occurs when the government degrades 

terrorist groups’ financial efficiency and forces them to accept lesser utility measured in 

terms of political impact. 

23
Figure 3: The Impact of Constraining Organizational Control

Security

Control/

Efficiency C’ C

U

U’

The key intuition represented in these examples is that government actions to make 

the security environment harder reduce the feasible level of political impact for terrorists. 

Government actions and environmental changes that increase preference divergence and 

challenge the control and financial efficiency within terrorist groups have a similar effect. 

Exactly how these changes will alter groups’ optimal tradeoff between security and 

control, or between security and financial efficiency, will depend on the exact shape of

their indifference curves. These will vary across groups for numerous reasons such as . 

In the concluding section of this analysis, we will use this framework to suggest a number 

of actions to make the terrorists’ organizational challenges harder. Doing so will reduce 

their ability to conduct attacks and achieve their desired political impact. 

Back to table of contents

24
Al-Qa’ida: Back to the Future 

The Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood Operations in Syria 

Back to table of contents

The lessons from the Syrian experience should be studied and analyzed by us and 

by others who choose to follow this path; it is of tremendous value to our brethren 

in other countries who choose to hoist the jihad banner. The Muslim arena is 

similar in all countries, the enemy is the same, the battle is the same, the 

circumstances of war may or may not be the same, Allah knows best, Allah guides 

our path and grants us success. 

 — Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri58

Harmony document AFGP-2002-600080 recounts al-Qa’ida’s “lessons learned” from

the Syrian jihad. It articulates the organization’s failure to balance the need for 

operational security with financial efficiency and tactical control. The experiences of the 

Muslim Brotherhood and the al-Tali’a al-Muqatila59 (The Fighting Vanguard) in Syria 

from 1976-1982 provide a textbook case of an organization that initially possessed little 

awareness of the agency problem that in retrospect likely doomed the effort from the 

start. 

This section begins with a brief history of the Muslim Brotherhood followed by 

specifics of the conflict in Syria. Next we address al-Qa’ida’s “lessons learned” in Syria 

as outlined in Harmony AFGP-2002-600080, which we believe is the work of Abu 

Mus’ab al-Suri (the nom de guerre of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar). In this document, he 

details a series of salient points that are meant to transmit the experience of what he terms 

the first generation mujahadeen (those who fought the global jihad in the time of the 

Syrian conflict) to the third generation mujahadeen (those who fight currently). Finally, 

we apply organizational and agency theory to understand these “lessons learned,” and 

compare the Syrian experience to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s current efforts in Iraq. 

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood 

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is replete with examples of preference 

divergence and factionalism. The Muslim brotherhood sprang from Muslims’ increasing 

disenchantment with Arab Nationalism and a perceived void in Political Islam after the 

collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the last caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood was 

founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Bannah, an Egyptian schoolteacher from a small town in 

the Nile Delta, as a small social club. Bannah sought to form an “Islamic System” that 

would gradually reform civic, social, family, and educational organizations, which he 

believed had been torn apart by Western secularism (non-religiosity) and materialism.

60

 

58 This quote is from Harmony AFGP-2002-600080. 59 Harmony translates al-Tali’a al-Muqatila (The Fighting Vanguard) as “Attilea,” which appears to be a 

phonetic transcription. We use the term al-Tali’a in this chapter to insure consistency with other sources. 60 Ghassan Salame, “Islam and the West” Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993): 24

25
This movement originally did not advocate the overthrow of national governments and 

was in fact very supportive of the nationalist ideology that was popular at the time. 

The movement gained traction quickly among college students and young 

professionals. Anti-western sentiment began to increase dramatically in Egypt by the end 

of WWII largely because of British troop presence and increased exposure to Western 

ideas resulting from Egypt’s economic expansion. With the increased focus on the West, 

the group became increasingly radicalized and established a small militant wing known 

as the Secret Apparatus. Guerillas from this group reportedly fought against Israel in 

1948. 

Although Bannah’s approach was measured, his goals were perceived as radical by 

the government. Fearing the Brotherhood was becoming a state within a state, the 

Egyptian government outlawed the organization and assassinated Bannah. The 

Brotherhood revived in 1950, and some of its members ran in elections by registering as 

independents. In 1952, army officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser seized control of the 

Egyptian government and legalized the Brotherhood, only to ban it again in 1954. The 

Secret Apparatus retaliated by trying to assassinate Nasser, who responded by deporting 

or imprisoning and executing many fundamentalists. 

Nasser’s imprisonment of fundamentalists during the 1960s had the unintended result 

of further radicalizing the fundamentalists. The relationship between the Egyptian 

government and the Muslim Brotherhood continued to ebb and flow. Just before the Six 

Day War in 1967, Egyptian authorities attempted to recruit inmates for the jihad against 

Israel. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the notorious Abu Za’bal prison camp

expressed unrelenting support for the jihad and resolved to fight. A small group of 

inmates refused, however. They were led by Sheikh ‘Ali Abduh Isma’il and believed that 

the state of Egypt was apostate and so were its supporters. The group was turned over to 

prison authorities and isolated from the rest of the prison community. Eventually, they 

were returned to the general population, but chose to keep to themselves and refused to 

associate with Muslim Brotherhood inmates. This was one of the first cleavages between 

the core membership of the Muslim Brotherhood and those who were becoming 

increasingly radicalized. This splinter group would eventually evolve into Takfir w’al 

Hijra, a group that more closely resembled a religious cult than a politically motivated

terrorist group. 

The defeat of the Arab armies by Israel in 1967 marked the beginning of the end for 

pan-Arab nationalism. Many fundamentalists viewed the defeat as the ultimate failure of 

corrupt governments that had attempted to show strength in the struggle against Zionism. 

The Israeli victory in 1967 reordered the priorities of radical groups. Instead of focusing 

on retaliation against Israel, they began to turn inward towards Arab society, to fight the 

“jahiliyya within.” Jahiliyya refers to a state of ignorance—specifically, Arab culture 

prior to God’s Koranic revelations to Mohammed. The radicals attracted new recruits 

from those who were turning to terrorist organizations and schools for answers to the 

societal trauma caused by the Arab defeat. This was a significant departure from previous 

thinking. In May 1965, a month before his death, the famed Muslim Brotherhood leader 

26
Sayyid Qutb met with other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to discuss future tactics. 

He was opposed to large-scale terrorist operations that could weaken Egypt and carry out 

the work of the “Zionist threat.” The organization overruled him, however, and went 

ahead planning operations. Any of the residual feelings Qutb—and especially his 

followers—had with regards to violent tactics were resolved in Cairo’s military prisons. 

Prison guards would torture and berate the prisoners, likening them to the Jews and 

accusing them of being a greater threat to Arab society than Israel. Thus, the first 

generation of what Sivan calls the “New Radicals” was born.61 

The New Radicals movement was less a cohesive operational organization than it was 

a collection of ideologically similar national groups with no overall leadership. National 

decentralization of the groups also occurred, leading to the fragmentation of the New 

Radicals into many small groups and factions. The theological justification was based on 

14th century theologian Ibn Taymiyya’s writings regarding the necessity of having many 

imams when there are many Islamic states. However, ideological differences and 

decentralization led to fights among (and even within) the new groups. 

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 

It was during this same period that a parallel development involving one of these 

factions transpired in Syria. Similar to Egypt, Syria was experiencing a growing conflict 

between Islamic groups and a nationalist regime in the 1940s. Initially, this conflict was 

mainly non-violent, but after the Ba’ath party took power in 1963, the conflict between 

secular Ba’athists and the Muslim Brotherhood escalated. Beginning with the antiBa’athist sermons, events degenerated into riots and violence. The Muslim Brotherhood 

began operations to undermine the regime and increasingly radicalized sub-groups were 

formed. This is perhaps best exemplified by the creation of al-Tali’a al-Muqatila (The 

Fighting Vanguard), founded by Marwan Hadeed.62

 

In this first phase of the struggle between the Syrian Government and the Muslim

Brotherhood, the radical factions were fairly unified. The Muslim Brotherhood did not 

always anticipate the reaction of Damascus, however, and in the wake of repeated 

assassinations of Ba’ath party officials, President Amin al-Haffez ordered the Army into 

Hama for the first time, and went so far as to authorize air raids on the Sultan Mosque, a 

Muslim Brotherhood enclave. Decimated by these attacks, the Muslim Brotherhood was 

forced to temporarily cease militant activity. 

In the mid-1970s, they resumed operations against the Alawite controlled regime of 

Haffez al-Assad. Once again there was a failure to anticipate the threshold level of

violence that could be inflicted on the government without drawing a crushing response. 

The Vanguard, allegedly without Muslim Brotherhood authorization, launched a series of 

deadly attacks, including one on the Syrian Artillery School in Aleppo that killed all the 

 

61 Emmanual Sivan, "The Clash within Islam" Survival, Vol 45, no, 1, Spring 2003, 25-44. 

62 “The Battle Within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali Bayanouni” Terrorism 

Monitor III, 16 (August 2005): 8-1

27
Ba’athist cadets as well as many Sunnis. The prominent Sheikh Mohammad al-Shami

was killed in a related attack. In an attempt to distance themselves from the attack, the 

Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement denying involvement and denouncing the 

Vanguard.63 This did not prevent the government from responding with devastating 

violence. The most visible and memorable event occurred at the culmination of the 

conflict when the Syrian government laid siege to Hama for a second time. By this time 

Hama was a city of 180,000 and a center of Sunni radicalism. In February, 1982 more 

than 4,000 Syrian troops engaged members of al-Tali’a al-Muqatila (The Fighting 

Vanguard) as well as other members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in 

bloody house-to-house fighting. When all was said and done, an estimated 5,000 civilians 

and insurgents were killed, along with over 1,000 troops. The city was essentially leveled 

in the course of the assualt.64

The Lessons of the 1st Generation: Failure to Manage Agency Problems 

As shown in the preceding chapter, terrorist organizations face fundamental tradeoffs 

between operational security on the one hand, and financial efficiency and tactical control 

on the other. Balancing these needs is a major leadership challenge for any successful 

terrorist network. In the case of the Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, the 

leadership failed to understand and compensate for these agency problems and preference 

divergences. The tradeoff between operational security and tactical control was not 

effectively managed as evidenced by the following lessons learned, described in 

Harmony document AFGP-2002-600080: 

Lack of secure communications. The movement usually used primitive, insecure 

communication methods. These included un-encoded messages sent by courier, regular 

face-to-face meetings, and unsecured phone lines. The movement had almost no wireless 

communication ability until the later stages of the conflict, even at the tactical level. With 

a lack of secure and reliable communication methods, maintaining even a minimal level 

of operational security required relinquishing a significant amount of tactical control. By 

employing more secure communications, terrorist leadership could have executed greater 

tactical control while still maintaining the same level of operational security. The 

document also notes the lack of a system for compartmentalizing information. By 

ensuring that all information is “need-to-know,” leadership could have maintained higher 

tactical control and operational security, because a captured foot soldier or informant 

would only know a small part of the overall operational picture. 

Ineffective military command structure. The Muslim Brotherhood and Vanguard 

lacked a centralized planning and strategy capability, and field commanders too often 

found themselves cut off from the headquarters. Although a certain level of autonomy is 

necessary for tactical success, this extreme situation resulted in well-intentioned 

commanders acting out of concert with headquarters’ intent as well as a lack of proper 

allocation of resources on the battlefield. Although part of this decentralization was due 

 

63 Sami Moubayed, “The History of Political and Militant Islam in Syria” Terrorism Monitor III, 24

(August 2005): 6 64 Thomas Friedman, “A Syrian City Amid Rubble of Rebellion,” New York Times, 23 May 1982

28
to the communication problems discussed above, the situation is very instructive. 

Although the terrorist leaders enjoyed a very high level of operational security, the 

accompanying loss of tactical control proved extremely detrimental to the war effort. 

The following examples from Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 illustrate how tradeoffs 

between operational security and efficient allocation and control of resources were not 

effectively managed in this case: 

Dependence on outside sources for support. The terrorist network did not adequately 

predict and prepare for the costs and expenses of a high intensity conflict. The movement 

became dependent on erratic sources of income from such unexpected places as the Iraqi 

regime. Operational security was subsequently reduced as the number of incoming 

funding lines increased as well as the influence that donors exerted on operational goals. 

Had the Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood ensured that the organization possessed 

sufficient funding for a continuing conflict, they could have maintained a much higher 

level of operational security and control. Because it proved so difficult to maintain even a 

minimal level of financial efficiency due to constant fund solicitation, the operational 

security suffered dramatically as a result. 

Time in training camps inefficiently spent. The leadership “powered down” the 

training in camps and other locales to very low level leaders in the organization. By 

providing resources and then staying out of the management, operational security is 

maximized. However, the efficiency of the resource management, in this case those 

allocated for the training of recruits, suffers due to a lack of higher-level supervision. 

Criticisms of the training program include a lack of emphasis on physical fitness training, 

a lack of practical application of theoretical knowledge, a complete lack of training for 

vital subject areas, and an inexperienced cadre. This may have been avoided if the 

leadership sacrificed some operational security and ensured resources for training 

programs were better disbursed to meet organizational objectives. 

Failure to air a consistent public relations message. The terrorist leadership utterly 

failed to coherently communicate the vision and goals of the movement in order to win 

the support of the populace. Aside from a few ineffective communiqués, there was no

organized public relations campaign, leading to a situation where lower level members 

were the primary mouthpiece of the movement. Operational security was maximized due 

to the isolation of the higher-level leadership. Predictably, however, the loss of message 

control ensured that the public relations of the movement was ineffective. Although the 

Muslim Brotherhood later tried to start a public relations campaign in exile, the 

propaganda-like nature ensured its failure. 

The Lessons of the First Generation: Strategic Failure 

In addition to the agency problems and preference divergences discussed at length 

above, there are numerous reasons why movements, in particular insurgent/terrorist 

groups, experience schisms. One theory, posited by Bard O’Neil, suggests that there are 

seven main causes for disunity within insurgent/terrorist groups – social, political29
cultural, personal, teleological, theoretical, strategic, and tactical.65 The movement in 

Syria suffered from all of these to one degree or another, but the strategic problems 

assume a greater significance when examined through our framework. 

As highlighted in Harmony AFGP-2002-600080, the level of strategic planning was 

quite poor at the outset of the conflict. This problem only worsened as factionalism set in 

and the mujahadeen began taking heavy casualties. There are three strategic 

subcategories worth examining. The first is the mobilization strategy, the second is 

leadership strategy, and the last is political-ideological strategy. 

 Mobilization. One example was the failure to mobilize rural areas and focus 

recruitment efforts solely on urban centers. The urban poor had long been dissatisfied 

with the Assad regime, and members of this segment of Syria’s society were considered 

the “low hanging fruit” in terms of recruitment. The failure to mobilize them is 

particularly interesting because there had been a similar failure in the 1940s when the 

radical anti-government clerics targeted their efforts almost exclusively at the urban poor. 

The president adroitly turned this strategy back on them by shutting down social welfare 

programs in these neighborhoods and declaring that if the people needed milk they 

should “go to the sheiks, let them give you milk.” When the sheiks could not supply these 

services, the disenfranchised poor turned against them very quickly.66

There was a great deal of resentment in the outlying areas as well, but the mujahadeen 

failed to capitalize on this. Syria had long been a class-driven society, and the Ba’ath 

party’s ascendancy had significant class implications that extended to those within the

Islamist movement.

67 The Ba’ath party gained power largely on promises of land 

redistribution and the restructuring of Syrian society to enfranchise the poor.68 These 

promises were rarely realized, which opened the door for the kind of disillusionment that 

the mujahadeen could have capitalized on. 

The mujahadeen’s failure to expand the jihad to the countryside made targeting 

significantly easier for the regime. The Assad government used siege tactics to wear 

down the insurgency. Allepo, Damascus and Hama—all major urban centers—became 

the battlefields in this struggle. Because the movement was so heavily concentrated in the 

cities, the regime had a much easier time isolating the various wings and destroying them. 

It is critical for an insurgency to avoid isolation from a supportive population or 

containment.69 Isolation in Syria was initially self-imposed through a poor recruitment 

strategy, which allowed the Syrian army to capitalize on their lack of broad public 

support. Had the mujahadeen employed a more diffuse recruitment strategy, they would 

 

65 Bard O’Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism, (Potomac Books, 2001): 101-103 66 Sami Moubayed, “The History of Political and Militant Islam in Syria” Terrorism Monitor III, 16

(August 2005): 6 67 John Galvani, “Syria and the Ba’ath Party,” Middle East Research and Information Project Report No. 

25, February 1974, 3-16 68 John F. Devlin, “Syria: Modern State and Ancient Land” Middle East Research and Information Project

125/126 (July-September 1984): 61 69 Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Washington, DC: Brassey, 2002) p. 163

30
have had a much more secure network for moving people, supplies and money into and 

out of cities as they fought. The decreased operational security through such a strategy 

would have been significantly outweighed by the increased tactical control and greatly 

benefited the movement in terms of the political impact of its activities. 

 Leadership. Leadership defines strategy. Many successful insurgencies have had a 

key individual leader who drew support from charismatic appeal of one form or another. 

Personal valor, a dynamic personality, and other laudable traits can greatly bolster an 

insurgent movement, though it is hard to quantify the impact of such leadership. What is 

safe to say is that the loss of such leadership can have an equally negative impact. Even 

more disastrous are public fractures within the leadership that can be amplified within the 

movement as a whole. 

 

The movement in Syria suffered from both. From the beginning there were serious 

schisms between the field commanders and the international leadership of the Muslim 

Brotherhood. Marwan Hadeed—who had participated in the jihad against the Syrian 

government in 1965—tried to bridge these gaps, which were both internal and external to 

Syria. Within Syria, there were fractures between the Vanguard and the Muslim

Brotherhood, and within the Brotherhood itself there were regional fractures between the 

cells in Damascus, Allepo, and Hama. Several key leaders tried to forge more cohesive 

ties. Marwan Hadeed and Adnan Akla both had limited success, but were ultimately 

stymied—the latter by unilateral agreements between Iraq and the International 

Leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the former by his capture, torture and 

execution by the Assad regime. Adnan Akla was also eventually captured on the Syrian 

border. His persona had grown to such mythical proportions that when he was 

imprisoned, the Vanguard in Syria—now with all ties to the Muslim Brotherhood 

severed—could not recover. 

 Political-ideological. Once the political-ideological schisms started, they were 

exacerbated by political failures on the part of the leadership. As the leaders with the 

clearest understanding of the political goals of the group were killed or captured, their 

replacements began to operate along increasingly disparate political agendas. Adnan 

Akla, leader of the Vanguard, at one point declared that all who followed the Muslim

Brotherhood or supported the alliance they entered into with Iraqi Ba’athists were kufar

(infidels or heretics), even as Adnan Sadduddin declared in an interview that the 

members of the Iraqi Ba’ath party were true Muslims. This mixed message was not only 

indicative of diametrically opposed political stances, but also evidence of a burgeoning 

ideological fracture, which was far more troubling for the long-term prospects of radicals 

in Syria than diverging political views. 

This growing factionalism was not unique to Syria. The various chapters of the 

International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood all dealt with internal political 

divisions in their home nations. Adherence to a central political line began to waver. The 

Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, for example, ended up providing religious justification 

for the Hashemite kingdom’s legitimacy in exchange for concessions from the rulers.70

 

70 Jiles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard University Press, 2000) p. 335 

31
Though some group members perceived these moves simply as the realpolitik of the 

Middle East, others—particularly the extreme elements—saw such actions as Faustian

bargains which would ultimately corrupt the cause if left unchecked. This and other 

similar actions only exacerbated the divide growing within the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Another leadership problem facing the mujahadeen in Syria was that power and 

leadership were concentrated in the hands of a few, creating a considerable amount of 

cronyism that eventually eroded the quality of the leadership throughout the movement. 

Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 delves into this to some extent, though the author takes 

care not to besmirch the names of those who may have died in the jihad. This, too, 

harkens back to the isolation discussed in the strategy section of this report, and is a clear 

example of how reductions in control can lead to agency problems. The movement was 

simultaneously isolated and factionalized, and so leaders tended to circle the wagons. 

While this may not matter in a lower intensity environment where leader deaths or 

detentions are somewhat infrequent, it most likely will cause friction in a higher intensity 

environment such as that in Syria. 

The problems triggered by this strategic disunity are deeply intertwined with the 

tactical problems. In the jihadist insurgent movement there are often few degrees of 

separation between those controlling strategy and those executing tactics, especially 

relative to more traditional models such as the nation-state or state-sponsored terrorist 

groups. Thus in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Vanguard in Syria, several 

tactical decisions had dire strategic consequences. One of these was the decision to 

assault the Syrian Artillery School in Allepo in 1979, a decision made entirely by the 

Vanguard and ultimately disavowed by the Muslim Brotherhood.71

The Third Generation: Applying Syria’s Lessons to Iraq

The existence of a formal third generation of jihadists is debatable, but there is some

evidence that they exist and are now fighting in Iraq. A recent study of the posted list of

names on al-Qa’ida in Iraq websites shows that only about 5% of those slain in Iraq have 

previous mujahadeen experience and that their average age is 27.72 In the recently 

discovered and declassified letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, there are several allusions to 

the generational nature of the jihad and the importance of handing over the fighting to 

this new generation.73 

This generation appears to have learned some of the lessons discussed in AFGP2002-600080, while others seem to have been disregarded. The final portion of this case 

study focuses on three recurring problems mentioned in Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 

that appear to be continuing problems for the insurgency in Iraq. 

 

71 Mahan Abedin, “The Battle Within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali 

Bayanouni” Terrorism Monitor III, 16 (August 2005): 8 72 Murad al-Shashani, “Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists” Terrorism

Monitor III, 16 (August 2005): 1 73 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declassified in October 2005 and available at

http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html 

32
Ideological and Religious Indoctrination 

The author of Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 spends a good deal of time discussing 

the problems among the mujahadeen in Syria due to insufficient indoctrination. Clearly, 

al-Qa’ida learned from this and did not make this mistake in Afghanistan in the 1990s, as 

they incorporated indoctrination heavily into their training regimen. Since late 2001, 

however, groups have been highly constrained in their ability to conduct consolidated 

training. Agency problems arise when principals have a difficult time controlling their 

agents. In the Syria case, when the training of new mujahadeen became more 

decentralized and was delegated out of necessity, we observed a greater variance in the 

quality and intensity of the indoctrination of the new recruits. There is a positive 

correlation between the level of ideological indoctrination and the level of control a 

group exerts over its members. Thus we can expect increasing agency problems going 

forward as newly matriculated members are increasingly less ideologically grounded. 

It is very difficult to exert central control over a group like the Muslim Brotherhood 

except by sacrificing security. The best example of this is the use of various SalafiJihadist websites, which are frequently used as repositories for messages from radical 

clerics and ideologues. The websites are then accessed by operational cells, thereby 

ensuring some degree of homogeneity in the global jihadi message, even though the cell 

may be physically quite decentralized. Here we see an example of the security-efficiency 

tradeoff described earlier: In order to spread centrally approved “talking points” to the 

scattered operational cells, the messages must be posted in a fairly accessible place. This 

is an efficient but inherently insecure method. If the leadership were to make more use of 

encryption, for instance, they would clearly reduce their vulnerability but they would also 

exert less centralized message control given the expectation that fewer members would 

ultimately access these encrypted “talking points.” 

Alliances of Necessity with Untrustworthy Arab Regimes 

The historical precedent set when the alliance with Iraqi Ba’athists greatly 

undermined the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, suggests that cooperation between 

jihadists and secular elements of the Iraqi insurgency will be temporary. There is 

certainly an alignment of short-term goals among the various components, but an 

insurgency—more so than any other form of warfare—is intrinsically political, and there 

is a high degree of dissonance between the political goals of the various groups in Iraq. 

Ba’athist nationalists have always held views considered heretical by al-Qa’ida. 

Furthermore, the Ba’athist component has goals which are more practical. Reasserting 

control by members loyal to the former regime, while unlikely to succeed given 

continued U.S. presence, is still far more achievable than restoring the caliphate, which is 

the ultimate goal of al- Qa’ida.74 

The difference in the probability of success provides an opportunity to fracture the 

insurgency. The Sunni component of the insurgency is primarily interested in local 

power. By designing a package of incentives that incrementally increases political power, 

 

74 Ibid. 

33
it is possible that much of the causus belli could be drained away from this component of 

the insurgency over time. Because the long term goals of al- Qa’ida are so much broader, 

we can achieve a market separation within the insurgency. Additionally, any acceptance 

of these “carrots” by the Sunnis will be seen as a betrayal by the more ideologically 

motivated within the movement, just as the realpolitik decisions of the Muslim

Brotherhood ultimately isolated the Vanguard in Syria. The targeting of Shiites is likely 

an attempt to provoke a backlash on Sunnis that will compel moderate groups to adopt 

Zarqawi’s more extreme positions.

75 Countering this will be a tremendous challenge. The 

coalition’s tenuous peace with the Shia militias makes managing their outrage appear 

almost impossible. Nevertheless, providing political insurgents access to the political 

process, coupled with mitigating the security impact to them of political failure, while

simultaneously urging Shia restraint in the face of Zarqawi’s provocations, seems the best 

policy option. 

Command Structure 

As in the Syria case, there is a growing gulf between the central al-Qa’ida leadership 

and those engaged in close combat. Al-Qa’ida’s central authority has been heavily 

disrupted and been reduced largely to providing ideological leadership in the form of 

frequent messages. There is a palpable degree of discomfort with this detachment from 

the field commanders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, when one reads documents like 

the recently declassified letter from al-Zawahiri.76 The undercurrent within this letter 

seems eerily similar to the situation described in Harmony AFGP-2002-600080, where 

the author describes the increasing tensions between the leadership within the country 

and the foreign leadership. Again, this can be examined using agency theory framework. 

The preferences of al-Qa’ida’s central leaders and Zarqawi, while always a source of

tension, are diverging in new and important ways. This is evident in the shifting tactics 

and targeting of attacks and corroborated in the captured documents and correspondence. 

This preference divergence will almost certainly continue to grow, and the agency 

problems associated with this divergence have an increasingly deleterious impact on alQa’ida’s capability to centrally direct future operations. 

In fact, this may have already occurred. In October 2004, al-Qa’ida publicly released 

a letter from al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad (Tawhid refers to the Muslim declaration of 

monotheism) where Zarqawi offered a bayat or pledge of loyalty to Osama bin Laden and 

al-Qa’ida. The subsequent name change to al-Qa’ida in Iraq reflected this new 

arrangement. While this relationship caused concerns within the intelligence community, 

it is worth noting that, by al-Qa’ida’s own admission, this pledge of loyalty was the result 

of eight months of negotiations between Zarqawi and al-Qa’ida.77 This bargaining 

process reflects the serious strategic and tactical differences which had to be reconciled 

 

75 Zarqawi letter captured in early 2004 after arrest of Hassan Ghul, provided by Coalition Provisional 

Authority at http://www.cpa-iraq.org; Gary Gambill, “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” 

Terrorism Monitor II, 16 (December 2004): 1 76 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declassified in October 2005 and available at

http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html 77 Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to al-Qaeda from Mu’askar al-Battar, Issue 21, obtained from a 

translated copy by Jeffrey Pool appearing in Terrorism Monitor Volume II, Issue 24, 16 December 2004. 

34
between the two groups. Undoubtedly, compromises were made by both sides, but those 

compromises could easily become untenable in the light of the shifting tactical situation 

faced by al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The June 2005 letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi suggests that 

even after the bayat there are still latent tensions that can be exploited. 

Critical examples are Zarqawi’s persistent attacks against Shiites. Although these 

attacks reflect a policy publicly articulated long before signing on with al Qa’ida, 

Zawahiri’s letter suggests that they are now a source of tension between the two. This 

separation between an operational commander and a senior leader is indicative of the 

kinds of agency problems that the author of Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 believes 

undermined the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts in Syria. 

Zarqawi: Building an Ideology of Isolation 

Although maintaining his loyalty to al-Qa’ida for the time being, Zarqawi’s recent 

public statements emphasize his unwillingness to follow orders from the center. In a 

lecture entitled, It is Allah Whom ye Should More Justly Fear, Zarqawi explains his 

disapproval of scholars advising mujahadeen from safety far from the jihad’s actual 

fighting.78 Although Zarqawi defends his position in ideological terms, an unwillingness

to take direction seems as much a personality trait as ideological decision. Nevertheless, 

Zarqawi’s argument has two components: he takes orders from God, not from men, no 

matter how wise; and calling for jihad is not nearly as important as taking action for 

jihad. 

There are two possible targets for Zarqawi’s vitriol in his Justly Fear lecture. The 

first is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor while he was imprisoned 

in Jordan. The two have waged a very public debate about the acceptability of suicide 

bombings and attacks on Shiite civilians over the past two years. Furthermore, the tension 

between Maqdisi the scholar versus Zarqawi the soldier has long defined their 

relationship. In prison, Maqdisi—by far the more renowned scholar—took a backseat to 

Zarqawi as he used impassioned speeches and promises of bold action to recruit 

supporters. The tension between the idealism of scholars and the practicality of soldiers 

may be an increasing dilemma for the modern radical Islamic movement. 

The second possible target is Ayman al-Zawihiri, Al Qaeda’s number two leader and 

author of the well publicized letter to Zarqawi criticizing his attacks on Shiite civilians. 

Zarqawi does not explicitly identify who he is targeting in Justly Fear, which is odd 

because he has shown no qualms about using Maqdisi’s name in past statements. 

Despite Zarqawi’s vagueness, it is likely that he is again targeting Maqdisi rather than 

Zawahiri. Zarqawi identifies scholars that avoid the hardships of jihad and live “in the 

land of infidels,” a characterization that fits Maqdisi much more than what is known 

about Zawahiri. 

 

78 Posted on www.world-news-network.net. 14 October. GMP20051019520001 (Internet) Jihadist Websites 

– FBIS Report in Arabic 19 Oct 05

35
Zarqawi’s critique is that scholars merely issue declarations and live far from the 

arena of jihad. This is important because the violent fundamentalist Islamic movement is 

largely tied together by ideologues able to disseminate their views using modern 

communications systems. Zarqawi, essentially, is arguing that this alone makes them illfit to be leaders of the radical militant movement. Only by sacrificing do they 

demonstrate their worthiness to lead the jihadist movement. Zarqawi makes his case quite 

explicitly: 

Those who examine the situation of religious scholars and leaders will see that their status 

varies in the eyes of people according to the association between their words and their 

actions. People always respect the one who accompanies his words with deeds and the 

opposite is true...Action is more forceful than the verbose call itself.

79

The problem with scholars, Zarqawi argues, is that even the wisest among them are 

human, while the true mujahadeen should take direction only from God. 

The members of the victorious group, although they respect the status and worth of religious 

scholars, do not know the truth through these scholars. They know men through the truth, 

since men are only a means to know the truth by stating its proof and basis. This is not

because truth is known through them and therefore their words and deeds are followed. 

Following men, irrespective of their religious knowledge and performance, leads to the 

widest paths of falsehood and greatest causes of misguidance if they lack authority.

80

After explaining why scholars are misguided, Zarqawi begins to discuss his current 

situation. 

Recently, some of our brotherly scholars, who were pioneers in the call for God’s way, fell 

into fault and made mistakes, caused by their distance from the arenas of jihad and by the

fact that they are not actually involved in jihad. Thus, their lapses were greatly advertised, 

and the guided news media carried them everywhere. All that was aimed at causing disunity, 

dissension, keeping people away from jihad, and making them hate the mujahadeen.

81

Zarqawi argues that scholars should not simply be thinkers; they must have 

knowledge of both “the rule of God and the situation to which this opinion applies.”

82

Zarqawi rejects what he calls the term “theoretician of the Salafist Jihadist Trend,” which 

in essence are men like al-Maqdisi who have provided the intellectual foundation for 

jihad but failed to fight themselves. It is not clear that Zawahiri, who has been involved at 

the operational level of al Qa’ida, would fall into this category. 

This term is actually an undesirable separation between words and deeds. Scholars were 

throughout the ages at the forefront of the bandwagon of jihad...the theoreticians of the 

jihadist current were the ones who carried the Book and sword in their hands and took the 

front line. They led the masses and abandoned the transient pleasures of life. They preferred 

the reward of eternal life. They abandoned their palaces and houses and chose to live in 

caves and mountains. They did so to protect their religion and couple their words with deeds.

 

79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 

36
A scholar living in the land of infidels away from the arenas of jihad and the real situation of

the mujahadeen should not issue fatwas to the people on issues the least that can be said

about them is that they express an independent judgment that can be interpreted differently.

83

 

 The destruction of al Qa’ida’s Afghanistan-based hierarchy drove the movement 

underground and initiated a metamorphosis into the loosely-linked, ideological-based 

network we see today. This transition makes the movement very difficult to track, but 

raises critical agency problems because of the absence of a typical command 

structure. Particularly for agents pressured by intense operational demands, as in Iraq, 

we are likely to see tension between central ideological thinkers and the operational 

leaders on the ground. 

Zarqawi and al-Tali’a: Side by Side Comparison 

Zarqawi’s unwillingness to accept direction is not the only way that AFGP-2002-

600080’s lessons provide perspective on Zarqawi’s organization. Zarqawi’s Al-Qa’ida in 

Mesopotamia most closely resembles the al-Tali’a in Syria. Both are extremist, even 

compared to their militant Islamic peers, and relatively small components of a 

multifaceted insurgency. Table 1 compares the mistakes AFGP-2002-600080 attributes to 

al-Tali’a and compares them to Zarqawi’s performance on similar issues. 

Table 1: A Comparison of al-Tali’a in Syria and Zarqawi in Iraq

al-Tali’a Zarqawi

No prior strategic planning Improved. Although little is known of Zarqawi’s preparation for 

jihad in Iraq, his training camp in Heart, relationship with former 

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood operatives, and detailed planning

documents indicates strategic planning. 

Lack of media and political arm Much improved. Zarqawi has well developed media and 

ideological organizations. 

No clear sense of purpose and goals Improved. Although not tied to specific political results, Zarqawi 

has developed a clear set of strategic goals based mostly around

the purification of the practice of Sunni Islam. 

Lack of central coordination of 

military operations 

Improved. This is aided by the information revolution. At times, 

Zarqawi has shown the capacity to unleash devastating attacks in

different regions almost simultaneously.

Inability to adjust tactics Improved. Zarqawi’s group has used car bombs, IEDs, 

ambushes, and large-scale defensive tactics as in Fallujah.

Dependence on foreign government

aid 

Improved. Unlike al-Tali’a in Syria, Zarqawi is not dependent on

a foreign government suitor for weapons and money.

Inability to replenish cadres Improved. Zarqawi has lost several legal and military advisors 

and has maintained his effectiveness.84

Dependence on non-locals Unclear. Recent reports suggest Zarqawi is recruiting Iraqis, but 

the core of his original organization was not Iraqi. 

Extremism—labeling other groups 

‘infidels’ 

Poor. Zarqawi’s ideology is extremely exclusionary. He rejects 

tribal affiliations, Shiites, all Arab governments, and has 

developed major doctrinal schisms even with other Salafists. 

Zarqawi’s extremism is likely his greatest weakness. 

 

83 Ibid. 84 Examples include: Abd al-Hadi Daghlas, Khalid al-Aruri, Abu-al-Ghadiyah, and Abu Anas al-Shami

37
Leadership cult Unclear. Zarqawi has emphasized the importance of maintaining 

his movement even if he is killed. He has developed into almost a 

legendary figure in jihadist circles, which improves his ability to

generate support in death. 

Zarqawi’s most important improvement on al-Tali’a’s model is his media operation. 

Unlike al-Tali’a’, Zarqawi has effective media and ideological operations designed to 

both indoctrinate his followers for a drawn-out fight and to publicize his activities to 

domestic and international audiences. This will build a resilient movement and is critical 

for de-territorializing the Iraq conflict in order to attract non-Iraqis to the fight. 

Zarqawi also has a clear set of strategic and operational goals, necessities that alTali’a did not possess. But, like his al-Tali’a predecessors, Zarqawi’s ideological 

perspective is extraordinarily exclusionary. 85 Zarqawi labels Shiites, Arab governments, 

and all those that cooperate with secular regimes as either ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’ and 

vows to fight them. 

Furthermore, Zarqawi’s insistence on a purely ‘Islamic’ perspective may prevent him

from successfully exploiting the unique political opportunities posed by an occupation in 

an ancient, proud, and tribal society. In other words, Zarqawi’s religious lens allows him 

to transform the war in Iraq into a struggle relevant to all Muslims, but it may limit his 

ability to successfully exploit the unique grievances of Iraqis. The author of AFGP-2002-

600080 seems to believe that al-Tali’a’s dependence on foreign logistical support was a 

major handicap; in Iraq, Zarqawi can easily access the materials of guerilla warfare, but 

depends on a universalist ideology that may create a similar dynamic for him in Iraq. 

The primary limitation of Zarqawi’s ideology is that it limits his ability to develop 

strategic relationships with different insurgent organizations. In an effort to recreate the 

persecution and struggle of the prophet’s companions, Zarqawi recognizes and embraces 

the exclusionary nature of his ideology. His understanding of Islam is that it is in a 

continual struggle against numerically superior forces of infidels and apostates. Zarqawi 

likely sees widespread condemnation of his movement as a sign that his interpretation of 

Islam is correct. 

Nevertheless, this perspective is politically limiting. Although Harmony AFGP-2002-

600080 points out the danger of accepting large numbers of low quality recruits into the 

ranks, Zarqawi’s insistence on Islamic ‘purity’ as he understands it is a major weakness. 

Harmony AFGP-2002-600080 quotes a Muslim Brotherhood cadre speaking about alTali’a leader Adnan Akla in a manner that could easily be used to describe Zarqawi: “I do 

not doubt Adnan Akla’s loyalty and integrity as a leader, nor do I doubt his courage, I 

also have no doubt that he lacks the wisdom to benefit from those two characteristics.” 

As Zarqawi attempts to expand his reach beyond Iraq, his agency problems will 

likely increase. Within Iraq he has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to organize near 

simultaneous attacks in geographically separated areas. This tactical control is harder to 

 

85 Harmony AFGP-202-600080. 

38
exert over operatives working farther away. For example, the Amman hotel bombings 

last year should be considered strategic failures from Zarqawi’s perspective—although 

many were killed, the bomb was detonated in the middle of a wedding, which generated a 

predictable backlash against the attack and Zarqawi’s group generally in the Jordanian 

population. 

Although it is possible that Zarqawi approved of targeting the wedding, it is equally 

possible, and perhaps more likely that the bomber detonated himself in the midst of the 

largest crowd without thinking through the strategic impact of his tactical decision. 

Zarqawi seems to have recognized the negative strategic impact and disavowed the bomb 

detonated amongst the wedding party.86 This is indicative of the agency problems we 

have identified in Syria and will be increasingly common if Zarqawi continues to broaden 

his reach beyond Iraq. The need to delegate tactical control to subordinates increases as 

the theatre of operations expands, and that in turn increases the chance that tactical 

decisions made by subordinates will undermine Zarqawi’s strategic intent. 

Back to table of contents

 

86 Zarqawi audio statement released 18 November, 2005. FBIS GMP20051118336002

39
Organizational Vulnerabilities 

and Recommendations to Exploit Them 

Back to table of contents

 The recently declassified documents used in support of this study are a small 

sampling of those contained in the Harmony Database. These documents do not provide 

compelling evidence that U.S. counterterrorism policies to date have been misguided or 

have overlooked any major developments. To the contrary, the documents reflect 

ongoing jihadi concerns about operational security and sustainability in the midst of 

America’s counterterrorism efforts. Encouragingly, some of the documents even reflect 

al-Qa’ida’s fear that U.S. intelligence collection efforts are in some cases exceeding alQa’ida’s ability to enact countermeasures. 

Perhaps the most interesting insight from the present collection of documents is the 

way in which they demonstrate how al-Qa’ida executives deal with the same banal 

challenges that occupy any other organization—be it employee salary and benefits, 

debates over strategic vision, or underlying doctrinal interpretations. This report’s 

application of principle-agent theory and organizational approaches to this declassified 

document collection are meant to provide a useful model for conducting terrorism

analysis as well as identify new insertion points for counterterrorism policy. 

Any external assessment of al-Qa’ida’s weaknesses will have inherent limitations. 

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point believes an internal assessment—from 

actual members of the al-Qa’ida organization—is the best method to accurately assess 

their own true vulnerabilities.87 Whereas Western analysts rely on incomplete 

information and informed speculation about such matters, jihadi strategists are enmeshed 

in the daily functioning of their own organization, and have a privileged perspective from

which to view such shortcomings. Although the jihadis have been quite open with one 

another about those weaknesses, few in the U.S. Government have recognized the 

significance of these internal “lessons learned” documents. Abu Musab al-Suri’s 

reflections on “what not to do” based on the experiences of the mujahadeen in Syria, for 

instance, need to be viewed as a guidebook for the United States in formulating policy 

recommendations. The following section will illustrate how even a seemingly eclectic 

and disparate set of documents such as these can produce important and novel 

counterterrorism policy recommendations, when taken in concert with an existing body 

of scholarship and a rigorous theoretical framework. 

Like all terrorist groups, Al-Qa’ida values the ability to achieve political impact. In 

the pursuit of this, the organization must balance its need for security with operational 

control as well as with financial efficiency. Government efforts to degrade al-Qa’ida’s 

capacity will succeed if they reduce its security environment, the degree to which it can 

control operations, and/or its ability to fund its activities. We identify potential points of 

pressure and methods for achieving these ends. We also suggest methods of exploiting al-

 

87 The CTC thanks one of its Fellows, William McCants, for his insights on this topic. 

40
Qa’ida’s network vulnerabilities and creating internal discord within the organization that 

leverage underlying preferences for security, control, and efficiency of its leadership. 

1. Disrupt al-Qa’ida’s control of operations and limit its financial efficiency. 

Government interventions that reduce operational control and/or efficiency within the 

al-Qa’ida organization generate a corresponding reduction in the political impact 

al-Qa’ida is capable of generating. These captured documents shed further light on alQa’ida’s organizational preoccupation with their ability to control their membership as 

well as their position vis-à-vis other jihadist organizations. Abu Huthayfa’s memo to Bin 

Laden for instance, shows an al-Qa’ida member calling for the establishment of a 

database on al-Qa’ida members and programs, the goal being to guide the organization 

and the broader jihadi movement by the study of its people.88 

This need for control is not limited, however, to just intra-organizational activities. 

For example, an al-Qa’ida employment contract from another Harmony document reveals 

the obligation for new members to swear loyalty to al-Qa’ida alone and the requirement 

that members “have no dealings with any other Islamic group.”89 The document 

describing al-Qa’ida’s bylaws reinforces the same theme, arguing that al-Qa’ida should 

not be “distracted” by relief and aid operations around the world.90 This obsession with 

control is a vulnerability that can be exploited by the government. Figure 4 illustrates the 

consequences of external efforts that decrease the maximum possible level of control 

over al-Qa’ida’s organizational functions. 

In this diagram, the line C′ represents the projected impact of government actions to 

increase internal dissension within the group and other interventions that degrade the 

leadership’s ability to control their operatives. As indicated here, the resulting best 

feasible tradeoff for the group has shifted down from U to U’, meaning the group has to 

accept much less control than before to maximize political impact. The optimal tradeoff 

between security and financial efficiency is reduced in the same manner through efforts 

to increase inefficiencies in the financing of operations. 

 

88 Harmony AFGP-2002-003251. 89 Harmony AFGP-2002-600045. 90 Harmony AFGP-2002-600048. 

41
Figure 4: The Impact of Constraining Organizational Control

Security

Control/

Efficiency C’ C

Control/Efficiency

Reducing Interventions

U

U’

The U.S. Government can intervene to reduce al-Qa’ida’s control and financial 

efficiency within the organization—thus limiting its potential political impact—by 

pursuing carefully crafted policies grounded in al-Qa’ida’s own assessments of their 

vulnerabilities. The following general prescriptions highlight possible ways governments 

can thwart al-Qa’ida’s organizational development. 

Refrain from actions that encourage preference alignment. Al-Qa’ida members who 

appear less committed should not necessarily be removed from the network if they can be 

reliably observed, even if they present easy targets. By leaving them in place, the 

probability that the group will identify agency problems and hence adopt securityreducing measures increases. Consider the February 11, 1999 e-mail by Ayman alZawahiri to a Yemeni cell leader: 

“With all due respect, this is not an accounting. It’s a summary accounting. For 

example, you didn’t write any dates, and many of the items are vague. The

analysis of the summary shows the following: 

1–You received a total of $22,301. Of course, you didn’t mention the period over which 

this sum was received. Our activities only benefited from a negligible portion of the 

money. This means that you received and distributed the money as you please.... 

2–Salaries amounted to $10,085–45 percent of the money. I had told you in my fax...that 

we’ve been receiving only half salaries for five months. What is your reaction or

response to this? 

3–Loans amounted to $2,190. Why did you give out loans? Didn’t I give clear orders to

Muhammad Saleh to...refer any loan requests to me? We have already had long

discussions on this topic... 

42
4–Why have guesthouse expenses amounted to $1,573 when only Yunis is there, and he

can be accommodated without the need for a guesthouse?” 91

The individual on the receiving end of Zawahiri’s ire increases agency problems and 

organizational dysfunction that may arguably contribute more to degrading al-Qa’ida’s 

capabilities if he is allowed to remain in the organization than if he were selected out. 

Importantly, it is the perception of financial inefficiency that is important not the 

inefficiency itself. This can be achieved by pursuing measures that incriminate financial 

agents and add to suspicions of graft and corruption in the eyes of their leaders 

Make credible punishment of operatives harder for al-Qa’ida. This is most easily done by 

providing an exit option for members other than indefinite detention or death. This 

approach can yield benefits in two ways. First, it will make it harder for groups to enforce 

discipline-hence control- through the use of force against their own members.92 This will 

reduce the level of political impact groups can achieve. Second, offering well-publicized 

amnesty or reduced punishment for defectors will encourage those dissatisfied with the 

organization to leave by reducing the perceived costs of exit. In response, al-Qa’ida will 

have to become more careful about screening applicants, which will in turn reduce the 

pool of potential members, or increase the use of problematic screening mechanisms. 

Increase internal dissension within the al-Qa’ida leadership. Dissension among the 

leadership of al-Qa’ida decreases cohesiveness and control within the organization. An 

example from Harmony includes a letter to “Mukhtar” that refers to senior al-Qa’ida 

military director Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In this letter, one ‘Abd al-Halim Adl 

expresses concern that al-Qa’ida is “experiencing one setback after another and have 

gone from misfortune to disaster.” ‘Abd al-Halim Adl blames this series of failures on 

faulty leadership, arguing that those in charge rush “to move without vision.” Focusing 

on the negative impact that Osama Bin Laden has had on the organization in particular, 

the letter pleads with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to reject Bin Laden’s orders and instead 

concentrate efforts on reorganizing and reinvigorating both the organizational 

infrastructure and the relationship between the commanders and the foot-soldiers. 

Effective information operations can achieve similar effects and will bring into question 

the theological justification for actions as well as the legitimacy of key leaders within alQa’ida. 

Publicly emphasize the differences between al-Qa’ida leaders and affiliate groups. 

Agency problems can be enhanced within al-Qa’ida by reducing incentives for al-Qa’ida 

subgroups to remain closely linked to the center. Giving Osama bin Laden credit for Abu 

Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s terrorist attacks only legitimizes and strengthens their relationship. 

 

91 Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Monthly, September 2004. 

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/cullison. The response email to Zawahiri’s pointed concerns

explains a number of these financial anomalies to Zawahiri in a defensive, seemingly irate manner. 92 An example of this is the defection of Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi from Saudi Arabia in

June 2003. Al-Ghamdi was involved in the May 12, 2003 bombings of Riyadh and was known to have 

close ties with Al-Qa’ida. Debate continues regarding al-Azdi’s impetus to give up, but his own father

told reporters that “security agencies have promised that if he gives in and is convicted of the alleged

crimes, his punishment would be reduced to half.” 

43
Publicly recognizing the differences between peripheral groups and the center, however, 

may generate competition for authority between them. Terrorist organizations are 

inherently weak relative to their opponents and must overcome that weakness in order to 

rally supporters to their cause. Al-Qa’ida’s central leadership maintains nominal 

relationships with peripheral groups in part to generate a perception that it is a powerful 

group that can realistically challenge its enemy. Effective policies to degrade al-Qa’ida’s 

capacity will avoid supporting this tactic and highlight differences in the movement 

instead. 

 

Make the management of al-Qa’ida’s financial assets more difficult. One way to 

accomplish this is to refrain from publicizing the freezing of funds or seizure of assets. 

When government freezes funds in this way, the individual responsible for those funds 

has to explain what happened. Either he must make up the funds from his pocket, or 

come under suspicion within the group, creating the perception of diverging preferences 

that lead to agency problems. Keeping asset seizures secret also increases the perceived 

uncertainty of the operational environment, making it more difficult to maintain effective 

oversight in many interactions.93 This in turn leads to a worsening of many agency 

problems in the long term. 

 

Crack down on fundraising through legitimate businesses and charities. Forcing al-Qa’ida 

to resort to criminal fundraising will greatly reduce the efficiency of its financial 

transactions. Illicit fundraising has historically created dissent over both resource 

allocation and tactics. With respect to resource allocation, money from illicit purposes 

must be laundered to prevent investigators from using the predicate offense to gain 

information on the group. The laundering process is inefficient and requires secrecy, 

making it harder for leaders to monitor how funds are used, and making the group more 

prone to corruption. Moreover, as the IRA experience shows, terrorist cells trained in 

illicit fundraising are extremely likely to begin seeking opportunities for personal profit, 

even at the expense of political goals.94 In the tactical arena, reliance on criminal 

fundraising also creates opportunities to generate negative reactions in the community.95

So, when al-Qa’ida’s cells are allowed to choose their own targets to enhance security, 

and they choose targets that arouse public ire, the leadership faces an unpalatable 

tradeoff. Efforts to exert greater control in response to this tradeoff will lead to a 

reduction in potential political impact. 

Make sole source funding unavailable. One further implication of the agency theory 

framework presented in the first section is that central control over al-Qa’ida’s funding 

provides at least a minimum level of organizational control to its central leaders. Leaders 

can control their agents by withholding funds if they do not behave as desired. PIJ leaders 

in Lebanon reportedly use this method to condition logisticians arranging suicide 

 

93 In an uncertain environment, it is harder to know if an operation failed because your agent did not

faithfully execute his orders, or because you got unlucky. More explicitly, the lower the signal-to-noise 

ratio in the environment, the less informative is any one signal. 94 Horgan and Taylor (1997). 95 FARC, JI, PIRA, UDA, and UVF all suffered politically for their moves into criminal fundraising. 

44
bombings.96 Central control of funding occurs when groups rely on a few deep-pocket 

donors who prefer to deal with one leader rather than several factions, or when they raise 

funds from sources requiring centralized infrastructure.97 This centralized process 

guarantees leaders de facto control over resources. So, to the extent that government 

actions can deter donations from deep-pocket al-Qa’ida donors, the frequency of agency 

problems will increase. 

2. Constrain al-Qa’ida’s security environment. 

Government interventions that make the environment less secure for al-Qa’ida also 

reduce al-Qa’ida’s ability to create a political impact. An illustration of this is provided in 

Figure 5.98 Here we see the projected impact of government actions that reduce the 

maximum feasible level of security from S to S’. Maintaining sufficient operational 

control and/or financial efficiency in this changed security environment forces the group 

to move to a lower indifference curve and accept a corresponding reduction in political 

impact—U’. In other words, the government’s security reducing interventions produce 

environmental changes that increase preference divergence among the group’s 

membership. 

Figure 5: The Impact of Constraining the Security Environment

Security

Control/

Efficiency

Security Reducing 

Interventions

S

S’

U

U’

 

96 According to the sometimes-reliable DEBKA report. 97 For example, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) fundraising in the Sinhalese Diaspora in Canada 

is facilitated by the coordinated use of social pressure. LTTE leaders control organized groups that 

blacklist businesses and individuals who do not contribute. 98 See pages 22-25 for a more complete explanation of how al-Qa’ida’s ability to achieve political impact is

reduced when its ability to control operatives or maintain a level of efficiency in its financial transactions 

is reduced. 

45
Create uncertainty about operationally relevant technical information. One key 

vulnerability of all terrorist organizations is communications. A greater volume of 

communications between operational cells and others presents a proportionally greater 

number of opportunities for compromise. If al-Qa’ida’s operators can readily find reliable 

technical information on bomb-making and the like, they can operate with a great deal of 

independence. However, if public technical data sources are rife with misinformation, 

then cells will need to communicate more to make sure they are using appropriate 

materials/techniques. These increased communications reduce the maximum feasible 

level of security. 

Make screening strategies appear risky. Al-Qa’ida can reduce preference divergence, and 

hence increase their ability to achieve political impact, by screening their membership 

more closely. A common strategy to do so is to recruit within familial networks. By 

openly monitoring the family relations of known al-Qa’ida members, governments can 

create the perception that using family ties to screen potential members is a security risk. 

This takes away a useful screening strategy, reducing the maximum feasible level of 

security. Note that this is an additional benefit not available when monitoring is strictly 

covert. 

Enhance intelligence collection operations. The greater the level of intelligence activity in 

an area al-Qa’ida intends to operate in, the lower the feasible level of security it can 

achieve. This is not a new observation, but it is worth noting that although increasing the 

density of all types of intelligence collection will reduce al-Qa’ida’s political impact, it 

does not have a definite effect on how it is organized. Depending on the political goals of 

the respective al-Qa’ida group’s leadership, it may actually adopt measures to achieve 

greater control. 

3. Prioritize efforts based on sub-group vulnerabilities. 

We believe that al-Qa’ida sub-groups’ critical organizational vulnerabilities are 

largely determined by their need for discrimination in the use of violence to achieve 

political objectives. For example, a group like the IRA is attempting to achieve objectives 

that require significant popular support. They need to be very careful about who they hit 

in order to avoid losing this critical support. In contrast, groups like Zarqawi’s in Iraq 

operate with very loosely defined political goals which appear to extend little beyond 

driving out the United States and preventing a political settlement. Given their objectives 

do not hinge on winning broad based popular support, Zarqawi’s group does not need to 

be as careful about whom they inflict casualties upon.99 

 

Our application of this theory to the Harmony documents and related cases leads us to 

conclude that, in cases where terrorist leaders have strong preferences for controlling 

operatives, interventions that reduce this control have greater impact on the organization 

 

99 Zarqawi’s “indifference curve” would thus look different compared to those leaders- principals- who 

demand greater control and discrimination. 

46
than those that degrade the security environment. However, in cases where government is 

combating terrorist factions that place a lesser value on control, they will do better 

pursuing actions that reduce the group’s security. For example, when developing 

strategies to limit the political impact of al-Zarqawi’s group, reducing control does not 

matter much because he values it less.

100 

However, for al-Qa’ida terrorists operating in groups whose leaders insist on greater 

discrimination in their application of violence, reducing their level of control should lead 

to a greater probability of accepting a lower level of political impact. Terrorist leaders 

with such preferences would therefore be more likely to scale back on violent actions 

than risk collateral damage and alienating others. 

4. Conduct an aggressive study of jihadi strategy and foreign policy. 

Operational approaches discussed thus far must be pursued in concert with strategies 

that focus on undermining the body of ideas driving this violence. Students of al-Qa’ida 

would be remiss to think that the organization did not have its own understanding of 

international politics and its own foreign policy objectives informed by that 

understanding. Each stated objective, however, should be viewed as a new avenue by 

which to fracture the movement from within. The captured documents presented in this 

study reflect an important point of tension on the strategic level regarding the 

prioritization of countries in which to wage jihad, and the criteria for determining 

whether a population is ripe for accepting jihadi ideology. 

The prioritization of countries to be attacked continues to be disputed both inside and 

beyond the al-Qa’ida movement. One captured document details a scouting trip, likely 

from the mid-1990s, on the prospects of waging jihad in Kenya.101 Other documents 

reveal that senior leaders looked to Yemen as a high priority target. In other Harmony 

documents, jihadi commanders argue for the need to preserve strong, secure rear areas in 

places like Sudan and Afghanistan while launching offensive strikes into Russia, 

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.102 The United Arab Emirates slowly made its way up the 

targeting chain through the 1990s. But Somalia was seen as not being “ready for classic 

jihad” because the Somali movement had already come close to alienating itself from the 

masses.103 

 

100 In Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s case, operating at a distance from the center will inherently create agency 

problems that the United States should be prepared to exploit. It should include closely monitoring goods

and people leaving Iraq and preparing intelligence services in neighboring states for the intellectual and

operational influence of Zarqawi. For these states, that should mean emphasizing the nationalist nature of

opposition groups and the deliberate demonization of Zarqawi’s particularly brutal tactics. Creating a 

market separation between nationalist groups in Iraq and Zarqawi will be very difficult; neighboring

countries should begin that process with their own opposition groups now and head off violence before it 

begins. 101 Harmony AFGP-2002-600113. 102 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. 103 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. 

47
The importance of maintaining connections between jihadi leadership and the people 

has been critical to most jihadi policy planning since Abdallah Azzam advocated such a 

policy in the 1980s. Al-Qa’ida strategist Abu Musab al-Suri argues, in documents found 

in this collection and elsewhere, that this loss of connection between jihadi leadership and 

the people has been a key factor in the failure of jihadi movements, particularly in Syria. 

By understanding both consensus and dissension among al-Qa’ida strategists about 

targeting priorities, U.S. policymakers increase their options for posing challenges to the 

organization’s operations. 

5. Deny jihadi groups the benefit of security vacuums they seek to exploit and create. 

 

Policymakers are correctly concerned about the existence of ungoverned spaces as 

being potential safe-havens for terrorist groups. The Harmony documents demonstrate 

that al-Qa’ida has been thinking about the necessity to exploit such spaces since their 

organizational founding. 

The Somali document referenced above identifies a five-point strategy to unite 

Somali forces and create an Islamic national front.104 The author argues for: 

1. expulsion of the foreign international presence; 

2. rebuilding of state institutions; 

3. establishment of domestic security; 

4. comprehensive national reconciliation; and 

5. economic reform and combating famine. 

This approach parallels the June 2005 Zawahiri letter addressed to Abu Musab alZarqawi in Iraq.105 In this letter, Zawahiri argues that jihad in Iraq should proceed 

incrementally, according to the following phases: 

– expel the Americans from Iraq; 

– establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it; and 

– extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. 

He also notes that jihad in Iraq may coincide with what came before: the clash with 

Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity. 

Both of these documents focus on the need to create viable operational space by first 

expelling occupiers and then by establishing and nurturing their own system. By 

identifying, catalyzing and swallowing ungoverned spaces, jihadi strategists believe they 

will be able to consolidate their strength and pursue their broader political and 

internationalist agendas. Notice that what is important to these thinkers is not the 

existence of a security vacuum, but what comes next, establishing functioning state 

institutions under jihadi control. In fact, existing security vacuums have not proven to be 

a viable base for exporting attacks abroad. No major international attacks, for example, 

have been supported out of Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia. 

 

104 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. Pg. 6. 105 Available online at: http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html 

48
Thus, while a concern with security vacuums is warranted, the implication is not that 

we must consistently prevent security vacuums.106 That takes immense resources, as the 

largely unsuccessful effort to end the security vacuum in Iraq show.107 Indeed preventing 

all security vacuums would be a Herculean task involving American power in numerous 

failed and failing states around the world. However, denying terrorists the benefits of 

security vacuums is likely a more feasible strategy. The massive troop deployment in Iraq 

has so far denied terrorists the use of that country as a staging ground for attacks in the 

West. Meanwhile, terrorists are denied the benefits of a potential Afghan security vacuum

with 18,000 troops, while CJTF HOA effectively denies jihadis the use of Somalia and 

the rest of that region with only 1,600 troops108—in both cases, these deployments are far 

less resource-intensive than would be required to actually end the security vacuum. A 

more cost-effective strategy, we believe, may be to maintain the capability to act 

decisively when necessary in security vacuums, without embarking on an unsustainable 

mission to end security vacuums worldwide.109

6. Turn the jihadi vanguard back on itself. 

The strategic proponents of al-Qa’ida are what Vladimir Lenin, among a wide variety 

of other revolutionaries, described as the “vanguard.” These “professional 

revolutionaries” possessed both the intellectual capacity and the fighting spirit to blaze

the trail toward revolution. As most students of jihadi terrorism know, Abdallah Azzam

employed this same notion of the vanguard in his early conceptualization of the al-Qa’ida 

organization. The application of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionary doctrine is 

critical to understanding jihadi strategy. Jihadi strategists have formulated a general 

roadmap for breaking what they see as America’s physical and virtual chokehold on the 

periphery—both in the literal international political sense, but also in a cognitive sense. 

Their solution draws not only on Lenin but also on Mao’s “Rural Strategy” or 

“Encirclement” path to revolution. Mao argued that the vanguard party needed to engage 

the masses, who in China were predominantly “poor and blank” peasants. These peasants 

provided the perfect launching pads for establishing pockets of resistance in the 

periphery. Although Mao’s long-term goal was to actually overthrow the urban centers of 

capitalist entrenchment, his immediate objective was to encircle these centers with 

strategic footholds and wage stealth, pinpoint strikes. In Harmony AFGP-2002-600053, 

the author (Hassan) bolsters this point when he argues that “the strategy of the ‘Jewish 

West’ is to strike at the periphery of the Muslim lands.”110

 

106 What made Afghanistan so useful to Al Qaeda from 1995 onwards was not an absence of state 

institutions, but that it was that Al Qaeda could operate under the protection of a sovereign state, relying 

on that state’s sovereignty to shield its infrastructure from potential attack by Western forces. Operating 

in a security vacuum, where training camps and the like could be targeted directly by the United States, 

and indirectly by local allies, is much less attractive. 107 Whatever political and military progress is being made in Iraq, it is indisputable that the country suffers 

from a security vacuum relative to most states. 108 Menkhaus, Ken. Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism. International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, 2004. 109 This supports the rationale behind SOCOM’s expanded roles and missions in support of the GWOT. 110 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. 

49
As jihadi strategists see it, their Mao-styled mobility has allowed their own resistance 

to seamlessly open new fronts of battle when other ones close, thereby causing American 

action to be perpetually defensive in nature. This logic is not only reflected in the upper 

echelons of al-Qa’ida leadership. Indeed, in a letter included in this Harmony sample 

from a Central Asia-based jihadi commander, Hassan al-Tajki, one can see this calculus

play out. Tajiki sees Russia in a state of economic, political and military chaos. However, 

as much as jihadi forces would like to exploit this political space, he identifies that

“America is planning, indeed has actually begun, to fill the political vacuum occurring in 

the area.”111 Unpredictable waves of jihadi “attack and retreat” campaigns serve, in their 

eyes, to confuse coalition forces and paralyze their ability to formulate and implement 

their own offensive strategy, thereby freeing jihadists to proceed virtually unencumbered. 

We can learn a great deal from jihadi strategists and their application of historical 

insurgency tactics against our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. can similarly 

employ tactics that seek to surprise and exhaust jihadi safe-havens by coordinating 

attacks in an unpredictable yet continuous fashion. Effective strategies will aggressively 

seek opportunities to create power vacuums within jihadi areas of responsibility 

7. Confuse, humiliate, demoralize and embarrass the jihadi rank-in-file. 

Taken in context with our theoretical model, the Harmony documents suggest 

government policies would find success facilitating intra-movement rivalries and 

competition within al-Qa’ida. As one of the Harmony documents details, Tajik 

mujahideen had been demoralized by the intimidation and bullying from other jihadi 

forces. Subsequently, “the majority of the young men snuck away and went back looking 

for work with their old area commanders.”112 Jihadi-on-jihadi tension has historically run 

high, seen in the conflict between the “Afghan Arabs” and the Afghan mujahadeen, as 

well as in other jihadi combat experiences. When jihadi recruits, at least in this case, felt 

unwanted, they were compelled to leave the movement and return home. Government 

efforts to stymie recruitment of new jihadis ought to capitalize on the psychological need 

by many of these men to feel a sense of belonging to an organization. By denying that 

psychological payoff, jihadis on the margins of support for the cause may otherwise 

return home, like the Tajik mujahideen described in the Harmony document above. 

8. Subvert the authority of senior commanders. 

The sample of documents from Harmony released for this study highlight the longstanding concern that the al-Qa’ida organization has had with securing the right kind of 

leader, often referred to as the Emir. Senior strategists learned from past jihadi 

experience. As Abu Musab al-Suri’s observations on the Syrian experience illustrates, 

without an active and highly trained cadre of senior leaders, any movement is destined to 

fail.113 This dearth of senior jihadi leaders reduces the maximum level of control al-

 

111 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. pg. 12. 112 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053, Letter Four, pg. 50. 113 Harmony AFGP-2002-600080. 

50
Qa’ida can exert and thus reduces the potential for political impact as discussed earlier in 

this section.

While al-Suri’s treatment focuses on general trends concerning the role that 

commanders play in jihad, other documents contain sections dedicated solely to 

articulating the professional qualifications, personality characteristics and organizational 

duties of commanders.114 Still others concentrate on the need for providing leaders with 

real-time information about the movement, its members and the broader political space in 

which it operates. In fact, among the documents that speak to the role and activities of 

leaders, they almost uniformly reflect having learned al-Suri’s lessons from Syria: not 

letting untrained people into senior command positions; not letting the senior leadership 

lose touch with its operatives on the ground; and the importance of training junior 

members not just with tactical and operational knowledge but with the strategic relevance 

of their participation in jihad. 

With the goal of turning jihadi strengths against them, increased focus on pursuing 

strategies that seek to separate leaders from their troops may be effective. Identifying the 

lines of communication among jihadis is key to this effort. Sometimes these are best 

monitored clandestinely. In fact, there is significant anecdotal evidence from jihadi use of 

the Internet that the paranoia about being monitored hampers operations by significantly 

increasing the types of operational security measures that may be employed. In other 

instances, those tasked with counterterrorism efforts should seek to inundate those lines 

of communication with alternative discourse, thereby disorienting and confusing jihadis. 

In rare instances, it may be both operationally expedient and necessary to shut down 

these lines of communication. 

9. Facilitate misunderstanding as well as understanding of America’s intentions and 

capacity. 

Throughout its historical evolution, the al-Qa’ida organization has internally wrestled 

with a number of strategic concerns, particularly those related to where and how to 

implement violence. The Harmony documents provide insight into the jihadi 

understanding of American foreign policy priorities, which jihadis believe to have been 

significantly handicapped by the American experience in Vietnam. 

In one series of letters extracted from Harmony regarding the American military 

experience in Somalia, one jihadi author writes that: 

The Somali experience confirmed the spurious nature of American power and that 

it has not recovered from the Vietnam complex. It fears getting bogged down in a 

real war that would reveal its psychological collapse at the level of personnel and 

leadership. Since Vietnam, America has been seeking easy battles that are 

completely guaranteed. It entered into a shameful series of adventures on the 

island of Grenada, then Panama, then bombing Libya, and then the Gulf War 

 

114 Harmony AFGP-2002-000078 and Harmony AFGP-2002-000080. 

51
farce, which was the greatest military, political, and ideological swindle in 

history.115

This statement reveals several important insights. First, at least throughout the 1980s 

and 1990s, al-Qa’ida believed the United States to be an aggressive and belligerent 

power, perpetually seeking opportunities to exercise its military domination. Those 

following al-Qa’ida rhetoric over the recent decade have heard statements arguing that 

the only language the United States understands is that of violence.116 America’s 

perceived bellicose leanings, however, were seen as being tempered by the lessons 

learned in Vietnam—namely, that protracted wars of attrition should be avoided at all 

costs. Jihadists writings generally portray the United States as a paper tiger, one that 

possessed overwhelming military power, but constrained in its ability to employ this 

strength by a domestic population and leaders who lacked the resolve to sustain military 

campaigns without public support. 

Jihadi assumptions about America’s reluctance to use military force were reinforced 

following the perceived lack of response to the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in 

Kenya and Tanzania, as well as to the USS Cole attack in 2000. The predominant jihadi 

assumptions about America’s perceived risk aversion likely caught them off guard and 

facilitated American military success against those jihadists in the early 2000s. There 

may be an advantage in allowing jihadists to underestimate American resolve and power, 

in certain situations, as it may lead to a decreased perception within al-Qa’ida of the need 

for operational security measures. 

10. Force jihadi propagandists back on their heels. 

Ultimate success for al-Qa’ida lies in reshaping mass perceptions about good and 

evil. As was the case since Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood, it is 

essential to grasp the fact that the long-term goal of this jihadi salafi movement is to 

change the face of society. Al-Qa’ida has been relatively successful in packaging and 

marketing their message in a social movement. Through the persuasive figurehead of 

Osama Bin Laden, the persistent continuation of global terrorism and the work by an 

army of propagandists to spin the tale of jihad, al-Qa’ida as an idea is actually much more 

difficult for governments to counter than when it was more or less an organization or 

confederation with its associated organizational vulnerabilities described earlier in our 

analysis. 

The jihadi movement’s strategic coherency to this point is attributable, in large part, 

to how skillfully its members used propaganda instruments, particularly since 9/11, for 

weaving a historical record, as one senior al-Qa’ida ideologue called it. As a repository of 

images, videos and stories, the Internet has come to codify a particular jihadi 

foundational myth, accessible to anyone, anywhere, anytime. Publishing their ideas in

short forum postings, longer articles floated online or in voluminous books, jihadi 

strategists not only recruit new members into this worldview, but they spoon-feed recruits 

 

115 Harmony AFGP-2202-600053. 116 Bin Laden’s “Letter to America.” November 24, 2002

52
with their virulent (and tedious) vocabulary for expressing their anger, and provide 

direction to operators on the ground, both in Iraq and abroad. 

In a Harmony document written in 1994, the author (Hassan) contends that “more 

effective radio broadcasts are needed to launch a propaganda campaign in Yemen and 

Somalia.” Much like the prolific jihadi propagandists at work today, Hassan believed that 

“radio stations are more powerful than atomic bombs.” Again, the target of propaganda 

campaigns, he argues, must be the youth, who in small numbers can bring “correct 

teaching” to a large area.117 Bin Laden himself, in a captured letter he wrote to Mullah 

Muhammad ‘Omar, wrote “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the 

strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the 

battles.”118 In “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah,” the author, Abu 

Huthayfa, suggests that Muslims should seek to integrate jihad into all aspects of their 

lives. For example, he argues, marriage ceremonies “should include speeches, songs, and 

poetry promoting jihad.”119

 It seems imperative that combating terrorism efforts do everything possible to contain 

the spread of the jihadi body of ideas. The insight gained from the application of our 

theoretically informed model to this limited number of documents suggests that 

governments would find success implementing policies that focus on denying jihadis the 

operational space they seek; pitting groups, ideologues and even propagandists against 

one another; encouraging parochial squabbles within organizational leadership; and 

demoralizing new recruits while providing viable alternatives and exit strategies to them. 

11. Understand and exploit the ideological breaks in the jihadi movement.

Combating the al-Qa’ida movement over the long term requires identifying where 

key jihadi thinkers break with one another. The documents in this report reveal how such 

doctrinal disagreements have historically driven wedges within the upper echelons of alQa’ida. It is this intra-movement contention that comprises the soft underbelly of violent 

jihad, which can be exploited to great ends. Interdicting and corrupting the lines of alQa’ida’s ideological influence strikes at the core of its ability to exert indirect control of

its members. Ideological influence may prove to be al-Qa’ida’s center of gravity as a 

social movement; efforts to attack this should be weighted accordingly. 

 

One Harmony document, for instance, points to debate among al-Qa’ida thinkers 

about Muhammad Nasir-ud-deen, better known as Shaikh Al-Albani, who is a renowned 

name among salafists and a revered Hadith scholar. He—like other late salafi sheikhs 

(part of what is known as the Awakening Movement) including Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, 

Salim al-Hilali, and Rabee Madkhalee, among others—preached about the deviations 

made by Sayyid Qutb and those who follow in his path, which includes followers of alQa’ida. In this document, Ayman al-Zawahiri criticizes Sheikh Albani for constraining 

 

117 Harmony AFGP-2002-600053. 118 Harmony AFGP-2002-600321, pg. 2. 119 Harmony AFGP-2002-003251. 

53
the pursuit of jihad to “forgiveness, education and prayer.”120 Zawahiri, like his 

ideological comrades—whom Awakening Salafis label “Qutubis” for their ardent 

following of Qutb’s deviant teachings—rejects such limits as appeasement. It is 

necessary for Muslims to go beyond simply gaining knowledge and education, which 

implicitly means enduring the oppression of perceived apostate leaders and “imperialist 

infidels,” and instead take action. This ideological break is but one of many that exist 

within the broader movement that can be usefully exploited. 

12. Anticipate al-Qa’ida’s transformation from an organization to a social movement. 

The United States and its allies have found great success fighting al-Qa’ida as an 

organization. We have significantly degraded its formal command structure, debilitated 

its capabilities to readily move money and closed most of its training facilities. Despite 

the success against the organization, however, terrorist attacks in the name of al-Qa’ida, 

such as those witnessed in London or Madrid, continue. While not coordinated by the alQa’ida organization, they are informed by the model that al-Qa’ida popularized. This 

report highlights a number of effective methods for limiting al-Qa’ida’s potential political 

impact in cases where the terrorist group can be characterized to a greater degree as an 

organization. Al-Qa`ida’s continued transformation into a broad-based social movement, 

however, will pose overwhelming challenges to U.S. and other governments’ 

counterterrorism efforts and therefore must be stopped at all costs. 

One senior al-Qa’ida strategist, Abu Musab al-Suri, advances in one of the included 

Harmony documents—as well as in other writings found elsewhere—a comprehensive 

call to violent revolution among Muslims.121 His writings need to be understood for what 

they are: a template for morphing the loose coalition of organizations, personalities and 

ideas that has come to be known as al-Qa’ida into a global revolutionary movement. His 

movement is well-conceived and designed it to be organic, clandestine, adaptable to 

changes in political reality and self-sustaining. 

Since the Afghan training camp system had been shut down, Suri argues for the need 

to transfer the training to each house of each district in the village of every Muslim. By 

making appropriate training materials available to more than a billion Muslims in the 

world, Suri believes that he can catalyze a revitalized culture of preparation among them. 

Taking advantage of information technology like the Internet, Suri contends that anyone 

interested can access military and ideological training in any language, at any time, 

anywhere. Muslim homes, as envisioned by Suri’, not only become the new training 

camps, where families can recruit, educate and train, but also serve as staging grounds 

from which ideological adherents are able to consolidate their strength and wage 

terrorism. Further complicating matters, Suri articulates expanded opportunities to 

participation in jihad for the large numbers of Muslims who may agree with the ideology 

he advances but are reluctant to engage in acts of violence. 

 

120 Harmony AFGP-2002-601041. 121 Harmony AFGP-2002-60008

54
Aggressive and proactive efforts are needed to curtail al-Qa’ida’s transformation from 

a terrorist organization to that of a social movement. Increasing opportunities and 

mediums for individuals to support jihad, along with greater variation in the types of 

roles available, will require ever more comprehensive responses and mechanisms to deter 

them. 

Concluding Remarks 

The analysis provided in this report and accompanying selection of recently 

declassified documents from the Department of Defense’s Harmony database included in 

Part 2 will hopefully accomplish three basic objectives. First, they provide a new source 

of raw data to scholars, analysts and others interested in learning more about al-Qa’ida 

from the perspective of the organization’s members. The 28 documents presented here 

represent a small number of an ever-growing collection of al-Qa’ida related material, 

which will be increasingly made available to the public. 

Second, this report seeks to demonstrate the utility of organization and agency theory 

for conducting terrorism analysis. Based on the logical frameworks of this field of 

inquiry, the analysis provided here illustrates concepts and insights that can help conduct 

a more nuanced study of primary source documents. Its focus on the dynamic interplay 

between organizational necessity for concomitantly pursuing security, efficiency and 

control emphasizes opportunities for those tasked with countering the terrorist threats. 

Finally, the policy recommendations presented here are meant to expand the 

perspective of the US Government and all concerned states on the types of instruments 

and timelines it can use to combat al-Qa’ida. This list is not exhaustive, and as more 

information is provided through additional documents, the Combating Terrorism Center 

and other researchers can continue to research, analyze, develop, and refine 

recommendations. Certainly, this report represents just one component of a much larger, 

comprehensive effort to combat al-Qa’ida with increasing sophistication and success. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military 

Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

 

Back to table of contents

55
Part II: Al-Qa’ida “In Their Own Words” 

The Harmony Documents 

Back to table of contents

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the responsibility 

to plan and synchronize efforts across the Department of Defense for the war on 

terrorism. In conducting their operations over the past several years—particularly 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—representatives 

of USSOCOM have uncovered scores of documents authored by members of al-Qa’ida. 

These documents, which currently reside in a classified database called “Harmony,” shed 

important new light onto the inner workings of the organization as well as the 

personalities and preferences of their authors. The database houses thousands of items

with a wide range of content, including loose papers, multimedia, and personal letters.

In the latter half of 2005, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point was 

given access to a small subset of recently declassified Harmony documents and asked to 

provide an analysis of potential network vulnerabilities and conflicts of interests within

the organization. The CTC was chosen to conduct this study based partly upon its 

expertise in analyzing al-Qa’ida’s strategic texts, jihadi images, video clips, and other 

materials distributed on the Internet. The documents used in this study were initially 

identified, processed and translated based upon criteria established to support military 

planning efforts, including: 

 al-Qa’ida documents (media, letters, loose papers) discussing ideology, tactics, 

techniques, procedures, strategy, and operations; 

 Taliban documents discussing prior or future terrorist actions in Afghanistan or 

the region and the interaction/coordination with al-Qa’ida; 

 any material related to al-Qa’ida extremist ideology, training, recruiting, and 

logistics flow; 

 documents discussing any al-Qa’ida operation; and 

 any dialogue from al-Qa’ida that threatens another country/group or its 

leadership. 

The initial 28 documents extracted from the Harmony database that met combinations of 

the search criteria described above range from single page letters to 70+ page excerpts 

from larger jihadi texts, and were authored both before and after September 11, 2001. 

Every document released to the CTC from the Harmony database is included on the 

enclosed CD-ROM in both original Arabic text and English translation and is posted on 

the CTC website at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq.asp. 

56
This collection of primary documents exposes the banality of al-Qa’ida’s day-to-day 

operations. Its corporate culture appears to be similar to other modern organizations: 

permeated by personality conflicts, intra-organizational disputes about senior 

management decisions and conflict over the allocation of scarce resources. Readers of 

these documents will gain unique perspective into the leadership’s utilitarian 

hybridization of jihadi principles and Western-styled bureaucratic structures. 

In prosaic detail, the documents identify the al-Qa’ida recruitment criteria, the 

training program for “new hires,” and the tactics of information, political, and military

warfare needed to defeat the Jews and Crusaders and restore the Muslim lands to the rule 

of the caliphate. Beginning with the Islamist battle to overthrow the secular government 

of Syria in the 1970s and 1980s, and following jihadists through campaigns in Africa, 

Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Gulf States, and Afghanistan, these papers also reveal a 

high level of arrogance and intense ambition. 

The al-Qa’ida vision, as reflected in the included documents, demands ruthless 

adherence to its leadership and teaching, and uncompromising hostility toward Jews, 

Crusaders, Buddhists, Hindus, and apostate Muslims. Apostasy is defined, of course, to 

include all those who disagree with al-Qa’ida’s interpretation of Islam. While the 

theology may seem reactionary, the organization insists on using modern management

principles as well. Instruction is provided on applying information technology, 

manipulating the media, and researching the use of nuclear weapons for the cause of 

jihad. 

 

Given the broad swath of time, place and organizational level from which they come, 

these Harmony documents reveal sides of the organization not widely seen before. The 

documents reflect meticulous operational calculations being made by the leadership over 

intended results and available opportunities for exploitation. The strategic discussions 

reflect a patient, organized, and determined foe that has known defeats, but one with the 

ability to learn from its mistakes. Readers will see how some operations they know all too 

well had been in conceptualization or even planning stages long before much of the West 

had heard the term “al-Qa’ida.” 

Like other revolutionary ideologies that have emerged throughout history, the idea of 

al-Qa’ida—an organization which touts itself as representing the will of a broader 

constituency—has considerable appeal for those alienated by the penetration of global 

capitalism or those who feel victimized by corrupt, indifferent rulers. As the 

accompanying analysis seeks to demonstrate, the importance of al-Qa’ida’s myth-making 

machinery cannot be underestimated. A careful reading of the documents here dispels the 

fiction that some have come to accept about al-Qa’ida: that it is a coherent, unified 

organization informed by Islamic principles. There is perhaps no better and more 

objective way to understand the fractured and duplicitous nature of al-Qa’ida than by 

simply listening to what its own leaders have said. 

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57
Harmony Document List 

Back to table of contents

Al-Qa’ida Goals and Structure................................................61

AFGP-2002-000078

Interior Organization............................................................63

AFGP-2002-000080

Open Letter to King Fahd from bin Laden....................................64

AFGP-2002-000103

Al-Qa’ida Staff Count Public Appointments.................................65

AFGP-2002-000112

Letter of Threat to Americans....................................................66

AFGP-2002-001120

A Memo to Sheikh Abu Abdullah.............................................67

AFGP-2002-003251

Employment Contract...........................................................69

AFGP-2002-600045

Al-Qa’ida Bylaws................................................................70

AFGP-2002-600048

Five Letters to Africa Corps – Letter One....................................71

AFGP-2002-600053

Five Letters to Africa Corps – Letter Two...................................72

AFGP-2002-600053

Five Letters to Africa Corps – Letter Three..................................73

AFGP-2002-600053

Five Letters to Africa Corps – Letter Four...................................75

AFGP-2002-600053

Five Letters to Africa Corps – Letter Five...................................76

58
AFGP-2002-600053

Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria..................78

AFGP-2002-600080

A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi.....................................82

AFGP-2002-600113

Letter to Aba Khalid from bin Laden.........................................83

AFGP-2002-600157

Letter to Mullah Mohammed ‘Omar from bin Laden......................84

AFGP-2002-600321

Call to Jihad Against the Syrian Regime.....................................85

AFGP-2002-600966

A Response to Accusations Against Sheikh Albani........................91

AFGP-2002-601041

Criticism of Abu Al-Bara’a....................................................92

AFGP-2002-601346

Status of Jihad....................................................................93

AFGP-2002-601693

Political Speculation............................................................94

AFGP-2002-602181

Criticism of Sheikh Bin Baz...................................................95

AFGP-2002-602187

Get the Idolaters Out of Arab Island..........................................96

AFGP-2002-603856

Various Admin Documents and Questions...................................97

AFGP-2002-801138

Letter to Pakistani Scholars from bin Laden.................................100

AFGP-2002-901188

Al Adl Letter.....................................................................101

59
Letters from bin Laden.........................................................102

AFGP-2002-003345

Brief Biography of Ayman Al-Zawahiri.....................................115

2RAD-2004-600457

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60
Harmony Document Summaries 

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-000078

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 9 pages 

Title: None Assigned (Al-Qa’ida Goals and Structure)

Full Text: English Arabic

Back to Document List

Synopsis: The document sets forth the goals and structure of the Military Committee, 

Political Committee, Information Committee, and the Administrative and Financial 

Committee. Qualifications are listed for different positions of the committee. The intent is 

to develop Al-Qa’ida as an effective force under the direction of leaders who are 

professionally capable, trained in Islamic laws, faithful to jihad, and loyal to Al-Qa’ida. 

Key Themes: The Military Committee has five divisions: 

 President. 

 Training-Combat 

 Training-Operations 

Nuclear Weapons Section 

Library and Research Section 

Specific qualifications are sought for each position. The president should possess the 

following abilities: 

Knowledge of Islamic Law 

Military operational experience. 

University Graduate (Military Academy Preferred) 

30 years of age. 

Qualifications for Training Section Supervisor are less demanding: 

2 years of service in the Jihad. 

Possession of appropriate scientific knowledge. 

25 years of age. 

High School graduate. 

Knowledge of Military Science 

Distinguished by wisdom, sobriety, and military discipline. 

Similar qualifications are listed for Training Section Supervisor, General Combat Section 

Supervisor, and Special Operations Section. 

The Political Committee and its leadership are charged with spreading political 

awareness among Al-Qa’ida members, between Islamic republics, and with other Jihad 

Movements. The committee is required to return to Al-Qa’ida before establishing a new 

61
stance, and to avoid the public criticism of Islamic groups. Requirements listed for the 

President of the Committee; these are similar to the Military Committee with the 

exception of English proficiency, security awareness, and personal attributes such as: 

“large hearted, mild tempered, correct in opinion, good planner, smart and clever.” 

The Informational Committee is charged with spreading the Al-Qa’ida vision of jihad to 

all Muslims, and to develop and communicate expertise in scientific and legal areas as

well. Branches of the committee are designated to handle the following areas: computers, 

printing, foreign relations, photography, phonetics, translations, and microfiche. This 

committee is also required to seek Al-Qa’ida approval for all new stances.

Requirements for the President of the Committee listed, but are less rigorous than the 

Political Committee Chairman. 

The Administrative and Financial Committee duties include: 

 Administrative Services 

 Hospitality 

 Accounting 

 Financial Services 

No requirements are listed, but the document ends abruptly indicating that it is either 

unfinished or missing additional pages.

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62
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-000080

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 9 pages 

Title: Interior Organization 

Full Text: English Arabic

Back to Document List

Synopsis: A description of Al-Qa’ida’s organizational structure including the 

responsibilities and qualifications of the commander, duties of the five general 

committees, and general goals of the movement. Key goals are to establish the truth, get 

rid of evil, and establish an Islamic Nation. 

Key Themes: A detailed, analytical statement of the goals of the Al-Qa’ida command 

and the qualifications of the Commander. The Commander presides over a ruling council 

which is divided into five committees: Military, Political, Administrative and Financial, 

Security, and Surveillance. 

The commander is chief administrator and is “given obligations similar to the general 

obligations of the Imamate because it is expected that the commander will undertake the 

work of judging in the division of the spoils of the jihad’s judgment. 

With non-Jihad Muslim groups, the goal is to develop relations of love and friendship in 

an effort to bring out the good and correct mistakes. Al-Qa’ida seeks to eliminate 

regionalism and tribalism, and bring all Muslims into the Jihad. Muslims must be agitated 

so they can serve as “fuel for the battle.” 

For the “dictators of the earth and secular groups,” the Al-Qa’ida position “is that there 

are innocents among them and unbelievers among them and that there will be continuing 

enmity until everyone believes in Allah.” 

Al-Qa’ida is structured as a Jihad organization, not an aid group, with the goal of 

administering Shariah law. It is committed to secrecy and self-reliance. 

The commander is given a list of 11 personal characteristics which emphasize his 

commitment to Jihad, Shariah law, and personal qualities, and 17 duties which focus on 

managerial and administrative abilities. 

Likewise council members are required to meet five qualifications, and the work and 

authority of the council are carefully delineated. The document is precise and specific and 

demonstrates the value Al-Qa’ida places on organizational design and leadership ability. 

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63
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-000103

Date: 11 July 1995 

Author: Osama bin Laden 

Length: 34 pages 

Title: Open Letter to King Fahd Regarding the Recent Cabinet Reshuffling 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A letter which strongly criticizes the Saudi regime for not adhering to the 

tenets of Islam, particularly monotheism, as well as for rampant corruption and being 

essentially a puppet of America and other Western states. 

Key Themes: This document is virtually identical to a document in the “Letters from Bin 

Laden” document and is analyzed there in detail.

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64
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-000112

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 7 pages 

Title: Al-Qaeda Staff Count Public Appointments 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A management review of Al-Qa’ida personnel and organizational structure and 

an exhortation to ensure that the new cadres are placed on the right path. 

Key Themes: The organization must guard against complacency and maintain a faithful 

commitment to the goals and visions of Al-Qa’ida. This document emphasizes proper 

policies for keeping the organization focused and purposeful. 

Through the establishment of a “Personnel Matters Section,” equipped with its own 

dedicated computer, Al-Qa’ida will be able to properly management existing cadre and 

recruit the right people for the new cadre. 

Describes the role of the military training camp. The intent is to not only instruct the 

candidates, but also to assess their personal qualities and potential for future 

advancement. 

Stresses the importance of developing new leaders and providing time for rest and 

reflection for current leaders so that they can relieve stress and deal with psychological 

problems.

Proposes the equivalent of correspondence courses so that leaders in the field can keep 

abreast of the latest developments. Regular instruction in oral and written communication 

must be given to leaders in training. 

Key areas of study for Al-Qa’ida commanders are: 

Islamic Studies 

Military Studies 

Security Studies 

Management Studies 

Political Studies 

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65
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-001120

Date: First letter undated (post 9/11); second letter 10 Nov 2001 

Author: First letter Abu ‘Abullah Al-Kuwaiti; second by Abu Yousef Al-Qannas 

Length: 4 page outline of original 14 pages 

Title: Letter of Threat to Americans 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A letter from Abu ‘Abdullah Al-Kuwaiti outlining the next attack against the 

Americans, and issuing a statement to the Americans to let them know of their fighters’ 

readiness to kill hundreds of thousands with their nuclear and biological arsenal. The 

second letter is dated 10 November 2001 from Abu Yousef Al-Qannas to Khallad AlKuwaiti informing him that he is moving north by orders of the Sheikh (Osama bin 

Laden), and that he will join him in a week’s time. 

Key Themes: Abu ‘Abdullah Al-Kuwaiti’s undated letter is addressed to the American 

people. He writes that he is announcing publicly the next attacks against the Americans, 

and that groups in America and Europe, which are “above suspicion,” have been given 

the green light to move. He also writes that there is no animosity between “us” and the 

Americans; the war is only between “us” and the Jews. By interfering in their countries, 

the Americans have brought this on themselves. 

He goes on that they have nuclear and biological weapons with which they will kill 

“hundreds of thousands” of people that they don’t otherwise wish to fight. He states that 

the billions of American dollars spent thus far have succeeded in killing less than ten 

“martyrs.” 

The next few pages list varied locations in Afghanistan, a series of names, a packing list 

of personal items, and an admonition to fast and pray during Ramadan. 

The second letter, dated 10 Nov 2001, is by Abu Yousef Al-Qannas to Khallad AlKuwaiti. Al-Qannas writes that he is heading north by orders of the Sheikh (Osama bin 

Laden). He also notes that Khallad Al-Kuwaiti must meet with the Sheikh first. 

A third letter is included at the end from Salman Yahya Hasan Mohammed Al-Rabi’I to 

Furqan Al-Tajiki professing his undying love. This is not of apparent consequence. 

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66
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003251

Date: 18 Rabeei Al Awwal 1421 AH(June 20, 2000) 

Author: Abu Huthayfa 

Length: 11 pages 

Title: A memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: The author writes to his honored mentor and presents his views on the 

leadership skills and tactics that Al-Qa’ida must use to achieve victory. Emphasis is given 

to the political and military methods as well as public relations strategies and information 

management techniques that can produce positive results for Al-Qa’ida. 

Key Themes: The writer emphasizes a leadership style that calls for reflection, selfknowledge, and the development of a database on Al-Qa’ida members and programs. The 

movement must be guided by the study of its people and the development of practical 

conclusions. 

Next is a review of the public relations assets. Osama Bin Laden is considered a “...star 

similar to the fortress of Saddam” who has used the Al-Jazeera channel very effectively. 

Insufficient effort was made to exploit the success of the Mujahideen in Somalia against 

the Americans. The bombings in Dar es Saalam and Nairobi likewise were not exploited 

successfully for their promotional value in the Saudi peninsula and are described as a 

“horrible informational and political shortfall.” 

Al-Qa’ida should emulate Hamas and have the statements of “martyrs” videotaped prior 

to their operations. If the efforts of martyrs from the Peninsula were publicized, this 

would have a tremendous impact on recruitment in Saudi Arabia. The document refers to 

an unspecified cruise ship attack which also lacked effective publicity for the martyrs and 

the cause of jihad. 

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan provides an important sanctuary and training ground 

for the jihad. Trained brothers can go back to their homeland from Afghanistan to spread 

the message of jihad. 

In between the review of operations is a paragraph emphasizing the importance of a right 

belief in the Unity of God. 

The organization should be structured with separate political and information sections. 

The political section needs to control the movement to guarantee correct application of 

Shariah. All aspects of the work should serve to promote the movement. Marriage 

ceremonies, for example, should include speeches, songs and poetry promoting jihad. 

These celebrations should be videotaped and distributed by the political section for 

maximum publicity value. 

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The role of the information section is to link the movement to the masses by utilizing 

email and websites. Driveway.com is mentioned as a good place to store documents. The 

movement should have a web site to locate all legible, audible, and visible archives. Jihad 

must be promoted as a popular movement, not an elite organization. 

Algeria is pointed out as a good example because the movement there started internally 

with the people and then Mujahideen from abroad could come in and receive cover 

provided by the masses. 

At all times the movement must engage in critical self-analysis, and questioning of 

tactical assumptions. The only thing not subject to negotiation is the infallible Shariah.

The debate over identifying the principal foe, the “original non-believers” or the 

“renegade non-believers” is important and should be discussed in an “open and ...healthy 

environment.” 

 

The fight against the Americans (Jews and Crusaders) is characterized as a series of 

battles; the struggle with Saudi Arabia is a war. An oil spot strategy must be pursued 

against Saudi Arabia, with the goal of expanding the circle of jihad through successful 

operations that break down the fear barrier which keeps Mujahideen from fully engaging 

the Saudi state. 

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68
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600045

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 6 pages 

Title: Employment Contract

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: An employment contract for potential recruits to enlist in Al-Qa’ida. The 

document sets forth the principal goals of Al-Qa’ida, and defines the salary, benefits, and 

job expectations of Al-Qa’ida members. 

Key Themes: After an overview of Al-Qa’ida objectives, the document sets forth 

specific guidance for new recruits seeking to join Al-Qa’ida. 

Objectives stated as: 

Support God’s religion, 

Establishment of Islamic rule, and 

Restoration of the Islamic Caliphate. 

Recruits are required to: 

Abide by Al-Qa’ida Rules 

Obey leaders without disobeying Islamic rules 

Have no dealings with any other Islamic group. 

Maintain secrecy 

Spread jihad to family and friends. 

Salary, vacation, and home leave travel benefits are specified for married and unmarried 

personnel. Procedures for handling grievances and disputes are established in accordance 

with Islamic Law. 

Recruits are challenged to show more zeal in serving religion than the infidels, and 

specialized knowledge and training is to be placed at the disposal of Al-Qa’ida. 

Document concludes with a solemn written pledge that recruits must sign committing 

them to the service of Allah and Al-Qa’ida. 

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69
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600048

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 32 pages 

Title: None (Al-Qa’ida Bylaws) 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A lengthy organizational document covering the goals of Al-Qa’ida, 

organizational procedures, bylaws, benefits, and allowances. Reveals the highly 

centralized and controlling nature of the organization, and the extent to which it has 

embraced modern management practices while maintaining fidelity to its religious vision. 

Key Themes: The document begins with an outline of Al-Qa’ida structure and bylaws, 

and the equivalent of a mission statement. The organization has four goals: 

Spread jihad. 

Prepare and train qualified Muslim personnel for jihad 

Support local jihad movements around the world. 

Coordinate international jihad movements so as to create a united global Jihad 

movement. 

Al-Qa’ida must be prepared to wage jihad anywhere in the world, and not to be distracted 

by relief and aid operations. Al-Qa’ida must have no relation to the world of idols and 

secular and nationalist movements. Relations with non-jihadi Islamic groups should be 

respectful, but dedicated to pointing out their shortcomings and try to gain their support 

for jihad. 

Lengthy job description is posted for the position of emir, his deputy, and other positions 

on the council. Of special interest is the position of the Executive Council Chairman who 

serves as a chief financial officer. His duties include control over bank accounts, 

expenditures, and budgeting. Salaries are paid according to a fixed schedule. 

Policies are described for additional salary based on family size (married man receives 

6,500 rupees with 700 rupees for each additional wife.) Provision is made for cost of 

living adjustments. 

The document outlines medical, loan, furniture , vacation, disability, and severance 

benefits. 

Also of interest are the duties for the Decision Execution Branch which has responsibility 

for imprisonment and torture as well as for the information and procedural security of the 

organization. This section is also responsible for personal security of the Emir and the 

guard detail chief be an Arab but Yemenis and Gulf Arabs are excluded. The chief of 

guards is instructed to keep very close watch over non Arab staff. 

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70
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter One)

Date: Mid 1990s 

Author: “Your Uncle” 

Length: 32 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps I 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: This letter is addressed to “Dear Brother Saif” and signed by “Your Uncle.” 

The author has prepared a lengthy response to issues raised in two previous letters (not 

included in this collection) sent by Saif from Somalia where he is in charge of Al-Qa’ida 

activity. Uncle gives frank observations about the prospects for jihad in Somalia. 

Key Themes: Uncle believes that Somalia is not ready for classic jihad and that AlQa’ida will not be able to find an ally with an identical intellectual force. The goal is to 

expel crusader forces from Somalia even if a semi-Islamic, semi-democratic government 

were to gain power. 

Saif is warned that the Somali movement he is working with is in danger of isolating 

itself from the masses, and if the masses become suspicious of a movement it has no 

prospect for success. 

The U.S. invasion of Somalia presents Saif with a golden opportunity to strike at the

“bald eagle” now that it has landed unexpectedly in his sights. 

Flexibility is required. If Al-Qa’ida could work with Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and Burhan to 

achieve it purposes in Afghanistan, then Saif can work with Aideed, Mahdi, and Kharteet 

in Somalia. The Somali leadership, however, must be bolstered since they have even less 

manhood than Saddam Hussein and Arafat. 

Uncle proposes a 5 point strategy to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national 

front: 

1. Expulsion of the foreign international presence. 

2. Rebuilding of state institutions. 

3. Establishment of domestic security. 

4. Comprehensive national reconciliation. 

5. Economic reform and combating famine. 

The message ends with encouragement to persevere through financial difficulties and act 

according to the traditions “of our noble Messenger.” Uncle cites God feeding Quraysh

and the great Badr raid as examples of victories that come through the “confident belief 

that God will grant victory.” 

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71
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Two)

Date: September 30, 1993 

Author: Hassan al-Tajiki 

Length: 11 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps II 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: The letter provides an update and analysis concerning jihad activity in 

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Russia, and China. 

Key Themes: Tajikistan is judged to be a challenging but not hopeless area for jihad 

activity. 

Russia is in chaos and the former republics of the Soviet Union are weak. America is 

preparing to fill the power vacuum in the region. 

In Afghanistan America is supporting warlords and exploiting Civil War to neutralize 

opposition to its control of the region. 

China is a rising power where future relations with the Islamic world will be of great 

importance. 

The letter concludes with an upbeat assessment for future jihad operations in Tajikistan. 

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72
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Three)

Date: May 24, 1994 

Author: Hassan 

Length: 36 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps III 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: Congratulations for the victory in Somalia and a strategic review of worldwide 

jihad operations. Success of the Africa Corps is contrasted with the difficult position of 

the Asian Corps. 

Key Themes: Hassan begins by expressing his congratulations to the Africa Corps for 

their great victory in Somalia. He would like to join them is having difficulties traveling 

because he is now wanted for security reasons in Pakistan. 

He asks the questions: “So how were our amazing Corps and its starving African Muslim

allies able to be victorious over the greatest power in the world today?” The answer lies 

in the power of God, because “When we are truly fighting in the name and on behalf of 

God, we have nothing to fear...” 

In Somalia, Islamic forces were able to exploit America’s Vietnam Complex, because the 

American’s fear getting bogged down in a real war. Al-Qa’ida needs to develop a tactical 

doctrine to exploit the weakness of its great enemy, and a Counter-Intelligence strategy to 

confront the power of the American security agencies. 

Victory in Somalia must be followed up to avoid giving the defeated foe time to regroup. 

The strategy of the “Jewish West” is to strike at the periphery of the Muslim lands. The 

original crusaders tried to strike at the center of the Islamic lands, but were defeated. The 

Crusaders adapted, conquered the periphery, and were then able to control the Arabian 

Peninsula and Palestine. 

Somalia represents a victory for Al-Qa’ida on the periphery. The hour for regaining the 

heartland has arrived, but much training is required before this phase can begin. 

While the Africa Corps has been successful, the Asian Corps is very weak with only 5 

members. Yemen is described as a crucial battlefield, an auspicious location for declaring 

jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. 

More effective radio broadcasts are needed to launch a propaganda campaign in Yemen 

and Somalia. Demands should include: 

Evacuation of the Crusaders, Jews, and infidel forces from the Peninsula. 

Destruction of churches and Jewish and Buddhist temples. 

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Hassan observes that radio stations are more powerful than atomic bombs and that 

several dozen committed young believers can bring correct teaching to the whole area. 

Martyrdom attacks in Yemen create an auspicious opportunity to declare jihad in the 

Arabian Peninsula. 

Next comes a review of lessons learned in Tajikistan. Serious errors have been committed 

by the Nahdha who have relinquished their Islamic identity. Nahdha like Saddam

Hussein exploits Islam to gain popular support, but by no means expresses true adherence 

to Islam.

In Kabul, warlords who pursue their own agendas are weakening the work of jihad. 

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74
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Four)

Date: May 24, 1994 

Author: Hassan 

Length: 14 pages 

Title: The Fourth Letter about Jihad in the Caucasus 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: Hassan is writing from an Al-Qa’ida training camp and relates his 

disappointments concerning reverses Al-Qa’ida has experienced in Central Asia. He also 

seeks to apply lessons learned from the arrest of international terrorist Carlos. 

Key Themes: In Tajikistan Al-Qa’ida has been outmaneuvered by the Nahdha movement 

and Ahmad Shah Mas’oud who have been able to extract arms and ammunition from AlQa’ida without providing training. Demoralized Mujahideen have been leaving the 

movement. 

Arab fighters in northern Afghanistan are loathed by Mas’oud and his commanders and 

in Pakistan Arab fighters are restricted and harassed by Pakistani authorities. Combating 

Islam is now both a state motto and policy in that country. In Pakistan Islam is a 

“folkloric” religion. 

Hassan state that Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan is besieged and that “All we have is the 

beleaguered space between our camp and Kabul in which to move with relative 

freedom.” 

Jews are gaining strength in Russia. Hassan engages in the eschatological speculation that 

the Jewish nuclear project will prepare the way for Armageddon and the rule of King 

Anti-Christ. He proposes bringing the jihad to Moscow with the ultimate objective of 

bringing jihad to Jerusalem.

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are essential fronts for fighting to overcome the developing 

American blockade in Central Asia. 

The extradition of Carlos emphasizes the need for preserving strong, secure rear areas in 

Sudan and Afghanistan. 

Hassan says that he is bored in Afghanistan and want to relocate his family to Sudan. 

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75
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Five)

Date: 1994?

Author: Hassan al-Tajiki 

Length: 14 pages 

Title: The Fifth Letter to the Africa Corps 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: An analysis evaluating the impact of jihad in the Caucasus. Written while 

fighting is raging in Grozny, Hassan sees this struggle holding great promise for the 

future of jihad. 

Key Themes: The Soviet Union collapsed as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan. 

This left the U.S. to run the world in an autocratic manner. The U.S. alliance of Western 

states is fragile, however, due to the warfare inherent in the capitalist system. 

The new world order is America against everyone, and everyone against the Muslim. The 

Jews have succeeded in creating a Crusader alliance among Orthodox, Protestant, and 

Catholic churches. Then they added Hindu and Confucian Buddhist power in India, 

China, and Japan. 

This alliance is fragile and just as the 11th and 12th century Crusaders succumbed to 

infighting, so too will this alliance. Jihadists can look forward to Russian gangs selling 

nuclear weapons and ultimately providing nuclear arms for the jihad. 

The Caucasus is a strategically important zone because it provides access to the West. 

The U.S. is attempting to use Turkey and Pakistan to isolate the region, but the Chechens 

are rugged warriors. 

Furthermore, harsh Russia violence in the region means only opportunities for martyrdom

and paradise for Muslims. The Crusader strategy will backfire because the “bloody 

governing” of the Russians will result in a disaster inflicted by Islamic forces. 

Al-Qa’ida can best support Chechen rebels by striking in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Arab 

fighters are at a disadvantage in the area since they do not know the language and culture. 

In an aside, Hassan comments that the jihadi missionary must be patient. Most Muslims 

will not pick up a weapon and declare jihad “unless he has tasted killing and felt the knife 

as it passed across his throat.” 

Therefore the Crusader wars are welcomed, but the” armed missionary must realize that 

his moving amongst Muslims whose Islam exists in Name only.” Apostasy reigns, not 

only in Turkey and Pakistan, but also in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The challenge for AlQa’ida is to unite the rising jihadi spirit in Arab lands with that in the Caucasus. The 

76
regions of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan are fruitful areas for 

expansion because of the hostility toward Russia in those areas. 

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77
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600080

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 53 pages 

Title: Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A lengthy document of 20,000 words that examines the jihad waged against 

the Syrian regime of Hafez el Assad from 1976-1982. The document begins with a 

Chapter 2 entitled “Basics” followed by a Chapter 1 “Observations on the experience as a 

whole. This is followed by another Chaper 2 entitled “Lessons learned from the obstacles 

facing military jihad.” The Syrian militants belong to one group called the Attalieaa-the

Vanguard and their erstwhile allies in the Muslim Brotherhood fought secretly and 

openly against the Alawite regime in Damascus. Although brutally repressed, this 

campaign taught Islamic militants many valuable lessons. 

Key Themes: Drawing on Islamic tradition and Twentieth Century examples of guerilla 

and information warfare, the study takes a critical look at the many failings of this 

campaign, and develops a strategy for waging jihad successfully. 

Lessons learned can be grouped in these major categories: 

Islamic Tradition: 18 Lessons Learned, of which the most important are: 

Leadership Battles. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were more concerned about 

their leadership battles than the struggle. They are accused by the author of treason and 

criminal behavior against jihad. They betrayed the faith and devotion of the young 

followers. The Vanguard while strong in faith and dedication, were weak in leadership 

and training. Their Islamic devotion was blessed by Allah who saved them from deviant 

thought and deterioration. 

Insufficient religious instruction. Fighters were either not properly taught or not 

sufficiently instructed in Islam. This problem became more acute as the original fighters 

were killed off and replaced by members who lacked proper understanding of Islam.

Insufficient number of committed Mujahadeen to fill all important positions. 

Lack of study in the Islamic tradition. A myriad of rich experiences were readily 

available for those seeking knowledge, but nobody bothered to study these traditions. 

Failure to develop a public relations campaign to communicate Mujahid 

Revolutionary Theory, The most important element of any revolutionary struggle is to 

communicate the right message. This was not done and the people therefore did not 

support the struggle. 

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Untrustworthy Arab Regimes. While reluctantly willing to support jihad against Syria, 

the Arab neighbors were at best temporary allies. The leaders of the neighboring 

countries in reality feared Islam and imprisoned the faithful. 

Excessive Dependence on Outside sources of support. Mujahideen must be selfsufficient, otherwise they become dependent on unreliable external benefactors. It is 

better to depend on stealing from the hostile regime, than to develop a dependency on 

external supporters 

Failure to deter allies of Syria. The lack of a means to strike at the allies of Syria meant 

that Arab regimes suffered no penalty for assisting Damascus. 

Lack of Scholarly Contribution. Islamic scholars in the region failed to contribute their 

knowledge, and the Mujahideen likewise did not make sufficient effort to seek out and 

develop religious scholars. 

Unprepared Islamic Missionary Groups. These groups did not understand the 

requirements for jihad and failed to prepare their followers both spiritually and militarily 

for the struggle. 

Pan-Arabism Undermining the Islamic Message. When secular, pan-Arab nationalist 

thinkers became involved in the movement, the message of jihad was distorted by an 

Iraqi Baath message. 

Lack of Operational Security. Groups used open lines of communication which made it 

easy for intelligence services to collect information and control the movement. 

While all of these lessons do not appear directly related to the Islamic tradition, the 

conclusion to this section states that despite the failings of the religious leaders, the 

Muslim masses demonstrated the power of jihad, and Allah honored their sacrifice. “A

giving Muslim nation willing to sacrifice is the ultimate capital.” 

Lesson Learned in Jihad Operations and Guerrilla Warfare: (Text refers to “gang 

warfare” but the clear sense corresponds to the sense of guerrilla war) 

No comprehensive Plan and strategy. The movement lacked a strategic vision, had no 

understanding of the importance of terrain, and failed to analyze the strengths and 

weaknesses of the Syrian regime. This led to events, not plans, controlling the course of 

the battle. 

Insufficient screening of recruits. Mujahideen failed to vet carefully recruits. This 

allowed many government informers and moles to join, and betray the movement. 

Improper Command Structure. The movement was too dependent on outside sources 

and field commanders were not given sufficient authority. The organization must be 

provided with sufficient resources instead of depending on raiding the resources of the 

79
opponents. Field commanders, however, must be in communication with a central 

command that performs the planning and strategy, or the field commanders may be 

isolated and subsequently destroyed. 

Links to Intelligence Services. By developing relationships with the intelligence 

services of Arab states, the movement yielded its autonomy and came under the control 

of these groups. 

Too Much Time Spent in Training Camps. Much of the time spent in training camps in 

other Arab countries was wasted because no military or spiritual training was pursued. 

Leaders must stay close to their troops to properly instruct, train, and inspire them. 

Concentration of Forces. Too many of the forces were concentrated in Hama, Syria 

which allowed the Syrian military to concentrate its forces, encircle the city, and destroy 

the Mujahideen. 

Detachment from the Masses. Citing a “gang (guerrilla) warfare theorist, the author

repeats Mao’s familiar wisdom that “The masses are the sea in which the vanguard 

organization should swim like a fish.” The masses are the source of information, supplies, 

personnel, and organization. Successful examples of revolutionary war, Algeria, China, 

and Vietnam are contrasted with failures like Malaysia, Philippines, and Greece. 

Adequate Supplies. Prior to launching an operation, the movement must have secured an 

adequate supply of arms and ammunition. 

Communications Security. The organization must avoid open transmission of messages 

and develop a command structure that protects information and personnel from

disclosure. Capture of fighters creates a problem if they are knowledgable about the 

organization and its structure. The movement is encouraged to emulate the Italian Red

Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and ETA to see how organizations can 

compartmentalize information and still achieve operational effectiveness. 

Care for the Wounded. Plans must be made to allow for the evacuation of the wounded 

to care for them and most importantly to prevent them from being captured by the enemy. 

Role of Families. Mujahideen must accept that their families will be involved in the 

struggle, and that family members will be subject to punishment and torture by the 

regime. Retaliatory attacks will raise the morale of civilians and encourage the fighters. 

An American expert is quoted as follows: “...the brutality a regime uses against the 

civilians in retaliation to acts committed by the revolution is the best gift a revolution can 

receive, even neutral people will end up joining their ranks, the regime will be seen as the 

oppressor and the revolution will be seen as the just and fair side.” 

Victory. The war will not be won by defeating the enemy on the battlefield. Using the 

tools of modern communication combined with the power of faith the jihad will 

ultimately prevail. Victory will come in a protracted war in which the enemy is defeated 

80
through exhaustion and annoyance. Mujahideen must be smart, dedicated, and well 

trained, and only the fighters with the right personality and temperament can make 

successful mujahideen. Ultimately Allah will provide the victory. 

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81
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600113

Date: Unknown 

Author: Omar al-Sumale 

Length: 6 pages 

Title: A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi to Cape Kambooni and the 

Situation in the Southern Region 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: Omar describes the tribal population, the region’s cities, and the topography. 

He also writes about the schedule of future work, provides some examples of terrorist 

operations that his group carried out, and gives his opinion on the location and the future 

of the operation. 

Key Themes: The notes made in the first section represent a terrorist scouting report for 

the Kenyan coast popular with tourists. Special attention is given to the areas where 

tourists congregate, and the patrols conducted by the police. Tactics for avoiding police 

detection are described as well as navigational details for moving by ship along the coast. 

The second part of the document begins with ethnographic information about Bajuni, 

Ogaden, and Jal Jaal people of coastal northern Kenya and Somalia. Political programs 

were established with all three to promote their cooperation with Al-Qa’ida. 

Operational requirements for the region are established, and the results of two operations 

analyzed. 

Ambush of Belgian Patrol. Al-Qa’ida supported forces in Somalia are credited with 

killing a Belgian soldier in an ambush and driving the Belgians out of the region. 

Attacks against Indian forces. Al-Qa’ida supported forces are credited with a successful 

attack against the Indian Army encampment at Bols Quqani, and in another operation 

driving the Indian out of Kambooni. 

Omar has a high opinion of the local fighters who have proven to be successful and have 

inspired many Muslim youth to sign up and be fighters. 

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82
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600157

Date: unknown 

Author: Osama bin Laden 

Length: 1 page 

Title: Letter to Aba Khalid 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A one-paragraph response by bin Laden to a letter that Aba Khalid wrote to 

him. Bin Laden expresses pleasure that Khalid’s letter reflected an understanding of the 

goals of the movement and the dangers confronting it. Bin Laden also states that they are 

considering the suggestions of Aba Khalid and will let him know their decision on them. 

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Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600321

Date: unknown 

Author: Osama bin Laden 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: Letter to Mullah Mohammed ‘Omar from Osama bin Laden 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A two page typed letter discussing the situation in Afghanistan, the 

continuation of jihad in the Islamic Republics, and the situation in the Arabian peninsula. 

Key Themes: Through jihad Allah helped the Muslims to push the Communists out of 

Afghanistan. Following the Russian departure the country was in great turmoil, but under 

Omar’s leadership unification under Islamic law was made possible. 

Bin Laden cites the great success in training and arming the jihadists in Tajikistan, and 

emphasizes that this effort must be continued. The continuation of jihad throughout the 

Islamic Republics will keep the Russians and American allies focused on stopping the 

spread of jihad and not on the Afghan issue. The scientific human capital available 

throughout the Islamic Republics will assist greatly in future jihad. 

He then lists the reasons for the great significance of the Arabian peninsula: 

• it holds the Ka’abah and the Prophet’s mosque 

• it holds 75% of the world’s oil and whoever controls oil controls the world 

economy (this explains the tenacity of the Americans and others) 

He also notes the extreme importance of the media battle and that it may consume 90% of 

total preparation for battles. 

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84
Doc ID: AGFP 2002-600966 

Date: 22 June 2000 

Author: ‘Umar ‘Abd-al-Hakim

• a.k.a. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri 

• a.k.a. Mustapha Hakim al-Set Mariam 

• Born Mustapha Abdul-Qadir Mustapha Hussein al-Sheikh 

Ahmad al-Jakiri al-Rifa’ei 

Length: 81 pages 

Title: The Confrontation Between the Sunni Population of Al Sham against AlNaserieh, Crusaders and Jews 

Location: Kabul, Afghanistan 

Full Text: English Part: One Two Three Four Five Six Arabic

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Background: Per translator, this is an abbreviated version of a longer book that was 

found on floppy disks captured from Mes Ainak, Jalalabad 

The text is a call to jihad against the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Asad. It outlines various 

offenses committed by the Alawites (also referred to as Nusayris) against Sunni Muslims, 

presents theological justification in support of jihad, and outlines a broad strategy for 

beginning jihad in Syria. In addition to Syrian Alawites, Al-Suri advocates killing Sunnis 

in the employ of the government, Jews, and Christians, specifically mentioning 

Americans, British, French, and Russian. 

Table of Contents: 

1. The Pharoah is Dead, and the Nusayri Alawites Are Implanted in Syria. 

 2. The Nusayri Alawites: Creed, History, and the Rules of Islam Concerning Them

3. Selections From the Modern History of the Nusayri Alawites, 1970-2000 

4. The Mission Assigned to the Nusayris in Light of the Prospects for the Future 

5. What God Has Decreed in This Matter and the Duty Incumbent Upon the Sunnis 

6. Urgent Appeals 

7. Advice on the Method of Confrontation Between the Sunnis and the Nusayri 

Alawites in Syria and Lebanon 

8. Good News of the Book and the Sunni Concerning the Land of Syria and its 

People 

References: 

1. The Jihadist Islamic Revolution in Syria: Pains and Aspirations, by ‘Umar ‘abd-al 

Hakim

2. The Rules on Jihad Against the Apostates and Their Supporters, and the Rules on 

Driving Off the Tyrant, unpublished letter by ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim

3. The Nusayri Alawites, by Muhajid al-Amin 

4. The Conspiracy of Sectarian Statelets, by ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nuwawi 

5. Amal and the Palestinian Camps, by ‘Abdallah Gharib 

6. The Turn of the Magi Has Come, by ‘Abdallah Gharib 

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7. The Missing Duty, by Martyr ‘Abd-al’Salam Faraj 

8. Defending the Honor of Muslims is the Most Important of Individual Duties, by 

the martyr ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam

9. Major Fatwas Vol. 28, by Imam Ibn Taymiyah 

10. Hadith on the Virtues of Syria, Edition of Al=Albani 

11. Virtues of Syria and Its People, by Imam Ibn Taymiyah 

Other citations not listed above: Imam Abu-Bakr al-Jassas, Ibn Kathir, Abu-Ya’la 

Said, Ibn al-Qayyim, Ishaq bin-Rahawiyah, Imam al-Shatibi, Imam al-Qurtubi, AlSheikh Muhammad Rida, Al-Sheikh Mahmud al-Alusi, Al-Sheikh Muhammad Amin 

Al-Shanqiti, Sheikh Muhammad Na’im Yasin, Ahmad Shakir, Sheikh al-Islam

Mustafa Sabri, Ahmad Shakir, al-Tabari, ‘Abd-al Qadir ‘Awdah, Al-Jahidh Ibn Hajar, 

Imam al-Juwayni, 

PART ONE: 

The text is dedicated to martyrs through the ages and current heroes such as Usama Bin 

Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Sayyaf, Sayid Qutb, Hassan al Banna, and Marwan Hadid 

(partial list). It is written for “a new generation of young men who are determined to join 

the jihad” on the occasion of the death of Hafez al-Asad. 

PART TWO: Al-Suri presents theological arguments suggesting that the Alawites (also 

called Nusayris) are heretics who threaten the very survival of Muslims in Syria. The 

Alawite sect developed in the third century of the Hejira, drawing on rites drawn from 

Mazdaic, Jewish, Persian, Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist origins. Non-Islamic beliefs 

include the “idea of transmigration of souls, reincarnation, permissibility of fornication

with the unmarriageable, and sex between men.” Additionally, Alawites celebrate 

Christmas, the Persian holiday of Nawruz, and Islamic holidays not recognized by 

Sunnis. Al-Suri writes that Alawites do not believe in heaven and hell, or in judgment, 

and that their prayer rituals differ from those of Sunnis. Furthermore, they oppose 

pilgrimage to Mecca, and “harbor special hostility to the Ka’bah.” He cites pages of antiAlawite fatwas from Sheikh al-Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah stating that Alawites are 

“worse unbelievers than the polytheist Jews and Christians” and therefore it is the duty of 

any Muslim who is aware of their doctrines to expose them for what they are (apostates). 

PART THREE: Al Souri describes the historical sins of the Alawites in Syria, beginning 

with their help to the “Tatar” invaders who occupied Syria in xxx. The author holds the 

Alawites responsible for allowing Jerusalem to fall to the Crusaders, and for 

collaborating with the French occupation of Lebanon in 1920. This occupation eventually 

resulted in the current confessional system of governance in Lebanon, which, according 

to al-Suri, favors Christian interests. 

Al-Suri accuses the Alawites of supporting the rise of the socialist Ba’th party, and of 

deliberately losing the 1967 Arab-Israeli war by ceding the Golan Heights to the Israeli 

Defense Forces by secret arrangement. As evidence, he cites a Defense Ministry 

Communiqué, No. 66, which apparently ordered the Syrian army to withdraw from the 

battle lines seventeen hours before the IDF entered the town. Al-Suri goes on to accuse 

86
the Alawites of abandoning Lebanon to IDF control when it withdrew the Syrian army

from thirty-nine Lebanese villages in 1973. 

The author declares that the recent crimes of the Alawites are too numerous to describe in 

full, so he limits himself to a selection of issues. The Alawites are accused of purging all 

Sunnis from political, party, and military leadership, thereby placing Nusayris in control 

of all security and intelligence services. This has been compounded by a history of graft 

and corruption that fragmented the army and the economy through linkages between the 

Alawite officers and a “circle of big merchants.” The Alawites manipulated educational 

institutions through the Ba’th Revolutionary Youth, which led to distortions of the 

religion, and increased atheism, libertinism, corruption, dissolution, and rebellion. 

Furthermore, the Alawites eliminated any opposition from ulema, preachers, and sheikhs 

following the short-lived uprising led by Sheikh Marwan Hadid. 

From 1978-1982 Marwan Hadid led an uprising against Hafez al-Asad. According to alSuri, two thousand Sunni youth were killed by the government, and 30,000 were 

imprisoned, and 10,000 rendered homeless. Hadid was executed in 1976 (sic). Per alSuri, the government “liquidated” thirty-thousand Sunni prisoners and “bearers of 

advanced degrees” between 1983 and 1996. 

Al-Suri accuses the Alawites of co-opting members of the Palestine Liberation 

Organization (PLO) and then eliminating the PLO in Lebanon. According to the author, 

the Syrian army committed several massacres in Lebanon in 1975, and another in Hamah 

in 1982 which killed 45,000 civilians. In 1985 the Syrian army bombed Tripoli, killing 

several thousand and causing 300,000 to flee. He accuses the Alawite regime of 

cooperating with Christian Maronite militias to allow massacres in refuges camps in AlZa’tar in 1976, and again in the Sabra and Shatila camps in 1982. He believes that the 

Syrian army arranged the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. 

The author criticizes Hafez al-Asad’s manipulation of the government to allow his son 

Basil to be named as his successor. After Basil was killed in a car accident, al-Asad’s 

second son, Bashar, was put in place through manipulation of the legislature. Al-Suri 

faults Bashar for having spent ten years living in England being trained in “lackeyhood” 

by the British [per al-Suri, Bashar al-Asad is tainted because he completed his dentistry 

studies in England, yet al-Suri spent significant amounts of time in Spain and England]. 

PART FOUR begins with the statement that Asad is fulfilling the “task entrusted to the 

Nusayris” by the “international Christian-Jewish order.” The Nusayri mission is to allow 

the Jews to control the region through normalization of economic, cultural, political, 

military, and social relations with the West. He also accuses Arab leaders such as 

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King Abdullah, Saudi Crown Prince 

Abdullah, and the U.A.E. president of complicity with the “Crusader Jewish New World 

Order.” France comes under criticism for supporting the Maronite Christians in Lebanon, 

while Iran is accused of attempting to convert Syrian Sunnis to Shi’ism. 

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Al-Suri sees two possibile avenues by which the Nusayris may accomplish these 

missions. In the first scenario, Syria provokes a war with Israel so that Israel can “play 

the role of the hero.” The largely Sunni army will be decimated by the IDF’s superior 

firepower, and the Nusayris will then accept Israel’s terms. This is the “Iraq model.” In 

the second scenario, Bashar sponsors an era of openness to the Jews and Americans, 

resulting in a “deluge” of IMF loans and investments. The economy prospers, capitalism

prevails, and the Syrian people are “plunged into the maelstrom of consumer luxury” 

wherein the rich get richer, and the poor poorer. Both scenarios ensure Jewish survival, 

Christian oversight, and glory for the Nusayris while the Syrian people suffer occupation 

and the army is broken. This is the “Egyptian model.” 

After either of these, Israel will destroy al-Aqsa mosque, rebuild the Temple of Solomon, 

and expel the remaining Palestinians to Jordan, where they will be abased according to a 

different scheme supervised by the Masons and the sons of the former apostate Husayn 

(father of Jordan’s King Abdullah). The Lebanese Christians will control Lebanon, while 

the Syrian economy will be plundered by the Americans and Nusayris through American 

control of Syria’s oil reserves. Al-Suri cites leaked information from unnamed strategic 

centers that indicate Syria’s oil reserves equal or exceed Saudi reserves. 

PART FIVE: 

Al-Suri presents evidence suggesting that jihad is an individual duty in the case of Syria. 

He argues that jihad against infidels is an individual duty if the infidels seize any Muslim

land, or if they “transgress against any of Islam’s sanctities.” In this case, the same rules 

apply to jihad against anyone who supports the infidels. He cites evidence based on two 

kinds of jihad: offensive (jihad al-talab) and defensive (jihad al-daf). Offensive jihad 

involves pursuing the infidels in their lands, which is a collective duty, the smallest part 

of which is to block enemy frontiers with believers and to send an army at least once a 

year to the front. The Imam is responsible for sending a force against the enemy once or 

twice a year, and the people must help him. If he fails, it is a sin. He quotes other 

unnamed “fundamentalists” who say that jihad is an obligatory call, and it must be 

carried out as much as possible so there will remain none but Muslims and those entered 

into peace treaty with Muslims [the use of the term “fundamentalist” is important, as it 

may indicate that al-Suri is trying to position himself as a moderate, implying that his text 

is a mainstream argument containing nothing controversial]. 

The defensive jihad involves driving infidels out of Muslim lands, which is an individual 

duty. It is required in three (sic) cases: when infidels invade a Muslim town, if the two 

armies (Muslim and infidel) meet, if the Imam calls individuals or people to arms, and if 

infidels capture a number of Muslims [the third instance is particularly important, as alSuri is implying that he has the authority to call Muslims to arms]. He cites Ibn 

Taymiyah’s writing to illustrate that having no transportation to the battle is not an 

acceptable reason not to fight. This suggests that all Muslims must participate in 

defensive jihad, even if it constitutes a material sacrifice on their part. In other words,

there are no exemptions from jihad. To illustrate the broad foundation of this argument, 

al-Suri also cites a Hanafi scholar (al-Suri is Hanbali) who argues that collective duty 

becomes individual duty if those closest to the fighting need reinforcement. 

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[A section of the text or the translation may be missing] 

Al-Suri presents several pages of Sura and Hadith dealing with the importance of sharia 

law as the basis for law and governance. He quotes Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Kathir 

extensively to illustrate that rulers who do not ensure that sharia is the law of the land are 

apostates, and that supplementing sharia with other kinds of law is not acceptable. 

Mustafa Sabri, writing at the time of the Ottomans, warned about the dangers inherent in 

the separation of church and state, as it constitutes an attempt to destroy religion. Europe 

therefore is apostate and atheist. 

The next section provides evidence that alliances, collaboration, or cooperation with Jews 

and Christians are considered apostasy, again using Sura, Hadith, and quotations from 

scholars. From this, al-Suri presents evidence that it is a duty to fight apostate rulers. 

Critically, he writes that obedience to rulers is not a duty (‘Abd al-Qadir) and that 

Muslims do not need permission from anyone to undertake this duty. Other traditions of 

jurisprudence emphasize that obedience to rulers is necessary, even when they are unjust. 

Based on the preceding paragraphs, al-Suri declares that there are two choices: organize 

jihad against the Jews and Christians, or organize jihad against the other apostate enemies 

of God that are the “closest enemy” (here he mentions Jordan). He acknowledges that 

because Sunni Muslims are employed by the governments of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and 

other Arab countries, the jihad will necessarily involve fighting other Muslims. This leads 

into the next section, which discusses various scholarly opinions on dealing with 

“supporters of infidels and apostates.” 

Al-Suri states that most of the Muslims employed by the apostate regimes are either 

ignorant or forced to serve these regimes. It is desirable to educate them so that they may 

avoid serving apostates. Barring this, these Muslims should avoid fighting for the 

apostate regimes. If they are forced to fight, Allah knows what’s in their hearts, and will 

make the appropriate judgment for them. 

The next section explains that Muslims are allowed to defend their religion, life, honor, 

and property. Anyone who dies defending his life, honor, or property is a martyr (women 

and children are counted as part of the “honor” section). Property is broadly defined to 

include income, and this allows al-Suri to claim that tax collection is an attack on 

property, which can justifiably be fought. 

PART SIX is an appeal to Sunni Muslims in Syria, Lebanon, and Greater Syria to join 

the jihad against the apostate rulers and the infidel Jews and Christians. He asks what 

Muslims are waiting for, and mocks them by asking whether they’re content with 

degrees, television screens, and satellite dishes. Jihad in the path of Allah is the shortest 

way to paradise. A series of specific appeals follows, beginning with Sunni youth, whom

he calls the hope of Islam. He states that they do not need permission from anyone, as 

jihad is an individual duty. He urges the Ulema to awaken to their duty, arise from their 

negligence, and encourage jihad. Al-Suri’s appeal to the “sons of the Sunnis” that work in 

89
police, army, and security services is a bit conflicted. He condemns them for their 

participation in apostate regimes and assures them that they will be severely punished by 

God while simultaneously urging them to join the jihad. He urges Bashar al-Asad to give 

up his infidelity by becoming a Sunni, or else flee to his Christian masters. 

PART SEVEN: Al-Suri provides advice on how to confront the Nusayris in Syria and 

Lebanon, beginning with recruitment of more fighters. Unity of effort in da’wah, military 

and propaganda efforts is required. Avoid side clashes with other sects. Do not target 

Sunni supporters of the Alawites, especially those in the security services as it is 

preferable to win their support. Avoid infighting, and concentrate on domestic 

propaganda to further the cause. Methods for communicating the call to jihad include 

distribution of books, pamphlets, cassettes, computer disks, wall stickers, and writing 

“short slogans on walls.” He urges attention to operational security, and tells mujahideen 

to avoid leaving any marks, stamps, handwriting, or fingerprints that could be traced by 

security services. He suggests that jihadi cells should be pyramidal in organization, 

emphasizing small, scattered groups whose recruitment should be based on personal 

connections. 

Ulema should not be harmed, rather they should be presented with evidence that will 

correct their understanding of the situation. Al-Suri makes a strong point about this, 

repeating that it is a scandal to kill men of religion and knowledge. Moreover, it is a

scandal to give the government an opportunity to accuse the mujahideen of committing 

such acts, as they will call the mujahideen “kharijites.” 

In the beginning, military confrontations should be limited to attacking small companies 

and individuals, including seizure of civil, military and security chiefs at home or abroad. 

He recommends killing Jews, American, French, and English citizens “to cause turmoil.” 

He suggests that mujahideen should study the Quran, do extra fasts, and “work much and 

speak little.”

PART EIGHT: Here al-Suri cites Sura and Hadith extolling Syria’s importance and 

blessedness. He winds up with a final call to jihad, and signs off “from the Kabul 

Garrison.” 

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90
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-601041

Date: Unknown 

Author: Ayman Zawahiri 

Length: 3 pages 

Title: The Response to the Serious accusations against Shiekh Albani 

concerning the silence of the turncoat leaders. 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A call to Muslims to recognize shame and bad conditions of their lives is not 

the doing of fellow Muslims, but rather the result of the deception and cunning of the 

infidels. This three page document is an outline of an 18 page original document. 

Key Themes: Shar’ia is proclaimed as the rule of God and whoever doesn’t govern by 

Shar’ia is an infidel. Believers are called upon to kill the infidels. 

Sheikh Albani accused of making grievous errors for prohibiting Muslims from

participating in true jihad, and believing in a jihad based on forgiveness, education, and 

prayer. 

While calling for attacks against the Jews, the first priority should be an attack against the 

apostate backslidden leaders. 

The document refers to fatwas by Ahmad Shaker, Muhammad Hamid Al-Faqi, and 

Muhammad Bin Abr Aheem and revelations by Ibin A’bas and King Al-Shaj’ai. 

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91
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-601346

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 3 pages 

Title: Criticism of Abu Al-Bara’a 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: The author writes against those who “innovate in religion.” In particular, he 

believes that Abu Al-Bara’a distorts Islamic law to his own ends. Abu Al-Bara’a ignores 

any evidence or arguments brought forth contrary to his opinions and picks and chooses 

what teachings fit his interests. People such as Al-Bara’a do not comprehend the truth.

Key Themes: It is wrong to “innovate in religion.” Those who pick and choose which 

teachings to follow or advocate to fit their own interests are wrong and do not 

comprehend the truth. 

Abu Al-Bara’a is the man targeted in this piece. He is quoted as stating that one cannot be 

declared an apostate unless solid evidence is established and that the scholars’ statements 

do not address the issue of worshipping other deities than God. He specifically attacks 

Abu Hamza as being ignorant on this issue. 

Abu Hamza is then quoted in response. He cites two scholars who committed apostasy as 

counterexamples to Al-Bara’a’s note above. He also counters Al-Bara’a’s accusation by 

stating that the scholars’ rulings are not ultimate rulings but are based upon Islamic law. 

Also, he states that all scholars agree that polytheism is a damnable offense. 

The author concludes by again attacking Abu Al-Bara’a for using a deceptive style to 

justify his own agenda with Islamic law. Al-Bara’a repeatedly ignored arguments and 

evidence based upon the Koran, the Prophet’s traditions and scholars’ views, and tried to 

convince his readers of the accuracy of his belittlement of the scholars. Such behavior is 

unacceptable. 

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92
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-601693

Date: Unknown 

Author: Abu Mus’ab 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: None (Status of Jihad) 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A letter from Abu Mus’ab to Abu Mohammed relating a meeting with Abu 

Musab Zarqawi. The author and Zaraqawi agree that the Muslims fighting in Bosnia, 

Tajisistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir are polytheists and supporters of secular democracy, 

and that the Taliban are a front for Pakistan. 

Key Themes: Zarqawi tells Abu Mus’ab that he is accused of Takfir (infidelity) because 

of his views about the Mulsims in Bosnia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir. 

Their interest is in secular democracy and are all too willing to seek accommodation with 

secular power. 

93
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-602181

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: None (Political Speculation) 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: This document is a response to issues raised in a previous correspondence. It 

appears to be addressed to Al-Sahal Al-Mumtan’, but this could be the author’s name. 

The author is analyzing the impact of the destruction of the Buddha statues, the fall of the 

Taliban regime, and speculates on future U.S. steps in the Middle East. 

Key Themes: The author concurs with his correspondent in stating a low opinion of the 

Taliban. The Taliban has a “mentality based on fabrications, wrongdoing, beating around 

the bush and running away from reality.” The destruction of the Buddhas is judged 

insignificant in comparison to the desire of some Taliban to gain respectability by taking 

a seat in the United Nations. 

The author disagrees concerning Iranian leadership of the Islamic movement. He asks: 

“How can it fulfill the leadership role when it is incapable of guiding the Islamic 

insurgency?” He encourages Iran to attack Israel, and speculates that the U.S. is planning 

to attack Iran to protect Israel. 

The final paragraph expresses a change in tone with admiration expressed for the Taliban 

for destroying the Buddhas and protecting Osama bin Laden. 

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94
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-602187

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: None (Criticism of Sheik Bin Baz) 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A letter addressed to Sheik Rida from an unknown author criticizing the sheik 

for his unfair criticism of Sheik Bin Baz’s ruling on apostasy and his exaggeration of 

Sheik Magdasi’s blunder. 

Key Themes: Sheik Bin Baz issued two edicts: one forbade seeking the aid of infidels 

when the Syrian Mujahideen asked Saddam Hussein to overthrow the regime of Hafiz

Al-Assad in Syria; the other edict allowed the Gulf regimes to depend on the infidels in 

attacking Saddam Hussein. 

The author states that the recipient does not understand the position of Sheik Maqdasi, 

and should be open to the views of other’s. 

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Doc ID: AFGP-2002-603856

Date: 14/May/June 2002 (sic) 

Author: Al-Jihad Qa’ida Organization 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: Get the Idolaters out of Arab Island (Gulf Countries) 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: A warning to the officials of the United Arab Emirates to stop detaining 

Mujahideen sympathizers. 

Key Themes: This letter signed by the Al-Jihad Qa’ida Organization warns officials that 

they risk retribution if they keep arresting and detaining Mujahideen sympathizers. The 

author boasts that the security agencies of the emirates have been infiltrated, and if the 

Americans are vulnerable so are they. 

The tourist industry is described as shameless and the area is considered an easy target. 

Al-Qa’ida does not want to attack the Emirates, but policy in the area will compel an 

attack. 

96
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-801138

Date: Sept. 2000 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 57 pages 

Title: None (Various Administrative Documents, Minutes of Meetings, and 

Questions for Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders) 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: This document is a collection of many administrative papers dated September 

2000. They cover a range of administrative details concerning the administration of AlQa’ida camps in Afghanistan, issues raised by trainees in the camps, and interpretations 

of Qu’ranic verses. 

Key Themes: This document contains hundreds of questions apparently posed by recruits 

in Al-Qa’ida training camps in Afghanistan. While answers are not given, the questions 

are remarkable for the breadth of topics which they cover and their bold, challenging, and 

at times naïve style. The major category of questions and sample questions are as 

follows: 

1. Questions about Taliban and Arab Freedom Fighters: 

Please explain the legal reasons behind the guys fighting on the side of Taliban 

against Mas’oud, what is the fact behind this man and his followers. 

2. Ethics: 

There are infidels in Pakistan and India of Christian and others (sic). Is it ok for us 

to kill them and take their possessions and properties? Is it ok to steal from the 

infidels residing in the Islamic and non Islamic countries?

3. Saudi Arabia: 

After listening to these words, what is our duty towards the occupation of the 

Holy Land (Saudi Arabia) and do we unify to save the most sacred places on 

earth? 

4. Jihad Movements: 

The Eritrean movement is headed by brother Abu Suhail despite the weakness of 

their freedom fighters in guerilla warfare against the Afourqi Christian Jewish 

regime. Although the area is strategically important and Jewish experts are 

participating in fighting against the freedom fighters, no one is showing any 

interest in supporting this Jihad movement which is the entryway for combat in 

the Arabian Peninsula keeping in mind that the regime in it is Christian and that it 

was the land of the first migration of Islam?

5. Pakistan 

97
What is the cover story used by the Americans concerning the presence of the 

American Special Forces in Pakistan and what are the Pakistani interests in this 

case? 

6. Geography 

What are the countries that border Kosovo geographically on the map?

7. Chechnya: 

What is the latest news about Chechnya or how true is the news about the siege of 

the freedom fighters on the Dagestan borders?

8. The United States 

Dear Sheikh, you said that the United States can not pay its debts and to the rest 

of the countries. Does everyone borrow from the Jews?

9. News and Events: 

What are the latest news from Algeria, Philippines and Timor? 

10. Political Terminology: 

How could one benefit from politics and gain political analysis and knowledge of 

events? Is it by listening to the news or by reading books? What are the books you 

advise reading to gain political knowledge?

11. Old World Order: 

You mentioned that the British handed the Arabian Peninsula over to Al Saud. 

How were they chosen? 

12. Military: 

Please give us an idea about the AWACS aircraft. How is eavesdropping done 

from the aircraft, and what is the difference between it and the rest of the military 

aircrafts?

13. Islamic Movements: 

You mentioned that the Prophet accompanied him to battle the scholars, 

scientists, teachers and students. There was no excuse for anyone when it came to 

Jihad. What should we say to our famous scholars who did not participate in the 

Jihad against Russia in Afghanistan and the days of Serbia in the Bosnia and 

others?

14. Globalization: 

Dear Sheikh, don’t you see that public awareness in purchasing locally produced 

goods even if it is highly priced will relatively solve the globalization problem?

15. Islamic Countries 

Numerous questions raised about the political situation in countries with active 

jihad movements. 

98
16. Personal Qualities: 

Dear Sheikh, we observed that you are a man of politeness, humbleness and 

bashfulness. What is humbleness and how is it gained?

17. Apostasy: 

A matter is puzzling me and making me uneasy towards Jihad on the side of the 

Taliban. There is a presence of polytheism indicators in this country that is 

controlled by the movement. How would Sharia and monotheism be applied with 

the greatest of its pillars threatened now especially the existence of the tombs, and 

one of which is inside the mosque located in front of the offices of Emir alMu’mineen (Mullah Omar)?

18. Strategy: 

What is the advantage of moving the camps from one location to another knowing 

the enemy has the capability to detect the location of the camps anywhere it is? 

We all know that the Al-Jazirah TV station announced the movement of the 

terrorist camps to the area near Helmand. 

In addition to hundreds of questions raised by camp trainees, this document also includes 

a random assortment of papers dealing with the procurement of supplies for the camps, 

minutes of administrative meetings, and commentary about the meaning and applicability 

of Qu’ranic verses. 

The final document contains instructions for working with Adobe programs, editing 

video, and organizing documents using Microsoft software. 

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99
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-901188

Date: unknown 

Author: Osama bin Laden 

Length: 3 pages 

Title: Letter to Pakistani Scholars from Osama bin Laden 

Full Text: English Arabic 

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Synopsis: A letter to the scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar, Pakistan. Osama bin Laden 

asks for a fatwa from them, noting that some Arab peninsula scholars have already done 

so. He also encourages them to recruit youth as soldiers for the jihad and the wealthy for 

donations to the cause. Finally, he asks for allegiance to himself and Mullah Mohammed 

Omar. 

Key Themes: Bin Laden details the problem of the Islamic holy places continuing to be 

under the control of the Jews and the “Crusaders.” The Islamic governments have done 

nothing to stop this and are useless. The people need a clear fatwa from the scholars to 

end this sacrilege. 

The duty of the scholars is to explain the cause to the assembled masses who come to 

them for guidance. They must teach that the jihad is necessary for the sake of Allah. They 

must also teach that this jihad will occur under a group which obeys the will of Allah. Bin 

Laden specifically refers to Afghanistan under the leadership of Mullah Omar as being 

the embodiment of Allah’s will. 

He asks the scholars at their conference to encourage youth to join the jihad, persuade the 

rich to contribute funds, and to put out the fatwa he requests. He reminds them that some

scholar in the Arabian peninsula have already issued this fatwa. 

Finally, he asks for allegiance to himself then to Mullah Mohammed Omar. 

Back to Document List

100
Doc ID: Al Adl Letter

Date: June 13, 2002 

Author: ‘Abd-al-Halim Adl 

Length: 4 pages 

Title: Letter to Mukhtar 

Full Text: English Arabic

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Synopsis: ‘Abd-al-Halim Adl vigoroulsy challenges the leadership of Osama Bin Laden 

and accuses him of being close-minded and oblivious to the great harm suffered by AlQa’ida in recent months. He writes to Mukhtar both to confront him for his complicity in 

these ill-conceived plans and to change Mukhtar’s thinking. 

Key Themes: ‘Abd-al-Halim Adl writes a letter to his dear friend Mukhtar to challenge 

him for his role in the defeats that have befallen al-Qa’ida in the last six months, and to 

encourage him in his challenge to the management of Osama Bin Laden. The recent time

period is one in which the movement has gone from “misfortune to disaster” with serious 

setbacks encountered in East Asia, Europe, America, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, the 

Gulf, and Morocco. 

Al-Qa’ida needs to pause and regroup but ‘Abd-al-Halim ADL is a lonely voice on the 

exterior unable to impress those around bin Laden on the interior. He challenges Bin 

Laden’s leadership, and tries to convince Mukhtar to use his influence as one on the 

interior to halt the disastrous course of action pursued by Bin Laden. A pause for 

regrouping is desperately needed. But Bin Laden refuses to listen. ‘Abd-al-Halim Adl 

recognizes that Mukhtar has the ear of Bin Laden, and needs to tell him the truth about 

the external situation. Bin Laden, however, is difficult to persuade: “...unfortunately this 

is his habit that he will not abandon. If someone opposes him, he immediately puts 

forward another person to render an opinion in his support, clinging to his opinion and 

totally disregarding those around him, so there is no advice nor nothing.” (sic) 

He calls on Mukhtar to disregard Bin Laden’s order: “My beloved brother, stop all 

foreign actions, stop sending people to captivity, stop devising new operation, regardless 

of whether orders come or do not come from Abu-Abdalla (bin Laden.) 

‘Abd-al-Halim Adl writes out of conviction and appeals to Islamic obligation and his 

concern for Mukhtar that he not be judged by Allah for the errors which he has 

perpetrated. 

He concludes the message by questioning the recent posting of another letter that ended 

up on a web site and revealed the identity of his family. 

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101
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003345

Date: 12 April 1994 to 7 May 1998 

Author: Osama Bin Laden “The Committee for Advice and Reform”

Length: 103 pages 

Title: Letters from bin Laden: A Collection of letters from Osama Bin Laden to 

various persons in Saudi Arabia 

 Statements 7 -21 

Full Text: English Part: One Two Three Four Five Arabic

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Notes: 

Skipped pages indicate repetition of a communiqué 

The translations omit specific Sura and Hadith, as well as the names of scholarly sources 

that were mentioned in the original Arabic texts. 

References: Imam Malik, Imam Ahmad, Ibn Taymiyah, Al-’Izz Ibn ‘Abd-al-Salam

Synopsis: The following letters were written between 1994 and 1998, and cover a range 

of topics related to Saudi Arabia. The primary theme is the illegitimacy of the Saudi 

regime, and the allegation that they are supporting a Western plot to destroy the Muslim 

nation. Each letter addresses a current event, describing the event and providing the 

author’s analysis of the context and implications of the regime’s actions. Most statements 

end with a call to action on the part of the regime, the scholars, or the citizens of Saudi 

Arabia. The statements are coherently written and well-organized, and they are designed 

to motivate support through appeals to Muslim’s better nature. Bin Laden’s writing 

demonstrates an ability to communicate with multiple audiences, appealing to each 

group’s pride and specific capabilities 

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Statement 7 (sic), pp. 001-003: Our invitation to Give Advice and Reform 

To: King Fahd Bin ‘Abd-al ‘Aziz Al-Saud and the people of Saudi Arabian 

Peninsula 

02-11-1414 (12 April 1994) 

King Fahd has asked Osama Bin Laden to return to the country, however this is unlikely 

as Osama Bin Laden’s money was frozen and his passport confiscated. Religious scholars 

have previously asked King Fahd to cease actions against God’s law but he has not done 

so. A petition signed by 400 people was sent in 1411 (during the Gulf War), and another 

in 1413. The people’s rights have been abrogated and corruption infests government 

agencies. The country’s monetary and economic situation is worsening, taxes have been 

raised yet the government wastes money. The armed forces are in poor condition, and 

shari’a law has been suspended. Foreign policy works against the interests of Muslims in 

Gaza, Jericho, and Algeria while supporting infidels. Attempts to promote reform have 

triggered reprisals and the “waging of war against just people who are hunted at home

and abroad.” To fulfill advisory promises, “we would like to announce the arrival of our 

brothers and scholars into the country.” Osama Bin Laden urges King Fahd to abide by 

the requests of the Committee. End quote: God will not change people unless they do so 

for themselves. 

Statement 3, p. 007: Saudi Arabia Supports the Communists in Yemen 

27-12-1414 (07 June 1994) 

The Yemeni communists have enslaved the Yemeni people, spreading apostasy and 

corruption. Infidel forces and their agents in the region led a conspiracy to re-establish 

two Yemeni states to promote conflict between them, Prince Sultan led a special

committee that funneled support to the Yemeni Socialist Party. King Fahd is known to 

have anti-Islamic policies such as opposing Islamic awakening that would expose the 

artificiality of his rule; supporting anti-Islamic regimes such as the USSR, Algeria, Syria, 

and Christian groups in Sudan. Furthermore, he supported United Nations resolutions that 

cost Muslim lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Kashmir, and which support the 

Jews in Palestine, Muslims now realize that the U.N. is an instrument in the hands of the 

Jews and Crusaders, Such behavior encourages divisions in the umma, leads to dispersal 

of wealth away from the Arabian Peninsula, supports socialists and communists who 

oppress the Yemeni people, is likely to provoke punishment from God, and allows for 

foreign intervention in the region. The letter ends with a call to the ulema to declare that 

these policies are dangerous and evil. 

Statement 4, pp. 009-010: The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian 

Peninsula: The Episode and the Proof. 

12-2-1415 (11 July 1994) 

Jihad operations had been successful in eliminating socialist camps in Yemen, which is a 

lesson proving that all those who oppose the faith of the amah will fail. The Saudi 

regime, particularly Prince Sultan, supported the communist factions with money and 

weapons, which is a form of apostasy given that communists are atheists. Western 

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powers were too smart to back the losing side, showing that Western powers will not 

“take the risk of intervening in order to protect or assist corrupt regimes that do not have 

the support or endorsement of their people.” The defeat of the communists is a rejection 

of secular and atheist regimes across the region. 

Statement 5, pp. 013-014: Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism 

11-2-1415 (19 July 1994) 

Osama Bin Laden praises scholars who have bravely unveiled the truth about the Saudi 

government. The government has used witchcraft and the media to justify its stands 

against Islam, while supporting the unbelievers. Scholars have raised the head of the 

ummah high to face the despotism and injustices of the regime. In turn, the government 

has slandered these scholars, taking away their freedom and trampling their rights. 

Statement 6, pp. 017-018: Saudi Arabia Unveils its War Against Islam and its 

Scholars 

08-04-1415 (12 September 1994) 

In accordance with instructions from the United States, Saudi intelligence agents are 

arresting prominent anti-government scholars and preachers, including Salman Al-

’Awdah and Safar al-Hawali. Prince Bandar also publicly acknowledged a relationship 

with the Zionist entity. This confirms that the Saudi government is in a war against Islam 

and is no different from secular governments. The government has been unable to deal 

with criticism, and indicates that the King and his “gang” obey the mercenary intelligence 

agents of foreign governments, Christians, and Zionists, Osama Bin Laden calls for 

righteous scholars to be patient and steadfast, for Muslim people to stay committed and 

not be confused by government deception, for silent scholars to take a stand, for Muslims 

in government to remember that they are accomplices unless they act against the regime, 

and to the government to be advised that they are at war with God. 

Statement 7, pp. 21-22: Urgent Letter to Security Officials

11-04-1415 (16 September 1994) 

 

Security officers are reminded that they were trained to defend the interests of their 

people and to act as their representatives. They must be vigilant guardians, but the 

government has attempted to take this “great and honorable position” away from them

and turn them against Islam by forcing them to participate in the arrest and detention of 

scholars. He lists crimes of the Saudi government before calling on the security services 

to refuse to arrest any more scholars. He reminds them that God will bear witness to the 

punishment of those who stand by a tyrant, and reminds them that “every Muslim’s 

blood, wealth, and food are forbidden to other Muslims.” To show other Muslims that 

they are slaves of God alone, they should repent evil, refuse to obey orders to commit 

aggression against ulema, urge others not to obey such orders, help the people remove 

tyranny, not trust the regime, and strive to have the arrested scholars released. 

Statement 8, pp. 25-26: Important Telegram to Our Brothers in the Armed Forces 

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14-4-1415 (19 September 1994) 

The Saudi government has exposed its hostility to Islam by arresting the best of the 

ulema. The regime also imported Christian women to defend it, thereby placing the army 

in the highest degree of shame, disgrace, and frustration. It allowed American army bases 

in the peninsula, supported communists in Yemen, and has not helped defeat the IDF. 

Prince Sultan received five billion dollars’ worth of commissions on arms sales in one 

year at the same time that allowances and reimbursements for soldiers were stopped. He 

argues that the regime has lost its legitimacy as a result of its friendliness with enemies of

Islam and because of its hostility to the feelings of the people in a time of need. He 

predicts that it’s only a matter of time until the regime falls. He reminds the 

“extraordinary men” that they are guardians of the faith, and reminds them that “if a man 

kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is hell, to abide therein forever and wrath 

and curse of God are upon him,” (Quran 4:93) and that “the most despicable to God is he 

who kills a Muslim man” (Hadith). 

Statement 9, pp. 29: Do Not Have Vile Actions in Your Religion 

11-04-1415 (16 September 1994) 

Muslim youth are called to action. The time of listlessness and relaxation is over. The 

Saudi government committed a fatal mistake in arresting scholars, as this shows that they 

are enemies of Islam. This not a trial but a blessing, as it reveals the truth about the battle 

between the regime and the people and their ulema, The people, who are “exploding with 

anger” are urged to renew their pledge to God by giving as much as they can (to zakat), 

to be disciplined and avoid taking actions that will harm the interests of the whole, to 

reveal the reality of the struggle to everyone they know, and to continue to demand the 

release of the imprisoned scholars. 

There is a genius way of writing as if his opinions are already accepted and as if it should 

all be intuitive. 

Statement 10, pp. 31-32: Higher Committee for Harm!! 

10-05-1415 (15 October 1994) 

After conducting an “insane campaign” against the ulema and scholars in Saudi Arabia, 

the regime created the Higher Committee for Islamic Affairs. This entity is an attempt to 

polish the regime’s image by deceiving the people into believing that its purpose is to 

promote da’wah. Prince Sultan (Minister of Defense) and Prince Naif (Minister of 

Interior) are head of the council, which “leaves no room for doubt” about its intentions: 

“the destruction of true Islam and its da’wah, support for the religion of the king, and 

preparation for the history of the two black men filled with a malice for Islam.” The 

duties and powers of the council are not defined, showing the arrogance of the regime. 

The creation of this committee shows that the regime is not ready to listen to the good 

council of Sheikh ‘Adb-al ‘Aziz Bin Baz, who had tried to encourage reform. The 

committee has punished Sheikh Bin Baz by absorbing his powers. The strange thing is 

that the regime is able to find ulema that are still willing to back it. 

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Statement 11, pp. 35-38: Open Letter for Sheikh Bin Baz 

27-07-1415 (29 December 1994) 

Begins with praise and greetings, and a Hadith: “The best jihad is the word of truth in the 

presence of the unjust sultan.” The ulema are heirs to the prophets and represent the good 

example and ideal model for the umma. The true ulema resist tyranny and speak the truth. 

Osama Bin Laden reminds the Sheikh of his great responsibility, and wonders at his 

silence during a time of liars and evil. Osama Bin Laden lists examples where the ulema 

have acted in error, about which Sheikh Bin Baz has not corrected the error. 

1. Corruption has spread, and ulema have been complicit in sanctioning usury (charging 

interest for bank loans, which is considered haram by some Muslims). Osama Bin Laden 

states that the Sheikh has deceived the people by not making a distinction “between rulers 

who merely tolerate usury and rulers who legitimize and legalize usury.” Those who 

legitimize usury are apostates and infidels, but Bin Baz continues to praise the regime. 

The current economic struggles are a punishment from God for allowing usury. 

2. King Fahd wore a cross, and Bin Baz justified this action, although it is clearly 

apostasy. The king’s poor health is clear indication that this was infidelity.

3. Bin Baz issued a fatwa permitting the Crusader-Jewish alliance that occupied the 

country in the name of liberating Kuwait. This was an abominable action that insulted the 

honor of the umma, sullied its dignity, and defiled the holy places. 

4. Bin Baz kept silent when the Saudi regime aided the communists in Yemen, 

considering them to be fellow Muslims. Osama Bin Laden writes, “When were the 

communists ever Muslims? Aren’t you the one who previously issued a fatwa on their 

apostasy and the necessity of killing them in Afghanistan? Or is there a difference 

between Yemeni communists and Afghan communists?” 

5. Bin Baz wrote a fatwa allowing the “attacks and maltreatment” of the ulema that 

resulted in eh arrest and detention of Salman al-’Awdah and Safar al-Hawali. 

More recently, Bin Baz supplied a fatwa sanctioning peace and normalization with the 

Jews, something that is painful for Muslims as it gives a veneer of legitimacy to the 

“surrender documents that the treacherous and cowardly Arab tyrants signed,” opening 

Jerusalem to occupation. 

Per Osama Bin Laden, the present Jewish enemy is “not dwelling in his original country,” 

and therefore peace is not allowed (as it is with one who is warred on from outside). Jews 

have usurped sacred Muslim land, and they are an “attacking enemy” that corrupts 

religion. [The formulation that Jews are outside their original country allows any kind of 

warfare upon them.] Ibn Taymiyah is quoted as follows: The attacking enemy who 

corrupts the religion and the world must, in keeping with the faith, be repelled. There are 

106
no (limiting) conditions.” Therefore, it is religiously required to defend Palestinian 

people and the “stone-throwing heroes.” 

Osama Bin Laden goes on to argue that even if it were permissible to make peace with 

the Jews, the Arab leaders are illegitimate, and are therefore not allowed to make peace 

on behalf of the umma. Such apostate rulers have neither legitimacy nor sovereignty over 

Muslims. Bin Baz’ fatwa gave legitimacy to secular organizations [the United Nations] 

and deceived the umma with its disgraceful summary and misleading generalization. 

Osama Bin Laden suggests that the opinions of people who have experience in jihad are 

more legitimate than those who have no experience. Quoting Ibn Taymiyah, “Obligation 

is to be considered in matters of jihad according to the opinion of upright men of religion 

who have experience in what people of this world of, rather than those who mainly look 

at a matter from the viewpoint of religion. Do not adopt their opinion – not the opinion of 

men or religion that have no experience in the world.” [This is another key formulation 

that gives Osama Bin Laden’s opinion equal weight to that of religious scholars, and 

gives him the authority to challenge more learned men]. Whoever issued Bin Baz’ fatwas 

has a “lack of awareness of the true nature of the situation.” Osama Bin Laden closes 

with several paragraphs urging bin Baz to keep his distance from the tyrants and 

wrongdoers. 

Statement 12, pp. 47-50: The Second Letter to Sheikh ‘Abd al’Aziz Bin Baz

29 January 1995 

Sheikh Bin Baz’ latest fatwas have “scared Muslims in general, as well as freedom

fighters, and weaker men/women and children of Palestine.” These fatwas give religious 

legitimacy to Arab leaders’ political treason in that it allowed reconciliation with the 

[Jewish] enemy. The Advice and Reform Foundation had expected Sheikh Bin Baz to 

take a stand against this, but instead he confirmed his earlier fatwas on the same subject. 

The current situation in Palestine cannot be considered a truce, because only the enemy’s 

terms have been met. Additionally, the deal was created by a group of apostate Arab 

leaders. The agreement, which establishes diplomatic representation and economic 

cooperation, effectively indicates Jews’ “eternal ownership of the land – thus 

permanently calling off jihad” [Entering into treaty commitments legitimizes Israel’s 

existence]. Secularism amounts to atheism, and so this agreement is based on 

“invalidity,” therefore it is invalid itself. 

“This fatwa’s claim of Muslim’s weakness and inability to fight Jews is invalid, 

because...subject experts did not issue it...It does not make sense [that] more than a 

billion Muslims who own the largest natural resources in the world are unable to defeat 5 

million Jews in Palestine.” The ailment is not the military or financial, but rather the 

leaders’ betrayal and the scholar’s acceptance of the current situation. 

107
Osama Bin Laden calls for a return to fatwas issued by those who have knowledge of 

both religion and current affairs, urges Bin Baz to distance himself from the regime or 

resign his position. 

Statement 13, pp. 51-52: Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms 

12 February 1995 

The Saudi regime has dissolved charitable organizations that used to deliver donations 

directly to needy people inside and outside the country. These independent organizations 

have been replaced by new institutions that are subservient to Prince Salman, who “has 

never been known to be interested and care for Muslim affairs.” In the past, the Saudi 

regime used popular donations to influence Afghan freedom fighters to conform to 

Western policy goals. It also gave donations to Christian organizations in Bosnia, to 

Yemeni communists, to the communist Dostum (Rachid Dostum, an Afghani warlord), 

and the Al-Kata’ib party in Lebanon. The Saudi regime supported the Algerian regime as 

it suppressed Muslims, and also provided money to the Soviets to repress Muslims in 

Chechnya. 

The timing of this initiative supports the U.S. presidents’ decision to freeze the assets of 

groups that oppose the [Middle East] peace process. Osama Bin Laden draws the 

brother’s attention to the danger of depositing monies into UD banks, as it may be frozen. 

Muslims are encouraged to avoid giving funds to the government agencies, but rather 

give them directly to the needy, or those “trusted individuals who will deliver them.” 

Statement 14, pp. 55-58: Saudi Arabia Continues Its War Against Islam and Its 

Scholars 

09 March 1995 

After Eid a- Fitr, a second group of clerics was detained, including Muhammad bin Sa’id 

al-Qahtani, Dr. Sa’id bin Zu’ayr (Zuhayr) and Dr. Bashar al-Bashar. This confirms the 

aggression of the Saudi regime against Islam and is evidently a “strategy planned by 

international infidel countries.” These Sheikhs, like Salman al-’Awdah and Safar alHawali, have been imprisoned for speaking the truth, calling for the application of

Islamic laws, and calling for reform of the media and administration. [Text goes on to list 

same grievances previously mentioned in preceding letters regarding usury, the state of 

the military, etc]. Reiterates the regimes hostility to Islam and these scholars personally, 

and reminds umma to be wary of fatwas issued on behalf of the regime’s interests. 

Osama Bin Laden notes that these most recent arrests came after NATO’s “call tot eh

countries of the region to cooperate in order to eliminate the danger that threatens its 

interests and desires for hegemony [referring to ?]. In fact, the Saudi regime has done

Muslims a favor by revealing its true objective and providing proof to those who still 

think positively about the regime. He urges fair trials for the detainees, who are praised 

for their courage and reminded that this is a trial from Allah to differentiate the righteous 

from the others. 

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Statement 15, pp. 59-68: Scholars are the Prophet’s Successors 

16 May 1995 

Scholars are the successors of the prophet and the defenders of religion. Because of their 

importance, it is important to distinguish between those working to further the word of 

Allah, and those who prefer earthly things and materials. Sura and Hadith emphasizing 

importance of scholars. Underestimating scholars, or talking negatively about their 

knowledge is “associated with danger,” yet no one should be impressed with the 

knowledge of one who memorizes the Quran but doesn’t follow its teachings. Bad 

scholars can be distinguished from good scholars in two ways: lack of acting on their 

knowledge, and changing what Allah said to interpret laws to their own benefit. 

“Disintegration of rulers is caused by scholar’s dissolution, which is caused by love of 

money and material things,” and standing up to bad scholars is a priority in defending 

Islam. Yet a majority of people believes that “obeying scholars had no limits” and this is 

a mistake, which is why religious laws warn against glorifying scholars. Quoting Sheikh 

Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al Wahab in his book Al-Tawhid: those who obey scholars and 

rulers in forbidding that what Allah allows and vice versa, perceive them as gods. 

[Therefore, anyone who blindly follows any scholar in something contrary to Allah is an 

apostate.] 

Several paragraphs about proper way to correct scholars follow, which show that a harsh 

response is legitimate when a scholar persists in a judgment or action after he is aware 

that he is “on the wrong side.” Some exception is made for scholars who have good 

intentions but are taken advantage of by corrupt sultans. However, fatwas may not be 

issued by those who are not fully informed, and such fatwas are automatically null. 

The requirements for a good scholar are listed. Scholars must be role models in 

knowledge and action, and must be sure of all the conditions of a fatwa. He must be 

aware of the possibility of being led into temptation, and have the courage to speak out. 

Salman al-’Awhad and Safar al-Hawali are examples of courageous scholars. Scholars 

must stay away from the “suspicious ways of rulers,” and the Prophet is quoted as saying, 

“Whoever gets close to rulers will be infatuated, the closer a person gets to a ruler, the 

farther he gets away from Allah.” Scholars who abide by these guidelines deserve respect 

and honor. 

Statement 16. p. 69: Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commission 

13-2-1415 (11 July 1995) 

The Saudi regime has abandoned the requirements of monotheism and witnessing (there 

is no God but God, and Mohammad is his messenger), and therefore has lost its 

legitimacy. The economy is in terrible condition, due in part to the accumulation of 

interest debt and the plundering of public wealth by the regime. These debts have led to 

privatization of state assets such as the Saudi airline. Clearly, the regime intends to get 

new money “from the hands of the people.” Privatization will get rid of the debts of the 

airline, but only after it purchases 7.5 billion dollars for 60 new American-made planes, 

which are not needed. The French made a much better offer, but royal family members 

109
(particularly Prince Sultan) made the deal in order to please the Americans. This will 

provide 20,000 jobs to U.S. airline manufacturers, which will keep it operational for five 

years. 

The private sector will probably be forced to buy the Saudi national airline at an unfair 

price, and will have to assume the accumulated debt. As a result, privatization will cost

many people their jobs, and it is unclear who will then pay for the air travel of the royal 

family. 

Statement 17, pp. 71-79, 89: An Open Message to King Fahd On the Occasion of the 

Latest Ministerial Shuffle 

5-3-1415 (3 August 1995) 

This letter is an attempt to “pierce the veil with which [the king] has surrounded [himself] 

so that [he] does not have to listen to the truth.” Osama Bin Laden hopes to break through 

the wall that [the king] has built around [himself] “that stops the truth from getting to” 

him.

The king and his princes have deceived the people, and have tried to “absorb their anger 

through marginal and deceptive reforms,” which were “nothing more than temporary 

sedatives for the people’s anger.” The Advisory council was “born dead” and the recent 

ministerial shuffle will have minimal impact. The king curbed the rights of the religious

scholars, and desecrated the nation’s holy places while plundering its wealth. He led the 

nation into an economic decline. The basis for these problems is that the king and the 

regime “strayed from the requisites of monotheism and its obligations.” 

Anyone who legislates human laws that are contrary to the laws of Allah is an infidel 

[Quranic citations apparently follow, but these were not included in the translation]. The 

Saudi regime is therefore practicing the arbitration of infidel laws, which are “positive” 

[can be developed and elaborated upon by people]. Trade councils and banking laws that 

allow interest in transactions are one example of such laws. A second example is the Gulf 

Cooperation Council, which lists as its legal basis the laws of the council itself, the 

principles of international law, the world conventions, and the principles of Islamic 

shari’a. Osama Bin Laden calls this mockery to the religion and contempt to the shari’a, 

and continues, “You placed the scum of human positivist thoughts, the customs and 

traditions of the pre-Islamic epoch, and the laws of infidel judicial associations above the 

shari’a.” Several Sheikhs are quoted to establish the authenticity of this argument. 

On the subject of interest, Osama Bin Laden writes that, “the one that was aware that it 

was forbidden to accept interest and goes ahead and does it, he had committed one of the 

gravest sins, Allah protect us; however, the one who legislates the laws that allow interest 

is an infidel. The bank towers themselves rival the towers of the two holy mosques. 

The true motive of the regime is to protect infidel interests. Although the regime

sometimes supports Islamic causes, it never supports these causes when they conflict 

with Western interests. Somalia, Bosnia, and Palestine, “the mother of Islamic causes” 

110
are examples. He relates an incident in which President Clinton demanded that the king 

meet him at the American air base, not in Riyadh, as a humiliating example of American 

dominance, demonstrating that the kingdom is no more than an American protectorate 

subject to American laws. 

The economic situation is dire. At the beginning of the king’s reign, there was an 

estimated reserve of one hundred and forty billion dollars, with average daily oil revenue 

amounting to one hundred million dollars. In spite of this, the country is indebted by 

more than eighty percent of its national gross income, which makes it the most indebted 

nation in the world [?]. Average citizens suffer from high taxes and duties, and the rising 

cost of water, electricity, and food. Commodity prices are rising, and schools are 

suffering from over crowdedness. Hospitals are no being properly maintained or funded, 

and unemployment is rising. The government has urged people to conserve energy while 

the palaces are well lit, with the air conditioning running day and night. The king has 

built palaces all over the country, and in every major world capital and Western resort. 

The causes of the crisis include falling oil prices, for which the king bears some

responsibility as he allowed the oil reserves to be tapped in order to prevent price spikes. 

The king is subordinated to Western interests, as demonstrated by his decision to provide 

$25 billion to Saddam Hussein to keep the price of oil down during the Iran-Iraq war in 

order to hurt Iran. The king has not attempted to find alternate sources of income, and 

spent sixty billion dollars to underwrite the cost of the Gulf war. After the war, the 

regime spent an additional forty billion dollars on American arms, and also purchased 

Tornado aircraft from the British. 

The regime borrowed from local international banks with interest, and the king has 

“broken every statistical record in squandering” public funds. This puts him in a class 

with the Shah of Iran, Marcos of the Philippines, Ceausescu (SP?) of Romania. 

The first economic crisis of Saudi Arabia was in 1964 and 1965, due to the 

mismanagement of King Sa’ud who was removed from the throne to resolve the crisis. 

There was a second crisis in 1986 due to collapse of oil prices. 

On judgment day, Allah will not talk to an adulterous sheikh, a lying king, or an arrogant 

destitute (Hadith). The king has limited options, none of which will be politically 

popular. In a mocking tone, Osama Bin Laden asks the king if he will reduce the interest, 

devalue the riyal, raise taxes, or sell government properties (by which he means palace 

furnishings). Osama Bin Laden tells the king that his “staying will be the cause of your 

extinction, and your continuing on will be the cause of your end.” 

The military situation: The army has traditionally consumed one third of the national 

budget, which is much more than other countries (France, for example, spends one 

percent). In spite of this spending, the army is just a lot of equipment with no human 

resources to use it. It has been used as a source of income by influential princes. 

Examples of unnecessary spending include the seventy F-15 aircraft purchased “to 

support George in his election campaign after the war.” There was a deal to expand the 

111
telephone system for the sake of Clinton, who “lost because of your support to his 

competitor George Bush” (sic). 

During the Gulf war the air force “did not perform anything worth mentioning” while the 

navy didn’t fire a single shot. In order to prepare one brigade of armored cars, the army

had to bring in technicians from Pakistan. This demonstrates the failure of Prince Sultan 

as Minister of Defense. 

In 1992 the citizens of the Arabian Peninsula spent more money on defense than 

Germany, Italy, Egypt, Romania, Poland, Spain, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ireland, and the 

United States combined (sic). Much of the money has gone to commissions and bribes, as 

princes seize between forty and sixty percent of the value of every arms deal. Most of the 

balance of money has been spent on bases and facilities that are too large for the national 

army, and were built to serve the American and Western forces. Why are the Americans 

still on these bases? Is Iraq still an imminent threat? Saudi Arabia has been delivered into 

“a condition of chronic military crippling in [an] effort to tolerate the Crusader and 

Jewish forces that are defiling the holy places.” 

The king and the defense minister are to blame, not the “members of the Army or the 

Guard, whose goodness, gallantry, and bravery have been witnessed by many.” The King 

has always been afraid of allowing coordination between the forces, yet coordination is 

essential for successful military operation. 

Summary: The regime has “committed sins against Islam that negate its guardianship in 

the eyes of Allah.” These sins include corruption, subordination to the infidels and their 

laws, and failure in the areas of defense, economics and economics. These failures 

demonstrate the king’s inability to run the nation, “even if he had not sinned against 

Islam.” There is a deep struggle between two ideologies: a godly system that is whole and 

places all matters in the hands of Allah versus the regime itself. The religious scholars,

reformers, merchants and tribal sheikhs will all go against the regime. This will not be

considered a prohibited abandonment of the rulers because the regime lacks legitimacy: 

“what does not exist legally, does not exist at all.” 

Osama Bin Laden urges the king to accept responsibility and resign. 

Statement 18, pp. 91-92: The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of 

the Two Mosques 

15-3-1416 (11 August 1995) 

The Saudi government closed charitable organizations that delivered contributions of 

benefactors to deserving recipients. These organizations have been replaced with 

associations that are supervised by members of the ruling family such as Prince Sultan 

and Prince Salman. This revealed a scheme to monopolize charitable contributions to 

prevent Islam and Muslims from reaping any benefit. It has been used to pressure 

mujahideen and influence their policies. These “scandals” have become public, but the 

regime ignores the growing level of awareness about this situation. The government’s 

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involvement is merely a show of support to “raise the value of its declining political 

stock.” 

By way of example, money donated to the Palestinian cause (the mother of all Islamic 

causes) was diverted to the “extortive Jews.” Contributions that were meant for Bosnian 

Muslims were shared with Croats and Serbs. The Saudi regime sponsored a United 

Nations conference on Bosnia that was designed to ensure the destruction of Bosnian 

Muslims by denying them the means to defend themselves. 

When individual citizens tried to intervene to help the Bosnians, the regime prohibited 

their travel in response to Western pressure, and then arrested these individuals when 

they returned to Saudi Arabia. The Bosnians know who their real supporters are, the 

“cream of youth who have slipped away from the grasp of the ruling regime.” 

The following lessons have been learned: Muslim regimes do not represent the will of 

their own people, human rights and equality are dead slogans of the west when it comes 

to Muslim matters, the United Nations is nothing but a tool to implement the Crusader’s 

plan to kill the nation of Islam, and compliance with the United Nations constitutes 

conspiracy against Muslim causes. 

Therefore, Muslims are urged to bypass the regime-sponsored charitable organizations 

and donate directly to trusted individuals who will ensure that the money is used for 

Muslim causes, not against them. 

Statement 19, pp. 95-96: The Saudi Regime and the Repeated Tragedies of the 

Pilgrimage 

8-12-1417 (16 April 1997) 

Every year there are catastrophes and tragedies during that kill thousands of pilgrims. The 

Saudi regime has not taken the necessary precautions to prevent these tragedies. There 

are insufficient accommodations, which leads to crowdedness. The lack of security 

procedures, poor handling of events, and general negligence contribute to the problem.

The number of pilgrims is increasing, yet little money is being spent on the problem. A 

little spending is all that’s needed. 

At the same time, the regime has made a big deal about the killing of a handful of 

American military personnel. “To satisfy the Americans, the regime offered the heads of 

a group of pure youth who are zealous about their belief , their country, and their 

nation....Since when are a handful of defiled Jewish souls and the conquering Americans 

more precious than thousands of guests of the most merciful and the pilgrims of his 

ancient house?” Adding insult to injury, the regime has kept some of the bodies of 

deceased pilgrims for autopsy materials. 

Statement 20, pp. 97-98: (no title) 

No date or signature 

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The recent arrest of scholars from Pakistan is one more example of the Saudi regime’s 

“deep-rooted hate and animosity toward Islam.” These guests were performing “the 

rituals of pilgrimage when they were arrested by Saudi intelligence services for the 

following charge: that some of them gave a fatwa in which they said that the Americans 

must be forced out of the land of the two holy mosques.” These scholars were only doing 

their duty in honoring their covenant pledging to show the truth to the people. They 

mentioned nothing negative about the Saudi regime, which has demonstrated that it is not 

satisfied with that it is doing against its own people, but is seeking to generalize these 

rules of repression. 

By its actions, the regime is actually strengthening the message of the scholars that have 

been persecuted. The scholars and influential people that have not condemned the 

regime’s actions cannot be excused, as it is an obligation to help a brother Muslim. 

Statement 21, pp. 103: Supporting the Fatwa by the Afghani Religious Scholars of 

Ejecting the American Forces Form the Land of the Two Holy Mosques 

1-1-1419 (7 May 1998) 

The united religious scholars of Afghanistan issued a fatwa that stresses the necessity of 

ejecting the American forces for the Arab peninsula and the land of the holy two 

mosques. The fatwa contained shari’a proofs that the entrance of these forces into this 

country is forbidden, and that their ejection is absolutely necessary. The responsibility of 

ejecting them and declaring jihad against the occupiers rests with the entire nation of 

Islam. This fatwa was originally issued eight years ago by Safar al-Hawali and Salman 

al-’Awdah, who willingly paid the price for their truthfulness. The prophet’s last wish, 

may Allah’s prayers and peace be upon him, was to drive the polytheists out of the 

peninsula, and he said that “the big countries are the cause of problems and instability in 

the region, and they are the ones that create incidents. They show up every time there is 

an incident under the pretense that they will improve the situation and eliminate the 

danger, yet they are the biggest danger of all. How can the fox be the shepherd for the 

sheep?” 

Back to Document List

114
Doc ID: 2RAD-2004-600457

Date: unknown 

Author: unknown 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: A brief biography of Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri 

Full Text: English Arabic

Back to Document List

Synopsis: A short biography pulled from an Islamic terrorist website focusing on his 

education, beliefs, formative experiences for his beliefs, his ties to bin Laden, and his 

terrorist activities. As one would expect, it is told from a sympathetic perspective. 

115
For more information about this or other research initiatives of the 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, please visit our website, at: 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu

Combating Terrorism Center 

Lincoln Hall 

U.S. Military Academy 

West Point, NY 10996 

Phone: (845) 938-8495 

Fax: (845) 938-8472 

E-mail: ctc@usma.edu 

CTC FACULTY AND STAFF 

General (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing, Chair 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Felter, Director 

Dr. James Forest, Director of Terrorism Studies 

Mr. Jarret Brachman, Director of Research 

Mr. Brian Fishman, Associate 

Ms. Lianne Kennedy, Associate 

Ms. Thalia Tzanetti, Project Fellow 

Mr. Clint Watts, Executive Officer 

Captain Bill Perkins, Operations Officer 

CTC SENIOR FELLOWS

BG (Ret.) Russell D. Howard 

Dr. Bruce Hoffman 

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna 

Dr. David Franz 

Ms. Kate Frucher 

CTC FELLOWS

Dr. William McCants 

Major Reid Sawyer 

CTC ASSOCIATES

Colonel Mike Meese

Colonel Cindy Jebb 

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Kip McCormick 

Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson 

Major Jeff Bramlett 

Major Christopher Hornbarger 

Major Joanne Moore 

Major Richard Wrona 

Major Jim Walker 

Dr. Ruth Beitler 

Dr. Frederick Moxley 

Mr. Kelly Hicks 

Mr. Jacob Shapiro 

116