FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT
UNIT E D ST A T E S O F AM E RICA, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. B ARRY L AM AR B O NDS, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 11-10669

D.C . No. 3:07-c r-00732-SI-1
O P INIO N

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Susa n Illston, Se nior Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d Se pte m

be r 18, 2014 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : RE INH ARDT , K O Z INSKI , O ’SCANNL AIN , G RAB E R ,

W ARDL AW , W . FL E T CH E R , RAW L INSO N , CAL L AH A N , N.R. SM IT H , NG UYE N and F RIE DL AND , C i rc uit Judge s. PE R CURIAM : During a grand jury

proc e e ding, de fe n da

nt ga ve a ram bling, non-re sponsive
answe r to a

sim ple que stion. B e c a

use the re is insuffic i e nt e vide nc e tha t Sta te m e nt C wa s m a te ria l, de fe nda

nt’ s c onvic tion for obstruc t ion of justic e in viola tion of 18 

# F IL ED
APR 22 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALSpa ge 2

U.S.C . § 1503 is not supporte d by the re c o rd. Whate ve r se c t ion 1503’ s sc ope m ay be in othe r c irc um sta

nc e s, de fe nda

nt’ s c onvic tion he re m

ust be re v e rse d. A re v e rsa l for insuffic i e nt e v ide nc e im plic a t e s de fe nda

nt’ s right unde r the Double Je opa

rdy C la u s e . Se e Unite d Stat e s v. Pre ston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1028 (9th C ir. 2014) (e n ba

nc ) (c iting B urks v. Unite d Stat e s, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)). His
c onvic tion a

nd se n te nc e m

ust the re fore be va c a te d, a nd he m ay

not be trie d a ga in on tha t c ount.
RE V E RSE D.pa ge 3 CO UNSE L De nnis P. Riorda

n (argue d) and Dona ld M . Horga n, R i orda n & Horga

n, Sa n Fra nc i sc o, C a lifornia ; Te d Sam pse l l Jone s, W illia

m M itc he ll C o lle ge of La

w, St. Pa ul, M i nne sota , for Appe lla nt. M e rry Je a n C ha n (argue d ), Assista

nt Unite d State s Attorne y , M e linda Ha a g, Unite d State s Attorne y , B arbara J. Va llie re , Assista

nt Unite d State s Attorne y , C hie f, Appe lla

te Division, Unite d Stat e s Attorne y s’ Offic e , San Franc isc o, C a lifornia , for Appe lle e .Unite d

State s v. B onds, No. 11-10669: K O Z I NSKI , C irc uit Judge , with whom C i rc uit Judge s O ’SCANNL AIN , G RAB E R , CAL L AH AN and NG UYE N join, c onc urring: C an a single non-re s ponsive answe r by a grand jury

witne ss support a
c onvic tion for obstruc tion of justic e unde r 18 U.S.C . § 1503?
I De fe nda nt, who wa s the n

a profe ssiona l ba se ba ll pla y e r, wa s sum

m one d be fore a grand jury an d que s tione d for ne arly thre e hours a bout his suspe c te d use of ste roids. He wa s subse q ue ntly c ha rge d with four c ounts of m aking fa l se sta te m e nts a nd one c ount of obstruc tion of justic e , a l l ba se d on his gra nd jury te stim ony . The jury

c onvic te d him

on the obstruc tion c ount a nd wa s othe rwise
una ble to re a c h a

ve rdic t. The jury instruc t ions ide ntifie d se ve n of de fe nda nt’ s sta t e m e nts tha

t the gove rnm e nt a lle ge d obstruc te d justic e . The jury , howe ve r, found only one sta te m e nt obstruc tive . Tha

t sta t e m e nt wa s re fe rre d to a s State m e n t C at tria l and is unde rline d in the pa ssa ge be low: Q: Did Gre g[, y o ur tra ine r,] e ve r give y ou a nything tha

t re q uire d a sy ringe to inje c t y ourse lf with? A: I’ ve only

ha d one doc tor touc h m e . And tha t’ s m y only pe rsona l doc tor. Gre g, like I sa id, we don’ t ge t into e a c h othe rs’ pe rsona l live s. W e ’ re frie nds, but I don’ t— w e don’ t sit a round a n d ta lk ba se ba ll, be c a

use he knows I don’ t

wa nt— 

# F IL ED
APR 22 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALSp a ge 2 don’ t c om e to m

y house ta lking ba se ba ll. If y ou wa nt to c o m e to m y h o use and ta lk a

bout fishing, som

e othe r stuff, we ’ ll be good frie nds. You c om e around ta lking a bout ba se ba ll, y ou go on. I don’ t ta lk a

bout his busine ss. You know wha t I m e an? Q: R ight. A: That’ s wha

t ke e ps our frie ndship. You know, I a m sorry , but that— y ou know, tha

t— I wa s a

c e le b rity c hild, not just in ba se ba ll by

m y own instinc t s. I be c a

m e a c e le brity c hild with a fa m ous fa the r. I just don’ t

ge t into other pe ople ’ s busine s s be c a use of m y fa the r’ s situa

tion, y ou se e . De fe nda nt wa s a ga in a ske d a

bout inje c ta

ble ste roids im

m e diate ly following this e xc ha nge and a fe wothe r tim e s during his te stim ony . He provide d dire c t
re sponse s to the follow-up que stions. For e xam ple , he wa s a ske d whe the r he e ve r

“ inje c te d [him ] se lf with a nything tha

t Gre g . . . ga

ve [him ] .” He re sponde d “ I’ m not tha t ta le nte d, no.” The gove rnm e nt be l ie ve d tha t those answe rs we re fa lse but,
a s note d, the jury

fa i le d to c onvic t de fe nda nt on thefa lse sta

t e m e nt c ounts. The distric t c ourt re

je c te d de fe nda nt’ s post-ve rdic t m otion for a c quitta l on the o bstruc tion c ount a

nd a thre e -judge pa

ne l a ffirm e d. Unite d State s v. B onds, 730 F.3d 890 (9th C ir. 2013). W e grante d e n ba nc re he aring. Unite d

Stat e s v. B onds, 757 F.3d 994 (9th C ir. 2014).
I Ipa ge 3

A. Title 18 U.S.C . § 1503(a ), whic h de fe nda nt wa s c onvic te d of viola

ting, provide s in re le va

nt pa rt a s follows: “ W hoe ve r . . . c orruptly or by thre a ts or forc e , or by any thre a te ning le tte r or c om m unic a tion, influe nc e s, obstruc ts, or im pe de s, or
e nde avors to influe nc e , obstruc t, or im pe de , the due a dm inistra

tion of justic e , sha l l be punishe d a s provide d in subse c tion (b).” Known a s the om nibus c la u se , this la ngua ge “ w a s de s igne d

to prosc ribe a ll m anne r of c orrupt m e thods of obstruc ting justic e .” Unite d State s v. R a s he e d, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th C ir. 1981). W e have he ld tha t a de fe nda nt “ c orruptly ” obstruc ts justic e if he a c ts “ with the purpose of obstruc ting justic e .” Id. As should be

a ppa re nt, se c tion 1503’ s c ove ra ge is va st. B y its lite ra l te rm s, it a pplie s to a ll sta g e s of the c rim ina l a nd c i vil justic e proc e ss, not just to c onduc t in the c ourtroom

but a lso to trial pre pa

ra tion, disc ove ry

and pre tria l m otions. Inde e d , it a

rgua bly c ove rs c onduc t ta

ke n in a ntic ipat ion tha

t a c i vil or c rim ina l c a se
m ight be file d, suc h a s tax pla nning, hiding a sse ts or ta lking to polic e . And the te xt of the om nibus c la use , in c onc e rt with our de finition of c orruptly , e n c om pa s se s a ny
a c t tha t a jury m ight infe r wa s inte nde d to “ influe nc e , obstruc t, or im pe de . . . the due a dm inistra

t i on of justic e .” Tha

t’ s true e v e n if no a c tua l obstruc tion oc c urs, be c a use the c l a

use ’ s use of “ e nde av ors” m ake s “ suc c e ss . . . irre l e va nt.” Se epa ge 4

Unite d State s v. R ic ha

rdson, 676 F.3d 491, 503 (5th C ir. 2012) (inte rna l quota tion
m arks om itte d). Stre tc he d to its lim

its, se c tion 1503 pose s a

signific ant ha z ard for e ve ry one involve d in our sy ste m

of justic e , be c a

use so m uc h of wha

t the a dve rsary proc e ss
c a lls for c ould be c onstrue d a s obstruc tion. Did a tort pla i ntiff file a

c o m p la int
se e k ing da

m a ge s fa r in e xc e ss of wha

t the jury ultim at e ly

awards? Tha

t c ould be vie w e d a s c orruptly

e nde avoring to “ influe nc e . . . the due a dm inistra tion of justic e ” by se e king to re c ove r m ore tha n the c la im

de se rve s. So c ould a

ny of the following be haviors tha

t m ake up the bre a d a

nd butte r of litiga

tion: filing a

n
answe r that de nie s lia

bility for c onduc t tha

t is ultima te ly

a djudge d wrongful or
m a lic ious; unsuc c e ssfully filing (or opposing) a m otion to dism

iss or for sum

m ary judgm e nt; se e king a

c ontinua nc e in orde r to inflic t de la y on the opposing pa

rty ; frivolously

ta king a n a p p e a l or pe titioning for c e rtiora ri— the list is e ndle s s. W itne sse s would bepa

rtic ula rly vulne ra ble be c a use , a s the Supre m e C ourt ha s note d, “ [u] nde r the pre s sure s a nd te nsions of interrogation, it is not unc om m on for the m ost e arne st witne sse s to give answe rs tha t a re not e ntire ly

re sponsive .” B ronston v. Unite d State s, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973). Lawy e rs fa c e the m ost pe rva sive thre a t unde r suc h a re gim e . Ze a l ous
a dvoc a c y som e tim e s c a lls for pushing ba c k a ga inst a

n a dve rsary ’ s just c a se andpa ge 5

c a sting a de spic a

ble c lie nt in a fa vora

ble light, y e t

suc h c onduc t c ould be de sc ribe d
a s “ e nde avor[ing] to . . . im pe de . . . the due a d

m i nistra tion of justic e .” Eve n routine a dvoc a c y

provide s a

m ple oc c a sion for stum

bling into the

he artla nd of the
om n ibus c la use ’ s swe e p ing c o v e ra ge . Ora l a rgum e n ts providea

re a dy e xam ple
. One ne e d not spe nd m

u c h tim e in one of our c o urtroom s to he ar la wy e rs da nc ing
around que stions from

the be nc h rathe r tha

n giving pithy , dire c t a

nswe rs. The re is, for insta nc e , the e ve r popula

r “ but tha t is not this c a s e ” re tort to a hy pothe tic a l, whic h c ould be c onstrue d a s a n e ffort to dive rt the c ourt a nd the re by

“ i nflue nc e . . . the d ue a dm inistra

tion of justic e .” It is true tha

t a ny suc h m ane uve r would viola te se c tion 1503 only

if it we re done “ c orruptly .” B ut it is e qua lly true tha t we hav e give n “ c o rruptly ” suc h a broa d c onstruc tion tha

t it doe s not m e aningfully c a bin the kind of c onduc t tha t is subje c t to prose c ution. As note d, we have he ld tha t a de fe nda

nt a c ts “ c orruptly ,”
a s tha t te rm is use d in se c tion 1503, if he doe s so “ with the purpose of obstruc ting justic e .” R a she e d, 663 F.2d a t 852. In thee xam

ple s a b ove , a prose c utor c ould
argue that a

c om pla int wa s file d

c orruptly be c a use it wa s de signe d to e xtort a nuisa nc e se ttle m e nt, or a

n a nswe r wa s file d c orruptly be c a use its princ ipa l purpose
wa s to pre ssure a

ne e d y pla intiff into a

n unjust se ttle m e nt, or tha t the la wy e r who pa rrie d a judic ia l hy

pothe t ic a l with “

but tha t is not this c a se ” wa s e nde avoring topa ge 6

distra c t the c ourt so it would re a c h a wrong re sult. Tha

t a jury or a judge m ight not buy suc h a n a rgum e nt is ne ithe r he re nor the re ; a c rim ina l prose c ution, e ve n one that re s ults in a

n a c quitta l, is a life -wre nc hing e ve nt. Nor doe s an a c quitta l wipe
c le an the suspic ion tha

t a guilty de fe nda nt got off on a

te c hnic a lity
. W e have no doubt tha

t Unite d State s Attorne y s a nd the ir Assista

nts would
use the powe r to prose c ute for suc h c rim e s judic iously , but tha t is not the

point. M ak ing e ve ry one who pa rtic ipate s in our justic e sy ste m a pote ntia l c rim ina l de fe nda n t for c onduc t tha

t is nothing m

ore tha n the ordina

ry tug a nd pull of litiga tion risks c hilling z e a lous a dvoc a c y . It a lso give s prose c utors the im m e nse
and unre vie wa

b le powe r to re ward frie nds a nd punish e ne m ie s by prose c uting the latte r and giving the

form e r a pa ss. The pe rc e ption tha t prose c utors ha

ve suc h a pote nt we a

pon in the ir a

rse na l, e ve n if ne ve r use d, m ay we l l da m pe n the fe rvor with whic h la

wy e rs, pa rtic ula rly those re pre se nting c rim ina l de fe nda nts, will disc ha rge the ir dutie s. The am orphous na ture of the sta

tute is a lso a

t odds with the
c onstitutiona

l re quire m e n t

tha t individuals ha

ve fa i r notic e a s to wha

t c onduc t m ay be c rim ina l . Se e Unite d State s v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 996 (9th C ir. 2014) (c iting Skilling v. Unite d State s, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010)).pa ge 7

B . B e c a use the sta

tute swe e ps so broa d ly , due proc e ss c a lls for prude ntia l lim ita tions on the

gove rnm e nt’ s powe r to prose c ute unde r it. Suc h a lim ita tion
a lre a dy e xists in our c a s e la w inte rpre ting se c t ion 1503: the re quire m e nt of
m a te ria l ity . Se e Unite d State s v. Thom a s, 612 F.3d 1107, 1128–29 (9th C ir. 2010). M a t e ria lity

sc re e ns out m any

of the sta tute ’ s troubling a

pplic a tions by

lim i ting
c onvic tions to those

situa tions whe re an a c t “ ha s a

natura l te nde nc y to influe nc e , or
wa s c a pa b le of influe nc ing, the de c ision of thede c i sionm a k ing body .” Se e Kungy s v. Unite d Stat e s, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (inte rna l quota

tion m arks om itte d); Thom a s, 612 F.3d a

t 1124. Put a

nothe r way , the gove rnm e nt m ust prove be y ond a
re a s ona ble doubt tha

t the c ha rge d c onduc t wa s c a

p a ble of influe n c ing a de c isionm aking pe rson or e ntity

— for e xam

ple , by c a using it to c e a se its inve stiga tion, pursue diffe re nt a

ve nue s of inquiry

or re a c h a diffe re n t outc om e . Se e Unite d State s v. M c Ke nna , 327 F.3d 830, 840 (9th C ir. 2003) (finding sta te m e nt m ate ria l be c a

use it c o uld ha

ve a ffe c te d the “ de c ision-m a k ing proc e ss” ); W e instoc k v. Unite d

State s, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C . C ir. 1956) (noting tha t, to be
m a te ria l , a

sta te m e nt “ m

ust ha ve som e we i ght in theproc e ss of re a c hing a de c ision” ). In we ighing m a te ria lity , we c onside r “ the intrinsic c a pa b ilitie s of the
. . . sta te m e nt itse lf,” ra the r tha

n the sta te m e nt’ s a c tua l e ffe c t on the de c isionm ake r, se epa ge 8

Unite d State s v. Se rv. De li Inc ., 151 F.3d 938, 941 (9th C ir. 1998) (inte rna l quota t ion m arks om itte d), a

nd we e va luate the sta

te m e nt in “ the c o nte xt in whic h [it wa s] m a de ,” Unite d State s v. R iga s, 490 F.3d 208, 231 (2d C ir. 2007); se e a lso Unite d State s v. M c B ane , 433 F.3d 344, 352 (3d C ir. 2005); W e instoc k, 231 F.2d
a t 703 (noting tha

t in c o n te xt, a

sta t e m e n t wa s “ rob[be d] . . . of a ny
m a te ria l ity

— any possibleinflue nc e upon the [de c isionm ake r] in re a c hing its de c ision” ). W e sta rt with these lf-e vide nt proposition tha t Sta te m e nt C , sta

nding a lone , did not ha ve the c a pa c ity to dive rt the gove rnm e nt from its inve stiga

tion or influe n c e the grand jury ’ s de c ision whe the r to indic t a ny o ne . He re it is a ga i n: That’ s wha

t ke e ps our frie ndship. You know, I a m sorry , but tha

t— y ou know, tha

t

— I wa s a c e le brity c hild, not just in base ba ll by m y own instinc ts. I be c am e a c e le brity c hild with a

fam ous fa

the r. I just don’ t ge t into other pe ople ’ s busine ss be c a use of m y fa the r’ s situa

tion, y ou se e . The sta te m e nt sa y s a b s olute ly nothing pe rtine nt to thesubje c t of the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion. Eve n whe n pa ire d with theque stion tha t prom pte d it, Did Gre g e ve r give y ou a nything tha

t re quire d a

sy ringe to inje c t y ourse l f with? Stat e m e nt C c om

m unic a t e s nothing of va

lue or de t rim e n t to the inve stiga

t ion. Ha d the a nswe r be e n “ I’ m a fra id of ne e d le s,” it would ha ve be e n pla

usible to infe r anpa ge 9

unspoke n de nia l, with the a c tua l words se rving a s an e xpla nation or e l a

boration. B ut, a s give n, the answe r did not e nlighte n , obfusc a te , c onfirm or de ny anything within thesc ope of the que stion pose d. The m ost one c an sa

y a bout this sta

te m e nt is tha

t it wa s non-re sponsiveand the re by im p e de d the inve stiga

tion to a sm a ll de gre e by

wa sting thegrand jury ’ s tim e and try ing the prose c utors’ patie nc e . B ut re a l -life witne ss e xam inations, unlike those in m ovie s a

nd on te le vision, inva

ria bly are litte re d

with
non-re sponsiveand irre le v ant a nswe rs. This ha

ppe ns whe n the spe ake r doe sn’ t unde rsta nd the que stion, be gins to talk be fore thinking (la wy e rs do this with surprising fre que nc y ), wants to a void giving a

dire c t an swe r (ditto), or is te m poriz ing. C ourtroom s a

re pre ssure -la d e n e nvironm e nts a nd a c e rta in num

be r of
non-re sponsiveor irre le v a nt sta te m e nts c an

be e xpe c te d a s pa

rt of the give -and-ta

ke of c ourtroom

disc ourse . B e c a

use som e non-re s ponsive answe rs a re
am ong the roa d ha z a

rds of witne ss e xam i nation, a ny one suc h sta te m e nt is not, sta nding a lone , “ c a

pa b le of influe nc ing . . . thede c ision of [a ] de c i sionm aking body .” Se e Thom a s, 612 F.3d a t 1124. This is true e v e n if, a s the gove rnm e nt now a rgue s, Sta te m e nt C is lite ra lly fa lse . An irre le va

nt or wholly

non-re sponsiveanswe r sa y s nothing germ ane to the subje c t of the inve stiga

tion, whe the r it’ s true or fa lse . For e x am ple , if a witne ss ispa ge 10

a ske d, “ Do y ou own a

gun? ” it m ake s no diffe re nc e whe the r he answe rs “ The sky is blue ” or “ The sky

is gre e n .” That the se c ond sta te m e nt is fa lse m ake s it no m ore like ly to im pe d e the inve stiga

t ion tha n the first. State m e n t C doe s not, howe ve r, sta n d a lone . It wa s a

sm a ll portion of a
m uc h longe r e xam ination, a nd we m ust look a t the re c ord a s a

whole to de t e rm ine whe the r a ra tiona l trie r of fa c t

c ould ha ve found the sta

te m e nt c a pa ble of influe n c i ng the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion, in light of de fe nda

nt’ s e n tire gran d jury te stim ony . If, for e xam

ple , a witne ss e nga ge s in a patte rn of irre le va nt sta te m e nts, or la unc he s into le ngthy disquisitions tha t a re c l e arly de s igne d to wa ste tim e and pre c lude the que stione r from c ontinuing his exam ination, thejury c o uld find tha

t the w itne ss’ s be havior wa s c a pa ble of ha ving som e swa

y . On c are ful re vie w of the re c ord, we find insuffic ie nt e vide nc e to re nde r Stat e m e nt C m a te ria l. In c onduc ting this re vie w, we are m indful tha t we m ust give the j ury the be n e fit of the doubt a nd dra w a ll re a sona

ble infe re nc e s in fa

vor of its
ve rdic t. Se e Ja c k s on v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). At the sa m e tim e , we
m ust c o nduc t our re vie w with som e rigor for the prude ntia l re a sons disc usse d
a bove . Se e pp. 3–8 supra
. The gove rnm e n t c ha

rge d a tota l of se ve n

sta te m e nts, only

one of whic h the jury found to beobstruc tive . Two of the se sta te m e nts (inc l uding Sta

te m e nt C )pa ge 11

a ppe ar to be wholly irre le va nt— ve rba l de tours with no be aring on theproc e e dings. One sta te m e nt is “ I don’ t

know,” followe d by

a brie f e xpla

nat ion for the la c k of knowle dge . The re s t a

re dire c t a nswe rs tha

t the gove rnm e nt c la im e d we re fa lse , a ll
c onc e rning whe the r de fe nda nt’ s tra ine r ha d provide d or inje c te d him with ste roids. In the c onte xt of thre e hours of gra nd jury te s tim ony , the se six a dditiona l sta te m e nts a re insuffic i e nt to re nde r the othe rwise innoc uous Sta te m e nt C m a te ria l. If this we re e n ough to e sta blish m ate ria lity , fe w witne sse s or la wy e rs would be sa fe from prose c ution.Unite d

State s v . Bonds , No. 11-10669 N.R . SM ITH, C irc uit Judge , with whom C irc uit Judge s WA RDLAW , C ALLAHAN, a

nd FR IEDLAND join, c onc urring:: I a gre e tha

t no re a sona

ble juror c ould ha

v e found B onds guilty

of viola ting 18 U.S.C . § 1503. B onds wa s c onvic te d of obstruc ting justic e by offe ring a

“ m isle a ding or
e va sive ” sta

te m e nt— State m e nt C

—

to the grand jury . The Gove rnm e nt e xpre ssly de c line d to se e k a

c onvic tion on the

grounds tha

t Sta te m e nt C wa s fa lse
. 1 Whe n
e va luating whe the r the e v ide n c e wa s suffic ie nt to show tha t State m e nt C viola

te d § 1503, we m

ust de t e rm i ne “ w he the r, a fte r vie wing the e vide n c e in the light m ost fa vora ble to the prose c ution, a ny ra tiona l trie r of fa c t c ould ha ve found the
e sse ntia l e le m e nts of the c rim e be y ond a re a s ona ble doubt.” J

ac k son v . Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This sta nda rd of re v ie w re quire s us to de te rm ine whe the r the jury c ould “ drawre a sona ble infe re n c e s from

ba sic fa c ts to ultima te fa c t s.” Id. In this pa

rtic ula r c a se , we m

u st de t e rm i ne whe the r a

single truthful but
e va sive or m isle a ding a

nswe r c ould c o nstitutee vide nc e of obstruc t ion of justic e 

# F IL ED
APR 22 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1 The Gove rnm e n t

a sse rts tha

t, de spite the position it a

rgue d to the jury , the e vide nc e wa s suffic ie nt to c onc lude tha t Sta te m e n t C wa s lite ra lly

fa lse . The Gove rnm e nt will not be a l lowe d to c ha n g e its position on a

ppe a l
. Se e Mc C

ormic k v . Unite d State s , 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991) (“ Appe l late c ourts a

re not pe rm itte d to a ffirm c onvic tions on a

ny the ory the y ple a se sim

ply be c a use the fa c t s ne c e ssa

ry to support the

the o ry we re pre se nte d to the jury
. ” ).

-1-unde r § 1503. It c ann ot.

Se c tion 1503(a

) punishe s those who “ c orruptly . . . influe nc e , obstruc t[] , or im pe de [] , or e nde avor[] to influe nc e , obstruc t , or im pe de , the due a dm i nistra

tion of justic e .” 2 The Supre m e C ourt ha s im pose d a m a te ria lity

re q uire m e nt on thebroa d
re a c h of § 1503, re quiring tha t “ the e nde avor m

ust ha ve the natura l a

nd proba ble
e ffe c t of inte rfe ring with the due a dm inistra

tion of justic e .” Unite d State s v . Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (inte rna l quota

t ion m arks om itte d). The Gove rnm e nt is re quire d to prove m a te ria lity to the jury
. Unite d State

s v . Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1995). The Supre m e C ourt furthe r instruc ts us, whe n

2 W e ne e d not a c c e pt B onds’ s invita tion to re a sse ss the re a c h of § 1503. Doing so would re quire us to ove rturn the we i ght of Ninth C irc uit pre c e de n t a pply ing § 1503 to in-c ourt te stim ony . Se e Unite d State s v . Thomas , 612 F.3d 1107 (9th C ir. 2010) (a

pply i ng § 1503 to false sta te m e nts m a de be fore a

grand jury ); Unite d State

s v . Gonzale

z-Mare s , 752 F.2d 1485 (9th C ir. 1985) (a pply ing § 1503 to fa lse sta

te m e n t m a de be fore a

m a gistra te judge ); Unite d State

s v . Rashe e d , 663 F.2d 843 (9th C ir. 1981) (a pply ing § 1503 to c onc e a lm e nt of doc um e nts from

grand jury ). This a

pproa c h would a lso bring us into c onflic t with othe r c irc uits tha

t ha ve a pplie d § 1503 in the

sa m e m anne r. Se e Unite d State s v . Pe tzold , 788 F.2d 1478 (11th C ir. 1986) (a pply ing § 1503 to gra

nd jury te s tim ony ); Unite d State s v . Griffin , 589 F.2d 200 (5th C ir. 1979) (sa m e ); Unite d State

s v . C ohn , 452 F.2d 881 (2d C i r. 1971) (sa m e ). Furthe r, e ve n if we we re to c o n side r B onds’ s a rgum e nts tha

t the le gisla

tive history

of § 1503 lim

its the a pplic a tion of the s tat ute , we would run up aga inst theSupre m e C ourt’ s de c ision in Aguilar , whic h im plie d tha t fa lse te stim ony

offe re d dire c tly to a

grand jury

c o uld support a c onvic tion unde r § 1503. Unite d State s v . Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593, 601 (1995). Give n our c onc lusion tha

t B onds’ s c onvic tion c a

nn ot sta nd e v e n if § 1503 re a c he s in-c ourt te stim ony , we ne e d not c onfront this issue
. -2-de a ling with the swe e ping la

ngua ge of § 1503, to “ e xe rc ise [] re stra int in a sse ssing the re a c h of a

fe de ra l c rim ina l sta

tute . . . out of c onc e rn tha t a fa i r warning should be give n to the world in la n gua g e tha

t the c om m on world will unde

rsta nd, of wha

t the l aw inte nds to do if a

c e rta in line is pa sse d.” Aguilar , 515 U.S. a t 600 (inte rna l quota t ion m arks om itte d). 1. C ongre ss c ould not ha

v e inte n de d § 1503 to be

so broa dly

a p plie d a s to
re a c h a single truthful but e v a sive sta te m e nt suc h a s State m e nt C . Our c onc lusion that State m e nt C c ould not ha ve “ the natura l an d proba b le e ffe c t” of im

pe ding the gran d jury ’ s inve s tiga

tive func tion ste m s from

two sourc e s: (1) the Gove rnm e nt’ s duty to c la rify m e re ly m isle a ding or e va sive te stim ony and (2) re le va

n t pre c e de nt indic a ting tha

t the Gove rnm e n t

m ust show tha

t truthful but m

i sle a d ing or e va sive te stim ony m ust a m ount to a

re fusa l to te stify

be fore it is m a te ria l. Ta

ke n toge the r, the s e two sourc e s le a d to the c onc lusion tha t a single truthful but e v a sive or
m isle a ding sta

te m e nt c ann ot sa

tisfy § 1503’ s m a te ria lity

re quire m e nt. 3

3 In c om i ng to this c onc lusion, I do not m e an to sugge s t tha

t the m a te ria lity of State m e nt C turns on whe the r it wa s truthful. B e c a use Stat e m e nt C wa s obviously non-re sponsive , it c ould not ha ve c o n stitute d obstruc t ion e ve n if it ha d be e n fa lse . A witne ss who is a ske d a bout the loc a tion of ke y

doc um e nts a

nd re sponds “ I am

surprise d it is ra ining” is not lia ble for obstruc tion re ga

rdle ss of whe the r it is ra ining. B ut if the sa m e witne ss knows whe re the doc um e n ts a re and y e t c la im s ne ve r to ha

ve he a rd of the m , tha

t pote ntia lly

c ould be m a t e ria l an d so -3-The Supre m e C ourt’ s de c ision in Bronston v . Unite d State s , 409 U.S. 352 (1973), re quire s the c onc lusion tha t Sta te m e nt C doe s not viola

t e § 1503. Although Bronston de a lt with a c onvic tion for pe rjury , the Supre m e C ourt’ s la ngua ge re ga

rding the gove rnm e nt’ s duty to c onduc t c o m

pe te nt a nd thorough que stioning is illum

inating. In short, “ [t] he burde n is on theque s tione r to pin the witne s s down to the

spe c ific obje c t of the que stione r’ s inquiry .” Id. at 360. Exte nding § 1503’ s re a c h to tra nsie nt e va sive or m isle a ding sta te m e nts would obvia t e the prose c utor’ s duty

to thoroughly

e xam i ne the witne ss. Id. a t 358 (noting that c om pe t e nt c ross-e x am ination should be c onduc te d “ b y

c ounse l a le rt–a s e ve ry
e xam ine r ought to be

–to the inc ongruity

of [the witne s s’ s] unre sponsiveanswe r” ). It would be c o ntra

ry to the sta tute ’ s purpose to a llow the gove rnm e nt to pe rm it a n
e va sive or m isle a ding sta

te m e nt to go unc ha lle nge d, in the hope s of obta ining a n obstruc tion of justic e c onvic tion la t e r. The gove rnm e nt is obliga te d to do a ll it c an to obta in a

dire c t sta te m e nt in re sponse to its que s tioning. The truth-se e k ing func tion of thegrand jury m ay be im pa ire d by lax que stioning a s m

uc h, if not m ore

c ould a m ount to obstruc t ion. Se e Unite d State s v . W illiams , 874 F.2d 968, 982 (5th C ir. 1989) (a ffirm ing obstruc tion of justic e c o nvic tion ba se d on re pe a te d fa lse de nia ls of knowle dge be fore a grand jury

re ga rding m a te ria l m a tte rs). The Aguilar sta nda rd a pplie s to a ll c onduc t unde r § 1503. Thetruthfulne ss or fa lsity of a sta te m e nt a lone is not dispositive : the re le va nt inquiry will be whe the r the sta te m e nt wa s m a t e ria l, a

p ply ing the Aguilar

sta n da rd. -4-tha

n , a n ina rtic u late or wa

nde ring a nswe r. Bronston c ounse ls tha

t, to c onvic t

a de fe nda nt for viola

ting § 1503, the

jury
m ust find m ore tha

n tha t the witne s s utte re d a

n e va sive or m isle a ding sta t e m e nt a t
som e point during his te stim ony
— the “ natura l a

nd proba ble e ffe c t” of a

single truthful but e va sive or m isle a ding sta t e m e nt is m e re ly

to prom pt follow-up que stions. Given this burde n, State m e nt C did not ha ve the natura l or proba

ble
e ffe c t of inte rfe ring with the due a dm inistra

tion of justic e , be c a

use the Gove rnm e nt ha d a duty to c la rify any single m isle a ding or e va s ive sta te m e nt B onds m a de
. 2. The Supre m e C ourt’ s m ate ria lity sta n da rd re inforc e s Bronston ’ s c o re holding: we

should not find lia

bility for a single sta te m e nt tha

t is m e re l y
m isle a ding or e va s ive . The judic ia lly -c re ate d m at e ria lity re quire m e nt is a

prim ary obje c tive lim ita

tion on § 1503’ s e xpa

nsive re a c h. Se e Unite d State s v . Thomas , 612 F.3d 1107, 1128-29 (9th C ir. 2010). This mat e ria lity sta n da rd ne c e ssa

rily take s into a c c ount the c onte x t of the c ha rge d c onduc t, e va luat ing whe the r the
m isle a ding or e va s ive sta

te m e nt c ould ha

ve “ the nat

ura l a nd proba ble e ffe c t of inte rfe ring with the due a dm inistra t ive of justic e ” give n

the e ntire ty

of a witne ss’ s
e xam ination. A guilar , 515 US. a t 599 (inte rna l quota

tion m arks om itte d). The Gove rnm e nt m ay

not isola te a single sta t e m e nt, prove it m isle a ding or e va sive , a nd -5-argue that the sta te m e nt is m a te ria l ba se d sole ly on tha t fa c t. Eva sive or m isle a d ing sta te m e nts a re diffe re nt from

fa lse sta te m e nts. Inste a d of providing the

tribuna l with ba d inform a tion, inform a tion tha t c a n be
e va luate d for its c a

pa bility to influe nc e , a

m isle a ding or e va sive sta te m e nt is m e ant to dive rt or slow thetruth-se e king func tion in the first insta nc e ; it doe s not so m

uc h influe n c e an inve stiga

tion a s dive rt it by

de p riving theque stion of its forc e . In this
se nse , offe ring e va sive or m isle a ding te s tim ony is c lose ly ana logous to the de struc tion of e vide nc e . Se e Unite d State s v . Rashe e d , 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th C i r. 1981) (“ the de struc tion or c onc e a lm e nt of doc um e n t s c an fa ll within the prohibition of the

sta tute ” by “ suppre ss[ing] e vide nc e ” ). W e should e va luate the
m a te ria l ity

of e va sive or m isle a ding te stim ony the sam e wa y : for its c a

pa bility to im pe de the inve stiga

tive func tion of the grand jury
. The Fifth C irc uit’ s e xpla

nation of them a te ria l ity

sta n da rd in Unite d State

s v . Griffin is pa

rtic ula rly pe rsua sive pre c e de nt. A fa lse , m i sle a d ing, or e va sive sta te m e nt m a

y be m a te ria l, ta

ke n in the c onte xt of the e ntire e xam i nation, whe n it
am ounts to “ a fla

t re fusa l to te stify .” Unite d State s v . Griffin , 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th C ir. 1979). Eva sive or m i sle a ding te stim ony , in this light, c an only obstruc t the d ue a dm inistra

tion of justic e whe n it c o m ple te l y thwa

rts the inve stiga

tive
nature of the tribuna l—

w he n it de ra ils the grand jury

“ a s e ffe c tive ly

a s if [the -6-witne s s] re fuse d to a nswe r the que stion a

t a ll.” Id. The prope r que stion is not whe the r a sta te m e n t ha d the intrinsic c a pa bility to influe nc e the gran d jury , but whe the r the sta

te m e nt, vie we d in the c onte xt of the witne ss’ s te s tim o ny a s a whole ,

“ c l ose d off e ntire ly

the ave nue of inquiry

be ing pursue d by ” the grand jury
. Unite d State s v . Brow n , 459 F.3d 509, 531 (5th C ir. 2006) (inte rna l quota tion m arks
om i tte d); se e also Unite d S t ate s v . C ohn , 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d C ir. 1971) (“ The blat antly e va sive witne ss a c hie v e s th[e ] e ffe c t [of im pe ding the gathe ring of
re le va nt e vide nc e ] a s sure l y

by e re c ting a

sc re e n of fe igne d

forge tfulne ss a s one who burns file s or induc e s a pote ntia l witne ss to a

bse nt him s e lf.” ). Apply ing the m a te ria lity

sta nda rd a single truthful but e va sive or m isle a ding sta te m e nt c an ne ve r be m a te ria l . Our e xam ination of Sta t e m e nt C

— a

single
e va sive or m isle a ding sta

te m e nt— re ve a l s why . No rationa l juror c ould ha v e found that State m e nt C am ounte d to a re fusa l to te s tify , suc h tha t B onds’ s te stim ony thwa rte d the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tive func tion. In sum m ary , the “ natura l and proba b le e ffe c t” of a

single true but e va sive
re sponse to the gove rnm e nt’ s que stioning is not to im pe de the grand jury

but,
ra the r, to prom

pt follow-up que stioning. A sta te m e n t tha

t “ goe s off into the
c osm os” m e re ly

trigge rs the prose c utor’ s duty to pin thewitne ss down a nd e lic it a
c le ar re sponse . Inde e d, tha t is e xa c tly

what ha ppe n e d in this c a s e . Fa c e d with a -7-ra m

bling re sponse , the prose c utor re sta te d the sa m e que stion a

nd e lic i te d a dire c t,
una m biguous a nswe r from

B onds: “ No.” No rationa l juror c ould c onc lude tha t B onds re fuse d

to a n swe r the que stion; it is pla in in there c ord tha

t B onds ga

ve his te stim ony to the grand jury . Furthe r, this is thus not a situa tion in whic h a witne ss te stifie d e va sive ly

for so long a

nd with suc h pe rsiste nc e tha t the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion would like ly

have be e n

thwa rte d, a s would bere quire d for the te stim ony to be m a te ria l. Sta

te m e nt C wa s the re fore not m a te ria l , a nd B onds’ s
c onvic tion m

ust be re ve rse d.

-8-Unite d

State s v . Bonds , No. 11-10669 R EINHAR

DT, C irc uit Judge , c onc urring: B e c a use I c onc ur not only

with thepe r c uriam

opinion but a

lso with pa

rts of Judge Koz inski’ s a

nd Judge N.R . Sm ith’ s opinions (while disa gre e ing with other pa rts), I offe r m

y se pa ra te vie ws re ga

rding wha

t is in a fa c t a ve ry sim ple c a se , a s
we ll a s m y thoughts c onc e rning the prope r c onstruc tion of 18 U.S.C . § 1503, the obstruc tion of justic e sta

tute . I. M y answe r to the que stion with which Judge Koz inski be gins his opinion,

“ C an a single non-re sponsive answe r by a gran d jury

witne ss support a

c onvic tion for obstruc tion of justic e unde r 18 U.S.C . § 1503? ” is sim ple : No. M y

re sponse would be the sa

m e re ga rdle s s of the c onte xt in whic h the answe r wa s give n. I re a c h the c onc lusion tha t B onds’ s Stat e m e nt C wa s not m a te ria l a nd thus
c ould not (a

nd did not) obstruct justic e on diffe re nt a nd na rrowe r grounds tha

n doe s Judge Koz inksi. I do not a gre e , for e xam

ple , with his opinion’ s swe e ping sta te m e nts re ga

rding the sc ope of the sta

tute or with its intim

ations tha tnonre sponsiveanswe rs tha

t a re not la te r c ure d by

wa y of dire c t re plie s m ight c onstitute obstruc tion of justic e . Sim ila rly , I would not sugge st tha t the re m ay

be a c a te gory of non-re sponsiveor irre le va nt a nswe rs tha

t c o uld be c ha

ra c te riz e d a s e va s ive or 

# F IL ED
APR 22 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1m isle a ding a nd thus subje c t to diffe ring tre a tm e nt from othe r kinds of nonre sponsiveanswe rs. In m y opinion, Sta

te m e nt C “ c annot be sa id to ha ve the ‘ natura l a

nd proba b le e ffe c t’ of inte rfe ring with the due a dm inistra

tion of justic e .’ ” Unite d State s v . Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593, 601 (1995). 1 As Judge Koz i nski him se lf puts it,

“ [it] sa y s a bsolute ly nothing pe rtine nt to thesubje c t of the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion.” Koz inski Op. a

t 8. At m ost, Sta

te m e nt C wa s non-re sponsive , a nd in
no re spe c t c ould it (or did it) c onstitute a c rim ina l a c t. I c onc ur with JudgeKoz inski’ s opinion a s we ll a s Judge N.R . Sm ith’ s insofa r a s the y sta te tha t Sta te m e nt C c ould not ha

v e be e n m a t e ria l e v e n

if it ha d be e n fa lse . A non-re sponsive answe r that is fa lse is “ no m ore like ly to im pe de the inve stiga tion tha n” a non-re sponsive answe r that is true . Koz i nski Op. a t 10; se e also N .R . Sm ith Op. a

t 3 n.3. Inde e d, e ve n “ pe rjure d re le v a nt te stim ony

. . . ne e d not ne c e ssa

rily . . . obstruc t or ha lt the judic ia l proc e ss.” In reMic hae l , 326 U.S.224, 227–28 (1945) (em p ha sis a dde d) (e xpla ining tha t c o nte m pt for

“ obstruc t[ing] the a dm inistra t ion of justic e ,” unde r pre de c e ssor sta tute to 18 U.S.C
. § 401, re quire d m ore tha

n a fa lse sta te m e nt). I a lso a gre e he artily with Judge Koz inski’ s sta

te m e nts tha

t “ a c e rta in num

be r of non-re sponsiveor irre le va nt

1 Se e infra p . 3 an d

note 2. 2sta

te m e nts c an be e xpe c te d a s pa rt of the give -and-ta

ke of c o urtroom

disc ourse ,”
and tha t we m ust c onside r the pra c tic a litie s of “ re a l -life witne s s e xam inations” whe n inte rpre t ing the sta

tute . Koz inski Op. a

t 9. M ore o ve r, in m

y vie wthe
a ppropria te c ourse in the e ve nt of m a te ria l fa lse te s tim ony is a pe rjury prose c ution, not a prose c ution for obstruc t ion of justic e . In fa c t , the prose c ut ors trie d to c onvic t B onds of pe rjury

on se ve ra l c ounts in this ve ry proc e e ding, but ha d

no be tte r luc k with the jury

in tha t e ffort tha

n the y have ha d with this c ourt on toda y ’ s a ppe a l. Unlike Judge Koz inski, I c onc ur with thepa rt of Judge N.R . Sm ith’ s opinion that would hold tha

t the “ natura l a

nd proba ble e ffe c t” te st a

rtic ulate d in Unite d State s v . Aguilar c onstitute s the prope r sta nda rd for m a te ria l ity

with re spe c t to § 1503. 2 I a lso c o nc ur with thepa rt of Judge N.R . Sm i th’ s opinion tha t would hold that unde r Bronston v . Unite d

State s , 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the natura l a nd proba ble
e ffe c t of Sta

te m e nt C is m e re ly

tha t c ounse l will ha

ve to a s k follow-up que stions. Fa c e d with a

sta te m e n t tha

t is “unre sponsiveon [its] fa c e ,” id. a t 361, “ [i] t is the
re sponsibility

of the la wy e r to probe ; te stim onia l inte rrogation . . . is a probing, pry i ng, pre ssing form

of inquiry . If a

witne ss e va de s, it is the

la wy e r’ s
re sponsibility

to re c ogniz e the e va sion a nd to bring the

witne ss ba c k to the m ark, to

2 C f. Koz inski Op. a

t 7 (de sc ribing m a te ria lity sta nda rd a s whe t

he r c onduc t “ ha s a natura l te n de nc y

to influe nc e , or wa s c a

pa ble of influe nc ing, the de c ision of the d e c isionm aking body ” ). 3flush out the whole truth with the

tools of a dve rsary e xam ination.” Id. a t 358–59. In the insta

nt c a se , the prose c utors did e xa c tly tha t: the y c ontinue d to pre ss B onds until hegave a

dire c t a nswe r. The bre a dth of JudgeKoz inski’ s opinion, its unwa rrante d spe c u lation
re ga rding c onte xt, a

nd its useof Unite d State s v . Thomas , 612 F.3d 1107, 1124 (9th C ir. 2010), rathe r tha n A guilar , 515 U.S. a

t 601, to de fine the m a te ria lity
re quire m e nt pre ve nt m e from joining more of tha

t opinion tha

n I ha ve . As to Judge N.R . Sm ith’ s opinion, I find it in se ve ra l re spe c ts m ore pe rsua sive tha n Judge Koz inski’ s, e spe c ia lly

in its use of the Aguilar s ta

nda rd for m at e ria lity

and its disc ussion of Bronston . Howe ve r, in the e nd, I c annot join tha t opinion e i the r, for
se ve ra l re a sons. One , I disa gre e tha t a flat re fusa l to te s tify

m a y be prose c ute d unde r § 1503. Two, I do not a gre e tha t non-re sponsiveanswe rs a re in a ny re spe c t

“ c l ose ly re lat e d to the de struc tion of e vide n c e . ” N.R . Sm i th Op. a t 5. In m y vie w, ha d B onds re fuse d to te stify or c ontinue d to a

nswe r e va sive ly , the a

p propria te
c ourse would ha

ve be e n a c onte m pt proc e e ding, not a

n obstruc tion of justic e prose c ution. Se e In reGrand J u ry Proc e e dings, Ortloff

, 708 F.2d 1455, 1457–58 (9th C ir. 1983). Thre e , I do not a gre e with theunne c e s sa ry and, in m y vie w, inc o rre c t disc ussion of misle a ding or e va sive te stim ony or with his im

plic it
e ndorse m e nt of Unite d State s v . Griffin , 589 F.2d 200 (5th C i r. 1979), a s the prope r

4rule for this c irc uit. Se e N.R . Sm ith Op. a t 5. M any funda m e nta l que stions pe rsist re ga rding the m e aning a

nd sc ope of § 1503, notwithsta

nding our c ourt’ s broa d c o n struc tion of thesta tute in the pa st,
se e ge ne rally

Unite d State

s v . Rashe e d , 663 F.2d 843 (9th C ir. 1981), a nd the Supre m e C ourt’ s indic a tion of a sim i la r vie win dic tum in

Aguilar , se e ge ne rally 515 U.S. 593. B oth JudgeKoz inski’ s a n d Judge N.R
. Sm ith’ s opinions ha ve m uc h to c o m m e nd the m . Howe ve r, ne ithe r suc c e e d s in its e fforts to a nswe r the c ritic a l que stions re ga

rding the purpose and role of the sta tute , in Judge N.R . Sm ith’ s c a se
a t le a st, pa

rtly be c a use of c urre ntly

c onflic t ing c irc uit la

w tha t he m ay , unde rsta nda b ly , be re luc t a

nt to ove rrule in light of the Supre m e C ourt dic tum

in Aguilar
. Se e N .R . Sm ith Op. a t 2 n.2. R a the r tha

n atte m pting to re solve those proble m s in this c a se , howe ve r, I would sim ply hold tha t B o nds’ s a

nswe r in no
way c onstitute s a

viola tion of § 1503 be c a

use it is non-re sponsive and thus nonm a te ria l , a

nd tha t his prose c ution for thec h arge d offe nse wa s the re fore wholly
unwa rrante d unde r the la

w. I would le ave the re st of the spe c ulation a nd the
unne c e ssa

ry , if not e rrone ous, a

na ly sis in m

y c olle a gue s’ opinions to a nothe r tim e , pre fe ra bly a fte r the Supre m e C ourt ha s spoke n. I I. M y own vie w is tha

t § 1503 should not be c onstrue d a s c ove ring te stim ony

5of witne sse s at c ourt proc e e dings. I e xpla in m y re a ding of thesta

t ute only brie fly in light of wha

t a ppe ars to m e to be the Supre m e C o urt’ s c urre nt vie w of the la w— a vie w tha t a lso c a use s m e to re fra in from

sugge s ting a

t this time tha

t we
ove rrule Ninth C irc uit c a se s tha t c onstrue § 1503 ove rly

broa dly , se e Rashe e d , 663 F.2d at 851–52, or tha

t a pply it to in-c ourt te stim ony . Se e Thomas , 612 F.3d a t 1125–29. Although our c ourt ha s pre viously a ffirm e d a

§ 1503 c o nvic tion ba se d on in-c ourt te stim ony , s e e id. , the Supre m e C ourt ha s ne ve r done so a nd ha s indic a te d its vie w only

in dic tum c onta i ne d in Aguilar
. Se e 515 U.S. a t 600–01. Given the history an d c irc um sta

nc e s of § 1503, I would hope tha t the C ourt would not follow the A guilar dic tum

whe n it c onfronts theissue dire c tly
. 3 The history

unde rly ing § 1503 strongly supports the c onc l usion tha

t in-c ourt te stim ony is not a subje c t of c rim ina l sa

nc tions unde r that sta

tute . The pre de c e ssor to § 1503 wa s origina lly

e na c t e d in 1831 in re sponse to a buse of the c onte m

pt powe r by a fe de ra l distric t

judge who ha d

im prisone d a m an for publishing a
c ritic ism of one of his opinions. N y e v . Unite d State

s , 313 U.S. 33, 41 (1941). In

3 In this re spe c t m

y a pproa c h is som e what le ss bold tha n Judge W
. Fle t c he r’ s. I do not be lie ve tha t we ne e d c onfront the A guilar dic tum in orde r to re ve rse , so, a s a

prude ntia l m a tte r, I would not re ly on the far broa de r ground disc usse d in this se c tion of m y c onc urre nc e . Ne ve rthe l e ss, should it be c om e ne c e ssa ry in a future c a se to a ddre ss the Aguilar dic tum , I re se rve the right to c onside r furthe r the que stion of its binding na ture . 6e sta

blishing the

c rim e of obstruc tion of justic e , C o ngre ss c re at e d, a s N y e put it, a

“ ge ogra phic a l ” divide be twe e n the c onduc t c onstituting tha t c rim e and c o nduc t subje c t to c onte m

p t: “ m isbe h avior of a

ny pe rson or pe rsons in the pre se nc e of said
c ourts, or so near the re to a s to obstruc t the a dm inistra

tion of justic e ” c o nstitute d
c onte m p t unde r se c tion 1 of the

Ac t of M arc h 2, 1831, whe re a s pe rsons outside of
c ourt who “ c o rruptly , or by thre a ts of forc e , obstruc t, or im pe de , or e nde avor to obstruc t or im

pe d e , the due a dm inistra

tion of justic e ” c om

m i tte d the c rim e of obstruc tion of justic e unde r se c tion 2. Id. a t 46–49 (e m pha sis a dde d). Se c tion 1 survive s toda

y a s 18 U.S.C . § 401, thec onte m pt sta tute , while se c tion 2 be c am e the c la u se of § 1503 a

t issue in this c a se . Thus, theorigina l unde rsta nding of the
c rim e of obstruc t i on of justic e wa s tha t it a pplie d to c onduc t outside the pre se nc e of a c o urt. Suc h wa s a

nd is theinte nt of C ongre ss, a n d “ [w] e c a

nnot by proc e ss of inte rpre tation obliterate the distinc tions whic h C o ngre ss dre w.” N y e , 313 U.S. a

t 50. W he n one c onside rs the othe r c rim ina l sta tute s a va ila b le to punish in-c ourt
m isbe havior by a

witne ss—

that is, m isc onduc t during te stim ony
— this

“ ge ogra phic a l ” de line a tion, id. a t 48, whe re by only out-of-c o urt c onduc t
c onstitute s obstruc tion of justic e unde r § 1503, m ake s se nse . A fa lse sta te m e nt
m a de during in-c o urt te stim ony c onstitute s pe rjury
. Se e 1 8 U.S.C . §§ 1621, 1623. 7A fa ilure to a nswe r a que stion or a

m a te ria l e va sion tha

t the witne ss re fuse s to
c orre c t during in-c ourt te stim ony c onstitute s c onte m

pt. I se riously

doubt tha t the obstruc tion of justic e sta

tute wa s inte n de d to duplic a te the se c rim e s. Som e thing
m ore tha n a witne ss m e re ly ly ing or be ing non-re s ponsive during te s tim ony is
re quire d in orde r to viola

te § 1503. Othe rwise , the c rim e of obstruc tion of justic e would be to tha

t e xte nt wholly

supe rfluous. M ore im porta nt, the argum e nt for c o ve ra ge of suc h a c tions unde r § 1503 hinge s e ntire ly on the single word “ c orruptly .” The othe r spe c ifie d m e ans of obstruc ting justic e e num e ra te d in tha t se c tion— “ by

thre a ts or forc e , or by any thre a te ning le tte r or c om

m unic a tion”

—

whe n vie we d in c onte xt dic tat e the opposite
c onc lusion: “ c orruptly ” doe s not de s c ribe the in-c ourt c onduc t of a witne ss, but
ra the r, like those e num e ra te d m e ans, de sc ribe s the c o nduc t of a third pa rty who
se e k s to obstruc t

the proc e e d ings. The spe c ifie d m e ans ne c e ssa rily de sc ribe the
a tte m pts of a third pa rty to a ffe c t the judic ia l proc e e dings by c orrupt m e ans. As Judge W . Fle tc he r e xpla ins, the inte rpre tative c anon nosc itur a soc iis

— lite ra lly

“ [i] t is known from its a s soc iate s”

— te lls us tha

t “ the m e aning of que stiona ble or doubtful words or phra se s in a sta tute m ay be a s c e rta ine d by

re fe re nc e to the
m e aning of othe r words or phra se s a ssoc iate d with it.”B la c k’ s La w Dic tiona

ry 1060 (6th e d. 1990). B e c a u se obstruc ting proc e e dings by “ thre a ts or forc e ” pla inly 8re fe rs to the c onduc t of pe rsons outside of c ourt who se e k to obstruc t the proc e e dings a

nd not to the

witne ss who is te stify ing in c ourt in theproc e e dings,

“ c o rruptly ” m

ust simila rly be unde rstood a s re fe rring to them e ans use d by third pa rtie s to influe nc e , obstruc t, or im pe de proc e e d ings, a

nd not to in-c ourt te stim ony by a witne ss who m ay

we ll be the obje c t but not the subje c t of the c orrupt ta c tic s. Eve n if § 1503 c ove re d in-c ourt c onduc t, “ c o rruptly ” would, unde r the
nosc itur a soc iis c an on, a s we ll a s unde r any othe r re a sona

ble m e ans of sta

tutory
c onstruc tion, re quire a

gre ate r m a gnitude of m isc onduc t tha n sim ply giving a fa l se
or non-re sponsiveanswe r to a q ue stion. C le arly , a m e re lie or e va sive answe r is not
akin to using thre ats or forc e to c a use anothe r to lie . Inde e d, the Supre m e C o urt ha s
on oc c a sion re c ogniz e d

tha t lie s a nd e va sive answe rs a

re pa rt a nd pa rc e l of the proc e s s of unc o v e ring the truth through adve rsa ria l witne ss e xam ination. Se e Bronston , 409 U.S. a

t 358; M ic hae l , 326 U.S. a

t 227–28. The

use of thre a ts or forc e to im

pe de a proc e e ding, by

c ontra s t, is not a

c u stom ary

inc ide n t of tha

t proc e s s a nd c onstitute s a

far m ore se rious offe n se . “ C orruptly ” in the obstruc tion of justic e sta

t ute c ove rs c onduc t at the sa m e le ve l of obstruc tion a s the use of thre a ts or forc e and m a

y not prope rly

be inte rpre te d

so a s to bring a

m e re lie or
e va sive answe r by

a witne ss within the

sc ope of the sta

tute . Although I a

m not
c e rta in tha

t “ c orruptly ” is limi t e d to bribe ry a s Judge W . Fle t c he r c onte nds, I a m 9wholly

c o nfide nt tha

t it doe s de sc ribe c onduc t of tha t m a gnitude and not a

sim ple lie or e va sive answe r by

a witne ss during in-c ourt te stim ony . For the re a s ons disc usse d a bove , I would hopetha

t the Supre m e C ourt would re visit its dictum

in Aguilar and would c onc lude tha t § 1503 doe s not c ove r
a witne ss’ s in-c ourt te stim ony . Afte r a ll, C ongre ss ha s e na c te d c rim ina l sta tute s othe r tha n § 1503 tha

t suffic ie ntly

a ddre ss a witne s s’ s in-c ourt c onduc t. The proble m s c re a te d

by the m isuse of § 1503 by

ove re a ge r prose c utors to punish witne s se s for wha

t the y sa y in c ourt a

re a ll too e v ide nt from

the fa c ts of this c a se . It is tim e for the m to c e a se using tha t se c tion a s a

substitute

for vigorous c rosse xam ination or for thec rim i na l sta tute s tha t prope rly a pply to in-c ourt te stim ony . * * * In short, this c a se involve s nothing more tha n a n irre le va nt, ra m b ling sta te m e nt m a de by

a witne ss during the

c ourse of a

grand jury inve stiga

tion. Stat e m e nt C wa s not m a te ria l and c ould not possibly have inte rfe re d with thedue
a dm inistra

tion of justic e . I the re fore c onc ur in the pe r c uriam opinion (a

nd the pa rts of Judge Koz inski’ s a

nd Judge N.R . Sm i th’ s opinions tha t I ha ve ide ntifie d
a bove ). B onds’ s c onvic tion for obstruc tion of justic e c annot sta nd a nd he m ay

not be re trie d on the sa

m e c ha rge .

10Unite d

State s v . Bonds , No. 11-10669 W . FLETC HER , C i rc uit Judge , c onc urring in thejudgm e nt: I strongly but re spe c tfully

disa gre e with the ra tiona le a dva nc e d by the pe r
c uriam opinion a

nd by the princ ipa l c onc urre nc e . I c o nc ur only in the judgm e nt. The issue be fore us is them e an ing of the fe de ra l obstruc tion of justic e sta tute , 18 U.S.C . § 1503(a ). Se c tion 1503(a ) provide s, in re le va

n t pa rt: W hoe ve r c orruptly , or by thre a ts or forc e , o r b y a ny thre a te ning le tte r or c om m unic a tion, e nde avors to influe nc e , intim idate , or im pe de any grand o r pe tit juror, o r offic e r in or of any c ourt of the Unite d State s . . . o r c orruptly or by th r ea t

s or forc e

, or by any t

hre ate ning le tte r or c ommunic ation, influe nc e s , obstruc ts, o r i mpe d

e s, or e nde av ors to influe nc e , obstruc t, or impe de

, the due administration o

f justic e , sha ll be punishe d a s provide d in subse c tion (b). (Em pha s is a dde d.) Se c tion 1503(a ) a pplie s to obstruc tion of justic e , a s de fine d by the s tat ute , in both c rim ina l a

nd c i vil proc e e dings. Se c tion 1503(b) provide s punishm e nts of va

ry ing se ve ritie s, de pe nding on the nature of the a c t. The m ost le nie nt punishm e nt is “ im prisonm e n t for not m ore tha n 10 y e ars, a

fine unde r this title , or both.” Id. § 1503(b)(3). B onds wa s prose c ute d unde r the se c ond, or “ om nibus,” c la

use of § 1503(a ), the e m pha siz e d portion a

bove . The gove rnm e nt a

nd the princ ipa l c onc urre nc e re a d the w ord “ c orruptly ” at the be ginning of the c la use to re fe r to a

sta te of m ind,
m e aning “ with inte n t to influe nc e , intimi date , or im pe d e the due a dm i nistra

tion of 

# F IL ED
APR 22 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1justic e .” The y re a d the c la use a s c rim i na liz ing e ve n e ntire ly truthful sta

te m e nts, so long a s those sta

te m e nts a re m a de with suc h inte nt. In the gove rnm e n t’ s vie w, a ny truthful a nswe r give n in the c ourse of c ivil or
c rim ina l litiga

tion, if intende d to influe nc e , obstruc t, or im pe de the a dm inistra

tion of justic e , viola

te s the om

nibus c la u se . At ora l a

rgum e nt, the gove rnm e nt m a de te rrify ingly

c le ar the re sult of its re a ding of thesta tute . The gove rnm e nt c onte nde d that the obstruc tion sta

tute c rim ina l iz e s a

truthful but inte

ntiona lly e va sive or
m isle a ding a

nswe r to a

n inte rrogatory

in c i vil litiga

tion. Thegove rnm e nt a l so
c onte nde d tha

t the sta tute c rim ina liz e s a

truthful but inte

ntiona lly e va sive or
m isle a ding a

nswe r during a

ppe lla te ora l a rgum e nt: Q: I think it’ s a c om

m on e xpe rie nc e am ong a ll of us on the a ppe l late c ourt to a sk of the la

wyer i n f ront of us in a c rim ina l c a se that’ s c om e up o n a

p pe a l: “ C ounse l, c o uld y ou ple a se e xpla in to m e what ha p pe n e d a t t

ria l ? ” and for the la

wy e r arguing from t

he U.S. Attorne y ’ s Offic e to sa

y , “ Yo u r H o n o r , I wa s not the t ria l a ttorne y . ” Now, som e t im e s tha t’ s a n e va s ive answe r. The y m ay we ll know the a

n swe r, but i t’ s true that t he y w ere n’ t the t

ria l a ttorne y . . . . Ha s the l aw y er just c om m itte d a c rim e ?
. . . [T] he answe r that I j ust hy

pothe siz e d wa s d es i g n ed to put m e off the tra c k. . . . A truthful but e va sive answe r.

. . . A: I think tha

t would beobstruc tive , Your Honor. W he n a ske d how m a

ny San Franc isc o la

wy e rs it pla

nne d to throw in ja

il, the gove rnm e nt de c line d to spe c ify
. 2The princ ipa l c onc urre nc e a gre e s with thegove rnm e nt’ s re a d ing of the

sta tute . B ut it se e ks to lim

it the sc ope of its ope ration, writing, “B e c a use the sta tute swe e ps so broa dly , due proc e ss c a lls for prude n tia l lim ita tions on the gove rnm e nt’ s powe r to prose c ute unde r it.” C onc urre nc e at 7. Ac c ording to the
c onc urre nc e , “ due proc e s s” and “prude n c e ” dic tate tha t a truthful but inte

n tiona lly
e va sive or m isle a ding sta

te m e nt c an be prose c ute d unde r the sta t ute only if it wa s

“ m a te ria l .” Id. at 7–8. Thec o nc urre nc e de fine s “ m a te ria l ” a s “ c a p a b le of influe n c i ng a

de c isionm aking pe rson or e ntity .” Id. at 8. Apply ing its prudenc e -ba se d de finition of ma te ria lity , the princ ipa l
c onc urre nc e te lls us tha

t B onds’ s wa

nde ring a nd non-re sponsiveanswe r wa s not
m a te ria l and the re fore not c rim ina l, e ve n if give n with inte nt to influe n c e , obstruc t, or im pe de . It c onc lude s, “ State m e nt C , sta nding a lone , did not ha

v e the c a pa c ity to dive rt the gove rnm e nt from its inve stiga

tion or influenc e the grand jury ’ s de c ision whe the r to indic t a

ny one .” Id. a t 9. The c o nc urre nc e c ontra sts B o nds’ s a nswe r with a n a nswe r that would ha

ve be e n c rim i na l. B o nds wa s a ske d , “ Did Gre g e ve r give y ou a

nything tha

t re quire d a

sy ringe to inje c t y ourse l f with? ” If B onds ha d
answe re d “ I’ m a fra id of ne e dle s,” the c onc urre nc e te lls us tha t he c ould ha

ve be e n
suc c e ssfully

prose c ute d. Id. If B onds ha d give n tha t a nswe r, “ i t would ha

v e be e n pla u sible to infe r an unspoke n de nia l, with thea c tua l words se rving a s a n 3e xpla

nation or e la

b ora t ion.” Id. The princ ipa l c onc urre nc e ’ s “ prude ntia l” na rrowing of “ the gove rnm e nt’ s powe r to prose c ute ” is ha rdly re a ssuring. An a

ttorne y who provide s a

truthful but
e va sive answe r to a

n inte rrogat ory

in c ivil litiga

tion ofte n doe s so in thehope tha t his a nswe r will “ influe nc e the de c isionm aking pe rson” who re c e ive s it. If the re is
a re a sona ble c ha nc e tha t the hope will be re a liz e d, the attorne y is a c rim ina l. An
a ppe lla te attorne y

who a nswe rs during ora l a

rgum e nt, “ I wa s not thetria l attorne y ,”
som e tim e s knows wha

t ha ppe ne d at tria l but give s tha t a nswe r in the hope tha

t the judge will not pursue

the m atte r. This a

ttorne y , too, m ay

be a c rim ina l. I disa gre e . The om

n ibus c la use of § 1503(a ) is not a

n ope n-e nde d provision whose c onstitutiona

lity we c an uphold only by

m anufa c turing a

“ prude ntia l ” lim ita tion on the

gove rnm e nt’ s powe r to prose c ute . R a t he r, it is a na rrowly ta rge te d provision tha

t ha d a spe c ific m e aning whe n e n a c te d a nd whose te xt ha s
re m a ine d substa

ntia lly unc ha n ge d for ove r 180 y e ars. The ke y to a prope r unde rsta nding of the sta

t ute is the m e aning of the word “ c o rruptly .” I. M e aning of “ C orruptly ” As use d in § 1503(a

), “ c orruptly ” doe s not de s c ribe a sta te of m ind. R a the r, it de sc ribe s a forbidde n m e a ns of influe nc ing, obstruc ting, or im pe d ing the due
a dm inistra

tion of justic e . As use d in § 1503(a ), “ c orruptly ” m ost like ly

m e ans “ by 4bribe ry .” The re are two a rgum e nts supporting this re a ding: first, the te xt of the sta tute ; se c o nd, a

c om pa rison with 18 U.S.C . § 1621, thefe de ra l pe rjury sta tute . A. Te xt of the Statute The pre d e c e ssor to § 1503(a ) wa s e na c te d in 1831, in re a c tion to pe rc e ive d
ove rre a c hing by

a fe de ra l judge who ha d he l d a la wy e r in c o nte m

pt for an out-ofc ourt writing. Se e W a lte r Ne lle s & C arol W e iss King, C onte mpt by

Public ation in the U nite d State

s: To the Fe de ral C

onte mpt Statute , 28 C o lum . L. R e v. 401, 423–31 (1928). The

1831 sta tute ha d two pa

rts. The first de sc ribe d, a nd se t lim its on, the c o nte m

p t powe r of fe de ra l judge s. The se c ond, a t issue in this c a s e , c rim ina liz e d out-of-c ourt c onduc t tha t im prope rly sought to influe

nc e judic ia l proc e e dings. Se c tion 1503(a ) is the suc c e ssor to these c ond pa rt. The 1831 sta

tute re a d, in re le va

nt pa rt: And be it furthe r e na c te d, That if any pe rson o r pe rsons sha ll, c orruptly , or by thre a ts or forc e , e n de avor to influe nc e , i ntim idate , o r im pe de any juror, witne ss, o r offic e r, in any c ourt o f the Unite d Stat es , in the disc ha rge of h is duty , or sha ll c orruptly , or by thre ats or f

orc e , obstruc t or impe de , or e nde a v or to obstruc t or impe de , the due administration of justic e the re in, e ve ry pe r s o n o r pe rsons, so offe nding, sha l l be lia ble to prose c ution the re for . . . . Ac t of M ar. 2, 1831, c h. 99, 4 Sta t. 487, 488 (e m

pha sis a dde d). For c onve nie nc e , I quote a ga in the c orre sponding provisions of the m ode rn § 1503(a): W hoe ve r c orruptly , or by thre a ts or forc e , o r b y a ny thre a te ning le tte r or 5c om

m unic a tion, e n d e avors to influe nc e , intim idate , o r im pe de any grand or pe tit juror, or o ffic e r in or of any c ourt of the Unite d State s, . . . i n the disc ha rge of his duty
. . . o r co r r u p t ly or by thre ats or forc e , or b y any thre ate ning le tte r or c ommunic ation, influe nc e s, obstruc ts, or impe de

s, or e nde av o rs to influe nc e , obstruc t, o r impe de

, the d ue administration of justic e , sha ll be punishe d a s provide d in subse c t ion (b). 18 U.S.C . § 1503(a ) (e m

pha sis a dde d ). The om

nibus c la use , highlighte d a

b ove , is
a t issue he re . The re are thre e diffe re nc e s be t we e n the om

n ibus c la use a s origina l ly

e na c te d in 1831 a nd a s it a ppe ars toda

y . First, in 1872, C ongre ss e na c te d a provision tha t prohibite d obstruc tion “

by thre a te ning le tte rs, or a

ny thre a te ning c om

m unic a tions,” in a d dition to the

1831 prohibitions on obstruc tion “ c orruptly ” and “ by

thre a ts or forc e .” Ac t of June 10, 1872, c h. 420, 17 Sta t. 378, 378. As pa

rt of the ge ne ra l
re vision a nd c odific a tion of thefe de ra l c rim ina l c o de in 1909, C ongre ss sim plifie d the s tat ute by re p la c ing “ any

thre a te ning le tte rs, or a

ny thre a te ning
c om m unic a tions,” with “ any

thre a te ning le tte r or c om m unic a tion.” Ac t of M ar. 4, 1909, c h. 321, 35 Sta

t. 1088, 1113. Se c ond, the 1831 la w prohibite d obstruc ting or im pe ding the a dm i n istra

tion of justic e . The 1872 sta t ute a dde d a

prohibition
a ga inst influe nc ing its a dm inistra tion. Ac t of June 10, 1872, c h. 420, 17 Sta t. 378, 378. Third, a s pa

rt of the 1909 re vision, the c om m a a fte r “ c orruptly ” wa s droppe d,
a lm ost c e rta inly ina dve rte ntly . Ac t of M ar. 4, 1909, c h. 321, 35 Sta t. 1088, 1113.
6The re ha d be e n a c om m a a fte r the word “ c orruptly ” in both the first a n d om nibus
c la use s in the 1831 a

nd 1872 sta

tute s, a nd a c om m a wa s re ta ine d a fte r “ c orruptly ” in the first c la

use of the obstruc tion sta

tute . Se e Ac t of M ar. 2, 1831, c h. 99, 4 Sta t. 487, 488; Ac t of June 10, 1872, c h. 420, 17 Sta t. 378, 378; Ac t of M ar. 4, 1909, c h. 321, 35 Sta

t. 1088, 1113. No re a son wa s give n in 1909 for dropping the c om m a
a fte r the word “ c orruptly ” in the se c ond, om nibus c la use . As writte n in 1831, the om nibus c la u s e provide d two m e thods, sepa ra te d by
c om m a s , by whic h a pe rson c ould im

prope rly “ obstruc t or im

p e de ” the “ due
a dm inistra

tion of justic e .” A pe rson c ould do it “ c orruptly ,” or he c ould do it “ by thre a ts or forc e .” As writte n in 1872, the c la use provide d thre e suc h

m e thods,
a ga in se pa

rate d b y c om m a s, by whic h a pe rson c ould im

prope rly “ i nflue nc e , obstruc t, or im

p e de ” the “ d

ue a dm inistra

tion of justic e .” A pe rson c o u ld do it

“ c o rruptly ,” “ by

thre ats or forc e ,” or “ by

thre a te ning le tte rs, or a

ny thre a te ning
c om m unic a tions.” Fina lly , a s re vise d a nd c odifie d in 1909, the c la use c ontinue d to provide thre e m e ans, now pa rtia lly se pa ra te d by c om m a s, by whic h a pe rson c ould

“ influe n c e , obstruc t, or im pe de ” : a pe rson c ould do it “ c o rruptly ,” “ by thre a ts or forc e ,” or “ by

thre a te ning le tte r or c om m unic a tion.” The om

nibus c la use ha s
re m a ine d e s se ntia lly

unc h ange d sinc e the 1909 ge ne ra l re vision a nd c odific a tion. A “ c om m onse nsic a l inte rpre tive princ iple ” is tha t “ words m e an wha

t the y 7c onve y e d to re a sona ble pe ople a t the tim e the y we re writte n .” Antonin Sc a lia & B ry an Ga rne r, Re ading Law : The Inte rpre t ation of Le

gal Te x t 15–16 (2012). The 1828 Ame ric an Dic tionary of the English Language , publishe d thre e y e ars be fore the e na c tm e nt of the origina l ve rsion of § 1503(a ), gave two de finitions for
c orruptly : 1. In a c orrupt m anne r; with c orruption; vic iously ; wic k e dly ; without inte grity . W e have de a lt ve ry c orruptly a g a inst the e . Ne he m ia

h 1. 2. B y bribe ry . A judgm e nt wa s obta ine d c orruptly
. A c onte m pora ne ous doc um e nt, a s we l l a s a n inte rpre tive c anon, show tha t whe n it wrote the word “ c orruptly ,” C ongre s s wa s like ly using thena

rrow and spe c ific
se c o nd de finition. The N ational Inte llige nc e r , publishe r of the R e giste r of De bate s a n d the pre d e c e ssor to wha

t la te r be c am e the C

ongre ssional Re c ord , re porte d

an a c tion of the H ouse of R e pre se ntative s on the Se nate B ill tha t be c am e the 1831 sta

tute . It
re porte d tha

t on W e dne sda

y , M arc h 2, 1831, the

House am e n de d a

nd the n a gre e d to the Se nate B ill punishing “ a tte m pts to c orrupt or intim

idate jurors” : The Se nate ’ s am e ndm e nts to the Ac t de c la ra tory of the po w e rs of the C ourts of the Unite d State s on the subje c t of C onte m pts; a dding a se c ond se c tion for punish i n g a ll atte mpts to c orrupt or intimidate j urors , & c . w as am e nde d on the s ugge stion of M r. B UC HANAN, and the n a gre ed to.
8Tw e nty -First C ongre ss, Se c ond Se

ssion , Da ily

Nationa l Inte llige nc e r, M ar. 3, 1831 (e m pha sis a dde d ). The re fe re nc e is to thefirst c la use ra the r tha

n the om n ibus
c la use of the sta

tute , but the re is no re a son to be lie ve that “ c orruptly ” ha d diffe re n t
m e anings in the

two pa ra lle l c la use s. The N

ational Inte llige nc e r ’ s use of the infinitive , “ to c orrupt,” in c onne c tion with the dire c t obje c t, “

jurors,” indic a te s tha

t the p rohibition ag a inst a c ting “ c orruptly ” wa s a prohibition a

ga inst a spe c ific a c t

— c orrupting, or a

tte m pting to c orrupt, jurors, a

nd the re by

obstruc ting or im

pe ding justic e . Tha

t is, theprohibition a

ga inst a c ting “ c orruptly ” wa s a na rrow and spe c ific prohibition a

g a inst bribing jurors, using the se c ond de finition. It wa s not a broa d ge ne ra l prohibition a g a inst a c ting “ wic ke dly ” or “ vic i ously ” in obstruc ting or im pe ding justic e . The te xt following the word “ c o rruptly ” in the om nibus c la use of § 1503(a )
re inforc e s the c onc lusion tha t it m e ans “ by

bribe ry .” In the c urre nt ve rsion, the re
are t hre e spe c ific forbidde n m e thods of “ influe nc ing, obstruc ting, or im p e d ing the due a dm inistra

t i on of justic e ” : (1) “ c orruptly ,” (2) “ by thre a ts or forc e ,” or (3) “ by
any thre a te n ing le tte r or c om m unic a tion.” In the 1831 ve rsion, the re we re two spe c ific forbidde n m e thods: (1) “ c orruptly ,” or (2) “ by thre a ts or forc e . ” Whe re sta tutory te rm s “ are susc e ptible of m ultipleand wide -ra nging m e a n ings . . . those
m e anings a

re na rrowe d by

the c om m onse nse c anon of nosc itur a soc iis

— whic h 9c ounse ls tha t a word is give n m ore pre c ise c onte nt by the ne ighboring words with whic h it is a ssoc iate d.” Unite d State s v . W illiams , 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008). “ The
m a xim nosc itur a soc iis , . . . while not a n ine sc a pa ble rule , is ofte n

wise l y a pplie d whe re a word is c a

pa ble of m any

m e anings in order to a

void the giving of uninte nde d bre a dth to theAc ts of C ongre ss.” J are c k i v . G. D. Se arle

& C o. , 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961); se e also U nite d State

s v . K imse y , 668 F.3d 691, 701 (9th C ir. 2012) (e ve n whe n a

n inte rpre tation is c onc e i va ble “ b a se d on e t

ym ology a lone ,” that de finition is “ se ve re ly

unde rm ine d” whe n it is illogic a l in light of the
ne ighboring sta

tutory te rm s). The te xt of the om

nibus c la u se of § 1503(a ) is pre c ise ly the kind of te xt to whic h the c an on a

pplie s. Se ve ra l m e thods of obstruc ting the a dm inistra t ion of justic e are liste d im

m e diate l y following the word “ c orruptly ” : “ by thre a ts,” by

“ forc e ,” “ by

thre a te ning le tte r,” and by thre a te ning “ c om

m unic a tion.” The se are not sta te s of m ind. The y

are spe c ific m e thods of obstruc ting justic e . W e c an re a d

“ c o rruptly ” a s de sc ribing a sta te of m ind. Or we c a

n re a d it a s de sc ribing a

nothe r spe c ific m e thod of “ influe nc ing, obstruc ting, or im pe ding” the “ due a dm inistra tion of justic e .” The c anon of nosc itur a soc iis , a s we ll a s c om m on se nse , instruc t us to
c hoose the latte r. R e a d in light of a

c onte m pora ne ous dic tiona

ry m e a n ing of “ c orruptly ,” in 1 0light of the

c onte m pora ne ous re port on thebill tha t be c am e the pre de c e ssor to § 1503(a ), and in light of the n osc itur a soc iis c anon, I c onc l ude tha t § 1503(a) forbids individua

ls from obstruc ting thea dm inistra tion of justic e (1) by

bribe ry , (2) by thre a ts or forc e , or (3) by any thre a te ning le tte r or c om m unic a tion. B . C om pa rison to Pe rjury A c om pa rison of the fe de ra l obstruc tion of justic e sta tute with the fe de ra l pe rjury sta tute re inforc e s the c onc lusion tha t “ c orruptly ” m e a

ns “ by bribe ry .” The obstruc tion of justic e sta

tute pre sc ribe s diffe re n t ra nge s of punishm e nt de pe nding on the a c t. The m ost le nie nt is “ im p risonm e nt for not m ore tha n 10 y e ars, a

fine unde r this title , or both.” 18 U.S.C . § 1503(b)(3). Thefe de ra l pe rjury sta tute , by
c ontra st, pre sc ribe s only

one range of punishm e nt. It provide s tha t som e o ne found guilty of pe rjury “ sha ll . . . be fine d unde r this title or im prisone d not m ore tha

n five y e ars, or both.” 18 U.S.C
. § 1621. If we a c c e pt the princ ipa l c onc urre nc e ’ s re a ding of theword “ c orruptly ,” a pe rson who m ake s a

m a te ria l truthful sta

t e m e nt with the

inte nt to “ influe nc e , obstruc t, or im

p e de the due a dm inistra

tion of justic e ” m ay

be punishe d by

a te rm of im prisonm e nt of up to ten y e ars. A pe rson who m ake s a m a te ria l untruthful sta te m e nt with the

sa m e inte nt m ay

be punishe d by

a te rm of im

p risonm e nt of up to only ha lf tha t. It m ake s no se nse for C ongre ss to punish a truthful sta

te m e nt 1 1m ore se ve re ly tha n a lie
. If, on the othe r ha

nd, we a c c e pt tha

t “ c orruptly ” m e ans

“ by bribe ry ” in § 1503(a), the dispa rity in punishme nt m ake s pe rfe c t se n se . In Bronston v . Unite d State s , 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the C ourt e xpla ine d the diffe re nc e be twe e n truthful but m isle a ding sta

t e m e nts, on theone ha

nd, a nd pe rjurious sta

te m e nts, on theothe r. The C ourt fa c e d a que stion re lat e d to the que stion now be fore us: “ w he the r a witne s s m ay

be c onvic te d of pe rjury

for an
answe r, unde r oath, tha

t is lite ra lly

true but not re sponsiveto the que stion a s ke d
and a rgua bly m isle a ding by

ne gative im

plic a tion.” Id. a t 352–53. The gove rnm e n t ha d c ha

rge d B ronston with viola

ting § 1621, the

fe de ra l pe rjury sta tute , ba se d on sta

te m e nts he ha d m a de at a

he aring be fore a ba

nkruptc y
re fe re e . Whe n a ske d whe the r he ha d e ve r ha d any ba nk a c c o unts in Swiss ba

nks, B ronston re plie d tha

t his “ c o m

pa ny ha d a n a c c ount the re for a

bout six months, in Zuric h .” Id. at 354. B ronston did not m e ntion tha t he ha d pre viously

ha d a pe rsona l ba

nk a c c o unt in Ge ne v a . Id. B ronston’ s a nswe r wa s true . His c om pa ny ha d inde e d ha d a

n a c c ount in Zuric h. Howe ve r, his a nswe r, while true , wa s de signe d to m isle a d the que s tione r. The Unite d State s suc c e ssfully prose c ute d B ronston for pe rjury

on the the ory that he ha d te stifie d unde r oath “ with lite ra l truthfulne ss but unre s ponsive ly .” Id. at 355. TheC o urt re ve rse d B ronston’ s
c onvic tion be c a

use “ the fe de ra l pe rjury

sta tute c annot be c onstrue d to sustain a 1 2c onvic tion ba se d on [his] answe r.” Id. at 357. The C ourt e xpla ine d, “ [W ] e pe rc e ive no re a s on why C ongre ss would intend the d ra stic sa n c tion of a

pe rjury prose c ution to c ure a

te stim o nia l m isha

p tha t c ould
re a d ily have be e n re a c he d with a single a dditiona l que stion by c ounse l a le rt —

a s
e ve ry e xam ine r ought to be

— to the inc ongruity of [B ronston] ’ s unre sponsive
answe r.” Id. at 358. “ If a witne ss e va de s, it is the

la wy e r’ s re sponsibility

to
re c o gniz e the e va sion a

nd to bring the

witne ss ba c k to the m ark, to flush out the whole truth with the

tools of a dve rsary

e xam ination.” Id. at 358–59. This is so
e ve n whe n a witne ss’ s a

nswe rs we re “ not guile l e ss but we re shre w dly c a lc ulate d to
e va de .” Id. at 362. The C ourt re

je c te d the ve ry argum e nt tha

t the gove rnm e nt m ake s in the c a se now be fore us: It is no an swe r to s ay that he re the jury found t hat [the witne ss] inte nde d to m isle a d his e xam i ne r. A jury s hould not b e pe rm itte d to en g ag e in c onje ct u r e w he the r an unre sponsive answe r, true and c om ple te on its fa c e , wa s inte n de d to m isle a d or dive rt the e xam i ne r; the sta te of m i nd of the witne ss is re le va

nt only to the e xte nt that it be ars on whe t he r “ he doe s not be l i e ve (his an swe r) to b e true .” To h o l d othe rwise would be to inje c t a ne w and c onfusing e l e m e nt into the a dve rsary te stim onia l s y ste m we know. W itne sse s would be unsure of t he e xte nt of the ir re sponsibility for the m i sunde rsta ndings and ina de qua c ie s of e xam ine rs, and m ight we ll fe ar hav ing that re sponsibility te s te d by a jury unde r the va gue rubric of “ inte nt to m isle a d” or “ pe rjury by i m p l i c a tion.” The se m ina l m ode rn tre a tm e nt of the history of t he off e nse c o nc lude s that one c o n side ra tion of polic y ove rsha dowe d a l l othe rs during the y e ars 1 3whe n pe rjury first e m e rge d a s a c om m on-la w offe nse : “ that the m e a sure s take n a ga ins t t he offe nse m ust not be so se ve re a s to disc oura ge witne sse s from

a ppe aring or te stify ing.” Id. at 359 (c ita

tion omitte d). Sim

ply put, “ a ny spe c ia l proble m s a

rising from

the lite ra lly true but unre sponsiveanswe r are to be re m e die d through the ‘ que stione r’ s
a c uity ’ and not by

a fe de ra l pe rjury

prose c ution.” Id. at

362. The gove rnm e n t a

nd the princ ipa l c onc urre nc e brush B ronston a side . Tha t is not so e a sily done , for the C o urt’ s re a soning is a s a p plic a ble to this c a se a s to B ronston’ s. In e ithe r c a se , “ [a ] jury should not be

pe rm itte d to e nga g e in
c onje c ture whe the r an unre sponsiveanswe r, true and c om ple te on its fa c e , wa s inte nde d to m isle a d or dive rt the e xam ine r.” Id. a t 358. “ To hold otherwise would be to inje c t a

ne w a nd c onfusing e le m e nt into the a dve rsary

te stim onia l sy ste m

we know.” Id. Furthe r, and pe rha p s m ore im

p orta nt, if the c onc urre nc e is right a bout the m e aning of “ c orruptly ” in § 1503(a), the C ourt’ s c are ful pa rsing of the pe rjury sta tute in Bronston w a s wa ste d e ffort. If the c onc urre nc e is right, a prose c utor
se e k ing to c onvic t

som e one who m ay

or m a y not ha v e te stifie d truthfully

will
ne ve r ne e d to pursuea

pe rjury c onvic tion. Theprose c utor c an ge t a n obstruc tion of justic e c onvic tion, c a

rry ing twic e the pe na lty , for ha lf the e ffort. II. Unite d State

s v . Aguilar Supre m e C ourt dic tum de sc ribing § 1503(a ) doe s not c ha

nge m y c onc lusion. 1 4In Unite d State s v . Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593 (1995), the C ourt re ve rse d a c onvic tion of U.S. Distric t Judge R o be rt Aguila r for obstruc tion of justic e in viola tion of the
om n ibus c la use o f § 1503(a). A gra

nd jury ha d be e n inve s tiga

ting a c onspira c y

to influe n c e anothe r distric t judge . One of the suspe c t e d c onspira t ors, Abe C ha

pm an,
wa s a dista nt re lation of Aguila

r. Whe n Aguila r le arne d tha

t C ha pm an ha d be e n
nam e d in a

fe de ra l wire ta

p a uthoriz a tion, Aguila

r warne d him . During a subse q ue nt gra nd jury inve stiga tion, FB I a ge nts que stione d Aguila r a bout his knowle dge of the wire t a

p a nd the unde rly i ng c onspira c y . Aguila r fa lse ly sta te d that he did not know a

b o ut e ithe r. His fa lse sta

te m e n t s provide d the ba sis for his
c onvic tion unde r the om

nibus c la use . The Supre m e C ourt re v e rse d the c onvic tion be c a use “ [t] h e a c tion ta

ke n by the a c c use d m

ust be with a

n inte nt to influe nc e judic i a l or gra nd jury proc e e dings; it is not enough tha

t the re be an inte nt to influe nc e som e anc illa ry proc e e ding, suc h
a s a n inve stiga tion inde pe nde nt of the c o urt’ s or gra nd jury ’ s a

uthority .” Id. at 599. “ In othe r words, the e nde avor m ust ha v e the natura l a

nd proba ble e ffe c t of inte rfe ring with the due a dm inistra t ion of justic e . ” Id. (quota tion m arks om itte d). In dic tum , the C o urt distinguishe d fa l se sta te m e nts m a de to a

n FB I a ge nt from sta te m e nts m a de dire c t ly

to a grand jury
. The C ourt a ssum e d tha t suc h sta te m e nts m a de to the grand jury would be c ove re d

by the om n ibus c la use . It 1 5wrote that Aguila r’ s c onduc t “ fa lls on theothe r side of the sta t utory line from tha t of one who de live rs fa lse doc um e nts or te stim o ny to the grand jury

itse l f. C onduc t of the latte r sort a ll but a ssure s tha t the grand jury

will c o nside r the m a te ria l in its de libe ra t ions.” Id. at 601. If I we re c om

pe lle d to tre a t the C ourt’ s dic tum a s a c ontrolling sta

te m e nt of la w, I would not be

a b le to a rgue , c onsiste nt with the

vie w of the Supre m e C ourt, that the word “ c orruptly ” i n § 1503(a ) m e ans “ b y bribe ry . ” B ut I do not be lie ve I
am so c om pe l l e d. “ W e do not tre a t c onside re d dic ta from the Supre m e C ourt lightly ,” be c a

use “ it se rve s a s a

prophe c y of what tha

t C ourt m i ght hold.” Mc C alla
v . Roy al Mac C

abe e s Life Ins. C o. , 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th C ir. 2004) (quota tion
m arks a nd c ita tions omitte d). B ut the C ourt ha s instruc te d tha t while “ dic tum

‘ m ay be followe d if suffic ie ntly pe rsua sive ,’ it ‘ ought not to c o ntrol the judgm e nt in a subse q ue nt suit.’ ” Unite d State

s v . Monte ro-C

amargo , 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th C ir. 2000) (e n ba

nc ) (quoting Humphre

y ’s Ex e c utor v
. Unite d State s , 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)). I do not be lie ve the C ourt’ s dic tum in Aguilar wa s “ c onside re d” in the
re quisitese nse . The que s tion whe the r fa lse sta te m e nts m a de dire c t ly

to the grand jury viola te the om nibus c la use wa s not be fore the C o urt. In his opposition to
c e rtiora ri, Aguila r ha d c onc e de d tha

t , “ a s the gove rnm e nt note s, the c ourts ha ve 1 6routine ly

a pplie d Se c tion 1503 to fa lse te stim ony

to the grand jury .” B rie f in Opposition a

t 18–19, Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593 (No. 94-270). The gove rnm e nt highlighte d tha

t c o nc e s sion in its m

e rits brie f. B rie f of Pe titione r at 20, Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593 (No. 94-270) (“ a s re sponde nt ha s c onc e d e d, ‘ the c ourts ha ve routine ly a pplie d Se c tion 1503 to fa lse te stim ony

to the grand jury .’ ” ). In the
c onte xt of his suit, Aguila r’ s c onc e ssion m ake s se nse , for it e na ble d him to foc us his a rgum e nt m ore na

rrowly , a nd to a rgue tha t e ve n if the om

n ibus c la use c ove re d fa lse sta te m e nts m a de to a

grand jury , his fa l se sta

te m e n ts to a

n FB I a ge n t we re not
c ove re d. The C o urt a c c e pte d without c ha lle nge the strate gic c onc e ssion tha t fa lse sta te m e nts to thegran d jury we re c ove re d, a n d he ld tha

t , e ve n so, Aguila

r’ s
c onduc t fe ll outside

the om nibus c la use . The C ourt wa s thus not a ske d to c onside r the q ue stion whe the r fa lse sta

te m e nts we re c ove re d

by the om nibus c la use be c a use that que stion ha d b e e n ta

ke n off the ta

ble
. The que stion pre se nte d in the c a se now be fore us —

whe the r truthful but e va s ive sta te m e nts a re c ove re d by the om

nibus
c la use — wa s so re m ote from

the c onte m

plation of thepa

rtie s tha t the re ha d be e n
no ne e d e ve n to ta

ke it off the ta

ble
. No a rgum e nt wa s m a de to the C ourt in A guilar a bout the m e aning of

“ c o rruptly ” in 1831, whe n the obstruc t ion of justic e sta tute wa s e na c te d. Nor wa s
any argum e nt m a de to the C ourt a bout the dispa

rity in se nte nc ing be twe e n the 1 7pe rjury

sta tute an d the obstruc tion of justic e sta tute . Ha d the gove rnm e nt sought a
c onvic tion unde r the om

nibus c la use ba se d on a

true but e v a sive or m i sle a d ing sta te m e nt to a g ra

nd jury , a n d ha d the se argum e nts be e n pre se nte d to the C ourt, it is not a t a ll c le ar that the C ourt would ha ve re a d the sta

tute a s broa dly

a s its dic tum sugge s ts. It is possible

tha t I am wrong a n d tha t I am re quire d to re ga

rd the C ourt’ s dic t um in Aguilar a s c o ntrolling. I do not be lie ve tha t this is so, but if it is I
e nc oura g e the C o urt to re visit, e ithe r in this c a se or anothe r, the que stion of the
sc ope o f the om

nibus c la use of § 1503(a ). If the C ourt doe s re visit theque stion, I think it like ly

— pe rha p s ve ry l ike l y
—

tha t it will c onc lude , a s I do, tha t the word

“ c o rruptly ,” a s use d in § 1503(a ), m e ans “ by

bribe ry .”

1 8U.S. v . Bonds , No. 11-10669

R awlinson, C irc uit Judge , disse nting: The re is no joy

in this disse

nting judge . The p e r c uriam and c o nc urring opinions ha

ve struc k out. 1 Str ike O ne - T he pe r c uriam and c o nc ur r ing opinions se c ond-gue ss the jur y ’s ve r dic t r athe r than de fe r r ing to it. I join theprinc ipa l c onc urring opinion in its vie w tha t c onte xt m a tte rs in de te rm i ning whe the r suffic ie nt e vide nc e supports the c onvic tion in this c a se . Se e K ozinsk i C onc u rring Opinion , p. 9. A vital pa rt of tha t c o n te xt is thee vide nc e be fore the jury . Afte r a ll, it is tha t e v ide nc e we e xam ine to de t e rm i ne whe the r any
re a s ona ble juror c ould ha

ve c onvic te d the de fe nda

nt. In doing so, we vie w the
e vide nc e in the light m o st favora ble to the prose c ution. Se e J ac k son v . Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); se e also United State s v . W hitte m ore , 776 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th C ir. 2015). B arry B o n ds wa s c o nvic te d of one c ount of obstruc tion of justic e in viola tion of 18 U.S.C . § 1503. Tha t sta tute provide s for the punishm e nt of

“ [w] hoe ve r, c orruptly

. . . influe nc e s, obstruc ts, or im p e de s, or e nde avors to influe n c e , obstruc t, or im

pe de the due a d

m inistra t ion of justic e . . .” 

# F IL ED
APR 22 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1 Apologie s to Erne st La

wre n c e Tha

y e r, C ase y at the Bat (1888) (“ B ut the re is no joy in M udville

–M ighty C a se y ha s struc k out.” ). 1At the tria l of this m a tte r, the jurors we re inform e d tha t the c h arge s a ga inst B onds ste m

m e d from his a ppe aranc e be fore a

grand jury

inve stiga ting ste roid use by at hle te s. The obstruc t i on of justic e c ount a lle ge d tha t B onds ga

ve “ m a te ria l Grand Jury

te stim o ny

tha t wa s inte ntiona lly

e va sive , fa lse , a

nd m isle a ding.” Prior to his gra nd jury te stim ony , B onds wa s gra nte d im m unity from prose c ution if he
c om plie d with theim

m unity orde r. Spe c ia l Age nt Novitz ky re a d the im

m unity orde r to the jury . The orde r provide d in pe rtine nt pa rt: B arry B o n ds m a

y be c a lle d to te stify

be fore the grand jury ; a

nd In the judgm e nt of the Unite d State s Attorne y , the te s tim ony and othe r inform a tion to beobta ine d from B arry B o n ds is ne c e ssa

ry to the public inte re st; a

nd

. . . It is the re fore orde re d tha t B arry B onds, soon a s he m ay be c a lle d, sha ll te stify

unde r oath a

nd provide othe r inform ation, inc luding doc um e nts, in this c a se and in a ny furthe r a nc illa ry proc e e dings. It is furthe r orde re d tha

t the te s tim ony

and othe r inform ation c om

pe lle d from

B arry B onds pursua

nt to this orde r . . . m ay

not be use d a g a inst him

in a ny c rim ina l c a se , e xc e pt a

prose c ution for pe rjury , fa lse de c la ra tion, or othe rwise fa iling to c om p ly with this order. The purpose of im

m uniz i ng a witne ss in e xc ha

nge for his te stim ony

is to
e nsure tha

t the witne ss, fre e d from

the spe c te r of prose c ution, will provide
2c om

ple t e an d truthful te s tim ony . Se e Unite d State s v . Thomas , 612 F.3d 1107, 1126 (9th C ir. 2010) (obse rving tha t “ [t] he purpose of the im m unity orde r in [the B ALC O] c a se wa s to c om pe l the witne ss to te stify truthfully and in good faith be fore the grand jury

to a ssist it in its inve stiga tion” ) (e m

pha sis in the

origina l). Giving e va sive te s tim ony is inc onsiste nt with the

obliga tion to provide

c om ple te
and truthful te stim ony . S e e Unite d State

s v . Griffin , 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th C ir. 1979) (“ [A] n obstruc t ion of justic e re sults whe n atte m pts to ga the r re le va

nt
e vide nc e . . . a

re frustrate d by

the use of c orrupt or fa lse m e ans. The bla ta ntly
e va sive witne ss a c hie ve s this e ffe c t a s sure ly by e re c ting a

sc re e n of fe igne d forge t fulne ss a s one who burns file s or induc e s a pote ntia l witne ss to a

bse nt him se lf.” ) (c i tation a

n d inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d). He nc e , c ha

rge s we re brought a ga inst B onds for obstruc tion of justic e . At tria l, Spe c ia l Age nt Novitsky de sc ribe d the B A LC O La boratorie s inve stiga tion prim arily

involving the

distribution of a

n a bolic ste roids. Oneof the princ ipa l ta

rge t s of the c rim ina l inve stiga tion wa s Gre g Ande rson, B onds’ fitne ss tra ine r. Ac c ording to Age nt Novitsky , e xe c ution of se arc h wa rra nts a t B ALC O La boratorie s produc e d a

“ tre a sure [trove ] of drugs a nd doc um e n ts indic a t ing usa ge
and distribution [of a

na bolic s te roids] to e lite profe ssiona l at hle te s.” Authoritie s
a lso found “

p hy sic a l e vide nc e in te rm s of drugs tha t pe rta ine d to . . . ste roid
3distribution” following a

se arc h of Ande rson’ s re side n c e . Spe c ific a lly , sa m ple s from Ande rson’ s re side nc e we re re ve a le d to be a “ de signe r ana

bolic ste roid.” Authoritie s a l so re c ove re d $60,000 from a sa fe in Ande rson’ s re side nc e and a ba g of sy ringe s in his ve hic le
. It wa s a ga inst this bac kdrop tha t B onds wa s im

m uniz e d a n d brought be fore the g rand jury

to te stify , with thegrand jury proc e s s c onside re d a c ontinua tion of the i nve stiga

tion. B onds wa s not a

ta rge t of the grand jury . R a t he r, he and othe r
a thle te s we re e xpe c te d to te s tify c andidly and truthfully

to furthe r the inve stiga

tion into those who we re the ta

rge ts of the grand jury
. Age nt Novitsky

te stifie d tha

t the inc o nsiste nc ie s be twe e n B onds’ te stim ony
and othe r e vide nc e be fore the grand jury re ga rding the re lationship be twe e n the
a thle te s a nd the ste roid distributors, inc luding thee v a sions, re quire d the inve stiga tors to c o nduc t a dditiona l inquirie s tha t would not ha

v e be e n ne c e ssa

ry ha d B onds give n non-e va sive te stim ony . W e c annot sa y with c e rta inty

tha t no
re a s ona ble juror c ould c onc lude othe rwise . Inde e d, dra wing a l l infe re nc e s in fa

v or of the gove rnm e n t, a re a sona b le juror c ould re a s ona

bly c o n c lude tha

t B onds’
e va sive te stim ony

dive rte d the inve stiga

t ion, the re by

im pe ding the a d

m inistra tion of justic e . Se e id
. From the inc e ption of this na

tion’ s sy ste m

of justic e , the jury

ha s pla y e d a n
4inte gra l role in the a dm inistra tion of justic e . Se e C

ity of Morgantow

n, W .Va. v
. Roy al Ins. C

o., Ltd. , 337 U.S. 254, 258 (1949) (a rtic ulating tha

t “ [t] ria l by

jury is a vita l a nd c he rishe d right, inte gra l in our judic ia l sy s te m ” ). W e de fe r to the wisdom of twe lve ordina

ry c itiz e n s, se l e c te d by

the pa rtie s, who he ar the e vide nc e and follow theinstruc tions give n by the judge to re a c h a ve rdic t. Se e Long v . J ohnson , 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th C ir. 2013) (“ Although the e vide nc e pre se nte d at tria l c ould y ie ld a n a lte rna tive infe re nc e , we m ust re spe c t the e xc l usive provinc e of the jury to de te rm i ne the c re dibility

of witne sse s, re s olve e v ide ntia ry c onflic ts, a

nd dra w
re a s ona ble infe re nc e s from prove n fa c ts. . . .” ) (c ita tion, a lte ration, a

nd inte rna l quota t ion m arks om itte d). Ove rturning a jury ve rdic t, pa

rtic ula rly on a suffic ie nc y of e vide nc e c ha lle n ge , is ra re , a s it should be
. Se e Unite d State s v . N e v ils , 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th C ir. 2010) (e n ba nc ). This “ re vie wing c ourt m a y not a s k itse lf whe the r it be lie ve s tha

t the e vide nc e at the tria l e sta blishe d guilt be y ond a
re a s ona ble doubt, only

whe the r any

ra tiona l trie r of fa c t c ould ha ve m a de that finding.” Id . (c ita

t i ons a nd inte rna l quota

tion m arks om i tte d) (first e m pha sis
a dde d). R e gre tta

bly , littlec onside ra t ion is given in the pe r c u riam and c onc urring opinions to the

e ntire ty of the e vide nc e introduc e d during B onds’ tria l. Inde e d, the princ ipa l c onc urring opinion focuse s on “ the instrinsic c a pa bilitie s of the sta

te m e nt itse lf,” a s de te rm ine d on a ppe a l. K ozinsk i C onc urring Opinion , p. 7 (e m pha sis in
5the o rigina l). Howe ve r, a s disc usse d be low, this a na ly sis a pplie s to fa lse sta te m e nts ra

the r tha n to e va sive sta

te m e nts. Im

porting a n ina p plic a ble ana ly sis to
ove rturn the jury ’ s c onside re d ve rdic t a ppe ars to be a

m e ans of “ re a c h [ing] the
c onc lusion tha

t se e m s be st” to m

y c onc urring c olle a gue s. BlueC ross &Blue Shie ld v . Rubin , 490 F.3d 718, 724 (9th C ir. 2007) (c ita t ion om itte d). W e know that the jury de libe ra t e d c are fully

be c a use it c o nvic te d B onds on only one of four
c ha rge d c ounts. Se e Unite d State s v . Plunk , 153 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th C ir. 1998),
ov e rrule d on othe r grounds by Unite d State s v . Hank e y , 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 n.7 (9th C ir. 2000) (obse rving tha t “ the fa c t tha

t the jury re nde re d

a m ixe d ve rdic t . . . sugge s ts tha

t it re vie we d the e v ide nc e ra tiona lly and inde pe n de ntly ” ) (c ita tion,
a lte ra tions, a

nd inte rna l quota

tion m arks om i tte d). Suffic ie n t e vide nc e supports the jury ’ s c onside re d ve rdic t, a nd the ve rdic t wa

rra nts de fe re nc e ra the r tha n se c ondgue ssing. Se e Long , 736 F.3d a t 896. W he n B onds wa s a ske d be fore the grand jury if Ande rson ha d e ve r give n him anything tha

t re quire d a

sy ringe to inje c t him se lf with (a y e s or no que stion), B onds la unc he d into the following ra m bling soliloquy : I’ ve only ha d one doc tor touc h m e . And tha t’ s m y only pe rsona l doc tor. Gre g, like I sa id, we don’ t ge t into e a c h othe rs’ pe rsona l live s. W e ’ re frie nds, but I don’ t–we don’ t sit a round a nd ta lk ba se ba ll, be c a

use he knows I don’ t wa nt–don’ t c om e to m

y house ta lking ba se b a l l. If
6y o u wa nt to c om e to m

y house and ta lk a

bout fishing, som e othe r stuff, we ’ ll be good frie nds. You c om e around ta l king a

bout ba se ba ll, y ou go on. I don’ t ta lk a bout his busine ss, You know wha t I m e an?

. . . That’ s wha

t ke e ps our frie ndship. You know, I a m sorry , but tha t–y o u know, tha

t –I wa s a c e le brity c hild, not just in ba s e ba ll by

m y own instinc ts. I be c am e a c e le brity c hild with a

fam ous fa

the r. I just don’ t ge t into other pe ople ’ s busine ss be c a

use of m y fa the r’ s situa

tion, y ou se e . This ra m bling, non-re sponse answe re d the following una ske d que stions: [Que stion: How many

doc tors ha

ve touc he d (tre a te d? ) y ou? ] Answe r: I’ v e only

ha d one doc tor touc h

m e . And tha

t’ s m y only pe rsona l doc tor. [Que stion: Do y ou a

n d Gre g (Ande rson) ge t into e a c h othe rs’ pe rsona l live s ? ] Answe r: Gre g, like I sa i d, we don’ t ge t into e a c h othe rs’ pe rsona l live s. [Que stion: Do y ou a

n d Ande rson ge t into e a c h othe rs’ profe ssiona l live s? ] Answe r: W e ’ re frie nds, but I don’ t –we don’ t sit a

round a nd ta lk ba se ba ll, be c a

use he knows I don’ t

wa nt–don’ t c om e to m

y house ta lking ba se ba l l. If y ou wa nt to c om e to m

y house and ta lk a

bout fishing, som e othe r stuff, we ’ ll be good frie nds. You c om e around ta lking a bout ba se ba ll, y ou go on. I don’ t ta lk a bout his busine s s. [Que stion: W

hat ke e ps y our frie ndship with Ande rson? ]
7Answe r: Tha t’ s [not ge tting into e a c h

othe r’ s pe rsona l or profe ssiona l live s] what ke e ps our frie ndship. [Que stion: W e re y ou a

c e le brity c h ild? ] Answe r: You know, I a

m sorry , but tha

t–y ou know, tha

t–I wa s a c e le brity c hild, not just in base b a ll by m y own instinc ts. I be c am e a c e le brity c hild with a fa m ous fa

the r. I just don’ t ge t into other pe ople ’ s busine ss be c a

use of m y fa the r’ s situa

tion, y ou se e . De spite the se e xte n de d re sponse s to una ske d que stions, B onds studiously
avoide d a nswe ring the que stion tha t wa s a c tua lly a ske d: “ Did [Ande rson] e ve r give y ou a

nything tha

t re quire d a

sy ringe to inje c t y ourse l f with? ” The jury ponde re d B onds’ re sponse in c onjunc tion with Agent Novitsky ’ s te stim ony tha t B onds’ re sponse re quire d the inve s tiga tors to se arc h

for othe r
e vide nc e tha

t Ande rson provide d ste roids to B onds. Tha t e vide nc e inc lude d te stim ony from othe r a thle te s who a c knowle dge d re c e iving ste roid inje c tions, a nd from Ste ve Hoskins, B onds’ c hildhood be s t frie nd a n d pe rsona l a ssista

nt, who ha d disc ussions with B onds a

bout ste roid inje c tions a

nd who he ard B onds c om pla in
a bout pa i n a s soc iate d with theinje c tions. Hoskins a lso witne sse d Ande rson a nd B onds e nte r a

be droom “ a c ouple of tim e s” at

B onds’ Ariz ona

re side n c e , with Ande rson holding a

ne e dle tha

t Hoskins be l ie ve d wa s for ste roid inje c tions. Hoskins a lso re c o unte d a

n inc ide nt whe n Ande rson re fuse d to inje c t B onds a nd B onds sta te d tha t he would “ g i ve it to him se lf.” Hoskins te stifie d tha t B onds’ shoe
8siz e inc re a s e d, his glove siz e c ha nge d, a nd his body

got bigge r, he a

v ie r a nd “ a lot
m ore m usc u la r.” During Hoskins’ te stim ony , a n a udiota pe wa s pla

y e d tha t Hoskins m a de of Ande rson disc ussing providing ste roids to B onds. Hoskins wa s growing inc re a singly

c onc e rne d

a bout B onds’ ste roid use and wa nte d B onds’ fa the r to inte rve n e . B e c a

u se Ande rson a

nd B onds de nie d the use of ste roids, Hoskins hope d to use the ta p e to c onvinc e B onds’ fa the r that Hoskins’ c onc e rn wa s justifie d. The ta

p e wa s ultim a te ly

provide d to inve stiga

ting a ge nts. A form e r girlfrie nd of B onds te stifie d tha t B o nds re ve a le d to he r that a lum p on B o nds’ e l bow wa s c a

use d by ste roid use . She a l so obse rve d Ande rson a

nd B onds re gula

rly e nte r a be droom in B onds’ Ariz ona re side nc e with a satc he l, loc k ing the door a fte r the m an d re m a ining inside for a pproxim a te ly

twe nty
m inute s . At the sa

m e tim e , the form e r girlfrie n d note d signific ant phy sic a l c ha nge s in B onds, inc luding a dram a tic inc re a se in siz e , a c ne on his uppe r shoulde rs a nd ba c k, ra p id ha i r loss, te stic ula

r a trophy , a

n d de c re a se d se xua l pe rform a nc e . In
a ddition, B onds be c am e “ inc re a singly a ggre ssive , irrita b le , a gita te d, ve ry im patie n t, a lm ost viole nt.” The jury wa s inform e d by

the C hie f Sc ie nc e Offic e r of the U nite d State s Anti-Doping Age nc y tha t the se are ty

p ic a l side e ffe c t s of
ana bolic ste roid use
. Fina lly , Kathy

Hoskins, siste

r to Ste ve Hoskins, te stifie d tha t she a c t ua lly
9witne s se d Ande rson a dm iniste r a shot into B onds’ “ b e l ly

button” with a

sy ringe ,

“ like the Doc t or with a

sy ringe in the be lly

button.” Ac c ording to Ka thy Hoskins, B onds c om

m e nte d tha

t the inje c tion wa s “ a

littlesom e som e , whe n I go on the
roa d , y ou know we c an’ t de te c t it, y ou c an’ t c a tc h it.” Afte r he a ring this e vide nc e , the jury wa s instruc te d tha

t to c onvic t B onds of obstruc ting justic e , the gove rnm e nt wa s re quire d to prove be y ond a re a sona ble doubt: 1. The de fe nda nt c orruptly , tha

t is, for thepurpose of obstruc ting justic e , 2. obstruc te d, influe nc e d, or im pe de d, or e nde avore d to obstruc t, influe nc e , or im

pe de the gran d jury

proc e e ding in whic h de fe nda nt te stifie d, 3. by k

n owingly giving m a te ria l te stim o ny that wa s inte ntiona lly

e va sive , fa lse or m isle a d ing. The instruc tion on m a te ria lity inform e d the jury that: A sta te m e nt wa s m a te ria l if it ha d a natura l te nde nc y to influe nc e or wa s c a

p a ble of influe nc i ng a

de c ision of thegrand jury
. The gove rnm e n t a lle ge s tha t the unde rline d portion of the following sta

t e m e nts c o nstitutem a te ria l te stim ony tha t wa s inte ntiona lly

e va sive , fa lse or m isle a d ing. In orde r for the de fe nda nt to be found guilty of c o unt 5, y ou m ust a ll a gre e tha

t one or m ore of the following sta

te m e nts wa s m a te ria l a

nd inte ntiona lly

e va sive , fa lse or m isle a ding, with al l of y ou una nim ously a gre e ing a s to whic h sta te m e nt or sta

te m e nts so qua lify [.]

10So instruc te d, the jury re a sona bly found tha

t B onds’ ra m

bling sta te m e nt wa s
e va sive . Unde r the suffic ie n c y of e vide nc e sta

nda rd, we drawa l l infe re nc e s in fa vor of the gove rnm e n t

whe n de te rm ining whe the r any ra t iona l juror c ould ha

ve found tha t B onds’ e va sive te stim ony m a t e ria l ly

im pe de d the grand jury ’ s pe rform a nc e of its inve stiga

tory func tion. Se e Griffin , 589 F.2d a t 204; se e also Unite d State s v . Brow ning , 630 F.2d 694, 699, 701 (10th C ir. 1980) (“ The ultim a te que stion . . . is not whe

the r the de fe nda

n t told the

truth but whe the r the de fe nda nt obstruc te d or inte rfe re d with theproc e ss of truthfinding in a n inve stiga

tion . . . ” ). Evide nc e m ay

be suffic ie nt to sustain a

c onvic tion unde r § 1503 e ve n if “ it doe s not e xc l ude e ve ry

re a sona ble hy pothe sis of innoc e nc e or is not wholly inc o nsiste nt with e ve ry

c onc lusion of guilt [be c a use ] [a ] jury

is fre e to c hoose
am ong re a s ona

ble c onstruc tions of thee vide nc e . ” Unite d State s v . Pe rk ins , 748 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th C ir. 1984) (c ita tion, a l te ra tions a

nd inte rna l quota

tion m arks
om i tte d). The princ ipa l c onc urring opinion ac knowle dge s tha t the suffic ie nc y

of
e vide nc e sta

nda rd of re vie w is a

de m anding one , but ne ve rthe le s s e le c ts to a pply the s ta n da rd with “ som e rigor.” K

ozinsk i C onc urring Opinion , p. 10. W ithout
c ita tion to a ny pre c e de nt supporting the a ddition of “

rigor” to the gove rning sta nda rd of re vie w, tha

t la ngua ge sounds suspic iously c lose to a e uphe m ism

for
11se c o nd-gue ssing thejury and “ re a c h[ing] the c onc l usion tha t se e m s be st” to those joining the

princ i pa l c onc urre nc e . Rubin , 490 F.3d a t 724 (c ita

tion omitte d). As the princ ipa l c o n c urring opinion ac knowle dge s, § 1503 swe e ps broa dly
. Se e K ozinsk i C onc urring Opinion , p. 3. Applying tha t broa d sta tute to the fa c ts of this c a s e , we m

ust de t e rm i ne whe the r the re wa s suffic ie nt e vide nc e be fore the jury that B onds sought to c orruptly im pe d e the work of the grand jury
. S e e id . W e are not c a lle d upon to de te rm ine how fa r § 1503 c an be prude ntia lly a pplie d. Nor ne e d
we de c ide whe the r attorne y s at ora l a rgum e nt c ould be prose c ute d for giving
e va sive answe rs to que stions from m e m be rs of the ora l a

rgum e nt pa

ne l . Suc h a disc ussion is more akin to re solving a c la i m tha t a sta tute is ove rbroa d, a

n issue that is not be fore us in this a

ppe a l. In a

ny e v e nt, a hy pothe tic a l ove rre a c h of the sta tute c annot a ffe c t B onds’ c onvic tion for c o nduc t tha t fa lls squa

re ly within the sta tute . Se e Unite d State

s v . J e te r , 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th C ir. 1985) (c onc l uding that 18 U.S.C . § 1503 wa s not va gue or ove rbroa d be c a use “ [t] he re a c h of the sta tute is c le arly

lim ite d to suc h c onstitutiona

lly unprote c te d a

n d purporte d ly

illic it
a c tivity a s tha

t unde rtake n by

[the de fe nda

nt] . . .” ). The jury ne c e ssa rily found tha

t B onds’ e v a sive te stim ony wa s m a te ria l be c a use it wa s instruc te d tha

t it ha d to m a

ke tha t finding be fore B onds c ould be
c onvic te d of viola

ting § 1503. Neve rthe le ss, the princ ipa l c onc urring opinion
12re lie s upon the“ se lf-e vide nt” proposition tha t B onds’ e va s ive sta

te m e nt “ did not have the c a

pa c ity to dive rt the gove rnm e nt from its inve s tiga

tion . . .” K

ozinsk i C onc urring Opinion , p. 8. B ut this c onc lusion ignore s Age n t Novitzky ’ s te stim ony and the jury ’ s finding of fa c t. At a m inim um , the jury ’ s finding is supporte d by Age nt Novitsky ’ s te stim ony tha t B onds’ e va sive re sponse s dive rte d
and im pe de d the inve stiga

tion by re quiring theinve stiga

t ors to de te rm ine whe the r B onds wa s be ing inje c t e d with ste roids unknowingly , a nd whe the r B onds’ inc o nsiste nt te s tim ony

c om prom ise d the te stim ony

of the othe r witne sse s. Se e Pe rk ins , 748 F.2d a

t 1528 (noting tha

t “ m argina l” e vide nc e is suffic ie nt to support
a c onvic tion for obstruc tion of justic e ). The jury c hose “ a m ong re a sona

ble
c onstruc tions of thee vide nc e ,” and we m ust re spe c t tha

t c hoic e ra the r tha

n se c ondgue ss it a s the c onc urring opinions do. Id . at 1526 (c ita tion omitte d). Str ike T w o - T he pe r c uriam and c o nc ur r ing opinions disr e gar d pr e c e de nt that suppor ts upholding the jur y ’s ve r dic t. This is not the first tim e we have c onside re d whe the r e va sive te stim ony m ay
se rve a s the ba sis for a

n obstruc tion of justic e c ha rge . It m ay

be the first tim e we have c o nside re d

the sta tute a s a pplie d to a

fam ous a thle te . B ut tha

t should not be the d e c iding fa c tor, a

n d the re is no othe r re a son to interpre t the sta tute diffe re ntly in this c a se . 13In Unite d State s v . Rashe e d , 663 F.2d 843, 851 (9th C i r. 1981), we re ite ra te d that the “ obstruc tion of justic e sta tute wa s de signe d to prosc ribe a ll m anne r of
c orrupt m e thods of obstruc ting justic e . . . .” (c iting C atrino v . Unite d State

s , 176 F.2d 884, 887 (9th C ir. 1949)). In Rashe e d , the de fe nda nt ha d de s troy e d or
c onc e a l e d subpoe na e d

doc um e nts, a

nd we c onc lude d tha

t the suppre ssion of doc um e nta

ry e vide nc e viola

te d the obstruc tion of justic e sta tute a s m uc h a s the suppre ssion of te stim o nia l e vide nc e . Se e id . at 852. The de fe nda nt a rgue d tha t whe n she a

ppe are d be fore the grand jury , she a c knowle dge d tha t she ha d not produc e d a ll the subpoe n a e d doc um e nts. Se e id . at 853. She a sse rte d tha t the gove rnm e nt e xc use d he r from any furthe r obliga

t ion of produc tion, re s ulting in a la c k of suffic ie nt e vide nc e to support a c onvic tion for obstruc tion of justic e . Se e id . W e disa gre e d , holding tha t the obstruc tion of justic e wa s c om ple te whe n de fe nda n t dire c te d de struc tion or c o nc e a lm e nt of the doc um e nts. Se e id . W e
c la rifie d tha t the a c tions of the prose c utor “ in no wa y ne gate [d] the c om

m ission of the c rim e . At be st, [the prose c utor’ s] re lie ving [the de fe nda nt] of furthe r produc tion indic a te s tha

t justic e wa s not, in fa c t , obstruc te d. This is not a de fe nse . . . .” Id . (e m

pha sis a dde d). W e e xpla ine d tha t onc e it wa s e sta

b lishe d tha

t the d e fe nda

nt a c te d with “ the inte nt to obstruc t justic e and e nde avore d to do so[,] [t] his is suffic ie nt for guilt unde r se c tion 1503. . . .” Id . The sa m e ana ly sis is
14a

pplic a ble to B onds’ e va sive te stim ony . Onc e B onds a c te d with theinte nt to e va de giving thete s tim ony

tha t wa s c o m pe lle d by the im

m unity orde r, the obstruc tion of justic e offe nse wa s c om

p l e te . Se e id . Eve n if B o nds e ve ntua lly c e a s e d his e va sive
e fforts, his prior inte

nt to obstruc t wa s not ne g a te d
. Se e id . B onds’ e va sive te stim ony c ould a nd did interfe re with thec ontinue d B ALC O inve stiga t ion a s
re fle c t e d in the te stim ony of Age nt Novitsky
. Se e id .; se e also Griffin , 589 F.2d a t 204 (obse rving tha

t justic e is obstruc te d “ whe n atte m pts to ga the r re le va

nt
e vide nc e . . . a

re frustrate d by

[a ] bla ta ntly e va sive witne ss” ) (c ita

tion a nd inte rna l quota t ion m arks om itte d). Othe r c irc uits a gre e . Se e Unite d State s v . C ohn , 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d C ir. 1972) (holding tha

t “ c onc e a ling da

ta re c orde d in one ’ s m e m ory ” through bla ta nt
e va sion c onstitute s obstruc tion of justic e ); se e also Unite d State s v . Lange l la , 776 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d C i r. 1985) (de sc ribing “ obviously e va sive ” answe rs a s

“ c o nc e a lm e nt of e vide nc e ” within the sc ope of § 1503). In Pe rk ins , 748 F.2d a

t 1528, the Ele ve nth C irc uit simila rly c ha ra c t e riz e d the de fe nda

nt’ s c onduc t

a s obstruc tive whe n he gave e v a sive answe rs be fore the grand jury . The Ele ve nth C irc uit de sc ribe d the fa c t s of the c a se a s re fle c ting tha t the de fe n d ant kne w the re
we re irre gula

ritie s in a c e rta in ba

nk a c c ount, tha

t the a c c ount wa s he ld unde r a fic titious na

m e , a nd tha t the grand jury

wa s se e king to le arn the true ide ntity of the
15a c c ount holde r. Although the c ourt a c knowle dge d tha

t the gove rnm e nt c ould ha ve que stione d the de fe nda

nt m ore e ffe c tive ly , it none the le ss he ld tha t a re a sona ble jury c ould ha ve found tha

t the de fe nda

nt’ s e va sive answe rs we re inte nde d to obstruc t the grand jury ’ s inve stiga t ion. Se eid
. Ignoring the se c a se s, in m y vie w, c re a te s a

n unwa rra nte d c irc uit split a

nd disre ga rds our own pre c e de nt without justific a tion. Str ike T hr e e - T he c onc ur r ing opinions r e ly on pr e c e de nt m or e applic able to pe r

jur y than to obstr uc tion of justic e . The princ ipa l c onc urring opinion c i te s this la ngua ge from

Bronston v
. Unite d State s , 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973): “ Unde r the pre ssure s a

n d te n s ions of inte rrogation, it is not unc om m on for the m ost e arne st witne s se s to giveanswe rs that are not e ntire ly re sponsive .” K ozinsk i C onc u rring Opinion , p. 4. Howe ve r, the
c ite d la ngua ge doe s not support a c onc lusion tha

t the re wa s insuffic ie nt e vide nc e to support B onds’ c onvic tion. In Bronston , the Unite d State s Supre m e C ourt
a ddre s se d the pe rjury

sta tute , 18 U.S.C
. § 1621 (not the obstruc tion of justic e sta tute , 18 U.S.C . § 1503), a nd de c i de d the issue of whe the r a witne ss m ay be
c onvic te d of pe rjury

for giving a

n a nswe r that is lite ra lly

true , but non-re sponsive to the que stion a ske d
. Se e id
. at 352-53. The re wa s a bsolute l y no disc ussion of
e va sive te stim ony

or obstruc tion of justic e . 16The de fe nda nt in Bronston an swe re d se v e ra l que s tions pose d during
a dve rsaria l ba

nkruptc y proc e e dings c onc e rning whe the r he or his c om pa ny ha d Swiss ba nk a c c ounts. Se e id. a t

354. Although the

de fe nda nt de nie d ha

ving Swiss ba nk a c c o unts, the re wa s e vide nc e tha t the de fe nda

nt ha d a pe rsona l ba

nk a c c ount in a Swiss ba

n k for a prior pe riod of five y e ars. Se e id. It wa s undispute d tha t the de fe nda n t’ s a nswe rs we re lite ra lly

truthful be c a

use the de fe nda

nt did not ha

ve a Swiss ba nk a c c ount “ a t the tim e of que stioning . . .” Id. In the c onte xt of a prose c ution for pe rjury , the Supre m e C ourt obse rve d tha t “ [t] he c a s e s support pe titione r’ s position tha

t the pe rjury

statute is not to be

loose ly c o nstrue d , nor the sta tute invoke d sim

ply be c a use a wily witne ss suc c e e ds in de ra iling the que stione r— so long a s the witne ss spe aks the lite ra l truth. The burde n is on the que stione r to pin thewitne ss down to the spe c ific obje c t of the que s tione r’ s inquiry .” Id. at

360 (c i tations omitte d) (e m pha s is a dde d). The re is a nota ble sta tutory distinc tion be twe e n the pe rjury at issue in Bronston and the obstruc tion of justic e at issue in this c a se . In Bronston , the Supre m e C ourt e xpre s se d its unwillingne ss to e xpa nd the pe rjury

sta tute ’ s re a c h to
e nc om pa ss lite ra lly

truthful a nswe rs be y o nd the lim its e sta blishe d by

C ongre ss. Se e id. at 358. In its curre nt form , the pe rjury sta tute , 18 U.S.C . § 1621, provide s: W hoe ve r– (1) having ta

ke n a n oath be fore a c om

pe te nt tribuna l,
17offic e r, or pe rson, in a ny c a se in whic h a

la w of the Unite d State s a uthoriz e s a

n oat h to be a dm iniste re d, tha

t he will te stify , de c la

re , de pose , or c e rtify

truly , or tha

t a ny writte n

te stim ony , de c la

ra tion, de position, or c e rtific a t e by him subsc ribe d, is true , willfully and c ontra ry to suc h oath sta

te s or subsc ribe s a

ny m a te ria l m a tte r w hic h he doe s not be lie v e to be

true ; or (2) in a

ny de c la ra tion, c e rtific ate , ve rific a tion, or sta

te m e nt unde r pe na lty

of pe rjury

a s pe rm itte d unde r se c tion 1746 of title

28, Unite d State s C ode , willfully subsc ribe s a s true any m a te ria l m a tte r whic h he doe s not be lie v e to be

true ; is guilty of pe rjury
. . . 18 U.S.C . § 1621 (e m

pha se s a d de d). Im

p orta ntly , the pe rjury

sta tute spe c ific a lly
re quire s tha

t the de fe nda

n t ha ve knowle dge tha

t the sta te m e nt itse lf wa s not true . Se e id. The pe rjury

sta tute is m uc h m ore forgiving in its knowle dge re quire m e nt tha n the e le m e nts de line a te d

in 18 U.S.C . § 1503 for obstruc tion of justic e . Nota bly , 18 U.S.C . § 1503 doe s not c onta in a ny c om pa ra ble re quire m e nt of known fa lsity . R a t

he r, the obstruc t ion of justic e sta tute m e re l y re quire s tha

t the de fe nda

nt

“ e n de av or [ ] to influe nc e , intimidate , or im pe de any gran d or pe tit juror . . .”18 U.S.C . § 1503(a ) (e m

pha s is a dde d). As the Supre m e C ourt ha s a rtic ulate d , “ the te rm ‘ e nde a vor’ . . . m a

ke s c onduc t punisha

ble whe re the de fe nda

n t a c ts with a

n inte nt to obstruc t justic e , and in a m anne r that is like ly

to obstruc t justic e , but is foile d in som e wa

y . . . .” U n ite d State

s v . Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1995). The obstruc tion of justic e sta tute doe s not m ake a

distinc tion be twe e n obstruc tive sta te m e nts tha

t a re fa lse and those tha

t a re e va sive and not litera lly fa lse . The

18sta

tute re q uire s only tha t the de fe nda

nt inte nd his sta

te m e nt to obstruc t justic e . It is que stiona

ble w h e the r the “ lite ra l truth” unde rpinnings of B r onston a pply outside the c o nfine s of a dve rsaria l proc e e dings whe re opposing c ounse l a re
e xpe c te d to c ontinuously

hone the ir que stions to re q uire de finitiveanswe rs, a

nd a judge is pre se nt to c ontrol unc oope ra tive witne sse s . In c ontra st, the grand jury is a
non-a d ve rsaria l, inve stiga

tory proc e e d ing with no judge pre s iding. M ore ove r, B onds wa s give n im

m unity from prose c ution in e x c ha

nge for his te stim ony . Se e Unite d State s v . Bosk i c , 545 F.3d 69, 92 (1st C ir. 2008) (que stioning “ whe the r the lite ra l truth de fe nse a s a

rtic ulate d in Bronston is a ppropria t e ly invoke d outsidethe
c onte xt of a dve rsary

que s tioning. . . .” ). In Bronston , the de fe n da

nt’ s re sponse s we re lite ra l ly truthful ba se d on the spe c ific que stions pose d. In othe r words, the que stions in Bronston pe rm itte d the de fe nda n t to e xploit the

va ga rie s of the que stions while still providing lite

ra lly truthful a nswe rs. In c ontra s t, the gove rnm e nt in this c a s e dire c tly and
una m biguously inquire d of B onds, “ Did Gre g e ve r give y ou a nything tha

t re quire d
a sy ringe to inje c t y ourse lf with? ” B onds’ answe r that he wa s a c e l e brity c hild wa s lite ra lly truthful in only

the m ost a

tte nuate d and supe rfic ia l m anne r, a s it ha d

19nothing to do with the que stion a ske d. 2 Unlike in Bronston , the re we re no nua nc e s to e xploit in the

dire c t que stion pose d to B o nds. In Unite d State s v . C ampe r , 384 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th C ir. 2004), we re c ogniz e d this lim ita t ion with re spe c t to Bronston . (“

Bronston’s rule is limite d to c a se s in whic h the sta

te m e nt is indisputa bly true , though mi sle a ding be c a use it wa s unre sponsiveto the que stion
a ske d. . . .” ). Unlike in Bronston , a nd c onside ring his e va s ive and m isle a ding
answe r, the jury

c ould ha ve re a sona

bly c onc lude d tha

t B onds e nde avore d

to im pe de the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion. Se e Unite d State

s v . Re illy , 33 F.3d 1396, 1416 (3d C ir. 1994) (“

Norm a lly , it is for the

pe tit jury to de c ide whic h c onstruc tion the d e fe nda

nt pla c e d on the que stion. . . .” ) (c ita tion omitte d); s e e also Griffin , 589 F.2d at 204 (“ [A] n obstruc tion of justic e re sults whe n atte m p ts to ga t he r re le va nt
e vide nc e by

a judic i a l body , whic h is c ha rge d by la w with the ta s k of inve stiga ting

2 B onds’ answe r to the gove rnm e nt’ s que s tion a s to whe the r Ande rson “ e v e r gave [him ] anything tha

t re q u ire d a sy ringe to inje c t [him se lf] with” wa s not lim ite d to B onds’ answe r tha t he wa s a c e le brity c hild. Although it m

ay be lite ra lly true tha t B onds wa s a

c e le brity c hild, his a

nswe r wa s a lso c ouple d with the sta te m e nt tha

t he “ just didn’ t ge t into other pe o ple ’ s busine s s be c a use of [his] fa the r’ s situa

tion . . .”To the e xte nt the answe r e v e n a ddre sse d the gove rnm e nt’ s dire c t que stion, it im

plie d tha t, be c a use he wa s a

c e le b rity c hild, B onds did not inte rje c t him se lf “ into othe r pe ople ’ s busine s s” and did not re c e ive anyt hing re late d to ste roids from

Ande rson. The jury

c ould ha ve re a sona

bly c onc lude d

tha t the la st pa rt of B onds’ answe r wa s a n atte m pt to im pe de the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion by de fle c ting theque s tion a

n d e va sive ly

im p ly ing tha

t, c ontra ry to the e vide nc e pre s e nte d at tria l, he did not know a bout Ande rson’ s ste roid ope ra tion be c a use he did not ge t involve d in the busine ss of his frie nds. 20and punishing crim e , a re frustrate d by

the use of c orrupt or fa lse m e ans. The blat antly e va sive witne ss a c hie v e s this e ffe c t a s sure ly by e re c ting a

sc re e n of fe igne d forge tfulne ss a s one who burns file s or induc e s a pote ntia l witne s s to
a bse nt him s e lf” ) (c ita

tion a nd inte rna l quota

tion m arks om i tte d ); Unite d State s v . Brow n ing , 630 F.2d 694, 699 (10th C ir. 1980) (holding tha t Bronston ’ s lite ra l truth de fe nse wa s ina

p p lic a ble to a n obstruc tion of justic e offe nse be c a use “ Bronston involve d a

pe rjury prose c ution in whic h the que s tion wa s whe the r the de fe nda nt ha d told thetruth. Theultim a te que stion in the c a se at ba r is not whe the r the de fe nda n t told the

truth but whe the r the de fe nda nt obstruc te d or inte rfe re d with the proc e s s of truthfinding in a n inve stiga

tion in the proc e s s of e nforc ing the la w” ).

“ The func t ion of the grand jury is to inquire into a ll inform a tion tha t m ight possibly be ar on its inve stiga

tion until it ha s ide ntifie d an offe nse or ha s sa

tisfie d itse lf tha t none ha s oc c urre d. As a ne c e ssa ry c onse que nc e of its inve stiga tory func tion, thegrand jury

pa ints with a

broa d brush. . . .” Unite d State s v . R. Ente r., Inc
. , 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (c ita tion omitte d). Give n the im porta nc e of the gran d jury ’ s inve s tiga

tive role , the re is no re a son to pe rm it a n im m uniz e d gra

nd jury witne ss to obstruc t

the a dm inistra

tion of justic e by

e nde avoring to influenc e or im pe de the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion. It would a

ppe ar that if the re wa s e v e r a
m om e nt for a

witne s s not to e nga ge in obstruc t ive te stim ony , it would be be fore a
21gran d jury
.

Applic ation of Bronston ’ s lite ra l truth a na ly sis guts the

obstruc t ion of justic e provision prohibiting a

ny a tte m pt to “ c orruptly

. . . e nde avor to influe nc e . . . or im pe de any grand or pe tit juror . . .” 18 U.S.C . § 1503(a ). Equa ting obstruc tion of justic e with pe rjury

a c tua lly supe rim pose s the he ighte n e d

knowle dge re quire m e nt
c onta ine d in the pe rjury

sta tute upon the “ e nde avor to influe nc e or im pe de ” provisions of the

obstruc tion sta

tute . 18 U.S.C . § 1503(a ); c f . 18 U.S.C . § 1621(1). Spe c ific a lly , Bronston ’ s re quire m e nt tha t a n attorne y m ust a sk c la

rify i ng que stions in orde r to c ure pote ntia lly pe rjurious te stim ony

should not be

e xte nde d to a witne s s a fforde d im

m unity who a tte m pts to obstruc t a

grand jury inve s tiga

tion through m isle a d ing a

n d e va sive answe rs. B onds wa s lia ble for obstruc tion of justic e at the m om e nt he e nde avore d to influe nc e or im pe de the grand jury ’ s inve stiga tion with his m

i sle a ding a

nd e va sive answe r to the gove rnm e nt’ s dire c t
and una m biguous que s tion. S

e e Aguilar , 515 U.S. a

t 601 (holding tha

t a de fe nda nt
m ay be c onvic te d of obstruc tion of justic e “ whe re the de fe n d ant a c ts with a n inte nt to obstruc t justic e , but is foile d in som e wa y ” ). In Aguilar , the Supre m e C ourt de line a te d the dic h otom

y be twe e n pe rjury

and the inte nt to obstruc t justic e : W e re a de fe nda nt with the

re quisiteinte nt to lieto a subpoe na e d witne ss who is ultim

a te ly not c a lle d to te stify , or who te stifie s but doe s not tra

n sm i t the de fe nda

nt’ s ve rsion of the story , the de fe nda nt
22ha s e nde avore d to obstruc t, but ha s not a c tua lly obstruc t e d, justic e . Unde r our a

pproa c h, a

jury c ould find suc h de fe nda

nt guilty
. Id. As the Supre m e C ourt e m pha siz e d, “ [t] his is not to sa y tha t the de fe nda

nt’ s
a c tions ne e d to be suc c e ssful; a n e nde avor suffic e s . . .” Id. at 599 (c ita tion
om i tte d). De spite the jury ’ s ina bility to una n im ously find tha t B onds c om

m itte d pe rjury , the gove rnm e nt pre se nte d suffic ie nt e vide n c e that B onds’ e va sive answe r inte rfe re d with thea dm inistra tion of justic e . Se e id
. Onc e B onds c orruptly

e n de avore d to im

p e de the inve stiga

tory func tion of the g rand jury , his c rim e wa s c om ple te . S e eRashe e d , 663 F.2d a

t 853. C ontra

ry to the v ie ws e xpre sse d in the c onc urring opinions, the obstruc tion c a

nnot be undone by bla m ing the prose c utor for fa iling to pre ve nt the obstruc tion. Se e id . (“ [The prose c utor’ s] a c tions in no wa y ne gate the c o m

m ission of the

c rim e . At be st, his
re lie ving [the de fe nda

n t] of furthe r produc tion indic ate s tha t justic e wa s not, in fa c t , obstruc te d. This is not a de fe nse . . . .” ); s e e also Pe rk ins , 748 F.2d a

t 1528 (obse rving tha

t a lthough the

prose c utor c ould ha

ve que stione d the witne s s m ore
e ffe c tive ly , a

re a sona ble jury c ould ha ve ne ve rthe le ss found thete stim ony to be
e va sive in a

n e ffort to obstruc t justic e ). None of the c a s e s c ite d in the princ i pa l c o nc urring opinion support the notion tha

t the re is insuffic ie nt e vide nc e to susta i n a n obstruc tion of justic e

23c onvic tion in this c a se , whe re the jury wa s instruc te d on m a te ria lity

and spe c ific a lly

found tha

t B onds’ sta

te m e nt obstruc te d justic e . Se e Thomas , 612 F.3d
a t 1129 (upholding a

c onvic tion for obstruc tion of justic e whe re the jury found
m a te ria l ity

an d obstruc tive sta

te m e nts); c

f
. K ungy s v . Unite d State

s , 485 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1988) (discussing ge ne ra lly c o nc e a lm e nt of a

m a te ria l fa c t in the de natura liz a tion c onte xt); Unite d State s v . Mc K e nna , 327 F.3d 830, 840 (9th C ir. 2003) (disc ussing m a t e ria lity ge ne ra lly in the pe rjury

c o nte xt); W

e instoc k v . Unite d State s , 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C
. C ir. 1956) (disc ussing m a te ria lity in the fa lse sta te m e nt c onte xt); Unite d State s v . Se rv . De li Inc ., 151 F.3d 938, 941 (9th C ir. 1998) (sa m e ); Unite d State

s v . Mc Bane , 433 F.3d 344, 350-51 (3d C ir. 2005) (sam e ); Unite d State

s v . Rigas , 490 F.3d 208, 231 (2d C i r. 2007) (disc ussing
m a te ria l ity

ge ne ra lly in the ba nk fra ud c o nte xt). To thee xte nt tha t the princ ipa l
c onc urring opinion c ite s the se c a se s for the proposition tha t the gran d jury

func tion
m ust be subje c t to influe nc e for the obstruc tion c onvic t ion to sta nd, I disa gre e . Se e , e .g. Aguilar , 515 U.S. a

t 601 (e xpla ining tha

t a de fe n da nt m a y be c onvic te d of obstruc tion of justic e e ve n if his a tte m pt to obstruc t is foile d ). M ore ove r, the jury in this c a se wa s instruc te d on m a te ria lity and found B o nds’ sta

te m e n t obstruc tive pursua nt to tha t instruc tion. Abse nt a

c om p le te supe rim

position of the

“ l ite ra lly true ” Bronston an a ly sis, the c a se s c ite d in the princ ipa l c onc urring opinion sim ply
24do not provide a ba s is for re ve rsing B onds’ c onvic t ion.

Final Pitc h B arry B o n ds re c e i ve d a

grant of im

m unity in e xc ha nge for his truthful a

nd
c andid te s tim ony

be fore the grand jury . R a the r tha n a iding thegrand jury

in its inve stiga tory que st, B onds e le c te d to obstruc t the gran d jury proc e ss by

giving
e va sive te stim ony . The re is suffic ie nt e vide nc e to support his c onvic tion be c a use the j ury wa s instruc te d tha

t it m ust find his eva s ive te stim ony to be m a te ria l be fore
re nde ring a

guilty ve rdic t . In m

y vie w, the p e r c uriam and c onc urring opinions im pe rm issibly se c ond-gue s s the jury ve rdic t, disre ga

rd our pre c e d e nt, c re a te an
unwa rrante d c i rc uit split a

nd im port ina pplic a b le princ iple s from Bronston into the obstruc tion of justic e ana ly sis. I c ry foul.

25