Technical Report 1186

Leader Experience and the Identification of

Challenges in a Stability and Support Operation

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel

United States Military Academy

Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership

Michelle L. Zbylut

U.S. Army Research Institute

Daniella Fuchs, Kathleen Campbell, Donna Brazil,

and Eric Morrison

United States Military Academy

Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership

July 2006

20060929047

United States Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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for the Behavioral And Social Sciences

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Authorized and approved for distribution:

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Acting Technical Director Acting Director

Technical review by

James Lussier, U. S. Army Research Institute

Kimberly Metcalf, U. S. Army Research Institute

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (from... to)

July 2006 Interim February 2005 - December 2006

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

MIPR4JUSM04056

Leader Experience and the Identification of Challenges in a Stability

and Support Operation 5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

622785

6. AUTHOR(S): 5c. PROJECT NUMBER

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel (United States Military Academy, Department of A790

Behavioral Science and Leadership), Michelle L. Zbylut (U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral & Social Sciences), and Daniella 5d. TASK NUMBER

Fuchs, Kathleen Campbell, Donna Brazil, and Eric Morrison (United States 269

Military Academy, Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership) 5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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Arlington, VA 22202-3926 Technical Report 1186

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Subject Matter POC: Michelle Zbylut

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

This paper describes exploratory research that examined the impact of military leadership experience on how individuals

frame a type of operating environment encountered by Soldiers deployed to the Middle East. Sixteen captains and 25 cadets

from the United States Military Academy watched a film depicting a food distribution operation in Afghanistan and then

indicated the key leadership challenges and decisions that they believed were present in the scenario. Content analysis

resulted in 21 dimensions of leadership activities and four higher-level categories representing tactical decision-making,

managing relationships with subordinates and other Soldiers, situational challenges, and handling local civilians and

warlords. Consistent with previous research on expert-novice differences, experienced leaders placed significantly more

emphasis on tactical and leadership concerns than did inexperienced cadets. Officers' answers to open-ended questions also

displayed more integrative thinking than cadets. Contrary to expectations, however, officers and cadets did not differ with

respect to how they framed cultural issues embedded in the film. Results of the paper have implications for how instructors

can help build the expertise of their students.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Leadership, Expertise, Experience, Cultural Awareness, Stability and Support Operation, Training, AXL, Power Hungry

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ..- 19. LIMITATION 20. NUMBER 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

- OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES Ellen Kinzer

16. REPORT 17. ABSTRACT 18. THIS PAGE Technical Publication Specialist

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited 34 703-602-8047
ii
Technical Report 1186

Leader Experience and the Identification of Challenges in a

Stability and Support Operation

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel

United States Military Academy

Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership

Michelle L. Zbylut

U.S. Army Research Institute

Daniella Fuchs, Kathleen Campbell, Donna Brazil, and Eric Morrison

United States Military Academy

Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership

Leader Development Research Unit

Stanley M. Halpin, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926

July 2006

Army Project Number Personnel Performance

622785A790 and Training Technology

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

111ii
iv
LEADER EXPERIENCE AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGES IN A

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

Increasingly, junior officers in the United States Army operate in highly complex

environments, requiring them to fulfill multiple roles simultaneously, such as warfighter,

peacekeeper, and nation builder. Junior leaders must quickly develop leadership expertise to

deal with the current operating environment. This research examines the relationship between

military leadership experience and how individuals conceptualize a chaotic and unpredictable

operating environment.

Procedure:

Sixteen captains and 25 cadets at the United States Military Academy watched a film

depicting a food distribution operation in Afghanistan. Captains and cadets responded to five

open-ended questions about the key challenges encountered by the company commander in the

scenario, situational variables that impacted the mission, effective and ineffective actions of the

commander, and actions that the commander should have done differently. Answers were then

content coded to extract themes participants used to conceptualize the scenario. Answers also

were scored for thematic emphasis and breadth of coverage across different themes.

Findings:

Results indicated that the scenario could be conceptualized in terms of 21 dimensions.

The 21 dimensions could be grouped into four higher-order categories: (1) managing tactical

aspects of the task, (2) managing relationships with followers and self-management, (3)

situational challenges, and (4) handling the local population and militias. Captains' answers

tended to emphasize tactical decision making and managing relationships more strongly than did

cadets' answers, and captains' answers also indicated greater integration of multiple higher-order

categories than did cadets' answers. However, a surprising finding of this investigation was that

captains and cadets did not differ with respect to their emphasis on either situational challenges

or how to handle the local population.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

This research sheds light on the differences between novice and experienced leaders in

how they think about complex operating environments. This investigation resulted in a

framework of 21 dimensions and four higher-order categories that instructors can use to guide

students to think about issues that might be overlooked. Additionally, results indicated that

captains and cadets did not differ significantly with respect to their cultural understanding of the

scenario used in this research, suggesting that instructional interventions to improve cultural

knowledge are necessary at both the cadet and captain-level.

v
vi
LEADER EXPERIENCE AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGES IN A

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATION

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1

The Distinction Between Experts and Novices .............................................................. I

Experience and Leadership ............................................................................................ 3

M ETHOD ............................................................................................................................. 5

P articip an ts ...................................................................................................................... 5

Task and Procedure .................................................................................. 5

The Identification of Emergent Themes in the Power Hungry Scenario ....................... 5

Scoring Participant Responses ........................................................................................ 6

RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 8

Number and Type of Dimensions Identified ................................................................. 8

Dimensional Emphasis .................................................................................................... 9

Category Breadth ............................................................................................................ 13

Exploration of Relationships among Dimensions ........................................................... 13

DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 19

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 23

vii
CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF TABLES

Page

TABLE 1. DIMENSIONS AND HIGHER ORDER CATEGORIES DERIVED

FROM CONTENT ANALYSIS ....................................................... 7

TABLE 2. T-TEST RESULTS FOR INDICES OF OVERALL DIFFERENTIATION

AND DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN CATEGORY .................................. 9

TABLE 3. T-TEST RESULTS COMPARING OFFICERS TO CADETS WITH RESPECT

TO EMPHASIS ON DIM ENSIONS ..................................................... 10

TABLE 4. PERCENTAGES OF HOW OFTEN EACH DIMENSION WAS MENTIONED

BY OFFICERS VERSUS CADETS ................................................... 12

TABLE 5. T-TEST RESULTS FOR INDICES OF INTEGRATION (I.E., CATEGORY

B R E A D T H ) ................................................................................ 13

TABLE 6. ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS FOR CADETS (N = 25) FOR TOTAL

NUMBER OF UNIQUE DIMENSIONS AND DIMENSIONAL EMPHASIS.... 15

TABLE 7. ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS FOR OFFICERS (N= 16) FOR TOTAL

NUMBER OF UNIQUE DIMENSIONS AND DIMENSIONAL EMPHASIS... 17

viii
LEADER EXPERIENCE AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGES

IN A STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATION

Introduction

The current operational environment of the United States (U.S.) military is highly

complex and ambiguous. Often, junior officers are required to fulfill multiple roles

simultaneously, such as warfighter, peacekeeper and nation builder (Wong, 2004). Junior

leaders must be able to adjust to the concurrent demands of fighting insurgents while developing

collaborative relationships with the local population (Kifner, 2006). Junior leaders may be

required to be expert tacticians in one situation and diplomats in the next. Unfortunately,

domain-specific or principled knowledge developed to address one aspect of leadership (e.g.,

battlefield skills) may not generalize to the demands of peacekeeping situations or other types of

interpersonal interactions with civilians. Research is necessary that examines how military

leaders frame the culturally complex and ill-structured problems commonly encountered in the

current operational environment in order to identify strengths and weaknesses in leader

conceptualizations. Additionally, research should investigate the role that expertise plays in how

Soldiers think about such situations because knowledge of expert-novice differences may

suggest ways to accelerate the learning process for inexperienced leaders. This paper explores

the impact of military leadership experience on how individuals conceptualize one type of

operating environment encountered by officers deployed to the Middle East.

The Distinction between Experts and Novices

Experience plays a key role in the learning and acquisition of job relevant knowledge

(Borman, Hanson, Oppler, & Pulakos, 1993; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986) and it

represents the most prevalent operationalization of expertise (Bedard & Chi, 1993; Cellier,

Eyrollr, & Marine, 1997). The impact of expertise, and especially the processes by which

experts apply their experience to solving problems, has been researched extensively in many

different domains, including decision making and problem solving (Anderson, 2004; Carnahan,

Lickteig, Sanders, Durlach, & Lussier, 2004; Hershey, Walsh, Read, & Chulef, 1990; Huber &

Wider, 1997; G. Klein, 1993; Zsambock, 1997), game playing (Abernathy, Neal, & Koning,

1994; Saariluoma, 1994; Schneider, Gruber, Gold, & Opwis, 1993), medicine (Dillon & Norcio,

1997; Norman, Brooks, & Allen, 1989), sports (Bedon & Howard, 1992; Deakin & Allard, 1991;

Kioumoutzoglou, Michalopoulou, & Deft, 1998), and computer science (Barfield, 1997; Batra &

Davis, 1992; Guerin & Matthews, 1990; Paull & Glencross, 1997; Weidenbeck, 1985, 1986).

While experts perform well in their domain of specialization, their expertise does not

automatically transfer to other domains (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Voss & Post, 1988). For example,

an expert chess player may or may not be able to successfully diagnose a problem with a car

engine. To provide a more military-specific example, tactical expertise on the battlefield may

not automatically translate to success in interpersonal one-on-one interactions with local

civilians. This is because experts tend to rely on methods that work well within their domain of

specialization, and these methods may not be applicable to other domains (Johnson, Jamal, &
Berryman, 1991). Specifically, experts are likely to rely on domain-specific assumptions that (1)

direct the search for relevant information, (2) act as a foundation for interpreting this

information, (3) limit the range of acceptable solutions to a problem, and (4) provide guidelines

for solving problems. Thus, when dealing with a problem from a different domain, an expert is

more likely to be successful to the extent that the new problem can be solved using knowledge

and rules-of-thumb from the expert's domain of specialization.

Experts possess well-developed schema that facilitate pattern recognition (Glaser & Chi,

1988). Although novices may be able to recognize a few elements of a problem, experts can

often "intuit" how multiple elements of a problem fit together into a large picture. In some

instances, novices do possess the ability to recognize patterns. However, the quality of patterns

for experts differs from novices in at least three ways (Cellier et al., 1997). First, experts have a

greater number of patterns available in memory. Second, experts are able to include more pieces

of information or variables in their patterns. Third, experts recognize more connections or

relationships between variables, thereby allowing experts to see the "big picture." Consequently,

experts possess a superior understanding of how variables are related to one another, and this

knowledge enables experts to extract the overall meaning from several individual pieces of

information. Experts can draw inferences from a situation to compensate for missing

information, and they know when they need to seek more information to make a decision.

Conversely, novices often do not know what information is relevant to solving a problem.

Experts also tend to represent problems at a much deeper and more principled level than

do novices (Glaser & Chi, 1988). While experts use principles and abstract concepts to group

information, novices group by actual objects or features of a problem. For example, Hardiman,

Dufresne, and Mestre (1989) conducted a study in which experts and novices performed a

categorization task of 32 physics problems. Subjects were asked to compare 24 problems to eight

model problems, which represented certain physics principles that would be used to solve the

problem. Correct classification was dependent upon whether the classification matched the

principle used to solve the problem (e.g., this set of problems required knowledge about the law

of thermodynamics). Results indicated that experts relied on deep structures or meaningful

relationships to classify the problems, while novices relied on surface features (e.g., this set of

problems involved water). These results suggest that experts possess a deeper and more

thorough understanding of principles involved in problem solving, and this deeper understanding

facilitates problem solution.

Thus, experts have developed a sophisticated understanding about how variables and

concepts are interwoven with one another. In the expert-novice literature, this sophisticated

understanding is referred to as knowledge structure (Hardiman et al., 1989), representation of

knowledge (Glaser & Chi, 1988), mental models (Hanisch, Kramer, & Hulin, 1991), or schema

(Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Davies, 1994; Olsen, 2004). These schema allow experts to

perceive large patterns, better understand the nature of a problem, set parameters for problem

solving, clearly visualize potential solutions to a problem, comprehend constraints and

contingencies associated with potential solutions, and make good decisions (Cellier et al., 1997,

Glaser & Chi, 1988; Lord & Hall, 2005; Shanteau, 1992). Experts also use schema to engage in

preventive monitoring and to anticipate potential problems before they occur (Cellier et al.,

1997).

2
Experience and Leadership

Research about expertise can be applied specifically to the concept of leadership.

Researchers noted that leaders draw from experience to deal with interpersonal and

organizational issues (Cianciolo, Antonakis, & Sternberg, 2004; Hedlund, Forsythe, Horvath,

Williams, Snook, & Sternberg, 2003) or to make decisions in the context of battle command

(Carnahan, et al., 2004; Serfaty, MacMillan, E. E. Entin, & E. B. Entin, 1997). Like "experts"

traditionally depicted in the cognitive psychology literature, effective leaders possess complex,

well-organized and domain-specific schematic structures of knowledge that allow them to

respond flexibly to a large range of situational demands (Streufert & Nogami, 1992; Zaccaro,

Gilbert, Thor, & Mumford, 1991). Knowledge representations derived from prior experience

and job knowledge are reshaped and reformed as a way to generate new solutions to novel

problems (Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000). Research investigating a

cognitive skills-based model of leadership effectiveness found that senior and mid-level military

officers demonstrated more complex knowledge representations of their leadership role (as

indicated by higher levels of coherence, organization, and principle-based structures) than did

less experienced junior officers (Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000).

Effective leadership can be viewed, therefore, as a form of expertise that includes both a broad

response repertoire and the ability to apply this knowledge to the resolution of everyday

problems (Day & Lance, 2004). Such findings are consistent with the assumptions of the

Leaderplex model of leadership growth and effectiveness (Hooijberg, Hunt, & Dodge, 1997),

which views social and cognitive complexity as major determinants of behavioral complexity

and leadership effectiveness (Denison, Hooijberg, & Quinnl, 1995). Increased cognitive

complexity is defined in terms of the two complementary processes of differentiation, referring

to the number of dimensions or concepts used in the perception of the social or physical

environment, and integration, which represents the degree to which individual dimensions can be

combined to meet the demands of specific situations (Day & Lance, 2004; Hooijberg et al.,

1997).

Given that experts have highly differentiated knowledge structures compared to novices

(Day & Lance, 2004; Hooijberg et al., 1997) and cognitive complexity plays an important role in

behavioral adaptability (Zaccaro, 1999), experienced leaders are expected to perceive and

recognize a broader range of elements (e.g. tactical, interpersonal, and cultural variables)

inherent in a situation than are less experienced leaders. Moreover, due to their greater capacity

for integrating knowledge principles (Hooijberg et al., 1997), experienced leaders may be more

likely to make decisions that take into account the multiple facets of a situation, and this effect

may be more pronounced as the complexity and ambiguity in the situation increases. For

example, in an exploratory study that investigated differences between experts and novices on a

complex command and control task, experts simultaneously considered nine different command

considerations (i.e., mission, terrain, situational awareness, enemy, assets, planning, informing,

visualizing the battlefield, and the coordination of assets and personnel), while novices

considered only six (Carnahan et al., 2004). Specifically, novices failed to discuss planning,

visualizing the battlefield in proactive ways, and coordinating assets and resources.

Additionally, within the command concern of enemy characteristics, novices primarily focused

on the location of the enemy, while experts discussed the location of the enemy, as well as how

to identify the enemy and the disposition of the enemy.

3
Differences between expert and novice performance are most apparent under conditions of

complexity and uncertainty (Enis, 1995; Spence, 1996). Situation assessment and problem

framing is critical for effective decision making (G. Klein, 1993; Lipshitz, 1993), but novices do

not possess the mental models that would allow them to identify and define problems, resolve

discrepant information in the environment, recognize gaps in information, and ignore irrelevant

information. While much decision making research has noted differences between expert and

novice problem solving in complex situations, it is unclear how experienced and novice leaders

might differ in their beliefs about appropriate leadership actions in conditions of uncertainty.

Leadership research suggests that followers have a strong preference for a directive leadership

style when confronted with uncertainty and risk. Followers may be willing to forgo their desire

to participate in decision making for the promise of a speedy delivery from distressing and

uncertain conditions (Bass, 1998; Bass & Riggio, 2006; A. Klein, 1976; Weinberg, 1978). These

findings are consistent with normative decision making models (Vroom & Jago, 1988; Vroom &

Yetton, 1973) and contingency leadership theories (Fiedler, 1978, Hersey & Blanchard, 1977;

House & Mitchell, 1974), which prescribe that leaders should adopt a directive style of

leadership to help followers deal with unstructured and complex tasks. Conversely, another line

of leadership research proposes that, in complex situations, leaders might wish to obtain input

and information from followers (Drath & Palus, 1994). Obtaining input from followers could be

particularly advantageous when crisis conditions make it more difficult for leaders to pay

attention to all aspects of the situation (Bass & Riggio, 2006; Yukl, 2002). This line of

leadership research suggests that a consultative leadership style would be preferable to a

directive leadership style in times of stress and uncertainty.

The preference for a specific type of leadership style under conditions of uncertainty may

depend on the leader's level of experience. For example, novice leaders with little leadership

experience may adopt more of a follower's perspective and focus on the follower's need for

guidance under conditions of uncertainty. Experienced leaders, however, may define the

problem space differently and focus on things that will enable the leader to make and implement

good decisions, such as incorporating the expertise and knowledge of followers. Research is

required that investigates how expert and novice military leaders differ with respect to what

leadership issues they find salient under conditions of uncertainty.

In sum, experienced leaders are likely to perceive situations and frame problems

differently from their novice counterparts, and the ability to properly define the problem space

enables experts to make effective decision making (G. Klein, 1993; Lipshitz, 1993). The present

investigation explores how commissioned military officers differ from pre-commissioned

military cadets in their understanding of a complex operational environment. Unlike earlier

research that focused primarily either on tactical or interpersonal aspects of military leadership

(Hedlund et al., 2003; Serfaty et al., 1997), the present investigation explores the full range of

leadership considerations, including interpersonal, cultural, and tactical actions. This

investigation also examines how the perception of uncertainty is related to different assessments

of the situation and how those assessments may differ depending on the individual's level of

experience.

4
Method

Participants

Participants were 25 United States Military Academy (USMA) junior and senior-level

cadets enrolled in two organizational behavior classes and 16 officers (15 Army captains and one

Coast Guard captain) enrolled in a graduate program at USMA. Two of the captains and seven

of the cadets were female. Twelve of the 16 captains had deployment experience in Iraq,

Afghanistan, or other locations, and the length of deployment ranged from two to 24 months.

The average deployment length was 11 months. For most captains, their recent deployment

ended immediately prior to joining the graduate program at USMA in June, 2004. For purposes

of this exploratory investigation, captains are classified as "experienced" military leaders, while

cadets are classified as "novice" military leaders.

Task and Procedure

Officers and cadets watched a video case study called Power Hungry and responded to a

short questionnaire at the end of the video. The Power Hungry case study' is a 13-minute film

about a character named Captain Young and an Army company tasked with securing a food

distribution site in Afghanistan. Captain Young encounters a number of problems, including

poor terrain, severe time constraints, faulty communication systems, inexperienced subordinates,

local Afghan villagers, and uninvited warlords. Effectively dealing with the situation becomes a

complex matter involving tactical, cultural, and interpersonal considerations. The film content is

perceived as highly realistic by students (Zbylut &Ward, 2004; Zbylut, Ward, & Mark, 2005)

and was based on interviews with officers who had been deployed (Hill, Douglas, Gordon,

Pighin, & van Velsen, 2003). Immediately after watching the movie, participants completed a

paper-and-pencil questionnaire that contained the following five open-ended questions:

1. What were the key challenges and decisions that Captain Young faced as the

operation evolved?

2. What situational factors were likely to impact Captain Young's ability to succeed?

3. Identify Captain Young's key effective actions in response to the challenges.

4. Identify Captain Young's major ineffective actions.

5. What additional actions would you recommend to Captain Young to avoid mission

failure?

The Identification of Emergent Themes in the Power Hungry Scenario

Before exploring differences between experienced and novice military leaders, it was

important to determine what aspects of the Power Hungry scenario participants generally found

to be salient. To determine the salient features of the scenario, the first and third authors of this

1 A text-based version of the Power Hungry story can be found in "Think Like a Commander: Excellence in

Leadership-Educating Army Leaders with the Power Hungry Film" (Zbylut & Ward, 2004). Copies of this

instructor's manual are available through the Scientific and Technical Information Network at

http://stinet.dtic.mil/str/index.html. Power Hungry was developed as part of a collaboration between the Institute for

Creative Technologies and the Army Research Institute.

5
paper content analyzed participant responses to the five items on the questionnaire. This analysis

resulted in 21 dimensions of key actions and situational challenges. The 21 dimensions were

then grouped into four higher-order categories based on the judgment of the two authors. The

four categories were (1) managing tactical aspects of the task, (2) situational challenges, (3)

managing relationships with followers-self-management, and (4) handling local leaders and

their militias. The 21 dimensions and the four higher-order categories are presented in Table 1.

The managing tactical aspects of the task category reflects tactically-oriented actions that the

leader or other Soldiers should have engaged in or engaged in incorrectly during the scenario.

These include actions such as decision making and planning, gathering intelligence, positioning

troops, and establishing a secure perimeter. The situational challenges category includes

parameters of the situation that impacted mission success, such as physical conditions (e.g.,

terrain, heat), resources (e.g. time, people, equipment), and task characteristics (e.g. uncertainty,

ambiguity, threat). The managing relationships with followers-self-management category

reflects actions involving interactions between the leader and his direct followers. The

leadership issues included in this category have an interpersonal component such as providing

guidance and direction, being respectful and offering supportive communication, and utilizing

the advice of followers. This category also includes one dimension that addresses selfmanagement issues, such as managing one's own emotions, adapting to change, and taking

responsibility. Dimensions in the handling local leaders and Afghan militias category reflect

cultural awareness and issues that deal with warlords and their armed militias. While some of

these dimensions have tactical (e.g. how to remove the warlords and their groups from the

perimeter) or interpersonal (e.g. specific suggestions about negotiation) characteristics, these

dimensions all include an element of dealing with the local Afghan population.

Scoring Participant Responses

Once dimensions and broad categories were identified, the researchers then applied the

taxonomy to score participant answers. Using the scoring protocol, interrater agreement between

the coders ranged from 87% to 100% (M= 93%).

Because more experienced leaders may be likely to identify a greater number of issues in

a situation than are novice leaders, the total number of unique dimensions cited by each

participant across the five questions was counted. Potentially, a participant's score could range

from zero to 21 dimensions. The total number of unique dimensions across categories provides

an index of differentiation.

Second, within a given category (i.e., tactical, situational challenges, relationships, and

handling locals) a more experienced leader is likely to identify more dimensions than a less

experienced leader. Thus, the total number of unique dimensions within each category was

counted for each participant. For the tactical category, potential scores could range from zero to

six. For the relationships, situational challenges, and handling locals categories, potential scores

could range from zero to five. These measures serve as indices of differentiation within a

category.

6
Table 1

Dimensions and Higher-Order Categories Derived from Content Analysis

Managing Tactical Aspects of The Task

1. Preparation Issues (e.g., gathering intelligence, preparing in advance for the situation, conducting initial

assessments and developing a plan and setting priorities)

2. Timely Decision Making and Decision Implementation (e.g., action orientation, exerting control over troops

and situation, making decisions, sticking to decisions, taking control of the situation)

3. Positioning/Use of Resources (e.g., perimeter, Soldiers, weapons, general statements about establishing

security)

4. NGO Convoy Issues (e.g., establishing communications, route/location, coordination, protection of convoy)

5. Brigade Issues (e.g., asking for brigade support, following brigade intent)

6. Rules of Engagement (e.g., when and to what extent force should be used according to Rules of Engagement)

Situational Challenges

7. Terrain/Physical Setting

8. Personal Experience/Expertise of Leader or Subordinates

9. Resource Constraints (e.g., troops, equipment, communication equipment)

10. Time Constraints

11. Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Situation

Managing Relationships with Followers- Self Management:

12. Involving Soldiers (using team expertise, involving followers in problem solving, delegating responsibilities)

13. Providing Guidance and Direction (e.g. briefing junior officers, ensuring everyone had a common

understanding, establishing command authority)

14. Manner and Sufficiency of Communication with Subordinates

15. Other Leadership Style Comments (e.g. bad people skills, did not earn trust)

16. Self-management/Overall Personal Style (e.g. situational awareness, operating under stress, adapting to change,

managing temper, taking responsibility)

Handling Locals and Af2han Militias

17. Recognizing Need for Solution with Warlords (e.g., how to maintain peaceful relationships, how to deal with

conflict between warlords, who to trust, who to work with).

18. Specific Suggestions for Negotiated/Peaceful Solutions (e.g. allow warlord to secure area, allow rival clans a

cut of the food, allow locals to stay in the area in exchange for not approaching the convoy)

19. Gaining Control of the Local Nationals in the Perimeter (e.g., how to remove warlords, using force to remove,

gaining control over local civilians in perimeter, separating warlords)

20. Combining Threat of Force with Negotiation Tactics

21. Unfamiliarity with Culture, History, and Language

7
Third, experience might impact how much emphasis is placed on certain features of a

problem or situation. A dimensional emphasis score was computed for each participant on each

of the 21 dimensions by counting the number of times a participant addressed a particular

dimension across the five questions. Thus, the dimensional emphasis score takes into account

not only whether a particular dimension was discussed, but how often the participant discussed

the dimension across the five questions.

Fourth, more experienced leaders are likely to possess a larger knowledge base than

leaders who have substantively less experience. Moreover, experienced leaders may be better

able to integrate diverse concepts when assessing a situation than are novice leaders. Within the

context of this investigation, the number of different higher-order categories included in a

response might be thought of as one indicator of level of integration, which refers to the degree

to which conceptual dimensions are combined to address a question or problem. To explore the

notion that experienced leaders engage in more integration than novice leaders, a category

breadth score was calculated for each participant. A category breadth score was computed for

each of the open-ended questions by counting the total number of unique categories represented

in a participant's answer. An overall category breadth score across the questions also was

computed by using the mean score across the five questions. All category breadth scores could

range from zero to four. The category breadth scores represent indices of integration.

Results

Number and Type of Dimensions Identified

Because experience is related to differentiation, it was anticipated that officers would

report a greater number of total dimensions in their answers than would cadets. An independent

samples t-test confirmed that officers reported significantly more dimensions (M = 10.94

dimensions, SD = 3.38) than did cadets (M = 7.80 dimensions, SD = 2.40), t(39) = 3.48, p < .001.

Independent samples t-tests also were conducted to examine whether officers differed

from cadets with respect to how many dimensions they identified within each of the four higherorder categories. Within the managing tactical aspects category, officers (M = 3.81, SD = 1.22)

identified more dimensions than did cadets (M= 2.56, SD = 1.26), t(39) = 3.30,p < .01. Officers

(M= 2.81, SD = 1.11) also identified more dimensions in the managing relationships category

than did cadets (M= 2.00, SD = 1.00), t(39) = 2.43,p < .05. Although officers also appeared to

identify more dimensions related to situational challenges and handling locals than did cadets,

these differences were not statistically significant. These results are reported in Table 2.

8
Table 2

T-test Results for Indices of Overall Differentiation and Differentiation within Category

Officers (n = 16) Cadets (n = 25)

Variable M SD M SD t df

Total Number of Unique Dimensions 10.94 3.38 7.80 2.40 3.48** 39

Number of Unique Tactical Dimensions 3.81 1.22 2.56 1.26 3.14** 39

Number of Unique Situational Dimensionsa 2.12 1.78 1.36 0.99 1.57 21.04

Number of Unique Relationships Dimensions 2.81 1.11 2.00 1.00 2.43* 39

Number of Unique Handling Locals Dimensions 2.19 0.83 1.88 0.93 1.08 39

Notes. **p <.01, *p <.05

a Levene's (1960) test for homogeneity of variance indicated that equal variances for this variable should not be

assumed. The t-test and degrees of freedom have been corrected to address unequal variance. However, t-tests for

both equal and unequal variances result in similar conclusions about significance.

Dimensional Emphasis

Independent samples t-tests were conducted to explore if more experienced leaders

differed from novice leaders with respect to how much they emphasized individual dimensions

within each category. Table 3 summarizes how officers compared to cadets with respect to how

much they emphasized each of the 21 dimensions across the five questions about the scenario.

Within the tactical category, officers (M = 4.38 times, SD = 2.50) placed much stronger

emphasis on positioning resources to secure the food distribution site than did cadets (M = 1.56

times, SD = 1.12), t(18.91) = 4.24,p < .001. Officers also tended to emphasize the issue of

obtaining brigade support across the five questions (M = 1.06, SD = 1.34) more than did cadets

(M= 0.12 times, SD = 0.33), t(16.18) = 2.76,p < .05. Officers and cadets did not differ with

respect to how often they mentioned the other tactical dimensions, however, suggesting that

officers and cadets placed a similar amount of emphasis on the remaining four tactical

dimensions.

Within the situational challenges category, officers placed a greater emphasis on the

experience of the leader or subordinates (M = 0.38 times, SD = 0.50) than did cadets (M = 0.04

times, SD = 0.20), t(18.11) = 2.56, p < .05. However, officers and cadets did not significantly

differ in emphasis on any of the other situational dimensions.

With regard to the managing relationships category, officers placed significantly stronger

emphasis on providing guidance and direction (M = 1.69, SD = 1.58) than did cadets (M= 0.32

times, SD = 0.56), t(17.41) = 3.33,p < .01. Although not statistically significant at thep < .05

level, two other dimensions in the managing relationships category approached the .05 standard.

9
Table 3

T-test Results Comparing Officers to Cadets with Respect to Emphasis on Dimensions

Officers (n = 16) Cadets (n = 25)

M SD M SD t df

Preparation Issues 1.25 1.39 0.74 0.94 1.13 24.10

Decision Making and Decision Implementation 1.31 1.20 0.76 1.20 1.44 39

Positioning/Use of Resourcesa 4.38 2.50 1.56 1.12 4.24** 18.91

NGO Convoy Issues a 1.81 2.10 0.96 1.17 1.48 21.03

Brigade Issues a 1.06 1.34 0.12 0.33 2.76* 16.18

Rules of Engagementa 0.44 1.03 0.12 0.33 1.19 17.01

Terrain/Physical Setting ' 0.63 1.09 0.32 0.48 1.06 18.73

Personal Experience/Expertise of Leader or Subordinates ' 0.38 0.50 0.04 0.20 2.56* 18.11

Resource Constraints a 0.50 0.82 0.16 0.37 1.56 19.09

Time Constraints 0.44 0.63 0.32 0.56 0.61 39

Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Situation 0.94 0.93 0.72 0.74 0.79 39

Involving Soldiers a 1.44 1.21 0.76 0.78 1.9 9b 23.01

Providing Guidance and Direction a 1.69 1.58 0.32 0.56 3.33** 17.41

Communication with Subordinates 1.19 1.33 0.56 0.71 1.97c 39

Other Leadership Style Comments 0.50 0.73 0.40 0.71 0.44 39

Self-management/Overall Personal Style 0.38 0.62 0.36 0.64 0.07 39

Recognition of Need for Solution with Local Warlords 2.63 1.89 2.40 1.19 0.47 39

Specific Suggestions for Negotiated/Peaceful Solutions a 0.44 1.09 0.00 0.00 1.60 15

Gaining Control of the Locals in the Perimeter 0.81 1.05 0.60 0.76 0.75 39

Combining Threat of Force with Negotiation Tactics 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.28 -0.21 39

Unfamiliarity with Culture 0.69 0.95 0.52 0.77 0.62 39

Notes. *p <.05, **p <.01 a Levene's (1960) test for homogeneity of variance indicated that equal variances for these variables should not be

assumed. The t-test and degrees of freedom have been corrected to address unequal variance.

b p = .058 when corrected for unequal variances, but was significant atp = .035 when not corrected for unequal

variances.

C p = .05 6 .

10
Specifically, officers referenced involving Soldiers and gathering their input and expertise (M =

1.44 times, SD = 1.21) slightly more than did cadets (M= 0.76 times, SD = 0.78), t(23.01) =

2.99,p = .058. Additionally, officers referenced communication with subordinates (M= 1.19

times, SD = 1.33) slightly more than did cadets (MW= 0.56, SD = 0.71), t(39) = 1.97,p = .056.

Officers did not differ from cadets with respect to their emphasis on either leadership style or

self-management, however.

With respect to the category of handling the local population, officers and cadets did not

differ in their emphasis on any of the five dimensions. This was surprising given that several

officers had previous deployment experience, as opposed to cadets who had no deployment

experience. Although both cadets and officers appeared to recognize the importance of dealing

with the warlords in the scenario (M = 2.63 for officers and M = 2.40 for cadets), both groups

appeared to have very few suggestions as to how to address the problem. Specifically, the

participants in this group did not place much emphasis on specific suggestions for negotiated or

peaceful solutions, how to gain control of locals who were inside the perimeter, or the possibility

of combining the threat of force with negotiation tactics. Another unexpected finding was that

very few participants in the group indicated that unfamiliarity with the culture was a problem in

this scenario, even though this issue was intentionally built into the scenario and the U.S. Army

has reiterated the importance of cultural awareness numerous times in discussions of effective

and adaptive leadership.

An examination of the percentages of dimension endorsement for each group of leaders

provides another indication that more experienced leaders differ from novices with respect to the

dimensions that they emphasize. Table 4 indicates the percentage of respondents, by group, who

mentioned a dimension in their answers to the five questions about the scenario. In general,

experienced leaders tended to mention more various tactical dimensions than novice leaders. Of

note, 100% of experienced leaders mentioned positioning and using resources to secure the food

distribution site, as compared to 84% of novice leaders. Additionally, over half of the

experienced leaders referred to issues with brigade, as opposed to 12% of cadets. The largest

discrepancy between experienced and inexperienced leaders, however, occurred with respect to

the issue of providing guidance and direction to subordinates. While 81% of experienced leaders

indicated in their answers that the subordinates in the scenario needed more guidance and

direction, only 28% of novices included that issue in their answers.

With respect to the handling locals category, a low percentage of officers and no cadets

mentioned potential peaceful solutions to the conflict with the warlords. Additionally, officers

(6%) and cadets (8%) rarely discussed the potential of combining threat with negotiation as a

way to resolve the dispute with the warlords. In general, neither group appeared to view

negotiation as a potential solution for the problems embedded in this scenario.

In sum, officers appeared to be more concerned than cadets with security arrangements.

Officers also appeared to be more concerned about a wide spectrum of leadership behaviors,

including directive (i.e. providing direction), supportive (sufficient and respectful

communication), and consultative (utilizing follower input) leadership styles. Officers also

placed greater emphasis than cadets on the situational challenge of inexperienced Soldiers, and

this aspect of the situation may hold relevance for what leadership behaviors are appropriate for

11
the situation. However, an unexpected finding was that officers and cadets did not differ with

respect to their emphasis on handling the cross-cultural interactions with local warlords.

Table 4

Percentages of How Often Each Dimension Was Mentioned by Officers versus Cadets

% Officers (n = 16) % Cadets (n = 25)

Preparation Issues 56 52

Decision Making and Decision Implementation 69 44

Positioning/Use of Resources 100 84

NGO Convoy Issues 69 52

Brigade Issues 56 12

Rules of Engagement 25 12

Terrain/Physical Setting 31 32

Personal Experience/Expertise of Leader or Subordinates 38 4

Resource Constraints 31 16

Time Constraints 38 28

Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Situation 63 56

Involving Soldiers 69 56

Providing Guidance and Direction 81 28

Communication with Subordinates 69 44

Other Leadership Style Comments 38 32

Self-management/Overall Personal Style 31 28

Recognition of Need for Solution with Local Warlords 94 96

Specific Suggestions for Negotiated/Peaceful Solutions 19 0

Gaining Control of the Locals in the Perimeter 50 48

Combining Threat of Force with Negotiation Tactics 6 8

Unfamiliarity with Culture 44 40

12
Category Breadth

To explore the issue of integration, independent samples t-tests were conducted to

determine whether officers differed from cadets with respect to the number of unique higherorder categories reflected in their answers. Consistent with expectations, officers' responses

reflected greater category breadth (i.e., integration) than cadets on most of the five open-ended

questions. Additionally, the overall category breadth score across the five questions was higher

for officers (M= 2.48, SD = 0.51) than for cadets (M= 1.82, SD = 0.44), t (39) = 4.34, p < .001.

These findings are reported in Table 5.

Table 5

T-test Results for Indices of Integration (i.e., Category Breadth)

Officers (n = 16) Cadets (n = 25)

M SD M SD t df

Category Breadth: Question 1 2.93 0.85 1.92 0.70 4.16** 39

Category Breadth: Question 2 2.50 0.90 2.00 0.70 1 .9 9 b 39

Category Breadth: Question 3' 2.06 1.03 1.37 0.49 2.42* 18.07

Category Breadth: Question 4 2.30 0.80 1.72 0.84 2.24* 39

Category Breadth: Question 5 2.60 0.99 2.00 0.78 2.11 * 37

Overall Category Breadth 2.48 0.51 1.82 0.44 4.34** 39

Notes. *p <.05, **p < .001

a Levene's (1960) test for homogeneity of variance indicated that equal variances for this variable should not be

assumed. The t-test and degrees of freedom have been corrected to address unequal variance. However, tests

assuming both equal and unequal variances result in similar conclusions about significance.

b p =.054.

Exploration of Relationships among Dimensions

Results presented earlier in this paper indicated that many differences exist between

cadets and officers with respect to how they frame and understand the issues embedded in the

scenario used in this investigation. While this scenario was created to represent the complexity

and uncertainty often encountered in the twenty-first century operational environment, it should

be noted that "uncertainty" can be construed as a largely subjective matter. That is, what is

complex and ambiguous to one individual may be simplistic and clear-cut to another individual.

13
An exploratory series of correlational analyses was performed to examine if an emphasis

on uncertainty in the environment had different meaning for experienced leaders versus novice

leaders. Looking at correlations permits an examination of whether different patterns of

conceptual relationships exist for officers versus cadets. Correlations among variables (number

of unique dimensions and dimensional emphasis) are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Correlations

were computed separately for cadets (Table 6) and officers (Table 7) in the event that

relationships among variables were different for the different groups. Given that the sample

sizes were small in both groups, results should be interpreted with extreme caution and are

primarily reported here for exploratory purposes and to stimulate future research ideas.

While cadets and officers did not differ on average with respect to how much they

emphasized uncertainty in the environment, results suggest that increased emphasis on

uncertainty in the environment might hold different meaning for cadets versus officers. Cadets

who emphasized uncertainty in the environment also placed more emphasis on preparation issues

(r = .45, p < .05), rules of engagement (r = .48, p < .05), and providing guidance and direction (r

= .43, p < .05) than did cadets who did not emphasize uncertainty. Each of these three

dimensions shares a common theme in that these are factors that can be used to reduce

uncertainty in the food distribution mission.

Officers demonstrated a different pattern of relationships for perceived uncertainty.

Officers who were concerned about uncertainty in the environment emphasized concerns about

leader-follower relationships (r = .51, p < .05), dealing with the local Afghans (r = .53, p < .05),

communicating with subordinates (r = .71, p < .01), engaging in self-management behaviors (r =

.62, p < .01), considering a combination of military threat and negotiation (r = .59, p < .05), and

unfamiliarity with the Afghan culture (r = .51, p < .05). For experienced leaders, it appears that

concerns about situational ambiguity are related to a better appreciation for cultural concerns, but

this relationship is not evident for inexperienced leaders. Concerns about uncertainty also appear

to hold different implications for cadets and officers about what leadership issues are important.

While cadets concerned about uncertainty emphasized the role of the leader in providing

guidance and direction, experienced leaders concerned about uncertainty emphasized the

importance of providing supportive communication to subordinates and managing one's

emotions and reactions to the situation. Regardless of the perceived ambiguity of the situation,

almost all experienced leaders (i.e., 81%) indicated that the leader should provide more guidance

and direction to subordinates.

14
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Discussion

This research explored differences between how experienced and inexperienced leaders

frame and conceptualize an operational environment. Increasingly, junior military leaders are

faced with missions that require the ability to transition rapidly from collaborating with the local

population to engaging in high risk operations against hostile forces (Scales, 2006; Wong, 2004).

Examining the role of experience in how Soldiers frame their understanding of these types of

complex missions can shed light on the emergence of domain-specific leadership expertise

relevant to today's operational environment.

Before turning to our broader conclusions, certain limitations of this research should be

noted. Although significant differences were found between the two groups of leaders

concerning their judgments about the scenario, results should be interpreted with caution due to

the small sample size used in this research. A somewhat different pattern of findings may

emerge with the inclusion of a larger or different sample (e.g., lieutenant colonels). However,

the results were consistent with findings from other studies exploring differences between

experts and novices, suggesting that similar patterns of results might emerge with a different

sample.

This investigation also employed only one scenario to assess differences in the judgment

of officers and cadets. Although this particular scenario is rich in details and realistic in its

themes (Zbylut et al., 2005), employing multiple scenarios that depict different styles of

leadership in different types of situations would strengthen the generalizability of the findings.

Lastly, this research did not include objective or expert-based assessments of the appropriateness

of actions and concerns identified by participants, making it difficult to conclude that

experienced leaders focused on more relevant aspects of the scenario than did novice leaders.

That is, although experienced leaders appeared to identify more elements and have a broader

conceptual understanding of the scenario, the veracity of that understanding was not assessed.

Despite these caveats, the results of this research have some noteworthy implications for

understanding the development of military leadership expertise for the current operational

environment. This research also highlights different patterns of thinking among novice and

experienced leaders in the face of uncertain, ambiguous, or unfamiliar situations.

Results indicated 21 dimensions that individuals may use to conceptualize the leadership

actions and challenges in stability and support operations. These dimensions appear to belong to

four higher-order categories: (1) managing tactical aspects of the task, (2) managing

relationships with followers-self-management, (3) situational challenges, and (4) handling the

local population and militias. Although this framework was based solely on the scenario used in

this research, such a framework might be generalized to other scenarios to test Soldiers'

understanding of complex military environments. Additionally, such a framework could be used

to help novices (e.g., USMA cadets, Reserve Officers Training Corps, and second lieutenants)

think systematically about situations and scenarios that they encounter during the educational

process.

19
Consistent with previous research on expertise (Glaser &Chi, 1988; Shanteau, 1992) and

leadership (Day & Lance, 2004; Hooijberg et al., 1997; Lord & Hall, 2006; Mumford et al.,

2000), experienced leaders identified significantly more elements or dimensions of the scenario

than did novice-level cadets. With respect to specific categories of dimensions, experienced

leaders identified a greater number of tactical concerns than cadets, as well as a greater number

of concerns about managing relationships and managing the self. Captains placed a stronger

emphasis than cadets on the specific issues of decision making and implementation, positioning

and using resources, communicating with brigade headquarters, taking into account the level of

expertise of subordinates, and the importance of providing guidance and direction. These

findings suggest that captains engage in more differentiation than do cadets, and are able to

perceive many more issues than cadets when confronted with a complex situation.

Results also indicated that captains tended to construct answers that tapped a larger

number of higher level categories than did cadets. That is, captains appeared to do a better job at

composing answers that integrated diverse concepts than did cadets. Thus, the experienced

leaders appeared to be superior to cadets on indices of both differentiation and integration, and

appeared to understand the scenario using a slightly more sophisticated schema.

In a similar vein, Carnahan et al. (2004) found evidence that experts engaged in greater

differentiation and integration than novices while dealing with a dynamic, but more traditional,

battle scenario. Like the results of the present investigation, experts in the Carnahan experiment

were more tactically knowledgeable than novices. Experts were able to better integrate diverse

command concepts in their decision making process and showed fine distinctions in their

thinking about specific topic areas, like understanding the enemy. Unlike the present

investigation, however, the Carnahan work found that novices had poor situational awareness

compared to experts. This discrepancy could be due to several factors. First, while the novices

in the Carnahan research also were USMA cadets, the expert group consisted of lieutenant

colonels. The situational awareness of lieutenant colonels may be superior to the captains in the

present investigation due to longer exposure to the military. Second, the scenario employed in

the Carnahan investigation was a battle scenario, which might be more familiar to military

professionals than scenarios dealing with stability and support operations; this familiarity may

improve the likelihood of situational awareness for the expert group. Third, the sample size in

the current investigation might not be large enough to detect significant differences between

cadets and captains, but these differences could become evident with the inclusion of additional

research participants.

Regardless of discrepancies between the current investigation and the Carnahan et al.

(2004) work, one practical implication of both lines of research is that experienced leaders differ

from novice leaders with respect to what they emphasize. Instructors can use information about

specific expert-novice differences to help novice leaders think more like experts (Shadrick &

Lussier, 2004). The results of the current investigation suggest that instructors who want to help

novice trainees understand a complex mission, like a stability and support operation, might

consider framing the discussion along four dimensions-tactical concerns, situational factors,

leadership concerns, and cultural considerations. Moreover, to assist novices in thinking like

their more experienced counterparts, instructors may need to spend time focusing on areas in

which novices did not excel-positioning and using resources, issues in dealing with brigade or

20
higher, considering the various areas of expertise of team members, and providing guidance and

direction to subordinates.

Given that captains appeared superior to cadets in terms of knowledge about tactical and

relationship issues, it was surprising that captains and cadets performed similarly with respect to

situational challenges and handling the local population. These results were particularly

unexpected given that many of the officers had returned from deployments to the Middle East.

One possible explanation for these findings is that, although captains have had more experience

with the military and deployment in general, the officers who participated in this research may

have only had limited exposure to the specific type of situation depicted in the film. That is,

although the captains may have been deployed to the Middle East, they may not have had

interactions with warlords or been involved in food distribution operations. Thus, the captains

might not be more "expert" than cadets with respect to the cultural and situational variables in

the scenario used to conduct this research. What might be of greater concern, however, is the

possibility that the captains who participated in this research think about cultural issues in much

the same way as cadets do. Such thinking may be the result of deficits in either the tacit

knowledge gained through experience or formal training of cultural issues. Hedlund and

colleagues (2003), for example, suggested that experienced-based, tacit knowledge is a form of

procedural knowledge that complements formal training by indicating what leadership methods

may be most effective for different types of situations. Expertise likely results from a

combination of formalized training and experience garnered across multiple situations. While it

is likely that the officers who participated in this investigation have been exposed to military

doctrine and extensive training concerning tactical decisions, there may be limited training

available for preparing leaders to handle the complicated job of integrating tactical and security

concerns with cross-cultural and nation-building tasks (Ben-Yoav Nobel, Wortinger, & Fuchs,

2006; Scales, 2006; Wong, 2005). In sum, officers may not have had adequate opportunity to

integrate hands-on experience with knowledge acquired in systematic instruction, resulting in

non-significant differences between their level of expertise and that of cadets. Additional

research is needed to assess the combined effect of personal exposure to cross-cultural/nationbuilding missions and pre-deployment training on the development of leadership expertise

relevant for handling such tasks.

Although both officers and cadets recognized that dealing with the warlords was

important, very few individuals in this investigation mentioned the possibility of crafting a

peaceful solution to the conflict or expressed a desire to pursue negotiation for resolving

problems embedded in the scenario. Thus, it might be that negotiation and peaceful solutions

were either not seen as viable approaches to resolving the disputes in the scenario or that both

officers and cadets lacked the knowledge that would help them consider the application of such

approaches for handling the situation. Instead, answers primarily focused on tactical approaches

to dealing with both the local civilians and the warlords (e.g., remove locals from the perimeter).

A potential implication of this finding is that, in situations of threat and risk, Soldiers may

readily think of tactical solutions for which they have been well-trained, but are less able to think

of alternative solutions that are non-tactical and, therefore, unfamiliar. Research that examined

the interactions between Israeli Soldiers and Palestinian civilians supports the idea that Soldiers

rely on practices that they are familiar with, even if it is not the optimal course of action (Veiner

& Shazberg, 2005). In operating checkpoints, Israeli Soldiers who were confronted with

21
ambiguity and vague rules about handling Palestinian civilians' needs and requests tended to rely

on well-established and familiar hierarchical military communication and patterns of interaction,

leading to reactions of resentment and hostility on the part of the civilians.

Developing peaceful solutions through negotiations is likely to help Soldiers foster

collaborative relationships with members of the local population as a way to achieve both

"winning hearts and minds" and obtaining necessary local support (e.g. intelligence) to ensure

mission success (Ben-Yoav Nobel et al., 2006; Goodwin, 2005). Cross-cultural negotiation

skills and the use of negotiation combined with war fighting are central developmental areas for

preparing troops to conduct stability and support operations in hostile environments. Providing

Soldiers with the appropriate skill set that best fit the demands of interacting with local civilians

is important to ensure mission success. Given that very few of the individuals in this research

considered negotiation and other non-tactical approaches to dealing with the problems embedded

in this scenario, individuals involved in the education and training of junior officers should

explore whether their curricula should include instructional objectives that target how leaders can

leverage cultural knowledge to diffuse situations.

Although cadets and officers did not differ on average with respect to their emphasis on

ambiguity, the results suggest that cadets and officers are concerned with different issues when

they perceive that the environment is unpredictable. Specifically, cadets who were concerned

with unpredictability also tended to stress that the leader needed to provide guidance to

subordinates and subordinates needed a clear understanding of the rules of engagement. This

finding is consistent with followers' preference for direction when confronted with uncertainty

(Bass, 1998; Bass & Riggio, 2006; A. Klein, 1976; Weinberg, 1978). Conversely, almost all

officers (i.e., 81%) believed that it was important for the leader to provide more guidance,

regardless of whether they reported concern with the unpredictability of the environment.

Instead, officer perceptions of ambiguity were related to issues of emotional self-control and the

communication style (particularly supportive communication) used with subordinates. Future

research should explore the potential moderating effect of leadership experience on the

relationship between perceptions of uncertainty and the preference for consultative, directive, or

supportive leadership behaviors.

22
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