1 Rule 1 0 of the R ules of the C ourt of A ppea ls provide s as follows:
Th is Co urt, w ith the c onc urre nce of all jud ges p articipa ting in the case , may af fi rm , revers e or modi fy the act ions of the tri al c ourt by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedentia l value. When a case is decide d by memorandum opi ni on i t s hal l b e de si gna te d “MEMORANDUM OP INI ON ”, sha ll not be publi shed, and shal l not be ci ted or

rel ied on for any reas on in any unrelat ed case. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs D ecember

21, 2001 MONROE E. DA VIS v. STATE OF TE NNESSEE , ET AL. Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, Eastern Division No. 20001753 Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Commissioner

FILED JANUARY 30, 2002 No. E2001-02032-COA-R3-CV

The plaintiff, Monroe E. Davis is a prisoner in state cus tody. He filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commis sion (“the Claims Com mission”) against

the State of Tennessee and the wardenof the fa

cilityat which he is incarcerated, seeking da mages for the alleged detention and/or conversion of his personal property by thewarden . The Claims Commission g ranted t he defe ndants’ motion to dis miss. We a

ffirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission Affirm ed; Case

Remanded C HARLES D. S USANO , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., and D. M ICHAEL S WINEY , J., joined. Monroe E. Davis, Petros, Tennessee, Pro Se. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Moore, Solicitor General; and Nichon Shannon, for the appellees, State of Tennessee and H oward Carlton.

MEMORAN

DUM OPINION 1-2- I. Davis, an inmate

at the Nor

theast Correct ional Compl ex (“NECC”) in Mou ntain City, filed a complaint with the Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee and Howard Carlton, the wardenof NECC, alleging that Warden Carlton disposed of numerous boxes of Davis’ personal items and t

hat said d isposition w as in viola

tion of Da

vis’ right s. The State filed a motion to dismi ss pursua nt to Tenn. R. Ci v. P. 12.02 for failure to state a claim upon which relief

c ould be granted. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion, predica ted on Davis’ failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of T.C.A. § 9-8-307 (S upp . 2001). Davis now appeals, contending that the Claims Commission erred. II. The relief g

ranted b y the trial c ourt in re sponse to t he State’ s Rule 12.0 2 motion pr esents a question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997). We must examine the complaint alone, “construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, [and] tak[e] all allegations of fact therein as true.” Cook v. Spinnaker’s of Rivergate, Inc. , 878 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994). III. The jurisdict

ion of the Claims Commis sion is go verned by T. C. A. § 9-8-307, whic h provide s, in pertine nt part, a s follows: (a)(1) The commission or

each commissioner sitting individually ha s exclusive jurisdiction to d etermine all moneta

ry claims against the stat e based on the acts or omissions of “state employees ,”... f allin g into one ( 1) or mor

e of the f ollowing categ ories: * * * (F) Negligent

ca re , c us to dy o r c on tr ol of pe rs on al pr op er ty; * * * (d)

... The state wi ll not be liable for willful, malicious, or criminal acts by state employees, or for acts on the par t of s tate employees done for pe rsonal gain

.... * * * (h) Stateoffice

rs and em ploy ees are

absolute ly im mune fro m liability for acts or omissions within the scope of the officer’s or employ ee’s-3- office or employ

ment, except for

willful, ma

licious, o r crimina l acts or omissions or for acts or omissions done for personal gain.... (Emphasi s added). D avis asserts that Warden Carlton acted “willful[ly ], malicious[ly], and criminal[ly],” and that he acted “for personal g ain” in allegedly disposing of

Davis’ property

. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(d) specifically

provides that the state “will not be liable for willful, malicious, or criminal acts by state employ

ees, or for acts on the part of state employ ees do ne for personal gain.” Therefore, we findand hold th at Davis’ claim ag ainst the S tate, asalleged by him, is outside of the scope of the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission. We also find

and hold th at T.C.A. § 9-8-307 limits the ju risdictio n of the Cla

ims Co mmission to covered claims asserted against the State . The Cla

ims Commissio n has no jur isdiction t

o enterta in a claim against an individual. See Myer s v. Hurst Constr. Co. , C/A 01A01-9609-CV00397, 1997 WL

92078, at

*2 (Tenn . Ct. A pp. M.S., f iled Marc h 5, 1997) . Hence , the Claim s Commission was correct in dismissing Davis’ claim against Warden Carlton. Davis bases his argument as to Warden Carlton on T.C.A. § 9-8-307(h), which provides that state employees ar

e not immune from liability for “willful, malicious, or criminal acts or omissions or for a cts or omis sions done

for per sonal ga

in.” This subsecti on of the s tatute sim ply establishes that a s tate em ploy ee is not im mune for the ty pe of conduct desc

ribed the rein. The import of t

his subsection, in the

cont ext of t he f act s of

th is cas e, i s l im it ed t o t hi s s tat eme nt of n on- im mu ni ty. It has no furthe

r meanin g; it c ert ainly does not confe r jurisdiction upon the Claims Commission for claims ag ainst indiv

iduals. IV. The judgment of the trial court is aff irm ed. This c ase is re

manded f or colle ction of c osts, assessed below. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Monroe E. Davis.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE