Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening an Insurgency 

through a National Reconciliation Program

Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq 

Raymond A. Millen, Ph.D.
PKSOI Paper

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Weakening

 an Insurgency through a National

 Reconciliation Program

Three Case Studies: Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq 

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability

Operations Institute

May 2020

Raymond A. Millen, Ph.D.

Author
*****

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ISBN-13:978-1-7325659-4-4

ii
iii

Table of Contents

Foreword.......................................................................... v

About The Author.......................................................... x

Introduction .................................................................. xii

Chapter One – Observations from the Malaya 

Insurgency........................................................................1

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation .......................1

Malay Government Commitment to the 

Reconciliation Program. .............................................2

Information Operations..............................................6

Crafting the Reconciliation Policy.........................7

The Means of Dissemination..................................8

Instructions on How to Defect.............................10

Repatriation Process..................................................12

Utilization of Former Insurgents.............................14

Conclusions ................................................................16

Chapter Two – Observations from the Vietnam 

Insurgency......................................................................17

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation .....................18

South Vietnamese Government Commitment 

to the Reconciliation Program .................................21

Information Operations............................................24

Inducement: Reconciliation Policy......................26

The Means of Dissemination................................30

Chieu Hoi Reception Centers ..................................33

Reception Centers ..................................................33

Interview Process...................................................36

Political Rehabilitation..........................................39

Vocational Training...............................................41

Military Service of Ralliers.......................................43

Kit Carson Scout Program....................................44

Armed Propaganda Teams (APT).......................45

Rallier Resettlement ..................................................48

Follow-up System of Ralliers...................................49
iv

Conclusions ................................................................49

Chapter Three – Observations from the Iraq 

Insurgency......................................................................52

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation .....................54

Iraqi Government Commitment to 

Reconciliation.............................................................55

Detention Operations................................................60

The 2003—2007 Period..........................................60

The 2007—2008 Surge Period...............................63

Detention In-Processing and Assessment..........65

Rehabilitation Programs .......................................66

Transition Programs..............................................67

Transitioning Detention to Iraqi Authority .......69

Conclusions ................................................................70

Conclusions....................................................................71

Endnotes.........................................................................77
v

Foreword

Death by a Thousand Cuts explores the application 

of national reconciliation programs to undermine 

insurgencies from within and lay the groundwork 

for stability in the post-conflict period. Dr. Raymond 

A. Millen presents three case studies—Malaya, South 

Vietnam, and Iraq—for his examination of national 

reconciliation programs. Such programs have received 

little attention after the Vietnam conflict, so this study 

provides insights of particular interest for US assistance 

to countries suffering from an insurgency.

The insurgency in Malaya served as a testbed for 

a national reconciliation program, providing astute 

observations on the character of the insurgency. 

In this case, the British and Malayan authorities 

studied insurgent motivations for surrendering and 

adapted information operations and the reconciliation 

program accordingly. In time, they incorporated the 

reconciliation program into the counterinsurgency 

strategy, which ultimately proved efficacious. The allies 

employed the voluntary services of former insurgents 

in information operations, intelligence collection, and 

military operations, with great success. Of interest 

to enduring stability, reconciliation allowed former 

insurgents to atone for their misdeeds and reintegrate 

into society.

As most Americans are aware, the Vietnam conflict 

was an acute threat to South Vietnam’s sovereignty. 

Following the example and advice of British efforts in 

Malaya, US and South Vietnamese authorities adopted 

a national reconciliation program called Chieu Hoi 

(Open Arms). Also noting Viet Cong disaffection in 

the ranks, the allies designed information operations 

and the Chieu Hoi program to encourage surrenders. 
Moreover, the Republic of Vietnam government 

established scores of reintegration centers throughout 

the country, which provided care, education, and 

vocational skills for ralliers. As in Malaya, the allies 

employed former Viet Cong in extensive information 

operations, intelligence exploitation, military 

operations, and local security. While former Viet Cong 

successfully reintegrated into society, the long-term 

effects are unknown, in view of the North Vietnamese 

invasion and occupation of South Vietnam in 1975.

The insurgency in Iraq is relatively fresh in most 

American minds. Fortunately, a number of books and 

the official history of the conflict provide detailed 

observations of the conflict. From these sources, it 

appears that US officials initially focused on trying to 

avert an insurgency, which proved unavailing. Despite 

the lack of a formal national reconciliation program, 

Sunni insurgents (and some Shi’a) began making 

overtures to coalition commanders in 2005, which 

bore fruit in 2007. Of interest to this study, the use of 

reintegration programs in detention facilities provides 

insights for including reconciliation opportunities for 

incarcerated insurgents.

As Dr. Millen reveals in this study, some telling 

observations from these case studies are worth 

noting. First, insurgent cohesion is more friable than 

assumed, so a reconciliation program must provide a 

way out for the insurgent’s predicament. Information 

operations and national reconciliation programs must 

be designed to inform insurgents of the program, help 

them surrender safely, assure them of good treatment, 

and provide opportunities to reenter society as a 

productive citizen.

Second, host government commitment to the 

reconciliation program is imperative. Since long-term 

legitimacy and credibility of reconciliation rests on 

vi
the host government’s buy-in, allied patrons must 

devote considerable energy early to that end. Host 

nation management, resources, and linguistic/cultural 

acuity make the reconciliation program viable. While 

a counterinsurgency strategy without a reconciliation 

program is possible, long-term stability with such a 

program will not likely endure.

Third, a national reconciliation program requires 

time, resources, and funding. For counterinsurgency 

strategists, such an effort may appear inappropriate 

given the exigencies of the emergency. However, 

by their nature, insurgencies average ten years, so 

they are marathons, not sprints. In terms of potential 

military costs, casualties, and damage, the benefits 

of a national reconciliation program are worth the 

investment. The construction of reintegration centers 

during the insurgency can serve the same purpose 

for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

programs in the aftermath of conflict. Again, the value 

of the investment provides a variety of dividends.

Death by a Thousand Cuts provides a roadmap 

for assistance to countries embroiled in prolonged 

insurgencies. The Malayan and South Vietnam case 

studies provide practical details for the establishment 

and implementation of a national reconciliation 

program. The Iraqi case study adds to this knowledge 

with the use of reconciliation programs as part of 

detention operations. The defense community would 

find this PKSOI study profitable for extending global 

stability.

Scot N. Storey

Colonel, Civil Affairs

Director, Peacekeeping and 

Stability Operations Institute 

29 April 2020

vii
About The Author

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen (retired) is 

currently the Professor of Security at the Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA. A 

1982 graduate of the US Military Academy, he was 

commissioned as an infantry officer, and later served as 

a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He held a 

variety of command and staff assignments in Germany 

and Continental United States: 8th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), 7th Infantry Division (Lt), the US Army 

Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry 

School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive 

Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 

and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team 

Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. At the 

Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, he 

served as the Director of European Security Studies, 

producing studies on NATO, Afghanistan, and 

counterinsurgency. Dr. Millen served three tours in 

Afghanistan first, from July through November 2003 

on the staff of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army 

and the General staff; second with Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan from August 2006 

to August 2007 establishing police coordination centers 

in northern Afghanistan; and third from September 

2008 to September 2009 as an MPRI Senior Mentor 

for the Afghan Assistant Ministry of Defense for 

Strategy and Plans. Dr. Millen has published articles 

in a number of scholarly and professional journals 

to include Parameters, Military Review, Joint Special 

Warfare Journal, Small Wars Journal, Comparative 

Strategy Journal, Infantry Magazine, and the Swiss 

Military Journal. The second edition of his book, 

viii
ix

Command Legacy, was published by Potomac Books 

in December 2008. In February 2019, he published the 

PKSOI book, Bury the Dead, Feed the Living, a history 

of Civil Affairs and Military Government during the 

Second World War. Professor Millen is a graduate of 

the US Army’s Command and General Staff College 

and the US Army War College. He holds an M.A. 

degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown 

University, as well as an M.A. degree in World Politics 

and a Ph.D. in Political Science from The Catholic 

University of America.
x

Introduction

National reconciliation programs have the potential 

to weaken an insurgency significantly and set the 

conditions for enduring stability after the conflict. 

As this study emphasizes, reconciliation is not a 

substitute for a counterinsurgency strategy but it is 

a vital component. It follows the counterinsurgency 

axiom that the military cannot kill its way to success. 

Rather, national reconciliation programs focus on soft 

power: psychological motivations of insurgents, a path 

to amnesty, ways to surrender safely, provision of 

medical, educational, and vocational services, and the 

reintegration of former insurgents into society.

This study recounts the use of national reconciliation 

programs during the Malaya, South Vietnam, and Iraq 

insurgencies. As with all insurgencies, the context 

was unique, but each shared commonalities which 

portended the potential of reconciliation as an enabler 

to success. While the literature on these insurgencies 

provides ample space to reconciliation, its import is 

often understated, almost as if to say, “While the military 

was doing the heavy lifting, these other activities also 

took place.” This study probes the proposition that 

national reconciliation programs should be one of the 

prominent pillars of a counterinsurgency strategy.

This study touches on the interaction of national 

reconciliation programs, counterinsurgency operations, 

and pacification programs. For reconciliation to 

work, insurgents wishing to surrender need both 

the opportunity to defect and the assurance of good 

treatment. Clear and hold operations are designed 

to deprive insurgents of territory and separate them 

from the populace. Pacification programs consolidate 

and build on the military successes, providing local 

security, policing, reconstruction, and essential services 
xi

to local communities. Ideally, these activities provide 

the space and opportunities for insurgents to surrender 

safely. This study explores whether a relationship 

existed between the expansion of government control 

of territory and the rate of surrenders.

The cost-benefits of a national reconciliation program 

came into play in Malaya and South Vietnam, but not 

so much in Iraq. A predominately military approach 

to counterinsurgency was costly in terms of combat 

power, casualties, and funding. National reconciliation 

programs were expensive as well. Resourcing 

information operations, reconciliation centers, 

educational and vocational facilities, and reintegration 

programs required a substantial investment. So, the 

mid- and long-term payoffs had to be high enough 

to justify the investment. Accordingly, the aggregate 

cost of killing an insurgent versus processing the same 

insurgent through a reconciliation program was an 

important factor. Further, whether or not the depletion 

of insurgent ranks through voluntary surrender 

would result in substantially fewer friendly casualties 

required due consideration. Since the insurgencies in 

question averaged ten years, the amount of time to 

establish and manage such a program was not a key 

determinant. Lastly, considerations of post-conflict 

stability made national reconciliation programs an 

attractive investment.

This study explores insurgent motives for 

reconciliation in each insurgency. A prevalent 

presumption was that insurgent cohesion remained 

unbreakable, that insurgents were committed to the 

united cause, and that only victory or death would end 

the struggle. Allied interviews of insurgents suggested 

that unit cohesion was not as tight as assumed. As 

such, understanding which factors compelled an 

insurgent to remain in the ranks or to surrender was 
xii

critical to the design of the reconciliation program and 

the prosecution of the counterinsurgency strategy. If 

personal reasons to defect predominated ideology and 

the insurgent cause, then the reconciliation program 

needed to address them. Psychological factors, such 

as fear, exhaustion, demoralization, and disaffection, 

were therefore important to the program’s information 

operations. The reconciliation program needed to offer 

ordinary insurgents a way out of their predicament 

safely, alleviate their uncertainty regarding their 

treatment upon surrender, and meet their aspirations. 

Further, the reconciliation program had to consider 

possible counteractions by the insurgent leadership 

to thwart reconciliation. Finally, the reconciliation 

program needed to acknowledge that the hard-core 

insurgents would likely remain irreconcilable. So the 

central question was whether they or the rank and file 

was the center of gravity to the insurgency.

In each insurgency, the commitment of the host 

nation government to the reconciliation program seems 

paradoxical. In Malaya, Britain was in the process of 

granting independence to a new government. In South 

Vietnam, the United States was the powerful benefactor 

to the government. In Iraq, the United States was the 

transitioning authority to the new government. In each 

insurgency, the great powers had the theoretical capacity 

to manage reconciliation without host government 

commitment. However, in Malaya and South Vietnam, 

Britain and the United States respectively invested 

substantial time and resources to gain host government 

commitment to reconciliation. Host government 

legitimacy was certainly a principal reason. But, since 

the reconciliation program was oriented to insurgent 

psychology, only the host government possessed the 

linguistic and cultural credibility to offer amnesty and 

craft messages which resonated with insurgents. Host 
xiii

government personnel needed to manage the program 

to maintain this credibility. The great powers could 

provide advisors, resources, and funding, but the face 

of the national reconciliation program needed to rest 

on the host government.

The Iraqi government had no national reconciliation 

program, nor did the US coalition, due to the exigencies 

of the emergency, insist on one. Instead, reconciliation 

between Iraqi tribes and coalition forces occurred in an 

ad hoc, plodding manner. In spite of Iraqi government 

ambivalence, once reconciliation gained momentum, 

over one hundred thousand tribesmen allied with 

coalition and Iraqi security forces against al Qaeda and 

anti-coalition insurgent groups. Nonetheless, as this 

study points out, the failure of the Iraqi government 

to commit to a reconciliation program had detrimental 

consequences for Iraq during the post-conflict period.

US detention operations during the Iraq insurgency 

deserve special attention because they instituted 

reconciliation with the “COIN inside the wire” 

program. This novel approach physically segregated 

the hard-core from the general detention population, 

empowered moderate inmates to stand up to extremist 

inmates, and focused on the “battlefield of the 

mind.”1 Detention officials provided the moderates 

with educational and vocational training, religious 

instruction by traditional Islamic clerics, stipends, 

and family visitations. Although a contentious issue 

at the time, the detention transition (release) program 

provided a way for former insurgents to cleanse 

their past and reintegrate into society. Therefore, the 

detention reconciliation program provides practical 

insights, which complement the observations of the 

Malayan and South Vietnamese national reconciliation 

programs.
xiv

On one level, a national reconciliation program 

was a zero-sum gain, meaning a loss of an insurgent 

was a gain for the host government. While the 

majority of former insurgents chose to return 

home and lead peaceful lives, the Malayan and 

South Vietnamese governments took the program 

one step further by offering interested, qualified 

volunteers the opportunity to serve in the military 

or the government. Some served in the information 

operations and psychological warfare services, 

helping to craft sophisticated, resonating messages; 

several served as interrogators in military units and at 

reconciliation centers to glean perishable intelligence 

and to identify insurgent infiltrators; scores served on 

propaganda teams inside insurgent-controlled areas, 

where they provided information on the reconciliation 

program and shared their personal stories with local 

communities; they also made secret contact with 

insurgents to encourage defection; hundreds served as 

administrators and provided security at reconciliation 

centers; and thousands served in the South Vietnamese 

and US military as instructors on insurgent tactics, 

techniques, and procedures, as scouts, and as counterguerrillas.

A telling feature of the Malayan and South 

Vietnamese reconciliation programs was the totality of 

the effort. Public information services provided short 

documentaries at movie theaters, displayed posters 

and paraphernalia everywhere, published newspaper 

and magazine articles, provided media interviews 

from government officials and former insurgents; 

and dispatched theatrical troupes to villages. These 

information efforts served to inform the public of the 

reconciliation program and the need to accept former 

insurgents back into society. Further, most insurgents 

remained in contact with relatives and friends, which 
xv

used the proffered information to encourage them to 

enter the program.

This study only touches on the counterinsurgency 

strategies employed in Malaya, South Vietnam, and 

Iraq in order to provide historical context. To reiterate, 

national reconciliation programs are not a substitute 

or a silver bullet solution to an insurgency. If applied 

as such, it would likely fail because the other aspect of 

counterinsurgency operations are essential to sustain 

reconciliation.

As greater thinkers are fond of saying, “If you want 

a new idea, read an old book.” So it is with this study. 

Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency: The 

Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, Richard L. Clutterbuk’s 

The Long Long War, and John A. Nagl’s Learning to Eat 

Soup with a Knife offer sublime insights of the national 

reconciliation program during the Malaya insurgency. 

As a British adviser in Vietnam, it is not surprising 

that many of his ideas were applied during the 

Vietnam insurgency. Herbert A. Friedman’s website, 

The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam, is a treasure trove of 

material on South Vietnam’s reconciliation program, 

complete with pictures and illustrations. The RAND 

Corporation Vietnam studies are particularly useful 

in understanding Viet Cong motivations and analyses 

of the Chieu Hoi program: J. A. Koch, The Chieu Hoi 

Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971; J. M. Carrier and 

C. A. H. Thomson, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: 

The Special Case of Chieu Hoi; L. Goure, A. J. Russo and 

D. Scott, Some Findings of The Viet Cong Motivation 

and Morale Study: June-December 1965; and Lucian W. 

Pye, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program. Emmett 

J. O’Brien’s 1971 US Army War College Strategic 

Research Paper, Defection: A Military Strategy for Wars of 

Liberation, provides useful insights from a participant in 

the Chieu Hoi program. For literature on reconciliation 
xvi

and detention operations during the Iraq insurgency, 

the most comprehensive to date is the US Army War 

College’s two volume set, The US Army in the Iraq War: 

2003-2006 and The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011. 

Finally, Anthony Lieto’s PKSOI article, “Rule of Law 

and Justice in Security Sector Reform,” and Conrad C. 

Crane’s Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future 

War are exceptionally perceptive in understanding the 

reconciliation programs inside the detention facilities.

The intent of this study is to provide a roadmap 

for best practices in designing and implementing a 

national reconciliation program for future conflicts. 

For practitioners and advisers of counterinsurgency, 

host nation government commitment to a national 

reconciliation program is an imperative to success not 

only during the conflict but also to enduring stability 

in its aftermath. 
1

Chapter One – Observations from the

 Malaya Insurgency 

The Malaya insurgency (1948-1960) provided useful 

insights into the use of reconciliation programs. Since 

the insurgents were ethnic Chinese and land squatters, 

the British and Malayan authorities had a somewhat 

easier time separating them from the rest of Malayan 

society. However, the Chinese minority was large, so 

a concerted counterinsurgency strategy was necessary. 

While historians have devoted significant attention to 

the “New Villages” program, the reconciliation program 

received less notice. The reconciliation program was not 

a substitute for the larger counterinsurgency strategy, 

but it was a vital enabler and influenced the post-conflict 

period. This chapter recounts the main features of the 

Malayan reconciliation program: 1) insurgent motives 

for reconciliation; 2) government commitment to the 

program; 3) information operations; 4) repatriation 

process; and 5) utilization of former insurgents. Given 

Britain’s limited resources, the reconciliation program 

featured an approach beyond military action.

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation

From his experiences in the Malaya Emergency, 

Sir Robert Thompson observed that regardless of 

their reasons for joining an insurgency, an array of 

rebels will wish to defect to the host government.2 A 

contemporary of Thompson, Major General Richard 

L. Clutterbuk judged that disillusionment set in as the 

conflict persisted and victory remained elusive. The 

principal contributing factors included the abiding 

hazards of combat, heavy casualties, and hardships 

of living in the jungle. Their dejection increased as 
2

popular support for the cause ebbed, with villagers 

regarding them as burdens rather than as liberators.3

Paradoxically, the insurgent leadership’s fanatical 

application of communist doctrine depressed 

morale and created desperation. While communist 

indoctrination and “self-criticism” sessions kept 

insurgents under control, they also created a sense of 

mutual suspicion, paranoia, and loneliness. Feeling 

misled and duped, guerrillas grew to hate their 

communist leaders, but they remained in the ranks 

out of a fear of summary execution if betrayed by their 

comrades, and thus a sense of fatalism set in.4

Fortunately, British authorities learned of the 

average insurgent’s plight through interviews with 

surrendered and captured insurgents. Consequently, 

they began developing a program which would 

offer a way for guerrillas to defect and subvert the 

insurgency from within. They also recognized that the 

Malayan government needed to take the lead on the 

reconciliation program.

Malay Government Commitment to the 

Reconciliation Program.

The Malayan government’s commitment to the 

defection program was part of a larger reconciliation 

process with the Malayan ethnic-Chinese community. 

The roots of the insurgency coincided with Britain 

granting statehood to Malaya in 1948, thereby creating 

the Federation of Malaya. Even before independence, 

relations between the ethnic Malay and the ethnic 

Chinese communities were dismal. While the ethnic 

Chinese represented 38 percent of the population (two 

million out of 5.3 million), they remained politically 
3

disenfranchised, primarily due to long-standing ethnic 

discrimination and competition for jobs.5

During the Second World War, Japanese occupation 

forces had expelled approximately 500,000 ethnic 

Chinese from their villages. Settling as squatters in 

jungle clearings, many of the ethnic Chinese formed 

the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) 

under the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party 

(MCP), which the British supported with weapons and 

equipment.6 With the return of the British after the war, 

the MPAJA morphed into the anti-British Malayan 

Races Liberation Army (MRLA).7

As the military arm of the Malayan Communist 

Party, the MRLA numbered 7,000 guerrillas with 

thirty to forty thousand cohorts providing “money, 

food, intelligence, and communications support.” 

Almost entirely ethnic Chinese, the MRLA operated 

in small groups (up to 50 guerrillas), launching raids 

and ambushes against British troops, as well as 

intimidation and murder against the ethnic Chinese 

communities. As is often the case, insurgents resorted 

to coercion and terror of the local populace to garner 

needed resources and acquiescence.8

Slowly adapting their counterinsurgency tactics 

and strategy to the MRLA threat, British authorities 

conferred with the Malayan government to embrace 

a reconciliation program wholeheartedly, along with 

other political reforms, as a way to draw away rank 

and file insurgents from the MRLA.9 Gaining Malayan 

government commitment to the program was essential 

for three reasons. First, the government would need 

to manage and resource the program (i.e., a Malayan 

rather than a British face). Second, the government 

would need to assure ordinary insurgents that 

reconciliation was in earnest. Third, the government 
4

would need to convince the population—many of them 

victims of communist atrocities—that reconciliation 

was in everyone’s best interests.10

The British logic behind a reconciliation program 

rested on a firm foundation. Foremost, encouraging 

defections was to be less costly and easier than 

killing insurgents. Second, information gleaned from 

former guerrillas would yield accurate, expeditious 

intelligence on insurgent organization, locations, and 

tactics. Accordingly, precise intelligence would only 

require small unit actions rather than large, unwieldy 

military operations. Finally, once the humane 

treatment of surrendered insurgents became wellknown, desperate insurgents under the communist 

tyranny would feel encouraged to defect.11

According to Sir Robert Thompson, humane 

treatment of repatriated insurgents is essential to a 

reconciliation program. A policy of humane treatment 

signals the government’s genuine commitment to 

reconciliation. In turn, the government needs to 

inculcate humane treatment of surrendering insurgents 

in the security forces and the public.12 Of course, 

securing popular acceptance of this policy is difficult 

because such conflicts engender widespread hatred of 

insurgents. Consequently, the government must make 

a concerted effort to dispel hatred towards insurgents 

for moral and pragmatic reasons:

First, it leads to ill-treatment by the armed 

forces of captured insurgents and suspects, 

and encourages bullying of the population in 

insurgent-controlled areas. This is degrading to 

the troops themselves and is bad for their morale 

and discipline. It also creates a completely 

wrong impression of the government which 

they represent. Second, those who are hated 

become too scared to surrender to their 
5

haters, even when cornered and wounded in 

battle. It takes a long time to build up in the 

minds of people subject to daily communist 

indoctrination and propaganda that they will 

be well treated if they surrender, and any case 

in which a person is not well treated is liable 

to do irreparable harm to the reputation of the 

government. (Just think what a superb line it is 

if the government can say and get across to the 

insurgent: “Leave your wounded behind after 

a battle: we will look after them”). Third, if the 

government is going to win, it is going to have 

to live with the after-effects. If there is a hate 

campaign, which will involve more than just 

the insurgents who live in insurgent-dominated 

areas, the government will find it very difficult 

to bring these persons back into the body 

politic as loyal and useful citizens ready to play 

their part in the future progress of the country. 

The sooner wounds can be healed the better.13

Major General Clutterbuk believed the Malayan 

government’s commitment to reconciliation had a 

salutary effect. Guerrillas learned over time that the 

government honored its promises of amnesty and 

that no guerrillas—with the exception of notorious 

terrorists—were prosecuted. Whether surrendered 

or captured, any guerrilla who cooperated with the 

government was classified as Surrendered Enemy 

Personnel (SEP), which encouraged other guerrillas to 

surrender and cooperate.14

Clutterbuk also assessed that persistent 

counterinsurgency operations and reconciliation were 

mutually supporting. Well-treated SEP provided 

relevant intelligence which permitted national 

security forces to pinpoint guerrilla bases. Operations 

became more effective, which harried insurgent 
6

groups, inflicted more casualties, and prompted more 

surrenders. Clutterbuk concluded that this increased 

operational tempo created “a kind of galloping 

consumption that was fatal” to the insurgency.15

Information Operations

British and Malayan authorities established a 

sophisticated information apparatus to promote 

the national reconciliation program. Sir Thompson 

recounted that the information campaign required 

synchronization of effort, a well-crafted plan, and 

astute, devoted personnel. The information services 

was the executive agency, ensuring that the various 

supporting efforts were integrated holistically. 

The information services had two audiences—the 

insurgents and the public. Coordinating its messages 

with the information services, the psychological 

warfare section focused on undermining insurgent will 

and encouraging surrender. For its part, the Malayan 

government sought to bolster public support for the 

war effort.16 The British recognized the powerful 

message of Malayan independence, so they made sure 

that the Malayan government was in charge, albeit 

with British support.17

Two organizations managed the propaganda 

effort. As an executive agency, the information 

services concentrated on policy formulation and timely 

production of propaganda. It sought professional 

directors and editors to craft effective messaging. It 

coordinated closely with all government departments, 

including the military, to stimulate timely, effective 

dissemination of policies and events.18

The psychological warfare section comprised about 

thirty personnel, the majority of which were former 

Chinese insurgents.19 Major General Clutterbuk noted 
7

that the section’s team leader was ethnic Chinese, 

“who spent much time talking to surrendered 

guerrillas and studying captured documents. He was 

adept at forecasting their policies and reactions, and 

his psychological-warfare approach was based on the 

understanding gained from this constant contact with 

current Communist thinking.” British involvement 

was limited to organization and supervision so as 

to curb corruption and potential treachery. They left 

“the intellectual contacts with Chinese guerrillas 

and villagers—both in the police Special Branch and 

psychological warfare—to other Chinese.”20

While contemporary societies view propaganda 

pejoratively as disinformation, the British at the time 

viewed it positively as a means of persuasion. To be 

credible, propaganda must state facts truthfully and 

without exaggeration (understatements are more 

effective than overstatements). Propaganda should be 

tailored to the various localities of the country since 

local communities focused mainly on parochial issues. 

Of great import, propaganda should be “interesting, 

and entertaining, as well as informative,” in order to 

establish and maintain an audience.21

Thompson maintained that a genuine free press 

is a potent instrument for political legitimacy. The 

government needed to accept certain realities. One, 

insurgent agents would likely penetrate the press 

to distort facts. Two, the press would often engage 

in biased and irresponsible reporting, particularly 

sensational stories built on rumors and gossip. 

Government censorship, however, would prove 

counterproductive, sowing suspicion among the 

populace. Instead, the government should concentrate 

on confident, optimistic, and dignified messages. 

When mistakes are made, it should focus on corrective 
8

actions and compensation rather than denial or coverup.22

Crafting the Reconciliation Policy 

As an integral component of the psychological warfare 

effort, Thompson articulated three objectives of the 

government reconciliation policy: “(1) to encourage 

insurgent surrenders; (2) to sow dissension between 

insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders; and (3) to 

create an image of government both to the insurgents 

and to the population which is both firm and efficient 

but at the same time just and generous.”23

In close collaboration with the government, the 

psychological warfare section rigorously crafted the 

explicit terms of the government reconciliation offer. 

Care was taken to make the offer appealing, reasonable, 

charitable, and clear. The scope of the initial offer 

required scrutiny since the government could always 

improve the terms but could not backtrack without 

damaging its sincerity. The Malayan government 

refrained from offering amnesty early since insurgents 

could interpret it as an indefinite offer covering future 

atrocities and as a sign of government desperation. 

Additionally, the communist leadership likely 

would have used it as a bargaining chip for political 

recognition as a legitimate party.24

The timing of the offer was important since the 

government had to make it from a position of strength, 

specifically after a major success. The offer intentionally 

distinguished between the leadership and the rankand-file in order to promote discord. The government 

reiterated the offer occasionally, with subsequent 

overtures to specific local insurgent groups and even 

named individuals. The psychological warfare section 

intentionally avoided the terms “surrender” and 

“prisoner of war” for the purpose of sowing discontent 
9

between the leadership and the ranks, thereby 

promoting the theme, repatriation with honor.25

The Means of Dissemination

The information services utilized practically every 

means of dissemination imaginable. Commercial radio 

and newspapers were common media for encouraging 

reconciliation. Aircraft broadcast messages with 

loudspeakers and dropped leaflets. Vehicles with 

loudspeakers also broadcast messages, and ground 

patrols distributed leaflets in villages. Volunteer 

repatriated rebels provided voice recordings for 

broadcast messages and personally visited their home 

communities to tell their stories. The participation of 

repatriated insurgents in the information campaign 

proved most effective since active insurgents were 

more receptive to hearing from former colleagues than 

from government channels.26

Propaganda films for cinemas and for mobile 

troupes visiting villages enjoyed great appeal. 

Repatriated insurgents provided testimonies as part of 

the film circuit, and they acted in anti-communist plays 

written by the information services. The novelty of 

films and plays was particularly effective for illiterate 

audiences.27 Clutterbuk mentioned an effective 

propaganda method:

Leaflets were dropped carrying two 

photographs of a guerrilla—one taken at the 

time of his surrender, scrawny and exhausted; 

another taken a few weeks later, plump and 

smiling, with his mother and his girl friend, 

standing in front of the family table stacked 

high with food. Apart from the suggestion that 

the Communists had misled them into wasting 

their lives, politics was not mentioned.28
10

The omission of politics was insightful. The British 

likely concluded that trying to change individual beliefs 

was futile since they are part of one’s core values.29

Reintegration into society had greater significance as 

long as the repatriated insurgent remained a peaceful 

citizen. Essentially, whatever someone’s political 

beliefs, even radical beliefs, being a peaceful citizen 

counted most.

Instructions on How to Defect

The psychological warfare section disseminated 

leaflets, signed by the Malayan Chief Minister, 

throughout insurgent-controlled areas. These leaflets 

served as safe conduct passes and guaranteed food and 

medical attention to rallying insurgents.30 An example 

of an early leaflet stated:

TO ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE JOINED THE 

INSURGENTS

Many of your comrades, realizing that they 

have been deceived and misled by their 

communist leaders, have rallied to the 

Government during the past few months and 

have been well treated. The government now 

makes the following offer to all those bearing 

arms against the Government and those who 

support them:

1. If you now come in and co-operate with the 

government, you will be given fair treatment 

and the opportunity to “self-renew” and to join 

your families.

2. If you have committed murder or other 

brutal crimes against civilian members of the 

population, you may be required to stand your 

trial but your sentence will depend upon the 
11

manner in which you subsequently co-operate 

with the Government.

3. This offer does not apply to those who are 

captured in operations, but if such persons 

subsequently co-operate with the Government, 

then they may be accorded the same terms as 

those who “rally” voluntarily.31

Following Malaya’s independence in 1957, the 

government included amnesty in its offer. The front 

of the leaflets featured the terms, and the reverse side 

served as a safe passage pass in English, Malay, Tamil, 

and Chinese:

1. Those of you who genuinely desire to give 

up the armed struggle may come out of the 

jungle and may ask any individual to help to 

do this.

2. You must bring your arms with you or be 

prepared to state where they are so that they 

can be recovered by the Government.

3. You will NOT be prosecuted for any offense 

connected with the emergency which you have 

committed under Communist direction before 

this date.

4. Those who show that they genuinely intend 

to be loyal to the elected Government of Malaya 

and to give up their Communist activities will 

be helped to regain their normal life and to be 

reunited with their families, if they so wish.

5. As regards the remainder, they will be 

repatriated to China (with their families 

if they so wish) and will not be made the 

subject of any investigation but will be given 

fair treatment while awaiting repatriations.32
12

In addition to the promises of good treatment, 

the government offered monetary rewards to 

insurgents who provided information which led 

to the apprehension or death of senior communist 

leaders. In terms of best practices, the comprehensive 

integration of military operations, genuine government 

commitment to reconciliation, and astute information 

operations enervated the communist insurgency.33

Repatriation Process

The British interrogated all insurgents in custody for 

intelligence and categorization. Those who rallied 

were classified as Surrendered Enemy Personnel 

(SEP) and processed for reintegration. The British 

interrogated captured insurgents as well to ascertain 

the circumstances behind their captivity. For example, 

sometimes insurgents exhausted their ammunition 

as a matter of honor before surrendering. Therefore, 

the attitude of the insurgent during interrogation 

determined his status. For those who cooperated and 

expressed a desire to be a loyal citizen, the British 

classified them as SEPs. Those who remained recalcitrant 

were classified as Captured Enemy Personnel (CEP). 

CEPs were treated as criminals, brought to trial, and 

punished. Active insurgents quickly learned of both 

categories, which influenced their decision to defect as 

well as their attitude during interrogation.34

 The British interrogated both SEPs and CEPs for 

intelligence, at times over extended periods. Regardless 

of the insurgent’s status, the British provided good 

treatment. Thompson observed that insurgents 

divulged a plethora of information over time. 

Interrogators often used known intelligence to verify 

information and to prompt an interviewee to provide 
13

greater details. “This [technique],” in Thompson’s 

view, “shocks the truth out of him far more effectively 

than torture.”35

If defectors had no useful intelligence, they at 

least provided information on their former colleagues 

and leaders still in the jungle. Quite a few brought in 

photographs and daily journals, which the intelligence 

services studied. As a result of this intelligence 

exploitation, local police stations had useful personal 

information on guerrillas operating in their districts.36

As a result of the interrogations, the British 

processed SEPs and CEPs as follows:

(a) Those who are harmless, are of no further 

use to the government and can safely be 

allowed to rejoin their families immediately. 

(b) Those who are of no further use to the 

government either in intelligence or in 

propaganda work, and who can be given such 

employment with the government.

(c) Those who are harmless and of no further 

use to the government, but who either have 

no employment or whose families are unable 

to support them. These should be sent either 

to a local rehabilitation camp, or to a specially 

selected village where they can be given 

further education, taught a trade or usefully 

employed. These camps and villages should 

be sited in a safe area, and the surrendered 

personnel should preferably be unguarded 

other than by themselves. (The ‘unguarded’ is 

important because the risk of one backslider is 

well worth the feeling of faith and confidence 

in the government which is built up in the 

remainder.)

(d) Those who may have to stand trial for their 

crimes. In fact, no one should be prosecuted 
14

because it is most unlikely that the more brutal 

types will surrender. However, there may 

be borderline cases which require continued 

detention for at least a period. They should be 

sent to a special rehabilitation camp (unless 

satisfactory local facilities can be provided) 

where there are facilities for education and 

learning a trade, but the camp should be 

guarded. They should be eligible for promotion 

to (c).37

Remarkably, repatriated insurgents peacefully 

reintegrated into Malayan society with no accounts of 

recidivism.38 While reconciliation helped to weaken 

insurgent ranks, the British employed volunteer, 

repatriated rebels to assist the counterinsurgency 

effort.

Utilization of Former Insurgents

The British welcomed the services of repatriated 

rebels in a variety of capacities. To prevent potential 

treachery or insurgent infiltration, candidates were 

initially assigned tasks which seriously undermined 

the insurgent cause. Such tasks proved necessary to 

compromise candidates in the eyes of the communists.39

The British Special Branch employed defectors at 

interrogation centers. Some select defectors served 

as interviewers to wheedle information from SEPs 

and CEPs. Some served as informants among the 

inmate population. And others provided background 

information on active combatants for psychological 

warfare leaflets and broadcasts. Partly out of gratitude 

for their good treatment and partly out of secure 

employment, these defectors served for months if not 
15

years.40 Even after resettlement, former rebels could 

assist the intelligence services with their insights when 

needed.41 Since intelligence from the interrogation 

centers was perishable, the intelligence services needed 

to disseminate it to the operational forces immediately 

following interrogations in order to capitalize on the 

fervor of volunteers and before the affected communist 

bands displaced.42

The psychological warfare section publicized 

the good treatment of defectors and captured rebels 

to encourage more defections. Propaganda also 

highlighted the rewards of payments and gainful 

employment of repatriated rebels.43 Of course, once 

they appeared in propaganda features, repatriated 

rebels were compromised, so they were beholden to 

the government for their safety and were unlikely to 

rejoin the insurgency.

The British military paid bounties to volunteers 

to guide patrols to insurgent bases. Irrespective of 

financial rewards, volunteers willingly led patrols 

to jungle camps to avenge the mistreatment by their 

despised communist leaders. Some of the volunteers 

were adept trackers, which British commandos used 

to track down senior communist leaders in raids or 

ambushes.44 One enterprising tactical commander 

employed former rebels as advisors on guerrilla tactics, 

techniques, and procedures as well as evaluating 

his units’ tactics, techniques, and procedures.45 This 

part of the reconciliation program was so effective, 

that American and Vietnamese militaries employed 

repatriated volunteers in various ways during the 

Vietnam War.
16

Conclusions

In comparison with other insurgencies, the twelve-year 

Malayan Emergency was relatively innocuous. British 

and Malayan security forces suffered 4,436 casualties, 

and civilian casualties were slightly higher at 4,668. The 

communist casualties were around 16,171, including 

2,980 SEPs and CEPs.46 Yet, the contest of wills was 

difficult and protracted.

The reconciliation program reflected the British 

and Malayan adaptation to the character of the conflict, 

thereby exploiting the weaknesses of the communist 

revolutionary war. British and Malayan authorities 

displayed an amazing ability to learn and an openness 

to try different approaches as the conflict evolved. As 

became apparent, military operations alone were not 

pivotal to success. The reconciliation program was a 

reflection of that realization.

A key feature of the reconciliation program was its 

contribution to post-conflict adjustment. There was no 

need to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

(DDR) in the aftermath of the conflict because it was an 

ongoing program of the counterinsurgency strategy. 

Malayan government commitment to the reconciliation 

program significantly assisted in the reintegration of 

former insurgents into society. This feature accounts 

for the enduring stability of Malaya.
17

Chapter Two – Observations from the

 Vietnam Insurgency

The US counterinsurgency strategy in the Vietnam 

War was needlessly complex, costly, and protracted. 

From 1961 to 1962, numerous advisors within the John 

F. Kennedy administration recommended the creation 

of a fortified line along South Vietnam’s border with 

North Vietnam, through Laos’ southern panhandle, 

and anchored on the Mekong River (Thailand’s 

border). Such a fortified line would have prevented 

North Vietnamese infiltration of proxy troops and 

supplies along the nascent Ho Chi Minh Trail. Behind 

the safety of the fortified line, the Republic of Vietnam 

government would have crushed the Viet Cong 

insurgency with existing resources. The precedent 

for this strategy was the recent counterinsurgency 

experiences during the Korean War.

President John F. Kennedy rejected this course 

of action in favor of a counterinsurgency strategy 

confined to South Vietnam. Kennedy’s strategy failed 

because the rate of North Vietnamese infiltrations 

exceeded South Vietnam’s capabilities. The Lyndon B. 

Johnson administration ultimately opted for military 

intervention to avert the collapse of South Vietnam.

The allied counterinsurgency effort was 

prodigious, signifying the ingenuity and perseverance 

of the American military. One of the most inspired and 

successful initiatives was the reconciliation program 

from 1963 to 1972. This chapter examines the South 

Vietnamese reconciliation program: 1) insurgent 

motives for reconciliation; 2) government commitment 

to the program; 3) information operations; 4) 

reconciliation reception centers; 5) military service of 

ralliers; 6) Rallier resettlement; and 7) the follow-up 

system of ralliers. As this chapter details, the South 
18

Vietnamese reconciliation program substantially 

expanded and improved upon the Malayan 

reconciliation program.

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation

Vietnamese insurgent (Viet Cong) motives for 

defecting to the Republic of Vietnam government 

(RVN) were diverse and invariably personal.47 The 

protracted nature of the conflict (1961 to 1972), the 

military effectiveness of allied operations, and the 

ruthless behavior of the communist leadership created 

a feeling of anxiety, weariness, and alienation among 

the rank and file insurgents.48 Irrespective of individual 

reasons for joining the Viet Cong, the unremitting 

realities of fighting proved mentally debilitating.49

Most telling was the myth that the average guerrilla 

was ideologically motivated.50

From the beginning, the communist leadership 

at all levels assured the proletarian ranks that the 

insurgency would achieve victory swiftly, and the 

populace would hail them as patriots. When these 

promises proved illusory and the conflict continued 

unabated, the average Viet Cong became disheartened 

and doubted the insurgency would prevail, especially 

once US military forces intervened. Adding to their 

despondency was the aloofness of villagers to the 

communist cause. As a matter of survival, villagers 

refused to take sides, became unsympathetic to the 

communist revolution, and avoided the Viet Cong to 

the point of even leaving their ancestral villages.51

The effectiveness of US and ARVN (Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam) operations had multi-ordered 

effects on insurgent psyches. Unremitting combat 

demoralized the Viet Cong. The fear of inevitable 

death, of abandonment on the battlefield, of never 
19

seeing their families again, and of not having a 

proper burial was pervasive. Evading allied forces 

required constant movement in a harsh environment, 

which deprived them of adequate food, medical care, 

and rest.52 While few insurgents credited defeat on 

the battlefield as the reason for rallying, the loss of 

territorial control and severance from the succor of 

villages multiplied their hardships.53 The 1968 Tet 

Offensive debacle was a particular blow to their morale 

as hopes for a quick victory became forlorn.54 The US/

RVN pacification program (1968-1972), which featured 

the clear and hold strategy, further isolated Viet Cong 

forces from their indispensable control of villages.55

Paradoxically, US/ARVN military successes provided 

excellent opportunities for Viet Cong soldiers to defect 

since communist leadership control was temporarily 

severed.56

Remarkably, US air and artillery strikes on villages 

did not alienate villagers or even prompt voluntary 

enlistment into the Viet Cong. Villagers fatalistically 

viewed their predicament as being caught between two 

warring powers (“a fly caught between two fighting 

buffaloes”) but harbored no reported animosity to the 

US or RVN governments. Villagers were not angered 

by the impersonal nature of air and artillery strikes; 

however atrocities and mistreatment by ARVN forces 

did incur their wrath, which prompted many to join 

the Viet Cong. Moreover, villagers appreciated US 

warnings of pending airstrikes and took the opportunity 

to depart the village, defying Viet Cong attempts to 

keep them in place as shields. A distinct majority of 

villagers blamed the Viet Cong for endangering their 

lives with their presence.57

The severe discipline and policies of the Viet 

Cong leadership engendered hostility, revulsion, and 

desperation among the rank and file. As the conflict 
20

became prolonged, the Viet Cong leadership resorted 

to coercion of the populace (e.g., threats, intimidation, 

terrorism, and violence), so as to levy heavy taxes 

and to impress young men, women, teenagers, and 

even children into service, two issues which further 

alienated villagers. Some insurgents harbored deep 

resentment and revulsion over Viet Cong atrocities 

on family members. As they lacked motivation, 

impressed Viet Cong lowered unit morale and combat 

effectiveness, lacked commitment to the communist 

cause, and deserted at the earliest opportunity.58 In an 

effort to exert greater control and staunch desertions, 

the Viet Cong leadership exacted draconian discipline 

and punishment on their soldiers, which in turn further 

lowered morale and led to even more desertions 

and defections.59 A vicious cycle of desperation and 

recrimination pervaded the average Viet Cong’s 

miserable life.

Both conscripts and volunteers grew to loath Viet 

Cong cadre indoctrination and discipline. Typically, 

the Viet Cong leadership exercised stringent control 

over guerrillas using the three-man group system and 

the close scrutiny of political officers. The leadership 

prohibited fighters from visiting relatives, marrying, 

and raising a family. Since Vietnamese revered close 

family ties and the fighters suffered from homesickness, 

these restrictions were particularly vexing. Discontent 

also arose from the denial of leave for insurgents wishing 

to check on their families’ safety or contribute to their 

livelihood. Among other grievances, the reasons for 

defecting or deserting were overwhelmingly personal, 

and no amount of indoctrination could maintain 

devotion to the cause or to fellow colleagues.60

The major deterrents to defection were uncertainty 

of RVN government treatment upon surrender, 

separation from their families, the opportunity to 
21

escape, and fear of Viet Cong retribution on their 

families. Surrendering in battle is always hazardous, 

and fear of mistreatment by RVN security forces created 

anxiety. Consequently, without a clear commitment of 

the RVN government towards reconciliation and the 

means of safe passage for defection, many Viet Cong 

insurgents would remain in the ranks.61

In recognition of the insurgent’s dilemma, British 

and American advisors with counterinsurgency 

experience recommended the development of a 

reconciliation policy. While these advisors were the 

inspiration for the program, the RVN government 

needed to manage it for reasons of popular legitimacy, 

trust, and acceptance.62

South Vietnamese Government Commitment 

to the Reconciliation Program

Like the British in Malaya, American officials in 

Vietnam recognized that it was more cost effective in 

terms of military manpower, money and casualties 

to offer reconciliation to Viet Cong insurgents. As 

such, the average cost of persuading an insurgent 

to defect was $125 as opposed to $400,000 expended 

to kill one. In short, expenditures associated with 

reconciliation—inducement, reception, vocational 

training, and resettlement—were far less than using 

military power to kill insurgents. Not only would 

a reconciliation program deprive the Viet Cong 

apparatus of manpower, food, and revenue, but it 

would also furnish the government with much needed 

skilled manpower for the economy and military.63 In 

essence, reconciliation was a zero-sum game.

Designated as Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) in April 

1963, the Great National Solidarity program took 

several years before it became fully functional in 
22

1967—fundamentally at the insistence of the United 

States. Still, it was not until the 1968 Tet Offensive 

that the RVN government fully embraced the Chieu 

Hoi program.64 Its haphazard development and 

effectiveness were the result of hardline attitudes, 

inattention, and the turbulence caused by the frequent 

changes in government and internal political struggles 

from 1963 to 1967. Many ARVN commanders and 

provincial chiefs passively resisted Chieu Hoi because 

they believed the program rewarded traitors. Thus, 

convincing sceptics of the program’s value was a 

constant struggle.65

The nature of the conflict in South Vietnam 

reflected a prolonged insurgency, abetted by North 

Vietnam through trained Viet Cong cadres and North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) units. Having consolidated 

his political base in South Vietnam (1954-1958), 

President Ngo Dinh Diem launched an effective 

counter-guerrilla campaign in 1958 with the goal of 

eliminating residual Viet Minh cells. Diem’s campaign 

prompted Ho Chi Minh’s government in North 

Vietnam to render support to the Viet Cong (formerly 

Viet Minh), using infiltration routes through Laos into 

Cambodia and South Vietnam. Eager to showcase its 

theory on counterinsurgency in an appropriate setting, 

the John F. Kennedy administration abandoned Laos in 

early 1961 in favor of South Vietnam. From 1961 to 1965, 

the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations 

ultimately dispatched over 20,000 advisors, as well as 

a plethora of military assistance, to bolster the RVN 

military and counterinsurgency programs.66

 The war entered a new stage with the US military 

intervention in mid-1965. Along with the graduated 

escalation of airstrikes in North Vietnam, along the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and in South Vietnam, US 

and RVN military forces waged largescale operations 
23

as part of the attrition strategy (search and destroy). 

In the wake of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive 

in early 1968, the Richard M. Nixon administration 

and senior military leaders adopted a pacification 

counterinsurgency strategy (clear and hold). The 

purpose of pacification was to separate insurgents from 

population centers using a combination of military 

operations (clear) and local paramilitary (popular and 

regional forces) to control all urban areas (hold). In the 

later stages of the war, US and ARVN forces launched 

raids into Cambodia and southern Laos to destroy 

North Vietnamese staging and logistical bases. The 

success of pacification coincided with Vietnamization 

of the war effort, both of which permitted a US military 

withdrawal from Vietnam. The failure of the North 

Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972 demonstrated 

the ability of ARVN to repulse North Vietnamese 

aggression when backed by US airpower and logistical 

support. Consequently, North Vietnam and the United 

States signed the Paris cease-fire agreement in January 

1973, ending the war.67

It was in this setting that the RVN government 

implemented the Chieu Hoi program. At its inception 

in April 1963, the RVN government ran the program 

in Saigon, constructing reception centers in provinces 

and districts with US funding and material. Starting in 

1967, the RVN government extended reception centers 

to the village level. The program encouraged Viet 

Cong insurgents to “rally” in exchange for amnesty, 

guaranteed political and civil rights, vocational 

training, and job opportunities.68

As the Chieu Hoi program evolved, the RVN 

government established the Chieu Hoi Ministry in 

April 1967 to signify its importance. Underscoring 

the government’s commitment to the program, Prime 

Minister Nguyen Gao Ky announced the Policy of 
24

National Reconciliation in an April 1967 proclamation. 

In the wake of the 1968 Tet offensive, President Nguyen 

Van Thieu issued a July 1968 joint communique with 

President Lyndon Johnson reaffirming the RVN’s 

commitment to the Chieu Hoi program.69

US authorities managed the Chieu Hoi program 

with three organizations. The Civil Operations and 

Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) 

program provided executive authority. The US Agency 

for International Development (USAID) furnished 

funding, logistical resources, and personnel. The Joint 

US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) managed Chieu Hoi 

psychological operations. Accordingly, US authorities 

assigned American Chieu Hoi advisors to each of 

the four regions and 44 provinces. Additionally, US 

authorities issued pamphlets to American commands, 

explaining the Chieu Hoi program, its practical 

contribution to the war effort, and the guidelines 

for processing ralliers. To be clear, the United States 

remained the prime mover for the Chieu Hoi program. 

Without US persistence, the program would have 

likely floundered due to RVN skepticism of its value.70

Information Operations

The persuasion (propaganda) campaign was 

multifaceted and tailored to appeal to several audiences: 

rank and file insurgents, the national government and 

sub-government leadership, local communities and 

families, the allied militaries, and the police. Due to 

the negative implications of the terms “defection” and 

“surrender,” US and RVN authorities sought a name 

which would strike the right cord with insurgents. 

Hence, Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) conveyed a sense of 

“welcome back,” and surrendered insurgents were 

called Hoi Chanh, which meant rallier or returnee. In 

contrast, the RVN government did not recognize as 

ralliers those insurgents who had deserted for home 
25

or surrendered during combat. In effect, this approach 

sought to persuade insurgents to rejoin their families 

rather than to switch sides.71

An important component of reconciliation was 

the RVN government’s recognition of economic 

and social grievances among rural peasants and 

workers, which the ruling establishment had ignored 

for years.72 The Viet Cong were adept at exploiting 

popular resentments to garner revolutionary support, 

so the pacification program sought, in part, to redress 

these core grievances.73 However, pacification would 

take substantial time and depended on successful 

counterinsurgency operations, which for the rural 

communities meant the ability of the government to 

seize and hold territory, thereby providing enduring 

security, as well as greater opportunities for insurgents 

to defect.74 In this sense, pacification and reconciliation 

were mutually supporting.

The effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi program 

depended on an intimate linguistic and cultural 

understanding of Vietnamese society, which the 

Americans obviously lacked. Communist soldiers 

regarded American-derived propaganda as laughable 

and ignored it. Only the Vietnamese, particularly 

ralliers, could provide these qualities for information 

operations. Thus, the Chieu Hoi program needed 

sufficient numbers of ralliers to provide advice and 

assistance in crafting messages that resonated. Initial 

coordination of the propaganda program among 

the various organizations operating in Vietnam was 

deficient as well. The first order of business was 

creating an effective organization for the effort.75

The establishment of the Joint US Public Affairs 

Office (JUSPAO) coincided with the US military 

intervention in mid-1965. JUSAPAO served as the 
26

clearing house for psychological operations vis-à-vis 

the Chieu Hoi program. As such, JUSPAO established a 

unity of effort for propaganda efforts among pertinent 

organizations, such as the Military Assistance and 

Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command—

Vietnam, US Information Agency, USAID, CIA, and 

RVN government agencies.76 Due to the success of 

the Chieu Hoi program in the late 1960s, the Ministry 

of Chieu Hoi assumed complete responsibility of the 

JUSPAO in July 1971 and continued all programs 

associated with its psychological operations.77

As the Chieu Hoi program matured, US and 

RVN officials crafted a program strategy, which 

consisted of five phases: 1) Inducement; 2) Reception 

and Interrogation; 3) Training; 4) Resettlement and 

Employment; and 5) Follow-up.78 This strategy built on 

the existing Chieu Hoi program (and the similar British 

program in Malaya), but with greater sophistication, 

resources, funding, and focus.

Inducement: Reconciliation Policy

Based on interviews of ralliers, the propaganda 

effort focused on the “personal” motivations for 

rallying. Since morale problems within insurgent 

ranks were almost entirely personal—viz. hardships 

and deprivations, danger and high combat losses, 

grievances with Viet Cong leaders, repugnance of 

Viet Cong practices, elusive victory, and villager 

animosity—allied propaganda offered a way out of the 

insurgent’s dilemma.79 Messaging avoided ideological 

arguments because insurgents generally remained 

steadfast to the ideals of the communist movement 

(just as in Malaya).80

Foremost in insurgents’ minds were ways to 

surrender safely, the economic well-being of their 
27

families, and Viet Cong retaliation against their families 

after they rallied.81 Throughout the war, the Chieu Hoi 

program promised amnesty, political rehabilitation 

training, vocational training, a livelihood, and 

reintegration into society.82 Approximately 27,789 

insurgents had rallied from 1963 to 1965, which did not 

represent a substantial drain on Viet Cong numbers. 

After the US military intervention, JUSPAO officials 

devoted greater attention to the Chieu Hoi program.83

Prime Minister Nguyen Gao Ky’s 1967 proclamation 

articulated the government’s promise to prospective 

ralliers:

(1) All those who decide to leave the ranks 

of the Communists and reintegrate in the 

national community will be warmly welcomed 

as citizens with full rights of citizenship. All 

returnees will be protected by the government, 

which will also provide them facilities to build 

a new life. In other words, every citizen who 

abandons the Communist ranks will enjoy the 

rights set forth in the Constitution, including 

the right to have the law protect his freedom, 

his life, his property, and his honor, the right to 

vote and to run for office, the right to go back 

and live with his family, the right to choose 

his place of residence and the right to enjoy 

the national assistance in the pursuit of his 

profession.

(2) The citizens who rally to the national 

cause will be employed in accordance with 

their ability so that every Vietnamese without 

distinctions will have the opportunity to 

contribute positively to the reconstruction and 

development of the country.

(3) The citizens who rally to the national 
28

cause but who have violated the law under 

Communist coercion or deception, whether 

they have been convicted or not, will enjoy all 

the guarantees set forth in the Constitution. 

The country will be tolerant to the utmost so 

they have the opportunity to put their ability 

and determination to serve and redeem 

themselves.84

The RVN government offered further inducements 

for ralliers as well:

(1) Payment of weapons rewards, for weapons 

brought in, or a cache that the defector leads 

military forces to.

(2) Payment for inducing other Viet Cong or 

NVA [North Vietnamese Army] to defect.

(3) A government grant of 2,000 piasters (about 

$16) for clothing, and 300 piasters a month 

spending money during the orientation period, 

as well as 50 piasters a day for food.

(4) A departure gift of 1,290 piasters when the 

defector leaves the reception center.

(5) A six-month draft deferment commencing 

at the end of the orientation period.85

While the original Chieu Hoi program permitted 

limited numbers of ralliers to enter the armed services, 

to include Armed Propaganda Teams, the Americans 

expanded this opportunity to include service with 

the US Army, specifically as Kit Carson Scouts and 

Provincial Reconnaissance Units.86 By late 1960s, these 

volunteers provided immense service for the allied 

forces.
29

Greater opportunities for rallying were tied to 

the ability of the RVN government to expand its 

control of territory through military operations and 

pacification.87 Moreover, JUSPAO officials learned 

that their propaganda campaign needed some 

improvements: 1) a greater variety of “communication 

channels and techniques;” 2) prompt “exploitation of 

local developments;” 3) tailored messages to address 

local insurgents’ concerns; 4) the design of leaflets 

with authoritative imprimatur to serve as safe conduct 

passes; and 5) greater specificity regarding the Chieu 

Hoi program. Although many insurgents were aware 

of the RVN government’s appeals to rally, they 

remained ignorant of the specific details of the Chieu 

Hoi program.88

Based on interviews with ralliers, JUSPAO officials 

recommended that RVN government messages 

parallel the propaganda campaign by striking a tone 

of sympathy of the insurgent’s plight and the promise 

of good treatment upon surrender. They advised the 

government to advertise military successes, progress 

in the pacification effort, the attitudes of villagers 

towards the Viet Cong, and the poor conditions of 

villagers in Viet Cong controlled territories. They 

urged the government to highlight the desertions of 

North Vietnamese Army soldiers in order to create 

internal rifts and demoralize the Viet Cong. Finally, 

they wanted the government to encourage rural 

communities and refugees to complain to relatives 

serving in the Viet Cong about their own hardships.89

The Means of Dissemination

The dissemination of JUSPAO propaganda to the 

Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), the 

populace, and refugees was prodigious and varied. 

Aircraft dropped millions of leaflets and newspapers. 
30

Ground patrols and Armed Propaganda Teams 

(ralliers) distributed by hand millions of leaflets, 

newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, calendars, and 

comic books. Government officials displayed Chieu 

Hoi posters prominently and everywhere. Radio, 

television, and movie productions, in addition to 

loudspeaker broadcasts (aircraft, vehicles, boats, and 

outposts), were widespread. Chieu Hoi symbols and 

slogans were ubiquitous, on banners in schools, and 

printed on match boxes, bars of soap, and market bags. 

Information service teams, medical teams, Armed 

Propaganda Teams, Chieu Hoi Advisory Teams, and 

culture-drama teams (female ralliers) conducted Chieu 

Hoi rallies, lectures and conventions, as well as movie, 

theater, and music programs with local communities.90

As a note of interest, Chieu Hoi Advisory Teams (3-5 

men) operated in each of the four regions. Individual 

Chieu Hoi advisors (American or Filipino) were 

assigned to each of the 44 provinces.91

Since family members and friends remained in 

contact with those serving in the Viet Cong, JUSPAO 

outreach to local communities and refugees served as 

an indirect means of encouraging insurgents to rally. 

Many ralliers acknowledged that pleas and information 

on the Chieu Hoi program from relatives and friends 

were influential factors in their decision to defect.92

The Safe Conduct Pass proved the most effective 

means for rallying. Disseminated as leaflets, Safe 

Conduct Passes were multilingual (VietnameseKorean-Thai-English) and signed by President Nguyen 

Van Thieu, with instructions on how to surrender. US 

and RVN authorities ensured that military and police 

units, as well as advisors and civilian authorities, were 

knowledgeable of the Chieu Hoi program and the 

purpose of the Safe Conduct Pass. Typically, insurgents 

preferred to rally through civilian channels because it 
31

was less risky. Accordingly, 70 percent surrendered to 

police stations or Chieu Hoi Reception centers, whereas 

the remainder surrendered to military units.93

As the Chieu Hoi program evolved, JUSPAOtrained ralliers crafted propaganda themes and 

messages since they “knew the modus operandi of the 

enemy, their erstwhile comrades, and were themselves 

a part of the indigenous culture and social and political 

environment.” Rallied interviewees also provided 

crucial feedback on making the Chieu Hoi program 

more appealing, the design of Safe Conduct Passes 

more impressive, and propaganda messaging more 

effective. They also advised that JUSPAO characterize 

“defection as a courageous and patriotic act that 

will benefit the country.”94 Hence, ralliers served an 

important role in the propaganda program.

While the Chieu Hoi program concentrated on 

drawing off lower-level Viet Cong soldiers, by the 

last three years of the war, higher ranking Viet Cong 

began to defect, representing about seven percent 

of all ralliers. These defectors included company 

commanders, district and provincial committee 

members, and other officers with long service in the 

Viet Cong apparatus. This occurrence was surprising 

since JUSPAO had concluded early that committed 

Viet Cong would never rally. Nevertheless, it was an 

indicator that Viet Cong insurgents at all levels were 

losing faith in the communist cause.95

An additional anomaly was an increase of North 

Vietnamese Army defectors near the end of the war. 

Most NVA soldiers, however, remained in the ranks 

because they did not think the Chieu Ho program 

applied to them. While the number of deserters was 

small, about 800, ten percent were senior officers. 

Reasons for defecting included despondency over 

never seeing their loved ones again, US military 
32

effectiveness, and little desire to suffer and die in 

South Vietnam.96 Irrespective of the original intent of 

JUSPAO propaganda, the targeting of NVA soldiers 

was worthwhile if for no other reason than lowering 

morale.

In 1966, one enterprising US psychological warfare 

company disseminated a hand-written appeal from a 

captured North Vietnamese soldier to his comrades:

I was sick and abandoned by my unit. I was left 

without food or adequate clothing. I was left 

to die. The Americans found me and gave me 

food, shelter, clothing, and medicine to cure 

me of my sickness [malaria]. They have treated 

me well in all my request. I urge all of you, my 

comrades, to cease this useless fight that will 

only lead to a dishonorable death far from the 

homeland and our loved ones. Before it is too 

late rally to the Allied Forces. Come to the main 

highway with your shirt off and your weapon 

over your right shoulder, muzzle down. Wave 

your shirt over your head. The Allied Forces 

will help you. Do not fear them, they did not 

harm me.97

Airdropped over the NVA battalion’s area of operation, 

thousands of copies included pictures of the soldier 

enjoying a meal and receiving medical treatment.98 No 

record exists as to the effectiveness of the appeal, but 

it does show the US military did attempt to persuade 

NVA soldiers to defect.

Because allied information operations proved 

effective, Viet Cong leaders took measures to prevent 

propaganda from reaching the lower ranks. They 

directed all propaganda leaflets and safe conduct 
33

passes gathered immediately and destroyed; they 

took measures to drown out aerial broadcasts; and 

they threatened punishment of Viet Cong soldiers 

and villagers caught listening to forbidden radio 

programs or holding propaganda leaflets. Viet Cong 

propaganda warned that the RVN government used 

the reconciliation offer as a ploy and would punish 

defectors. Aside from intense indoctrination measures, 

Viet Cong leaders restricted freedom of movement to 

prevent defections, which caused animosity among 

the fighters. Hence, the existence of the Chieu Hoi 

program had an indirect effect on weakening Viet 

Cong cohesion.99

Chieu Hoi Reception Centers Reception Centers

As an integral part of the national reconciliation 

program, Chieu Hoi Reception Centers evolved slowly 

in scope and quality. Originally, the RVN government 

envisaged establishing the centers in every province, 

district, and village. Whereas the Saigon national center 

focused mainly on political indoctrination training and 

rehabilitation for senior Viet Cong and NVA ralliers, 

the other centers devoted greater attention to medical 

care and about eight weeks of vocational training.100

The indoctrination course aspired to instill the social 

and political ideals of the RVN government.101

When the Chieu Hoi Ministry came into being, 

reception centers existed in every province and most 

districts, but only in a few villages.102 Naturally, the 

expansion of reception centers was tied to progress 

in pacification, so as the government liberated more 

territory, the number of village reception centers 

increased. While the RVN government’s misgivings 

over the Chieu Hoi program hampered rapid progress, 

by late in the war, the Chieu Hoi Ministry oversaw 
34

the Saigon national center, four regional centers, 44 

provincial centers, and three autonomous city centers. 

District centers remained small, temporary facilities 

for later transport to provincial centers.103

The Chieu Hoi Reception Center exemplified 

the sincerity of the government’s promise of 

reconciliation, so the rallier’s first impression of the 

facility was momentous. The reputation of the Chieu 

Hoi program rested on ralliers’ experiences because 

insurgents in the field were well-informed of rallier 

treatment at the centers—if instances of poor treatment 

occurred, insurgents knew about them quickly. Since 

provincial chiefs managed the provincial centers, their 

enthusiasm and competence were important factors. 

Some provincial centers were so poorly managed 

and overcrowded that ralliers departed in frustration. 

However, most provincial centers were well-run and 

closely aligned with JUSPAO propaganda, which 

attracted the most ralliers.104 Hence, it behooved 

government officials to visit all reception centers to 

ensure uniform good treatment of ralliers.

The major appeal of the reception centers was an 

opportunity for ralliers to receive amnesty, a vocation, 

and an opportunity to return home. The Chieu Hoi 

Ministry provided additional incentives as well. Ralliers 

received immediate medical treatment at reception 

centers. The government widely publicized monetary 

rewards for turned-in weapons, for information which 

led to the capture of Viet Cong weapons caches, and 

for persuading other Viet Cong or NVA soldiers 

to defect. The establishment of reception centers in 

each province attracted those ralliers who wished to 

remain close to their home villages. During their stay 

at the reception center, ralliers received a stipend and 

vocational training. Moreover, their families received 

a small allowance and accommodations at the centers, 
and their children received a basic education. For those 

ralliers who could not return to their original homes, 

the RVN government, using US resources and rallier 

labor, constructed Chieu Hoi villages for them and 

their families. Additionally, resettled ralliers received 

a regular stipend, food, and other assistance.105

In the early years, reception centers were poorly 

managed and subject to corruption due to poorly trained, 

motivated, and paid employees. While overcrowding 

remained an issue, conditions and management 

improved significantly with the employment of ralliers 

as administrators. This proved an astute decision since 

ralliers empathized with defectors and sought to meet 

their expectations. While local police vetted defectors 

initially, rallier-administrators at reception centers 

scrutinized newcomers for Viet Cong infiltration. 

Ralliers also built or improved reception centers using 

US-provided materials. Finally, Armed Propaganda 

Teams (ralliers) provided security for reception 

centers.106

Upon reporting to a reception center, ralliers were 

fingerprinted and registered into the National Identity 

Registration Program (NIRP) by personnel from the 

Chieu Hoi Ministry. The National Police also issued 

them identification cards. While this procedure helped 

thwart Viet Cong infiltrators, the initial interview 

proved the most effective.107

Interview Process

The immediate interview of new ralliers at reception 

centers was a crucial component of in-processing. 

The purpose of the initial interview was to determine 

the ralliers’ motives for surrendering and to extract 

perishable intelligence they could offer.108 The 

interview process sorted ralliers into the following 
36

categories: refugees, marginal ralliers, activist ralliers, 

and Viet Cong prisoners of war. Chieu Hoi officials 

further segregated former Viet Cong and NVA officers 

from the average fighters.

109

Refugees were victims of Viet Cong coercion and 

sought to escape their control. Reporting to Chieu 

Hoi Reception Centers signaled that they were no 

longer noncommittal (fence-sitters) to the conflict and 

were active supporters of the RVN government. They 

viewed the Chieu Hoi program as a way to support 

the RVN government in safety, thereby contributing 

to psychological operations and political warfare. 

Accordingly, they would either join the refugee 

program or shift into one of the other categories.110

Ostensibly, they would return to their homes once the 

government had pacified the area.

Marginal ralliers represented the largest group of 

ralliers who had joined the Viet Cong movement. They 

were simple, apolitical peasants who possessed few 

technical skills and education of military or political 

use. The government would treat them as citizens who 

had strayed and now sought only security and peace. 

Since they had limited aspirations, they would remain 

content with leading a peasant lifestyle in the future 

(i.e., farmers and herders). After interviewers gleaned 

any intelligence of value, they were free to return home 

(if pacified) or be categorized as refugees.

111

Activist ralliers were the most valuable to the 

government cause due to their exceptional level of 

education, abilities, and aspirations. Because they 

had held positions of responsibility, interrogators 

sought to glean their extensive knowledge of Viet 

Cong organization, military tactics, operations, and 

communist ideology. Activist ralliers had originally 

joined the Viet Cong for political, social, and military 

advancement, so the RVN government would need 
37

to offer the same opportunities to gain their loyalty. 

While some political rehabilitation was in order, Chieu 

Hoi program officials took care to avoid debate on core 

beliefs. Since activist ralliers responded positively to 

trust and greater responsibility, they proved invaluable 

for propaganda and military efforts. Once officials 

recognized their acumen and ambition, they made 

beneficial contributions to society.112

US military, ARVN, and RVN government officials 

offered Viet Cong prisoners of war the opportunity 

to volunteer for the Chieu Hoi program. With an 

understanding that insurgents may have not defected 

earlier due to uncertainties regarding their treatment 

or fear of punishment, Chieu Hoi officials introduced 

this option, provided the candidates had committed 

no crimes. This discretionary approach appealed to 

the Vietnamese perceptions of fairness and justice. 

While the initial number of prisoner of war ralliers was 

modest, it did increase over time.113 Naturally, once 

prisoners of war entered the program, interrogators 

could elicit intelligence and employ their knowledge 

of Viet Cong tactics and methods.

The interview process was pivotal to the Chieu Hoi 

program. Due to personal and political sensitivities, 

Chieu Hoi officials used the term “interview” with 

ralliers instead of “interrogation.” Since surrendering 

was a voluntary act, ralliers were quite forthcoming 

regarding any intelligence they had. Vietnamese 

interviewers were the most effective in extracting 

essential information, not only due to their inherent 

linguistic abilities, but also their understanding of 

cultural subtleties (i.e., “politeness, respect, and even 

deferential treatment”). While US agency and military 

personnel were involved in the process, the principal 

interviewers came from the National Police Special 
38

Branch, local regional forces/people forces (RF/PF), 

the ARVN, and the Phoenix Program (after 1968).114

The initial interview served two purposes. First, 

interviewers needed to verify that a rallier was bona fide 

and not a Viet Cong infiltrator. The Viet Cong certainly 

tried to infiltrate agents into Chieu Hoi Reception 

Centers, so the threat was not speculative. Over time, 

interviewers became more skilled and sophisticated, 

a hallmark of a learning organization. However, the 

interview process did breakdown whenever reception 

centers were overwhelmed by throngs of ralliers. In 

these instances, interviewers failed to catch infiltrators 

and even missed opportunities to exploit perishable 

intelligence. Paradoxically, plenty of infiltrators were 

impressed by the RVN government’s commitment to 

reconciliation and the opportunities afforded in the 

reception centers. Won over, they informed Chieu Hoi 

authorities of their original intentions and informed 

on other infiltrators.115 Second, interviewers needed 

to assess the value of the perishable intelligence 

and pass it to the various police branches and 

assorted intelligence services for immediate action. 

Additionally, interviewers shared feedback to the 

psychological warfare agencies to help them hone 

propaganda messages.116

Aside from the services rendered for the war effort, 

employing ralliers allowed them to prove their loyalty 

to the RVN government cause and also compromised 

them from the perspective of their former communist 

comrades. Irrespective of their original intentions 

(i.e., communist agents or saboteurs), once the RVN 

government entrusted them with responsibility and 

publicized their contributions, ralliers were loath to 

defect back to the Viet Cong. Ralliers were encouraged 

to serve in the military or the government if they 

qualified, but it had to be completely voluntary, and 

ralliers had to prove their sincerity. This approach 
39

proved beneficial. During the Viet Cong 1968 Tet 

Offensive, no reported ralliers defected to the Viet 

Cong, and many distinguished themselves in the 

defense of the reception centers (prime targets during 

the offensive). Provincial Armed Propaganda Teams 

(ralliers) fought so valiantly during the Tet Offensive 

that the ARVN later incorporated them into military 

operations.117

Political Rehabilitation

As with other initial Chieu Hoi programs, political 

rehabilitation (reeducation or indoctrination) at Chieu 

Hoi Reception Centers suffered from inadequacies, 

viz., poorly trained instructors, unsuitable facilities, 

and small budgets. Additionally, early indoctrination 

courses emphasized eliminating the Viet Cong and 

annexation of North Vietnam rather than “peace and 

prosperity” themes. Learning from these mistakes, 

the RVN government instituted formal training of 

instructors at the National Training Center located in 

Vung Tau (southeast of Saigon). By 1969, the selection 

and training of instructors, particularly qualified 

ralliers with Viet Cong indoctrination experience, 

strikingly improved.118

Once interviewers categorized ralliers, Provincial 

Chieu Hoi Reception Centers transported former 

mid-level Viet Cong and NVA leaders to Regional 

Chieu Hoi Centers and former senior Viet Cong 

and NVA leaders to the National Chieu Hoi Center 

in Saigon. Viet Cong rank and file remained at the 

provincial reception centers. In this manner, Chieu Hoi 

authorities segregated communist ideologues from 

those less committed.119 The intensity of reeducation 

at the provincial, regional, and national Chieu Hoi 

Centers conformed to the education levels and 
40

leadership positions that ralliers held in the Viet Cong 

apparatus. Reeducation courses averaged 72 hours in 

duration and focused particular attention to explaining 

government policies and goals in order to cultivate a 

sense of citizenship.120

At each reception center, Chieu Hoi officials 

sought to place new ralliers immediately at ease. Some 

enterprising US advisers provided “Welcome Wagon” 

plastic bags with Chieu Hoi logos, containing soap, 

stationary, and propaganda materials. Newcomers 

were welcomed by resident ralliers and were free 

to mingle and converse with everyone in the center. 

Some newcomers were assigned a sponsor, who 

was a well-established rallier. Employing veteran 

ralliers as reeducation instructors was effective since 

they understood Viet Cong political indoctrination, 

shared common experiences with newcomers, and 

could proficiently explain RVN government social 

and political goals, that is rebuilding Vietnam and 

providing economic opportunities.121

Ralliers at the regional and national centers were 

of particular interest in support of the war effort. 

Nonetheless, RVN government, ARVN, and US 

officials asked ralliers in all the centers to volunteer their 

services for political warfare, psychological operations, 

advising, training, and other activities commensurate 

with their knowledge and skills.122 As this study 

reveals, these services contributed significantly to the 

defeat of the Viet Cong.

Vocational Training

The primary purpose of vocational training was to 

provide gainful employment for the rallier and his 

family, thereby forestalling potential recidivism to 

the Viet Cong. The training enhanced the promise of 
41

the Chieu Hoi program and signaled to insurgents 

that they too could enjoy employment opportunities 

once they defected. Ideally, the courses reflected those 

skillsets which contributed to a growing economy.123

During the initial years of the Chieu Hoi program, 

vocational training suffered shortfalls which did not 

fulfill the expectations of ralliers. In view of the brief 

stay at the centers (60 days) and the dearth of qualified 

instructors, much of the vocational training was limited 

to low-level skillsets, such as “sewing, barbering, 

brickmaking, carpentry, and basic mechanics.” Few 

ralliers wanted to return to farming, and many saw 

little practical use in the offered vocational programs. 

Thus, these ralliers refused to participate in vocational 

training and sought their own way upon leaving the 

centers.124

Numerous South Vietnamese had originally joined 

the Viet Cong out of ambition and as a means to 

escape the peasant lifestyle. They were self-motivated 

and aspired to higher positions of responsibility. The 

original lure of the Viet Cong was an opportunity 

to gain greater responsibilities, financial success, 

and social advancement.125 Once Chieu Hoi officials 

understood these motivations, they established formal 

vocational training centers, which offered expanded 

training for advanced skills. By 1970, USAID employed 

contractors to provide training in “automotive repair, 

electrical house wiring, plumbing, furniture-making, 

refrigeration, TV/radio repair, and other technical 

skills.” Select ralliers attended advanced training at 

the Government Agricultural Development Center 

on “the new ‘miracle rice,’ fish culture, and poultry 

and swine raising.” Moreover, provincial hospitals 

provided nursing training for interested ralliers.126

Vocational training was only part of the equation. 

Gainful employment required access to prospective job 
42

positions. The Chieu Hoi program actively sought to 

honor the implicit promise of the rallier’s reintegration 

into society. Regional Chieu Hoi officials and provincial 

authorities established job placement programs, in 

which they matched on-file job qualifications with 

prospective employer needs. Statistically, 50 percent 

of the ralliers opted to return home as farmers in 

government-provided plots; 27 percent served in the 

government or the military; and 20 percent worked in 

private industry.127

By 1972, the Ministry of Labor had assumed 

responsibility of the vocational training centers, 

employing USAID-trained ralliers as instructors. 

The evidence suggests that these centers were selfsufficient, efficient, and effective in preparing ralliers 

for careers. Of significance, the police-issued ID cards 

indicated to prospective employers that ralliers were 

reliable and loyal citizens. The vast improvements in 

vocational training demonstrated that the Chieu Hoi 

program sought to meet rallier ambitions, thereby 

depriving the Viet Cong of intelligent and motivated 

insurgents.128

Military Service of Ralliers

Suitable candidates had the option to serve in the 

military, and it was completely voluntary with no 

compulsion. Approximately twenty percent of ralliers 

elected to enlist in the various military services. The 

relatively low percentage of volunteers reflected a 

general weariness of military life and a desire to return 

home. For those opting for active duty military service, 

volunteers received the promised six-month deferment 

and the choice of service branches. Of interest, most 

ralliers had no reservations about fighting their former 

colleagues. Many volunteers with families chose to 
43

serve in militia forces (regional forces/people forces) 

in order to remain near their homes. As a snapshot, 

approximately 20,863 ralliers were serving in the 

ARVN and militia forces by mid-1971.129

The ARVN frequently employed ralliers and 

refugees as guerrillas against the Viet Cong. 

Operating in squads, ARVN guerrillas (some in 

communist uniforms) conducted special operations, 

employing their knowledge of guerrilla tactics and 

Viet Cong methods.130 Some served as scouts in 

regional forces reconnaissance companies uncovering 

enemy improvised explosives, weapons caches, and 

bunkers, as well as seeking out potential ralliers in 

the Viet Cong.131 Others even served in long-range 

reconnaissance patrols in North Vietnam and Laos.132

A select group, sometimes called “Road Runners,” 

conducted surveillance operations along the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia under the command 

and control of US Army Special Forces (MACV-SOG), 

the CIA, and the Vietnamese Special Mission Service.133

Kit Carson Scout Program

Established in the spring of 1966, the Kit Carson Scout 

program recruited ralliers from provincial Chieu Hoi 

centers to serve under US military command. Reaching 

a peak of around 2,500 in 1970, Kit Carson scouts served 

with tactical units and intelligence staff sections. In 

view of their knowledge of local terrain and the Viet 

Cong, they provided training on Viet Cong tactics 

and techniques, served as guides, assisted in locating 

equipment sites, weapons caches, mines, and explosive 

devices, and contributed to propaganda messaging. 

They provided an invaluable service by identifying 

Viet Cong infiltrators at checkpoints as well as dead 

and wounded Viet Cong. The US military used them 
44

as tactical interrogators of suspected and identified 

Viet Cong and NVA soldiers, who often divulged 

information once they realized a Kit Carson Scout was 

questioning them.134 As one American military advisor 

astutely observed, 90 percent of a counterinsurgency 

effort is devoted to pinpointing guerrillas, and the 

most effective counterinsurgent is a former guerrilla 

(“it takes a guerrilla to catch a guerrilla”).135

Serving with the US military provided numerous 

benefits for rallier recruitment. The US military 

provided salaries, clothing, gear, accommodations, 

rations, medical care, dental care, and deferment from 

ARVN service. Those disabled in the line of duty 

received vocational training and resettlement in Chieu 

Hoi villages. Death benefits included a formal military 

funeral, a new uniform for burial, and transportation 

to his ancestral family plot. The family also received a 

sum of the scout’s annual salary.136

US divisions recruited ralliers from Chieu Hoi 

centers located in their area of operations. Recruiters 

based their selection on good health and endurance, 

attitude, and family location. Recruiters preferred 

ralliers with families in government controlled areas 

in order to forestall possible Viet Cong retribution 

or blackmail. Recruits attended a thirteen-day 

probationary course, received a uniform with special 

insignia, were taught rudimentary English terms, 

and issued a MACV identification card. US units 

maintained a record on each scout, which included 

a picture, fingerprints, family history, and progress 

reports.137

Kit Carson Scouts repaid the US military with 

loyalty and dedicated service. They fought valiantly, 

with hundreds killed and wounded in the line of 

duty. Many gave their lives protecting American 

soldiers and marines, and as a sign of mutual respect, 
45

many American soldiers and marines gave their lives 

protecting Kit Carson Scouts.138 In terms of investment, 

the Kit Carson Scout program paid substantial 

dividends.

Armed Propaganda Teams (APT)

Standing up the Armed Propaganda Unit (APU) 

program in October 1964, USAID employed especially 

trained ralliers (male and female) to promote 

the Chieu Hoi program in Viet Cong-dominated 

areas. USAID selected ralliers with demonstrated 

leadership, patriotism to the government, and strong 

communication skills. Starting in February 1968, 

Armed Propaganda Team personnel attended a formal 

four-week training course on psychological warfare 

and basic military tactics. Accordingly, provincial 

Chieu Hoi chiefs exercised operational control of 

Armed Propaganda Teams.139

While the basic unit was a platoon of 35 ralliers, 

Armed Propaganda Teams (three ralliers) functioned 

as agents for disseminating Chieu Hoi propaganda 

in villages. As former Viet Cong, they embodied 

the government’s promise of reconciliation, thereby 

effectively countering Viet Cong propaganda. Lightly 

armed for self-protection, APT ralliers conversed 

with villagers about their experiences, the reality 

of communism, Viet Cong injustices, the Chieu Hoi 

program, and RVN government goals and reforms. 

Since many villagers had relatives and friends in 

the Viet Cong, these personal interactions served to 

encourage defections through trusted associations. In 

this regard, one Chieu Hoi adviser considered APTs as 

the most potent propaganda service for the war effort. 

140
46

As the war progressed, the number of Armed 

Propaganda companies surged from two in 1964 to 

around 84 in 1970, totaling 5,400 male and female 

ralliers. In addition to their propaganda and counterpropaganda activities, APTs directly contacted Viet 

Cong insurgents to persuade them to defect, assisted 

with psychological warfare operations, and used their 

knowledge of Viet Cong practices to uncover caches. 

As noted previously, APTs also provided security for 

Chieu Hoi centers and resettlement hamlets. In support 

of the Phoenix Program from October 1970 onwards, 

APTs reported to District Intelligence Operations 

Control Centers for the specific purpose of encouraging 

defections among Viet Cong political cadres.141

By 1969, all four regions and 44 provinces contained 

Armed Propaganda Companies. Armed Propaganda 

Companies deployed to provinces to conduct special 

operations with provincial companies (regional 

forces/popular forces). Provincial chiefs retained the 

prerogative to deploy Armed Propaganda Platoons to 

districts for independent operations or as part of larger 

military operations. However, since they were lightly 

armed they focused on psychological operations. The 

task organization was as follows:

•	 Armed Propaganda Company: three platoons 

(74 ralliers, including company commander, 

assistant company commander, administrative 

clerk, supply clerk, and medic).

•	 Armed Propaganda Platoon: three squads (23 

ralliers, including platoon leader and assistant 

platoon leader).

•	 Armed Propaganda Squad: two Armed Propaganda Teams (seven ralliers, including squad 

leader).

•	 Armed Propaganda Team: three ralliers.142
47

In 1971, the role of APTs expanded in support of the 

counterinsurgency strategy. They assisted the National 

Police as interrogators and uncovering itinerant Viet 

Cong, as well as providing instruction on Viet Cong 

tactics and techniques to People’s Self-Defense Forces 

(RVN guerrilla forces). Seven special APTs (five 

ralliers) provided lectures on Viet Cong methods to 

academic institutions, business industries, and military 

commands.143

In 1971, Chieu Hoi authorities established an 

effective program, with NVA ralliers formed into 

APTs. Because of their expertise with NVA doctrine 

and psychological operations, they were assigned 

to political warfare companies in ARVN infantry 

divisions. The crux of their instruction concerned ways 

to encourage defection with NVA soldiers.144

Rallier Resettlement

For those ralliers who declined government service, 

reintegration into society was no simple matter: 

suspicious villagers shunned them and feared they 

would invite trouble. The Chieu Hoi program had 

trouble finding villagers willing to sponsor them, 

and civilian employers were reluctant to employ 

them. The stigma of being a former Viet Cong caused 

mistrust. Further, resettled refugees resented ralliers 

because they competed for jobs. However, for those 

ralliers originally from villages under RVN control, 

reintegration was easier.145

For those ralliers from Viet Cong controlled areas, 

the Chieu Hoi program constructed special hamlets, 

to include providing a plot of land for a house and 

farming. The program provided money for lumber 

and materials for ralliers to clear the land and build 

their homes, though USAID provided roofing material 
48

and cement for the foundation. Chieu Hoi authorities 

provided an allowance to purchase tools and furniture, 

as well as subsistence food for six months. Thereafter, 

ralliers were to provide their own livelihood.146

The 38 Chieu Hoi hamlets proved problematic and 

no permanent solution. The hamlets were divorced 

from ralliers’ ancestral homes and isolated from the rest 

of Vietnamese society. The relative luxury of the homes 

caused resentments among other Vietnamese. Under 

these circumstances, societal integration remained 

sketchy. Because Chieu Hoi villages were conspicuous, 

the Viet Cong frequently attacked them, although 

Armed Propaganda Teams provided some security.147

Consequently, resettlement proved problematic for 

the Chieu Hoi program during the war but might have 

improved over time. This is unknowable since North 

Vietnam’s 1975 invasion and occupation wiped out the 

benefits of the Chieu Hoi program. 

Follow-up System of Ralliers

The Ministry of Chieu Hoi monitored ralliers for 

around six months after reintegration. The National 

Police Command placed them in an automated tracking 

system, maintaining their fingerprints and data on file. 

Ministry of Chieu Hoi village officials remained in 

personal contact with ralliers. The tracking system and 

local Chieu Hoi officials monitored their status even 

when ralliers moved to other provinces.148

The Ministry of Chieu Hoi used the follow-up 

system for statistical analysis of the program only. 

After six months, ralliers were considered fully 

integrated and no longer monitored. Since the act of 

defecting compromised ralliers from the perspective 

of the communists, especially their participation 

in government propaganda activities, less than 

two percent returned to the Viet Cong. This low 
49

recidivism rate was confirmed by captured Viet Cong 

documents.149

Even though reintegrated ralliers were basically 

inactive citizens, the government could employ their 

expertise whenever needed. Armed Propaganda 

Teams called upon them as part of their operations 

in provinces.150 Aside from informal intelligence and 

knowledge of the Viet Cong, reintegrated ralliers 

proved that they were loyal citizens, which bolstered 

the government reconciliation offer and caused 

dissension among the ranks in the Viet Cong.

Conclusions

The tempo of US/ARVN military operations and 

expansion of pacification had a direct relationship 

on the rate of Viet Cong defections. South Vietnam’s 

early commitment to the Chieu Hoi program laid 

the groundwork, which expanded in scope once the 

United States intervened directly. Two distinct surges 

occurred with the US military intervention in 1965 and 

in the wake of the failed Tet Offensive in 1968. Thus, as 

pacification advanced, rates increased from hundreds 

per month to thousands per month. While defection 

numbers varied among studies, upwards of “194,000 

former VC, NVA, and Communist sympathizers” 

rallied under Chieu Hoi from 1963 to 1973.151 Certainly, 

some corruption occurred in the program from South 

Vietnamese officials skewing the statistics or pocketing 

money.152 However, as oversight and management 

of the program improved, the opportunities for 

corruption declined.

A 1973 RAND study noted that ralliers represented 

about twenty percent of all Viet Cong casualties. Had 

these Viet Cong remained in the fight, the allies would 

have suffered thousands of additional casualties.153
50

Further, the costs of funding the Chieu Hoi program 

compared to the estimated costs of killing 194,000 

Viet Cong meant a savings of hundreds of millions of 

dollars. In both cases, the program was well worth the 

investment.

The long term benefits of reintegrating former Viet 

Cong into society is only a matter of speculation due 

to North Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of South 

Vietnam in 1975. One shudders to think what happened 

to all the ralliers. Nevertheless, combined with the 

effective counterinsurgency strategy and pacification 

program, the Chieu Hoi program was instrumental in 

defeating the Viet Cong insurgency. North Vietnam 

recognized the futility of the insurgency and therefore 

turned to conventional warfare as witnessed by the 

failed 1972 Easter Offensive but the successful 1975 

Spring Offensive. The US abandonment of South 

Vietnam in 1975 fed the convenient narrative that the 

counterinsurgency effort was a failure. For historians, 

such a conclusion is a false analogy. To take such a false 

analogy further, one could conclude the Allies lost the 

First World War because Germany defeated France in 

1940. 
51

Chapter Three – Observations from the

 Iraq Insurgency

With its occupation of Iraq in April 2003, the United 

States found itself enmeshed in a full-scale insurgency 

not experienced since the Moro Insurgency in the 

Philippines a century earlier. That the United States was 

caught completely by surprise is a paradox. In occupied 

Germany, the Allied policies of Denazification, 

demilitarization, and deindustrialization were 

draconian. But, with Germany completely exhausted 

and occupied by millions of Allied soldiers, an 

insurgency was out of the question. While occupation 

policies in Japan were somewhat less harsh, it too was 

exhausted and devastated by the war. Insurgencies 

during the Cold War were mostly proxy conflicts with 

communist and democratic powers supporting client 

states and/or non-state actors (the Algerian insurgency, 

1954—1962 was the exception). The US occupations of 

Grenada in 1983 and Panama, 1989—1990, could have 

triggered insurgencies, but they did not, even though 

the United States was largely neglectful of stability 

and dedicated few troops to the conflicts. The NATO 

peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 could have triggered a 

proxy guerrilla war by Bosnian Serbs and Serbians 

respectively, but the overwhelming number of 

occupation troops likely served to deter such attempts. 

With the exception of the Balkans venture, the NATO/

ISAF occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 followed past 

patterns, though a low-level insurgency would emerge 

a few years later. Hence, while apprehensions did exist 

regarding the difficulties of occupation, the historical 

experience suggested that Iraqis would welcome the 

liberation and work with the occupation authorities 
52

in rebuilding the country. Hindsight might provide 

perfect clarity, but it does not help practitioners 

navigate through the fog of uncertainty.

It was in this context that US officials struggled 

to understand the nature of the insurgency. Decades 

of Ba’athist rule had created a system of social and 

economic dependence on the central government. 

A multitude of wars, international sanctions, and 

regime policies had devastated the economy and 

infrastructure. The regime had persecuted the Shi’a 

majority and Kurdish minority communities. Every 

institution was corrupt in some manner. Given these 

factors, reconstruction and stability would take more 

time and resources than originally forecast. Time was 

the one commodity in shortest supply.

When Sunni Ba’athist loyalists and foreign 

paramilitary groups (Fedayeen) created unrest in 

the summer of 2003, senior US policymakers and 

commanders deduced they were the dying fleas of 

a dead regime. The capture of Saddam Hussein in 

December 2003 seemed to support that theory, but a 

resumption of the resistance with an influx of foreign 

fighters (al Qaeda) a few weeks later blossomed into 

a full-fledged insurgency by the spring of 2004. Once 

the insurgency gained momentum, neither a new 

Iraqi government nor elections would suffice. Ample 

ground forces would have created the necessary 

security for reconstruction and stability to progress, but 

the US active component Army and Marines were too 

small for a proper occupation, and too few countries 

contributed ground forces for the coalition. Hence, 

the US-led coalition had to improvise with available 

resources and without the basis of a counterinsurgency 

doctrine.

This chapter explores the main features of the US 

coalition reconciliation initiatives: 1) insurgent motives 
53

for reconciliation; 2) Iraqi government commitment 

to the program; and 3) US detention operations. 

Whereas reconciliation was largely extemporaneous, 

US reintegration programs within detention facilities 

provide useful insights.

Insurgent Motives for Reconciliation

During the initial stages of the insurgency in the fall 

of 2003, Sunni insurgents formed an alliance with al 

Qaeda foreign fighters to compel the withdrawal 

of US coalition forces from Iraq and to reestablish 

Sunni control of the government. In the spring of 

2004, Sunni uprisings across Iraq, aided by al Qaeda 

fighters, sparked heavy fighting with coalition forces, 

which persisted over a period of years. While Shi’a 

insurgents likewise rose up, the US coalition command 

(Multi-National Force-Iraq) and the subsequent Iraqi 

government did not perceive them as a major threat, at 

least initially, since they were generally supportive of 

the coalition and government.

While US coalition forces had inflicted a number 

of defeats and heavy losses on Sunni and al Qaeda 

insurgents from 2003 to 2006, these factors alone did 

not prompt Sunni overtures for reconciliation. The 

principal factor was the behavior of al Qaeda in Iraq 

(AQI), which had alienated several Sunni tribes by the 

summer of 2005. From the onset of its presence, the al 

Qaeda network in Iraq seized control of the traditional 

Sunni smuggling trade and imposed its fanatical brand 

of Islam on the populace. The al Qaeda leadership 

replaced rule of law with its own laws, exacted brutal 

punishments for perceived vice and venality, and 

imposed forced marriages between Sunni females 

and Islamic fighters. Further, al Qaeda terrorized the 

Iraqi populace, tribal leaders, and government security 
54

forces through murder, assassination, and desecration 

of bodies, virtually against anyone who opposed 

its rule or betrayed its cause. Al Qaeda’s incessant 

disruptions of essential services and local economies 

also antagonized the populace. As one tribal sheik 

declared, al Qaeda in Iraq “had gone too far,” and the 

leaders of al Qaeda in Pakistan were not representative 

of Iraqis.154

Coalition military operations not only caused heavy 

causalities on insurgents but also depressed their 

morale. As one insurgent seeking amnesty confided, 

“I’m tired of being a target and running.” Additionally, 

incessant fighting against Shi’a militia, Iraqi security 

forces, and al Qaeda fighters took a heavy toll on Sunni 

tribes. Local coalition offers of amnesty, reintegration, 

and stipends persuaded tens of thousands of Sunni 

insurgents to surrender peacefully, fight against al 

Qaeda, and contribute to security in general. As other 

Sunni tribes noted the fair treatment afforded Sunni 

reconcilers, they too switched sides.155

Iraqi Government Commitment to Reconciliation

Coming to power in January 2005, the Shi’a-dominated 

Iraqi government never fully embraced reconciliation 

with Sunni minorities, and until the US “Surge” in 

2007, senior US commanders remained cautious and 

skeptical regarding the reconciliation overtures from 

local Sunni tribes.156 Instead, for the first three years 

of the insurgency, senior US commanders focused 

on reconciliation negotiations with expatriated tribal 

chieftains in Jordan, though Multi-National Force—

Iraq commander General George Casey Jr did pursue 

better relations with Sunni tribes in Anbar province in 

2005.157 This approach delayed coalition reconciliation 

with local sheiks and created tensions. Further, coalition 
55

recognition of local sheiks and the rise of tribes as 

security guarantors threatened the political legitimacy 

of the Iraqi government.158 Other than favorable 

Iraqi media reporting on the Sunni “Awakening,” a 

comprehensive information operations campaign for 

reconciliation failed to materialize.159 However, once 

General David Petraeus assumed command of the 

Multi-National Force—Iraq, he instructed commanders 

at all levels to encourage reconciliation with Sunni 

tribes.160

The nature of the insurgency influenced the attitude 

of the Iraqi government and the US perplexed response 

to it. The virulence and scope of the insurgency came as 

a shock to the United States and created deep mistrust 

of Sunnis within the Iraqi government. Irrespective of 

Iraqi and American expectations, assumptions, and 

designs for the post-war period, the fundamental flaw 

in the occupation was the inability to provide security 

throughout Iraq. Certainly, the widespread breakdown 

of law and order, the complete collapse of the Ba’athist 

government, the extensive de-Ba’athification policy, 

and the dissolution of the military created grievances 

against the US occupation. However, it was the lack 

of country-wide security that spawned economic, 

political, religious, and ethnic instability, as well as 

a breakdown in essential services. Into the security 

vacuum poured Sunni and Shi’a militias, various armed 

groups, criminal gangs, and foreign fighters (al Qaeda 

and Ansar al-Islam), all with different motivations but 

united in creating mayhem. Syria and Iran bolstered 

the insurgency, with Syria rendering assistance to 

the Sunni resistance and foreign fighters, and Iran 

supporting the Shi’a political and militia forces. In 

addition to combating the US coalition, al Qaeda in 

Iraq strove to provoke a civil war by attacking Shi’a 
56

communities. In effect, Iraq epitomized the Hobbesian 

world of “continual fear and danger of violent death, 

and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 

short.”161 From 2003 through 2006, the US-led coalition 

sought to restore essential services, establish democratic 

political institutions, promote a free market economy, 

and organize Iraqi security forces (military and police), 

all for the purpose of creating the necessary stability 

for a coalition withdrawal. Throughout this period, 

coalition forces launched recurrent military operations 

to quash insurgent outbreaks while at the same time 

suffering from continuous isolated attacks everywhere. 

While a couple of military operations involved 

effective counterinsurgency techniques, the coalition 

command did not adopt a uniform counterinsurgency 

strategy. Thus, without sufficient ground forces and 

a counterinsurgency strategy, stabilization initiatives 

could not flourish. The 2007—2008 Surge blended 

sufficient security forces (coalition and Iraqi) with an 

effective counterinsurgency strategy to pacify Iraq and 

foster political and economic development—initially in 

Baghdad and its environs, and then to other cities and 

surrounding provinces. With the onset of countrywide 

stability, the US-led coalition withdrew incrementally 

from 2009 to 2011. Unfortunately, the Iraqi government 

alienated the Sunni minorities, which led to a resurgent 

insurgency in 2014 under the aegis of Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS).162

Despite the Shi’a-dominated government’s 

indifference, Sunni tribes began to coalesce 

incrementally against al Qaeda fighters and reach 

out to coalition tactical commands from 2005 to 2008. 

Wherever US forces increased combat power in 

provinces and tactical commanders became receptive 

to local tribal reconciliation overtures, Sunni tribes 

slowly but increasingly began to denounce al Qaeda 

and view the coalition as an ally to expel al Qaeda 
57

from Iraq. Over time, tribal loyalties among Iraqi 

military, police, tribesmen, and other Sunni insurgent 

groups increased the breadth and depth of the Sunni 

Awakening. Not only did reconciliation provide 

tens of thousands of militia forces for the coalition 

effort, but it also resulted in actionable intelligence 

on al Qaeda activities and cells. Equally important, 

these tribes provided recruits for the Iraqi police and 

army, and the number of attacks on coalition and 

Iraqi security forces declined substantially. Further, 

reconciled Sunni groups filled the security vacuum 

where coalition troops were sparse.163 As Sunni tribes 

allied with coalition and Iraqi security forces, progress 

against al Qaeda in Iraq proceeded unabated, which 

substantially bolstered the effects of the Surge from 

2007 to 2008.164

Increasingly jaded by extremist Shi’a and Iranian 

militia excesses, Shi’a communities also requested 

assistance and provided intelligence to coalition and 

Iraqi security forces. As important, the Iraqi government 

recognized the danger of these militias, and along with 

US coalition forces, actively quashed them in 2007. In 

2008, the US coalition command sought to create an 

Awakening among Shi’s tribes as well.165 While not as 

extensive as the Sunni Awakening, Shi’a cooperation 

with the US coalition reflected a dissatisfaction with 

Shi’a militancy and a rejection of Iranian influence.

During the 2007-2008 Surge, senior US commanders 

strove to gain the Iraqi government’s acceptance 

of the Awakening and eventual reconciliation with 

Sunni tribes. Faced with the ambivalence of the Iraqi 

government towards Sunni reconciliation, senior US 

commanders authorized subordinate commands to 

continue fostering local reconciliation, perhaps hoping 

it would gain momentum and eventual government 

institutional acceptance. Accordingly, subordinate 
58

commanders arranged ceasefires, the surrender 

of weapons, employment in the police, and local 

alliances against irreconcilable insurgents. Moreover, 

using Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

(CERP) funding, the coalition employed 100,000 

Iraqi volunteers (Sons of Iraq) to fight against the 

insurgents.166

As a part of reconciliation, US commanders 

required local sheiks to vouch for the loyalty of their 

tribesmen, who in turn had to renounce al Qaeda and 

swear allegiance to the tribe. This stipulation obligated 

reconciled Sunnis to ally with the coalition and 

become avowed enemies of al Qaeda. In view of their 

intimate knowledge of al Qaeda operatives, former 

Sunni insurgents proved invaluable in identifying 

fighter cells and weapons caches, thereby helping the 

coalition separate insurgents from the population. 

Under pressure by senior coalition commanders in the 

spring of 2007, the Iraqi government agreed to allow 

reconciled Sunnis to comprise twenty percent of the 

Iraqi security forces and to serve in the government. 

Ultimately, once Sunni tribes joined forces with 

the coalition against al Qaeda in Iraq, they proved 

instrumental in re-establishing stability.167

While the Iraqi government established the 

Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for 

National Reconciliation (IFCNR) in June 2007 to vet 

reconciled Sunnis for police and civil service positions, 

senior US leaders and advisors experienced difficulties 

convincing IFCNR members and government officials 

to embrace reconciliation fully. The main obstacle 

stemmed from the Iraqi government’s lingering 

suspicions of Sunni loyalties and a fear that Sunnis in 

the Iraqi security forces would pose a future threat to 

the government. Senior US commanders warned that 

if the Iraqi government did not take advantage of this 
59

window of opportunity, then enduring reconciliation 

would founder. As US forces withdrew from 2010 

to 2011, the Iraqi government ignored the earlier 

warnings and reneged on its promise to incorporate 

fully reconciled Sunnis in the Iraqi security forces as 

well as participation in the government.168 Thus, the 

subsequent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS) became a foregone conclusion.

Detention Operations

US detention operations ultimately proved the most 

successful in reintegrating moderate insurgents into 

Iraqi society. After a rough start, detention operations 

leaders recognized that detention facilities were serving 

the interests of Islamic extremists, turning the camps 

into “Jihad Universities.” Similar to the procedures of 

the Chie Hoi Reception Centers, US detention centers 

instituted procedures to separate moderate inmates 

from the Islamic extremists and to provide them 

rehabilitation opportunities.

The 2003—2007 Period 

Coalition detention facilities experienced almost 

insurmountable challenges from 2003 to early 2007. 

Coalition operations generated an unceasing flow of 

detainees daily, resulting in serious overcrowding. The 

US policy decision to categorize enemy combatants as 

civilian detainees rather than prisoners of war subject 

to the Geneva Conventions created legal complexities 

and loopholes, which extremist insurgents exploited. 

The dearth of properly trained interrogators and 

prison guards resulted in criminal misconduct and 

deaths of detainees, with the Abu Ghraib internment 

facility sparking a scandal in early 2004. The notoriety 
60

of Abu Ghraib abuses reverberated around the world, 

fomenting recruitment and support for the Iraqi 

insurgency. Predictably, “the number one recruiting 

tool used to recruit Foreign Fighters, Al Qaeda 

membership, and suicide bombers was the five minute 

Abu Ghraib video and pictures from the abuse at Abu 

Ghraib. These pictures were posted throughout Iraq, 

especially in the volatile Al Anbar Provence.”169

Established in early summer 2004, Task Force 134 

sought to enhance management of detention operations 

and rectify earlier problems. Overcrowding at the 

three main detention facilities—Abu Ghraib, Camp 

Cropper, and Camp Bucca—remained a persistent 

challenge because Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld resolved to transfer detention operations 

to the Iraqi government and refused to authorize the 

construction or expansion of facilities. Eventually, the 

Task Force 134 commander, with support of senior US 

commanders, persisted and gained authorization in 

late 2005 to expand facilities, which provided a total 

capacity for 18,000 detainees.170

Even with the expansion of detention facilities in 

2006, overcrowding continued to plague Task Force 134. 

The establishment of Combined Review and Release 

Boards in August 2004, together with multinational 

division and brigade legal reviews, sought to alleviate 

the problem. While the reviews resulted in the release 

of thousands of detainees after a relatively short 

captivity, the discharges could not keep pace with the 

number of incoming detainees. Further, the “catch 

and release” process created frustrations with tactical 

commands because around eight percent of released 

detainees returned to the insurgency (even this 

reported low recidivism rate was likely optimistic). 

Problems with verifying identities and biometrics 
61

of recidivists exacerbated these frustrations, which 

“created moral-ethical dilemmas for junior leaders” 

(i.e., shoot or release). In effect, detention facilities 

unintentionally served as rest and rehabilitation camps 

for insurgents.171

Aside from the heightened probability of escape 

attempts, rioting, and human rights violations due 

to overcrowding, Islamic extremists in the detainee 

population took advantage of the disorder to radicalize 

and train moderate Iraqis as jihadi insurgents and 

suicide bombers. They essentially took control within 

the facilities, making guard oversight hazardous. 

Detained insurgent leaders from various parts of Iraq 

had the opportunity to “exchange tactics, techniques, 

and procedures,” as well as network with one another 

within the safe confines of the facilities. Ironically, 

detention facilities served as both rest and training 

camps for insurgents, who were often released within 

months. Consequently, coalition troops derisively 

began to describe detention facilities as “Jihadist 

Gladiator Training Camps.”172

Successive Task Force 134 commanders instituted 

a number of countermeasures against “jihadist 

radicalization and recruitment” within the detention 

facilities. Integral to the task force’s “counterinsurgency 

in the compounds” program, counterinsurgency teams 

(intelligence personnel) identified Islamic extremists 

through an informant network. The counterinsurgency 

teams segregated detainees into five categories: al 

Qaeda, takfiris (apostate accusers), Jaysh al-Mahdi 

(JAM—Shia militia), moderate Sunnis, and moderate 

Shi’a. From inmate interviews, the counterinsurgency 

teams assessed that most moderates had joined 

the insurgency for money or had been incidentally 

detained during a military operation. So, Task Force 

134 began a reintegration program within the facilities 
62

for moderate Sunni and Shi’a inmates. Teachers 

within the detainee population provided educational 

instruction; external organizations provided vocational 

training; and moderate Islamic clerics gave temperate 

sermons.173

The 2007—2008 Surge Period 

The deployment of additional US ground forces and 

expanded counterinsurgency operations in 2007 

resulted in a sharp influx of detainees. Since detention 

facilities already stood at 88 percent capacity, the 

expected influx of 2,000 detainees per month threatened 

to overwhelm detention facilities once again. The 

Iraqi corrections system could provide no immediate 

relief, and the Iraqi government proposal for a mass 

amnesty of detainees (90 percent) would undermine 

the Surge counterinsurgency strategy. Unable to 

deploy nine additional military police companies into 

Iraq promptly, Multi-National Force-Iraq command 

augmented Task Force 134 with an artillery battalion. To 

improve the care and custody of inmates and optimize 

the number of corrections personnel available, Task 

Force 134 closed two detention facilities (Fort Suse 

and Abu Ghraib) and consolidated detainees in Camp 

Cropper and Camp Bucca. In the interim, engineers 

built temporary facilities while they modernized the 

facilities in both camps, with an objective capacity of 

30,000 inmates.174

 Nevertheless, detention facility expansion could 

not keep pace with Surge operations, so a renewed 

overcrowding crisis arose. Once again, Islamic 

extremists exploited the confusion to intimidate and 

recruit inmates for the insurgency. As such, Task 

Force 134’s control of detention facilities and the 

“counterinsurgency inside the compounds” programs 
63

suffered a significant setback. This loss of control 

became evident in April 2007, when a massive riot 

involving 10,000 inmates erupted in Camp Bucca. 

With great effort, the guard force managed to quash 

the riot, using nonlethal munitions and sequestering 

ringleaders into a separate part of the compound. This 

was a momentary respite to the larger inmate problem, 

which required immediate attention.175

During this crisis, USMC Major General Douglas 

Stone assumed command of Task Force 134 and 

revitalized detention operations with “COIN inside 

the Wire” programs. Continuing the initiatives of his 

predecessors and tying detention operations to the 

larger counterinsurgency strategy, Major General 

Stone viewed reconciliation as a way for moderate 

Iraqis to disassociate from the insurgency. This entailed 

wresting the stranglehold of violent extremists on other 

inmates, rehabilitating the reconcilable detainees, and 

reintegrating them into Iraqi society, once they had 

demonstrated a desire to live a peaceful, productive 

life. Of significance, Major General Stone enjoyed the 

full confidence and support of General David Petraeus, 

the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander, 

and the new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.176

“Coin inside the Wire” required a change in attitude 

regarding detention operations. Major General Stone 

believed the coalition had used detention operations 

excessively, using numbers of detainees as a goal and 

reporting metric of counterinsurgency progress. On 

the one hand, 8,000—10,000 Iraqis should not have 

been in the detention facilities. On the other hand, the 

detention of questionable Iraqis relieved soldiers of the 

moral dilemma of shooting or releasing them during 

military operations. Since insurgents were virtually 

indistinguishable from ordinary citizens, soldiers 

naturally erred on the side of precaution and placed 
64

suspects in the detention system. Coalition troops 

normally detained Iraqis observed conducting illegal 

activities or considered an imminent security threat. 

While twenty-five percent of the inmates warranted 

detention, seventy-five percent had engaged in 

insurgent activities because they were unemployed 

and needed the money.177

 In support of the overarching counterinsurgency 

strategy, detention operations had to deal with a host 

of diverse issues: innocent Iraqis detained during 

military operations; Iraqis serving the insurgency 

for money; hard core insurgents requiring continued 

incarceration and eventual judicial proceedings; 

fair and humane treatment of all inmates; insurgent 

propaganda regarding detention of innocent Iraqis 

and mistreatment of inmates to bolster the insurgency; 

and extremist cells intimidating, radicalizing, and 

recruiting moderate Iraqis within detention facilities. 

In short, detention operations policy needed to avoid 

any activity or perception that abetted the insurgency’s 

cause. To address these demanding tasks, Task Force 

134 instituted a structured process for detention 

operations, called DART—detention, assessment, 

rehabilitation, and transition.178

Detention In-Processing and Assessment 

As part of in-processing, all detainees received a full 

medical examination for disease, injuries, eyesight 

problems, and dental issues. For administrative 

purposes, detention personnel assigned each inmate 

an identification number. Trained interrogators 

interviewed new inmates and assigned a risk level to 

each. Inmates lived in improved accommodations and 

received “culturally appropriate meals.” As before, 

segregating the violent extremists was essential but 
65

difficult since they used anonymity to infiltrate into 

the general population. Hence, constant monitoring 

was essential to protect moderate Iraqis from 

intimidation and violence. A key objective of detention 

operations was winning the “battlefield of the mind.” 

As the reconciliation program matured, inmates felt 

empowered to expose the “irreconcilables” during 

morning sick call. Accordingly, moderate Iraqis became 

more assertive against extremist inmates, and in one 

case at Camp Bucca, inmates turned on the takfiris in an 

ad hoc “Awakening,” rounding them up and shaving 

off their beards. Ultimately, through continual vetting 

and monitoring, detention personnel succeeded in 

segregating around 5,000 violent extremists from the 

general population.179

Rehabilitation Programs 

Task Force 134 built a Theater Internment Facility 

Reintegration Center in each detention compound to 

provide educational and vocational opportunities for 

males, females, children, and the mentally challenged. 

Basic education instruction focused on literacy, 

math, and religion. Due to the popular demand, the 

program added courses on “history, science, civics, 

and geography.” Camp Cropper was fortunate to have 

a National Guard officer who was a former school 

administrator. He based classes on the Iraqi education 

model, with three hours of instruction and one hour 

of sports (e.g., soccer) per day. Up to thirty moderate 

clerics taught religion, and literacy courses enabled 

inmates to read the Koran personally instead of relying 

solely on cleric sermons. Graduates of the religion 

courses attended a ceremony with the top student 

receiving a personal Koran. Practically all Iraqis were 

grateful for the educational opportunities offered in 

the centers.180
66

Vocational training provided basic skills for 

employment, thereby empowering inmates to lead 

productive lives and giving them an alternative to life 

as an insurgent. Major General Stone initiated a “Lion’s 

Pride” program which paid inmates a small stipend for 

their acquired skills and products. The work program 

became quite popular because inmates provided their 

families with their salaries during visitations. Further, 

families received money to defray their travel costs to 

the detention facilities. Consequently, several thousand 

detainees participated in the “Lion’s Pride” program. 

Altogether, the improved detention processes and 

rehabilitation programs instilled calm within the 

detention facilities.181

Transition Programs 

The intent of the transition program was to reduce 

overcrowding by vetting and releasing detainees, 

deemed ready for reintegration into Iraqi society. At 

first blush, Major General Stone considered that 25 

percent of detainees represented no threat, while 30 

percent required indefinite detention (the “truly evil 

detainees”). The remainder would require intensive 

review before release. By August 2007, the release 

program had reduced the number of detainees to 

23,000 (well within facility capacity), and the goal of the 

release program was to limit the detainee population 

to 15,000 or less by the end of the Surge.182

To avoid earlier perceptions of “catch and 

release,” Task Force 134 established a Multi-National 

Force Review Committee Process, which comprised 

American and non-American personnel. Like a prison 

parole board, three committee arbitrators reviewed 

detainee files, noted their progress, and allowed 

inmates to present their case in person. Inmates were 
67

allowed to review their files as a demonstration of 

transparency. For those who failed the parole board, 

the committee would revisit the case in six months. As 

a final step for release, inmates had to swear before an 

Iraqi judge that they would not engage in insurgent 

or criminal activities, and a guarantor, such as a tribal 

chief, was responsible for a paroled inmate’s continued 

good behavior. Lastly, the committee provided the 

list of proposed releases to the relevant multinational 

divisions for final approval. The main goal of the 

program was to safeguard Iraqi society from truly 

evil criminals and transfer them to Iraqi corrections 

or an international organization for repatriation at the 

conclusion of the insurgency.183

The process suffered from some frustrating shortfalls 

however. Committee members and the inmates were 

not authorized to read the classified justifications 

for detentions, and Task Force 134 lacked sufficient 

translators for converting the files into Arabic. Further, 

committee personnel could not verify the veracity of 

informant assertions against prospective parolees. 

Finally, irrespective of multinational divisions’ vetoes 

of specific inmates, some extremist insurgents were 

released, which caused tensions between tactical 

commands and Task Force 134, and caused an uproar 

in Iraqi communities.184

Establishing an accurate record of recidivism among 

former detainees proved problematic. Throughout 

2007, TF 134 had released 7,510 detainees and 

reported a recidivism rate of 1.4 percent (70 returnees). 

However, TF 134 could not account for those who had 

returned to the insurgency but had evaded capture or 

died in combat. Coalition forces believed the reported 

recidivism rate was fanciful, and it remained a source 

of friction with TF 134. Regardless of the dispute, 

General Petraeus deemed that the release process 
68

ultimately reduced grievances and served the larger 

counterinsurgency goals. Ideally, “empowered and 

emboldened” former inmates would convince friends 

and family to reject extremist ideology. The release 

program, combined with the rehabilitation program 

did create calm in the detention facilities, though that 

did not necessarily mean extremist activities “inside 

the wire” had stopped.185

Transitioning Detention to Iraqi Authority 

Although the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

established the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in April 

2004 (and later provincial courts), rampant insecurity 

and instability disrupted its functions. To protect 

judges, investigators, and witnesses, Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) established a Rule of Law “Green 

Zone” in Baghdad on 2 April 2007, which comprised 

“a court, detention facility, and training academy as 

well as house judges and investigators along with 

their families.” With more FBI-training investigators 

and trained judges, the courts system began to operate 

more fully by the end of 2007.186

From 2008 to 2011, Task Force 134 released 12,000 

detainees, transferred 8,000 to the Iraqi corrections 

system, and repatriated 400 foreign fighters through 

the International Committee of the Red Cross. To 

meet UN standards, Task Force 134 improved the 

Iraqi corrections system with training, education, 

and mentorship programs, as well as inspecting 

prisons with Corrections Assistance Transition Teams, 

consisting of military police, engineer, medical, and 

legal officials. As transitions progressed, Task Force 134 

slowly downsized into a detention directorate, closing 

Camp Bucca in September 2009 and transferring Camp 

Cropper to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice in July 2010. 

Unfortunately, Iraqi corrections mismanagement and 
69

corruption resulted in the release of a great many 

inveterate insurgents who later contributed to the 

formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).187

Conclusions

The lapse in counterinsurgency doctrine and attention 

following the Vietnam War had a serious impact on 

the initial period of the Iraq insurgency. While some 

tactical commanders applied counterinsurgency 

operations with success (e.g., Colonel H. R. McMaster 

at Tel Afar and USMC Lieutenant Colonel Julian 

Alford in Anbar), and Multi-National Force—Iraq 

created a COIN Academy in 2005, a comprehensive 

counterinsurgency strategy did not materialize during 

the initial four years of the conflict.188 As Conrad Crane 

in Cassandra in Oz and Peter Mansoor in Surge recount, 

the intellectual underpinnings for counterinsurgency 

did not solidify until late 2006, resulting in Field 

Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (December 2006).

Many of the barriers to implementing a fullfledged counterinsurgency strategy stemmed from 

the belief that the unrest would dissipate once 

reconstruction, essential services, and government 

elections bore fruit. However, by 2004 insurgents were 

ensconced in the population and created pernicious 

insecurity. Ironically, ad hoc reconciliation preceded a 

counterinsurgency strategy, so a formal reconciliation 

program with a firm Iraqi commitment to amnesty, 

information operations, and reception centers failed to 

materialize.

Because reconciliation preceded the 

counterinsurgency strategy, senior US policy makers 

and commanders did not have the political leverage 

to secure meaningful Iraqi government commitment 

to reconciliation. The presence of coalition forces likely 
70

convinced the Iraqi government that the survival of the 

regime was not imperiled, so earnest reconciliation was 

unnecessary. Iraqi government prejudicial behavior 

towards Sunni tribes after the conflict certainly 

corroborate this conclusion. Thus, reconciliation was 

short-lived and the primary reason for instability in 

Iraqi.

US detention operations demonstrated great 

potential for reconciliation indirectly. Detention 

facilities provided a way for moderates to escape from 

extremist control, provided an education and job skills, 

and helped cleanse them from the stigma of being 

an insurgent. Surprisingly, a similar judicial process 

occurred in Germany in mid-1946 to restore former 

Nazi members to society.189 For this reason, detention 

operations deserve a role in reconciliation programs as 

part of a counterinsurgency strategy.
71

Conclusions

As the three case studies signify, a reconciliation program 

is an important component of a counterinsurgency 

strategy. In Malaya, it was the principal cause of the 

communist insurgency’s demise. Its effects in South 

Vietnam were not as decisive, but it deprived the 

Viet Cong infrastructure of sorely needed manpower. 

Along with the counterinsurgency strategy’s clear, 

hold, and build (pacification) operations, the Viet Cong 

insurgency ultimately collapsed, despite the flow of 

North Vietnamese reinforcements. In Iraq, despite the 

absence of a formal program, Sunni reconciliation did 

manifest, primarily due to the abhorrent behavior of 

al Qaeda fighters (though high casualties were a factor 

too). At any rate, the volte-face of Sunni insurgents 

accelerated the success of the Surge.

Counterinsurgency practitioners in each case 

study recognized early that a predominately military 

approach would be incredibly costly in terms of 

combat power, casualties, and treasure. Their costbenefits analysis suggested that killing an insurgent 

was exponentially more expensive than processing 

the same insurgent through a reconciliation program. 

The depletion of insurgent ranks through voluntary 

surrender resulted in substantially fewer friendly 

casualties as well. Since the three insurgencies averaged 

ten years, no fast solution was possible. So, while a 

national reconciliation program required a substantial 

investment in funding, resources, and people, the 

benefits in the long term far outweighed the costs.

Host government commitment to the national 

reconciliation program is a prerequisite. As the 

case studies suggest, the government and populace 

harbored intense hostility towards insurgents. Not 

only were insurgents traitors to the country, they also 
72

committed untold atrocities and wanton destruction. 

British and American officials successfully convinced 

their government counterparts in Malaya and South 

Vietnam relatively early. Since these governments 

provided the authority, managed the constituent parts, 

and provided the resources, reconciliation became 

a true national effort. Ultimately, cultivating an 

environment of forgiveness and generosity convinced 

insurgents to surrender. The Iraqi government never 

committed to reconciliation, which accounts for the 

breakout of a renewed insurgency in 2014.

In Malaya and South Vietnam, the information 

operations campaign was magnificent and worthy 

of emulation. The means and variety of media 

dissemination ensured that practically everyone was 

aware of amnesty and the reconciliation program. 

Malayan and Vietnamese personal involvement in 

messaging was critical because only they possessed 

the linguistic and cultural expertise to make themes 

resonate with insurgents. The inclusion of former 

insurgents in the operations bolstered the credibility 

of the information among insurgents as well. Along 

with the commitment of the government, information 

operations are essential to the success of the national 

reconciliation program.

Reconciliation centers were tangible proof of the 

government’s promise of amnesty and rehabilitation. 

For surrendering insurgents, first impressions of the 

centers were meaningful. In South Vietnam, insurgents 

were surprisingly well-informed of reception center 

conditions, so good management served to bolster the 

program’s image. As in Vietnam, the US detention 

facility reintegration centers in Iraq provided an 

opportunity for detainees to gain an education, 

vocational skills, and a pathway back into society as a 

trustworthy citizen.
73

Fundamentally, reconciliation was a zero-sum 

game for the insurgency movement. The loss of fighters 

had greater impact on the insurgency because it had 

far fewer resources and manpower to draw upon. 

Thus, recruiting and impressing new insurgents were 

persistent challenges. The effectiveness of the program 

depended on the government’s sincerity to address 

grievances, which were the wellspring of the insurgent 

cause. The allied patrons took reconciliation a step 

further by actively enlisting the services of qualified 

former insurgents into the counterinsurgency effort. 

The selective employment of former insurgents as 

interrogators, instructors on guerrilla practices and 

structures, intelligence analysts, scouts, and counterguerrillas immeasurably helped allied militaries 

pinpoint and eliminate insurgent groups without 

incurring high casualties in the process. The insight 

that “it takes a guerrilla to catch a guerrilla” is relevant 

to all insurgencies. In Malaya and South Vietnam, 

they served to disseminate government messages 

in insurgent-controlled areas and contacted former 

colleagues to encourage surrender. As security for 

reintegration centers, special government villages, and 

local forces, they allowed the government to devote 

more conventional units for military operations. 

While reconciliation in Iraq provided fighters for the 

counterinsurgency efforts, their potential use in other 

categories was limited. Simply put, reconciliation 

turned the insurgency on itself.

The abiding value of reconciliation was in the postconflict period. Malaya and South Vietnam enjoyed 

tranquility due to government efforts to impress on 

the populace the need to accept former insurgents as 

citizens. While suspicions and anger in communities 

likely lingered towards former insurgents, hostilities 

never arose within the countries. North Vietnam’s 
74

invasion of South Vietnam in 1975 does not detract 

from the success of the counterinsurgency strategy 

and national reconciliation program. In Iraq, the 

US administration and the US coalition sought to 

avert an insurgency through the establishment of a 

legitimate government, elections, economic reform 

and reconstruction. As those efforts proved fruitless, 

they pursued accelerated training programs for the 

Iraqi military and police. The dearth of institutional 

knowledge on counterinsurgency likely hindered 

any thoughts of a national reconciliation program. 

Commitment of the provisional Iraqi government in 

2004 might have created momentum for the permanent 

Iraqi government in 2005. By then, government mistrust 

and fear of Sunni intentions conspired to prevent true 

reconciliation. 

For current and future insurgencies in the world, 

a national reconciliation program would have a 

marked impact on the resiliency and duration of a 

conflict. The challenge for foreign advisors would 

be a host government commitment to the program, 

particularly if the insurgency has been long-standing. 

Once a host nation committed to the reconciliation 

program, it would provide a solid foundation for 

post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration (DDR) of former warring factions. 

Accordingly, a reconciliation program would expedite 

peace negotiations. Regardless of the final outcome of 

the peace agreement or surrender terms (if it comes 

to that), the country would need to demobilize both 

the rebel forces and downsize its military forces. 

With the assistance of external organizations (e.g., 

UN, NGOs, etc.), existing reconciliation centers could 

serve as reintegration centers for both government 

and rebel forces.190 Hence, the investment in a national 

reconciliation program would make the transition to 

DDR seamless.
75

Endnotes

1. Anthony Lieto, “Rule of Law and Justice in Security Sector Reform,” Peace and Stability Operations Journal On-Line, Vol 1, Issue 1 (October 2010), 15.

2. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons 

of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1966), 87.

3. Clutterbuk noted that Malayan guerrillas originally joined the 

insurgency for reasons of social and economic advancement or 

patriotism. Richard L. Clutterbuk, The Long Long War (New York: 

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1966), 103-104, 106.

4. Clutterbuk, 104, 106.

5. “By the late 1940s the population of 5.3 million included 49 

percent Malay persons, 38 percent Chinese, 11 percent Indian, 

and slightly more than 1 percent aboriginal persons. There were 

some 12,000 Europeans, mostly rubber plantation owners and tin 

mine managers; the Federation army and police force, composed 

mostly of Malays, were led by British officers.” John A. Nagl, 

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 

Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 

2005), 60; Walter C. Ladwig III, “Managing Counterinsurgency: 

Lessons from Malaya,” Military Review 83, no. 3 (May-June 2007), 

57; David H. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform: The 

Political History of the Malayan Emergency,” Journal of Strategies Studies (Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2017.1406852?needAc

ce ss=true, 8 August; David H. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency: 

The Legacy and Relevance of a Counterinsurgency Success-Story,. Pre-publication version–Final version published in Defence 

Studies 10, nos. 1-2 (2010), 4, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/

full/10.1080/14702430903377944, 8 August 2019.

6. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 5; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform.”

7. Under the communist leadership of Chin Peng, the MRLA was 

originally called the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA) and briefly the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). 

Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform;” Ladwig, 58.

8. Ladwig, 58; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform;” 
76

Nagl states that the MRLA organization was “3,000 insurgents 

into eight regiments and 7,000 into the self-Protection Corps.” 

Nagl, 63-64.

9. After a few years of frustrating failures, the British adopted a 

mutually supporting counterinsurgency strategy: the “New Villages” program, the reconciliation program, coordinated information operations, precise intelligence fusion, small unit counter 

guerrilla operations, a permanent police presence in cleared areas, and Malayan political-economic reforms. A national reconciliation program alone would not have succeeded. Nagl, 71-75, 

91-100; Ladwig, 59, 60-61; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed 

Reform.”

10. Thompson, 91, 95; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform.”

11. Nagl, 93; Clutterbuk, 105.

12. Thompson, 92-93.

13. Thompson, 94.

14. Clutterbuk, 105.

15. Clutterbuk, 106-107.

16. Thompson, 90, 95; Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 19.

17. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform;” Ladwig, 64.

18. Thompson, 97-98.

19. Nagl, 93.

20. Clutterbuk, 106.

21. Thompson, 96.

22. Thompson, 97-98.

23. Thompson, 90.

24. Thompson, 90-91.

25. Thompson, 92.

26. Thompson, 95; Clutterbuk, 105-106; Nagl, 93-95; Emmett J. 

O’Brien, Defection: A Military Strategy for Wars of Liberation (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 6 February, 1971), 24.

27. O’Brien, 24; Nagl, 93-94;

28. Clutterbuk, 105-106.
77

29. Thompson, 96.

30. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 20; Thompson, 92.

31. Thompson, 91.

32. Clutterbuk, 104-105.

33. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 19; Ucko, “Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform.”

34. J. A. Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971, 

A Report prepared for Advanced Research Projects Agency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1973), 15; Lucian W. 

Pye, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program, A Report Prepared for 

The Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs and The Advanced Research Projects Agency (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1969), 26-27.

35. Thompson, 87.

36. Clutterbuk, 109.

37. Thompson, 93-94.

38. Clutterbuk, 109.

39. In Vietnam, American authorities similarly tested defectors 

before using them in the Kit Carson Scout and Armed Propaganda Team programs. Koch, 15; Clutterbuk, 107.

40. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 19; Clutterbuk, 107, 109; 

Pye, 20-21.

41. Thompson, 88.

42. Clutterbuk, 107.

43. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 20.

44. Nagl, 92, 98, 105.

45. Ucko, “The Malayan Emergency,” 17.

46. Ladwig, 65.

47. Koch, v, 9; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, May 1966), xi.

48. O’Brien, 48.

49. While a hardcore of dedicated revolutionaries remained, 

many more individuals were impressed into service or joined out 
78

of a sense of adventure, a livelihood, or ideological enthusiasm. 

Pye, 12; Many joined the insurgency as a result of RVN government policies, misconduct by South Vietnamese soldiers, or corruption among local authorities and police. L. Goure, A. J. Russo 

and D. Scott, Some Findings of The Viet Cong Motivation and Morale 

Study: June-December 1965, A Report Prepared for The Office of 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs 

and The Advanced Research Projects Agency (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, February 1966), 9; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. 

Thomson, xi.

50. O’Brien, 34.

51. Koch, v, 6, 9; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, 

x-xi; Goure, Russo and Scott, x, 1-2, 9, 11, 13-15, 24, 26; Herbert A. 

Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program Of Vietnam, http://www.psywarrior.com/ChieuHoiProgram.html, 27 November 2019.

52. Koch, v, 6, 50; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, 

x-xi; Goure, Russo and Scott, 3, 14-15, 24; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi 

Program of Vietnam.

53. Koch, 6.

54. Koch, 50; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and 

Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 70.

55. Two resources address the effectiveness of the pacification 

program during the Vietnam War: Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The 

Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in 

Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999) and R. W. 

Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U. 

S.-VN Performance in Vietnam, A Report prepared for Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, August 1972); Koch, 49, 51, 56; Goure, Russo and Scott, 24.

56. Koch, 6; Goure, Russo and Scott, 23.

57. Goure, Russo, and Scott do make the point that “despite their 

dislike of VC taxes and policies, most of the farmers are reluctant 

to leave their lands unless their lives are immediately threatened 

by military activities.” Goure, Russo and Scott, 9-11, 24-26.

58. Koch, v, 2, 6; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, 

x-xi; Goure, Russo and Scott, x, 1-2, 13, 19, 24-25; Friedman, The 

Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.
79

59. Goure, Russo and Scott, 20, 23.

60. Koch, 1, 6, 9, 50; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xi-xiii; Goure, Russo and Scott, 23-24; Friedman, The Chieu 

Hoi Program of Vietnam.

61. Goure, Russo and Scott, 23-24; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. 

Thomson, xiv.

62. Sir Robert Thompson and his advisory group, as well as 

American advisors with experience in the Philippine Huk rebellion, promoted the Chieu Hoi program. Koch, 20.

63. Koch, 18, 26, 35; O’Brien, 23; Goure, Russo and Scott, 19; Herbert A. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

64. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 69; Komer, 116-117; “The 

Chieu Hoi Program,” Army Digest: The Official Magazine of the 

Department of the Army, volume 21, no. 10 (October 1966), 40; 

Koch, vii, 44; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

65. The kaleidoscope of governments and power struggles within 

each government were generally as follows: Ngo Dinh Diem, June 

1954-November 1963; Duong Van Minh’s Military Revolutionary 

Council, November 1963-January 1964; Hguyen Khanh, January 

1964-February 1965; Phan Huy Quat, February 1965-June 1965; 

Nguyen Cao Ky—Nguyen Van Thieu—Nguyen Huu Co National 

Leadership Committee, 11 June 1965-3 September 1967; Nguyen 

Van Thieu, 3 September 1967-25 April 1975; Duong Van Minh 

21 April 1975-30 April 1975. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 110, 

289, 294-295, 299, 303-304327; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History

(New York: Viking Penguin, 1991), Chronology, 691-701; J. M. 

Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, ix; Pye, 2; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi 

Program of Vietnam.

66. The Kennedy administration sought a policy to counter Soviet 

Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s Wars of National Liberation policy. 

See the books referenced in the next citation.

67. In addition to Karnow, Komer and Sorley, the following books 

provide a sufficient understanding of the Vietnam conflict: Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Victory in Vietnam: The 

Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. by 

Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002; Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and 

Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley: University 
80

of California Press, 1980); Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War, 

(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000); The Third Indochina 

War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79, eds. 

Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006); John M. Newman, JFK and 

Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York: 

Warner Books, Inc., 1992); Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, 

The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington D.C.: The 

Brookings Institution, 1979); Andrew Krepinevich, The army and 

Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

68. Sir Robert Thompson and Rufus Phillips gave impetus to the 

program in 1963. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; Koch vii, 21.

69. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; Koch, vi, 36-37; Friedman, 

The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

70. Koch, vi-vii; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

71. An alternate spelling was Quy Chanh. O’Brien, 11; Koch, v, 

xix, 6; Pye, ix, 1; Sorley, 76; Army Digest, 40; J. M. Carrier and C. 

A. H. Thomson, vii, ix; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

72. Koch 66, 69.

73. Koch, 59, 66.

74. As Sorley and Komer attest, the pacification program did not 

begin to yield positive results until 1969 onwards. Komer, 116-

117; Koch, 9, 28; Goure, Russo and Scott, 35.

75. Koch, vii. 60; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

76. Barry Zorthian was the US embassy public affairs officer and 

the director of JUSPAO from 1965 to 1968. In addition to coordinating the propaganda effort for the Chieu Hoi program, JUSPAO conducted daily press briefings, the Five O’clock Follies.” 

Overtime, an air of mistrust manifested among reporters regarding attempts of media manipulation, especially after the 1968 Tet 

Offensive. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 198, 259-260, 494; Koch, 

27, 60, 64; William Hammond suggests that JUSPAO should have 

focused on Chieu Hoi propaganda only and have another agency 

interface with journalists. William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: 

The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, The US Army in Vietnam, 

Center of Military History Publication 91-13 (Washington D.C.: 

US Government Printing Officer, 1988), 147-148; Friedman, The 
81

Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

77. Koch, 70.

78. O’Brien, 18.

79. Goure, Russo and Scott, 1-3, 14-15, 20, 24-25; J. M. Carrier and 

C. A. H. Thomson, x-xi; Koch, v, 6, 50; O’Brien, 47.

80. O’Brien, 34; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xi; Koch, v, 

9, 65-66.

81. Goure, Russo and Scott, ix-x, 23-24; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. 

Thomson, ix, xiv.

82. J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, ix; Koch, v, vii; Army Digest, 40.

83. Koch, 26.

84. Quoted in O’Brien, 21-22.

85. O’Brien, 22.

86. “The Chieu Hoi Program,” Army Digest, 40; J. M. Carrier and 

C. A. H. Thomson, ix; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; Koch, 

15, 44.

87. The increased effectiveness of regional forces and popular 

forces (RF/PF) to control local communities was particularly important. Koch, vii, 44, 49; Goure, Russo and Scott, 24-25; Sorley, 

76; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; Pye, 2; Komer, 116-117.

88. Goure, Russo and Scott, 34.

89. Pye, 9; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xv, xvii; Goure, 

Russo and Scott, 35.

90. Leaflets were a more effective media than aerial loudspeakers, which insurgents claimed were inaudible. Goure, Russo and 

Scott, 24; O’Brien, 25-26; Koch, 24, 47, 64, 66, 70; Carrier and C. A. 

H. Thomson, xiii; Donald S. Travis, US Progress Reports for Vietnam, 1967-68, A Study of the Hamlet Evaluation System and the 

Enemy Order of Battle (M. A. diss., University of Louisville, August 1990), 34-35; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

91. Koch, 47.

92. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xiii-xv; Pye, 17; Goure, Russo 

and Scott, 24, 34; Koch, 64-65, 75-76; O’Brien, 25-26.

93. Koch, 64, 66, 74-76; O’Brien, 25, 28; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. 

Thomson, xv-xvi; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.
82

94. Koch, 18, 65, 70; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xv-xvi; 

Goure, Russo and Scott, 34.

95. Koch, 51; O’Brien, 47; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, x, 

xii-xiii.

96. They also feared government retaliation on their families if 

they deserted. Goure, Russo and Scott, ix-x; Pye, 12. Encyclopedia of 

the Vietnam War, 70; O’Brien, 47; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program 

of Vietnam.

97. “Psy War Idea,” Army Digest, 40.

98. “Psy War Idea,” Army Digest, 40.

99. Koch, 19; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

100. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; “The Chieu Hoi Program,” 

Army Digest, 40; Pye, 4; Koch, 81.

101. Pye, 4.

102. In 1965, most of the provinces featured reception centers. 

Koch, 74-76.

103. The four regional centers were in Danang, Binh Dinh, Bien 

Hoa, and Cantho, and the autonomous city centers were in Danang, Camranh, and Vung Tau. O’Brien, 28; Koch vii.

104. Koch, viii, 35, 52, 74, Pye, 3-5; O’Brien, 27.

105. Pye, 3-4; Koch, 27, 71, 73-74, 76, 78; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam 

War, 70; “The Chieu Hoi Program,” Army Digest, 40; O’Brien, 19, 

21; Ralliers received rewards, ranging from $1000 to $50,000, depending on the type of weapon turned in. Friedman, The Chieu 

Hoi Program of Vietnam.

106. Koch viii; 15, 21, 35, 74, 76, 78.

107. Koch, 15, 78.

108. Koch, viii, 73.

109. Pye, 16, Koch, 78.

110. Pye, 16-17, 28-29.

111. Pye, 18.

112. Pye, 19-20.

113. Pye, 26; Koch, 13, 53-54.

114. According to O’Brien, “The National Police have the responsibility of verifying the curriculum vitae and origin of the defector. The National Police of Vietnam have detailed to each Region-
83

al and Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers at least two policemen, and a 

larger, more experienced police group conducts interviews at the 

National Center in Saigon. If at any time during these interviews 

it is determined that the defector has knowledge of weapon or 

supply caches, he may be borrowed to assist tactical operations. 

The essential fact is that he must volunteer for such operations.” 

O’Brien, 29-30; Koch, 74, 77; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of 

Vietnam.

115. O’Brien, 29, 43-44; Koch, vii, 15, 77; Pye, 28-29; Encyclopedia of 

the Vietnam War, 70; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

116. Koch, 47, 49, 65, 76-77.

117. Pye, 28-29; O’Brien, 30; Koch, 15-16, 77-78.

118. J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xviii; Koch, viii, 48-49, 53; 

Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

119. O’Brien, 29; Koch, 78, 80.

120. Koch, 78-79; O’Brien, 33.

121. Koch, 78-79; O’Brien, 33; Pye, 17; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

122. Pye, 4; Koch ix.

123. O’Brien, 33-34; Koch, ix, 33.

124. Koch ix, 53, 81; O’Brien, 34.

125. Pye, 24; Koch, 81.

126. Koch, 53, 81.

127. Koch, 85, 87; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70.

128. Koch, 34, 53, 82; Pye, 24.

129. Koch viii, 6, 83; O’Brien, 22, 39; Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, xiii-xiv; Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

130. Pye, 21-22.

131. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

132. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70.

133. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.

134. Aside the US Army, Kit Carson Scouts served with Navy 

and Marine units as well as Thai and Australian military units. 

O’Brien, 39; Koch, 58, 102-105; Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 70; 

Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam.
84

135. Major Nulsen, February 1963 letter to General Clutterbuk, 

quoted in Clutterbuk, 110-111; Charles “Bob” K. Nulsen, Jr. was 

“Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese Commander of Phuoc-BinhThan Special Zone until August of 1963.” Obituary, 10 December, 

2011, Chadwick Funeral Service, New London, New Hampshire, 

https://www.chadwickfuneralservice.com/obituary/1336733, 

11 November 2019. 

136. Koch, 103.

137. Koch, 103-104.

138. O’Brien, 39.

139. Called Project Takeoff, the formal training was a joint US/

ARVN endeavor by psyops battalions. Koch, 24, 93-94, 98.

140. Koch, 24, 93-95; Pye 20-21, 28.

141. Koch, 92-95, 99, 101; O’Brien, 39-40.

142. Koch, 95-96.

143. Koch, 95; The RVN government established the People’s SelfDefense Forces after the 1968 Tet Offensive. All eligible males (16-

17 and 39-50 years of age), excluding those on active duty, served 

in these guerilla militia forces. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 323.

144. Koch, 95.

145. O’Brien, 38; Koch ix.

146. Koch, 84.

147. Koch, ix, 84; O’Brien, 40.

148. Koch, 54, 90.

149. Koch, 88, 90; O’Brien, 43.

150. O’Brien, 43.

151. Friedman, The Chieu Hoi Program of Vietnam; Encyclopedia of the 

Vietnam War, 69-70; Koch, v, vii, 35; O’Brien, 26; Sorley, 76; J. M. 

Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, ix; Pye, ix, 1.

152. Travis, 47-48; Koch viii, 35.

153. Koch, 35.

154. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, eds. Joel D. Rayburn 

and Frank K. Sobchak, vol. 1 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States 

Army War College Press, January 2019), 458, 611; The US Army in 

the Iraq War: 2007-2011, eds. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sob-
85

chak, vol. 2 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, January 2019), 154, 158, 165, 171, 177-178, 294; William 

Rosenau and Austin Long, The Phoenix Program and Contemporary 

Counterinsurgency, Occasional Paper (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2009), 20.

155. Coalition units paid allied militia forces with funds from the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). The US 

Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 169, 171, 174, 179, 181-182, 347.

156. The imprudent Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections resulted in 

Sunni under-representation in the federal government. US Army 

in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 397, 459, 612.

157. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 459, 475, 612; The US 

Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 146.

158. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 612-613.

159. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 613.

160. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 145-147, 149, 152.

161. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: 

Hackett, 1994), 76.

162. Steven Metz, Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2008); The US Army in the Iraq 

War: 2003-2006; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra 

II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: 

Vintage Books, 2006, 2007); The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-

2011; Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2016); Peter 

R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the 

Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

163. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 459, 611-613; The US 

Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 158, 169, 171-172, 179-180, 237, 

255-256, 264, 347; Rosenau and Long, 20.

164. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 152, 165; Rosenau and 

Long, 19.

165. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 171, 230-231, 258, 295, 

365, 379.

166. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 152, 154, 160-161, 169, 

181, 216-217, 268, 270, 445.

167. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 220, 255, 267, 269-270, 

445-446; Rosenau and Long, 19; Crane, 188.
86

168. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 217-218, 268, 288, 447, 

538.

169. US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 250, 657; Lieto, 14.

170. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 315-316, 432, 436; The 

US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 325-326.

171. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 432-433, 436; The US 

Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 324-325, 330; Crane, 205-206.

172. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 315-316, 433-435; The 

US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 328; Crane, 205-206.

173. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 325-326.

174. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 324, 326; During the 

Surge, 26,000 Iraqis had been detained and 5,000 released. Crane, 

2004-2005; Lieto, 14-15.

175. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 326-327.

176. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 327-328; Crane, 203, 

205; Joseph Giordono “Abu Ghraib reformer Stone hands over 

command of detainee system in Iraq,” Stars and Stripes (June 7, 

2008), https://www.stripes.com/news/abu-ghraib-reformerstone-hands-over-command-of-detainee-system-in-iraq-1.79786, 

7 March 2019.

177. Because of this dilemma, Stone estimated that 160,000 Iraqis 

had passed through detention facilities since 2003. Crane, 204-205, 

208; Lieto, 13, 15.

178. Lieto, 13-14; The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 331; At 

Camp Bucca, 16,800 Iraqis were Sunni and 1,650 Shi’a militia; the 

remaining 1,900 were al Qaeda foreign fighters. Crane, 204-205.

179. Crane, 206; The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 331; Lieto, 

15-16; Mansoor, xvii-xviii.

180. Crane, 204, 206-207; Lieto, 14, 16; The US Army in the Iraq War: 

2007-2011, 327; Stars and Stripes.

181. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 327, 331; Lieto, 13-14, 

16; Crane, 207.

182. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 329, 331; Crane, 208.

183. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 329-330; Crane, 207-

208; Lieto, 16.

184. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 329-330.
87

185. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 330-331; Crane, 205-

206; Lieto, 15-16.

186. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 331.

187. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2007-2011, 530-532.

188. The US Army in the Iraq War: 2003-2006, 475.

189. See Raymond A. Millen, “Bury the Dead, Feed the Living:” The 

History of Civil Affairs/Military Government in the Mediterranean and 

European Theaters of Operation during World War II (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, February, 2019), Chapter 8 passim.

190. For more on a DDR program, see Raymond A. Millen, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Primer for Military 

Practitioners (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, October, 2019).
ISBN-13:978-1-7325659-4-4