Colloquium Brief

U.S. Army War College,

Bush School of Government and Public Service 

PREPARING FOR A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

OF LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

Jared E. Bennett

The Bush School of Government and Public Service

Joseph R. Cerami

The Bush School of Government and Public Service

Robin Dorff

Strategic Studies Institute

KEY INSIGHTS:

•	 The initiatives for the extensive national security reform that is required to meet current threats will

have to come from outside of the executive branch bureaucracy. This is true even though former senior

members of the Project on National Security Reform are holding key executive branch positions.

•	 The 3-D’s (defense, diplomacy, development, as 3 overlapping circles) has been a harmful way to portray

the capacities, requirements, and relationships for policy and operational effectiveness, especially in

ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The current 3-D’s model is incorrect, as these

functions are not properly represented by circles, are not the same size in terms of capacity and resources,

and in many significant ways they do not overlap in severalrespects in the key areas necessary for effective

integration, alignment, and coordination.

•	 The Obama Administration still has much work to do in organizing development efforts to focus on the

need for stronger political, economic and social development structures, resources, and leadership. Given

the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is an urgent need for better defining the roles and

responsibilities of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Agency for International

Development.

Introduction.

	 On April 22, 2010, the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), the Hudson

Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the American Security Project (ASP), Creative Associates International,

Inc. (CAII), and the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) participated with the Bush School of Government and

Public Service, and the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, in cosponsoring a colloquium in Washington,

DC, on a mid-term assessment of leadership and national security reform in the Obama administration. Three panels

discussed “Assessing National Security Reform,” “Legislative Imperatives,” and “Assessing National Security Reform-The

Way Forward.” Visit our website for other free publication

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	 The colloquium theme focusedon the needof advancing

the research and study of key national security issues,

engaging the invited participants in sharing their expertise,

and informing the interested community members of

ways to develop a deeper awareness and understanding

of security reform issues facing the U.S. Government by

examining the topics of leadership and national security

reform.

Panel 1: Assessing National Security Reform. 

	 The first panel clarified conceptual questions by

outlining the currentthemes inherentinthenational security

reform debate. In introducing the panel, Joseph Cerami of

the Bush School commented that the panel’s first objective

was to outline and assess changing national security efforts

as they have evolved and adapted during the first 2 years of

the Obama administration. The second panel objective was

to detail specific political and organizational challenges

where progress was made during the first 2 years, as well

as those obstacles that continue to impede significant and

efficient reforms.

	 The panelists introduced the current terminology

and trends, and set the conditions for the colloquium

discussions. Integral to this panel was an analysis of how

security paradigms and the continuing need for reform

might affect the organization, operations, policies, and

strategies of the U.S. military in the short term.

	 Joseph Collins of the National Defense University

spoke on Afghanistan. In his examination, Collins made

five major points: two presidents have declared that the

War in Afghanistan is of vital importance to the nation; the

costs of the war have been high in blood and treasure; the

Taliban is weakening, thanks to President Obama’s surge;

the Karzai government is weak, corrupt, and ineffective;

and, the Afghan people are tired of war, coalition forces,

and their own government. Collins further questioned the

future of the war’s success, given the current stress on the

Defense budget (currently at $700 billion/year).

	 Scott Feil of the Institute for Defense Analyses

addressed how assessments are generated within the

Department of Defense (DoD). Feil examined two

categories of assessments, Strategic Assessments and

Operational Resource Assessments, subsequently detailing

how such assessments contribute to national security

solutions. Using as examples the DoD response to the

improvised explosive device (IED) and the resurgence of

the Army post-Vietnam, Feil concluded that the obstacle

encountered in problem solving in government is that

it does not focus on the “problem as a whole.” Rather,

each segment of government proposes solution sets that

optimize its own capabilities and interests. He concluded

that the government should confront national security as

a whole with a focus on optimizing the overall function,

which necessarily suboptimizes the individual subordinate

processes and organizations.

	 Thomas Mahnken of Johns Hopkins University and

the Naval War College examined U.S. Defense policy and

its implications for national security reform. Focusing on

the proper division of labor in the government, Mahnken

suggested that entities within government abide by their

clearly defined roles, recommending that the DoD be used

to fight and win wars, and the State Department (DoS) and

USAID be empowered to support a “whole of government”

approach to national security issues.

	 Harvey Sicherman of the Foreign Policy Research

Institute reviewed the best/worst cases of past presidents’

actions in making national security policy, distinguishing

between the Truman (White House -State Department

partnership) and Nixon (White House dominant) models.

He praised the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft (Presidentialled, integrated, interagency process) variant. Sicherman

concluded that the current administration has tried a

version of the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft model, but too much

is being done in the White House. Instead, Sicherman

recommended giving greater responsibility to the State

Department, allowing the NSC to focus on its primary

mission of coordinating policy for the president while

considering policy alternatives.

Panel 2: The Legislative Imperative.

	 The secondpanel,discussing theLegislative Imperative,

examined the congressional role in the national security

process from 2008 to 2010. Panel Chair James Locher III

of the Project on National Security Reform opened the

panel by stating that 95 percent of people say that national

security reform will never be done. Locher went on to

refute this point, claiming that the objects impeding reform

were: lack of routine oversight; a lack of confidence; a slow

confirmation process for presidential appointees; a failure

to pass legislation that has become endemic; and, frequent

confrontation between the branches of the government.

Locher exclaimed that many believe Congress lacks the

political will to take on national security reform, but was

quick to point out that quite to the contrary, GoldwaterNichols achieved just this feat. To elucidate the issue’s

complexity, Locher identified clear differences between

the past and today, with today’s challenges being: a

security environment that is much more complex; the

unprecedented size of the defense budget; and, concerns

over domestic security. According to Locher, the major
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challenges confronting national security reform are those

of politics, scope, ownership, and bandwidth. Politically,

individuals favor the status quo. With regard to scope,

Locher emphasized that the size of national security reform

is daunting and it inhibits congressional commitment. In

reference to ownership, Locher stated that the simple fact is

thatthere is no mandate for national security reform. Finally,

he stated that bandwidth, or time, is a major challenge, as it

took Goldwater-Nichols over 4 years to complete. The focus

needed for national security reform would certainly require

politicians to surrender other legislative initiatives.

	 The post-9/11 system and campaigns in Iraq and

Afghanistan have placed additional pressure on the U.S.

Government’s civilian and military departments and

their levels of interagency cooperation. At the heart of

this discussion was an assessment of the contributions of

the Project on National Security Reform, an initiative on

Capitol Hill to build political support for congressional

reform of interagency dynamics much in the same way the

Goldwater/Nichols Act transformed the armed services.

	 Nina Serafino of the Congressional Research Service

focused on the possibility of legislative action on reform,

including reorganizing Congress for proper oversight.

Recognizing prospects for comprehensive reform is a

daunting task; however, Serafino stated that some members

are discussing selected reforms. One example is a national

security professional development program to foster interagency cooperation through a civilian interagency education and training program, including rotations between

agencies. She noted expert opinion that recommends that

Congress reorganize itself cyclically, with small changes

made in response to events and, large, substantive changes

following periods of rising frustration, or party turnover.

She reflected that the Obama administration might trigger

changes in Congress by submitting a “unified security

budget,” combining all security assistance accounts.

	 Larry Sampler of Creative Associates International

spoke on the topic of legislative imperatives for national

security reform. Sampler said that one of the major

impediments to national security reform is the prerogative

of an official to seek reelection, thus making things

inefficient. The U.S. Government’s system of checks and

balances creates an environment of stasis, leading to

operational paralysis in the government. Sampler also

addressed the issue of the terminology being used between

military and civilian entities, and the need to understand

this terminology to produce effectiveness. Sampler cited

the need for good leadership behind national security

reform. Finally, Sampler expressed his belief that the 3-D’s

(defense, diplomacy, and development) is not a model

based in reality, and should be done away with.

	 Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute and Project

on National Security Reform discussed the importance

of resource allocation and national security reform. He

recommended that the National Security Council (NSC)

play a greater role in designing an integrated national

security process, including new approaches for matching

resources to strategies. Weitz also suggested the need

for a national operational framework, whereby national

security reform would be viewed as more of a “national

responsibility.”

	 James Lindsay of the Council on Foreign Relations

examined the practicality of national security reform.

Specifically, Lindsay tried to answer the questions of

why Americans wish to produce reform, and why the

government has failed to achieve it. Lindsay suggested that

reform is undertaken to elicit greater policy effectiveness.

The U.S. Government has failed to achieve reform due to

bad policy choices and a streamlined executive. Lindsay

also focused on the role of development and its organization

within the government, emphasizing the political battles

that impede reform. He concluded that reform would

only be achieved if government focused on pivotal reform

measures, admitting that the overall political climate would

be the eventual catalyst for change.

Panel 3: Assessing National Security Reform-The Way 

Forward.

	 This panel focused on examining steps to implement

significant national security reform over the next 2

years (2010-12). Panel Chair Robin Dorff of the Strategic

Studies Institute asked the panelists to assess the Obama

administration’s first years with an eye towards offering

ideas for continuing or accelerating the pace of national

security reform. The researchers were also asked to assess

the successes and weaknesses of the first years and address

the institutional and organizational challenges that continue

to face the administration. Finally, the panelists were asked

to suggest promising areas for national security reform

initiatives in the near term.

	 Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American

Security stated that one issue confronting the Obama administration is that it has recognized its limits of engagement, especially given the complexity of issues like Iran

and North Korea. Cronin criticized the nearsightedness of

America by calling for a national security strategy that focused on the future, “thinking about the America of 2030,

and not just 2010.” Cronin recommended that the U.S.

should focus on civilian capacities and a stronger State

Department by developing a better system of educating

diplomats, and by recruiting the best and brightest. Cronin

also recommended that the U.S. should become serious

about investing in development, focusing on those countries in the bottom realm of the development process—the

poorest performers.
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	 Bernard Finel of the American Security Project suggested strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, and removing any politics associated with the position. He suggested that this could be achieved by assigning

a timeline to the position, such as 5 years without the possibility of removal. In that same vein, he recommended taking the media out of the military, allowing the DoD voice

to be expressed through a single office—the Secretary of

Defense. Fiscal responsibility was another topic of interest,

as Finel stated that declaring wars (those planned for 10,

15, or more years) should be something that is placed on a

normal budgeting process. Finel also discussed the Legality

of behavior in combat by suggesting that there should be an

increase in personal liability for criminal conduct.

	 James Stephenson of Creative Associates International

examined the areas of counterinsurgency, reconstruction,

andstabilization.Afocus ofthe talk was the shrinking role of

USAID. Stephenson said it was a great concern that USAID

was being taken over by the DoS,further hindering USAID’s

ability to control its own policy, planning, and budget. The

majority of Stephenson’s time was spent discussing the role

of stabilization and reconstruction. Stephenson said that the

individuals that work effectively in stabilization know their

territory and can enable the local populace. Mr. Stephenson

questioned the fiscal sustainability of the current DoS-led

civilian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which use

large numbers of U.S. temporary hires who are expensive

and lack the training, the experience, or the mobility to be

effective.

	 Beth Tritter of The Glover Park Group explored the

debate over development, questioning where it fits in the

approach to national security. Tritter agreed that the 3-D’s

approach is an incorrect model, and further addressed the

question of whether or not development was truly essential

to U.S. foreign policy. Tritter suggested that Secretary of

Defense Robert Gates was making development an issue

because it takes work off of the hands of DoD. Tritter also

commented on deficits and current spending levels, saying

that this will be the catalyst for reform.

Keynote Speaker: James Carafano, Heritage Foundation.

	 The Keynote Speaker, James Carafano, tackled

national security reform with regard to defense spending

and congressional oversight effectiveness. First, Carafano

addressed the overarching sentiment of pessimism in

America today—the belief in the idea that we cannot afford

defense measures. Carafano defended the position that

defense is the fundamentalresponsibilityofthegovernment.

He further stated that the proposition for cutting defense

spending often becomes an excuse for inaction. Carafano

also spoke on the topic of Congress, suggesting that it is

incapable of doing functional assessments of national

security. He said this is due to the fact that the majority of

power is being held by the Senate and House leadership,

and is not in the committees. This produces committee

hearings that are almost irrelevant, allowing little time to

be given to pertinent, substantial issues. He also directly

addressed “whole of government reform,” coupling it with

the recommendation that there is a need to more clearly

define this concept. Carafano concluded by stating that

the government should build an effective construct for the

whole of government, and the nation’s leadership needs

to build a conceptual doctrine in strategic, operational,

and tactical terms. According to Carafano, this will allow

the government to focus more directly on national security

issues that are non-linear and highly complex.

Concluding Remarks.

	 The panelists’ papers will be compiled into a book

published by the Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute. Previous collaborative efforts between the Bush

School and SSI on the topic of leadership and national

security reform have produced conference reports and

books that have reached a variety of national and

international government agencies, university research

programs, and think tanks. These publications include

Leadership and National Security Reform: the Next President’s 

Agenda (2008) and Rethinking Leadership and “Whole of 

Government” National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, 

and Prospects (2010). They are available on the SSI website at

www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/.

*****

	 The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position

of the Department of the Army, the Department of

Defense, or the U.S. Government.

*****

	 More information on the Strategic Studies

Institute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s

homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.