RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND 

THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Yong-Chool Ha

Beom-Shik Shin

December 2006

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iii

FOREWORD

One of the key challenges of our time is the threat 

posed to the security of Northeast Asia by North Korea’s 

nuclear proliferation. Efforts to resolve this problem 

through the medium of a six-party negotiation are 

proceeding with great difficulty. As in any multilateral 

process, a major problem is understanding the goals and 

perspectives of each of the participants. One of those 

participants is Russia, and this monograph focuses upon 

Moscow’s perspectives with regard to North Korea’s 

nuclear program and Russia’s own standing in Northeast 

Asia. This monograph makes a valuable contribution to 

the debate or analysis of the difficult issues connected 

with North Korea’s nuclear proliferation because the 

views of Russia, and of the other participants in those 

negotiations, unfortunately are not well-known or readily 

available in the United States. 

This monograph by two South Korean experts on 

Russia was presented at a colloquium jointly sponsored by 

the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War 

College; the Ellison Center for Russian, East European, 

and Central Asian Studies at the Jackson School of 

International Studies at the University of Washington; 

and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Pacific 

Northwest Center for Global Studies. Entitled “The U.S. 

and Russia: Regional Security Issues and Interests,” the 

conference was held in Washington, DC, from April 

24-26, 2006. It represents part of SSI’s efforts to provide 

strategic leaders with analysis and background on major 

trends in international security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

YONG-CHOOL HA is Professor of International 

Relations at Seoul National University and has served 

as a visiting professor at both the Jackson School of 

International Studies at the University of Washington 

and University of California-Berkeley. His research 

focuses on comparative studies between the Soviet 

Union, South Korea, Japan, and Prussia during the late 

industrial period, while he teaches comparative politics 

of Russia and Korea. Dr. Ha is currently writing a book 

on the social consequences of state-led industrialization, 

comparing the four countries mentioned above. His 

publications include: Economic Reforms in Socialist 

Countries, co-edited with S. Gomulka and Caeone Kim 

(1990), The Origins and Development of South Korea’s 

Northern Policy (2003), and The Dynamics of Strong State 

(2006). Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science 

from the University of California-Berkeley. 

BEOM-SHIK SHIN is Assistant Professor of Political 

Science and International Relations at the University 

of Incheon, South Korea. He is also a research member 

of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian 

Initiatives and a consulting member of Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Ministry of Unification of 

South Korea. Dr. Shin is the Director of the Committee 

for Foreign Relation of the Korean Association of Slavic 

Studies. Dr. Shin received his Ph.D. in political science 

from the Moscow State Institute of International 

Relations (MGIMO).
v

SUMMARY

Russia is one of the members of the six-party talks 

on North Korean nuclearization, but its views on how 

to deal with this problem do not agree with those of 

the U.S. Government. This signifies a gap between 

Moscow and Washington over the proper way to deal 

with proliferation and represents a change from the 

earlier pattern of bilateral cooperation in 1987-96 that 

led to significant achievements in the field of arms 

control and nonproliferation. 

We may attribute the major differences between 

Moscow and Washington to several factors, but 

two stand out here. One is that Moscow prefers a 

different model of resolving proliferation issues than 

Washington apparently does. Moscow’s preferred 

option is the so-called Ukrainian model, whereby the 

proliferating state is induced to relinquish its pursuit 

of nuclear weapons through a multilateral negotiation 

in which it receives both economic compensation and 

security guarantees from its partners. This is what 

happened with regard to Ukraine’s inheritance of 

thousands of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs) after 1991. The second model, apparently 

preferred by the United States, is the so-called Libyan 

model which is based on the experience of unrelenting 

coercive diplomacy, including sanctions and possible 

threats of actual coercion, until the proliferating state 

gives in and renounces nuclear weapons in return for 

better relations with its interlocutors. 

In the case of North Korea, Moscow believes that the 

Ukrainian model is the way in which the negotiators 

must proceed if they wish to bring this issue to a 

successful resolution. Seen from Moscow, the United 
vi

States appears to be more inclined to choose, instead, 

the Libyan model based on its policy of threatened 

regime change, coercion, sanctions, etc. This disparity 

between Pyongyang’s intransigence and America’s 

inclination to coercion, which reinforces the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) stance, is viewed 

as a major reason for the current stalemate.

The second explanation for the gap between the 

Russian and American posture on this issue is that 

Russia has arrived at a definition of its interests in 

Korea generally, and even more broadly in Northeast 

Asia, that is premised on a formally equal relationship 

and engagement with both Korean states, even though 

obvious economic considerations lead it to be more 

involved with the Republic of Korea (ROK). This effort 

to achieve balanced relations also is connected to the 

idea that such a stance enhances Russia’s standing in 

the Korean question in particular and more generally 

throughout the region, and the most important goal for 

Russia is to be recognized as a player with legitimate 

standing in any resolution of Korean security issues. 

After that, it is important to prevent a war from 

breaking out, as well as the nuclearization of the 

Korean peninsula. And beyond these considerations 

of status, prestige, security, and interest, comes the 

fact that Russia wants very much to play a major 

economic role with both Koreas in regard to transport 

networks, provision of energy, and overall economic 

development of both states. Indeed, Russia has offered 

to provide North Korea with nuclear and other energy 

sources once it gives up its weapons program as part 

of a multilateral agreement.

These considerations lead Russia to oppose much 

of the U.S. position in the six-party talks and to incline 

towards China and South Korea, which is trying to 
vii

maintain and extend its sunshine policy towards the 

DPRK. Taken together, the impact of differing interests 

and perspectives with regard to the best way to deal 

with proliferation explains, to a considerable degree, 

the divergence between the Russian and American 

positions in these talks, and why Moscow has taken 

the stands that it has in those negotiations.

1

RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND 

THE KOREAN PENINSULA

RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION MODEL

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been 

several significant achievements in international 

security regarding nonproliferation issues. The NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) system was extended 

permanently in 1995 and developed into the central 

form of multilateral cooperation in nuclear security. 

The most significant achievement of the NPT in the 

1990s was that France and China joined the 189 other 

countries of the world by signing and ratifying the 

NPT. The impetus that made this possible was the 

denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of course, 

such an achievement resulted from cooperation for 

nonproliferation between Russia and the United 

States.

Russia not only inherited the Soviet’s pro-Western 

diplomatic strategy and accepted the Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) II—a new U.S. proposal of 

nuclear arms control—but also continued to support 

U.S.-led policies such as economic sanctions on Iraq 

and NATO’s military intervention and arms embargo 

in Yugoslavia. In its urgent need for the economic 

reform of the newly established state, Russia pursued 

an “economic goals oriented diplomacy” designed 

to get the Western world’s economic support and 

incorporate itself into the international economic 

society, inevitably leading to the pro-Western foreign 

policy, with emphasis on the United States.1 It was also 
2

necessary that the United States closely cooperate with 

Russia in the short term by supporting President Boris 

Yeltsin’s transition effort to continue nuclear weapons 

reduction and nonproliferation and to secure nuclear 

materials in the former Soviet republics.

Mutual cooperation for strategic stability of nuclear 

weapons was a legacy from the Cold War era, but it also 

has been an important issue between the United States 

and Russia in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, 

they kept up the START I signed on July 30, 1991, and 

proceeded to a higher level of nuclear arms reduction 

treaty. In December 1991, the United States passed the 

Nunn-Lugar Act that provided economic support to 

the four former Soviet Republics for the reduction and 

security of nuclear weapons, material, and facilities.2

Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan essentially inherited 

tons of nuclear material and weapons and facilities after 

the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States and 

Russia, concerned about the proliferation of “loose” 

nuclear material and weapons, sought to devise ways to 

deal with the unaccounted nuclear weapons in Ukraine, 

Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which resulted in signing 

the protocol regarding strategic nuclear weapons at 

Lisbon, Portugal, on May 23, 1992. This protocol made 

Russia the only nuclear power in the former Soviet 

regions, and other republics transferred their nuclear 

weapons to Russia or dismantled them within a certain 

period and joined the NPT. This has been regarded as a 

great achievement of nuclear nonproliferation through 

U.S.-Russian cooperation. These efforts led to the 

U.S.-Russian nuclear agreement when Yeltsin visited 

Washington, DC, in June 1992, and fueled the START 

II negotiations to develop the strategic partnership 

between the two.3 The Clinton administration also 

actively supported those efforts to strengthen the 
3

strategic alliance and strategic partnership with Russia 

in order to prevent Russia’s failure to reform and 

consequent international instability and to construct 

an international regime to solve nonproliferation and 

other international issues.4

U.S.-Russian cooperation was essential in 

maintaining the nonproliferation regime after the Cold 

War, and this achievement became the backbone for 

the development of the regime in the 1990s.5 Moreover, 

the renunciation of nuclear programs in South Africa, 

Brazil, Argentina, and Libya proved the success and 

necessity of the nonproliferation regime. Thus the NPT 

became an important factor in that nonproliferation 

regime. It is clear that U.S.-Russian cooperation played 

the most important role in this achievement. Both during 

and after the Cold War, U.S.-Russian cooperation had 

played a central role in nonproliferation, not only at 

the global level, but also at the regional level in Europe 

and Eurasia.

However, despite all the success and achievements 

of the NPT, optimism about nuclear security is 

disappearing. Alexei Arbatov has stressed that 

although nonproliferation of WMD made great strides 

right after the Cold War, the current NPT system 

and other nuclear and weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) treaties are out of date, and that WMD have 

proliferated widely because of regional conflicts 

and the weakening of the great powers’ influence 

in international conflict.6 The United States tried 

to construct a new international order in the mid1990s based on its hegemonic power status in the 

post-Cold War era, but U.S. efforts to expand NATO 

ignored Russia’s diplomatic and security interests and 

weakened the U.S.-Russian alliance. In 2001, the Bush 

administration renounced the Anti-ballistic Missile 
4

(ABM) treaty, emphasizing American national interests 

and alliance partnership based on the “strong power.” 

This change threatened Russia’s deterrence based 

on the concept of nuclear mutual destruction due to 

Russia’s continuing arms reduction, and made Russia 

more dependent on its nuclear deterrence capability. 

Therefore Russia extended the operational service life 

of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Yet 

the Bush administration subsequently attempted to 

accelerate the development of a missile defense (MD) 

system, contributing further to deteriorating U.S.-

Russia relations.7

The weakening of U.S.-Russia cooperation at the 

regional level since the late 1990s made it difficult to 

maintain a multilateral basis for dealing with nuclear 

proliferation, and this led to the failure of the U.S. 

and Russian policy against nuclear proliferation. The 

United States strengthened its unilateral security 

policy based on its power rather than upon multilateral 

security cooperation, and, in this situation, the United 

States and Russia could not reach an agreement on 

nuclear issues.8 As the initial optimism of the 1990s 

faded, the permanent members of the United Nations 

(UN) Security Council could not cope with WMD 

proliferation properly, and failed to prevent the efforts 

of India, Pakistan, Iraq, and North Korea to develop 

WMD. In addition, they disagreed on policies toward 

Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, showing a lack of common 

interest and perception.9

Under such circumstances, India and Pakistan 

undertook nuclear tests and became de-facto nuclear 

powers with intermediate range ballistic missiles. 

Moreover, the danger of super-terrorism with terrorist 

groups’ possible use of nuclear weapons increased. Iran, 

Iraq, and North Korea purchased nuclear technology 

and equipment, and their nuclear program seriously 
5

challenged the international nonproliferation regime. 

Thus, it becomes more and more necessary to develop 

new cooperation to face these challenges.10

The Iranian and North Korean Nuclear Issues.

Specifically, the United States and Russia have 

displayed different perspectives on the Iranian and 

North Korean nuclear problems. To analyze these 

differences, it is necessary to look at three models 

that help to understand the disagreements between 

Russia and the United States: 1) the Ukrainian model 

that achieved nonproliferation through compensation; 

2) the Libyan model that achieved nonproliferation 

through nonmilitary sanctions; and 3) the Iraqi model 

that removed the nuclear danger through military 

means.

The Ukraine Model. The main feature of the Ukrainian 

model can be characterized by active U.S.-Russian 

cooperation and diplomatic settlement of the problem 

of potential diffusion of nuclear weapons. After the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine possessed 130 SS19 and 46 SS-24 ICBMs, approximately 3,000 strategic 

nuclear weapons, and 600 cruise missiles, making 

Ukraine the third nuclear power. The United States 

and Russia persuaded Ukraine to give up its nuclear 

weapons through compensation, so the Ukrainian 

congress ratified the NPT in November 1994 based 

on the Lisbon Protocol. Its last nuclear warhead 

finally was transferred to Russia in June 1996, with 

U.S. compensation for this process. This agreement 

exemplifies the positive-sum game of nuclear 

nonproliferation that satisfies the involved parties.11

The Libyan Model. However, such a model could not 

be applied to other cases. Libya had carried out an antiWestern policy based on its seventh largest petroleum 
6

production in the world, and tried to develop nuclear 

weapons for the purpose of securing its position in 

North Africa and the Muslim world, preparing for U.S. 

attack, and for defending against a war with Israel. In 

1979 Libya imported a nuclear reactor from Russia for 

research purposes and maintained nuclear cooperation 

with Russia until 2002. In reaction to Libya’s effort to 

develop WMD, the United States passed the “Iran and 

Libya Sanction Act” in 1996 and imposed nonmilitary 

sanctions by suspending Libya’s foreign trade. Before 

this, the UN Security Council accused Libya of 

terrorism and passed Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 

in 1992 and 1993, imposing nonmilitary sanctions. 

Such sanctions hugely damaged the Libyan economy, 

and Libya finally ended the UN sanctions only after 

promising to compensate for the Pan Am terror victims 

in 2003. Especially after the Bush administration took 

office, the United States took a resolute attitude on 

the war on terrorism and classified Libya as a target 

state for preemptive nuclear strikes. After 9 months of 

negotiations and contact with the British intelligence 

agency, Libya finally gave up its nuclear weapons 

program on December 19, 2003, immediately before 

the U.S. attack on Iraq.12 In short, in this model the 

United States achieved its objective of nonproliferation 

without Russia’s active objection by putting pressure on 

Libya through nonmilitary sanctions applied through 

the UN Security Council and by increasing the threat 

of preemptive strikes.

The Iraqi Model. The Iraqi model is an example 

of using military means. The UN Security Council 

already had passed Resolution 687 in 1991 and 

imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. The UN Special 

Commission (UNSCOM) also had gone through 250 

field investigations by December 1998, removing 
7

48 long-range missiles and 690 tons of materials 

for chemical weapons. However, even after those 

investigations, economic sanctions were not lifted, 

UNSCOM withdrew its investigation team, and the 

United States and the United Kingdom (UK) bombed 

the suspected WMD facilities in Baghdad. Afterward, 

the Bush administration announced its warning of a 

preemptive strike on September 20, 2002, and delivered 

an ultimatum on November 8, 2002. The UN Security 

Council supported the United States with Resolution 

1441, increasing the possibility of military action, 

and Iraq finally agreed to accept the UN Monitoring, 

Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 

and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

investigations. However, those investigations found 

no evidence of Iraq’s nuclear program. In spite of 

Saddam Hussein’s claim of there being no nuclear 

program in Iraq, the investigation team’s request 

for a cautious reaction, and the objections of Russia 

and other UN Security Council members, the U.S.-

led coalition invaded Iraq. By doing so, the coalition 

forces completely removed any hint of Iraq’s nuclear 

development. Nonetheless, despite the large British 

participation in Iraq, the U.S. attempt at nonproliferation 

through military force largely has been viewed as a 

unilateral action.

Today the problem is that the United States and 

Russia disagree on exactly how to resolve the Iranian 

and North Korean nuclear issues. Especially regarding 

the North Korean nuclear issue, the United States 

favored the Libyan model, while China favored the 

Ukrainian model. China appeared to believe that the 

Ukrainian model might persuade North Korea to give 

up its nuclear program by providing a multilateral 

security guarantee as well as economic compensation. 
8

But Russia seems to have some ambivalence between 

these two models.13

This monograph tries to answer the questions of 

what the difference is between the U.S. and Russian 

positions, and what lies behind Russia’s ambivalent 

position, given that Russia’s nonproliferation policy 

is affected deeply by its relations with the United 

States. In particular, it is important to understand why 

Russia’s general principles of nonproliferation are not 

applied consistently at the regional level. Therefore, this 

monograph will address such issues as where and why 

the United States and Russia agree or disagree on the 

North Korean nuclear issue and nonproliferation on the 

Korean peninsula, and will identify the characteristics 

and causes of Russian nonproliferation policy toward 

Northeast Asia. In addition, this monograph will show 

how the Russian position is reflected in the six-party 

talks for the second North Korean nuclear crisis and 

will clarify the significance and constraints of Russia’s 

nuclear nonproliferation policy in the Northeast Asian 

context.

PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS IN NORTHEAST 

ASIA AND RUSSIA

Although the United States and Russia agree on 

the goal of nonproliferation as a general principle, they 

disagree on dealing with specific cases. After President 

Vladimir Putin took office, significant changes took 

place in Russia’s national security strategy based on 

the reevaluation of various factors like the expansion of 

NATO, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty and 

construction of missile defenses, and terrorism.14 Due 

to the ensuing security perception of the occurrence 

of fundamental changes in its strategic environment, 
9

Russia pursued a series of security and foreign policies 

to seek a new strategic balance in the U.S.-led world 

order and tried to strengthen its position and the 

possible benefits that thereby might accrue to it.15 Iran 

and North Korea highlight the dual-sided U.S.-Russian 

relations of cooperation and competition in nuclear 

nonproliferation.

In the Iranian case, Russia’s position is pretty clear.16

Russia seems to have a good reason to support Iran’s 

position. Russia not only has $800 million of economic 

interest in building the Bushehr nuclear plant, but also 

regards the Iranian case as a means to achieve its global 

policy goal of WMD nonproliferation. Moreover, given 

Iran’s rising significance in the Middle East, Russia’s 

cooperation with Iran will improve its geostrategic 

position against the United States. Washington is well 

aware of this and also seems to understand that Russia’s 

supply of nuclear technology will not affect Iran’s 

nuclear armament directly.17 Given Iran’s increasing 

national power, strategic importance, possession of 

petroleum and natural gas, and potential market, 

Washington would not allow Russia to use Iran in its 

attempt to increase Russia’s influence in the Middle East 

and Central Asia. However, despite Iran’s dependence 

on Russia for nuclear reactors and conventional 

weaponry, the Putin administration has not been able 

to get much of what it wants from Tehran. Moscow’s 

conviction that Russia can exploit the Iranian-American 

rivalry is in reciprocal proportion to Tehran’s exploiting 

Moscow’s sense of rivalry with Washington.18 Thus 

Russia’s cooperation and confrontation with the United 

States over Iran must result from its geostrategic and 

economic considerations. 

In that case, what policy does Russia pursue 

between North Korea and the United States? In 
10

fact, North Korea does not appear to bring as much 

economic benefit to Russia as Iran does. If so, why does 

Russia support North Korea’s position? During the 

Brezhnev era, the Soviet position on security issues on 

the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia was affected 

by the need for a regional security regime mirroring the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(CSCE) and resulted in several nuclear free zone 

proposals for Northeast Asia. After the Soviet Union 

proposed the establishment of an Asian Collective 

Security System in 1969, Gorbachev suggested several 

collective security regimes such as “Comprehensive 

International Security System,” “Asian version of 

Helsinki conference,” and “All Asian Forum.” These 

proposals can be summarized as the Soviet Union’s 

efforts for “stability and settlement of peace in Northeast 

Asia through multilateralism.” After the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, Russia has pushed continuously for the 

establishment of multilateral talks to resolve Northeast 

Asian security issues. President Boris Yeltsin also 

proposed to establish a multilateral negotiation and 

regional risk-management system for Northeast Asia 

when he visited Korea in November 1992. In March 

1994 during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Russia 

proposed eight-party talks; including North and South 

Korea, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, the 

IAEA, and the UN Secretary General, emphasizing its 

position as a member of Northeast Asia. In addition, 

Russia proposed 10-party talks (North and South 

Korea, 5 permanent members of the UN Security 

Council, Japan, the UN Secretary General, and the 

IAEA Secretary General) for the Korean peninsula that 

would include general and working-level meetings.19

Most recently, regarding the second North Korean 

nuclear crisis, Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister 
11

of the Russian Foreign Ministry, proposed six-party 

talks in October 2002 to create an environment for the 

resolution of the issue.20 Thus, Russia has shown a 

consistent position on a Northeast Asian multilateral 

security system.

However, the rise of China and the subsequent 

changing balance of power, the most important change 

in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era, is posing a 

great challenge for Russia. Because the United States will 

pursue policies cautiously to balance against the rising 

challenger, China also is very cautious in its policies. In 

fact, the Bush administration does not consider Russia 

a serious enemy at this point. Assuming there will 

be no major war for hegemonic change in Eurasia at 

least for a generation, it apparently concluded that the 

potential threat referred to as the “hydraulic pressure 

of geopolitics” is moving toward East Asia.21 Although 

there were major wars in this region in the last century, 

there exists neither a regional security system nor 

a system of institutionalized regional cooperation. 

Especially because the conflicting interests of major 

powers exist in this region, the United States believes 

that it has a special stake in maintaining its regional 

hegemony. Furthermore, a serious militarization is 

going on in the region.22 In light of these geopolitical 

changes, Russia, for its part, felt a need to increase 

its weakening influence and renew its presence in 

Northeast Asia. In fact, Russia assesses that its influence 

in this region has diminished as similarly occurred 

throughout much of Europe after NATO’s expansion. 

After all, Northeast Asia is searching for a new balance 

of power due to the rise of China, and this makes it 

difficult for regional powers to decisively choose one 

or another policy.

In addition, the issue of nuclear proliferation is 

very important in Northeast Asia. Setting aside the 
12

two North Korean nuclear crises, the largest two major 

nuclear powers—the United States and Russia—are 

involved deeply in this region, and China is trying to 

raise its nuclear capability. This condition may make 

vertical nuclear proliferation more serious in this 

region. Moreover, Japan and South Korea possess 

enough capability of potential nuclear armament 

and have a special interest in North Korea’s nuclear 

program. Thus, if North Korea becomes a nuclear 

power, Northeast Asia is more likely to experience 

serious vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation.23

Such a situation will not only cause instability in 

Russia’s eastern border but also give Russia the extra 

burden of adapting itself to the new competition for 

nuclear weapons.

Russia’s Northeast Asia policy cannot but be 

influenced by its various geostrategic interests, 

such as relations with major powers like the United 

States, China, and Japan and its complex calculation 

regarding the two Koreas, as well as by its own 

political and economic factors. All these make Russia’s 

nonproliferation policy for this region very complex.24

In the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 

Federation” released in June 2000, President Putin 

stated clearly that Russia’s Korea policy would focus 

on guaranteeing Russia’s equal participation in the 

Korean issues and maintaining balanced relations with 

both North and South Korea.25 This policy intended to 

focus on economic cooperation with South Korea and 

on political and security cooperation with North Korea. 

Putin attempted to regain Russia’s strategic position 

on the Korean peninsula by restoring Russian-North 

Korean relations rather than hurting Russian-South 

Korean relations. In short, Putin’s Korea policy was 

based on a practical policy line to overcome Russia’s 
13

dilemma by pursuing the “causal benefit” to expand its 

political role on the Korean peninsula and the “practical 

benefit” to secure economic gains by strengthening 

political and security ties with North Korea on the basis 

of a “New Russia-North Korea Friendship Treaty” and 

increasing economic cooperation with South Korea. 

What does Putin try to achieve through such an 

equi-distance foreign policy on the Korean peninsula in 

the 21st century? First, the central issue in East Asia for 

Russia is to ensure its position and restore its influence 

on the Korean peninsula. Because Russia shares its 

Eastern border with the peninsula, the peninsula 

always has been included in Russia’s national interest. 

Therefore Russia is determined to play a central role in 

resolving the Korean issue.26 Russia’s national interest in 

the Korean peninsula can be defined clearly by Korea’s 

significance as a strategic point in Northeast Asia, i.e., 

a geostrategic gate connecting the continent and the 

ocean.27 In order to restore its influence and build a 

geopolitical context (favorable for Russia) in Northeast 

Asia, Putin needed a strong diplomatic effort to build 

up an influential position on the peninsula. Russian 

strategists like Andrei Voznensky commented on the 

geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula: 

The situation on the Korean peninsula is not only a simple 

political problem, but an important nexus to decide the 

flow of international security, politics, diplomacy, and 

economics in the Asian-Pacific region in the future. 

Therefore, the state which is not involved in the Korean 

issue will be excluded from East Asian affairs.28

In other words, Russia’s failure to be involved in Korean 

issues would mean giving up its influence on the entire 

Asia-Pacific region. So it is very natural that Russia 

regards diplomacy related to the Korean peninsula as 

a “nerve center” of Russia’s Northeast Asia strategy.
14

Thus, Russia’s key security interest on the Korean 

peninsula is to form a peaceful and stable peninsula, 

which can help Russia to focus its own domestic reform. 

Russia’s security goals on the Korean peninsula can 

be summarized as preventing direct military conflicts 

between the two Koreas or military conflicts caused 

by the intervention of a third party, and as checking 

overconcentration of the armed forces there. The former 

objective aims to remove the security cost produced by 

the military instability on the Korean peninsula, and 

the latter goal intends to prevent the domino effect 

in the Northeast Asian arms race that seriously may 

destabilize Russia’s Far East security.

Second, Putin’s political interest on the Korean 

peninsula is to be involved in moderating Korean issues 

and, if possible, Northeast Asia’s balance of power, 

consequently strengthening Russia’s geopolitical 

position according to its national interest. 

Third, Putin’s Russia sets four economic goals on 

the peninsula.29 The first goal is to make the Korean 

peninsula a bridgehead for Russia to make its way 

into the Asia-Pacific economy. As a Eurasian country, 

Russia seeks a balanced development of eastern 

territories beyond the Urals and influence in Asia. 

By increasing cooperation with South Korea, which 

has a significant geopolitical position in the region, 

Russia attempts to enlarge its field of activity into the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 

and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia 

and the Pacific (ESCAP) and to strengthen its position 

in the Asia-Pacific region by joining the Asia-Europe 

Meeting (ASEM).30

The second goal is to open markets for Russia’s 

competitive products such as energy resources, hightech weapons, and nuclear technology. The third 
15

goal is to develop an economic partnership for the 

development of Russia’s economic “desert,” Siberia 

and the Russian Far East. From the standpoint of 

national development strategy in the 21st century, 

Russia actively pursues projects to develop the large oil 

and gas resources in Siberia and the Far East. Given the 

geopolitical competition with Japan and China, Russia 

regards South Korea as an important source of capital 

and technology for the exploitation of resources and 

economic revitalization in this area and encourages 

South Korea’s large-scale economic cooperation and 

investment.31

The fourth goal is to extend the final destination of 

the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), the Eurasian landbridge of transportation, to the South. Russia recently 

has emphasized the connection of Trans-Siberian 

Railway and Trans-Korean Railway (TKR). Russia once 

stated, “We are willing to invest more than one billion 

dollars on the TSR-TKR connection project,” and made 

diplomatic efforts to persuade two Koreas to connect 

the main course of TKR to TSR along the east coast of 

Korea line.32

In fact, Putin’s new equidistance diplomacy, 

provided by the normalization of Russia-North 

Korean relations, helped Russia recover its geopolitical 

position on the Korean peninsula. North Korea 

provides important geopolitical leverage for Russia 

to control the situation on the Korean peninsula and 

Northeast Asia. In the future, Russia may demand 

more reward from South Korea by using RussianNorth Korean relations, and if the reward does not meet 

its expectations, Russia may use diplomatic resources 

that South Korea does not want to see. This option 

may include sales of high-tech weapons and military 

support for North Korea. However, Russia has more 
16

diverse and important political and economic interests 

with the South than with the North, and is less likely 

to provoke the South. If Russia inevitably has to give 

military support to the North, it is more likely to limit 

the support to defensive weapons, considering the 

strategic stability on the Korean peninsula, and even 

in this case, it will demand hard currency based on 

their history of reciprocity.33 Here we can see a facet of 

Russia’s dilemma in Northeast Asia. In short, Russia 

apparently pursues the equi-distance policy toward 

the two Koreas based on the separation of economy 

and politics, but in reality it cannot help but maintain a 

Southern bias based on realistic calculations of national 

interest. Russia needs to cooperate with South Korea 

for its national projects, such as energy development 

in Siberia and the Far East, the connection of TKR 

and TSR, its access to the Korean weaponry market 

that the United States has monopolized, its entry into 

world economic organizations, and, finally, its security 

interest in the six-party talks and multilateral security 

system in this region.

Thus, Russia will face numerous complex issues 

in Northeast Asia in case of military tension caused 

by the North Korean nuclear crisis. Russia’s worries 

primarily begin with the fact that unlike Iraq, North 

Korea shares a 19km border with Russia and is affected 

directly and structurally by the stability of Northeast 

Asia. First of all, a nuclear North Korea may threaten 

the strategic stability of Northeast Asia and Russia’s 

Far East security by sparking the chain reaction of 

nuclear armament by potential semi-nuclear powers 

like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and providing 

an excuse for the development of U.S. missile defense 

systems and Japan’s rearmament. In short, Russia 

cannot but worry about the arms race, the change 
17

of regional security order, and unstable relations 

in this region that may be caused by North Korea’s 

possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Russia 

has strategic concerns about a military conflict on the 

Korean peninsula that it can neither ignore nor fail to 

get involved in. Unless Russia gives up North Korea, 

it inevitably will have to deal with the deterioration 

of relations with the United States, but North Korean 

refugees in the Far East also will be troubling politically 

for Russia.34 If the United States performs surgical 

strikes on the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, radioactive 

fallouts potentially can be a disaster for East Asia. In 

the economic sphere, conflicts on the Korean peninsula 

will hurt Russia’s two important national projects of 

energy development in West Siberia and the Far East 

and the TSR-TKR connection.

In conclusion, as Russian Vice Minister of Foreign 

Affairs Alexander Losyukov once stated, “Military 

conflict in the Korean peninsula is not conducive to 

Russia’s national interest.”35 A military conflict on the 

Korean peninsula resulting from the North Korean 

nuclear crisis is a worse-case scenario for Russia. 

Russia currently regards stability at its borders as 

the central issue of its foreign policy in East Asia in 

order to secure its domestic dynamics, such as the 

consolidation of democracy, development of a market 

economy, and political and social stabilization. For 

Russia, which seeks a peaceful regional environment, 

the North Korean nuclear issue is one of the focal points 

of its foreign policy. Russia cannot sit back as a passive 

spectator regarding the North Korean nuclear issue 

because it needs to eliminate the security cost caused 

by military instability on the Korean peninsula; recover 

its national pride, which was hurt by being left out of 

the four-party talks during the Yeltsin era; and balance 
18

against U.S. hegemonic behavior in the region.36 This 

explains why Russia was the first nation that proposed 

to be an active moderator when the second Yongbyon 

crisis might have invited a possible U.S. preemptive 

military strike on the North.

SIX-PARTY TALKS AND RUSSIA’S DILEMMAS

Russia’s reaction to the second North Korean 

nuclear crisis was to secure its national interest, but 

Russia also had other dilemmas. In fact, after the Putin 

administration took office, Russia’s North Korea policy 

became more active than before. However, Russia’s 

gains have been marginal thus far. For instance, 

President Putin visited North Korea during the 

missile crisis in 2000 and spoke for the North Korean 

position at the G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit 2000, 

a clear shift of Russia’s foreign policy in Northeast 

Asia toward a more active role. Since then, Russia has 

supported North Korea’s position on the nuclear issue, 

despite suspicion of the North’s nuclear program 

by surrounding countries. When U.S. special envoy 

Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly announced in 

October 2002 that North Korea admitted its nuclear 

development, Russia showed a neutral position, 

demanding that the United States provide the “hard 

evidence” and that North Korea explain the suspicion. 

However, after North Korea admitted its development 

of nuclear weapons in the three-party talks in Beijing, 

Russia’s effort to mitigate tensions went in vain, 

resulting in a diplomatic crisis. President Putin had 

persuaded the West to believe that North Korea could 

be a trustworthy partner and keep their international 

agreements, and had built the framework to resolve 

the North Korean nuclear issue since 2000, but North 
19

Korea’s pronouncement of the nuclear development 

made Russia’s position awkward. The critics in Russia 

charged that the North Korean pronouncement made 

President Putin’s policy related to the North useless 

and increased distrust for Russia. A report published 

by the Foundation for Prospective Studies and Initiative 

argued that, if North Korea does not give up its nuclear 

program, Russia should participate in the international 

sanctions on North Korea to save Russia’s reputation.37

Likewise, the reaction of Russia to North Korea, 

which had nullified Russia’s attempt to strengthen 

its position in Northeast Asia, has a double side, and 

makes Russia’s first dilemma between a hard and soft 

reaction to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) understandable.

However, Russia’s immediate official reaction 

focused on North Korea’s intentions and the capability 

of its nuclear program. And in this situation, Russia 

overcame the first phase of its dilemma, successfuly 

redefining its role as the “honest broker.” That is 

because Russia recognized through its communication 

channels and information that the purpose of the 

North Korean nuclear program was not to secure 

nuclear deterrence, but to pursue a “regime protection 

function.”38

So Russia dispatched Vice Minister Losyukov 

to Pyongyang as a special envoy in January 2003. 

He listened to the North’s opinion and proposed a 

“package deal” as the solution for the issues. This was 

Russia’s first response to the North Korean nuclear 

issue as an active moderator that listened to Kim Jongil and other high-ranking officials and delivered the 

North’s position to South Korea, the United States, 

China, and Japan. In this process, Russia presented 

both the package deal and the “collective security 
20

assurance” plan. The package deal’s main points were 

that: 1) both the United States and North Korea observe 

such obligations as the North-South Joint Declaration 

on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and 

the Agreed Framework of Geneva, 2) the United States 

and North Korea resume bilateral and multilateral talks 

and provide security assurance for the North through 

these talks, and 3) the United States and other countries 

resume humanitarian and economic support to the 

North. The point about a collective security assurance 

plan can be understood especially as a compromise, 

since a U.S.-North Korean nonaggression pact actually 

is impossible to achieve.39

Russia’s official position on this issue became clear 

when Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with Maurice 

Strong, UN special envoy on the North Korean nuclear 

program, in March 2003. Foreign Minister Ivanov 

emphasized that Russia’s proposal for the package 

deal is the only solution to the crisis and insisted that 

the international community maintain a “cautious 

and balanced approach.” Emphasis was put on the 

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through 

North Korea’s observation of the NPT, acceptance 

of the IAEA’s inspections, and on the peaceful 

political-diplomatic resolution of the crisis through 

direct U.S.-North Korean talks, rather than through 

a military approach.40 There are two implications of 

this argument. First, Russia agreed to North Korea’s 

position that the North Korean nuclear issue should be 

resolved between the United States and North Korea. 

However, Russia made an official announcement that it 

“objected to North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, 

and at the same time to U.S. military pressures on 

North Korea.”41 This Russian position shows Russia’s 

second dilemma on the issue. Though Russia does not 
21

want nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula, 

it must moderate the negotiations and advocate the 

North’s concern, and therefore cannot merely follow 

U.S. initiatives on economic and military sanctions.42

Russia’s proposal implies that it already had 

acknowledged, through its steady connection with 

the North, that North Korea had developed nuclear 

programs against a security threat from the United 

States, and also believed that bilateral talks should 

come before a U.S. security assurance. Therefore, Russia 

now urged direct U.S.-North Korean dialogue along 

with China—contrary to its previous policy. While 

Russia complained strongly when it was excluded 

from the previous four-party talks, it accepted that 

the Beijing three-party talks on April 23-25, 2003, did 

not include Russia, and understood that the Beijing 

talks constituted a direct U.S.-North Korean dialogue 

mediated by China. However, Russia consistently 

insisted that bilateral talks between the United States 

and North Korea or the three-party talks including 

China are not enough to build a fundamental solution 

to the issue and, therefore, the talks should develop 

into six-party talks that would include other regional 

powers, such as Russia, Japan, and South Korea.

After the United States rejected direct dialogue with 

North Korea, the DPRK stated on May 25, 2003, that 

it might accept a U.S. proposal for multilateral talks. 

After July 23, it officially informed the other countries 

of its acceptance of the talks. In particular, on August 

1, 2003, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced the 

detailed North Korean position on multilateral talks 

after consulting with North Korea’s ambassador to 

Russia, Park Eui-chun. Along with China, Russia played 

a very critical role in persuading North Korea to accept 

the multilateral talks.43 China and Russia succeeded in 
22

persuading North Korea to understand that the United 

States would not accept the nonaggression pact and 

that North Korea needed the multilateral framework 

that would guarantee the regime’s survival through 

mutual compromise and agreement. In this process, 

Russia appeared to succeed in carrying out its role 

as a moderator, overcoming the second aspect of its 

dilemma.

Russia’s third dilemma is that North Korea proposed 

to include Russia in the crisis solution process. It was 

not the United States, but North Korea that insisted 

on including Russia in the six-party talks. The United 

States tried to isolate Russia from the North Korean 

nuclear issue. Just as it excluded Russia from the fourparty talks in 1994, the United States left out Russia 

and tried to expand the three-party talks into the fiveparty talks that included North and South Korea, the 

United States, China, and Japan.44 Of course, the United 

States opened the possibility of including Russia, but 

this depended on whether Russia was willing to agree 

with the U.S. preference, namely the Libyan model of 

denuclearization. Though South Korea did not object 

to Russia’s exclusion, North Korea wanted Russia to 

be involved in the multilateral process. Because of 

Russia’s active effort as a moderator, North Korea 

insisted on Russia’s joining in the talks, and the United 

States accepted.

In fact, after the United States decided on the fiveparty talks, China sent Vice Foreign Minister Dai 

Bingguo to Pyongyang and urged Kim Jong-il to accept 

the five-party talks. However, Kim Jong-il rejected the 

five-party talks and insisted on holding six-party talks. 

Though Russia disapproved of North Korea’s nuclear 

development, North Korea believed that Russia would 

support their position and lobby the United States on 
23

its behalf. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il called President 

Putin in July 2003 and asked Russia to join in the 

six-party talks and host the meeting. President Putin 

agreed to join in the six-party talks, but refused to host 

the meeting because of continuing Chinese efforts to 

mediate between the United States and North Korea.45

By including Russia in the process, North Korea 

expected Russia to check the U.S. hard-line policy 

and support North Korea’s position. However, Russia 

did not wish to take the hosting role because Russia’s 

in-between position was limited by its previously 

described dilemma. Instead, Russia supported China’s 

hosting role for the talks.

Russia’s goal was to convince North Korea to give up 

its nuclear program by delivering the North’s position, 

providing partial support for the North and urging the 

United States to cooperate. Of course, this goal resulted 

from Russia’s complex calculation of its position. 

Russia’s position can be summarized as follows. First, 

Russia has a right to participate in the process of 

resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis as a regional 

power. Russia made its position clear by strengthening 

its geopolitical and geo-economic positions. Second, 

Russia made clear its objection to the proliferation 

of WMD, including nuclear weapons on the Korean 

peninsula. North Korean proliferation would hurt 

stability on the peninsula and stimulate other nations’ 

arms race, including Japanese rearmament, threatening 

Russia’s security in its Far East. Third, Russia made 

clear its strong support for a peaceful resolution of 

the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue. The 

outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula would 

not only threaten Russia’s security but also hurt its 

national strategy of developing the Far East and Siberia. 

Consequently, in order to accomplish Russia’s national 
24

strategy, the peaceful resolution of the North Korean 

nuclear crisis and stability on the Korean peninsula 

are necessary for the development of the Far East and 

Siberia, regional economic cooperation, and securing 

Russia’s position as a regional power by connecting 

East Asia and Eurasia.

Russia’s achievements through the four rounds of 

the six-party talks can be summarized as follows: First 

of all, as mentioned before, the rapid development of 

Russian-North Korean relations after 2000 appeared to 

have enabled the six-party talks to occur. However, the 

six-party talks did not result directly from the restored 

relations between Russia and North Korea, but from 

Russia’s positive image as an impartial moderator and 

its increased influence on the North. Though President 

Putin’s friendship with Kim Jong-il may have been 

important, Russia’s “persuasive power” became 

more influential than its “coercive power” over North 

Korea. 

Second, Russia’s role as an “honest broker” should 

be recognized. Russia hopes that its role as a moderator 

and its package deal proposal will play a critical role in 

the comprehensive and gradual resolution of the North 

Korean nuclear crisis. In particular, Russia succeeded in 

communicating the North’s position to other countries 

and persuading them to enter into negotiations with 

North Korea.

Third, Russia prevented the rapid acceleration of 

tensions and helped avoid conflict between the United 

States and North Korea. After the U.S. disclosure of 

the North’s nuclear program in October 2002, Russian 

Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that no conclusion 

should be given without hard evidence. Russian 

nuclear energy minister Alexander Rumyantsev also 

denied North Korea’s capability to develop nuclear 
25

weapons.46 While the prospect for the second round of 

talks seemed uncertain in October 2003, high-ranking 

Russian military officers stated that North Korea was 

trying to develop nuclear weapons but did not possess 

them yet.47 Russia’s behavior can be understood as its 

effort to check the U.S. effort to drive North Korea into 

a corner. Russia’s buffering role regarding the North’s 

nuclear program gave other countries more time to 

respond discreetly to this issue, but it also may have 

impacted the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula 

negatively by giving more time to the North to continue 

proliferation.

Fourth, Russia has played a role as a safety valve 

for sudden changes or military conflict that may result 

from a second North Korean nuclear crisis, especially 

after the second Bush administration upset North 

Korea with its reference to “ending the tyranny,” 

which hurt the six-party talks. As a result, North 

Korea officially announced its possession of nuclear 

weapons and refused to participate in the talks. Such 

statements that imply regime change may worsen 

the North’s perception of the United States.48 Russia 

continued to object to such negative statements, 

though it acknowledges that changing the domestic 

regime is necessary for the ultimate resolution of the 

Korean peninsula’s problems. If North Korea cannot 

change and join the international community, a crisis 

may recur and threaten Russia’s national security 

once again. However, Russia prefers a gradual 

transformation over a sudden change through military 

means and is, therefore, helping the North cooperate 

with other nations, recover its economy, and obtain 

multilateral security assurances. If North Korea starts 

even a minor military conflict or the regime collapses, a 

large number of refugees may be produced and Russia 
26

will have to deal with the consequences—leading to 

serious instability in the region. As a result, Russia 

agrees with South Korea in favoring a gradual change 

in North Korea.

Russia’s achievements did not result entirely from 

its opposition to the United States. As noted above, the 

United States and Russia must cooperate with each 

other regarding the denuclearization of the Korean 

peninsula. This cooperation is not fully comprehensive, 

even though Russia once sent a message to North Korea 

drawing a line on its nuclear activities. Russia’s daily 

newspaper, Izvestiya, reported before the first round 

meetings on a possible Russian preemptive strike on 

the North Korean nuclear facilities.49 According to 

the report, many strategists argued that if Russia sees 

indications of a North Korean attack or if there is some 

possibility that North Korea will wage a nuclear war 

against the United States and South Korea, Russia may 

need to perform a preemptive military strike on North 

Korea through the Pacific fleet, because the North’s 

use of nuclear weapons on the South may result in 

serious pollution and damage in the Far East. This can 

be interpreted as Russia’s warning against the North’s 

possible renunciation of the six-party talks and conduct 

of nuclear tests.

In addition, Russia carried out a large-scale 

military exercise in August 18-27, 2003, for the first 

time in 15 years. One of the main purposes of this 

military exercise, which was performed under a state 

of emergency in the Russian Far East, was to gauge the 

ability to absorb an influx of hundreds of thousands of 

refugees if war occurs.50 South Korea and Japan also 

participated in rescue exercises and other multipurpose 

exercises, including one called “TU-160.” Through this, 

Russia made clear its importance as a Northeast Asian 
27

military power and sent a signal warning against the 

North’s provocation and America’s use of force.51 This 

was a strong expression of Russia’s position regarding 

the Korean issue and a significant effort to show its 

capability as a great power.

Fifth, Russia had worked like a coupling device 

in the six-party talks by continuously insisting on a 

multilateral approach to the Northeast Asian security. 

In fact, multilateralism has not been realized easily in 

Northeast Asia. Strictly speaking, the six-party talks 

cannot be labeled as a “multilateralism” framework.52

However, it was more of a multilateral experiment, with 

Russia playing a role as a coupling device by repeatedly 

urging other countries to solve the difficulties step by 

step. Russia’s position on the creation of a Northeast 

Asian multilateral security organization gradually took 

shape as a common interest among regional powers 

and was reflected in the joint statement of the fourth 

round of the six-party talks.

Thus, Russia’s plans are to strengthen its position 

as a regional power along with China in the six-party 

talks and actively pursue a balance of power in the 

region. In this sense, Russia seems sure that it will 

play an important role in long-term regional stability. 

Even at the height of the North Korean nuclear issue, 

Russia continued to argue for the denuclearization of 

the Korean peninsula, for North Korea’s observance 

of the Agreed Framework, against a U.S. preemptive 

strike on the North, and for peaceful resolution of the 

crisis through dialogue. Thus, the exclusion of Russia 

from the Korean issue could be very detrimental to any 

multilateral effort. It is quite controversial but thoughtprovoking to consider B. I. Tkachenko’s statement that 

“one of the most important reasons for the collapse of 

the Agreed Framework was that Russia was excluded 

from the process.”53
28

CONCLUSION

Russia’s policy toward nuclear issues on the Korean 

peninsula can be summarized as follows. First of all, 

the most important variable that determines Russia’s 

nonproliferation policy is its relationship with the 

United States. Russia has acknowledged that its U.S. 

policy right after the Cold War was biased and since 

has changed its foreign policy strategy. Such a change 

made Russia pursue a new strategic balance with regard 

to its relations with the United States. This is the basic 

factor that defines Russia’s nonproliferation policy. To 

pursue a new balance of power, Russia shows balancing 

and bandwagoning simultaneously, and this made 

Russia favor the multilateral approach to overcome its 

power disadvantage. Such factors differentiate Russia’s 

position from that of the United States regarding both 

vertical and horizontal proliferation problems.

Second, Russia’s goal of nuclear nonproliferation 

cannot be defined in simplistic terms in Northeast Asia 

where a new power dynamic is forming. The rise of 

China and America’s new Northeast Asia strategy give 

Russia a great challenge and opportunity. Because 

Russia has an unstable place in this region, it tries to 

use the nuclear issue to strengthen its position as a 

regional power.

Third, Russia pursues plans to develop the Russian 

Far East and Siberia with projects of transportation 

and energy development to secure a strong place as 

an Asian power. Such non-nuclear issues greatly 

affect Russia’s approach toward the Korean peninsula, 

so Russia’s Northeast Asia strategy is shaped by the 

complex consideration of both military-political factors 

and economic factors, leading to a nexus between 

nuclear and non-nuclear issues.
29

Fourth, Russia was caught in a dilemma due to the 

second North Korean nuclear crisis. Russia agrees with 

the United States in its objection to the proliferation of 

WMD, including nuclear weapons, but it refuses to 

accept a hard-line policy toward North Korea because 

it is afraid of losing a means to maximize its interest 

in Northeast Asia. Because Russia believes that the 

weakening of the NPT and subsequent horizontal 

proliferation are due mainly to the United States, 

Russia cooperates with the denuclearization of the 

Korean peninsula but objects to America’s one-sided 

hard-line policy. 

Fifth, Russia also may face the dilemma of losing 

both the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue and 

North Korean denuclearization if the six-party talks 

drag on, resulting in a situation that is favorable to 

neither the United States nor North Korea. Thus, Russia 

needs to create a consensus for making a compromise 

with China and South Korea between the United States 

and North Korea. In particular, Russia believes that 

North Korea does not yet have nuclear weapons, so it 

supports the North’s position and cautiously attempts 

to regain its influence on the Korean peninsula. 

This explains the reason for Russia’s different 

response from that of the United States regarding the 

second North Korean nuclear crisis. While the first Bush 

administration tries to use the Libyan model, North 

Korea favors the Ukrainian model that China supports. 

In this process, Russia supports the Chinese position 

and tries to strengthen its influence in Northeast Asia.

The Bush administration tried to form the “5 against 

1” structure to pursue UN Security Council sanctions 

following the Libyan model without much success for 

the following reasons. First of all, China and Russia 

did not accept the U.S. hard-line policy, and South 
30

Korea could not give up its engagement policy toward 

the North that had been implemented since the Kim 

Dae-jung administration began it in 2000, so the U.S. 

“5 against 1” structure did not succeed. If the United 

States could have formed the structure and gotten UN 

sanctions, it might have pursued the Iraqi model that 

shifts from economic to military sanctions. Of course, if 

the six-party talks collapse and North Korea launches 

a nuclear test, the U.S. plan may be realized. In case of 

a nuclear test by North Korea, not only South Korea’s 

position but also Russia’s place as an opportunistic 

moderator will be much weakened and China will have 

some difficulty in supporting the North. However, 

because North Korea is not likely to give up the sixparty talks and cross the “red line” that China does 

not support, this is less likely to be the North’s policy 

option.

Is the Ukrainian model that China and North Korea 

pursue and Russia supports useful in reality? There are 

several limitations in applying the Ukrainian model to 

North Korea. The number of nations that are involved 

in the issue is different. While the United States and 

Russia were involved in the Ukrainian issue, there are 

six nations in the North Korean equation that have 

different positions. Furthermore, while the United 

States and Russia cooperated to persuade Ukraine 

together, the United States, China, and Russia do 

not agree completely on this issue. Even if Russian 

and American cooperation on nuclear reduction and 

control in the European context could be (and were) 

negotiated bilaterally between Washington and 

Moscow, regional arrangements in Northeast Asia 

only can be comprehensive if China, with its nuclear 

and naval capabilities, is a part of it.54

In addition, Russia and America have different 

understandings of this nuclear crisis. While the United 
31

States tries to regard North Korea’s violation of the 

Agreed Framework as a global issue related to the 

spread of terrorism, China emphasizes North Korea’s 

perception of security, ascribes some responsibility to 

the United States, and argues for the need for a Northeast 

Asian security system. Russia plays a mediating role 

with South Korea that tries to harmonize two different 

positions. As a result, the six nations’ positions have 

shifted to a “2:2:2” framework. 

These changes appears to have had some influence 

on the second Bush administration. President Bush’s 

mention of “Mr. Kim” and Secretary of State Condolezza 

Rice’s reference to the DPRK as a “sovereign state” 

showed the beginning of the change. Afterward, North 

Korea returned to the six-party talks and resumed 

negotiations. Yet when the United States refused to 

accept North Korea’s peaceful use of nuclear energy 

and made it difficult to achieve the agreement of “word 

for word”55 at the fourth round of the talks, Russia 

and China supported North Korea and persuaded the 

United States to accept the compromise of September 

19, 2005. South Korea also supported this compromise 

and cooperated to persuade the United States, making 

the formation “3:1:2” or “4:2” and overcoming another 

hard time in the talks.

Such a complex mechanism of the six-party talks 

shows that the Ukrainian model has some limitations 

in the Korean issue. Nonetheless, there is always 

a possibility of a grand deal in which the United 

States and North Korea will give and take more 

than expected.56 What North Korea demands for the 

dismantlement of its nuclear program is assurance 

of regime and military security, the abandonment of 

the U.S. hostile policy and the conclusion of a peace 

treaty, the removal of North Korea from the list of 

states sponsoring terrorism, economic support, and the 
32

normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations. Their 

give-and-takes are not impossible, but what matters 

in the six-party talks is how to make a compromise. 

Russia tries to shift the approach of the talks from the 

Libyan model the United States favors to the Ukrainian 

model for their compromise. 

The reasons why Russia’s argument eventually 

might be accepted by the United States is that Russia is 

still a superpower with nuclear weapons and that the 

United States also needs Russia’s cooperation for the 

maintenance of the nuclear nonproliferation system. 

This is the critical factor by which Russia, along with 

China and South Korea, can persuade the United States 

to make a concession in the six-party talks. If Russia’s 

goal is achieved, a new model of denuclearization may 

be produced in which the moderator, not the parties 

concerned, leads. 

POSTSCRIPT

After the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, the 

United States started to press North Korea through 

financial sanctions, freezing North Korean accounts 

at Banco Delta Asia. Against this measure, North 

Korea resisted opening a new round of the six-party 

talks, officially pronounced its possession of nuclear 

weaponry on February 10, 2006, and launched a 

missile test again on July 5, 2006. However, the United 

States did not cease its financial sanctions, and North 

Korea ventured on with a nuclear test on October 9, 

2006, as a sign of crossing the “expected” red line. On 

the initiative of the United States and Japan, the UN 

Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 

14, 2006, which involves nonmilitary sanctions. This 

move initially made the prospects for the resumption 

the six-party talks very dim. 
33

Russia once again moved quickly, as it did at the 

first stage of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, 

dispatching Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr 

Alekseev to North Korea. After his visit to Pyongyang, 

he stressed that possibilities still exist for political 

resolution, and that Russia strongly opposed military 

sanctions. Owing to the opposition from Russia, along 

with China, the application of military means was 

excluded from the UN resolution. But Russia cannot 

help taking part in nonmilitary sanctions toward North 

Korea. This kind of Russian “dualistic” position, as was 

elaborated in this monograph, still seems to continue 

without serious changes.

As the Russian special envoy had predicted the 

possibility of six-party talks reopening, North Korea 

agreed to return to the talks on October 31, 2006. In 

spite of the significant change of the situation after the 

nuclear test, a long and tiresome tug-of-war between 

North Korea and the United States seems to be in line. 

Russia can play its role of “honest broker” as long as 

North Korea does not cross the “real” red line, even 

though we cannot be convinced of its boundary, for 

example, transferring nuclear technology and materials 

to terrorist groups or other rogue states.

ENDNOTES

1. Official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 

Russian Federation: “Об основных положениях концепций 

внешней политики Росийской Федерации” (“The Basic 

Formulations of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian 

Federation”), February 1992. 

2. For details of the denuclearization process in these states, 

see Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 

Weapons: An Action Agenda for Global Partnership, Russian 

Perspectives and Priorities, Vol. 4, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, January 2003.
34

3. Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 

London: Praeger, 1996, pp. 59-61.

4. Burns also characterizes the Clinton administration’s Russia 

policy as “engage policy” and “incorporation policy.” See Nicholas 

Burns, et al., “Three Years After the Collapse of the USSR: A Panel 

of Former and Current Policymakers,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 11, 

No. 1, 1995, pp. 2-3.

5. On the security cooperation between U.S. and Russian 

development, see Michael Cox, “The Necessary Partnership?: The 

Clinton Presidency and Post-Soviet Russia,” International Affairs, 

Vol. 70, No. 4, 1994, pp. 635-637; Steven Kull, “Cooperation or 

Competition: The Battle of Ideas in Russia and the USA,” in 

James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel, eds., The Limited Partnership, 

Building a Russian-US Security Community, New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1993, chap 12; Bill Clinton, “A Strategic Alliance 

with Russian Reform,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 4, 

No. 14, April 5, 1993, pp. 191-192; Strobe Talbott, “U.S. Must Lead 

a Strategic Alliance with Post-Soviet Reform,” U.S. Department of 

State Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 17, April 26, 1993.

6. Alexei Arbatov, “Horizontal Proliferation: New Changes,” 

Russia in the Global Politics, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2004.

7. V. V. Zhurkin, et al., Between the Past and the Future: Russia on 

the Transatlantic Context, Moscow, Russia: 2001, pp. 136-139.

8. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., Ядерное 

сдерживание и нераспространени (Nuclear Deterrence and 

Nonproliferation), Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2005, pp. 12-

14; George Perkovich, et al., Universal Compliance, 2004, pp. 9-10.

9. Philip Saunders, “New Approaches to Nonproliferation: 

Supplementing or Supplanting the Regime?” The Nonproliferation 

Review, Fall-Winter 2001, pp. 128-130.

10. For example, see George Perkovich, et al., Universal 

Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Washington, DC: 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.

11. Roman Ropadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, 

Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University, 1996.

12. Shannon A. Kile, “Nuclear Arms Control and NonProliferation,” SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmaments and 

International Security, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2004, pp. 617-619.
35

13. John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” 

The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, Autumn 2005, pp. 84-85.

14. Cf. Celeste A. Wallander, “Wary of the West: Russian 

Security Policy at the Millennium,” in www.armscontrol.org/ACT/

march00/cwmr00.htm; Mark Kramer, “What is Driving Russia’s 

New Strategic Concept?” in www/fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/

POLICY%20MEMOS/Kramer103.htm; Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s 

New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle,” in www.

nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclearCNS0100.html; Stephen J. Blank, Threats 

to Russian Security: The View from Moscow, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.

15. An Agenda for Renewal: U.S.-Russian Relations, A Report by 

the Russian and Eurasian Program of the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, December 2000); “U.S. Russian Relations: 

A Turning Point?” Russia Watch: Analysis and Commentary, No. 5, 

March 2001, pp. 1-8.

16. Vladimir A. Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov, “The Great 

Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” The 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, Spring 2005.

17. So Russian observers opine that U.S. objection to Russia’s 

assisting the Iranian nuclear energy program are based not on 

security concerns, but on commercial considerations. Mark N. 

Katz, “Exploiting Rivalry for Prestige and Profit: An Assessment 

of Putin’s Foreign Policy Approach,” Problems of Post-Communism, 

Vol. 52, No. 3, May/June 2005, p. 30.

18. Katz, pp. 30-31.

19. Such a proposal shows that the working-group meeting 

after the second round of six-party talks has been raised by 

Russia. For Russia’s proposals for multilateral security system 

on the Korean peninsula, see Valentin Moiseev, “On the Korean 

Settlement,” International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, Moscow, 1997.

20. Vladimir Kutakov, “Russia offers Six-Party Discussion 

Format in Northeast Asia,” ITAR-TASS, October 1, 2002.

21. Kun-Young Park, “Bush Administration’s East Asia Policy,” 

State Strategy, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2001.

22. Combined military expenditures of the East Asian nations 

reached $U.S.165 billion in the beginning of the 21st century, twice 

as much as in 1990. The Asian share in military purchases from 

the U.S. military producers rose from 10 percent to 25 percent of 

U.S. arms exports.
36

23. For nuclear armament and capability of Northeast Asian 

countries, see Alexei Arbatov and Vasily Mikheev, Ядерное 

распространение в Северо-Восточной Азии (Nuclear proliferation in 

Northeast Asia), Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2005.

24. Vasily Mikheev, “Multilateral Approaches to Peace Building 

in Northeast Asia: Cooperation-Security Strategy,” Proceedings of 

2005 KAIS International Conference, Non-Governmental Six Party 

Talks on Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Issues and Agenda, Seoul, 

Korea, October 6-7, 2005.

25.「Концепция внешней политики Российской 

Федерации」, Дипломатический Вестник (Concept of the Foreign 

Policy of the Russian Federation Diplomaticheskii Vestnik), август 

(Diplomatic Messenger), No. 8, August 2000.

26. Vladimir Tkachenko, 2000; “North-South Summit and 

Russia-North Korea Relations,” KIEP World Economy, Vol. 3, No. 

7, 2000.

27. Bom-Sik Sin, “Политика России в отношении Корейского 

полуострова во время 2-ого президентского правления 

Владимира Путина и её значение для Республики Кореи” 

(“Russian Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula at the Time of 

the Second Term of President Vladimir Putin and Its Significance 

for the Republic of Korea), Korean Slavic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 

2004, pp. 675-710.

28. Daehan Maeil Daily, February 19, 2001.

29. G. D. Toloraya, “Россия—Республика Корея: после 

саммита в Сеуле” (“Russia-Republic of Korea: After the Summit 

of Seoul), Проблемы Дальнего Востока (Problems of the Far East), 

No. 2, 2001, pp. 14-19.

30. Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Russian President Putin’s Policy 

towards East Asia,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. XV, No. 

1, Spring/Summer 2001, pp. 42-71.

31. Резюме доклада Совета Федерации Федерального 

Собрания Российской Федерации (Resume of the Report of the 

Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian 

Federation), “Стратегия развития России в АТР в 21-ом веке” 

[по итогам Байкальского экономического форума]) (“Strategy 

for the Development of Russia in the APR [Asia-Pacific Region] 

in the 21st Century [According to the Proceedings of the Baikal 

Economic Forum]), from www.forum.baikal.ru/about/strateg.htm.
37

32. Bom-Sik Sin, 2004. Besides, there are other economic 

policy goals such as the redemption of the North Korean bond, 

the promotion of North-South-Russian triangular cooperation to 

repair North Korean industrial facilities that the Soviet Union had 

built, the construction of a natural gas pipeline that goes all the 

way across the Korean peninsula, and South Korea’s participation 

in the free economic zone project for foreign companies in Russia’s 

Far East.

33. Putin’s security cooperation with North Korea focuses 

more on the “political security cooperation” for deterring U.S. 

hegemonic behaviors and strengthening its geostrategic position 

on the Korean peninsula than the “military security cooperation” 

for providing high-tech weapons. For example, when Kim Jongil visited Russia, Russia agreed with North Korea regarding 

observance of ABM, opposition of MD, North Korea’s insistence 

on the withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea, and the emphasis 

on the peaceful purpose of North Korea’s missile development, but 

there was no military agreement on sales of high-tech weapons. 

Russia’s reluctance for military security cooperation with North 

Korea is due to the North’s inability to pay and Russia’s intention 

not to provoke the South.

34. G.D. Bulychev, “Корейская политика России: попытка 

схематизации,” (“Russia’s Korea Policy: An Attempt at 

Schematization,”), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka (Problems of the Far 

East), No. 2, 2000.

35. ITAR-TASS, January 19, 2003.

36. А. V. Vorontosov, “Война компромиссов” (“The War of 

the Compromises”), 2003, in north-korea.narod.ru/vorontsov.htm.

37. Россия и мир: 2003 (Russia and the World 2003), Foundation 

for Prospective Studies and Initiative, 2002 in www.psifoundation.

ru/en/publications/russia-003/excerpts_from_the_report.html; www.

psifoundation.ru/publications/russia2002/index.html.

38. In the earlier stages, nuclear weapons were considered by 

North Korean rulers as an additional factor in the regional military 

balance on the Korean peninsula. Now, after the overthrow by the 

United States and the Western coalition of regimes in Afghanistan 

and Iraq through the use of military means, nuclear weapons start 

to be perceived as a “last resort guarantee” for the preservation of 

the North Korean regime in the global correlation of forces. See 

Alexander Nikitin, “Changing Priorities of the Russian Foreign 
38

Policy and New Mechanisms for Security in Eurasia,” The First 

KPSA-RPSA/MGIMO Joint Annual Conference Proceeding, 

Korean-Russian Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia, 

Seoul, Korea: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security 

(IFANS), November 30-December 1, 2005.

39. Izvestiya, January 20, 2003.

40. “Об итогах визита в Москву специального посланика 

генерального секретаря ООН по КНДР” (“On the Results of 

the Visit to Moscow of M. Strong, the Special Emissary of the 

General Secretary of the UN, With Regard to the Korean People’s 

Democratic Republic”) Стронга, М.: Informational Bulletin of the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 546-06-03-

2003.

41. Vremya Novostei, January 20, 2003.

42. On this difference, see Alexander Zhebin, “The Bush 

Doctrine and Russia: A Great Discord,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, 

No. 4, 2003, pp. 147-181.

43. New York Times, April 12, 2003.

44. Segyeilbo, June 14, 2003.

45. Tadashi Ito, “PRC Source Cited on Putin Rejecting Kim 

Chong-Il’s Request to Host Talks in Russia,” Sankei Shimbun, 

September 9, 2003.

46. On North Korea’s nuclear development capabilities, see 

Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 

CRS Issue Brief for Congress, June 9, 2003; Alexandre Y. Mansourov, 

“The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean 

Nuclear Programs,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 

1995, pp. 25-38; S. A. Letun, “The North’s Capability of Developing 

Nuclear Weapons: Russian Perspectives and Prospect,” 

presentation paper at the 4th Korea-Russia Defense Conference 

co-hosted by Korean Defense Institute and Military Academy of 

Russian Federation, Seoul, Korea, November 27, 2003.

47. Even with regard to North Korea’s announcement of nuclear 

possession in 2005, Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the Duma 

Committee on Foreign Relations, stated that it cannot be verified, 

and Russian scholars believe that North Korea’s announcement 

is designed to get as much from the United States as possible. 

According to the author’s interview with Russia’s Korean and 

military experts, North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons 
39

that the United States may have to worry about. This is one of 

the most important differences between the United States and 

Russia.

48. Haksoon Paik, “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward 

North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?” at www.

nautilus.org/fora/security/0530A_Paik.html, May 8, 2005.

49. Oleg Zhunusov, Elena Shesternina, “If Tomorrow There Is 

a War That in Two to Three Hours’ Time Involves Vladivostok,” 

Izvestiya, August 1, 2003.

50. Oleg Zhunusov, D. Litovkin, “There Is Legend: State of 

Emergency Has Been Introduced,” Izvestiya, August 22, 2003.

51. Seung-Ho Joo, “Russian Strategy for 6 Party Talks on North 

Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Kookbang Yeongoo, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2004, 

pp. 95-96.

52. Cf. John Gerald Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of 

an Institution,” International Organization, Vol. 46, 1992, pp. 561-

598.

53. V.P. Tkachenko, “Основные элементы российской 

политики в Корее” (“The Basic Elements of Russian policy 

in Korea”), Внешняя политика России в СВА (Russian Foreign 

Policy in Northeast Asia), Seoul: Hankook University for Foreign 

Languages, 2002, p. 13.

54. Nikitin.

55. The Joint Statement at the fourth round talks on September 

19, 2005, can be evaluated as the agreement of “word-for-word” 

for the next agreement of “action-for-action.”

56. For the possibility of such grand deal, see Michael O’Hanlon 

and Mike M. Mocizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal 

with A Nuclear North Korea, New York: Mcgraw Hill, 2003, Ch. 3.