CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS:

PERSPECTIVES, PROSPECTS AND 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

Jing-dong Yuan

October 2006

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Research for this project is supported by a generous grant 

from the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. The 

author thanks Randall Beisecker for his research assistance, and 

for the Chinese and Southeast Asian officials and scholars that 

he interviewed during the course of this project. He also thanks 

Dr. Sheng Lijun of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and 

an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions on 

an earlier draft of this monograph. Needless to say, all errors and 

interpretations remain the author’s alone.

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iii

FOREWORD

Relations between China and the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have undergone 

significant changes over the past 15 years. ASEAN’s 

concerns over Beijing’s drive for military modernization 

and its assertive posture in territorial disputes over the 

South China Sea of the early 1990s are replaced with 

growing economic ties and shared geo-political interests 

for building regional security through multilateral 

processes. Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Beijing 

has expanded its influence as a major political force in 

the region and a locomotive for economic recovery and 

future opportunity. What explains China’s successful 

diplomatic offensive and what implications do closer 

China-ASEAN ties have for the United States?

In this monograph, Dr. Jing-dong Yuan of the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies seeks 

to answer these questions by tracing the evolution 

of China-ASEAN relations since the early 1990s 

and examining some of the key factors that have 

contributed to the positive developments in bilateral 

ties. Specifically, he describes and analyzes how China 

and ASEAN have managed the territorial disputes 

through negotiation and compromises; looks at the 

expanding economic ties between China and ASEAN 

member states and examines the politico-strategic, 

as well as economic rationales for establishing a 

free trade area; and evaluates the emerging yet still 

limited defense and security ties between the two. 

Next, he provides detailed analyses of ASEAN’s 

dual-strategy of engagement and hedging, and looks 

at China’s bilateral relationships with seven ASEAN 

member states—Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
iv

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—and 

examines how each ASEAN state adopts a particular 

mix of policies due to its unique historical and geostrategic circumstances and its threat perceptions. 

Finally, Professor Yuan assesses the implications of 

the growing China-ASEAN ties for U.S. interests in 

the region and dispels some of the misperceptions and 

exaggeration of both Beijing’s intentions and influence. 

Washington retains much of the influence but does 

need to develop and adopt creative approaches to both 

individual member states and ASEAN as a group.

Professor Yuan’s timely analysis of this important 

issue is informed by his extensive research of the 

existing literature and personal interviews with officials 

and scholars in Beijing, Shanghai, and Singapore. 

Professor Yuan’s most valuable contribution to our 

understanding of the subject is his extensive use of 

Chinese sources not readily available to western 

readers. By synthesizing and presenting the views 

of Chinese analysts and media, Professor Yuan also 

provides some insights into Chinese perspectives on 

ASEAN as a regional player and how Beijing views 

its relationship with ASEAN in its efforts to promote 

regional stability for continued economic growth and 

prosperity. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased 

to publish this monograph as a contribution to the 

emerging debate on China-ASEAN relations and the 

implications for the United States.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JING-DONG YUAN is Director of Research for the 

East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies and an Associate Professor 

of International Policy Studies at the Monterey 

Institute of International Studies. Over the years, Dr. 

Yuan has provided consulting work for the Canadian 

government on issues related to Asia-Pacific security 

and arms control and nonproliferation, participated 

in the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific 

(CSCAP) working group meetings, and testified 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission on Chinese nonproliferation policy. He 

has also appeared as a commentator on the Voice of 

America (VOA), the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and 

Radio Free Asia. Dr. Yuan’s research focuses on AsiaPacific security, global and regional arms control 

and nonproliferation issues, U.S. policy toward Asia, 

and China’s defense and foreign policy. He writes 

extensively and is the author of over 100 monographs, 

book chapters, journals articles, and newspaper opeds. He is the co-author of China and India: Cooperation 

or Conflict? (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, 2003). A graduate of the Xi’an Foreign 

Language University, People’s Republic of China 

(1982), he received his Ph.D. in political science from 

Queen’s University in 1995 and has had research 

and teaching appointments at Queen’s University, 

York University, the University of Toronto, and the 

University of British Columbia, where he was a recipient 

of the prestigious Izaak Walton Killam Postdoctoral 

Research Fellowship. He was also a visiting research 

scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia 

National Laboratories before he joined the Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies in summer 1999. 
vi

SUMMARY

Since the mid-1990s, China and the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have developed a 

growing partnership in security cooperation, economic/

trade interdependence, and the development and 

sharing of “Asian values.” Compared to the late 1980s 

and early 1990s when Beijing had yet to establish or 

normalize diplomatic relations with key ASEAN 

member states and when the concerns over the “China 

threat” both drove Southeast Asia’s armament and 

military buildup and were the major rationale for 

initiating a regional security arrangement to keep the 

United States engaged, the current state of ChinaASEAN relationship is truly remarkable. While a China 

and Southeast Asia living in harmony contributes to 

regional peace, stability, and prosperity and minimizes 

the potential for conflicts over unresolved territorial 

disputes, the future direction of this relationship 

nevertheless could have major implications for longterm U.S. interests in the region, especially if it evolves 

into a competitive and even exclusive regional trading 

bloc and a geo-strategic arrangement under the shadow 

of a growing and more assertive China.

This monograph describes the evolving ChinaASEAN relationship over the past 15 years and 

examines the key elements of this relationship in the 

areas of economic/trade interdependence, security 

dialogue and cooperation, Chinese diplomacy in 

expanding influence in the region, China-ASEAN 

efforts in managing the unresolved territorial disputes, 

and the ASEAN member states’ continuing concerns 

about and the hedging strategy against an ever growing 

China. Three underlying themes are interwoven with 
vii

the discussions of both chronological developments 

and major issues in this study. The first describes 

Beijing’s post-Tiananmen diplomatic offensive: a 

good neighborly policy of establishing and restoring 

diplomatic ties with key ASEAN member states. It 

assesses how the changing environments at both the 

international and regional levels drove Chinese foreign 

and security policy during the initial post-Cold War 

period where the disintegration of the former Soviet 

Union effectively had reduced the utility of the “China 

Card” and hence its strategic importance in the strategic 

triangle. A more focused Asia policy of necessity led to 

greater attention to Southeast Asia.

The second theme relates to how ASEAN, alarmed 

by Beijing’s growing military buildup and the assertive 

irredentism regarding the territorial disputes in the 

South China Sea, sought to both keep the United 

States engaged in the region’s security arrangements 

and socialize a China that remained suspicious of 

multilateralism and the concepts of cooperative 

security, dialogue processes, and Track-II initiatives. 

Through the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings and the 

establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 

Southeast Asian nations were able to socialize, assure, 

and obtain assurance from China that the ASEAN 

Way could be the model for developing regional 

security institutions. At the same time, from the mid1990s onward was also the period that saw increasing 

economic ties between the two and, in the wake of the 

1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s position as a major 

market and source of low-cost production became 

more important to the recovery and sustainability of 

the Southeast Asian economy.

The third highlights the major developments over 

the past 5 years where the political, economic, and 
viii

strategic elements of China-ASEAN have become 

even more pronounced in the forms of the ChinaASEAN Free Trade Area, the ASEAN +3 process, and 

China’s accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation and the signing of the 2002 Declaration 

on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It 

examines the key factors driving these developments 

and speculates on their long-term impact on the 

transformation of the region’s geo-strategic and geoeconomic landscapes and the implications for U.S. 

interests in the region. In particular, the monograph 

discusses the ASEAN states’ lingering unease over 

China’s growing power and their hedging strategies, 

including continued and even intensified security ties 

with the United States.
1

CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS:

PERSPECTIVES, PROSPECTS AND 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

Relations between China and the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member 

states have undergone significant changes over the 

past 15 years. When Beijing first established official 

contacts with the original ASEAN-6 in 1991, it barely 

had restored diplomatic relations with Indonesia, had 

begun to normalize relations with Vietnam, and just 

had established diplomatic ties with Singapore. There 

were strong suspicions, as well as concerns, among 

ASEAN member states over China’s growing power 

and intentions toward Southeast Asia. History aside, 

Beijing’s assertiveness in its claims to sovereignty over 

the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, its ongoing 

military buildup, and the occasional uses of force in 

asserting its territorial claims (with South Vietnam in 

1974, and with Vietnam in 1988), cast a shadow over 

the Southeast Asian states at a time of uncertain U.S. 

commitment and military drawdown in the region 

(e.g., the closing of the Subic and Clark military bases 

in the Philippines in 1991). It was no accident that the 

“China threat” thesis found a receptive audience in 

the region’s capitals. Indeed, ASEAN’s internal and 

external balancing strategy in the early 1990s was very 

much driven by such grim assessments. 

What differences a decade and half have made. 

Today, China and ASEAN have formed a strategic 

partnership for peace and prosperity, signed a 

framework agreement on a China-ASEAN Free Trade 
2

Area (CAFTA), and are cooperating on a range of 

issues of mutual interest from maritime security to 

nontraditional security challenges. Washington should 

welcome a stable relationship between China and 

Southeast Asia that in general contributes to regional 

peace, stability, and prosperity, and minimizes the 

potential for conflicts over disputed territories that 

could endanger key sea lines of communication 

(SLOCs). At the same time, it also is important to assess 

the long-term implications of growing China-ASEAN 

ties, and if and to what extent the emerging East Asian 

regionalism and greater regional integration could 

undermine U.S. interests in the region.

This monograph takes stock of the evolving ChinaASEAN relationship over the past 15 years, examines 

some of the key elements of this relationship, and 

analyzes the implications for U.S. interests in the region. 

These include growing China-ASEAN economic/trade 

interdependence; bilateral and multilateral security 

dialogue and cooperation and efforts in managing 

unresolved territorial disputes; Chinese diplomacy in 

expanding its influence in the region in competition 

with Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States; 

and the ASEAN member states’ continuing concerns 

about and the hedging strategy against China that both 

offers opportunities and poses security challenges. 

The monograph seeks to address the following issues. 

First, it tests the International Relations theory on rising 

powers and the challenges to the international system, 

and the possible reactions from other actors in the forms 

of either balancing or band-wagoning. Second, it looks 

at the question of whether China would and actually is 

asserting a form of benign hegemony and sinocization 

of the region as its influences grow. Given the extensive 

Chinese communities in the region, what could be the 
3

implications of a Greater China in political, cultural, 

and economic terms? Finally, whether, how, and to 

what extent continued expansion and consolidation of 

China-ASEAN relations reconcile with U.S. regional 

strategic goals of retaining primacy and sustaining 

economic ties. Would Washington allow Beijing to 

develop a Monroe Doctrine of its own in Southeast 

Asia, or is such an alarmist perspective unfounded? 

Can a modus vivendi be developed between China and 

the United States so that the deepening China-ASEAN 

relations would not amount necessarily to an assertion 

of Beijing’s sphere of influence, or that long-term U.S. 

interests demand that Washington foil any efforts to 

exclude American presence and participation in this 

part of the world that is key to major international 

SLOCs, in addition to being a critical part of U.S. global 

as well as regional strategy?

FROM ENMITY TO AMITY: CHINA’S 

CHANGING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN

The history of China and its Southeast Asian 

neighbors during the Cold War years was one of 

both amity and animosity. Indonesia (April 1950) and 

Burma (June 1950) were among the first few countries 

to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

From the early 1950s until the mid-1960s, Beijing 

enjoyed an especially warm relationship with Jakarta, 

most prominently displayed in the 1955 Bandung 

Conference of Asian-African Countries and continued 

during much of President Sukarno’s reign. Beijing 

also maintained a close relationship with the fellow 

communist regime in North Vietnam and rendered 

significant support to its causes against France and the 

United States from the 1950s to the 1970s, including 

sizable material and human assistance.1
4

But China’s relationships with many Southeast 

Asia’s noncommunist states were decidedly estranged. 

Concerns over potential threats from communism 

led some of them to participate in and form alliancelike regional organizations (Southeast Asian Treaty 

Organization or SEATO, 1954-77; the Five-Power 

Defense Arrangements or FPDA, 1971-) with external 

powers—the United States in particular—to protect 

their interests. There were deep suspicions over China’s 

motives and activities, especially as they related to the 

large number of overseas Chinese residing in these 

countries.2 Beijing’s public support of the communist 

insurgents in the region only reinforced their perceptions 

and heightened their fears. Not surprisingly, many 

of them did not establish diplomatic relations with 

Beijing until the mid-1970s (Thailand, Malaysia, and 

the Philippines). Others only normalized ties with 

China in the 1990s (Singapore and Indonesia).3

The Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s 

led to the establishment of diplomatic ties between 

China and a number of ASEAN states. The emerging 

Chinese-ASEAN cooperation in the late 1970s ironically 

was prompted largely by their shared concerns over 

Vietnam’s growing assertiveness and its attempt to 

establish hegemony in Indochina, in particular in the 

aftermath of its invasion of neighboring Cambodia. 

Thailand, being on the frontline of the Cambodian 

conflict, sought to develop security ties with China. 

China also coordinated with ASEAN in seeking 

a political settlement of the Cambodian issue and 

supported the latter’s position that the Cambodian 

coalition government headed by Prince Sihanouk, 

not the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin regime, should 

represent Phnom Penh in the United Nations (UN).4

During the 1980s, Chinese policy toward Southeast 

Asia began to undergo important changes in two critical 
5

areas. Beijing started to place state-to-state relationships 

in precedence over ideological ties by halting its support 

to communist insurgence movements in the region. 

In 1989, it also passed laws on Chinese citizenship 

requiring overseas Chinese to adopt citizenship of their 

countries of residence. By taking these two important 

measures, major irritants effectively were removed 

from China’s bilateral relationships with a number of 

Southeast Asian countries. Beijing now seemed more 

than ever eager to court better relationships with its 

Southern neighbors, and this has paved the way for 

improvement of political ties.5

Beijing’s official contact with ASEAN as a group 

began in July 1991 when Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 

Qichen was invited to attend the opening ceremony 

of the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. 

Since then China has attended each ASEAN Foreign 

Ministers’ Meeting consecutively. In 1994, China 

participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 

became a consultative dialogue partner of ASEAN. 

This status was elevated in 1996, when China became a 

full dialogue partner with ASEAN. In December 1997, 

Chinese President Jiang Zemin and ASEAN leaders 

held their first ever summit in Malaysia and issued a 

joint statement announcing their decision to establish 

a partnership of good neighborliness and mutual 

trust between China and ASEAN oriented toward 

the 21st century. In October 2003, China and ASEAN 

signed the “Joint Declaration of the PRC and ASEAN 

State Leaders—A Strategic Partnership for Peace and 

Prosperity.”6

The emerging China-ASEAN ties were influenced 

by a number of developments at the time. One was 

Beijing’s efforts, in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, 

in particular in response to the sanctions imposed by the 
6

West, to break the isolation. Southeast Asian countries, 

given their relative reticence regarding the June 4 

Incident, became targets of the Chinese diplomatic 

good neighborly policy. Beijing and Jakarta restored, 

and China and Singapore established, diplomatic 

relations in 1990. Chinese Premier Li Peng visited 

Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Laos as part 

of that diplomatic endeavor. A second reason was to 

sustain the cooperation between the two in the wake 

of the Cambodian settlement, in which China played 

a constructive role in the resolution of the dispute and 

had been in close consultation with ASEAN in the 

1980s. But most important of all was Beijing’s changing 

perception of its security environment and the relative 

place of Southeast Asia in its post-Cold War security 

policy. This resulted in the successful management of 

the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Beijing’s 

reassurance to ASEAN of its benign intentions and its 

acceptance of multilateralism and cooperative security, 

and China’s growing economic ties with ASEAN.7

Managing Territorial Disputes.

To ensure a conducive environment for economic 

development required strengthening relations and/

or mending fences with China’s neighbors, including 

the Southeast Asian states.8 Disputes over the Spratly 

Islands began to emerge in the 1980s, especially after the 

signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. The reported rich deposits 

of maritime resources, including oil and natural gas, led 

to scrambling for atolls and islets in the South China 

Sea and disputes among six claimants—Brunei, China, 

Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.9 While 

Beijing sought to improve relations with ASEAN, its 
7

assertiveness in sovereignty claims almost derailed 

such efforts. This was most evident in China’s handling 

of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 

especially its occasional display of military might. The 

construction of shelters on the disputed Mischief Reef 

also was seen by some of the contenders as an act of 

aggressiveness. In addition to strengthening its claims 

to the disputed territories, China’s South China Sea 

policy also was a reflection of its growing interest and 

ambitions in extending its influence, and as a result, 

greater efforts in developing a navy that could go 

beyond coastal defense.10

Chinese assertiveness in its claims over the 

Spratly Islands was informed both by its strong sense 

of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and more 

pragmatic economic security considerations, including 

securing a peaceful external environment for economic 

development and protecting the country’s economic 

interests, including protecting its land, air space, 

and its territorial waters. The growing attention to 

maritime interests and the cultivation of a “conception 

of sea as territory” (haiyang guotuguan) reflected both a 

recognition of the potential of maritime resources for 

national economic development and a realization that 

China must enhance its ability to protect its perceived 

maritime territories. One Chinese analyst suggested: 

To make sure that such [maritime] resources are fully 

tapped and utilized, China needs to ensure the security of 

its maritime economic activities. A strong naval defense 

is essential to reducing the threat posed by sea-borne 

smuggling and piracy to China’s tariff incomes, ocean 

fishery, and marine transportation.11

According to Chinese sources, of the more than 3 

million square km of territorial waters China claims as 

its own, 
8

an area of more than 800,000 square km within China’s 

traditional maritime boundaries has been illegally 

delineated into the domain of other nations, with 410,000 

square km taken by the Philippines, 270,000 by Malaysia, 

70,000 by Vietnam, 50,000 by Indonesia, and the remainder 

by Brunei. . . . With rapid economic growth, China will be 

in greater and greater need of energy. The 3 million square 

km of national marine territory is where the Chinese 

nation’s descendants pin their hopes.12

This had prompted calls for exercising one’s own rights 

under UNCLOS that provides legitimacy for such 

claims. One Chinese naval officer contended: “From a 

national viewpoint, the Convention allows each country 

to utilize the ocean according to its own needs and gain 

its own individual ocean rights and interests, and it 

supplies a legal framework.”13 This call for more assertive 

sovereignty claims was understandably prompted by 

the fact that other claimant states reportedly already 

were operating 120 oil wells that could extract between 

30 and 50 million tons of crude oil, which was almost 

one-third of China’s annual extraction and surpassed 

China’s South China Sea oil production by 40 times. The 

loss to China was therefore enormous.14

China became a net oil importer in 1993. The need 

for energy to fuel economic development could create 

instability as countries in the region compete for energy 

resources, which in turn could exacerbate the already 

touchy territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China’s 

ongoing naval development can be seen, apart from the 

Taiwan scenario, as a direct response to energy shortages 

and the need to be able to assert claims over territories 

believed to contain much needed energy reserves.15 For 

these reasons, the Chinese Navy had been given the task 

of broadening the traditional mission of coastal defense 

to that of force projection into the South China Sea 

and beyond.16 Two important factors probably explain 
9

the rising importance of maritime security to China. 

One is that maritime routes are becoming essential to 

China’s growing international trade; it increasingly 

depends on the seaborne resources that go through 

the key chokepoints in Southeast Asia. With about 85 

percent of its trade being transported by sea, including 

an estimated 50 percent of its oil imports transiting the 

Strait of Malacca, Beijing understandably is keen on 

developing its force projection capability, if for nothing 

else than to protect critical sea lanes. The other reason 

is the potential offshore oil and mineral deposits, which 

are crucial resources to China’s economic development 

in the coming decades. 17

China claims complete sovereignty over the entire 

Spratly Island groups that are partly or in whole also 

claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, 

and Vietnam, and over Paracel, a claim that also is 

contended by Vietnam. In February 1992, China’s 

National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s 

putative legislature, passed the Law of Territorial Waters 

and Contiguous Zone that claims complete control and 

asserts that it will resort to the use of force to protect its 

territories. The controversial law, together with reported 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) construction 

of an airstrip on the Woody Island, struck the ASEAN 

states as showing assertive Chinese intentions toward 

the entire South China Sea.18 An internal document 

in China argued at the time that, given the country’s 

increasing demands for resources and the decreasing 

resource bases at home, the importance of the Spratly 

Island groups in terms of their potential oil and mineral 

reserves was becoming greater and, indeed, might 

provide the only survival space for China.19 

The island groups also sit on important SLOCs and 

therefore are strategically significant. Chinese control 
10

over the area means that they will be able not only to 

enhance their power projection capabilities but also to 

exert tremendous leverage over countries that rely on 

these SLOCs for their imports of key industrial resources 

such as oil. In other words, the ability or the perceived 

ability to disrupt normal transportation can cause 

great uncertainty and economic fallout. China already 

had engaged in two military clashes with Vietnam 

(1974, 1988) and was slowly but steadily increasing its 

presence in the South China Sea. The Chinese leaders, 

meanwhile, were trying to assure the neighbors by 

expressing willingness to discuss joint exploration and 

development efforts with other claimant states and 

shelve the sovereignty issue.20

However, Beijing continued to assert its exclusive 

sovereignty over the disputed territories in the South 

China Sea even as it advocated shelving the question of 

sovereignty. This was demonstrated by the revelation 

of its occupation of the Mischief Reef in February 1995, 

where the PLA built concrete constructs and shelters. 

There were competing explanations as to China’s 

intention in occupying the reef, and the Chinese 

themselves explained that the structure built would 

be used for fishermen regardless of nationalities. 

Nonetheless the Philippines were alarmed.21

The Mischief incident effectively raised ASEAN’s 

concern over China’s assertiveness and galvanized the 

organization into action. Until 1995, ASEAN had taken 

no public position on the South China Sea disputes. 

In March 1995, ASEAN for the first time publicly 

called for all parties to the dispute to adhere to the 

spirit and letter of the 1992 Manila Declaration on the 

South China Sea. The issue subsequently was placed 

on the agenda of the ARF despite Chinese objection.22

Member states converged on the idea of the code of 
11

conduct, reflecting the principles the group had always 

adhered to—nonforceful settlement of disputes, normbuilding, and confidence-building measures (CBMs). 

ASEAN itself first adopted principles of behavior 

among member states and then presented a united 

front vis-à-vis China. The approach was driven by two 

considerations. The first was to develop consensus 

among members, since not all of them lay claims to the 

disputed territories and as they each had a different 

relationship with China; secondly, it was hoped that a 

code of conduct, should it be accepted by Beijing, would 

constrain China, a stronger power in the disputes, to 

refrain from the use of force.23

However, even as member states were contemplating unified approaches toward the South China 

Sea disputes, some also sought to strike separate 

deals/understandings with Beijing. Malaysia, for one, 

accepted China’s preference for bilateral negotiation. 

What also was significant was Malaysian Prime 

Minister Mahathir’s call for external powers to stay 

out of the disputes, effectively ruling out possible 

intervention by the United States, something Manila 

was keen on securing.24 Indeed, the Philippines sought 

U.S. support and signed a Visiting Forces Agreement 

with Washington in February 1998, 7 years after it had 

evicted American forces from its naval and air force 

bases. Meanwhile, the Philippines also engaged in 

bilateral discussion with China, resulting in a Joint 

Statement on PRC-RP Consultation on the South China 

Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation in August 

1995.25

On November 4, 2002, ASEAN and China signed 

the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 

South China Sea, a major milestone in China-ASEAN 

relations, concerning how the claimant countries to the 
12

territorial disputes would resolve them. While ASEAN 

was not able to get Beijing committed to a code of 

conduct, which would be a more stringent measure, 

the declaration at least obliged China to pursue a 

multilateral approach to the issue, a shift from the 

bilateralism that it had preferred. It also was symbolic 

in that China had appeared to be accepting ASEAN’s 

preference for norms and regulation of the dispute.26

Specifically, the Declaration commits the signatory 

parties:

to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 

would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace 

and stability including, among others, refraining from 

action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, 

reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their 

differences in a constructive manner.

What motivated Beijing to adopt a more moderate 

approach to the territorial disputes was a growing 

concern over the Taiwan independence issue, and hence 

the need to secure ASEAN support for its unification 

policy; the risk of pushing the small Southeast Asian 

countries to the United States, resulting in greater 

ASEAN-U.S. military cooperation that could allow U.S. 

access to military facilities in the region, hence posing 

a greater threat to Chinese security interests, especially 

where the Taiwan contingency was concerned; and 

China’s own lack of power projection capability 

that could help enforce its claims effectively.27 These 

considerations led to changes in managing territorial 

disputes, moving away from more confrontational and 

militaristic approaches to ones that emphasize dialogue 

and promote joint exploration and development, 

without in any way giving up its claim to sovereignty 

over the disputed territories in the South China Sea.28
13

The more moderate stance was meant to deflate 

growing alarm over Chinese aggressiveness, especially 

in the context of the 1995-96 Chinese missile exercises 

in the Taiwan Strait, rather than a fundamental change 

of the conception of sovereignty. Indeed, if anything, 

western analysts suggest that Beijing may be engaged 

in a slow-intensity conflict where it steadily strengthens 

its hold on, and extends its reach to, disputed maritime 

territories.29

Beijing also negotiated separate codes of conduct 

with Vietnam and the Philippines. Between 1992 and 

2000, seven rounds of negotiation took place between 

China and Vietnam. In December 1999, Beijing and 

Hanoi signed a Land Border Treaty, which subsequently 

was ratified by the two countries’ parliaments in 2000. 

On December 25, 2000, China and Vietnam signed the 

Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, 

Exclusive Economic Zones, and Continental Shelves 

in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Agreement on Fishery 

Cooperation in the Beibu Gulf. Both agreements 

subsequently were ratified by the two countries’ 

legislatures in 2004.30

In March 2005, national oil companies from China, 

the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a landmark 

agreement to conduct joint prospecting for oil and 

gas in the South China Sea. On the one hand, this is 

considered to be a major breakthrough, especially based 

on the idea of shelving territorial disputes and seeking 

joint exploitation and development. However, there 

also are concerns, from the ASEAN perspective, over 

China’s “divide and rule” tactic that is establishing its 

dominance effectively in the region and undermining 

the organization’s unity in dealing with the rising 

power.31

Furthermore, the territorial disputes continue to 

resurface from time to time, with occasional clashes 
14

resulting in casualties and detention, or otherwise 

property damages. A July 1999 run-in between a 

Chinese fishing boat and the Philippine Navy ended 

in the former’s sinking. Similar incidents occurred in 

January 2000, when Philippine naval patrol personnel 

boarded Chinese fishing boats, touching off protests 

and warnings from Beijing.32 Chinese media also point 

out that Vietnam continues to encroach on Chinese 

territorial integrity in the South China Sea by setting 

up telephone networks on atolls and islets currently 

under Vietnamese occupation. These activities are 

seen as efforts to establish fait accompli to strengthen 

Hanoi’s leverage in future negotiations.33

Defense and Security Cooperation.

Over the years, China and ASEAN countries have 

developed defense and security ties in a number of 

areas, ranging from high-level visits by military and 

defense officials to port calls, small-scale joint military 

exercises, defense equipment transfers, military 

educational exchange programs, and multilateral 

dialogues by senior defense and military officers. In 

December 1999, General Fu Quanyou, Chief of the 

General Staff of the PLA, visited Thailand to observe 

ceremonies marking King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s 75th 

birthday anniversary. Between 2002 and 2006, the 

Chinese defense minister, the PLA chief of general 

staff, service and military area commanders, and other 

high-ranking Chinese military leaders made visits 

to all 10 ASEAN member states; China also received 

defense ministers and ranking military officers from 

these countries. Meanwhile, Beijing has established 

security dialogues with six ASEAN member states— 

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
15

and Vietnam—as well as ASEAN itself. Of these six, 

four have territorial disputes with China. China also 

has sold military equipment to six ASEAN member 

states (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 

Thailand, and Vietnam) over the past 5 years. In April 

2006, China and Vietnam conducted joint maritime 

patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin.34

In October 2003, China acceded to the ASEAN 

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and issued the ChinaASEAN Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership 

for Peace and Prosperity. In December 2004, a 5-year 

(2005-10) Plan of Action was adopted. The Plan focuses 

heavily on defense and security cooperation between 

the two, especially in the following areas:

• confidence and trust in defense and military 

fields;

• dialogue, consultation, and seminars on defense 

and security issues;

• cooperation on military personnel training;

• joint military exercises; and,

• peacekeeping operations.35

China also proposed and received endorsement 

from ASEAN, an Asian defense cooperation forum.36

The first ARF Security Policy Conference was held in 

Beijing on November 4-6, 2004. The Indonesian Vice 

Minister of Defense chaired the first meeting, which 

covered a whole panoply of issues including the 

Korean nuclear crisis and the Six-Party Talks, maritime 

security, and terrorist threats to the region. The second 

meeting was held in Vientiane, Laos, on May 19, 2005.37

China and ASEAN member states, especially those 

states adjacent to Yunnan Province, also cooperate 

in the areas of nontraditional security such as drug 
16

trafficking, piracy, and money laundering.38 Beijing 

has extended military assistance to Manila, including 

donations of $1 million in equipment and $3 million 

for setting up a Chinese-language training program for 

the Philippine armed forces. The PLA also invites the 

Philippine military personnel to receive educational 

training in China.39

China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.

A major development in China-ASEAN relations 

since the end of the Cold War is perhaps the growing 

economic interdependence between the two. Indeed, 

two-way trade has been growing at a rate of 20 percent 

for the last decade and reached over U.S. $100 billion in 

2004, a year ahead of a previously set target. It further 

registered a 23 percent increase in 2005, reaching $130.4 

billion.40 ASEAN member states have benefited from 

China’s spectacular economic growth as the Asian 

giant’s growing demands also generate economic 

benefits for the region as a whole. For instance, in 2004, 

ASEAN had a roughly $20 billion trade surplus with 

China, while China’s other major trading partners all 

sustained sizable deficits.41

Chinese analysts have divided the evolution of 

China-ASEAN economic relations into two phases. 

The first one, from 1991, when Chinese Foreign 

Minister Qian Qichen was invited to attend the 24th 

ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting, to 2001 when 

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed a ChinaASEAN free trade area, saw the two sides expand and 

deepen bilateral trade ties. The second phase began in 

November 2002, with the signing of the China-ASEAN 

Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 

Cooperation moving toward regional economic 
17

integration. Over the years, China and ASEAN have 

institutionalized 48 regular mechanisms to facilitate 

closer economic cooperation. Prominent among them is 

the highest political mechanism—ASEAN+1, launched 

in 1997. In addition, there are five working groups: the 

China-ASEAN Senior Officials meeting, the ChinaASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee, ASEAN-China 

Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation, 

ASEAN-China Joint Committee on Science and 

Technology (July 1994), and the ASEAN Beijing 

Committee. The two sides also have identified five 

key areas for cooperation—agriculture, information 

and communication technologies, human resource 

development, the Mekong River Development, and 

mutual investment.42

At the eighth ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, 

Cambodia, in November 2002, China and ASEAN 

signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 

Economic Cooperation. If and when implemented, 

it would constitute a common market of 1.7 billion 

people, with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) 

of U.S.$1.5-2 trillion. The two sides sought to establish 

a free trade area (FTA) within 10 years, first with the 

original ASEAN-6 by 2010, followed by the entire 

ASEAN-10 by 2015.43 The initiative largely came from 

China, as it recognized ASEAN member states’ concerns 

over China’s growing economy and its crowding-out 

effect on investment flows into Southeast Asia and 

increasing economic competition. After Premier Zhu 

proposed the FTA idea, an ASEAN-China Expert 

Group on Economic Cooperation was established to 

study Zhu’s proposal, as well as the impact of China’s 

World Trade Organization (WTO) entry in 2001. It 

also is a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis 

and hence the need for a more regional approach to 
18

future economic challenges. Cooperation also includes 

the Mekong River Basin development project that has 

been supported by the Asian Development Bank and 

the endorsement by ASEAN of a U.S.$2.5 billion TransAsian railway joining Kunming and Singapore.44

While there are many economic reasons for greater 

integration, some analysts also point to the strategic 

rationale for developing an FTA, especially from China’s 

perspective. To begin with, such an arrangement could 

facilitate a more peaceful regional security environment 

critical to China’s continued economic rise. Second, it 

addresses concerns in the region over China’s growing 

power by more closely integrating itself with ASEAN, 

hence increasing the costs of conflicts. Chinese analysts 

suggest that the CAFTA should be viewed from a 

strategic perspective and as part of its peaceful rise. 

Geo-economics and greater economic interactions with 

ASEAN would support these objectives. To preempt 

Taiwan’s strategy to buy its way into Southeast Asia, 

China should pay greater attention to the development 

of its southwestern region (Yunnan and Guangxi in 

particular) to develop and strengthen economic ties 

with the ASEAN countries.45

Third, by taking the lead in forming an FTA, China 

also hopes to play a more prominent role as the region’s 

center of economic growth. Fourth, by investing more 

in the region and allowing a certain degree of selfdiscrimination—as in the form of the so-called “Early 

Harvest Program,” giving ASEAN states preferential 

treatment on agricultural products in terms of tariff 

reduction and market access—Beijing seeks to address 

the perceived “China threat,” not in the security area 

but in the context of economic competition. And finally, 

by entering a rules-based free trade arrangement, 

China also wants to demonstrate its acceptance of 
19

multilateralism and respect for norms and rules. 

ASEAN member states for their own reasons sought 

to partake in China’s dynamic economic growth; at 

least not to be left behind. An FTA also could energize 

other external powers to seek similar arrangements, 

therefore opening up more opportunities in the areas 

of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).46

While China-ASEAN trade has registered rapid 

growth over the last decade, both rank fifth as each 

other’s trading partners, after intra-ASEAN, Japan, 

the United States, and the European Union (EU). 

Future developments will depend on how both could 

complement, rather than compete, in labor-intensive 

manufacturing sectors and increase investment in each 

other. ASEAN countries recognize the opportunities 

that a growing China provides, but they also are 

worried over the long-term impact of a stronger China 

competing with them for foreign direct investment and 

replacing them as the manufacturer of labor-intensive 

consumer products. There remain serious concerns that 

China may compete and crowd out ASEAN in terms of 

foreign direct investment, replace ASEAN states as a 

manufacturing base, and hence cause severe economic 

downturn in the ASEAN countries less capable of 

competition and with little room for adjustment.47

To address these concerns, China in particular needs 

to make a greater investment in ASEAN, potentially 

in the energy and resource-based sectors, to raise twoway trade volumes further, as well as to generate a 

larger market as is supposed to be provided by the 

CAFTA. However, investment negotiations between 

the two still face major hurdles. For instance, during 

1995-2004, Chinese investment ($1 billion) in ASEAN 

amounted to only 0.4 percent of the total. This compares 

poorly with EU-15 ($68.5 billion, 28.3 percent), the 
20

United States ($42.3 billion, 17.5 percent), and Japan 

($32 billion, 13.3 percent). It even is lower significantly 

than Taiwan’s investment in the region ($8.9 billion, 

3.6 percent).48 At the same time, China has replaced 

Southeast Asia as the destination of FDI. Beijing also 

needs to manage potentially contentious issues such as 

the Mekong River project that has economic, ecological, 

and environmental impacts on downstream Southeast 

Asian countries.49

The CAFTA has generated much interest in other 

extra-regional powers that seek FTAs with ASEAN. 

The United States proposed the Enterprise for ASEAN 

Initiative (EAI) that would enable member states to 

establish FTAs along the line of the U.S.-Singapore FTA. 

Japan also issued the “Joint Declaration of the Leaders 

of ASEAN and Japan on the Comprehensive Economic 

Partnership” on November 5, 2002, in Phnom Penh. At 

the 2003 ASEAN+1 summit held in Tokyo, Japanese 

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged $3 billion in 

new aid.50 With CAFTA, ASEAN+1, and other regional 

forums, including the East Asia Summit in December 

2005, there is what some would call the trend toward 

regionalism with shared markets, growing economic 

interdependence, and even shared ideas on what a 

regional security architecture should look like.51

China-ASEAN relations have evolved from enmity 

and suspicion to amity and greater cooperation on a 

broad range of issues. Having established a strategic 

partnership for peace and prosperity, the two sides 

are working toward building a stable, long-term 

relationship for the future. In addition to the state-tostate security and economic ties since reform started in 

the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 

sought to establish and expand ties with political parties 

in Southeast Asia. Today, the CCP has official relations 
21

with 39 political parties in the region, and the rationale 

and objectives are to promote mutual understanding, 

learning, economic success, and governance, regardless 

of ideologies. This is a far cry from the 1960s and 1970s 

when the CCP supported indigenous communist 

parties as part of a strategy to fan revolution in the 

region to topple ruling governments.52

Beijing’s efforts to assure its neighbors through the 

so-called new diplomacy have paid off in winning 

confidence from its Southeast Asian neighbors, if not 

completely erasing disputes between them. The 1997 

Asian financial crisis was a turning point. Chinese 

responses to the crisis, including its pledges of $1 billion 

to help Thailand and not to devaluate the Renminbi, 

won good will in ASEAN. Beijing also emerged more 

confident of its own potential leadership role in the 

region, although it remains deferential to ASEAN.53

China began to publish a defense white paper in 1998. 

Now published every 2 years, the document also has 

moved from mere exposition of general principles to 

some elementary explanations of defense budgets, 

modernization programs, and doctrinal issues. While 

still far from ideal, at least some modest steps have been 

made to enhance transparency. China also put forward 

the “New Security Concept” (NSC) at the ARF InterSessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building 

Measures that it co-hosted with the Philippines in 

Beijing, March 1997. The NSC emphasizes cooperative 

security, confidence-building, peaceful resolution of 

disputes, and multilateral dialogue.54 In November 

2004, China hosted the first ARF Security Policy 

Conference in Beijing. Within a decade, growing 

interdependence and skillful Chinese diplomacy have 

sustained a steady improvement and rising comfort 

level between China and ASEAN, allowing Beijing to 

exercise greater influence in the region.55
22

China and ASEAN also are expanding areas of 

cooperation, in particular in the nontraditional security 

areas, including securing SLOCs, antiterrorism, and 

antipiracy; ecological issues related to the Greater 

Mekong River project and other environmental issues; 

responses to the severe acute respiratory syndrome 

(SARS) outbreak, for instance, the first China-ASEAN 

summit on SARS; transnational organized crimes; 

and money laundering.56 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 

has proposed mulin, anlin, fulin to ASEAN [“friendly 

neighbors—peaceful coexistence, regional stability, 

and harmony”; “secure neighbors—regional peace 

and stability through dialogue, negotiation to resolve 

disputes,” and “rich neighbors”—develop, deepen 

regional and subregional economic cooperation, and 

promote regional integration].57

ASEAN COUNTRIES’ ENGAGEMENT 

AND HEDGING STRATEGIES

Southeast Asia always has had to deal with the issue 

of living adjacent to a great power. Historically, there 

was the tributary system, and continental Southeast 

Asia (Vietnam in particular) lived under the constant 

shadow of the Chinese empires.58 While relations 

between China and ASEAN have become much more 

amicable, ASEAN countries continue to harbor a mixed 

reaction toward the rise of China, viewing this as both a 

challenge and opportunities.59 Hence ASEAN countries 

have adopted the dual-strategies of engagement and 

hedging to protect their interests in the face of a rising 

China.60 The former is intended to explore opportunities 

by integrating China into regional political, security, 

and economic arrangements, recognizing that a policy 

of isolating and alienating China is unsustainable. 
23

ASEAN’s engagement strategy toward China 

since the mid-1990s has been driven largely by this 

consideration. The latter strategy emphasizes external 

balancing where ASEAN states seek to develop and 

strengthen relations with extra-regional powers such 

as the United States, Japan, India, and the EU, among 

others. 

ASEAN Engages China.

The ASEAN nations have always viewed China 

with both suspicion and some cautious optimism. 

Their threat perceptions are influenced by history, 

geography, and cultural factors. In the former sense, 

being small states vis-à-vis China, they have always 

harbored a suspicion of their giant northern neighbor 

for two reasons. One is historical precedent, in particular 

Beijing’s past support of the insurgent movements 

in their countries; the other is uncertainty about how 

China will use its power in regional affairs. China’s 

preponderance and its growing weight in the postCold War era create additional concerns. Territorial 

disputes in the South China Sea and China’s military 

modernization programs, together with perceived U.S. 

drawdown of forces have further heightened the sense 

of insecurity.61 But ASEAN countries also recognize 

that, given their limited capabilities, they need to live 

with China, and one way of ensuring that China will 

act responsibly is to encourage greater integration 

between China and the region, thus increasing the 

stakes. Indeed, ASEAN has been pragmatic enough 

to recognize the importance of engagement rather 

than confrontation and hence adopted a strategy that 

aims at integrating China gradually into a regional 

web of economic interdependence, political dialogue, 
24

and security dialogue processes. They also reject the 

strategy of containment as the best way to deal with a 

rising China.62

ASEAN’s active engagement of China played a 

critical role in removing suspicions and encouraged 

Beijing to full participation in the regional multilateral 

security arrangement. Specifically, three outstanding 

issues of particular concern to the Southeast Asian states 

were to be addressed: potential economic competition 

coming from China, territorial disputes, and lack of 

transparency in China’s defense spending. Beijing 

began to address these concerns, winning ASEAN’s 

confidence in the process.63

There is no question that the ARF has performed 

a critical role in exposing and socializing China to 

the ideas of cooperative security, multilateralism, 

consultation and dialogue, consensus-building, and 

noncoercive ways of settling disputes. Beijing’s early 

concerns fell in four areas: that the regional forum 

would be dominated by the United States or otherwise 

could provide the justification for Washington to 

intervene in the region’s affairs; concern over the 

internationalization of territorial disputes; concern 

that the Taiwan issue might be brought on the table, 

hence interfering China’s internal affairs; and concern 

that China would be pressured to display greater 

military transparency. ASEAN has been instrumental 

in engaging China and sensitizing Beijing to the values 

of the so-called ASEAN Way. This process has served to 

change China’s perceptions of its interests and its policy 

choice preferences, leading to more moderate behavior 

as contrasted to its earlier assertive posture.64

Over time, through participation in various ASEANled multilateral dialogues, China has moved from its 

early suspicion and resistance to gradual acceptance 
25

and embrace of the idea of cooperative security and 

multilateralism. However, China’s interpretation 

of multilateralism is a rather limited one, in that 

it is considered to be a supplement, rather than a 

replacement of the traditional bilateral approach. It 

also has resisted the more formal institutionalization 

of the ARF, as desired by the western countries. 

Beijing’s comfort level clearly has increased with the 

understanding that ASEAN will remain in the driver’s 

seat, and the forum will not touch on issues of vital 

importance to China.65

Indeed, while ASEAN could be credited with 

socializing China to the concept of multilateralism, 

one must acknowledge that the multilateralism 

Beijing embraces remains conditional, selective, and 

largely a way to counter U.S. power politics. State 

sovereignty is still the core of Chinese foreign policy 

and on fundamental issues such as territorial disputes 

and Taiwan, China’s positions continue to be more 

realpolitik than receptive of multilateralism. What 

China pursues remains a notion of multipolarity, in 

which it will be recognized as an important actor. For 

ASEAN, this remains an issue to be reckoned with, but 

for the time being at least, Beijing is trying to reassure 

its southeastern neighbors.66

The 1997 financial crisis significantly weakened 

ASEAN’s position. However, continued uncertainty in 

Sino-U.S. relations and their perceived competition for 

influence and primacy in Asia have given ASEAN some 

leverage, in so far as China’s diplomacy is concerned. 

This has enabled the organization to remain in the 

driver’s seat in regional security arrangements such as 

the ARF. At the same time, ASEAN also is reluctant to 

join U.S.-led military alliances due to ethnic sensitivity, 

as Southeast Asia is home to a large Islamic population. 
26

At a time when Beijing’s relations with Tokyo also 

are experiencing difficulties, the value for Beijing of a 

better relationship with ASEAN has increased steadily. 

Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, the two 

sides moved to develop a number of institutionalized 

mechanisms to deepen bilateral relations, including the 

ASEAN+1, among others.67 In 2003, China and ASEAN 

signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership 

for Peace and Prosperity.

The Hedging Strategy.

International Relations theories long have debated 

the policy options of states facing an emerging power 

or hegemon. They invariably would either choose 

to balance (internally and/or externally) against the 

dominant power or bandwagon with that power. The 

latter is dirvided further into bandwagoning because of 

fear or bandwagoning for profits. In recent discussions, 

a new concept of hedging has emerged as yet another 

policy option for states facing uncertain international 

security environments.68 Denny Roy has further 

characterized the ASEAN strategy of hedging as “lowintensity balancing” that both seeks U.S. support and 

works with China. They encourage the United States to 

maintain a military presence in the region and provide 

support and base access but decline to form formal 

military alliances with Washington.69

In Southeast Asia, hedging has been a particularly 

useful strategy for the region’s small powers to 

maneuver among major powers to secure their interests. 

According to Robert Ross, the continental ASEAN and 

maritime ASEAN member states would have different 

attitudes toward China.70 The new ASEAN, which 

consists of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, 
27

for instance, has special relationships with China due 

to history, geographical proximity, as well as unsettled 

issues.71 Wherever possible, ASEAN member states try 

not to be forced to choose sides, but opt for developing 

and maintaining good working relationships with as 

many major powers as possible.72 They all recognize 

the inevitability of China’s rise and see in it both 

opportunities and challenges. In a certain way, ASEAN 

states realize that they cannot by themselves form an 

effective alliance to check China’s rise; but neither do 

they want to ally themselves with external powers 

such as the United States for fear of provoking China. 

In addition to engagement with China, they therefore 

also seek to persuade the United States to stay engaged 

in the region to balance China’s rise and to develop a 

network involving all major regional powers so they 

have stakes in regional order.73

As pointed out above, since the end of the Cold 

War, ASEAN has pursued a dual-strategy of retaining 

U.S. security involvement in the region, including a 

military presence, and engaging China in diplomaticpolitical terms and expanding economic ties. While all 

member states recognize the importance of continued 

U.S. security involvement in the region, they also are 

concerned with Washington’s penchant for unilateral 

use of force, in particular after the September 11, 2001 

(9/11), terrorist attacks on the United States. Regarding 

China, ASEAN members have tried to refrain from 

identifying China as a threat; rather they talk about 

challenges and concerns, and their chosen strategy 

remains that of engagement rather than isolation, 

let alone containment. However, ASEAN also has 

reservations and appears uncertain about what a 

rising China will mean for them. If one could argue 

that ideology, overseas Chinese living in Southeast 
28

Asia, economic competition, and territorial disputes 

are the four key elements that could affect ChinaASEAN relations, then it is clear that the first two, by 

and large, have been addressed, with the latter two 

constituting the remaining major challenges. But even 

here, the implications may be different for ASEAN 

member states; the more developed may see less of 

economic competition in a rising China but more 

opportunities; countries that have territorial disputes 

with China may view Beijing’s policies and activities 

more suspiciously. This may explain why ASEAN 

member states have adopted different approaches, and 

applied the hedging strategies with varying degrees, 

in their handling of China. For instance, some look for 

closer U.S. ties, while others seek greater engagement 

with China; still others, living in China’s shadow, are 

making the best of their situations.74

Although China has developed extensive ties with 

ASEAN on political and economic fronts, Beijing 

also has maintained close relationships with specific 

member states, which remain essential in China’s 

regional diplomacy, especially where territorial 

disputes are concerned. At the same time, it should also 

be understood that ASEAN itself has yet to develop 

its own identity apart from agreements on general 

principles and processes. Each member state has 

unique historical experiences dealing with China, with 

varying threat perceptions regarding China’s rise, and 

has adopted different strategies in its respective China 

policy.75 ASEAN countries’ threat perceptions of China 

vary depending on history, geography, and the extent 

and nature of unresolved disputes.
29

Malaysia.

Malaysia established diplomatic relations with 

China in 1974. However, for a long time before 

and since normalization, Kuala Lumpur harbored 

serious misgivings about Chinese threats in the form 

of Beijing’s support of (or refusal to sever ties with) 

the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) and the 

insurgence movement. Indeed, during the early years 

of the Mahathir administration, Malaysian officials 

often warned against Beijing’s “dangerous ambitions 

. . . in the region” and the growing military threat to 

Malaysia’s interests.76

However, with the end of the Cold War and the 

initial uncertainty over long-term U.S. commitment 

to the region, Malaysia began to adopt a policy of 

engagement with China to mitigate any negative 

impact. Abdullah Badawi, then Malaysian Foreign 

Minister in the 1990s, made this observation on the 

importance of engaging China:

Close relations and cooperation between Malaysia and 

China would alleviate any attempt by China to resort to 

military action because that would also be detrimental to 

China. . . . If there is no cooperation, there is a possibility 

China may resort to military action (against Malaysia) 

or cause a conflict here because it will not lose anything. 

We want to create a choice (for China).77

In fact, the end of the Cold War has opened up 

opportunities for improving Sino-Malaysian relations. 

Malaysia made a dramatic turn in its stance on China, 

shifting from the earlier suspicions and warning to 

a more accommodative, if not apologetic, tone of 

praising mutual confidence and trust and dispelling 

rhetoric about the so-called China threat. Indeed, 
30

Prime Minister Mahathir had become the most vocal 

defender of China, from security issues to human 

rights. Beijing and Kuala Lumpur have found mutual 

interests in defending the principles of sovereignty, 

noninterference in domestic affairs, aversion to 

Western/U.S. dominance in international affairs, and 

hence the need to develop a fairer and more equitable 

international political and economic order.78 Bilateral 

relations have been strengthened through regular visits 

by top leaders and high-ranking officials and such 

bilateral initiatives as the Malaysia-China Friendship 

Society, the Bilateral Meeting between Foreign Officials 

of Malaysia and China, and the Beijing Dialogue on 

Malaysia and China Partnership aimed at further 

strengthening mutual understanding and mutual 

benefits.79

The area that has seen the most dramatic 

development of ties is bilateral trade, which grew 

from $910 million in 1988 to over $18 billion in 2003, 

and $18.7 billion in 2004, making Malaysia one of 

ASEAN’s largest trading partners with China, rivaling 

Singapore.80 During the first 9 months in 2005, bilateral 

trade was at $16.2 billion. Malaysian Prime Minister 

Abdullah Badawi told the visiting Chinese Premier 

Wen Jiabao in December 2005 after the first East Asian 

Summit that bilateral trade could reach $50 billion by 

2010.81

Even in areas such as territorial disputes, as both 

China and Malaysia lay claims to the Spratly Islands 

in the South China Sea, Kuala Lumpur tends to view 

Chinese assertiveness as more targeted at Vietnam 

and less at Malaysia. This being the case, Malaysia on 

occasion has adopted a rather non-ASEAN stance on 

the issue of territorial disputes and even opposed the 

Philippine suggestion of adopting an ASEAN stance 
31

against China. Indeed, at both Track I and Track 

II forums, Malaysian officials and representatives 

reportedly have foiled attempts to make the South 

China Sea issue a multilateral one and instead preferred 

bilateral discussion and resolutions. Malaysian Foreign 

Minister Syed Hamid Albar once even rejected a 

Philippine request to discuss the issue at the ASEAN 

Regional Forum.82 It also was Malaysia that effectively 

proposed the adoption of a political declaration rather 

than a more constraining code of conduct with regard 

to the South China Sea territorial disputes, hence 

winning Chinese acceptance and subsequently paving 

the way for Beijing to also accede to the ASEAN Treaty 

of Amity and Cooperation at the Phnom Penh Summit 

in November 2002, the first major power to do so.83

However, Kuala Lumpur hedges its China policy 

with its continued pursuit of ties with Washington, 

despite the occasional public rhetoric expressing 

differences of opinion. Indeed, Malaysian-U.S. military 

cooperation forms an important component of bilateral 

relations, even though Kuala Lumpur declined a U.S.-

Japan proposal for the joint patrol of the Strait of 

Malacca. During his recent visit to Japan, Malaysian 

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi tried to allay concerns 

that efforts at developing closer regional integration 

such the East Asia Summit held in December 2005 

are aimed at excluding U.S. participation. Badawi 

acknowledged U.S. interests and engagement in the 

region through multiple channels.84 At the same time, 

Malaysia, while initially cool toward a 2004 Chinese 

proposal for a joint undertaking to maintain security 

in the Strait of Malacca, did later welcome Beijing’s 

role in this regard in a joint communiqué issued after 

the China-Malaysia summit in December 2005.85 Kuala 

Lumpur and Beijing also signed a memorandum of 

understanding on maritime cooperation in August 

2006. 
32

Vietnam.

China and Vietnam have had a checkered 

relationship over the last 5 decades. Between the 1950s 

and 1970s, Beijing was a strong supporter of Hanoi’s 

anti-French and anti-American causes, both providing 

significant amounts of materials (RMB ¥20 billion) and 

sending over 320,000 PLA air defense and engineering 

corps troops to the North. For years, Beijing and Hanoi 

touted the so-called Sino-Vietnamese relationship 

sealed in blood, camaraderie plus brotherhood. 

Ho Chi Minh himself visited China no less than 30 

times between 1949 and 1969, the year when he died. 

Beginning in the late 1970s, relations began to sour, in 

large part driven by the two erstwhile allies’ different 

perspectives on how Indochina should be run. China 

considered Vietnam’s assertiveness as part of the 

Soviet Union’s southern strategy as well as Hanoi’s 

own aspiration for regional hegemony. A spat between 

the two was soon followed by Vietnam’s expelling 

of hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents and 

Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia to unseat the 

Khmer Rouge regime in a direct challenge to Chinese 

interests. In early 1979, China launched an all-out 

military attack against Vietnam to teach the former 

client state “a lesson.” The military clashes dragged on 

for years, causing tremendous damage to both sides. 

It was not until the early 1990s that the two countries 

normalized relations. The September 1990 Chengdu 

meeting, where top Chinese and Vietnamese leaders 

reached agreement on rapprochement, paved the way 

for bilateral normalization. The 1991 Paris settlement 

of the Cambodian issue further removed an obstacle to 

the normalization process.86

Bilateral ties have improved over the last decade. 

In recent years, the two countries have exchanged 
33

high-level visits between top party and state leaders. 

Bilateral trade also flourished, growing from U.S.$32 

million in 1991, to $3.6 billion in 2002, and continued 

to grow, registering a record of $8.2 billion in 2005.87 To 

facilitate border trade, the two sides also made great 

efforts in demining the areas. However, territorial 

disputes continue to cloud over the relationship. In 1988, 

the two countries clashed over the Spratlys, resulting 

in over 70 Vietnamese killed.88 Beginning in 1992, the 

two countries engaged in extensive discussions and 

negotiation over land and maritime boundaries. On 

December 30, 1999, a land border treaty was signed. 

On December 25, 2000, the two sides signed the 

Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, 

Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in 

the Beibu Gulf (hereinafter referred to as the Boundary 

Agreement), and the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation 

in the Beibu Gulf (hereinafter referred to as the Fishery 

Agreement).89 Although a protocol to the agreement 

of fishery cooperation was signed in December 2000, 

failure to define boundaries in the so-called Common 

Fishery Zone clearly has led to occasional clashes 

between the two, resulting in casualties. A shooting 

incident took place in January 2005, leading to the 

death of eight Vietnamese fishermen.90

Hanoi has sought to use its membership in ASEAN 

to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis China. 

While to some extent, it has been able to apply 

multilateral pressure in dealing with China, it has not 

been able to rely completely on ASEAN and expect 

that ASEAN would always come to its assistance, since 

there are overlapping claims in territorial disputes 

even among member states and as ASEAN’s own 

positions on the issue have undergone changes over 

the years.91 This reality has compelled Hanoi to try to 
34

balance its relationships with both the United States 

and China. U.S.-Vietnam military ties have grown in 

the last few years. But Hanoi’s strategic calculation 

remains anchored on how to balance between the two 

major powers without becoming overly dependent 

on either. If Vietnam has learned anything at all in its 

experiences in dealing with major powers, including 

France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and 

China today, that lesson is if it ever gets embroiled 

in a major-power conflict as a junior, the assistance 

it expects rarely comes through.92 Chinese analysts 

suggest that Vietnam will continue to deepen ties with 

Washington as the United States remains the source 

of economic assistance, investment, and markets. For 

instance, American companies such as Nike are setting 

up manufacturing in Vietnam. On the other hand, as 

a close neighbor, China also is important to Vietnam, 

not least because Chinese experiences in reform and 

opening up, while maintaining a socialist system, 

provide valuable lessons for Hanoi as it embarks on its 

own reform path.93

Singapore.

Singapore practices a classic hedging strategy. The 

city-state both seeks greater opportunities in China 

and remains the strongest U.S. quasi-ally in the region, 

offering to host the American naval logistics command 

center (WESTPAC LOGCOM) and providing naval 

facilities (the Changi Naval Base) for the U.S. Navy. 

On the one hand, Singapore has developed extensive 

contacts and expanded ties with China on security, 

economic, and political issues. On the other, Singapore 

also is modernizing its military forces, and has 

systematically built up its security relationship with the 
35

United States. Indeed, Singapore has demonstrated a 

marked preference for a continued U.S. presence in the 

region to provide security guarantees.94 In a speech in 

Washington, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong stated:

The U.S. involvement has had a profound impact on the 

history of East Asia’s development. America maintained 

an “open-door” to China, twice transformed Japan, 

and spilt blood to hold the line against aggression and 

communism. The U.S. constructed the post-World War 

II international order that allowed East Asia to flourish. 

American victory in the Cold War and its technology 

driving the new economy are continued influences. In 

the strategic sense, therefore, the U.S. is very much a part 

of East Asia. It has been, and still is, a positive force for 

stability and prosperity.95

Singapore has maintained a rather stable 

relationship with China since the establishment of 

diplomatic relations between the two in October 

1990.96 Ever conscious of its own ethnic make-up and 

always careful of not being seen as too China-leaning, 

Singapore nonetheless has assisted China in industrial 

development, governance, and development of an 

efficient bureaucracy. It also has sought to act as a gobetween in cross-Strait relations. Senior statesman Lee 

Kuan Yew has shuttled between Beijing and Taipei 

to facilitate cross-Strait contacts between Mainland 

China and Taiwan, sometimes offering Singapore as 

the neutral ground for dialogue. For instance, the first 

ever semi-official meeting between Beijing and Taipei 

was held in Singapore in 1993. However, Singapore’s 

self-assigned role has been under increasing stress in 

recent years, not so much because Beijing does not 

appreciate the effort but more out of concern that Taipei, 

and in particular the Chen Shui-bian administration, 

will take advantage of any semblance of official 
36

contacts between Taiwan and the Southeast Asian 

governments to boost its independence drives. Indeed, 

Singapore’s relationship with China took a dive when 

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited Taiwan before 

assuming his current position. Beijing was so upset 

that it strongly rebuffed Lee until the latter reaffirmed 

the “One China” policy.97

The two countries have developed and maintained 

a robust bilateral relationship, especially in the 

economic arena. Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee 

Hsien Loong, during his October 2005 visit to China, 

described the rise of China as the “single biggest event 

of our age.”98 The two countries enjoy booming trade, 

reaching $33.15 billion in 2005, a 25.78 percent jump 

over the previous year. Investment, including that in 

the banking and service sector, also is growing.99 At 

the same time, defense officials of the two countries 

also are seeking to foster closer military ties, although 

discussions so far have remained largely in principle 

and rhetorical in nature.100 Specific programs and 

activities such as functional-level exchanges, port calls, 

and joint military search and rescue operations, have 

yet to be developed. And there remains the Taiwan 

issue.

In fact, the China-Singapore tussle over the Taiwan 

issue may not be over. Singapore’s military continues to 

undertake training in Taiwan (Operation STARLIGHT) 

and retains extensive military ties with Taipei. China 

has offered Singapore its Hainan Island as the training 

ground for Singapore, but the latter has declined, 

given the sensitivity the city state always has over its 

ethnic makeup and how too cozy a relationship with 

the mainland could stir apprehension in its Southeast 

Asian neighbors. Recent reports suggest that the 

Singaporean and Taiwanese militaries were involved 

in joint military exercises.101
37

Myanmar.

China and Myanmar have had a long history of a 

relatively close relationship since the two countries 

established diplomatic relations in June 1950. The two 

countries soon resolved their boundary issue and jointly 

endorsed the five principles of peaceful coexistence. 

The late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai maintained close 

personal ties with Burma’s leaders (Zhou visited Burma 

nine times).102 Beijing’s current close ties with Rangoon 

began in the early 1990s as the military junta was 

shunned by the international community in the wake 

of its ruthless suppression of the country’s democratic 

movement. Beijing provided up to U.S.$1.4 billion in 

conventional weapons to the State Law and Order 

Restoration Council (SLORC). The package included 

ground-based radars, anti-aircraft guns, small arms, 

24 F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, 100 T-69 II main battle 

tanks, 100 T-63 light tanks, 150 T-85 armored personnel 

carriers, 144 air-to-air missiles, and four patrol boats.103

In addition, China also reportedly was helping Burma 

build a naval base on Hainggyi Island as well as setting 

up intelligence gathering posts on the Coco Islands. 

Presumably China may be expected to have access 

to these naval facilities and thus will have projected 

power capabilities into the Indian Sea.104 China also 

sees the importance of Myanmar as providing greater 

access to the Indian Ocean and through to the oil rich 

Middle East. While China’s intentions might be to 

revitalize the wartime Burma Road and hence facilitate 

the country’s southwestern region’s (Develop the West) 

economic interactions with South Asian countries,105 its 

influence is bound to increase as China extends its reach 

through the newly developed road networks to South 

and Central Asia.106 New Delhi regards this as Beijing’s 
38

intrusion into its traditional sphere of influence. Indeed, 

there are suggestions that the reason for India to cozy 

up relations with Vietnam and ASEAN, and even with 

Myanmar, was to counter Beijing’s growing influence in 

the region.107

The China-Myanmar relationship goes beyond 

arms sales and military assistance. From ASEAN’s 

perspective, Beijing’s policy of noninterference in 

Myanmar’s internal affairs is frustrating efforts to 

pressure Rangoon for change, which was the rationale 

in 1997 for accepting Myanmar into the organization. 

At the 2005 ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, Li 

Zhaoxing, the Chinese Foreign Minister, cut short 

his attendance to visit Myanmar instead, after 

the country received the strongest rebuke by the 

organization, a major sign of departure from its 

traditional noninterference position.108 From Beijing’s 

perspective, noninterference as a principle aside, the 

Chinese government values stability in Myanmar over 

democratic processes, which could result in a period of 

uncertainty in that country and, worse still, large-scale 

unrest that could harm Chinese interests.109

While Beijing maintains an amicable relationship 

with Rangoon, Myanmar’s junta also has been seeking 

to broaden its external relationship so as not to rely 

solely on China.110 Indeed, over the last few years, India 

has been making great efforts in courting Myanmar 

after years of policies of isolating the military regime. 

Some analysts suggest that China and India are now 

competing for influence over Myanmar, even though 

Beijing may retain the lead in a wide range of areas. In 

October 2004, pro-Beijing Prime Minister Khin Nyunt 

was fired, followed by Myanmar’s top leader General 

Than Shwe’s visit to India. There was much media 

speculation that Beijing was losing ground. However, 

analysts point out that may not be the case, as China’s 
39

influence remains deeply trenched, as are the middle 

kingdom’s strategic interests in the region.111 During 

a 2004 visit to Myanmar, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi 

pledged expanding bilateral trade from the current 

level of $1 billion to $1.5 billion in 2005. There have 

been proposals to build a pipeline running through 

Myanmar to connect Kunming, therefore providing 

China’s southwestern region a more direct access to 

Middle Eastern oil.112

Philippines.

The Philippines is confronted directly with the 

territorial dispute with China. After the Mischief Reef 

incident, Manila sought support from ASEAN, which 

expressed its concern and urged Beijing to abide by the 

1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea.113 The 

two countries subsequently signed a code of conduct 

to ease tension and seek maritime cooperation. While 

Manila continues to complain of Chinese violation of 

the code, by and large the two countries have kept 

their dispute under control.114

The Philippines signed a Visiting Forces Agreement 

with the United States in 1999 and requested that 

Washington provide military assistance. The Arroyo 

government also has been quite forthcoming in 

supporting the U.S. global war on terrorism, with the 

Bush administration expressing its appreciation by 

identifying the Philippines as a major non-NATO ally. 

Military assistance increased from $1.9 million in 2001 

to over $400 million in 2004. Manila also has allowed 

U.S. Special Forces troops to be sent to advise the 

Philippine military in its fight against the Abu Sayaaf 

group.115

When Chinese NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo visited 
40

the Philippines in September 2003, he proposed that 

the two countries jointly explore for oil in the South 

China Sea. Beijing and Manila have strengthened their 

economic ties over the last few years, with bilateral 

trade reaching $13.3 billion in 2004, up further to 

$17.5 billion in 2005. Bilateral trade may well reach 

$20 billion in the next few years. During Chinese 

President Hu Jintao’s visit to Manila in April 2005, 

the two governments signed 14 trade and investment 

agreements and targeted annual bilateral trade of $30 

billion by 2010. Other bilateral economic cooperation 

included agreement on a $400 million railway 

project.116

Indonesia.

As the largest member state and an initial leader 

of ASEAN, Indonesia has had a complex relationship 

with China. In the 1950s, Jakarta and Beijing forged 

close ties in promoting Asian-African emergence 

and solidarity, via the famous Bandung Conference 

of 1955, at which the Five Principles of Peaceful 

Coexistence were promulgated. However, bilateral 

relations entered a period of stagnation and hostility 

after the failed 1965 coup and the subsequent purge 

and prosecution of members of the Indonesian 

Communist Party and large-scale prosecution of the 

ethnic Chinese. Over 500,000 Chinese reportedly were 

killed. The two countries severed diplomatic relations, 

and it was not until 1990 that diplomatic ties were 

restored when Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 

and his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding on the Resumption of 

Diplomatic Relations between Indonesia and China.

Growth in bilateral trade represents the most 
41

significant achievement since Jakarta and Beijing 

mended fences in 1990. China now ranks as the fifth 

largest trading partner of Indonesia, which in turn ranks 

as China’s 17th. In 2005, bilateral trade totaled $16.7 

billion. The two countries are seeking to forge closer 

economic relations and increase bilateral trade to $20 

billion in the next few years. In 2002, a Memorandum 

of Understanding (MOU) was signed that set up the 

Indonesia-China Energy Forum. The Chinese national 

oil company has invested in Indonesia’s energy sector, 

while the latter won a contract to supply liquid natural 

gas to China’s Fujian Province. In April 2005, China 

and Indonesia signed an agreement of “strategic 

partnership” when Chinese President Hu Jintao 

visited Jakarta after observing the 50th anniversary 

of the Bandung Conference. During Hu’s visit, the 

Chinese side pledged $300 million in preferential 

loans, promised to facilitate a $10 billion investment in 

Indonesia’s private sectors, and expanded cooperation 

in joint efforts to combat smuggling and maritime 

piracy.117

While bilateral relations are stable and have 

continued to grow in recent years, problems remain. 

One is the Taiwan issue. The other relates to Jakarta’s 

concern over Beijing’s long-term intentions in the 

region. Yet a third is the potential conflict over 

exclusive economic rights in the South China Sea, 

where overlapping claims over areas with identified 

natural gas deposits could lead to conflict. Indonesia 

has maintained close economic ties with Taiwan, even 

after Jakarta and Beijing officially restored diplomatic 

ties. In 2000, bilateral trade amounted to $4.7 billion. 

Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui made a historical visit 

to Indonesia in 1994, even though the visit was termed 

private. Many high-ranking Indonesian officials, 
42

including cabinet members, continue to visit Taiwan. 

Indeed, Taipei has targeted Indonesia in its southward 

policy and “golf diplomacy,” or “tourist diplomacy,” 

which clearly irritates Beijing.118

Analysts suggest that, despite improvement in 

bilateral relations, elite perceptions in Indonesia remain 

suspicious of China’s long-term intentions. Jakarta 

also remains vigilant for signs of potential Chinese 

encroachment on what it considers as its oil and 

natural gas fields near the Natuna Islands.119 Indonesia 

continues to look to the United States for future military 

assistance, including the lifting of the arms embargo 

currently in place. The Bush administration has 

partially lifted the sanctions by allowing the provision 

of spare parts for Indonesian military transport planes 

in the post-tsunami relief operations. In addition, 

Washington has restored the International Military 

Education Training (IMET) program for Indonesia.120

Thailand.

Of all the ASEAN member states, Thailand 

maintains the most cordial relationship with China, 

matched perhaps with only that between China and 

Malaysia. Bangkok recognized Beijing in 1975, and 

in the 1980s formed a close alignment with China in 

their common objectives of seeking to oust Vietnam’s 

occupation of Cambodia. China began to provide arms 

to Thailand, including 500 T-69 tanks, some 1,160 T-531 

armored personnel carriers (APCs), and Jianghu-class 

frigates. Beijing also made “friendship”-priced offers 

to Bangkok for the transfer of anti-aircraft missiles, 

diesel-electric Romeo-class submarines, and F-7 fighter 

jets. In 1989-90, it transferred 200 T-69 main battle 

tanks (MBTs) to Thailand and in 1991, began delivery 
43

of the four 1,800-ton Jianghu-class frigates ordered by 

the Royal Thai Navy.121 Chinese arms sales to Thailand 

during this period represented an important aspect 

of this special relationship. Unlike some of the other 

ASEAN member states, Thailand does not have any 

territorial disputes with China, and most of the ethnic 

Chinese in the country are well-integrated into Thai 

society.

Relations continued to grow with the end of the 

Cold War and after the Cambodian settlement. This 

is particularly the case in bilateral trade, which grew 

from $24.6 million when the two countries established 

diplomatic ties in 1975 to $15 billion in 2004, with 

China now becoming the third largest trading partner 

of Thailand after Japan and the United States. Bilateral 

trade reached close to $22 billion in 2005, 5 years 

ahead of the originally set target.122 China contributed 

$1 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 

for rescue efforts during the 1997 financial crisis and 

extends the Early Harvest Program to Thailand in 

the China-Thailand Free Trade Agreement, where 

Thai agricultural produce is given preferential tariff 

treatment.123

The two countries also have formed strong political 

ties, signing a Joint Statement on a Plan of Action for 

the 21st century in February 1999. Thai Prime Minister 

Thaksin Shinawatra visited China eight times between 

2001 and 2005. All top Chinese leaders, including 

President Hu Jintao, also have made visits to Thailand. 

Bangkok adheres firmly to the One China principle 

and has carefully handled issues sensitive to Beijing. 

For instance, the Thai government has denied entry 

into the country by the Dalai Lama and has expelled 

members of the Falungong. Thailand has managed its 

relationship with China skillfully despite its alliance 

with the United States. 
44

In sum, due to historical and geo-strategic reasons, 

the seven ASEAN member states listed above have 

adopted various approaches in their dealing with 

China. While none has chosen confrontation with 

China, some, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, 

and Vietnam, obviously have the greatest concerns 

over China’s growing military and economic power 

since all three have had conflicts with China in the 

past and continue to have territorial disputes. But 

they have sought to face these challenges through a 

combination of alignments with external powers and 

bilateral negotiations with Beijing to arrive at mutually 

acceptable codes of conduct to restrain China’s use of 

force, while at the same time pushing for expanded 

ties in the economic field.

At the other end of the spectrum are countries such 

as Thailand and Myanmar, both of which maintain 

cordial relationships with China, although for different 

reasons. Bangkok’s ties with Beijing have been longstanding, and the absence of territorial disputes and the 

better integration of Chinese in Thailand have helped 

the two countries to focus on areas of mutual interest 

and gain—bilateral trade and investment. While small 

agricultural businesses in Thailand do face competition 

from China, the current Early Harvest Program at least 

provides some time—albeit rather short—for the Thai 

agricultural sector to make the adjustment. Beijing’s 

comfort level with Bangkok allows it to be rather tolerant 

of Thailand’s close military ties with the United States, 

including frequent joint military exercises. Myanmar, 

on the other hand, has developed a close relationship 

with China over the past decade out of necessity as 

the military regime in Rangoon seeks to hold on to 

power and maintain domestic order. In the face of 

international condemnation and isolation, Beijing’s 
45

assistance and moral support provide the necessary 

breathing space for the government. However, that 

does not mean that Rangoon is not concerned over its 

overwhelming dependence on China’s good will and 

pocket book, nor is it blind to the growing Chinese 

influence in the country, especially in the Northeastern 

areas bordering Yunnan Province. For that reason, 

Myanmar’s authority also has turned to other external 

powers to reduce its dependence on China. This 

explains Rangoon’s turn to New Delhi and the purge 

of the pro-China faction in the government.

Singapore and Malaysia stand in between the 

cordial and suspicious in their relationships with 

China. Territorial disputes do not constitute a major 

schism in bilateral relations. Both have played an active 

role in promoting engagement with China, although 

Singapore maintains extensive security ties with the 

United States. Malaysia, on the other hand, has found 

an ideological bedfellow in China in that both share 

such Asian values as sovereignty, noninterference 

in internal affairs, and moreover, a vision of greater 

East Asian community wherein Asian powers play a 

dominant role. 

CHINA EYES ASEAN: 

A RISING POWER CENTER?

Beijing did not take too seriously ASEAN’s growing 

role initially. Instead, it anticipated a greater role for 

the UN Security Council and a multipolar world when 

the Cold War ended. Within the Asian context, China 

saw the United States, Russia, Japan, and itself as the 

critical players, but not ASEAN, as it was deemed 

largely a subregional grouping with an inward-looking 

orientation. That began to change in the mid-1990s as 
46

Beijing both recognized and indeed appreciated the 

role that ASEAN could play. This became even more 

apparent with the expansion of the original ASEAN-6 

to the Greater ASEAN of Ten by the decade’s end.

Chinese analysts have characterized ASEAN’s 

evolving regional role as evolving in four phases.124 In 

the first phase, which began in the late 1970s largely 

in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia 

(and hence a direct threat to Thailand’s security), 

the organization’s major efforts were expended on 

seeking a peaceful solution of the Cambodian issue by 

engaging extra-regional powers. The Paris Agreement, 

to which ASEAN made a significant contribution, gave 

the organization a high profile in the international 

diplomatic arena and provided it with greater interest 

and the confidence to participate in and influence 

Southeast Asian affairs.

The second phase began in the early 1990s and 

focused mostly on ASEAN’s effort to engage major 

powers in the development of a regional security 

dialogue that aimed at both socializing China to the 

benefit of multilateralism and cooperative security and 

keeping the other major powers engaged in the region’s 

security to prevent the emergence of a power vacuum 

and hence invitation for competition. Through the PostMinisterial Meetings, dialogues, and the establishment 

of the ARF, the group succeeded in bringing all major 

powers under the framework of a security dialogue 

that was subject to the ASEAN Way of gradualism, 

consensus-building, and nonuse of force in dispute 

settlement.

The third phase was characterized by ASEAN’s 

continuing pursuit of multichannel, multilevel security 

dialogues that involved the Asia-Europe meeting 

(ASEM), ASEAN+1 and 3, and the organization’s own 
47

plan toward greater integration, including the ASEAN 

FTA. The current phase involves ASEAN’s efforts to 

move beyond Southeast Asia to launch a region-wide 

political forum that would include all major East Asian 

powers. Initially the brain-child of Malaysian Prime 

Minister Mahathir, the East Asia Summit was formally 

held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, but with the 

participation of Australia, India, and New Zealand, 

in addition to the originally conceived participating 

countries.

Over the years, ASEAN has debated, explored, and 

developed various strategies of dealing with major 

powers. These strategies have been applied during 

different periods, depending on specific security 

circumstances of the time. Essentially, three approaches 

have been especially emphasized. One is the NonAligned Movement (NAM) approach promoted by 

Indonesia. This would be an effort to exclude major 

power interference in ASEAN’s internal affairs. At the 

same time, it would sustain Jakarta’s position within 

the organization. The second approach is favored by 

Malaysia, which advocates neutrality in two ways. 

One is noninterference and nonaggression in interstate 

relations to avoid being involved in great power 

conflicts; the other is to secure major powers’ pledges not 

to intervene in Southeast Asian affairs, hence allowing 

the region to maintain autonomy and neutrality. The 

third is balancing, promoted by Singapore, between 

great powers. Singapore recognizes that major powers 

all have important interests in the region, therefore it 

is unrealistic to exclude their involvement. But efforts 

can be made to prevent one particular power from 

dominating the entire region.125

The ASEAN Way of informality and noninterference 

in domestic affairs has served as the guiding principle 
48

in its approach to regional affairs. While this approach 

has served the organization well and provided a 

comfort level for member states to interact with each 

other without having to accept binding decisions, it 

is now facing increasing challenges. The tendency to 

hold meetings, talk, and sign documents but to be slow 

in implementation has begun to constrain ASEAN’s 

ability to address real issues.126

Beijing increasingly has viewed ASEAN as an 

important power center in Asia. This is largely due 

to ASEAN’s skillful diplomacy of balancing all the 

major powers, hence enhancing its own leverage. 

This is possible because major powers essentially 

have balanced out one another, with no one able to 

dominate. Finally, ASEAN itself since 1997 has sought 

to consolidate and achieve economic integration 

(ASEAN Economic Community) by 2015, with security 

and social community to follow. It hosted the first 

East Asia Summit in December 2005, and has over 

the years developed various ASEAN+1/3 meetings, 

with the ASEM playing a facilitating role in promoting 

regionalism.127

At the same time, it should also be noted that ASEAN 

still harbors some suspicions toward China and likely 

will continue to resort to strategies of hedging or 

balancing through expanded ties with other external 

powers. In recent years, ASEAN member states have 

expanded their military cooperation greatly with the 

United States. Japan has been very active in regaining 

its influence in Southeast Asia and has offered a large 

economic aid package to the region. India also is actively 

engaging with ASEAN on greater economic, political, 

and military contacts.128 Finally, the East Asia Summit, 

originally billed as an exclusive regional event, had its 

inaugural meeting attended by Australia, India, and 
49

New Zealand, in addition to the ASEAN+3 countries. 

While a realpolitik assessment of these developments 

would alarm Beijing, as extra-regional forces would 

dilute China’s own influence, Chinese officials and 

analysts seem not to be bothered by ASEAN’s efforts 

to knit complex and overlapping arrangements and 

relationships with itself as the coordinating core. Indeed, 

a major Chinese report on ASEAN recommended that 

Beijing respect ASEAN’s position, including some 

member states’ growing military ties with the United 

States; acknowledge and respect that the United States 

has legitimate interests in the region; and actually 

encourage better ASEAN-U.S. cooperation, especially 

in the context of fighting terrorism. In that context, U.S. 

deployment of military forces, dispatching of special 

force advisors, and specific arrangements for base 

access should not be viewed as targeted at China.129

Nonetheless, Chinese analysts are monitoring 

these developments closely. The post-9/11 U.S. 

policy adjustment toward Southeast Asia could have 

a significant impact on issues of territorial disputes in 

the South China Sea, SLOCs, the cohesion of ASEAN 

as a group, and could cause domestic turmoil in some 

member states. Since 9/11, the United States has 

strengthened its military presence in the region and 

resumed and intensified joint military exercises with a 

number of ASEAN member states, ostensibly aimed at 

fighting global terrorism. Meanwhile, the U.S. position 

on territorial disputes in the South China Sea has shifted 

from neutrality and nonintervention to “positive” 

mediation, with greater emphasis on freedom of 

navigation, including escorts. What is most significant 

is a U.S. proposal for joint patrol of the Malacca Strait 

with the “Regional Maritime Security Initiative.” While 

the proposal has been turned down by the three Strait 
50

countries—Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—there 

has since been more cooperation between the United 

States and the regional militaries. For China, stable 

and uninterrupted supplies of oil through the Malacca 

Strait is critical to its economic security, and control 

by foreign powers could seriously undermine Chinese 

security interests.130

Another issue of potential concern is Taiwan’s 

activities in ASEAN countries. For various reasons, 

most of them economic, ASEAN has maintained rather 

close ties with Taipei. In fact, Taiwan has nine times the 

investment in the region than does China, and Taiwan 

was most active in the early to mid-1990s in pushing for 

more official contacts through “vacation diplomacy” 

and “golf diplomacy,” among other tactics. Lee Hsien 

Loong’s visit to Taiwan in the summer of 2004—billed 

as “private”—just before he became Singapore’s 

prime minister triggered strong reactions from China, 

including cancellation of previously scheduled 

bilateral meetings and visits by Singaporean ministers. 

Managing such incidents requires delicate diplomacy 

as much as it demands a resolute stance on an issue for 

which China has no room for negotiation.131

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

Southeast Asia has emerged as an area of increasing 

strategic interest to the United States. It straddles 

critical SLOCs, and the United States has an interest 

in maintaining freedom of navigation; it has one of 

the world’s major seaports and transit points that 

create opportunities for terrorist groups to transport 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials or 

sneak bombs to U.S. ports. In recent years, the region 

also has been the focal point of potentially deadly 
51

diseases such as Avian Flu and Pandemic Influenza. It 

contains a large Muslim population, and the region’s 

secular governments for years have had to deal with 

ethnic and religious extremist and terrorist groups. 

And it also is a vast market, as well as production base, 

for U.S. multinationals. Perceived growing Chinese 

influences have refocused Washington’s attention.132

The U.S. strategy for Asia remains that of maintaining 

its primacy and preventing the rise of a regional 

power that would challenge the U.S. position.133 And 

that power is unquestionably China. Specifically, the 

United States is highly aware of the consequences of 

Chinese domination of Southeast Asia. China’s naval 

ambitions, its territorial disputes with a number of 

Southeast Asian states, its threatened and actual use of 

force to prevent Taiwan independence, and its growing 

interest in guarding against piracy on the high seas 

mean that Beijing increasingly will seek to project its 

power, and hence could threaten SLOCs and therefore 

gravely affect U.S. interests in the region.134

Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN’s 

own ability to mediate the Sino-U.S. relationship has 

continued to depend on the nature of that relationship. 

Indeed, in a way, conflict and rivalry have provided the 

opportunity for the regional organization to continue to 

play the hedging strategy. This has allowed the smaller 

states of Southeast Asia to retain their autonomy, while 

at the same time exploring the opportunities provided 

by this geo-strategic structure. In general, Southeast 

Asians have sought to hedge against a potential 

Chinese threat in the future by aligning themselves 

with the United States in various security and military 

arrangements short of formal alliances, but continue to 

develop stable political and economic ties with China 

through engagement, exchanges, and exploration of 
52

economic opportunities. This way, they retain their 

strategic value to both great powers without either 

becoming subservient to one or having to choose 

between the two.135

Washington is seeking to reinsert itself in Southeast 

Asia’s geo-politics and to regain lost ground. Secretary 

of State Condolezza Rice made her first visit to 

Indonesia as America’s top diplomat in March 2006, 

where she sought to expand a “strategic partnership” 

with the important Southeast Asian country in an 

effort to regain U.S. influence in the region in response 

to China’s perceived inroads of the last few years.136

Indeed, since 9/11, U.S. policy has seemed to be less 

focused on winning political support in the region, but 

too much focused on the military dimension of its global 

war on terrorism. Washington’s occasional display 

of indifference to the region also helps diminish its 

influence; one example is the absence of Secretary Rice 

at the annual ARF foreign ministers’ meeting in July 

2005.137 At other times, American leaders’ moralizing 

irks Southeast Asian politicians, losing them as friends, 

if not creating enemies. 

The conventional wisdom is that ever since the 

1997 Asian financial crisis, Beijing has made significant 

gains in a region that only years before had harbored 

strong suspicion of Chinese intentions and ambitions, 

which had been amply displayed in the construction 

on the Mischief Reef in the South China Sea and the 

PLA missile exercises adjacent to Taiwan. The “China 

threat” was then a popular selling point and had a 

more receptive audience. But Beijing’s leadership 

since has modified its tactics dramatically, if not the 

essence of its policy objectives; has put forward a New 

Security Concept that appeals to and is compatible 

with the ASEAN Way of working on security issues; 
53

and has become an active participant in the region’s 

only multilateral security arrangement—the ARF—

something that it had shunned in the early 1990s, 

considering it a thinly veiled attempt by the region’s 

states to gang up against China.138

Not only has China embraced multilateralism—

with ASEAN characteristics, of course—but Beijing 

actively now has promoted its virtues as a preferred 

alternative for a regional security architecture to what 

it considers the Cold War relics, i.e., the hub-andspokes type of U.S.-led bilateral military alliances. 

Beijing also has moderated its approaches to territorial 

disputes significantly by signing a Declaration of 

Conduct in the South China Sea that commits it—in 

principle at least—to peaceful solutions of the issue. It 

also has acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation, the first major power to do so, effectively 

accepting the organization’s principles of respect for 

sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and 

the code of consensus in reaching decisions.139

However, the most important gains that China has 

struck over the past decade are the increasing economic 

ties between it and its Southeast Asian neighbors. 

Bilateral trade has been growing at 20 percent per year 

over the last decade, with China-ASEAN two-way trade 

reaching $130.4 billion in 2005. There also is growing 

economic interdependence and major initiatives such 

as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) that further 

promote economic cooperation. Even greater economic 

integration is projected with the signing of the ChinaASEAN FTA targeted at 2010-15. Analysts predict that 

by then China could well surpass the United States as 

the organization’s largest trading partner. What also is 

significant is China’s growing interest in developing 

energy cooperation with such ASEAN member states 
54

as Indonesia to secure oil and natural gas. Chinese 

companies have acquired stakes in oil and natural 

gas fields, and in 2004 Indonesian exports to China 

increased by 232 percent over the previous year.140

These are all significant achievements that greatly 

extend China’s reach and influence in the region. 

While not directly engaged in a contest with the United 

States, China does have different interests in the 

region’s development in terms of security architecture, 

economic interdependence and integration, and the 

political systems. Beijing promotes ARF and multilateral 

security dialogues as alternatives to what it considers 

as the Cold War relics—military alliances.141 China puts 

a high premium on sovereignty and noninterference 

in domestic affairs while the United States seeks to 

promote democracy and challenge the legitimacy and 

hold on power of authoritarian and repressive regimes 

such as the military junta in Myanmar.142

These differences aside, Beijing and Washington 

do not harbor open animosity, and U.S. influences are 

palpable. Indeed, the suggestion that China has made 

large gains in Southeast Asia and is wielding significant 

influence may be as misleading as it is exaggerated. 

Measured in trade, investment, and diplomacy, 

Beijing’s perceived inroads into Southeast Asia are less 

than what is usually portrayed by the media. China’s 

growing trade with the region largely is accounted for by 

intra-firm activities of the world’s largest multinational 

corporations. Chinese companies have yet to penetrate 

Southeast Asian markets. Nor is China’s investment in 

the region significant. As was noted earlier, it compares 

poorly with that by the EU, Japan, the United States, 

and even Taiwan. Chinese success in diplomacy has 

been achieved through moderation of its own stance 

rather than by imposing its will on ASEAN, hence the 

questionable influence.143
55

China’s growing political, economic, and security 

ties with ASEAN are the results of a combination of 

factors. Beijing’s post-Tiananmen diplomacy has 

focused its attention on Asia, including Southeast 

Asia, as it seeks to promote a stable regional security 

environment for its economic development. It also has 

reflected a change in its approaches to regional issues 

from confrontation and assertiveness to moderation 

and restraint in tactics without giving in on principles 

on issues it still holds dear—Taiwan, sovereignty, and 

maritime territorial integrity for economic security 

reasons. ASEAN’s own efforts at engaging China in 

ways that assured Beijing provide another impetus 

for the fostering of bilateral relationships, especially in 

the security area once Taiwan and maritime territorial 

disputes are taken off the agenda. The 1997 financial 

crisis in Asia has found ASEAN member states 

increasingly turning to China, partly as a result of their 

rejection by the United States and West-dominated 

international financial institutions. While many 

ASEAN states realize the long-term challenges of 

facing and retaining the ability to compete with China 

in manufacturing and attracting foreign investment, 

they also want to explore the opportunities that an 

expanding Chinese economy offers.

But ASEAN remains wary of China’s growing 

power and uncertain about Beijing’s future intentions. 

History, territorial disputes, and the ethnic Chinese 

issue continue to be important considerations for the 

foreign policies of some member states. They adopt the 

strategy of hedging as an insurance policy but choose 

not to alienate and alarm China by formally forming 

alliances with the United States. At the same time, 

Beijing’s influence remains limited, as is its capability 

to affect regional developments. The 2004 tsunami and 
56

the recent earthquake in Indonesia have displayed U.S. 

capacities in both the amounts of disaster relief it is able 

to provide and the speed with which it can deliver it.

If anything, the United States remains the major 

market and the source of investment and technology 

transfers for both China and ASEAN. Indeed, in 

all economic indicators, the United States remains 

unsurpassed, while China and ASEAN, respectively, 

rank fifth as each other’s major trading partners. 

Even in the politico-diplomatic arena, Washington’s 

lost ground may be more apparent than real. Indeed, 

American influence remains strong and deep-rooted, 

as are its institutional arrangements with the region 

in terms of alliances, base access, and visiting forces 

agreements. The post-9/11 security environment has 

provided the opportunity for the United States and a 

number of ASEAN member states to work out specific 

military cooperation arrangements that facilitate 

American military operations in the region in both 

supporting the global war on terrorism and positioning 

itself for future contingencies.144 Such ties are as much 

historical as the deliberate hedging strategies that 

ASEAN member states have adopted in securing their 

own vital interests in a region that is drawing growing 

attention from major powers, both because of its 

strategic location in the path of vital SLOCs and due 

to its rising importance in the global war on terrorism 

and WMD nonproliferation.145

But Washington does need to be more proactive 

and go beyond rhetoric in truly recognizing ASEAN’s 

critical place in American foreign policy. Specifically, 

it needs to change its current approach. First, it should 

treat ASEAN as an important multilateral organization 

and deemphasize its distinctly bilateral approach. This 

requires a positive attitude toward multilateralism 
57

and greater patience in accepting the ASEAN Way 

of gradualism, consensus, and nonconfrontational 

ways of settling disputes. The multilateral approach is 

applicable in equally developing and expanding U.S.-

ASEAN economic ties.146

Second, Washington should avoid a China-prism in 

its ASEAN policy. This is not, and should not be, framed 

as a zero-sum game in which Beijing’s gains must been 

seen as Washington’s loss. China itself certainly does 

not have the grand strategy of developing its own 

Monroe Doctrine in Southeast Asia. It is therefore 

particularly unhelpful, and indeed could be highly 

counterproductive, to present ASEAN member states a 

choice that they find most difficult to make. Most of all, 

it can be quite an embarrassment for Southeast Asian 

countries when American officials publicly chastise 

China on their turf.

Third, America needs to learn to apply nonmilitary, 

nonconfrontational means to address the challenges 

that the region is facing: fragile democracy, need 

for good governance and accountability, uneven 

distribution of wealth and poverty, and other social 

problems that could provide fertile grounds for ethnic 

and religious intolerance and terrorist activities. 

Indeed, U.S. responses to the tsunami disaster last year 

have won wide-spread good will in the region. On 

the other hand, too much emphasis on preemption, a 

penchant for unilateralism, and threats of force only 

heighten concerns among Southeast Asian states and 

could fan anti-American sentiments. ASEAN states’ 

shifting stances on the U.S. global war on terrorism are 

a good example.147 Most ASEAN member states, with 

the exception of Singapore and the Philippines, publicly 

oppose unilateralism and unipolarity, a clear reference 

to the United States. Perhaps a good way to start is to 
58

take a page from Beijing’s book of charm diplomacy. 

And this should be something easy to achieve and at 

relatively low costs. Washington should make better 

use of what it is supposed to do best: soft power. 

CONCLUSION

China-ASEAN relations have undergone significant 

changes over the past 15 years. Moving away from 

enmity and suspicion, bilateral ties have grown and 

strengthened in political, economic, and security areas. 

While ASEAN may still be apprehensive about China’s 

growing power and how it will use that power in the 

future relationship that ranges from the economic 

to the territorial, at least for the time being, China is 

recognized in the region as an economic opportunity, 

a political heavy weight, but not necessarily a military 

bully, even as Beijing continues to modernize its armed 

forces. 

But ASEAN states, given their place in the 

international pecking order and their strong sense of 

protecting national sovereignty and independence and 

recognizing the geo-strategic realities, have resorted to 

various stratagems of power balancing and hedging, as 

well as engagement of major powers. The United States 

remains a key power that is welcomed to continue 

playing a stabilizing and reassuring role in the region, 

but that may not be taken for granted, especially given 

the large Muslim communities and ASEAN’s political 

sensitivity to external interference in internal affairs, 

coercion and/or use of force, and unilateralism and 

blatant display of arrogance and domineering.

The United States retains strong political influence, 

economic clout, and military prowess in the region. 

Southeast Asia remains a key battleground for the 

global war on terrorism and U.S. efforts to prevent 
59

WMD proliferation. While China may have gained 

influence in Southeast Asia over the last decade, it may 

not be at America’s expense. On a number of fronts, 

closer China-ASEAN relations actually could advance 

American interests in the region. China’s agreement to 

be bound by restraint on the territorial issue lowers the 

risk of military conflicts and hence major disruption of 

key SLOCs vital to the economic security of both the 

United States and its important allies in the region, such 

as Japan, which depend on secure and stable supplies 

of raw materials and energy resources. Multilateralism 

and cooperative security also have led to gradual 

improvement in Chinese military transparency which, 

in turn, can address anxieties in the region’s capitals, 

as well as in Washington and Tokyo, about the scope 

and intensity of the PRC’s defense modernization 

programs. 

What may constitute the biggest threat to long-term 

U.S. interests lies in the economic field as China replaces 

America as ASEAN’s number one trading partner and 

as the CAFTA fully launches in the coming years and 

expands to the East Asian region to form the largest 

trading bloc in the world. But even here, the United 

States still holds some important cards—technology, 

market, and investment. But Washington’s approach 

must be strategic, comprehensive, and proactive rather 

than piecemeal, passive, and reactive. It is important 

to maintain solid bilateral relationships with its key 

allies and friends in the region, but the United States 

should also begin to recognize the value of the growing 

role and importance of ASEAN and treat the regional 

grouping as such.
60

ENDNOTES

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64

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92. Author interview, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 

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124. This is based on the author’s extensive discussions with 

Chinese analysts during his visits to Beijing in July and December 

2005, and Shanghai in August 2005, and review of the growing 

literature on ASEAN and China-ASEAN relations. See China 
73

Institute of Contemporary International Relations Project Group 

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128. Sudhir Devare, India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security 

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2006.

129. Interview, Asian Department, Chinese Ministry of Foreign 

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p. 10; Cao and Tang, New China-ASEAN Relations, Chapter 4, 

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130. Zheng Yisheng, “Cong junshi yanxi kan meiguo dongnanya 

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yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], No. 8, August 2005, pp. 

50-56; Yang Renfei, “Maliujia haixia wenti de zuixin fazhan jidui 

nanhai wenti de qishi” [“New Developments on the Malacca Straits 

and Implications for the South China Sea Issue”], Dongnanya 

zongheng [Southeast Asian Survey] No. 9, 2004, pp. 38-42, 54; Zhang 

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14.
74

132. Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison, China-Southeast 

Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States, 

CRS Report for Congress, updated April 4, 2006; Eric G. John, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, “The United States and Southeast Asia: Developments, 

Trends, and Policy Choices,” statement before the House 

International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and 

the Pacific, Washington, DC, September 21, 2005.

133. Robert Sutter, “The United States and Asia in 2005: 

Managing Troubles, Sustaining Leadership,” Asian Survey, Vol. 

XLVI, No. 1, January/February 2006, pp. 10-21.

134. Wayne Bert, The United States, China and Southeast Asian 

Security: A Changing of the Guard?, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2003; Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, C. R. Neu, The Role of 

Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2000; Joshua P. Rowan, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, 

ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” Asian Survey, Vol. 45, 

No. 3, May/June 2005, pp. 414-436.

135. Shannon Tow, “Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic 

Balance,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2004, pp. 

434-459.

136 . Steven R. Weisman, “Rice Seeks to Expand Indonesian 

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137. Simon Montlake, “Rice’s No-Show Irks Southeast Asia,” 

The Christian Science Monitor, July 26, 2005, www.csmonitor.

com/2005/0726/p06s01-wosc.html. 

138. On China’s growing influence, see David Shambaugh, ed., 

Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, Berkeley, California: 

University of California Press, 2005; Yong Deng and Fei-ling 

Wang, eds., China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign 

Policy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005; 

Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Lanham: 

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005.

139. Dana R. Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China and ASEAN: 

Endangered American Primacy in Southeast Asia,” Backgrounder,

No. 1886, October 19, 2005, Washington DC: The Heritage 

Foundation.

140. Jane Perlez, “As Rice Visits Asia, a China Subtext Looms,” 

International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2006.
75

141. Catharin E. Dalpino, “China’s Emergence in Asia and 

Implications for U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia,” statement 

before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

June 7, 2005.

142. Wayne Bert, “Burma, China and the U.S.A.,” Pacific Affairs, 

Vol. 77, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 263-282.

143. Sheng Lijun, “China’s Influence in Southeast Asia,” in 

Trends in Southeast Asia Series: 4, 2006, Singapore: Institute of 

Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.

144. “Rethinking Hub-and-Spokes? U.S. Military Relations 

with Southeast Asia,” in Dalpino and Steinberg, eds., Georgetown 

Southeast Asia Survey 2004-2005, pp. 53-63; Simon Montlake, 

“Military Ties Warm between US, Vietnam,” Christian Science 

Monitor, February 7, 2006, www.csmonitor.com/2006/0207/p07s02-

woap.html.

145. Reuters, “US, Japan to Help Malaysia Boost Strait 

Security,” February 27, 2006. 

146. Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United 

States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 

March 2004, pp. 47-69.

147. David Capie, “Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The 

‘War on Terror’ and Southeast Asian-U.S. Relations,” The Pacific 

Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 223-248; author’s discussion 

with Southeast Asian analysts, East Asian Institute, National 

University of Singapore, March 10, 2006.