Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC16-785

____________

TYRONE WILLIAMS, 

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondent.

[December 21, 2017]

CANADY, J.

In this case we examine section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009)—also 

known as Florida’s “Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act” (the “DSFO Act”)—

which imposes mandatory minimum sentencing for certain sexual crimes 

committed under certain circumstances. Specifically, we consider whether the 

DSFO Act’s mandatory minimum sentencing term of “25 years imprisonment up 

to, and including, life imprisonment” provides trial courts with the discretion to 

impose a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment irrespective of the statutory 

maximum for the crime. § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). We have for review 

Williams v. State, 189 So. 3d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), in which the First District 
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Court of Appeal held that the DSFO Act authorizes a mandatory minimum life 

sentence regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime. In so holding, the 

First District certified conflict with Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2014), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that when the 

statutory maximum for a particular crime is less than twenty-five years, the DSFO 

Act authorizes a trial court to impose only a mandatory minimum term of twentyfive years’ imprisonment. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 

Both parties agree—as do we—that this case is controlled by this Court’s 

decision in Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2010). In Mendenhall, we 

concluded that a very similar mandatory “25 to life” provision in section 775.087, 

Florida Statutes (2004)—also known as Florida’s “10-20-Life” statute1—

authorized the trial court “to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to 

life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for 

in section 775.082.” Id. at 742. As explained below, we decline Williams’s 

invitation to recede from Mendenhall. Accordingly, we approve the First District’s 

decision in Williams. We also disapprove the Fifth District’s decision in the 

conflict case of Wilkerson to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.

 

1. The 10-20-Life statute imposes mandatory minimum sentencing for 

certain crimes committed by an offender while possessing or using a firearm.
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I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Tyrone Williams, was convicted of sexual battery by use of force 

not likely to cause serious personal injury. Under Florida law, that crime is a 

second-degree felony generally punishable by a term of imprisonment not 

exceeding fifteen years. See §§ 794.011(5), 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). But

because Williams had been designated as a “dangerous sexual felony offender,” he 

was subject to the mandatory sentencing provisions under the DSFO Act.2 

§ 794.0115, Fla. Stat. (2009). The trial court sentenced Williams to a mandatory 

minimum life sentence. Williams appealed, and the First District affirmed. See

Williams v. State, 83 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

Williams subsequently filed a postconviction Motion to Correct Sentence

with the trial court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), contending 

that the mandatory minimum life sentence was unlawful. Specifically, Williams 

argued that the trial court was not authorized to impose any sentence under the 

DSFO Act other than a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years. In denying 

Williams’s motion, the trial court principally relied on two subsections of the 

DSFO Act—subsections (2) and (6). 

 

2. Williams does not contest his conviction or dispute that he is subject to 

the DSFO Act’s mandatory sentencing provisions.
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Section 794.0115(2) sets forth the enumerated crimes covered by the DSFO 

Act and contains the mandatory minimum sentencing provision itself. Under 

section 794.0115(2), an offender convicted of one of the referenced crimes and 

meeting certain other conditions “is a dangerous sexual felony offender, who must 

be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and 

including, life imprisonment.” § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2009).

Section 794.0115(6) addresses the DSFO Act’s mandatory minimum

sentencing provision as it relates to Florida’s general statutory sentencing 

maximums:

(6) Notwithstanding s. 775.082(3), chapter 958, any other law, 

or any interpretation or construction thereof, a person subject to 

sentencing under this section must be sentenced to the mandatory term 

of imprisonment provided under this section. If the mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds 

the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or 

chapter 921, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this 

section must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum term of 

imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be 

imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the sentence 

imposed must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 

under this section.

§ 794.0115(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). This mandatory minimum precludes eligibility 

for discretionary early release (including gain-time), other than pardon, executive 

clemency, or conditional medical release. § 794.0115(7), Fla. Stat. (2009). 

The trial court concluded that Williams’s mandatory minimum life sentence 

was appropriate because the plain language of section 794.0115(2) “does not 
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reflect any restriction on the length of the mandatory minimum that can be 

imposed under it, other than stating it must be between 25 years and life 

imprisonment,” and because the plain language of section 794.0115(6) provides 

that the mandatory minimum term must be imposed if the mandatory minimum 

exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime—which it did in this case.

In reaching its conclusion, the trial court dismissed the Fifth District’s 

decision in Wilkerson on the basis that it “provides no analysis of how it reached 

its conclusion that a trial court cannot impose more than a 25-year mandatory 

minimum on a second-degree felony.” The trial court also relied on Flowers v. 

State, 69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), in which the First District 

concluded that the “25 to life” provision in Florida’s 10-20-Life statute permitted a 

trial court to impose a mandatory minimum life sentence for a second-degree 

felony. The trial court noted that Flowers reached its decision by applying this 

Court’s decision in Mendenhall. And the trial court ultimately concluded that the 

same analysis in Flowers and Mendenhall should apply when analyzing the DSFO 

Act.3

 

3. The trial court also referenced certain legislative committee reports that 

supported the court’s conclusion. In 2003, the Legislature increased the mandatory 

minimum under the DSFO Act from a then ten-year minimum to “25 years 

imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.” See ch. 2003-115, § 1, at 

1-2, Laws of Fla. The trial court noted that the Senate committee reports contained 

examples of what the new mandatory minimum would be for persons convicted of 

second-degree felonies, and that those examples “reflect[ed] a mandatory 
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Williams appealed the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Correct Sentence. 

On appeal, the First District upheld the trial court’s sentence, holding that the 

DSFO Act provides the trial court with discretion to impose a mandatory minimum 

life sentence regardless of the statutory maximum for the charged offense. 

Williams, 189 So. 3d at 290. As did the trial court, the First District relied on the 

plain language of section 794.0115 and on the district court’s previous decision in 

Flowers. Id. at 289-90.

As to the plain language of the DSFO Act, the First District noted that under 

section 794.0115(2) and section 794.0115(6), a designated sexual felony offender 

“must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, 

and including, life imprisonment,” and the minimum sentence must be imposed 

whenever that minimum exceeds the statutory maximum otherwise provided by 

Florida law. Id. at 289 (quoting § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2009)). And according 

to the First District, that mandatory minimum allows for any term between twentyfive years and life. Id. at 289-90.

The First District also relied on its previous decision in Flowers, which held 

that the “25 to life” provision in the 10-20-Life statute authorized any mandatory 

 

minimum of ‘25 to life.’ ” See, e.g., Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 2172 

(2003) Staff Analysis 8 (Apr. 10, 2003). But the trial court also recognized that 

committee reports do not necessarily reflect legislative intent. 
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minimum term between twenty-five years and life for a second-degree felony. Id. 

at 290. Unlike the trial court, however, the First District did not mention the fact 

that Flowers reached its decision by applying Mendenhall.

In upholding Williams’s sentence, the First District disagreed with the Fifth 

District’s conclusion in Wilkerson that the plain language of the DSFO Act 

authorized only a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum when the underlying 

crime had a fifteen-year statutory maximum. Id. at 289. The First District 

determined that “the plain language of section 794.0115” instead supported the 

conclusion that the “minimum mandatory sentence” is “any term between twentyfive years and life in prison.” Id. The First District then certified conflict with 

Wilkerson. Id. at 290.

In Wilkerson, the defendant was similarly convicted of a second-degree 

felony that generally carried a fifteen-year statutory maximum. See Wilkerson, 

143 So. 3d at 463 (citing § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2012)). The defendant was subject 

to the DSFO Act’s mandatory sentencing provisions, and the trial court imposed a 

life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. 

Id. at 462. On appeal, the Fifth District reversed and remanded for resentencing, 

holding that the life sentence was unauthorized and that the only sentence that 

could be imposed was a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 

463. In so holding, the Fifth District relied on the plain language in subsection (6)
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of the DSFO Act which provided, in relevant part, that “[i]f the mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum 

sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment under this section must be imposed.” Id. (quoting

§ 794.0115(6), Fla. Stat. (2012)). The Fifth District determined that the term 

“mandatory minimum” under the DSFO Act means twenty-five years. Id. 

Consequently, because “the mandatory minimum under section 794.0[1]15 

(twenty-five years) exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under section 

775.082 (fifteen years), the mandatory minimum must be imposed.” Id. In 

reaching its conclusion, the Fifth District made no mention of Mendenhall.

II. ANALYSIS

This certified conflict case involves a question of statutory interpretation, 

which is a pure question of law that we review de novo. See Polite v. State, 973 

So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007). The issue presented is whether Florida’s DSFO Act

provides trial courts with the discretion to impose a mandatory minimum anywhere 

in the range of twenty-five years to life imprisonment, irrespective of the general 

statutory maximum for the crime. As correctly noted by Judge Makar in his 

concurring opinion below, an answer of “no” to this question could only be given 

if we recede from Mendenhall. See Williams, 189 So. 3d at 290 (Makar, J., 

concurring).
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Because of the similarities between the pertinent provisions in Florida’s 

DSFO Act at issue in this case and those in Florida’s 10-20-Life statute at issue in 

Mendenhall, we first present a comparison of the respective statutory provisions, 

followed by an examination of Mendenhall.

DSFO Act vs. 10-20-Life Statute

The DSFO Act imposes mandatory minimum sentencing for certain sexual 

crimes committed under certain circumstances. § 794.0115, Fla. Stat. (2009). The 

10-20-Life statute imposes mandatory minimum sentencing for certain crimes 

committed by an offender while possessing or using a firearm. § 775.087, Fla. 

Stat. (2004). The pertinent provisions in each law are strikingly similar, as shown 

below.

I. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Provisions

In the DSFO Act, section 794.0115(2) contains the mandatory minimum 

sentencing provision and provides that an offender convicted of one of the 

referenced crimes and meeting certain other conditions “is a dangerous sexual 

felony offender, who must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years 

imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.” § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. 

(2009) (emphasis added).4

 

4. In 2014, the Legislature amended the DSFO Act by increasing the 

mandatory minimum term for offenses committed on or after October 1, 2014. See

ch. 2014-4, § 4, at 7, Laws of Fla. The DSFO Act now provides that a dangerous 
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Similarly, in the 10-20-Life statute, section 775.087(2)(a)3. contains the 

mandatory minimum “25 to life” sentencing provision and provides that a

defendant who discharges a firearm causing death or great bodily harm while 

committing an enumerated felony “shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 

imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment 

of life in prison.” § 775.087(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).

II. Mandatory Minimums and Statutory Maximums

The DSFO Act and the 10-20-Life statute also both address their respective 

mandatory minimum sentencing provisions as they relate to the more general 

statutory sentencing maximums provided elsewhere under Florida law.

In the DSFO Act, section 794.0115(6) provides:

Notwithstanding s. 775.082(3), chapter 958, any other law, or any 

interpretation or construction thereof, a person subject to sentencing 

under this section must be sentenced to the mandatory term of 

imprisonment provided under this section. If the mandatory minimum 

term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the 

maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or 

chapter 921, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this 

section must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum term of 

imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be 

imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the sentence 

imposed must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 

under this section.

 

sexual felony offender “must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 50 

years imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.” § 794.0115(2), Fla. 

Stat. (2017). These amendments are not at issue in this case.
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§ 794.0115(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). 

In nearly identical fashion, section 775.087(2)(c) of the 10-20-Life statute 

provides:

If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant 

to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 

775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 

921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the 

mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section 

are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 

775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 

921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section.

§ 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).

Mendenhall

In Mendenhall, we concluded that the mandatory “25 to life” provision in 

the 10-20-Life statute gave trial courts “the discretion to impose a mandatory 

minimum sentence anywhere in the range of twenty-five years to life under section 

775.087(2)(a)(3), even if that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum provided 

for in section 775.082.” Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 746. In reaching our

conclusion, we examined the various provisions of the 10-20-Life statute but 

eventually relied primarily on the two provisions discussed above. Namely, we

noted that section 775.087(2)(a)3., which set forth the mandatory minimum for the 

crime at issue, “clearly states” that the “convicted person shall be sentenced to a 

minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term 
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of imprisonment of life in prison.” Id. at 748 (quoting § 775.087(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. 

(2004)). We also noted that section 775.087(2)(c) “makes reference to [the general 

sentencing statute] and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the 

statutory maximum, must be imposed.” Id. We interpreted the provisions to mean 

that the trial court may impose a minimum term of imprisonment “anywhere in the 

range of twenty-five years to life.” Id. at 746.

We supported our reading of the 10-20-Life statute by examining certain

tenets of statutory construction in order to “resolv[e] any perceived conflict

between the statutory maximum in the general sentencing statute and the 

mandatory minimum range of twenty-five years to life.” Id. at 748 (emphasis 

added). We primarily focused on the principle of statutory construction that the 

more specific provision controls over the general provision, finding that the more 

specific mandatory minimum provision controlled over the general provision 

regarding sentencing maximums. Id. We also noted the “elementary principle of 

statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, 

phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should 

not be construed as mere surplusage.” Id. at 749 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach 

Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009)). In doing 

so, we determined that adopting the defendant’s interpretation of the statute would 

render the following words in the mandatory minimum provision meaningless and 
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mere surplusage: “and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.” Id.

Lastly, we examined the statement of legislative intent in the act that created the 

10-20-Life statute in 1999, id. at 749-50 (examining ch. 99-12, at 537, Laws of 

Fla.), and concluded that our interpretation of the statute effectuated the 

Legislature’s “unambiguous intent to punish offenders who possess or use firearms 

‘to the fullest extent of the law,’ ” id. at 749 (quoting § 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. 

(2004)).

Hatten Reaffirms Mendenhall

We recently reaffirmed Mendenhall in no uncertain terms in Hatten v. State, 

203 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016). In Hatten, we again addressed the 10-20-Life statute, 

but in a slightly different context. There, the defendant was convicted of, among 

other things, a first-degree felony for which the statutory maximum was thirty

years’ imprisonment. Id. at 143, 145.

5 The trial judge sentenced the defendant 

under the 10-20-Life statute to a term of forty years, with a mandatory minimum of 

twenty-five years. Id. at 143. The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence 

was illegal because the forty-year term exceeded the statutory maximum of thirty

years. Id. The First District affirmed, relying on its previous decision in Kelly v. 

State, 137 So. 3d 2, 6-7 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), in which the district court held that 

 

5. The statutory maximum for the offense in Mendenhall was similarly 

thirty years’ imprisonment. See Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 750.
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“circuit courts in the First District may, pursuant to [the 10-20-Life statute], 

impose a sentence in addition to its selected mandatory minimum sentence without 

regard to whether additional statutory authority for such an additional sentence 

exists.” Hatten v. State, 152 So. 3d 849, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Kelly, 137 So. 3d at 6-7). The First District also certified 

conflict with various decisions from the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts “which 

held that the trial court may not impose a sentence in excess of 30 years for a firstdegree felony under the 10-20-Life statute when the court imposes a mandatory 

minimum term of less than 30 years.” Id. at 850 & nn.2-4.

On review, we quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for 

resentencing, holding that “additional statutory authority is required” in order for a 

trial court to be able to add a term of years in addition to the mandatory minimum 

selected by the trial court. Hatten, 203 So. 3d at 146. In doing so, we made 

multiple references to Mendenhall, unequivocally reaffirming that decision. For 

example, we noted as follows:

This Court in Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 742, clarified the issue of 

“whether the mandatory minimum terms of twenty-five years to life 

provide the trial judge with discretion to impose a mandatory 

minimum of twenty-five years to life without regard to the statutory 

maximum for the crime contained in section 775.082, Florida Statutes 

(2004).” And this Court expressly “conclude[d] that the trial court has 

discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory 

minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory 

minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 

775.082.” Id.
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Id. at 145 (alteration in original). We also noted in Hatten that “the trial court 

could have imposed the total 40-year sentence as a mandatory minimum sentence 

pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute, even though it would exceed the 30-year 

maximum under the general sentencing statute, pursuant to Mendenhall.” Id. at 

145-46. Finally, we noted that “Mendenhall clarified that the 10-20-Life statute 

prevails over the general sentencing maximums.” Id. at 146.

In short, Mendenhall makes clear that the “25 to life” provision in the 10-20-

Life statute provides trial courts with discretion in imposing a mandatory minimum 

anywhere in the range of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory 

minimum exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime. And Hatten makes clear 

that the same “25 to life” provision does not also provide trial courts with 

discretion to impose a sentence greater than the mandatory minimum selected by 

the trial court—instead, doing so requires “additional statutory authority.” Id.

Applying Mendenhall and Hatten

Because we see no compelling reason to recede from Mendenhall and to 

interpret the “25 to life” provision in the DSFO Act differently than we interpreted 

the similar “25 to life” provision in the 10-20-Life statute, we hold that section 

794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes trial courts to impose a mandatory 

minimum sentence anywhere in the range of twenty-five years to life, even if that 

sentence exceeds the maximum under the general sentencing statute.
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In the instant case, the trial court sentenced Williams under the DSFO Act to 

a mandatory minimum life sentence for a second-degree felony that generally 

carried a fifteen-year statutory maximum. In upholding the sentence, the First 

District interpreted the “25 to life” provision in the DSFO Act consistently with 

Mendenhall. See Williams, 189 So. 3d 288. Accordingly, we approve the First 

District’s decision.

In Wilkerson, the trial court sentenced the defendant under the DSFO Act to 

a life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years’

imprisonment for a second-degree felony that carried a fifteen-year statutory 

maximum. On appeal, the Fifth District correctly concluded that the life sentence 

was unauthorized but did so for the wrong reasons. Namely, the Fifth District 

erroneously held that the DSFO Act authorizes only a mandatory minimum term of 

twenty-five years whenever the general statutory maximum for the crime is less 

than twenty-five years. See Wilkerson, 143 So. 3d at 463. This holding, which the 

Fifth District reached without mentioning Mendenhall, cannot be reconciled with 

this Court’s jurisprudence. In short, under the DSFO Act, the trial court in 

Wilkerson had the discretion to impose a mandatory minimum anywhere in the 

range of twenty-five years to life. See Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 742. But once the 

trial court selected the mandatory minimum of twenty-five years, additional 

statutory authority was required for the trial court to be able to add a term of years. 
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See Hatten, 203 So. 3d at 146. Because the trial court had no such additional 

statutory authority, the life sentence imposed by the trial court was unauthorized.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we approve the First District’s decision in 

Williams. We also disapprove the Fifth District’s holding in Wilkerson that the 

“25 to life” provision in section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2012), does not 

authorize trial courts to impose a mandatory minimum sentence anywhere in the 

range of twenty-five years to life regardless of the general statutory maximum for 

the crime.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

QUINCE, J., dissenting.

The result of the majority’s continued acceptance of the legal fiction created 

in Mendenhall is a legal system where a defendant who is twice convicted of a 

second-degree felony, as in this case, is authorized to receive a harsher sentence 

than one who is repeatedly convicted of attempted murder, see § 775.082(3)(d), 

Fla. Stat. (2009). Surely this draconian and absurd outcome was not intended by 

the Legislature when it enacted the DFSO Act. Accordingly, I dissent.
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Although the parties argue that Mendenhall is controlling here, I cannot 

agree that Mendenhall is applicable under these circumstances. I believe that the 

language of the DFSO Act and the 10-20-Life statute are distinct enough to 

provide a different outcome. Unlike the 10-20-Life statute, the DFSO Act does not 

purport to supply the minimum sentence a defendant sentenced under the act shall 

receive. Compare § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing that a DFSO 

offender “must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years 

imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.” with § 775.087(2)(a)(3), 

Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing that defendants who discharge firearms during the 

commission of enumerated crimes “shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 

imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment 

of life in prison.”). Section 794.0115(6), Florida Statutes, provides that a term of 

imprisonment imposed under this section that is “less than the sentence that could 

be imposed under section 775.082, section 775.084, or chapter 921 . . . must 

include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section.” There 

is no reason for this language to be included if the Legislature believed that a 

minimum mandatory life sentence could be imposed. Unlike the 10-20-Life law, 

where multiple levels of offense exist, the DFSO Act provides one statutorily 

enhanced minimum mandatory. Accordingly under the majority’s reasoning, the 

language of section 794.0115(6), which provides for an occasion in which the 
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statutory minimum mandatory is less than the otherwise authorized sentence, is 

meaningless. As reasoned in Mendenhall, “to adopt [this] interpretation of the 

statute would render the phrase [‘If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 

under this section is less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, 

s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the sentence imposed must include the mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment under this section.’] meaningless and mere 

surplusage.” Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 749. Yet, the majority here has no problem 

ignoring the plain language of the statute to extend the holding of Mendenhall to 

this case where the statute differs. 

Furthermore, I agreed with Justice Pariente in 2010 that Mendenhall was 

wrongly decided. Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 751-55 (Pariente, J., dissenting). In 

addition to her reasoning there that statutes providing for mandatory minimum 

sentences do not “always trump the statutory maximums in other statutes,” id. at 

751, I would explicitly hold that where the lower term in a range of years provided 

as a statutory minimum mandatory sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for an 

offense the plain language of the DFSO authorizes only that the lower number be 

applied. The range provided by the Legislature exists to provide an enhancement 

to crimes where the statutory maximum may already exceed twenty-five years, not 

to create mandatory minimum life sentences for crimes that are otherwise subject 

to ten- or fifteen-year sentences. 
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Because I would find that the statutory maximum cannot be exceeded unless 

the minimum sentence under the DSFO is higher than the sentence otherwise 

authorized, I respectfully dissent.

PARIENTE, J., concurs.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified

Direct Conflict of Decisions 

First District - Case No. 1D15-5716 

(Alachua County)

Rocco J. Carbone, III, Eakin & Sneed, Atlantic Beach, Florida,

for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and 

Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent