If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re K. R. SHOMIN, Minor. May 25, 2023

No. 363274

Grand Traverse Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 21-004971-NA

Before: PATEL, P.J., and CAVANAGH and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s disposition order in this childprotection case involving his minor child, KS. The court authorized the petition after the 

preliminary hearing, removed KS from the custody of his parents, and continued KS’s placement

in a licensed foster care home. A jury found that jurisdiction was met under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), 

and the court has taken temporary jurisdiction over KS. Respondent, who is a member of the 

Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (GTBOCI), contends that his trial attorney 

was ineffective for failing to appeal the initial removal decision. Finding no error warranting 

reversal, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an 

emergency petition requesting the court to take jurisdiction over three-month-old KS. DHHS 

alleged that the child’s mother left KS unattended at a homeless shelter for over an hour and later 

“dropped” KS into a bassinet on the floor. At the time of the incident, KS’s mother appeared to 

be under the influence of some substance. There were concerns for KS’s safety because his mother 

had mental-health and substance-abuse issues, was unable to provide stable living conditions, and 

had been the subject of multiple CPS investigations since KS’s birth.1 Respondent has been 

incarcerated for KS’s entire life and thus unavailable to provide for the child’s care and custody. 

 

1 KS tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines at birth. Just days after KS’s birth, 

the child was found unattended in a car seat in 91-degree heat at a homeless encampment.
-2-

KS was removed from the care of his mother and respondent and placed in a licensed foster care 

home on an emergency ex parte basis. 

After KS’s emergency removal, respondent offered his mother as an alternate caregiver. 

But the GTBOCI determined that respondent’s mother was not appropriate for placement. 

Respondent failed to identify any other relatives that were available or met the criteria for 

placement. Following extensive testimony at the preliminary hearing, the petition was authorized

and KS was continued in foster care. Respondent’s attorney did not appeal the decision. A trial 

was held regarding adjudication, and the jury found that jurisdiction had been established. The 

court continued KS’s placement in foster care at the dispositional hearing. This appeal followed. 

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Respondent argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to appeal the initial 

removal decision following the preliminary hearing. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of 

fact and constitutional law.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We 

review a trial court’s factual findings, if any, for clear error, and the constitutional issue is reviewed 

de novo. People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011). Because this issue was 

not raised below and an evidentiary hearing was not requested, the issue is not preserved. We 

review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting the party’s substantial rights. In re Sanborn, 

337 Mich App 252, 258; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, 

three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear 

or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the 

outcome of the proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). When, as in this case, 

an evidentiary hearing has not been held, our review is limited to mistakes apparent from the 

record. People v Thorne, 322 Mich App 340, 347; 912 NW2d 560 (2017).

B. ANALYSIS

The principles applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the arena of 

criminal law also apply by analogy in child protective proceedings[.]” In re Martin, 316 Mich 

App 73, 85; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). The pertinent questions are whether “(1) counsel’s 

performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and [whether] 

(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the respondent.” Id. To establish prejudice, a party must 

show “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different 

but for trial counsel’s errors.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018)

(cleaned up).

“At the preliminary hearing, the court must decide whether to authorize the filing of the 

petition and, if authorized, whether the child should remain in the home, be returned home, or be 

placed in foster care pending trial.” In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 448; 861 

NW2d 303 (2014), quoting MCR 3.965(B)(12) (quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to MCL 
-3-

712a.13a(9), a court is authorized to place a child in foster care only if it finds all of the following 

conditions:

(a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm 

to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.

(b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child 

is reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from risk as described in 

subdivision (a).

(c) Continuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s

welfare.

(d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to 

prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.

(e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to 

safeguard the child’s health and welfare.[2]

Because KS is Native American and eligible for membership in a tribe, provisions of the 

Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq., and the Michigan Indian Family 

Preservation Act (MIFPA), MCL 712B.1 et seq., were triggered. These statutes impose certain 

requirements in child-protective proceedings involving a Native American child—such as proof 

by clear and convincing evidence that the child should be placed in foster care. See In re England, 

314 Mich App 245, 259; 887 NW2d 10 (2016).3 Specifically, MCL 712B.15(2) of MIFPA states:

An Indian child may be removed from a parent or Indian custodian, placed 

into a foster care placement, or, for an Indian child already taken into protective 

custody, remain removed from a parent or Indian custodian pending further 

proceedings, only upon clear and convincing evidence that active efforts have been 

made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent 

the breakup of the Indian family, that the active efforts were unsuccessful, and that 

the continued custody of the Indian child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely 

to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child. The active 

efforts must take into account the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way 

 

2 A 2022 amendment did not affect the language at issue. See 2022 PA 200. See also MCR 

3.965(C)(2).

3 A federal circuit court has concluded that certain provisions of the ICWA are unconstitutional on 

the basis that they commandeer states. See Brackeen v Haaland (Oh Rehearing), 994 F 3d 249, 

268 (CA 5, 2021), cert gtd ___ US ___; 142 S Ct 1205; ___ L Ed 2d ___ (2022). But this Court 

has found that the ICWA and the MIFPA provisions that are pertinent to the present appeal “are 

essentially identical[.]” In re England, 314 Mich App at 259. As such, the conclusion in Brackeen

is of little import because Michigan state law is applicable.
-4-

of life of the Indian child’s tribe. The evidence must include the testimony of at 

least 1 qualified expert witness, who has knowledge of the child rearing practices 

of the Indian child’s tribe, that the continued custody of the Indian child by the 

parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage 

to the Indian child.

In this case, respondent contends that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file an 

appeal4of the initial removal decision following the preliminary hearing. But respondent has not 

demonstrated that an appeal would have been successful. It is undisputed that respondent was 

unavailable to provide care and custody to KS because he was (and still is) incarcerated. We 

recognize that an incarcerated parent has the general authority to direct who is to care for his or 

her child. See, e.g., In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 420-421; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), and In re 

Mason, 486 Mich 142, 161 n 11; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). But the only person selected by 

respondent was his mother, whom the GTBOCI determined was not appropriate for placement due 

to her “substantiated history of neglect.” At the removal hearing, the tribe expert opined that KS 

should be placed out of the home. And both he and the GTBOCI were in agreement with KS’s 

placement in the foster home. 

Respondent contends that ineffective assistance of counsel is apparent because, as a result 

of the failure to appeal the removal decision, his trial attorney’s arguments at the adjudication trial 

were “rendered moot.” Respondent’s argument is not easy to decipher—he appears to be referring

to the court’s ruling that the circumstances of removal would not be covered in the adjudication 

trial. But the court’s justification for this ruling was as follows: “[W]e want the jury to focus on 

whether the statutory grounds have been met and not where the child is. . . . [A]nd if we get into 

removal, then that muddies the waters. So I think we’ll continue with our longstanding tradition 

that we not bring in any testimony about removal so that the jury can be focused on the statutory 

grounds for adjudication.” Contrary to respondent’s implication, the failure to appeal the removal 

decision had no bearing on the court’s decision to prohibit any discussion of removal at the 

adjudication. Respondent fails to demonstrate how providing the jury with additional5evidence

regarding the removal would have changed the jury verdict. Respondent has not established any 

entitlement to appellate relief. He did not seek an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance

 

4 See MCR 3.993(A)(6)(e) (dealing with appeals as of right for Indian children).

5 The jury was informed, in a general sense, about the events at the homeless shelter that led to 

removal of the child.
-5-

claim, and the existing record does not support that an appeal would have been successful. On this 

record, respondent cannot show he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to appeal the removal 

decision.

Affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Sima G. Patel 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ James Robert Redford