### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 20, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WAD E P . T UC KER

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for F ranklin County No. 13166 J. Curtis Sm ith, Jud ge

No. M2004- 02792-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Novem ber 22, 2005

This is an appea l as of rig ht from a de nial of post-convic tion relief. The Def endant, W ade P. Tuc ker,

was c onvicted of attempted first-deg ree murder pur suant to a g uiltyplea, a nd espec ially ag g ravated

r o b b e r y a n d a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y f o l l o w i n g a

b e n c h tr i a l

. T h e D e f

e n d a n tw a s s e n t e n c e d t o t w e n t yfo ur y e ars in the c us tod y

of the Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt of Cor re c tio n ( TD OC ). Th is C ou rt up he ld the De fe nd a nt’ s a tte mpt e d mu rd e r ande sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

c on vic tio ns on dir e c t app e a l, but reve rsed the c onvi ct i o n for a g g ravated burg lary . See State v. Wade P. Tucke r, No. M2001- 02298-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1574998 (T enn. C rim. App., Nashville, Jul y 17, 2002). The Def endant subseque ntly

filed a pe tition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. The De fenda nt now appe als denial of post-c onviction relief, a rg uing: ( 1) his conviction for attempted first deg ree
mur de r i s v oiddu e to a

fa ulty g uil ty ple a ; a nd(2 ) h e re c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

tr ia l c ou ns e l. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Robert G. Morg an and Franc i s P ry o r, Assistant Public Defe nders, Jasper, Te nnessee , for the appellant, Wade P. Tuc ker.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J. M ic h a e l T a y lo r , D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; a n d St e v e M

. B lo u n t, A s s is tan t D is tric t Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

F AC TS I. Background F acts The c on v i ct i o ns at issue in this case re sult from the robber y and bruta l shooting of the Def end an t ’s es t rang ed wife in her rur al Fr anklin Countyhome during the ea rly morning hours of Janu ary 23 , 2 00 0. Th e e ve nts le a din g to the De fendant’ s c on vic tio ns we re su mma ri zedby thi s Cou rt on dir e c t app e a l a s f

oll ow s:
The stipulation of fac ts revea led that the def endant a n d the victim were hu sb a nda nd wi fe. On N ov e mbe r 1 9, 19 99 , th e vic tim fi le d a div or c e c omp la int

in which sh e all eg ed that the de fendant had bee n g uiltyof “ina ppropriate marital conduct a nd adultery .” I n the complaint, the vi ctim sought c ustody of the pa rties’ two minor children a nd asked that she be awa rded, inter alia, the pa

rties’ jointly -owne d house located on Rock Cree k Road in Franklin Count y

. As of J anuary 23, 2000, the divorce was still pending, no property rig hts ha d been adjudicate d, and the de fendant was not s u b

j ec t to any

order restraining him from g oing a bout the victim or the parties’ house. The de fendant resided at the Dripping Springs Subdivision home of his fat h er , Ge rald Tucker, and the victim resided at the Rock Cree k Road house. Be tween N ovember 19, 1999[,] and J anuary 23, 2000, the defe ndant had bee n to the Roc k Cr e e k Ro a d h ou se on mul tip le occas io ns to p ic k u p a nddr op of f the pa rt ie s’ childre n

. On t h e evening of January 22, 2000, the parties’ childre n wer e staying at Ger ald Tucker’s home. T hus, on the nig ht of J anuar y 22 and in the ea

rly morning hours of January

23, 2000, the victim was the only person staying at the Rock Cree k Road house. At approximately

2:30 a.m. on J anuary

23, 2000, the victim a woke to g unfire and re alized that she had been shot. She g ot up f rom her be d and wa s shot ag ain. She saw “ a male looking fig ure near her bedroom door hol ding a long- barr eled g un.” The victim fled to a closet, and the assailant, who was wea ring a ski mask, came into the closet and shot her

ag ain. After the assailant left the closet, the victim craw led towar d her be d to ge t the cordle ss te lephone for the purpose of calling 911. Due to injuries to her ha nds and arms, she was unable to handle the phone and pushed it along the floor back to the closet. She hear d sounds of the assailant moving about in the house. Th e vic tim wa s able to dia l 91 1 wi th he r ton g ue a ndult imate ly re a c he d th e F rank lin CountySheriff’ s Depa

rtment dispatcher . Whil e the victim was on the telephone , she saw the ski-ma sked intrude r co m e bac k to the closet throug h the g low of the bathr oo m li g ht. De sp ite the pr e se nc e of theski ma sk , th e vic tim was able to

rec og nize the intruder as the defe ndant. She scre amed, a nd the def endant shot her ag ain. The vic tim “play ed dead at that time.” She hear d the def endant in the be droom op e nin g dr a we rs in h e r j e we lry c he st. F rank lin Cou nty

of fi c e rs arrive d at th e Roc k Cr e e k Ro a d h ou se pu rs ua nt t o the 91 1 c a ll a ndfo un d th e vic tim in the c los e t. S he wa s tr a ns po rt e d to a ho sp ita l in Win c h e s te r a n d w a s u lt im a te ly a ir

- li f te d to a me d ic a l c e n te r in Ch a tt a noog a. The-3-

vic tim su ff e re d “ mul tip le g un sh ot w ou nd s to he r c he st andne c k a re a , a ndto h e r a

rm s and hands.” The stipulation of fac ts revea ls that the v i ct i m “w as seve rely injured, with said injuries being life threatening [, resulting in her be ing] disfig ured.” Both the de fendant’s and the victim’s lives we re insure d by a Hor ace Mann I nsuranc e Company

life insuranc e policy

which provide d “that, if one of them died, the survivor would re ceive $300,000.” The office rs obtained a sample of the victim’s blood, and t h eyrec overe d shotgun pe llets from the victim' s bed, the b ed room floor, the c loset, the victim’s nig ht sh i r t , a n dt h e h o s p i t a l tr a u m a r o o mw h e r e s h e w a s tr e a t e d

. T h e o f f i c e r s a lso

rec overe d shotgun w adding from the be droom are a and f rom the victim’s person. The office rs found the vic tim’s jewelry chest ope n and dra wer s pulled out of furniture throug hout the hous e. An outside door was standing open with a window in the door broken. The office rs obtained sa mples of g lass from the door . They also found a live, twelve- g aug e shotg un shell in the house. Of fi c e rs wh o w e re dis patc he d to Ge ra ld T uc ke r’ s h ou se arrive d at 3: 08 a .m. and found the defe ndant’s truc k parke d outside the house with the “hood of the truck . . . hot to the touch.” When the def endant’ s father led the off icer s to the defe ndant’s room, “he actua lly cra wled out of t he bed and cra wled on the f loor befor e standing up with the assistance of his fathe r.” H e appe are d to the office rs to be “ve ry shaken.” Wit h the conse nt of Gerald Tucker, the office rs s ear ched his house and found a twelve -g aug e shot g un that, despite having be en re cently clea ned with oil, contained human blood and tissue inside the barrel. The DNA of the blood and tissue inside the shotgun ba

rre l was consistent with the victim’s DNA. The officers found pa rticles of g la ss i ns ide the de fe nd a nt' s tr uc k w hic h prov e d to be “ lik e a ndc on sis te nt w ith respe ct to ref

rac tive index” to the glass br oken fr om t h e d o o r wi ndow at the Rock Creek Roa d house. I n a sta te me nt g ive n to the of fi c e rs , the de fe nd a nt d e nie d th a t he ha d g on e to the vic tim ’s ho us e a nd that he ha d s ho t he r. He a dmi tte d to a n in tim a te re la tio ns hip with a woman na med Sabrina H odg e. On Fe bruary

18, 2000, a neighbor of Gerald Tucker found a dar k plastic bag in a wooded a

rea near the road that leads to the de fendant’s fathe r' s house. I nside the bag , he found a

wallet that conta ined the victim’s identification paper s. Be ing a war e of the a ssault ag ainst th e v i ct i m , t h e neig hbor ca lled the TB I . The TB I ag ent who took custod y o f the ba g found inside, in addition to the wallet, numerous piec es of je we lry , c oin s, a sk i ma sk
, g lov e s, c ov e ra lls
, a nd bo ots

. Th e pla sti c bag al so
c on ta ine d a no the r p la sti c ba g wh ic h cont aine d “ nu me ro us lov e le tte rs a ndc ard s” wh ic h h a d been sen t to the de fe nd a nt f ro m Ms . H od g e . T he se c on d b a g a lso contained “ numerous photos of Sabrina Hodg e in re vealing underw ear clothing.” The victim i d en t i fi ed the wallet as her s and the jew elry and coins a s her property that had bee n stored in her jewelry chest prior to the attack. T he photog raphs bore the defe ndant’s fing erprints. The victim identifie d the ski ma sk as being simil ar to the one the de fendant wore during the att ack. T he ski mask and g loves bore p a r ti c l e s o f

g l a s s w h i c h “ w e r e l i k e a n d c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e s p e c tt o r e f

r a c t i v e i n d e x”Pri or t o e n t er i n g h i s g u i l t y pl ea t o t h e at t empt ed mu r der c harge in o p en c ou r t , t h e D ef en dan t h ad s i g n ed a 1

G u ilt y P le a a n d W a ive r o f R igh ts fo rm a s to this c h a rg e in A p ril o f 2 0 0 1

.
-4- to the g lass broken f

rom the door. Furthermore
, via DNA analy sis, blood found on the ski mask matched the victim’s blood. The covera lls from the ba g contained f ive spent twelve- g aug e shotg un-shell casings. L aboratory analy sis revea led that all five shells had bee n fired f

rom the twelve- g aug e shotgun found at Ger ald Tucke r’s house. Analy sis of the empty

s h o t gu n ca s ings f

ound in the cover alls and the live twelve- g aug e rounds f

ound in the victim’s house and in th e def endant’ s truck

reve aled that a ll of the ammunition was “likely manufa cture d at the same time a s
eac h other a nd wer e likely packa g ed tog ether

by the manufa cture r.” Ba s ed u p o n co m p ar i sons made b et we en t h e p el l et p at t er n o f t h e t we l v e- gau ge shotgun f ound in Ger ald Tucker’s house and the pe llet pattern found in the vic tim’s nightshirt, TB I

laboratory

personne l opined that she was shot on at least one occ asion fr om a dis ta nc e of

le ss tha n te n f

e e t.

Wade P. Tucker , 2002 WL 1574996, at *1-3.

I n Mar ch of 2000, a Franklin County g rand jury

indicted the De fendant on one count of
atte mp te d f

ir s t d e g r e e mu r d e r , s e e T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 2 a n d 3 9

- 1 2

- 1 0 1
, o n e c o u n t of

e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, s e e i d

. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 4 0 3
, a n d o n e c o u n to f e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y, see id. § 39-14- 404.

II. P lea Hearing and B ench Trial At a hea ring conducte d in May

of 2001, the De fendant entere d a g uilty plea to the attempted murder c harg e and ple d not guilty to the rema ining two c harg es. The re cord rev ea l s that the 1 Def endant e lected to p ro ceed on the robbe ry and burg lary

char g es at a

bench trial pursuant to a

car efully cra fted stipulation of fac ts. Furthermore, a ll three plea s were enter ed with the understanding of “open” sentencing , with the trial court to dete rmine the De fendant’s sentenc e at a later hearing.

At the plea he aring , the trial court car efully ex p l ai n ed t o t he De fendant the rig hts he was forf eiting by entering a

g uiltyplea to the char g e of attempted murder. During this c olloquy , the court asked the Def

endant no less than f

i v e t i m es i f h e had any

questions, and ea ch time the De fenda nt responde d, “No, sir.” The c ourt asked the Def endant if h e wa n t ed t o g ive up his rig hts, and he

re pli e d, “ Ye s, sir .” Th e c ou rt a sk e d the De fe nd a nt if his a tto rn e y ha d d isc us se d h is c a se wi th h im; if they had discussed possible de fense s; an d if he wa s satisfied with his counsel’s re prese ntation. To e a c h of the se qu e sti on s the De fe nd a nt re pli e d, “ Ye s, sir .” Th e c ou rt a sk e d the Defend ant if any one had f

orce d him to enter his g uilty plea, and the Def endant replied, “No, sir.” The court a sked the Defenda nt if

h e h a d r e a d a n d d is c u s s e d w ith h is a tt o r n e y h is w r itte n g u il ty

p le a , a n d if

h e h ad signe d it, and the Defenda nt replied, “Yes, sir.” As a fina l question, the court aske d: “Mr. Tuc ker,

are y ou g uiltyof this offense ? ” Howe ver, the De fendant did not speak, rathe r the De fendant’s counsel responded as follows: “Your Honor, under t he fa cts and c ircumstance s that we’ve indicated,T h e D e fen d a n t ha d b e e n ind ic te d fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra v a te d b u rg la ry. 2

A c o n v ic tio n fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry re q u ire s 1 0 0 % se rv ic e o f sen te n c e

. S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3

4 0 -3 5 -5 0 1 (i)( 1 ) a n d (2 )( E ).

T he D ef endan t ’ s t r i al coun s el
, ag ai ns t wh om t he D ef endan t ’ s al l ega t i ons of

i nef fect i ve as s i s t anc e of

coun s el 4

were l evi ed
, wi l l be ref erred t o only as “Co unsel ” t hrougho ut t hi s o p i ni o n.

-5- I ha ve , M r. Tu c ke r h a s e nte re d th is g uil ty ple a wi ll in gly and op e nly . T he re is s imp ly no way to contra vene the scientific e vidence , the other e vidence indicated, a nd for that r eason he will state he’s

e nte ri ng a g uil ty ple a .” Whe re up on the tr ia l c ou rt a c c e pte d th e ple a a nd fo un d the De fe nd a nt g uil ty of attempted f

irst deg ree murder.

Ba sed on the sti p u l at ed fac ts entere d at the plea hearing, the trial court a lso found the Def endant g uiltyof the indi cted c harg e of e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry , and g uiltyof the lesse ri n c l u d e d c h ar g e o f

a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y. 2

III. Sentencing an d Direct Appeal I n May of 2001, the De fendant was sentenced as a R ang e I
, standard offende r, t o twenty -four y e ars fo r h is a tte mpt e d mur de r c on vic tio n, tw e nty -f ou r y e ars a s a vio le nt of

fe nd e r f or his e sp e c ia lly ag g r a v a te d r o b b e r y

c o n v ic ti o n , a n d f

iv e y e ar s a s a

s tan d ar d o f

f e n d e r f o r h is a g g r a v a te d b u rg lary 3 conviction. The sentenc es wer e order ed to be serve d concur rently
, for an eff

ective twenty -four

y ear term in the TDOC. On dire ct appe al, this Court rever sed and vaca t ed t h e ag g ravated burg lary

c on vic tio n, bu t a ff

ir me d t he rem ain ing c on vic tio ns a ndtw e nty -f ou r y e ar s e nte nc e s. Se e Wad e P. Tucke r, 2002 WL

1574996. In Decem b er of 2002, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court denied f urther

app e a l.

IV. P ost-c onviction I n November of 2003, the Def endant timely

filed a pr o se petition for post-c onviction relief alleg ing multiple issues. An attorne y was a ppointed, an d an ame nded post-convic tion petition alleg ing an involuntary

g uiltyplea a nd ineffe ctive assistance of counsel was filed in Ma rch of 2004. The De fendant rec eived a post-conviction hea

ring in Aug ust of 2004.

At the post-conviction evide ntiary hearing, the Def

endant’ s trial counsel (Counsel) testified 4 that he me t w iththe De fe nd a nt andva riou s mem bers of

his famil y

“ ma ny tim e s. ” Du ri ng the se meeting s Counsel d i s cu s s ed possible theorie s of def ense, but ultimately

determined the evidenc e ag ainst his client was “ove rwhe lming.” Counsel ther efor e advise d his client t o plead guilty to the

a tte mpt e d mur de r ch arg e a nd “ se e k dism iss a l of the Es pe c ia lly Ag g ravate d Ro bb e ry

c a se be c aus e of the de fer ential in punishment,” t h er eby making the Def

endant “ elig ible for pa

role a s early

as po ssi ble .” Whe n a sk e d if he wa s a wa

re of Mr

. Mil ton Ei ds on a s a po te nti a l w itn e ss, Cou ns e l sa id he wa s, but electe d not to interview him as he believed any eff ort to do so would have be en “f utile” considering the substantial evidenc e ag ainst his client.-6-

When asked about employ ing experts to challeng e the State’s DNA evidenc e, Counsel stated he discussed the proce ss, including the c ost, with the De fe n dant and his fa mily , but believed a ny such eff orts would not ha ve helped the ca se g iven the “totality of the fa cts.” Counsel testified that he did not believe that the State’s scientific e vidence “would be contra vened” by other e x perts, and further noted: “You’ ve g ot to remember in this case there was not only circ umstantial evidence , but there was dire ct evidenc e in this case.”

W h en as k ed wh y

h e d i d n o tp u rs u e go v er n m en tfu n d i n g t o h i re ex p er twi t n es s es t o ch al l en ge the State’s scie ntific evidenc e, C o u n s el s t ated that he did attempt to have funds he ld in escrow pursuant t o the Def

endant’ s divorce pr ocee dings r elea sed for this purpose, but his request wa s de nie d. Ho we ve r, Cou ns e l a dd e d th a t th e re a l is su e wa s n ot a ma tte r o f w hethe r hi s cli e nt c ou ld aff ord to hire e x pert witnesse s, but rather that doing so would not, in his opi nion, y ield any positive results. On cr oss-examination Couns el testified that he w as experienc ed in criminal law, had previously

handled c ases whe re D NA evide nce w as cha lleng ed, and he had fully discussed with the Def endant the pr os and cons of proce eding to trial or pleading g uilty

. Mr. Milton Eidson, a neig hbor of the property wher e the shooting took plac e, testified that on the nig ht in question he observed a black Chevrolet pickup i n his driveway betwee n 11:30 and 11:45 p.m., an d ap p r o xim a te ly a n h o u r late r h e h e ar d th r e e g u n s h o ts

. O n c r o s s

- e xa mi n a ti o n , M r. Eidso n a d mi tt e d h e w a s n o t s u r e o f th e e xa c t ti me s o f th e s e e v e n ts a s h e w a s n o t “ looking a t the clock,” and it may

have be en as late as 3:00 a .m. when he he ard the three g unshots. Mr. Eidson
test if ie d th a t th e d is tan c e b e tw e e n h is d r iv e w a y , w h e r e h e s a w th e tr u c k
, a n d th e h o u s e whe re the vic tim wa s sh ot, wa s a

bo ut s ix hun dr e d y ard s.

T h e D ef en d an t ’s fa t h er , M r. Ge ra l d T u ck er , t es t i fi ed t h at h e a cc o m p an i ed h i s s on in me et i n gs with Counsel “numerous times.” During these meeting s, Counsel w as informed of Mr. Eidson, who could testify

to an uni dentified indi vidual in a black Chevrolet truck being in the g ener al vicinity the same nig ht as the shooting, and of the De fendant’s claim that his g irlfriend’ s ex-husband kidnapped him at g unpoint and forced him to participate i n the shooting of the victim. Howeve r, Mr. Tuc ker believed Counsel ne ver f

ollowed up on either of these de fense theories. Mr. T ucker also stated that Counsel informed him that hiring outside experts to challeng e the State’s DNAevidenc e would be very expensive, but failed to inform him that g overnme nt funding may have be en available for suc h a cha lleng e.

Ad dit ion a lly , tw o o f the De fendan t’ s aunts a ndhis sis te r a lso te sti fi e d th a t th e y me t w ith Counsel and made him aw are of possible leads on alternative defe nse theorie s, but Counsel failed to pursue them.

T h e D ef en d an td i d n o tt es t i fyath i s p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n h ea ri n g.

I n a September

2004 order

the trial court denied the Def endant’ s petition for post-conviction relief . I n this order, the c ourt made de tailed finding s and conc luded that Counsel’s “strate g ic and
ta c tic a l c ho ic e s w e re re a so na ble in l ig ht o f the state ’s ov e rw he lmi ng pr oo f in this c a se a ndsh ou ldM a n n ing w a s a d ire c t ap p e a l, n o t an a p p e a l o f a p o st-co n v ic tio n ju d g m e n t. 5

-7- not now be sec ond-g uessed.” Thus, it found that the Def endant f ailed to show any

evide n ce of defic ient repr esentation by his trial counsel. As to the claim of a n involuntary g uiltyplea, the c ourt noted that the De fendant “did not take the stand at the post-conviction hea ring and pre sent ed no proof” as to this claim, thereby rende ring it meritless. This appeal followe d.

AN AL YSI S The Def endant first alleg es that his c onviction f or attempted murde r is void because he ne ver audibly admitted g uilt at the plea hea ring . The De fendant also claims his t ri al att orney was constitutionally defic ient in two respec ts: (1) Counsel failed to intervie w potential witnesses, a nd (2) Co u n s e l f a il e d to s e e k

f u n d in g for independe n t r e v ie w o f th e St a te ’ s s c ie n ti f

ic e v id e n c e

. We disag ree

.
I. Stand ard of Review To susta i n a p et i t ion for post-convic tion relief, a defe ndant must prove his or her fac tual alleg ations by clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e at a n evidentiary hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ); Momon v. State, 18 S.W .3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999) . Upon re view, this Court will not reweig h or re-eva luate the evidenc e below; all questions conce rning the credibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value to be g iven their testimony , and the f actua l issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e to be resolved by

the trial judg e, not t he appellate courts. See Mom on, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley v. State, 96 0 S. W.2 d 5 72 , 5 78 -7 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . T he tr ia l ju dg e ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t ona pe ti ti on for po stconvicti o n r e li e f ar e a f

f o r d e d th e w e ig h t o f a ju r y v e r d ic t a n d ar e c o n c lu s iv e o n ap p e a l u nless the evidenc e preponderates ag ainst those finding s. See Momon, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 578.

II. Void Guilty Ple a I n the Def

endant’ s first issue on appea l, he claims that “the judgme nt of g uilt to attempted murder i n the first deg ree [i s] voi d beca use [he] never admitted g uilt at the plea proc eeding .” To support this assertion the Def endant a rg ues that whil e he aff

irmed t hat he unde rstood the rig hts he

was surr endering and that he had signe d a written guilty plea, he never

himself audibly

said he wa s g uil ty . Rathe r, his tr ia l c ou ns e l ans we re d in th e a ff ir ma tiv e fo r h im. Th e De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t hi s plea is there fore void, and his plea proc eeding was c onstitut ionally defic ient, vi o l ating his due pr oc e ss rig hts a s g ua

rante e d b y

Artic le I , s e c tio n 9 of

th e Te nn e sse e Con sti tut iona ndthe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constituti on.

Th e De fe nd a nt a dmi ts that he faile d to raise thi s is su e on di rect app eal , o r i n h is p os tc on vic tio n p e tit ion , o r at his po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , b ut a rg ue s th a t it

is n ot w a ive d b e c a us e his judgme nt of guilt is “void ab in nitio” [si c] and therefor e not subject t o waiver

. Alternatively , the Def endan t ar g u e s th a t th is is a n “ e xc e p ti o n a l c ir c u ms tan c e []” w h e r e in th is Co u r t c a n a d d r e s s the issue on its own acc ord as a matter of pla in error , citing State v. Manning, 500 S.W.2d 913, 914 (T e nn . 1 97 3)

. Th e State arg ue s th a t th e De fe nd a nt h a s w a ive d th is i ssu e fo r f a ilu re to i nc lud e it i n 5 the po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ionor raise it at prior

pr oc e e din g s.W e n o t e that a d efen d an t i s all o w ed t o en t er a p l ea o f gu i l t y w he n he or she b eli ev es it i s i n their b est i ntere st 6

t o a cc ept a pl ea bar g ai n , bu t w h i l e s t i l l ma i n t ai n i n g h i s or h er i n n oce n ce

. Se e N or t h Car ol i n a v

. Al for d, 400 U

. S. 25, 37- 38 ( 1970)

. Ac cor di ngl y , it is w el l set t l ed l aw t h at a g u i l t y pl ea ma y be a cc ept ed, a n d a j u dg men t of c on v i ct i on

e n te re d , w itho u t t h e d e fen d a n t ac tua lly a d m itt ing he o r sh e is gu ilt y.

W e no t e t he D efend ant rai sed an i nvo l unt ary gui l t y p l ea cl ai m i n hi s o ri gi nal pro s e p o st

- co nvi ct i o n pe t i t i o n, 7

h o w e v e r, h is a rg u m e n t wa s tha t his p le a a g re e m e n t wa s v io la te d w h e n he w a s se n te n c e d to se rv e 1 0 0 % o f his e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry co n v ic tio n . W e no te tha t t h e re c o rd re v e a ls tha t t h e D e fen d a n t ne v e r e n te re d into a p le a a g re e m e n t,

a n d this a rg u m e n t wa s n o t ra ise d a t t h e p o st-co n v ic tio n he a rin g w h e n the D e fen d a n t wa s re p re se n te d b y c o u n se l.

-8- We beg in our analy sis by noting that the Defe ndant’s convic tion would be at most voidable,

a ndno t vo id. Th e De fe nd a nt h a s n ot p ro vid e d a ny auth ority , a ndwe kn ow of no ne , to su pp ort hi s claim that fa iling to per sonally answe r “y es” w h en as k ed “are y ou g uilty ? ” at a g uiltyplea he aring rende rs his judgme n t o f co n v i cti on void on its face. Rather, the w ell established standa rd for 6 challeng ing the validity

of a ple a proc eeding and a pote ntially void (i.e. voidable) g uiltyplea is set forth in B oykin v. Alabama, 395 U .S. 238 (1969), and State v. Macky
, 553 S.W .2d. 337 (Tenn. 1977)

. Howeve r, in this c ase, the Def endant has waived any

potential Boy

kin or Macky

claim with reg ard to not audibly

admitting his g uilt byfailing to raise this issue in his post-conviction petition or at prior pr oc e e din g s. 7

Th e re c or d r e ve a ls that th e De fe nd a nt d id n ot r a ise the iss ue of a “ vo id” c on vic tio n in h is p os tconviction petit ion or before the post-conviction court. I t is settled law that an issue not pre sented in the petition for post-conviction re lief or a ny of its amendments “may

not be ra ised for the first time on appe al.” State v. Tow nes, 56 S.W.3d 30, 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), rev’ d on other gro u n d s , S t at e v

. T erry , 1 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 5 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 3 ). S ee al s o T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 6 (g) (“ A g ro un d f

or re lie f i s waive d if the pe tit ion e r pe rs on a lly or thr ou g h a n atto rn e y

faile d to pr e se nt i t for de terminati on in any

proce eding befor e a c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction in which the g round

c ou ld h a ve be e n pr e se nte d. ” ). Mo re ov e r, plain e rr or a na ly sis is n ot a va ila

ble in an a

pp e a l of a po stconviction denial. See State v. West, 19 S.W .3d 753, 756-57 (Tenn. 2000). Acc ording ly , this iss ue is waived.

III. Inef fective Assistance of Cou nsel Th e De fe nd a nt a lso a sse rt s that his tr ia l a tto rn e y wa s c on sti tut ion a lly de fi c ie nt i n tw o r e sp e c ts

re la tin g to h is d e fe ns e : ( 1) Cou ns e l f a ile d to int e rv ie w a

po te nti a l w itn e ss, a nd(2 ) C ou ns e l f a ile d to “see k funding to provide re source s for inde p en d en t review of for ensic e vidence .” The Def endant fu rthe r a rg ue s th a t th e se de fi c ie nc ie s le d to a c tua l pr e jud ic e a ndhe is the re fo re e nti tle d to po stconviction re lief.

Both the Six th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article I , Section 9 of the Tenne ssee Cons t i t u t i on g uarantee a criminal def

endant the right to re prese ntation by counsel. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

. Both the U nited States S u preme Court and the Te nnessee Supreme Court have rec og nized that the rig ht to such repr esentation includes the rig ht to “rea sonably eff ective” assistance , that is, within t he-9-

rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. S ee Strickla nd v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Baxt er, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

A lawy er’ s assistance to his or he r client is ineff ective if the l awy er’ s conduct “ so undermined the prope r functioning of the adversarial proce ss that the trial ca nnot be re lied on as having produce d

a jus t r e su lt. ” Stric kland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 6. Th is o ve ra ll s ta nd ardis c omp ri se d of t wo c omp on e nts : defic ient perf

ormanc e by the defendant’s lawy er, and actua l prejudice to the defense c aused by the defic ient perf

ormanc e. See id. at 687; Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 461. The defe ndant bea rs the burde n of establishing both of

these c omponents by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T enn. C ode Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ); Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 461. The defenda nt’s failure to prove either deficienc y or pre judice is a sufficie nt basis upon which to deny relief on an inef

fec tive assistance of counse l claim. See Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 461; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996).

Th is t wo -p art

stand ardof

me a su ri ng ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l a lso app lie s to c la ims arising out of a g uiltyplea. See Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). The pr ejudice c omponent is m o d if ie d s u c h th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t “ mu s t s h o w th a t th e r e is a r e a s o n ab le p r o b ab il it y th a t, b u t for counsel’s e rror s, he would not have pleade d g uilty and would have insist ed on g oing to trial.” I d. at 59; see a lso Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

I n evaluating a

lawy er’ s perf

ormanc e, the r eviewing court u s es an objec tive standard of “re asonableness.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. The r eviewing court must be highly

defe rential to counse l’s choice s “and s h o u l d i n d u lge a strong presumption that counsel’s c ondu c t f

all s w ithin the wide rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W .3d

a t 46 2; s e e a lso Stric kland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 9. The cou rt sh ou ld not us e the be ne fi t of hin ds ig ht t o second- g uess trial strate g y o r t o cr i ticize counsel’s tac tics, see He llard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) , and counse l’s alleg ed err ors should be judge d in lig ht of all the fa cts and c ircumstance s as of the time they

wer e made , see Strickland, 466 U .S. at 690; Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

A trial court’s determination of an ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel claim pre sents a mix ed question of law and fac t on appea l. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) . This Court revie ws the trial court’s finding s of fac t w ith r eg ard to the eff ectivene ss of counsel unde r a de novo standard, a ccompa nied with a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect unless the pre ponderance of the e vidence is othe rwise. See id. “Howe ver, a trial court’ s conclusions of law- -such a s whether counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient or whether that defic iency was prejudicia l--ar e re viewed unde r a pure ly de novo standa

rd, wit h no presumption of correc tness g iven to the trial court’s conclusions.” I d.

A. F ail ur e to Int e r vie w a P ot e nt ial Wit ne ss The De fendant arg ues that Counsel provided de ficient re prese ntation b ecause he knew Mr. Eidson was a pote ntial witness, but failed to interview him. The Def endant a sserts that Mr. Eidson
te sti fi e d at the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng that a n u nid e nti fi e d p e rs on wa s in the sa me g e ne ra l vi c ini ty of the c rime sce ne the nig ht of the incident. Mr. Eidson testified that this p er s o n wa s in a blackT est i m o ny was subm i t t ed a t the p o st

- co nvi ct i o n he ari ng that the D efend ant ’ s t ruck was a grey T o y o t a, and t he 8 stip u la te d fac ts p la c e d the sh o o ting o f t h e vic tim a t 2 :3 0 a .m

.
-10- Chevrolet pickup, a nd that he hea rd g unshots between midnig ht and 1:00 a.m. The De fendant now 8

c laim s th at Mr. Ei ds on ’s te sti mon y c on tr a dic te d th e Sta te ’s e vid e nc e , a ndCou ns e l’ s f a ilu re to discover this testimony

prior to his g uiltyplea a nd bench trial amounted to def icient re prese ntation which pre judiced him.

I t appea rs that the De fendant’s arg ument is actua lly a claim of i nadequate i nvestig ation prior
to the g uil ty

ple a . H ow e ve r, the arg ume nt i s a lso dir e c te d at th e failu re to s ub po ena th e wi tne ss t o the Def endant’ s trial. To prevail on an ineffec tive assistance of counse l claim with reg ard to failure
to su bp oe na or pr od uc e a po te nti a l wi tne ss, the de fe nd a nt mus t 1) pr od uc e the wi tness at th e po stc on vict io n hea

ri ng , 2 ) s ho w that tria l c ou ns e l c ou ld h a ve loc a te d th e wi tne ss, a nd3) “ e lic it b oth favor able a nd materia l testimonyfrom the witness.” Denton v. State, 945 S.W .2d 793, 802-03 (Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ) (c iti ng B la c k v. State , 79 4 S.W. 2d75 2, 75 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 )) . In th e c a se ath an d
, t h e D ef

en d an tp ro d u ce d t h e al l ege d l y o v er l o o k ed wi t n es s at t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n p ro ce ed i n g, and Couns el admitted that he wa s made a war e of this potential witness. We ag ain note that the Def endant’ s conviction for attempted first deg reemurder was based upon his g uilty plea, not a trial

on the me ri ts. We a lso no te that his c on vic tio n fo r a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry fo llo we d a be nc h tr ia l with all fac ts being stipulated.

Mr. Eidson testified at the post-c onviction hearing that he heard shots
, but added that it was not unusual to hear g unshots in the rural ar ea in w hich he lived. He also stated that he w as not sure of the time he he ard the shot s , and they may have oc curr ed as late as 3:00 a.m. the morning of the incident. Ther efor e, the shots Mr. Eidson hea rd di d not contradic t the time frame advanc ed by the State and docume nted by the 911 ca ll. Moreove r, the De fendant failed to pre sent any potential defe nse theory

in which the blac k Chevrolet truc k observe d by Mr. Eidson in his driveway , which wa s some six hundred y ards f

rom the house in which the victim was shot, would have serve d as material evidenc e. In short, we fail t o see how Mr. Eidson’s testimony was pa rticularly favor able to the Def en d an t , an d we c onclude that it was not mate rial to his case . We are unconvince d that int e rv ie wi ng thi s wi tne ss wo uldha ve c a us e d Co un se l to a lte r h is o pin ionthat th e De fe nd a nt s ho uld plead g uiltyto attempted murder . We are also unconvince d that this witness’s statement would have mod if ie d c ou ns e l’ s st

rate g y to s ub mit

the re ma ini ng c ha

rg e s to t he jud g e up on sti pu la te d f a c ts. Acc ording ly , we f

ind that Counsel’s de cision not to interview Mr. Eidson in no way prejudice d the Def endant.

B. Failure t o pursu e fun ds to challenge the scientific evidence I n the Def endant’ s last issue on appea l, he claims that his trial attorney provided inef

fec tive assistance of counse l by

failing to declar e his client i ndige nt and pursue g overnme nt funding to hire independe nt experts to review and potentially challeng e the State’s forensic evidence. I n support of this claim, the Defe ndant ar g ues that case law re quires the a ppointment of expert assistance w hen an indige nt defe ndant has shown a ssistance “ is nece ssary ” for a constitutionally

ad eq uate de fense
, quoting f rom State v. Ba

rnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tenn. 1995), and ci t i n g S t ate v. Scott, 33-11-

S.W .3d 746 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that an indig ent def endant w as en t i tled to state-funde d expert assistance in the are a of D NA ana ly sis).

We conclude the Defenda nt has fa iled to establish that Counsel performed def iciently when he de te rm ine d th a t it

wo uldha ve be e n “ fu til e ” to pu rs ue fu nd s fo r i nd e pe nd e nt r e vie w o f the sc ie nti fi c
e vid e nc e be c aus e he didno t be lie ve “ it w ou ld b e c on tr a ve ne d. ” I n B arn e tt, ou r s up re me c ou rt he ld that a defe ndant should be g rante d acc ess to an “indepe ndent psy chiatric expert” only afte r proving

a “ pa rt ic ula ri zedne e d” thr ou g h s ho wi ng that th e fa c ts a nd c ir c ums ta nc e s of his pa rt ic ula r c a se wo uld require an expert in order to “insure a

fair trial.” B ar n et t , 9 0 9 S .W.2d at 431. However , the Def endant in this case provided only unsupported assertions that indepe ndent scientific e x perts may have be en helpf

ul to his ca s e. T h u s, the Def endant f ailed to demonstrate that independe nt expert testimonywas “ nece ssary ” to insure he rec eived a fair trial.

Additionally , the

f a c ts in Sc ott are disting uishable fr om the Def endant’ s case in severa l cruc ial

a sp e c ts: in S c ott , ou r s up re me c ou rt no te d th a t “ the State didno t ha ve a n o ve rw he lmi ng c a se ” a g a ins t the def endant; the victim “c ould not identify her attacke r”; and “the DNA evidenc e appea rs to have been the key stone of the State’ s case .” Scott, 33 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 5 5. Conversely , in this case the tria l
court c hara cterized the evidence ag ainst the Def endant a s “the state’ s o v er wh elm ing pr oof”; the vic tim didide nti fy

the De fe nd a nt a s h e r atta c ke r; a nd wh ile the Sta te uti lize d D NA e vid e nc e , it a lso had dire ct evidenc e in the form of the victim’s testimony as we ll as a substantial amount of other fore nsic circ umstantial e vidence that could proper ly be conside red to “ unerringly point the fing er of g uilt to t he def

endant to the e x clusion of all others be y ond a rea sonable doubt.” Hicks v. State, 490 S.W .2d 174, 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972)

.

B e c aus e we fi nd the De fe nd a nt’ s re pr e se ntatio n b y Cou ns e l w a s n ot d e fi c ie nt w ith re g ardto Counsel’s elec tion not to pursu e i n d ep en d ent i nvestig ation of the scie ntific evidenc e, we need not addre ss the Strickland prejudice prong . Acc ording ly
, the Defenda nt has failed to prove by clea r and

c on vin c ing e vid e nce th at he re c e ive d r e pr e se ntatio n th a t f e ll o uts ide the rang e of

re a so na ble profe ssional assistance. This issue is without merit.

CO NC LU SION Ba sed on the for eg oing r easoning and authorities, we affirm the judgme nt of the court deny ing post-conviction re lief.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE