Special Commentary:

COVID-19 and Indo-Pacific Strategy:

Korea is Up, China is Down, and the US (For Now) is Out

May 04, 2020 | Professors John Schaus and Nathan Freier

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to over three million confirmed infections and more than 

one hundred thousand dead globally. In the United States, over sixty thousand people have died

and more than 1 million have been infected. According to epidemiologists, this is only the first 

phase. Thus, near-term “success” against the outbreak reflects a current snapshot in time, not 

necessarily a permanent outcome.

In light of our very preliminary understanding of the long-term impact of the outbreak and 

national-level responses, there are discernible trends about how countries’ responses are 

impacting their standing in key regions and around the world. Few regions offer such stark 

contrast in stories as the Indo-Pacific. In that region, South Korea is up, China is down, and the 

United States is out. These shifts may or may not endure. What is increasingly clear, however, is 

that ineffective responses—perceived at home or abroad—will limit policymakers’ freedom of 

action for some time to come.

SOUTH KOREA IS UP

South Korea, with extensive tourist, educational, and commercial links with China, was one 

of the first countries outside China to be hit by a large COVID-19 outbreak. South Korea 

experienced a rapid rise in cases through community transmission in early February, resulting 

in a series of policy-decisions that have (so far) proven effective in “flattening the curve” of 

infections and keeping large parts of South Korea’ s economy open for business at the same 

time. 

South Korea’s current achievement during the pandemic is not an accident. It learned hard 

lessons from previous outbreaks, particularly the 2015 Middle East Respiratory Virus (MERS) 

epidemic. During the MERS outbreak, South Korea was the most impacted country outside the 

Middle East. Having identified areas for improvement from that experience, South Korea’s 

leadership prioritized rapid responses in the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak. South 
Korea’s response, largely viewed as successful at home, resulted in a landslide electoral win for 

the governing party in nation-wide parliamentary elections in April, despite pre-outbreak 

concerns on several issues. The election margins were the largest for a single party since 1987 

when South Korea began directly electing its legislature. 

Though certainly not monolithic, South Korea’s governing party will likely have greater 

latitude to pursue its preferred policies. It will also have greater “cushion” to take unpopular or 

controversial policy positions. A key question on this front will be South Korea’s (and South 

Koreans’) continued willingness to entertain US efforts to increase South Korea’s share of hostnation support for US troops stationed in South Korea. This is an area where the current US

administration has sought to increase South Korean support, from $830 million per year in 

2017 (roughly 40 percent of US costs), reportedly to $5 billion per year based on a report in 

April of 2020.

CHINA IS DOWN

China has posted some of the most impressive numbers of any country in its effort to 

counter the coronavirus. If China’s reported numbers are true, its response demonstrates 

significant political resolve and health-effective measures to contain the spread of the disease. 

Most foreign analysts are doubtful that even a state with near-pervasive control of daily life, like 

China, could so effectively contain the disease.

Among those watching from within, there is significant uncertainty about who is really 

leading China’s domestic response to COVID-19. Initial reports of an emerging disease from 

doctors in Wuhan were met with political condemnation and legal consequences for the 

reporting doctor. Later, Beijing fired the city and provincial leaders for poorly managing the

early stages of the outbreak. This came despite at least a 13-day lag between Beijing learning of 

the outbreak and it making any public statements on the issue. 

And, following a 76-day lockdown of the city of Wuhan, much of China began re-opening in 

April, with paeans to Xi Jinping’s adroit handling of the disease blanketing Chinese media. 

Beijing has imposed restrictions on publishing research into the origins of the outbreak.

Further, China has expelled numerous international reporters, reducing international access to 

China and limiting independent corroboration of its claims of success. Expelling reporters from 

several leading international newspaper outlets has only contributed to international perception 

that China’s approach is China first and burn the bridges behind.

European diplomats are increasingly public in their criticism of China’s crisis diplomacy as 

well. Concerns include price gouging and sending ineffective supplies. Spain, for example, has 

returned two consecutive shipments of test kits purchased from China for being faulty. More 

pointedly, diplomats express a sense that China “does not purvey the will to create partnerships, 

but [instead] the will to tell people what to do.” 
Facing a difficult public relations position due to the perception of one-sided diplomacy and 

flash-over-benefit aid, China leverages its international representatives to foment conspiracy 

theories and false narratives on the origin of the disease. 

Finally, as though its eroded domestic credibility and its cratering foreign-facing diplomatic 

efforts were not trouble enough for Beijing, it is rapidly undoing more than a decade’s work 

building ties in Africa. In particular, Chinese restaurants and hotels have been directed to not 

serve customers of African origin. Additionally, Africans living in China have reported being 

evicted from their apartments for fear that they carry the virus—despite having not traveled 

outside of China. 

China’s economic influence is in doubt because its economy is in its first contraction in over 

a generation. Its diplomatic influence is also fading as it is rapidly seen as a selfish actor with 

little concern beyond how its actions can be sold to China’s domestic audience.

THE UNITED STATES IS (CURRENTLY) OUT

The important lesson for US policymakers now is that—despite China’s tarnished reputation 

and an emerging backlash—the United States is not an automatic beneficiary. In fact, the United 

States will have to invest—likely significantly—to make near- to mid-term gains in the IndoPacific.

The United States’ fragmented, yet all-consuming, domestic response to the outbreak has 

limited US bandwidth for a proactive foreign policy agenda. The State Department website, for 

example, features the White House press briefing on the US COVID-19 task force more 

prominently than it does its initiatives to counter the outbreak through diplomacy and 

development efforts with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The present US response, 

almost entirely focused on domestic issues, has left US allies and partners to fend for 

themselves.

The region is not without opportunity. Across the Indo-Pacific region, as COVID-19 

containment turns more aggressively to COVID-19 recovery, the United States could turn the 

crisis in its favor. Doing so will require recognizing the needs of Indo-Pacific countries and 

opting to make the necessary investments to derive long-term benefit.

CREATING OPPORTUNITY FROM CRISIS

Currently, most of the Indo-Pacific region is dependent on trade with China to grow—much 

less to sustain—their GDP. Recent reports indicate that Vietnam is set to be a world-leader in 

GDP growth for the current year, yet its growth is likely to be only 2.5 percent. Other countries 

in East and Southeast Asia are expected to have even slower—or more likely, negative—growth 

through 2020. For developing economies where people’s livelihoods are even more precarious 
than many Americans, this can be a death-knell, not just for economic growth but also for longterm faith in trade-based economic growth. 

In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis and during recovery, the United States can influence 

regional growth. As the United States seeks to demonstrate the benefits of an alternative to 

China’s debt-trap diplomacy, the next few months are likely the best window to build ties at a 

relatively low-cost to US businesses and consumers. Done correctly, this can be an effective and 

affordable cost-imposing strategy by the United States in competition with China. If sustained 

over the mid- to long-term, the United States can increase the amount China has to invest to 

retain many of the regional relationships and access it currently enjoys. 

The United States has had considerable debate over this topic over the past decade or so, 

specifically around the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Independent of one’s view of that particular 

deal, the present circumstances provide the United States an opportunity to bargain-shop for 

both good deals and good will in Asia. Regional states are looking for ways to rebuild their 

economies following COVID-19. If the United States is seeking to provide an alternative to 

China, there will not likely be a better opportunity than now. 

Turning short-term benefits into long-term returns may involve creative thinking. The 

recently established Development Finance Corporation is an agency well suited to consider and 

advance such thinking. A successful approach would provide an inducement to US firms to 

diversify their supply chains out of a single country; would enable states throughout the region 

in need of economic infusion to see possible benefit; and would re-establish post-COVID supply 

chains that contribute to more diversified regional economic benefit than those that dominated 

the past four decades.

Closer (and more plentiful) economic ties with countries in Asia would help them mitigate 

dependency on trade with China. It would provide US firms a diversity of suppliers to mitigate 

the risk of future shocks. It would provide US diplomacy greater access and goodwill in 

achieving broader US interests. Finally, US regional alliances would grow stronger. This would 

have a tangible impact on collective security and regional deterrence. 

The preponderance of effort to turn the current crisis into strategic benefit for the United 

States will be in areas beyond the US Army’s purview. However, the Army can take several 

actions to contribute to national interests. First, speak with allies’ and partners’ armies. Start the 

conversations by listening. What was their experience of COVID-19? How were they called upon 

to respond? What lessons have they learned—and what can we do to leverage their lessons for 

our own future planning? After a healthy listening phase, start considering—with the ally or 

partner—what next steps would be value-added in bilateral subject matter expert exchanges, 

bilateral consultations, training, or exercises. Finally, bring those lessons back to the Army (or 

more broadly, to DoD) to improve US planning and preparedness for the next challenge—

expected or unexpected that comes along.
SO, AMERICA, ARE YOU IN?

The United States’ is largely absent from round one of international COVID-19 response. 

Frankly, most countries have focused internally as well. As the United States prepares for round 

two, targeted US responses in the Indo-Pacific can reshape international trade patterns in ways 

favorable to US national security. Imagine a positive transformation of Indo-Pacific affairs that 

re-orients the region to positive-sum and mutually beneficial engagement. The United States 

could lock in significant gains for decades. This is an opportunity unlikely to come again in the 

next century. Future generations would thank this administration for maximizing the current 

moment.

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The views expressed in this Special Commentary piece are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department 

of Defense, or the US Government. This article is cleared for public release; distribution is 

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