1

Shortly before the release of this opinion the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Act")

was signed into law; the Act aims to expedite the process of

federal collateral review. The Act specifically provides, in

pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-3058.

Daniel Eugene REMETA, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of

Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

May 31, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida. (No. 93-148-CIV-OC-16), John H. Moore, II,

Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

Daniel Eugene Remeta appeals the district court's order

denying his petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Remeta raises numerous issues on appeal with

respect to both his conviction and sentence. We conclude that

Remeta's claim regarding the state's alleged violation of the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), Fla.Stat. § 941.45, is

an issue of first impression in this circuit and therefore warrants

discussion. We find all remaining claims to be without merit and

affirm the district court's denial of his habeas petition for the

reasons set forth in its opinion.1
unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Title I, Sec. 104, § 3(d)(1), (2) (1996). Our review of

this case indicates that the state adjudiction of Remeta's

IAD claim resulted in a decision that was neither contrary

to clearly established Supreme Court precedent nor based on

unreasonable factual determinations. Therefore, under the

express terms of the new law, Remeta would not be entitled

to habeas relief. Because we deny the petition according to

pre-existing standards, however, we decline to consider

either the applicability of the Act to this case or whether

the Act provides a basis for the denial of relief. 

I. BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to this appeal are summarized briefly:

Remeta committed a series of murders, attempted murders, and

robberies in three different states during a two-week crime spree

in 1985. On February 8, Remeta murdered Mehrle W. Reeder during

the course of robbing a gas station in Ocala, Florida. Two days

after the Florida murder, Remeta and a companion shot Camillia

Carroll, a cashier at a convenience store in Texas, after robbing

her at gunpoint; Carroll survived the incident and testified

against Remeta at his Florida trial. On February 13, Remeta shot

and killed the manager of a highway gas station in Kansas. Shortly

thereafter, the car in which Remeta and several other individuals

were driving was pulled over by a Kansas sheriff; one of the

passengers in the car shot the sheriff twice. Remeta and his

companions subsequently fled to a grain elevator, where they

abducted two men after stealing their truck, made them lie face
down in the road, and killed them with gunshots to the back of the

head. Remeta pleaded guilty to each of the three Kansas homicides,

receiving two consecutive life sentences for killing the gas

station manager and two consecutive life sentences for killing the

grain elevator employees.

Remeta was extradited to Florida, where he was tried,

convicted, and sentenced to death for the Ocala murder. On direct

review, his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Florida

Supreme Court. Remeta v. State, 522 So.2d 825 (Fla.1988). The

United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of

certiorari. Remeta v. Florida, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 182, 102

L.Ed.2d 151 (1988). Remeta next filed both a motion for state

post-conviction relief with the state circuit court pursuant to

Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and a state habeas

petition with the Florida Supreme Court. Following an evidentiary

hearing, the trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion. The Florida

Supreme Court consolidated the Rule 3.850 appeal and the habeas

petition, affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for

post-conviction relief, and denied the habeas petition. Remeta v.

Dugger, 622 So.2d 452 (Fla.1993). Remeta then petitioned the

federal district court for the Middle District of Florida for

habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1994, the

district court denied the petition after finding that Remeta was

either procedurally barred or not entitled to relief on the claims

raised therein. The district court also granted Remeta's motion

for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. This appeal

followed.
 2

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides, however, that a petitioner

can rebut this presumption by showing that

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved

in the state court hearing;

(2) the factfinding procedure employed by the state

court was not adequate to afford a full and fair

hearing;

(3) the material facts were not adequately developed at

the state court hearing;

(4) the state court lacked personal or subject-matter

jurisdiction;

(5) the petitioner was indigent and the sate court

failed to appoint counsel, in deprivation of his

constitutional rights;

(6) the petitioner did not receive a full, fair and

adequate state hearing;

(7) the petitioner was otherwise denied due process of

law in the state court proceeding; or

(8) the state court factual determinations are not

supported by the record. 

II. DISCUSSION

 In reviewing a petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, we

presume that the factual findings made by a state court of

competent jurisdiction following a hearing on the merits are

correct if evidenced by reliable and adequate indicia.2

 Hamilton

v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1010 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507

U.S. 1000, 113 S.Ct. 1625, 123 L.Ed.2d 183 (1993). We review

factual conclusions made by the district court under a clearly

erroneous standard. Id. We review mixed questions of law and fact

de novo. Id. at 1034.

A. Procedural Default

 We note at the outset that the appellee raises the issue of
procedural default, stating that Remeta failed to present his IAD

claim either at trial or on direct appeal. See Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In its

ruling on Remeta's consolidated petition for state habeas relief

and motion for Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief, the state court

expressly found nine claims set forth by Remeta to be procedurally

barred; the court went on to conclude that Remeta's IAD claim

"[p]resent[ed] a novel argument regarding extradition; however, we

find that claim to be without merit and to be inappropriately

raised in a 3.850 motion." Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So.2d at 454.

As noted, Remeta raised the challenge to his conviction based

on Florida's alleged violation of the IAD in both his state habeas

petition and his Rule 3.850 motion; these separate challenges were

consolidated for purposes of appellate review by the Florida

Supreme Court. While we acknowledge that the state supreme court's

ruling in this case is not a model of clarity, we disagree with the

state's contention that the court found Remeta's claim to be

procedurally defaulted or, in the alternative, lacking in merit.

Rather, we resolve that the state court's decision constituted a

ruling on the merits with respect to Remeta's state habeas

petition, and a finding of possible procedural default with respect

to his motion for post-conviction relief. Because the Sykes

procedural default rule does not preclude federal habeas review of

a petitioner's constitutional claim if the state court adjudicates

the federal claim on the merits, Hardin v. Black, 845 F.2d 953, 958

(11th Cir.1988), we therefore proceed to address the underlying

merits of Remeta's challenge.
 3

This executive agreement was not contained in the record

before the district court, nor is it contained in the record on

appeal. 

B. IAD Claim

While imprisoned in Kansas State Penitentiary in 1985, Remeta

signed a document entitled "Request for Disposition of

Indictments[,] Informations or Complaints," in which he stated:

I hereby agree that this request will operate as a request for

final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or

complaints on the basis of which detainers or other criminal

charges have been lodged against me from your state. I also

agree that this request shall be deemed to be my waiver of

extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding

contemplated hereby or included herein, and a waiver of

extradition to your state to serve any sentence there imposed

upon me, after completion of my term of imprisonment in this

state. I also agree that this request shall constitute a

consent by me to the production of my body in any court where

my presence may be required in order to effectuate the purpose

of the Agreement on Detainers and a further consent

voluntarily to be returned to the institution in which I am

now confined.

R41-4627. Florida Assistant State Attorney John Futch subsequently

filed the following request for temporary custody of Remeta,

pursuant to the terms of the IAD, with Herb Mashner, director of

the Kansas penitentiary at which Remeta was incarcerated:

I hereby agree that immediately after trial is completed in

this jurisdiction I will return the prisoner directly to you

or allow any jurisdiction you have designated to take

temporary custody.

R41-4639. On the same day this request was sent, Futch informed

Mashner that he would be sending "under separate cover ... an

Executive Agreement stating that if Remeta should receive the death

penalty for the offense here in Florida that he will not be

returned to Kansas."3 R41-4632. The record reveals that in 1988,

three years after Kansas relinquished temporary custody of Remeta
to Florida, a Kansas Department of Corrections' ("DOC") official

forwarded a letter to the Florida DOC asking that a detainer be

lodged against Remeta in favor of the Kansas State Penitentiary.

R41-4615. This letter explicitly reminded the Florida DOC that

Kansas' release of Remeta "was under the term[s] of the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers. Under this Agreement, [Florida] is

obligated to return Remeta upon completion of all litigation." Id.

Remeta remains incarcerated, and on death row, in Florida.

In this habeas corpus proceeding, Remeta contends that (1) his

waiver of extradition was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary,

and (2) Florida's failure to abide by the terms of the IAD—by

trying him without a valid extradition waiver and by failing to

return him to Kansas—either effectively divested Florida of

jurisdiction to try him or rendered his conviction invalid. Remeta

seeks to have his conviction set aside on this basis. Whether

violation of the provisions of the IAD concerning extradition and

return to a "sending state" following trial can constitute

reversible error meriting habeas relief is an issue of first

impression in this circuit.

 The IAD is a compact entered into by forty-eight states and

the United States for the purpose of disposing efficiently of

outstanding criminal charges brought against prisoners incarcerated

in other jurisdictions. Hunter v. Samples, 15 F.3d 1011, 1012

(11th Cir.1994). The central provisions of the IAD are Articles

III and IV. Article III provides a procedure by which a prisoner
 4

A detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice agency

with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking

the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to

notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent. 

Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384, 389 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403, 87

L.Ed.2d 516 (1985)). 

against whom a detainer4 has been filed can demand a speedy

disposition of the charges giving rise to the detainer. United

States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1842, 56 L.Ed.2d

329 (1978). If the prisoner does make such a request, the

jurisdiction that filed the detainer must bring him to trial within

180 days. Id., 436 U.S. at 351-53, 98 S.Ct. at 1843. The

prisoner's request operates as a request for the final disposition

of all untried charges underlying detainers filed against him by

that state, and is deemed to be a waiver of extradition. Id.

Under Article IV, a signatory jurisdiction that has filed a

detainer may receive temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated

in another jurisdiction, and then prosecute that prisoner for

outstanding charges. Hunter, 15 F.3d at 1012.

 The district court found that Remeta actively sought the

death penalty in Florida, and therefore not only knew the

consequences of his waiver of extradition, but also possessed all

the necessary information to object to extradition at the time

Florida sought his presence for trial. Remeta argues that the

district court's findings in this regard are clearly erroneous and

that the fact that Remeta requested his Kansas trial attorney as

counsel in the Florida proceedings demonstrates that he did not

understand the import of the extradition waiver. Remeta asks, at

the minimum, that we remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on
this question.

As an initial matter, although the district court provided no

record citation to support its finding that Remeta was aware that

he might receive the death penalty in Florida, our independent

review of the record reveals that these determinations were not

clearly erroneous. The record contains letters from Remeta written

while incarcerated in Kansas that sustain the district court's

conclusion that Remeta understood the possible consequences of

being extradited. In one letter, Remeta wrote, "If I don't try for

the death penalty I'll die in some prison, [t]his is why I'm trying

to get extradited." R39-4357. In another letter, he stated, "I'm

gonna try for the death penalty if I can." Id. at 4359. A

psychiatrist who authored a clinical evaluation of Remeta for the

Kansas DOC also remarked that Remeta "hopes that he can be

transferred to one of the states where he is being sought and he

can get the death penalty." R40-4594. We conclude that the

district court did not err in finding that Remeta was informed of

the possible consequences of being extradited and tried for murder

in another state prior to signing an extradition waiver.

We need not decide, however, whether the district court

properly concluded that Remeta's extradition waiver was knowing and

intelligent. Even assuming that the waiver was not knowing and

intelligent, the denial of Remeta's statutory right to a

pre-extradition hearing would not entitle him to habeas relief.

Remeta suggests that Florida's flagrant violation of the IAD

effectively deprived that state of jurisdiction to try him for

murder. He fails, however, to point us to any decisional or
 5

It is interesting to note that in Shack, the Third Circuit

observed that although "the right to pre-transfer hearing is an

important one ... [the] denial of that right by a state official

is a violation of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act." Id. at

1173. The court further remarked that congressional silence

statutory law establishing that the IAD has a jurisdictional

element, nor does he provide any legal authority for the

proposition that a due process violation of the sort claimed here

renders a jury's verdict void on jurisdictional grounds. The IAD

does dictate that a state's failure to try a prisoner within the

statutory time period, prior to being returned to the "sending"

state, must result in dismissal of any untried portion of the

outstanding indictment. See Fla.Stat. § 941.45(e). However, there

is no provision in the IAD dictating that failure to either obtain

a knowing and intelligent waiver of extradition or provide a

prisoner with a pre-transfer hearing deprives the "receiving" state

of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that:

[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court is

convicted of a crime after having been fairly apprised of the

charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with

constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the

Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person

rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought

to trial against his will.

Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511, 96 L.Ed.

541 (1952); see also Shack v. Attorney General of State of Pa.,

776 F.2d 1170, 1172 (3rd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1030,

106 S.Ct. 1234, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986) (where petitioner was not

given pre-transfer hearing, court held that "the existence of a

procedural defect in [petitioner's] extradition proceedings did not

impair [the state's] power to try him and ... his confinement does

not violate due process.")5 We conclude that Kansas's alleged
regarding the need for a pre-transfer hearing as a jurisdictional

prerequisite to a trial in the receiving state may be

"attributable to an unwillingness on [Congress's] part to flog

one state for the failings of another." Id. Indeed, in this

case it is Kansas that allegedly failed to provide Remeta with a

pre-transfer hearing after obtaining from him an involuntary

waiver; we are not persuaded that Kansas's alleged violation of

the IAD should be found to have deprived Florida of jurisdiction

to try Remeta. 

failure to obtain from Remeta a knowing and voluntary waiver of

extradition coupled with its concomitant denial of a pre-transfer

hearing, even if assumed to be true, did not deprive Florida of

jurisdiction to try him for murder.

 As stated earlier, the record is ambiguous as to whether

Florida entered into a separate agreement with Kansas stipulating

that Remeta would not be returned if he received the death penalty

and whether such an agreement released Florida of its obligations

under the IAD. We also do not know whether Kansas is currently

seeking Remeta's return to serve the remainder of his sentence.

Even if we were to assume that Florida has failed to honor its

statutory commitment to Kansas under the IAD, however, this appears

to be a matter exclusively between Florida and Kansas. The

resolution of an IAD dispute between these two states (if such a

dispute exists) may necessitate that Kansas seek an injunction to

force Florida to abide by its agreement, return Remeta, and allow

him to serve out his Kansas sentence. This is not a matter for

federal habeas corpus review.

 More importantly, we previously have held that IAD violations

are not cognizable in habeas proceedings absent a showing that the

violation prejudiced the rights of the accused by affecting or

impugning the integrity of the fact-finding process. Hunter, 15
F.3d at 1012; see also Seymore v. State of Ala., 846 F.2d 1355,

1359 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that "violations of the IAD are

nonfundamental defects and—absent a showing of some sort of

prejudice—are uncognizable in a federal habeas proceeding."), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 806 (1989). As

discussed earlier, Remeta has neither alleged nor shown that the

two IAD violations at issue in this appeal, viewed in tandem, have

affected or undermined the integrity of the trial. Assuming that

Remeta did not voluntarily waive extradition, the alleged failure

of Kansas to provide Remeta with a pre-transfer hearing did not

divest Florida of jurisdiction to try him for murder. By the same

token, Florida's alleged failure to return Remeta to Kansas to

serve the remainder of his Kansas sentence in accordance with the

terms of the IAD is a matter between Kansas and Florida, and is not

reviewable by this court in a habeas corpus proceeding. In the

absence of any showing of prejudice to Remeta caused by these

alleged violations of the IAD, we are compelled to affirm the

district court's decision to deny habeas relief.

III. CONCLUSION

Remeta asks that we set aside his conviction due to Florida's

alleged breach of its commitments under the IAD. Remeta urges us

to strip the Florida court of jurisdiction to try him for murder

based on that state's allegedly flagrant and egregious violations

of the statute; yet, Remeta is unable to point to either statutory

or decisional law supporting such a directive. Moreover, even

assuming, arguendo, that Florida did fail to abide by its

obligations under the IAD, there is no indication from either the
records or briefs that the integrity of the trial itself was

undermined. The district court's order denying habeas corpus

relief is AFFIRMED.