Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-433| July 31, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT J.S.

Steven J. Halbert

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent–Child Relationship 

of K.C. (Minor Child)

and 

J.S. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 31, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JT-433

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Mark A. Jones, 

Judge

The Honorable Peter Haughan, 

Magistrate 

Trial Court Cause No.

49D15-1901-JT-111
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-433| July 31, 2020 Page 2 of 6

Bradford, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] J.S. (“Father”) and M.C. (“Mother”) are the parents of K.C. (“Child”). In 

January of 2020, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to Child. 

On appeal, Father contends that his due process rights were violated by the 

Department of Child Services’s (“DCS”) failure to make reasonable efforts to 

reunify him and Child by failing to provide him with services, case plans, and 

other documents. We affirm.1

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 6, 2016, Child was born and tested positive for opiates. Child 

was removed from Mother’s care, and DCS petitioned for Child to be 

adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) on December 12, 2016. At 

the time of Child’s birth, Father was incarcerated after having been convicted of 

check fraud, identity deception, and methamphetamine possession. On April 6, 

2017, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS and entered a 

dispositional decree. In November of 2018, Father was released from 

incarceration, and the juvenile court modified its dispositional decree, ordering 

Father to participate in the parental participation order. On January 17, 2019, 

1 Mother does not participate in this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-433| July 31, 2020 Page 3 of 6

the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption. On February 7, 

2019, DCS petitioned for the termination of Mother and Father’s parental 

rights. On February 28, 2019, the juvenile court ordered Father to complete a 

parenting assessment, comply with all recommendations, and complete a 

father-engagement program. 

[3] The juvenile court held a factfinding hearing regarding DCS’s termination 

petition on August 19, September 5, October 24, and November 21, 2019. On 

October 24, 2019, Father was scheduled to present evidence at the factfinding 

hearing but failed to appear, and his attorney was unable to contact him, 

leading the juvenile court to continue the hearing. On November 21, 2019, 

Father again failed to appear at the factfinding hearing, and the juvenile court 

noted that there remained an active warrant for his arrest in another case. On 

January 24, 2020, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to 

Child, in doing so, the court concluded, inter alia, that 

f. The conditions that led to the Child’s removal or placement 

and retention outside the home of Father are: Father’s issues 

with substance abuse; his lack of safe and stable housing; his lack 

of stable employment; and his criminal behavior and 

involvement with the criminal justice system. 

g. These conditions have not been remedied. 

h. It is highly probable that these conditions will not be remedied, 

even if Father was given additional time to remedy the 

conditions. The Child’s CHINS case has been open for over three 

(3) years. Throughout this time, Father has continued to engage 

in ongoing substance abuse by using heroin, methamphetamine, 

and alcohol. He has consistently failed to provide safe and stable 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-433| July 31, 2020 Page 4 of 6

housing for the Child and maintain stable employment. Although 

Father completed a parenting assessment and a substance abuse 

assessment, he did not consistently engage in or successfully 

complete the services recommended by those assessments: homebased therapy, home-based case management, and the 

recommended substance abuse treatment. Father currently has a 

pending criminal case and the criminal court issued a warrant for 

his arrest. Father subsequently failed to appear for trial in this 

matter. Father failed to consistently visit with the Child. 

i. Father has demonstrated a lack of commitment to preserve the 

parent-child relationship. 

j. There is a substantial probability that future neglect or 

deprivation will occur because of Father’s failure to remedy the 

conditions. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 25. 

Discussion and Decision

[4] At the outset, we note that Father does not directly challenge the juvenile 

court’s termination of his parental rights to Child, but, rather, only contends 

that his due process rights were violated by DCS’s failure to make reasonable 

efforts to reunify him and Child by failing to provide him services, case plans, 

and other documents.

[5] We conclude that Father’s contention fails for multiple reasons. First, because 

Father failed to raise his contention in the juvenile court, it is waived for 

appellate review. See Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family and Children, 845 

N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is well established that we may 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-433| July 31, 2020 Page 5 of 6

consider a party’s constitutional claim waived when it is raised for the first time 

on appeal.”). Moreover, Father’s claim is based on DCS’s alleged failure to 

provide him with additional services, which he seems to believe were needed; 

however, Father failed to request these additional services and cannot use 

DCS’s alleged failure on appeal to challenge the termination of his parental 

rights. See In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[A] parent 

may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then 

successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his 

parenting.”). 

[6] Finally, in In re J.W., Jr., we noted that 

The Indiana Supreme Court has long recognized that, in 

“seeking termination of parental rights,” the DCS has no 

obligation “to plead and prove that services have been offered to 

the parent to assist in fulfilling parental obligations.” S.E.S. v.

Grant Cnty. Dep’t of Welfare, 594 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ind. 1992). 

Likewise, we have stated on several occasions that, although 

“[t]he DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to 

preserve and reunify families during the CHINS proceedings,” that 

requirement under our CHINS statutes “is not a requisite 

element of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure to 

provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly 

attack a termination order as contrary to law.” A.Z. v. Ind. Dep’t of

Child Servs. (In re H.L.), 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 & n. 3 (Ind. Ct. App.

2009) (emphasis added) (citing I.C. § 31-34-21-5.5); see also Elkins

v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children (In re E.E.), 736 N.E.2d

791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“even a complete failure to 

provide services would not serve to negate a necessary element of 

the termination statute and require reversal.”); Stone v. Daviess

Cnty. Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1995) (“under Indiana law, even a complete failure to 
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provide services cannot serve as a basis to attack the termination 

of parental rights.”), trans. denied.

27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis in original), trans. denied.

Based on our caselaw, Father’s contention cannot serve as a basis to attack the

juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights.

[7] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.