U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

National Guard Plane 

Crash at Hotel Site

Evansville, Indiana

USFA-TR-064/February 1992

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA greatly appreciates the cooperation received from Chief Douglas Wilcox and members of 

the Evansville Fire Department and from Director Sherman Greer, Evansville-Vanderburgh County 

Emergency Management Agency

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the USFA Web site at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/

National Guard Plane Crash at Hotel Site

Evansville, Indiana

Investigated by: Mark Chubb

 

This is Report 064 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United 

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TAblE oF CoNTENTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

BUILDINGS AND CRASH SITE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE CRASH AND FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

EMERGENCY RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

EMS RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

COMMUNICATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

MEDIA RELATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEBRIEFING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

POST-INCIDENT CRITIQUE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

OCCUPANT RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Room 416. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Drury Inn Lobby7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

JoJo’s Restaurant8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Building Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Emergency Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Emergency Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Occupant Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Means of Egress Signs and Lighting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Appendix A: Vicinity Plan and Building Diagrams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix B: List of Responding Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Appendix C: Critical Incident Stress Briefing Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Appendix D: Evansville-Vanderburgh County Emergency Management Agency: 

Evansville Plane Crash After Action Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix E: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1

National Guard Plane Crash At Hotel Site

Evansville, Indiana

February 1992

Local Contacts: Chief Douglas Wilcox

Deputy Chief Thomas Gronotte

Investigator Jesse Storey

Investigator Roger Griffen

Evansville Fire Department

Civic Center Complex, Room 203

Evansville, Indiana 47708

(812) 426-5668

Sherman Greer, Director

Evansville-Vanderburgh County

Emergency Management Agency

City-County Complex, Room 18

Evansville, Indiana 47708

(812) 426-5603

O

At 9:53 a.m., February 6, 1992, a Kentucky Air National Guard C-130B military transport plane 

crashed at the site of a hotel and restaurant complex while performing routine pilot proficiency exercises at Evansville Dress Regional Airport. The crash and resulting fire killed all five crew members 

and 11 civilians on the ground – nine in the hotel and two in the adjacent restaurant. In addition 

to those who died at the scene, one of the emergency responders, an Evansville Police Officer, died 

February 24, as a result of injuries he sustained working at the crash site. Emergency responders 

from the City of Evansville, the Evansville Regional Airport, and police, fire, and emergency medical 

service (EMS) agencies across Vanderburgh County responded to the disaster.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY oF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Casualties 17 dead, including five aircraft crew, nine in hotel, and two in restaurant. A police 

officer died 16 days later from injuries incurred during rescue operations. 15 civilian injuries and 6 emergency responder injuries were also reported.

Building Construction Well designed, constructed, and maintained building features limited fire spread 

and loss of life.

Incident Command System (ICS) Use of the ICS throughout the operation contributed to effective command, control, 

and communication among diverse emergency and disaster response agencies 

and a smooth transition from response to recovery.

Emergency Planning and Preparedness Routine emergency planning and preparedness activities such as planning and 

exercises, augmented by regular emergency responder training facilitated coordination of structural firefighting and aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) forces, 

EMS, law enforcement, public works, coroner’s office, and military authorities.

Occupant Response Many occupants took self-protective actions. Three unrelated individuals sought 

refuge together in a room rather than evacuating the building. Some occupants 

reportedly exited, then reentered to rescue occupants trapped on upper floors.

Media and Public Relations The dissemination of information through the media was timely and effective. 

Emergency management officials took advantage of media interest in the crash 

to direct family and concerned citizens away from the scene to a citizens’ center 

where they could obtain information about those injured and killed.

Critical Incident Stress Management Civilian and military critical incident stress debriefing teams and social service 

agencies responded to manage the emotional and psychological impacts of the 

incident on responders, citizens, and family members.

A similar incident involving an Indiana Air National Guard A-7D attack aircraft occurred in October 

1987 in Indianapolis. In that incident, the aircraft struck a Ramada Inn hotel killing nine employees who were inside the building.1

 The pilot safely ejected prior to impact. Like the Indianapolis 

incident, the crash in Evansville occurred in mid-morning during a routine training mission. Both 

incidents also involved Air National Guard aircraft. However, the similarities do not end there.

In both cases, well designed, constructed, and maintained buildings minimized fire spread, structural damage, and most likely the loss of human life. Clearly, investments in built-in fire protection 

pay off, even in such unforeseen events as aircraft crashes outside the building, or literally into the 

side of the building, as was the case in Indianapolis.

In addition to the building performance, the effectiveness of emergency responders in controlling these incidents and coordinating massive response efforts demonstrated the value of training, 

planning, and preparedness. The use of ICS in each case significantly aided coordination, and in 

Evansville helped provide for a smooth transfer of authority to disaster management and later to 

military officials, which clearly expedited investigation and recovery efforts.

1 Ramada Inn Air Crash and Fire, Wayne Township, Indiana (October 20, 1987), Report 014, Major Fires Investigation Project, Technical Report Series, Emmitsburg, 

MD: Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Fire Administration. 
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 3

Table 1. Similarities in Evansville and Indianapolis Airplane/Hotel Crashes

•	 Occurred mid-morning with relatively few occupants in hotel

•	 Well constructed and maintained buildings minimized fire spread and structural damage

•	 Rapid fire and emergency service response

•	 Effective implementation and use of disaster plan

•	 Effective use of ICS

•	 Effective integration and use of mutual aid resources

•	 Effective media relations and use of media to disseminate information about the incident

Communication among emergency responders is viewed as critical at any emergency scene, but in 

both of these cases communication with the public was viewed as equally important; public information activities were an integral part of the disaster response. In Evansville, media briefings were 

used to direct family members and concerned citizens away from the accident site to a community 

center staffed by local clergy and counselors, where they could obtain information about deaths and 

injuries.

The Evansville incident provides an opportunity to study the behavior of building occupants in 

response to a highly unusual and virtually unforeseeable event and to learn how individuals coped 

with the unusual and confusing circumstances which confronted them. The factors of human 

response to fire situations are often overlooked in the development of codes, standards, and regulations that are intended to provide public safety.

B

The Drury Inn hotel and Jojo’s Restaurant were located in separate buildings which occupied a 

common parcel of land at the intersection of Lynch Road and U.S. 41 less than one mile south of 

Evansville Dress Regional Airport. A large undeveloped agricultural tract was situated east and south 

of the crash site. Diagrams of the buildings and site appear in Appendix A.

The four-story guest room portion of the hotel was completed in July 1980. The building was of 

noncombustible, Type 2 one-hour construction as classified by the Uniform Building Code, 1988 edition, 

upon which the Indiana Building Code is based. The restaurant was of unprotected Type 2 construction. In 1989, the motel was renovated and a four-story atrium lobby was added at the west end, 

separated from the guest wing by a two-hour fire wall with automatic closing fire doors.

Guest rooms were separated from the corridors and from one another by one-hour fire-resistance 

rated walls. Guest room doors were self closing twenty-minute fire rated doors in fire rated door 

frames. Where doors remained closed during the incident, they prevented the fire from spreading 

into the corridor.

The motel was protected throughout by an automatic fire alarm system. Smoke detectors and manual 

stations in the corridors initiated horn/strobe evacuation signals also located in the corridors. The 

activation of the fire alarm system caused the automatic closers to release the doors protecting the 

atrium firewall openings at the west end of the corridors.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Mechanical air handling equipment was designed to shut down upon detection of smoke in the 

supply or return air. Consequently, recirculation of smoke did not appear to be a significant problem 

during this fire.

Single station 110-volt AC-powered smoke detectors were installed in each guest room. They had 

little impact on the outcome of this incident since the first detectors activated were in the corridors, 

probably on the fourth floor.

A standpipe system was provided for both occupant and fire department use. Risers with fire department hose outlets were located in each of the three exit stairways. Occupant-use hose stations were 

provided outside the stairway enclosures. Firefighters used standpipes during the incident to battle 

the fire inside the hotel. However, initial attack lines were drawn directly from the pumpers.

Automatic sprinklers connected to the domestic water system protected designated hazardous areas, 

i.e., workshop, laundry room, and storage rooms, on the first floor. The atrium was also protected 

by a partial automatic sprinkler system. None of the sprinklers activated during this incident.

Emergency lighting and internally illuminated exit signs and were installed in the corridors to assist 

occupants in locating exits. However, dense smoke from the burning aviation fuel probably obscured 

the signs and impeded the usefulness of the emergency lighting.

THE CRASH AND FIRE

On the morning of February 6, 1992, a five member crew from the Kentucky Air National Guard’s 

123rd Tactical Airlift Wing based at Standiford Field in Louisville, Kentucky, was performing touchand-go landings at Evansville Dress Regional Airport as part of routine pilot proficiency training. The 

crew consisted of an experienced instructor pilot, two co-pilots, a flight engineer, and a loadmaster.

The type of military airplane – the Lockheed C-130-B Hercules – which crashed in Evansville on 

February 6, 1992, was renowned for its safety record and reliability. C-130 crashes are rare events. 

Historically, most aircraft crashes occur during takeoffs and landings.

At the time of the crash, one of the co-pilots was flying the aircraft under the supervision of the 

instructor pilot. According to U.S. Air Force investigators, the crash was attributed to pilot error, 

which produced an unrecoverable stall following a low level approach maneuver over the airfield. A 

stall results from insufficient airflow under the wing of an aircraft. The stall was the result of insufficient airspeed at the time a turning maneuver was executed. Without sufficient airspeed or altitude 

(approximately 1,300 feet), the crew was unable to regain control of the aircraft before it crashed.

The aircraft went down approximately one mile south of the departure end of Runway 22 at 9:53 

a.m., impacting in the courtyard behind the Drury Inn and Jojo’s Restaurant. The aircraft altitude 

and rate of descent produced a very small crash impact zone. At the time of impact, the aircraft 

was descending almost vertically at a rate of between 4,500 and 6,000 feet per minute with the 

nose elevated 4-degrees above vertical and the right wing 47-degrees below horizontal. The impact 

created a crater 8-feet deep and 12-feet across. The immense force of the impact splashed burning 

aviation fuel toward the hotel and broke windows across the center portion of that building. A large 

piece of the tail section of the aircraft landed on the rear quarter of the restaurant causing it to collapse, pinning two victims. Part of the skin of the right wing was propelled over the hotel into the 

parking lot south of the hotel and large chunks of the concrete pool deck and airplane parts landed 

on the four-story roof of the hotel.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 5

The fireball created by the crash impinged directly against the center portion of the north wall of 

the Drury Inn. Windows broken by the force of the impact and the radiant heat allowed the fireball 

to spread into several hotel rooms on all four floors. However, fire spread beyond these rooms was 

minimal in most instances because of fire-resistive construction separating the guest rooms from 

the corridors. In the few locations where the fire did extend beyond a guest room, doors had been 

left open by guests or hotel housekeepers. Fire extension in the corridors was minimal due to the 

limited fuel loading and interior finishes.

The fire was accompanied by choking black smoke produced by the burning aviation fuel. The high 

concentration of aviation fuel present in the air after the airplane broke apart made the smoke particularly dense and acrid due to incomplete combustion of the fuel.

The hotel operators believe that seventy-five to eighty people were inside the building at the time of 

the fire. This number included 11 employees of a local plumbing supply company and two instructors from the University of Southern Indiana who were conducting a total quality management 

seminar in a fourth floor meeting room. The post-crash fire killed nine of the people in this meeting 

room and seriously injured the other four. In addition, 11 other hotel occupants sustained various 

injuries, mostly from smoke or toxic fume inhalation.

At the Jojo’s Restaurant, two employees were killed when part of the airplane impacted directly on 

the kitchen area in the southeast quarter of the building. Two workers, a waitress, and a dishwasher, 

were pinned in the wreckage of the collapsed portion of the structure. Approximately twenty-five 

people escaped from the restaurant unharmed or with minor injuries.

EMERGENCY RESPoNSE

Firefighters at Evansville Fire Station #2 heard the explosion from the crash and went outside to 

investigate. They could see the smoke plume rising from the crash site, and, at 9:54 a.m., Engine 

Company 2 reported that they were responding to an explosion and fire which they believed was in 

the vicinity of the rail yard west of U.S. 41. (A few weeks prior to the crash, Evansville firefighters 

responded to a large hazardous materials incident at the rail yard and may have believed this type of 

incident was recurring.)

At the same time, air traffic controllers at the Evansville Tower alerted Airport Safety Department 

crews, who responded with one crash truck, Rescue 1.

Firefighters from both departments met Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s deputies on the scene. A 

deputy had been refueling his cruiser at the service station across the street from the hotel and 

witnessed the crash. Other deputies responded from a Sheriff’s substation office approximately onequarter mile north of the crash site.

Other emergency responders, including several Evansville police officers and EMS units from the 

local contract ambulance services also responded on the initial report of an aircraft down. (See 

Appendix B for a list of all the agencies which responded to this incident.)

The first firefighting units arrived on the scene less than two minutes after the airplane crashed. 

Evansville Engine Company 2 positioned itself at the east side of the crash site and advanced hoselines to protect the exposure along the north wall of the hotel, before initiating rescue efforts inside 

the hotel. Police officers, sheriff’s deputies, other emergency responders, and some hotel and restaurant occupants also initiated independent efforts to reach people trapped inside the burning hotel 
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

and restaurant. Meanwhile, Rescue 1 began attacking the fuel fire from the northwest side using its 

on-board foam/water supply.

The dense smoke made approaching the airplane and entering smoke-filled corridors particularly 

hazardous to personnel not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). An Evansville police 

officer, a Vanderburgh County sheriff’s deputy, and an emergency medical technician (EMT) who 

were not wearing SCBAs sustained serious respiratory injuries during this incident. The Evansville 

police officer entered the building several times but did not complain of any injuries until several 

hours later. He was admitted to an area hospital later in the day and died on February 24, due to 

complications from his injuries. The other two responders were exposed outside the building and 

were less seriously injured but did require treatment at the hospital.

The Evansville Fire Department initially dispatched four engine companies (including Company 

2), one aerial ladder, one heavy rescue company, and one district chief. At 9:57 a.m., while still en 

route to the scene, the Evansville District Chief requested a second alarm. The second alarm brought 

three additional engine companies, one aerial ladder truck, one rescue company with hazardous 

materials equipment, and one battalion chief. Additional administrative personnel responded from 

Fire Headquarters upon the report of an airplane down. A third aerial ladder and a quintuple 

combination engine company were special called to bring the total number of units at the scene to 

seven engine companies, four ladder companies (including the quint), one ARFF vehicle, two rescue companies, and two district chiefs. A number of other firefighters and township fire units also 

responded, although they had not been requested by Evansville authorities.

 Upon his arrival, the first district chief on the scene established a Command Post and activated the 

ICS. The Command Post was set up in front of the hotel on U.S. 41 west of the crash site. An interior 

sector was established to direct rescue efforts inside the hotel, and another sector was established 

to oversee operations at the east end of the crash site. The responding companies were committed 

primarily to search and rescue operations. Most of the exterior fire was knocked down by the initial 

attack and the interior fire was controlled with handlines.

Approximately 15 to 20 minutes into rescue operations, while the fire on the north side of the building was being controlled by the airport ARFF crew using foam and by structural firefighters using 

water hoselines, an aerial ladder was used to extricate three people who had taken refuge from the 

fire in room 405, on the south side of the fourth floor. Two of those rescued were severely burned 

and were later identified as having been in room 416 where most of the fatalities occurred when the 

airplane impacted. The other person, who was not injured, was the guest registered to room 405.

The fire was declared under control at 11:44 a.m., less than two hours after the initial crash.

Within 10 minutes of the crash, at 10:03 a.m., the Evansville Vanderburgh County Emergency 

Management Agency activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Once the center was operational, the agency director responded to the crash site to support fire control and rescue operations 

and to assume command of recovery operations once the fire was controlled. Overall command of 

the incident was transferred to the Evansville-Vanderburgh County Emergency Management Agency 

at approximately 12:15 p.m.

EMS RESPoNSE

A total of 34 ambulances from 12 service providers were sent to the scene to treat and transport 

victims of the crash. The local ambulance service which provides EMS for the City of Evansville, 
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 7

activated its Disaster Alert Plan which placed the three area hospitals on alert and summoned assistance from all available EMS from the six township volunteer departments in Vanderburgh County. 

The EMTs were instructed to respond to an EMS staging area near the crash site. A total of 83 EMS 

personnel responded to the incident.

CoMMUNICATIoNS

The Evansville Police and Fire Departments had completed conversion to a new communications 

system shortly before the incident. The new system consisted of enhanced 9-1-1, computer-aided 

dispatching, and an 800-MHz trunked radio system. The crash served as the first major test of the 

new communications equipment and procedures. According to local officials, both passed with flying colors.

Despite the large number of calls generated in response to the crash, the new system permitted dispatchers to keep pace with events without losing track of field operations. During the first hour of 

the incident, the dispatchers handled more than double the normal call volume. The second hour 

produced an even more dramatic 500 percent increase as calls poured in from outside the local area, 

many from the Regional and National media. Call volume remained high for more than 10 hours 

following the crash.

Figure 1. Total Calls Processed by Evansville Central Dispatch

February 6, 1992 (6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.)

While the dispatchers were managing the high volume of incoming calls and notifications associated 

with the incident, radio communications at the scene were aided by the trunked 800-MHz radios, 

which work much like cellular telephone service. This type of radio system permits a large number 

Source: Evansville R-e Department
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

of users to share a relatively small number of common frequencies. Users are divided into talk 

groups which share similar responsibilities or communications needs. Table 2 lists the talk groups 

used by Evansville and Vanderburgh County agencies during this incident. The shaded boxes indicate 

talk groups which were used for interagency communications.

Other agencies involved in rescue operations, including the EMS providers and airport ARFF crews 

were not equipped with 800-MHz trunked radios and encountered difficulty communicating effectively with the Incident Commander. These agencies operated on their own frequencies during the 

incident and had to relay their messages through liaison officers detailed to the command post or 

through face-to-face communication with Evansville or Vanderburgh county officials.

Table 2. City of Evansville Central Dispatch Talk Groups

Evansville Fire Department Evansville Police Department Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s Office

Fire Dispatch Police Dispatch Sheriff’s Office Dispatch

Fireground 1 Tactical 1

Fireground 2 Tactical 2

Administration Criminal Investigation Division Information

Investigators/Inspectors Information

Disaster 1

Volunteer Fire Dispatch Disaster 2

C3

 (Command)

Telephone Patch

MEDIA RElATIoNS

Within 20 minutes of the crash, calls began coming into the EOC from National radio and television 

networks, large-market metropolitan television stations, wire services, and newspapers requesting 

information about the incident. At the scene, television camera crews from local television stations, 

newspaper reporters and photographers, and local wire service correspondents were vying to capture their respective angles on the story.

Perimeter security at the scene minimized media interference with emergency operations. 

Nonetheless, the media’s need-to-know had to be satisfied. Moreover, it became apparent, with the 

onslaught of bystanders and sightseers flocking to the crash site, that the media could be helpful in 

informing the public not to come to the scene.

At 11:45 a.m., the fire chief, police chief, county sheriff, and a representative of the Indiana State 

Police held an initial news briefing at the incident scene. Each official provided a brief overview of 

the current status of their response, including the initial casualty figures, progress of fire suppression 

efforts, and information about traffic control around the incident scene.

A formal press briefing center was set up in the Ramada Inn located across the street from the incident site at about 12:15 p.m. A second press briefing was held at 1:00 p.m. to update the media 

and attempt to control rumors about the number of dead and injured. Representatives from the 

Evansville Police and Fire Departments, Indiana State Police, Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s Office, 
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 9

county coroner’s office, State Emergency Management Agency, Alexander Ambulance Service (the 

local EMS contractor), and the local Emergency Management Agency were present at the news conference. Later news conferences were attended by representatives of the Kentucky Air National Guard 

and U.S. Air Force Safety Investigation Board investigating the crash.

A total of eight press briefings were held in the three days following the crash, including five on the 

first day. During the briefings on the afternoon of the day of the crash, information was provided 

through the media to direct people to a community center set up to handle public inquiries about 

the status of family members and to provide relief assistance and counseling to families of crash 

victims.

CRITICAl INCIDENT STRESS DEbRIEFING

Both local authorities and the military recognized the extreme emotional and psychological impact 

the crash could have on emergency responders and the community at-large. Critical incident stress 

debriefing (CISD) specialists from the Southwest Indiana Critical Incident Stress Management Team 

and Scott Air Force Base (AFB) Medical Center responded to the scene to assist those affected by the 

incident. Debriefing sessions were held for both the emergency responders and the community. 

CISD team members reported that these sessions were well attended.

The CISD intervention was intended to prepare those who responded to or witnessed the incident 

for the possible physical, emotional, and cognitive effects to the stressful events they had experienced. The sessions provided useful information to the participants on how they themselves 

could minimize or manage their stress responses. They also identified agencies and individuals 

in the community who could provide expert assistance to those experiencing severe reactions to 

the incident. (See Appendix C for more information on the content of the critical incident stress 

debriefing program.)

According to the specialists sent from Scott AFB, this was the first time military critical incident stress 

teams have responded to a non-combat incident.

PoST-INCIDENT CRITIQUE

On February 19, 1992, the Evansville-Vanderburgh County Emergency Management Agency conducted an after-action critique of response and recovery operations. All of the agencies involved 

were invited to send representatives. (See Appendix D for a copy of the after-action-assessment comments of the critique participants.) Overall, the feedback from all agencies was positive. However, 

several areas for improvement were noted. These included:

•	 Better communication is needed between the incident scene and the hospitals regarding

casualties;

•	 Safety and accountability of emergency responders were compromised by freelancing by

individuals and by the uncoordinated actions of self-dispatched agencies and personnel and 

by the lack of a unified accountability system;

•	 Scene security was established early but compromised by agencies and responders who had

not been requested by local officials and were not integrated into the ICS;

•	 Better visual identification is needed for Command Post and Incident Commander for reference by agencies not on the local radio net;
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

•	 Radio communications with outside agencies, including EMS responders and Indiana State

Police, were compromised by lack of common radio net or channel; and,

•	 Better coordination with the news media was needed in light of the overload of information

requests and some misinformation provided in early reports.

Most agencies agreed that, notwithstanding a few minor problems, communication and cooperation 

among the diverse groups involved in the incident were exceptionally good. Moreover, they commended the local Emergency Management Agency on its excellent response during its first major 

disaster.

O

Human behavior in fire emergencies can have a significant impact on what firefighters encounter 

when they arrive on the scene. Firefighters rarely have an opportunity to find out what the occupants 

of a building were doing before they arrived. This incident presented a unique opportunity to evaluate what many of the occupants did before the arrival of the fire department and how it impacted the 

loss of life and the rescue situation confronting fire service and other emergency responders at this 

incident. The information which follows is based on press accounts, confirmed through interviews 

with fire officials and others who investigated this incident and interviewed those present when the 

airplane crashed.

Room 416

Thirteen employees of a local plumbing supply company were attending a seminar in a fourth floor 

meeting room (416) when the aircraft crashed. (A diagram of the room is shown in Figure 2.) 

Four of these people died instantly when the windows blew out and an expanding ball of burning 

aviation fuel engulfed the room. Five others lived long enough to take other actions. Three of them, 

their access to the exit blocked by the fire, sought refuge in the bathroom. A fourth went to the telephone and tried to call for help. The fifth tried to reach the door to the corridor but was felled by the 

smoke and heat before he could reach it. These nine victims were the only people to die inside the 

hotel. Four other occupants were seriously injured but managed to escape the inferno in room 416. 

What happened to these four individuals affected what the firefighters saw when they arrived.

Figure 2. Detail of Room 416
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 11

Immediately prior to the crash, the two instructors and 11 seminar attendees in room 416 had just 

reconvened after a short break. One of the instructors was writing on an easel pad at the front of the 

room. The other instructor was standing near her at the front (west end) of the room, closer to the 

door. The seminar participants were seated around a conference table in the center of the room. As the 

presentation was about to resume, the aircraft impacted directly below the windows of room 416.

After the fire, the other instructor, recalled, “I looked at Lynn and behind her out the small window. 

I didn’t see the plane crash. All I saw was this ball of fire which almost looked like it was coming at 

us in slow motion.”2

 In another interview, he recounted, “There was a strange airplane noise. Then 

a crash...there was a ball of fire coming at us.”3

The four occupants (including the two instructors) who were nearest the doorway escaped into 

the corridor.

The first occupant believed to have escaped room 416, the instructor who witnesses the fire through 

the window, later recounted, “I just thank God for my Cub Scout training. I knew I must be on fire, 

so I just dropped to the floor and rolled.”4 After extinguishing the fire on his clothing, the instructor 

ran west down the corridor, past the turn toward the west stairway, and onto the balcony overlooking the lobby atrium. There he yelled down to occupants and staff below that there was a fire in 

room 416, and that twelve people were inside the room. (He was apparently unaware that others 

had escaped.)

Moments later, the fire alarm system activated, releasing the magnetic door holders keeping the balcony 

door open. When the door closed, he was trapped on the small balcony, four stories above the atrium. 

The fire door protected him from the fire’s effects but prevented his reentry to the corridor because 

there was no hardware on the atrium side. Firefighters judged that he was not in immediate danger 

and attended to other occupants in more danger before rescuing him about one hour after the crash.

The instructor writing on the easel pad and one of the seminar participants also proceeded west down 

the corridor. As they approached room 405, prior to reaching the stairway, its occupant opened his 

door to investigate. The man in room 405 quickly realized that the building was on fire and that 

the corridor had become unsafe and recognized that both the instructor and seminar attendee had 

been injured and were in distress. The three retreated into room 405, went to the window on the 

south side to summon help, and while waiting to be rescued, sealed the undercut of the doorway 

with towels to minimize smoke infiltration. All three were rescued by Evansville firefighters using 

an aerial ladder 15 to 20 minutes after the crash.

The actions of the fourth occupant to escape room 416 are less clear. The occupant of room 419 

(directly across the hallway from room 416), reported that when she entered the hallway and began 

crawling toward a light at the end of the hallway (probably at the east end), she encountered another 

woman who was burned and in severe pain. She later stated, “I told her (the woman in the hallway) 

to get down and crawl. She said we’d never get out and I said, ‘Yes, we will; I’m not gonna die in 

here.’ Just follow the light.”5

2 “Drury Inn burn victim dodged ‘ball of fire’ to survive, “The Evansville Press, Feb. 8, 1992, p. 2

3 “Survivors mourn, relive nightmare,” Evansville Courier, Feb. 8, 1992, p. A1.

4 “Search for crash cause begins,” The Evansville Press, Feb. 7, 1992, p. 1.

5 “Survivors mourn, relive nightmare,” Evansville Courier, Feb. 8, 1992, p. A1. 
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Firefighters found three victims in the bathroom in room 416 huddled under a running shower. The 

occupants had turned on both the hot and cold water in an effort to protect themselves, but all had 

succumbed to smoke inhalation by the time rescuers reached them.

The woman from room 419 reported hearing their plaintive cries for help as she herself fled to safety.6 A fourth victim was found slumped on the floor just outside the bathroom where it appeared he 

had tried to use the telephone to call for help. One other occupant appeared to have tried to escape 

the room but collapsed and died a few feet from the doorway to the corridor.

Drury Inn Lobby7

Two Drury Inn guests reported that they were eating breakfast in the hotel lobby when the plane 

crashed. Both reported hearing aircraft noise prior to impact. (They were probably in the lobby 

when the first instructor to escape room 416 yelled down from the balcony that the building was on 

fire.) They exited the building through the south exit doors to the parking lot. Once outside, they 

heard calls for help from occupants on the fourth floor (possibly the occupants of room 405). They 

were joined in the parking lot by a bystander, who had run to the scene from a nearby business. The 

three men then entered the building and rescued several occupants in two successive attempts before 

worsening heat and smoke conditions prevented them from continuing. They suspended their rescue efforts when firefighters arrived on the south side of the building.

JoJo’s Restaurant8

Two men were working in the kitchen of JoJo’s Restaurant when they felt the impact of the crash. 

One of them reported the fire cut off access to the nearest exit. The other was standing in front of 

the grill and fryers when they lunged forward as the ceiling caved in from the crash impact. Both 

men assisted in efforts to reach two of their co-workers, a waitress and a kitchen worker, who were 

pinned in the structure’s wreckage. The second man estimated in an interview with reporters that 

they worked unsuccessfully for about 15 minutes to rescue the others. The two people pinned in the 

wreckage died.

Evansville fire officials estimate that as many as 25 employees and customers escaped unharmed 

from Jojo’s Restaurant, using the front entrance which was on the opposite side of the building from 

the fire.

ANAlYSIS

This fire presents an opportunity to learn lessons about several significant issues, including building construction and exit design, emergency response, incident command, communications, and 

human behavior in fire emergencies.

6 “Survivors mourn, relive nightmare,” Evansville Courier, Feb. 7, 1992, p. A1.

7 “Business partners staying at Drury recall crash,” The Evansville Press, Feb. 7, 1992, p. 3.

8 “Restaurant workers first to feel touch of tragedy,” The Evansville Press, Feb. 6, 1992, pp. 1, 14.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 13

Building Features

The noncombustible construction and relatively low fuel load from interior finishes and furnishings 

kept fire damage to a minimum. Most of the lethal fire and smoke production appeared to have 

resulted from burning aviation fuel. Only north facing rooms, which were directly exposed to the 

fire outside, sustained thermal fire damage. Smoke spread was heavy only where doors were left 

open by occupants, such as the fourth floor where the doors to rooms 416 and 422 were left open. 

Very little smoke or fire damage was noted in corridors on the first through third floors and none of 

the rooms on the south side of the building sustained thermal fire damage. The automatic-closing 

fire doors at the west end of the corridors worked in concert with the fire alarm system to prevent 

the fire from spreading into the atrium, especially on the fourth floor where open room doors permitted significant volumes of fire and smoke to enter the corridor.

Notwithstanding these successes, this fire points out other areas where building features, although 

code-conforming, may have contributed to injuries and loss of life. For example, none of the Nationally 

recognized model codes would have required two exits from room 416. Nonetheless, two remote 

means of egress from room 416 probably could have prevented the loss of at least four lives.

Emergency Response

Unrequested mutual aid response from neighboring departments and off-duty firefighters complicated incident command, and compromised fireground accountability and security of the incident 

scene. With law enforcement personnel assisting firefighters and attempting several risky rescues 

without proper protective equipment, early fire scene security was not established.

Fire department personnel cordoned-off the perimeter of the crash site themselves approximately 

30 minutes after the crash. As sufficient firefighting and rescue personnel arrived on the scene, law 

enforcement efforts were gradually redirected to monitoring scene access and controlling traffic.

Without early control of the fire scene, effective personnel accountability was nearly impossible. 

One Evansville police officer who had engaged in rescue efforts prior to the arrival of additional 

firefighters died on February 24 of injuries he sustained in the line-of-duty. A sheriff’s deputy and 

an EMT were also seriously injured but later recovered from smoke inhalation and exposure to toxic 

products of combustion sustained because they were not using appropriate respiratory protection. 

Four other emergency responders sustained minor injuries, including sprains, strains, and bruises.

Emergency Management

The participants in this incident generally agreed that the use of the ICS served them well in coordinating the emergency response and ensuring a smooth transition to recovery operations.

The timely activation of the joint city/county EOC aided in the smooth and effective management of 

this incident. Incoming requests for information about the incident were effectively managed while 

outgoing notifications and arrangements for assistance were executed. This extended as far as coordinating the response of clergy and counselors to assist victims’ families and emergency responders, 

which helped expedite the recovery process.

By responding to the incident site, the Emergency Management Director facilitated a smooth transition from emergency response to the investigation and recovery phases.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

By establishing good media relations, the police, fire, and emergency management personnel were 

able to successfully manage the intense public interest in this incident and prevent the public from 

unwittingly exposing themselves to harm and creating a larger problem for rescuers.

Communications

Evansville’s new 800-MHz trunked radio communication system provided needed flexibility and 

enhanced communications effectiveness during this very complex incident. Although call volume 

and radio traffic far exceeded reasonably anticipated emergency demand levels, communications 

personnel managed the situation admirably and gave much of the credit to the new system and 

procedures.

Personnel at the fire scene were impressed by the extent to which the trunked radio system allowed 

them to maintain good interagency communication. The only negative comments about fire scene 

communication among responders only served to highlight the value of the new equipment: the 

agencies that were not part of the new system now want to be added to the network.

Occupant Response

By the time firefighters arrived on the scene, the occupants of the Drury Inn and Jojo’s Restaurant 

who survived the plane’s initial impact had already fled the fire, were seeking refuge from it, or were 

attempting to save others who were trapped. Firefighters and other emergency responders encountered many of these people during their initial operations. The three people who sought refuge 

together in room 405 were extricated using an aerial ladder 15 to 20 minutes after the crash. The 

instructor who ran to the fourth floor balcony and became trapped there was rescued about an hour 

after the crash. Other rescuers tried in vain to reach the waitress and kitchen worker pinned in the 

structural debris of the Jojo’s Restaurant.

Most of the survivors of the Drury Inn and Jojo’s Restaurant evacuated without assistance. Those 

who were unable to escape were generally overcome by the fire, pinned in debris, or cut off from 

their means of escape. Although eleven people were killed in the hotel and restaurant, many more 

lives could have been lost were if not for the prompt, orderly evacuation of most of the occupants. 

Those who did not evacuate stayed to help others who they felt were in greater need of assistance 

than themselves, such as the two lobby occupants and the kitchen workers at Jojo’s. Their actions 

demonstrate that people are far more likely to respond adaptively and altruistically in the face of 

danger than to panic.

Those who attempted to flee but did not successfully evacuate the building illustrate a phenomenon 

which is common in multiple fatality fires. Three occupants sought refuge in the bathroom in room 

416 because they could not reach an exit. Two others sought refuge with a third occupant and protected that room until rescued. In one case, these actions were successful; in the other they were not. 

In both cases, the occupants were attempting to protect themselves by placing distance or a barrier 

or both between them and the fire. In the absence of a better course of action or a clear objective to 

evacuate the building, people will employ alternatives which are less than optimal. This underscores 

the need for clear, simple, direct means of egress and routine evacuation planning.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 15

Means of Egress Signs and Lighting

Emergency means of egress lighting and internally illuminated exit signs with backup power supplies were provided. However, their efficacy could not be determined through analysis of the actions 

of the survivors. The accounts of survivors shed no new light on the discussion of emergency lighting and exit sign requirements in the model codes. The initial responses of the individuals most 

directly affected by this fire seemed to be more directly oriented toward escaping from the room and 

extinguishing their burning clothing than evacuating the building per se. As such, their actions were 

probably not focused on looking for exit signs or other obvious indicators of the way to exits.

Many of the fourth floor survivors indicated that the corridor was dark, probably due to the heavy 

smoke produced by the burning aviation fuel not a failure of the emergency lighting. Emergency 

lighting is required in corridors and means of egress to assist occupants in identifying the path of 

travel and avoiding egress hazards. However, the lighting levels specified in the model codes are 

relatively low and generally incapable of overcoming the obscuration of dense smoke.

The merits of different methods of illuminating exit signs and their location have been subjects of 

considerable debate in the code development community through the years. Even internally illuminated exit signs emit less light than emergency lighting units and are generally installed at or near 

ceiling level which means that they can be easily obscured by rising smoke.

L

1. Command and control of a complex interagency emergency response is enhanced significantly by good equipment and well-planned communications procedures.

Evansville’s new communication system was put to an extreme test and passed with flying 

colors. This was due in large part to good planning. The telephone system handled a 500 percent increase in call volume during the initial hours of the incident, but all calls got answered. 

Fireground personnel from the city fire department, township fire departments, local EMS, 

law enforcement, emergency management, coroner, and public works agencies all were able to 

communicate effectively if not always efficiently. Those who were not on the new trunked radio 

system sent representatives to the command post to relay their messages. Despite the magnitude 

of the incident and the large number of agencies involved in the response, remarkably few complaints emerged in the formal critique. Those agencies which were not part of the new radio 

system expressed an interest in either acquiring the hardware or developing a means for sharing 

equipment at disasters.

2. The use of the ICS complemented effective communication and facilitated a smooth transition to recovery and investigation.

The use of the ICS facilitated an effective interagency response to this disaster. Fire service, law enforcement, EMS, emergency management, and public works departments all 

worked better because of the coordination and communication facilitated by use of the ICS. 

Moreover, the transition from response to recovery went smoothly because no single agency 

“owned” the ICS.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Some of the problems which did arise during the incident were linked to self-responding units 

and individuals not checking in with the Command Post and integrating their responses into 

the ICS. Although this led to some confusion, and may have contributed to untoward actions 

by some responders, the Incident Commander was able to overcome this disorganization and 

produce an effective response. 

3. Rescue operations should be restricted to personnel trained and equipped to deal with the 

hazards present.

The most serious injuries to emergency responders were suffered by personnel who attempted 

to perform duties for which they were not trained and not properly equipped. Every emergency responder has a role to play at a major incident. Law enforcement personnel can focus 

their attention on controlling access to the scene to prevent additional people from becoming 

involved. EMS personnel can triage, treat, and transport the injured. Controlling the fire and 

locating and removing the injured from danger should be left the primary responsibility of 

firefighters.

4. Adherence to minimum construction standards contributes to successful outcomes.

No building is designed to withstand the effects of an airplane crash. However, this fire demonstrates that compliance with model building code requirements and adherence to good design 

practices contributes to successful outcomes. Although part of the restaurant collapsed when 

the tail section of the airplane landed on it, the hotel sustained relatively minor structural damage. Only those north-facing guest rooms whose windows shattered on the initial impact sustained heavy fire damage. The interior fire was confined to those rooms except where doors to 

the corridors were left open. Most of the fire damage was caused by the burning aviation fuel, 

as opposed to interior finishes and furnishings.

5. The actions and accounts of survivors reinforce the understanding that human behavior in 

fire emergencies is generally rational, adaptive, and goal-oriented.

Despite the sudden and overwhelming danger which confronted the occupants of the Drury 

Inn, all of the survivors appeared to react in an adaptive and rational way, and evidence suggests 

that the victims responded similarly.
17

APPENDIx A

Vicinity Plan and Building Diagrams
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 19

Appendix A (continued)
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 21

Appendix A (continued)

3rd floor
22

APPENDIx b

List of Responding Agencies

(Provided by the Emergency Management Agency, Evansville-Vanderburgh County, Indiana.)

RESPoNDING AGENCIES--FEbRUARY 6, 1992

Evansville/Vanderburgh County Emergency Management Agency: Director--Sherman G. Greer, 

Assistant--Jane Snelling, Local Emergency Planning Committee--Janice F. Shah

Knox County Emergency Management Agency: Director--Steve Dillon

State Emergency Management Agency: Regional Coordinator--Jack Scott; District Coordinator 

Emergency Medical Services--Becky Blagrave; State Division Director For Emergency Medical 

Services Training--Tony Pagano, Chief Disaster Response And Recovery--Phil Brown

Public Information Officer: Christine Terry, Director, Epa

Fire Departments: Evansville, Knight Township, Perry Township, German Township, McCutchanville 

Fire And Rescue, Gibson Co. Rescue, Airport Safety Officers, Vincennes Township Rescue Squad, 

Marrs Township--Posey County

Emergency Medical Services: Alexander Ambulance, Bassemeirs Ambulance, Comaier Ambulance, 

Madison Ambulance, Henderson Ambulance, Warrick Co., McClure Ambulance/Bicknel, Gibson 

Co. Ambulance, Halter Smith--Vincennes, St. Anthony’s Ambulance--Vincennes, One Unit From 

Illinois

Security/Traffic Control: Evansville Police Department, Indiana State Police, Vanderburgh County 

Sheriff’s Department, Auxiliary Police Officers--Emergency Management Agency

American Red Cross--Evansville

American Red Cross--Knox County

Communications--Telephone: Indiana Bell, Contel Cellular, United States Cellular Mobile 

Telephone Network, Mci Telecommunications Network

Communications--Radio: Races, React, Evansville Citizens Radio League, Hal & Carol Wilson 

(Races) Team--Manned The Emergency Operations Center In The Emergency Management 

Agency Office, Keith Phillips At C.K. Newsome Center

Hospitals: Deaconess, Welborn, St. Mary’s

Military Services: Kentucky Air National Guard, Kentucky National Guard, Evansville National 

Guard, Indiana National Guard, Scott Air Force Base--Bellville, Illinois; Grissom Air Force Base, 

Air Force Claims Officers (7 From Grissom And Washington, Dc), Air Force Hazmat Team, Safety 

Investigation Board, Adjutant General--Kentucky Air National Guard

Building Commissioner/Ema Advisory Chairman: Roger Lehman

City Engineer: Herb Butler

Southwest Mental Health
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 23

County Prosecutor: Stan Levco

Coroner’s Office

Central Dispatch: Harold Crooks And Dispatchers

Council Of Churches

Clergy Of Evansville/Vanderburgh County

C.K. Newsome Center: Harvey Taylor

Parks & Recreation: Jim Hadden

Mayor F. Mc Donald & Staff: Cindy Baumgartner Developed Volunteer List For Ema Telephone 

Bank Work

County Commissioners

City Garage: Bob Brown

County Engineer: Gary Kercher

Ohio Valley Search & Rescue Dog Association: Volunteer Staffing in Ema Office--Dan Casper, Dave 

Johann, Harold Crooks, Marti Vanada, Janice McNeely, Tina Notter

News Media: Local, State, National, International (Mexico, London) 35 Media Represented

Health Department: Brett Townsend, Volunteer for Ema Office--Sherry Sampson

Convention/Visitors Bureau: Pete Helfrich--For use of his 800 number telephone line and personally manning it for many hours

Emergency Medical Technicians: Volunteers for the Emergency Operations Center and the C.K. 

Newsome Center--John Williams, Tom Dant, Jean Trulock

National Organization of Victims Assistance (Nova)

Hotels and Their Staff: Ramada Inn, Radisson, Holiday Inn

Alcoa/Warrick Operations: Generators And Lights

Rescoe Rents: Light Towers

Lamasco Equipment

Civic Center Complex: Telephone/Switchboard Operations, Security Officers, Dorothy Burgolt--

Night Security

Sigeco

City Water Department

TSF: Portable Johns

Food Donations: Chilli Cooking Teams (For Red Cross): New Hope Baptist Church, Cleaves Cme

Church, Nazarene Baptist Church, First Ebenezer Baptist Church, Ladies Auxiliary--Vfw Posey 

County, Domino’s Pizza, Little Caesar’s Pizza, Grandy’s, Rax, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Hardee’s, 

McDonald’s, Taco Bell, Merry-Go-Round Restaurant, Pantry Convenience Store (Kentucky & 

Riverside), Denny’s

Note: This list is based on the best information available at this time--February 12, 1992. A special thanks to all volunteers--both named and unnamed--who made all the assistance possible to so many agencies and individuals.

J.F.S.
24

APPENDIx C

Critical Incident Stress Briefing Materials

(Provided by the Southwest Indiana Critical Incident Stress Management Team and the 

U.S. Air Force Critical Incident Stress Team from Scott AFB Illinois.)

Dear Emergency Services Professional,

The event(s) you recently experienced were more intense than usual, even for emergency workers. 

These experiences can manifest themselves in a multitude of signs and symptoms:

PHYSICAL REACTIONS

•	 Fatigue/exhaustion

•	 Change in appetite

•	 Difficulty sleeping

•	 Headaches

•	 Digestive problems

•	 Startle reactions

COGNITIVE REACTIONS

•	 Difficulty concentrating/remembering things

•	 Flashbacks/intrusive memories

•	 Feelings of isolation

•	 Difficulty solving problems or making decisions

•	 Inability to feel that anything is important other than this incident

EMOTIONAL REACTIONS

•	 Anger/irritability

•	 Feeling of helplessness

•	 Over sensitivity

•	 Fear

•	 Loss of memory of event

•	 Depression

•	 Guilt

•	 Emotional numbing

•	 Anxiety

Although no one can prevent you from having these reactions, the following is a list of suggestions 

which should help you minimize the impact of them:

STEPS YOU CAN TAKE

•	 Alternate periods of strenuous physical exercise and periods of relaxation during the first few

days. This will help release some of the pent-up physical tensions and reactions.

•	 Structure your time in order to “keep busy.”

•	 Do not label yourself “crazy,”You are having NORMAL reactions!

•	 Talk to people – Talk is the healthiest medicine.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 25

Appendix C (continued)

•	 Beware of overusing drugs or alcohol to numb the pain. You don’t need to complicate the

problem with substance abuse.

•	 Other “mood altering” substances such as caffeine and sweets should be used in

moderation.

•	 REACH OUT! Spend time with others. People DO care.

•	 Keep your life as normal as possible. Do not make any “big” life changes. Do make as many

daily decisions as possible. This will help you regain the feeling of control over your life.

•	 Help your co-workers by sharing your thoughts and feelings and be willing to listen to

theirs. Check out how each of you are doing. You will find a lot of “common ground” 

concerning your thoughts and reactions.

•	 Give your self permission to feel rotten and share your feelings with others.

•	 The above symptoms should diminish over time (3 to 6 weeks). If they do not, or if they

intensify, you may need to seek additional professional help in dealing with this event. 

Remember, YOU ARE HAVING NORMAL REACTIONS TO ABNORMAL EVENTS!

Our only purpose is to help you deal with your reactions to the stressful event you just experienced. 

WE CARE ABOUT YOU!

SOUTHWEST INDIANA CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT TEAM 

OUR TEAM KEEPS YOUR TEAM ON THE JOB!
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

CRITICAl INCIDENT STRESS oVERVIEW

•	 You have experienced a traumatic event or a critical incident (any incident that causes you to

experience strong emotional reactions which have the potential to interfere with your ability 

to function either at the scene or later). Even though the event may be over, you may now 

be experiencing or experience later, some strong emotional reactions. It is very common, in 

fact normal, for people to experience emotional aftershocks when they have passed through 

a terrible event.

•	 Sometimes the emotional aftershocks (or stress reactions) appear immediately after the traumatic event. In some cases, weeks or months may pass before the stress reactions appear.

•	 *The signs and symptoms of a stress reaction may last a few days, a few weeks, or a few

months, and occasionally longer, depending on the severity of the traumatic event. With 

understanding and the support of loved ones, the stress reactions usually pass more quickly. 

Occasionally, the traumatic event is so painful, that professional assistance from a counselor 

may be necessary. This does not imply craziness or weakness. It simply indicates that the 

particular event was just too powerful. Think of it as a circuit breaker in an electrical system 

that disconnects, rather than risking overload to the system. The circuit breaker has done its 

job by temporarily disconnecting. The system is still intact and all that is needed is for the 

circuit breaker to be “reset.” That can be accomplished through peer counseling, defusing, 

debriefing and occasionally with the help of a behavioral science specialist.

•	 Here are some common signs and signals of a stress reaction:

PHYSICAL COGNITIVE EMOTIONAL

-fatigue -blaming someone -anxiety

-nausea -confusion -guilt

-muscle tremors -poor attention -grief

-twitches -poor decisions -denial

-chest pain -heightened or lowered alertness -severe pain (rare)

-difficulty breathing -poor concentration -emotional shock

-elevated blood pressure -memory problems -fear

-rapid heart rate -hyper vigilance -uncertainty

-thirst -difficulty identifying familiar objects or people -loss of emotional control

-headaches -increased or decreased awareness of surroundings -depression

-visual difficulties -poor problem solving -inappropriate emotional response

-vomiting -poor abstract thinking -apprehension

-grinding teeth -loss of time, place or person orientation -feeling overwhelmed
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 27

Appendix C (continued)

-weakness -disturbed thinking -intense anger

-dizziness -nightmares – intrusive images -irritability

-profuse sweating -agitation -fainting

-chills -shock symptoms

BEHAVIORAL

-change in activity -change in speech patterns -hyper-alert to environment

-withdrawal -emotional outbursts -startle reflex intensified

-suspiciousness -loss or increase of appetite -non-specific bodily complaints

-alcohol consumption -change in usual communications -increase or decrease in sexual functioning

-inability to rest -erratic movements -antisocial acts

-pacing

The Normal Recovery of Normal People Experiencing Normal 

Reactions to Abnormal Events!

Sane People Involved in an Insane Experience!

THINGS To TRY

- Within the first 24-48 hours, periods of strenuous physical exercise, alternated with relaxation will alleviate some of the physical reactions.

- Structure your time – keep busy.

- You’re NORMAL and having NORMAL reactions – don’t label yourself as crazy!

- Talk to people – talk is the healthiest medicine.

- Be aware of numbing the pain with the overuse of drugs or alcohol, you don’t need to complicate this with a substance abuse problem – Reach out – people do care.

- Maintain as normal a schedule as possible.

- Spend time with others.

- Help your co-workers as much as possible by sharing feelings and checking out how they’re 

doing.

- Give yourself permission to feel rotten and share your feelings with others.

- Keep a journal, write your way through those sleepless hours.

- Do things that feel good to you!
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

- Realize those around you are also under stress.

- Do make as many daily decisions as possible which will give you a feeling of control over 

your life (i.e., if someone asks if you want to eat, answer them even if you’re not sure.)

- Get plenty of rest.

- Reoccurring thoughts, dreams or flashbacks are NORMAL – don’t try to fight them – they’ll 

decrease over time and become less painful.

- Eat well balanced and regular meals. (Even if you don’t fee like eating.)

FoR FAMIlY AND FRIENDS

- Listen carefully.

- Spend time with the traumatized person.

- Offer your assistance and listening ear, even if they don’t ask for help.

- Reassure them that they are safe.

- Help them with everyday tasks, like cleaning, cooking, caring for the family, minding the 

children, etc.

- Give them some private time.

- Don’t take their anger or other feelings personally.

- Don’t tell them that they are “lucky it wasn’t worse” – traumatized people are not consoled 

by those statements. (It will make them feel guilty for feeling what they feel.) Instead, tell 

them that you are sorry such an event has occurred and that you want to understand and 

assist them.

- Don’t feel like you have to have all the answers or know exactly what to do. Just being there 

shows them that you care. (It is okay to ask them what they would like for you to do.)

(Compliments of the Combat Stress Treatment Unit) Major Meyer

Major Duane Meyer, Capt. Jack Little

Critical Incident Stress Team

USAF Med Cetr/SCHA

Scott AFB Illinois 62225-5300

AV 576-7386/87

Commercial 618-256-7386/87
29

APPENDIx D

Evansville-Vanderburgh County Emergency Management Agency

Evansville Plane Crash After Action Report

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

EVANSVILLE, VANDERBURGH COUNTY

Sherman G. Greer. Director

Room 18, City-County Complex

1 NW Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard Evansville, Indiana 47708

(812) 426-5602

Jane Snelling,

Administrative Assistant

EVANSVILLE PLANE CRASH - AFTER ACTION REPORT

Date: February 19, 1992

Location: Evansville Vanderburgh County E.O.C.

Critique/Lessons Learned: Sherman G. Greer

1. Communications

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Communications staff accompanied him at all times

Press briefing room set up

Rumor Control established - rumors of 28 dead

Fire suppression - fantastic job done by Airport

and/or Evansville Fire Department

Law Enforcement - perimeter control established;

U.S. 41 controlled

EMS response - (looked like ambulance convention)

Support Agencies -

Red Cross

Salvation Army

Incident command system established
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 31

Appendix D (continued)

Introductions: Jack Scott, Area Coordinator SEMA

Becky Blagrave, EMS Coordinator SEMA

Red Cross: Trish DeVoy - Everyone worked together real well.

Rob Goble helped with communications at Red Cross. Red

Cross lost power and phone service.

Salvation Army: Went to staging area and no one was there.

(Sherman suggested the Fire Inspector act as staging

officer). Jesse Storey said we would have to talk.

P.I.O.: Christine Terry - Communications is still important.

Came to E.O.C. from Fire Dept. Very busy - need for

portable radios. Too many people at site. Site control

good.

Deaconess Hospital: Communication from scene to hospital.

Need designated Family Center. Victims' families had to

go to all three hospitals. Occupancy full. Need

community transportation services.

St.Mary's Hospital: Number of victims and need communication

from scene. Information came in slow. Communications

between hospital also not good. Best information came

from Channel 14 live (television).

ALCOA: Unified command structure from all agencies.

Representatives from all agencies to be at I.C.

Welborn Hospital: Same as other hospital. Utilization of

resources. Helicopter not called to scene. High level

of care at scene. Need automatic response to disaster

scene. Need to update medical plan. CNN met helicopter

at Lousiville and pilot had no idea what site looked

like.

REACT: Radio Problems. Gave information to traffic at site.

Radio interference.

Amateur Radio:

Knox County EMA: Assisted Sherman Greer. Good job and well

done by all concerned.

Fire Chief Doug Wilcox: Concerns from Fire Dept. - only

concern was safety - keep unauthorized access from fire

ground. Tighten up own security in own agency. People

without proper training and equipment become part of the

problem. If we need assistance we will call. Then you

will be directed where to go. Don't come to be part of

the problem. All people need to be accounted for. I.C.

Systems will be in all incidents in Evansville till
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Sherman has arrived at the scene. Orderly transition

was and would be needed at any disaster.

Law Enforcement - Captain Cradock (Sheriff's Dept.): 800 meg

system good.

Evansville Police Dept. - Chief Art Gann: Additional ICS

training by law enforcement security part of scene.

Fire and EMS was allowed access. After scene was stable

coroner and military always allowed in. Law enforcement

went in with no air tanks. Need to back out and let

fire dept. take over. Coroner and 800 meg. worked well.

Radio good. Indiana State Police need access to 800 meg

system. Whether ISP or EPD buys - it is needed.

Indiana State Police Officer Taylor: Need 800 meg. system

for ISP aircraft investigator. No problems. Remove

unneeded people from scene. Situation board as needed.

( Sherman Greer comment: IC area needs to be identified)

EMS - Max Kleugh (Alexander Ambulance): Thanked everybody

that helped at scene. 35 ambulances arrived within 30

minutes. 800 meg. needed for EMS systems. No contact

with incident commanders. Transported private

individuals within 20-25 minutes. Information to

hospital important. Direct radio contact to hospital.

Releasing within 30 minutes. T&T went ok. Deaconess

Hospital was control hospital. Internal session help at

Alexander with good plans for the future. (Sherman,

Medical Task Force will get together shortly. Joint

command type system will be used in future). Incoming

services went to Alexander private channel. Will have

additional frequency in the future. Also, once people

are released, they need to leave and not hang around.

ID system will be adopted.

Central Dispatch: Traffic was too much. Need other numbers

for continuous request for additional assistance. Need

people to go to disaster frequencies quicker. Airport

security had 800 meg system but was not trained. Went

to "Disaster 1" frequency right away. Could not have

done without 800 meg. system. Need perimeter control on

different frequencies. Need information number so

people will not call dispatch.

Coroners'Office: News Releases were a problem. One location

for all news media. Items should be given to Sherman

Greer for media release. Bad information was given out.

All information should go through one person.

Coordinate all press releases. "28 people killed" - did

come from coroners' office. First call at 1O:Ol AM.

Calls from Japan, Britain, and Canada. Everything done
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 33

Appendix D (continued)

within 24 hours.

Airport: Briefly commented - radio system being installed.

Communications to Central Dispatch worked without any

problems.

Public Works: Could have been worse weather conditions.

Large trucks were used as barricades on US 41 North and

South. Other barricades were brought in on request.

County Response: Time will be a problem. Do not respond

unless called. CNN showed county highway truck on

television. Traffic control liability.

Comaier Ambulance: Every EMS person should have gone to

IHERN or common frequency. (Sherman Greer: 155.34

should be main frequency)

Bassmeier Ambulance: Responded late and not directed where

to go. Impressed with the way everything went.

Mr. Gamble: We don't pay Sherman enough for amount of stress

in his job. Gave him credit for his efforts.

State EMS: Good EMS response. State serves as backup to

local event.

Jack Scott: Communications and ICS, when you get involved in

exercise everybody should participate. Vanderburgh Co.

getting good reviews.

Other comments: Sherman Greer needs 800 meg radio.

Convention Bureau donated 800 number telephone line.

Cellular telephone companies donated 6 telephones.

Drury Inn Scholarship Fund $25,000.

In summary, everybody did well and the good hard work will

continue. The concept of the plan is falling together. Keep

working and keep improving.

Start: l0:00 AM

Finish: 11:36 AM

SGG:jfs
34

APPENDIx E

Photographs

Photo by Mark Chubb

View of crash site looking south toward Drury Inn. Plywood covers many of the windows broken by the blast 

from the crash.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 35

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

This photograph taken from the roof of the Drury Inn shows the crash site and damage to Jojo’s Restaurant. Note the 

aircraft’s main landing gear near the center of the picture.
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

The center stairway (on the north side of the Drury Inn) was heavily damaged 

by the fire when the windows broke. Note the heavy debris on the stairs and 

the wall from concrete spalling.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 37

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

Even on the most heaving damaged four floor of the Drury Inn, fire damage 

from flame rollover was limited to locations where corridor doors remained 

open during the fire. The damage in the foreground is outside room 416.
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

In room 328, heavy fire damage resulted when the windows shattered and 

fuel was sprayed throughout the room. However, the concrete masonry 

construction between guest rooms prevented the fire from spreading to 

adjacent spaces.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 39

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

Automatic closing fire doors at the west end of the corridors prevented 

smoke from spreading into the atrium. However, one of the occupants of 

room 416 became trapped on the balcony after the doors closed behind him 

when the fire alarm system activated.
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

Although the center stairway (on the north side of the Drury Inn) was heavily 

damaged by the fire, the fire door prevented it from spreading into the corridor.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 41

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

In rooms where windows remained unbroken, no fire or smoke damage 

was evident.
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

Even where windows were broken, fire damage was minimal in cases where 

only a limited amount of aviation fuel sprayed in.
USFA-TR-064/February 1992 43

Appendix E (continued)

Photo by Mark Chubb

The first floor corridor (looking east) remained free of smoke and flame. Fire 

resistance rated room doors held the fire in check.