* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/26/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JANICE K. THRONEBERRY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-5215 (D.C. No. 93-C-657-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Janice K. Throneberry appeals from an ord er of the district court that affirms the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny her social security disability benefits. Plaintiff claims she has been disabled since January 15, 1990 due to fibromyalgia. Her insured status expired on September 30, 1991. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denie d benefits at step five of the five-part sequential process for determining disabi lity. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing fi ve-step process). The ALJ determined that plaintiff retained the residual fun ctional capacity to perform sedentary work except in a stressful job and, basedon the testimony of a vocational expert, that there were jobs she could p erform within these limitations. The ALJ therefore concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's determinati on the final decision of the Secretary. On appeal, plaintiff contends the ALJ: (1) imprope rly discounted the objective medical evidence demonstrating plaintiff cannot perform sedentary work; (2) improperly discounted plaintiff’s allegat ions of disabling pain; (3)1 The parties consented to disposition of this case b y the magistrate judge.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). -3- failed to give proper weight to the opinion of plai ntiff’s treating physician that she is disabled; and (4) failed to properly evaluat e plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the Secretary's decision to determine only whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human S ervs. , 52 F.3d 288, 289 (10th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “such re levant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusi on.” Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quotation and citation omi tted). Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or is mere conclusion. Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment forthat of the Secretary. Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995). We have reviewed the briefs and the record on appea l, and are not persuaded by plaintiff’s claims of error. The magi strate judge 1 adequately addressed all of plaintiff’s arguments properly rai sed on appeal, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the magistrate judge’s order filed on-4-

August 15, 1995. To the extent plaintiff elaborate d on her arguments on appeal, we point out that we do not consider arguments rais ed for the first time on appeal. Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).
AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

James K. Logan Circuit Judge