IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-CA-00940-COA MIRIAM HOPKINS, ELDON SEWELL, DINA SEWELL, ABBIE PATRICK, JARIS PATRICK, JOVITA BOGGAN, RITA WIGGINTON AND ANN WOMACK APPELLANTS

v. CITY OF MENDENHALL, MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/11/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RICHARD W . MCKENZIE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: SIMPSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: GAY LEE W ILLIAMS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: L. W ESLEY BROADHEAD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: UPHELD CITY’S ADOPTION OF ORDINANCE 244 DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 10/06/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND JAMES, JJ. GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This is the second appeal of a city ordinance that cl o sed a street. It was challenged by concerned citizens. FACTS ¶2. The First Baptist C hurch of Mendenhall, M ississippi (“the Church”), f iled a petition and an am ended petition with the m ay or and board of alderm en (the “Board”) of the City of Mendenhall (the “City ”) seeking t o close East Court Street, which lies between East Streetand Oak Street in Mendenhall.

¶3. At a Board m eeting on April 6, 2010, a m o tion was m a de and carried by vote to: (1) accept t he Church’s petition to close a portion of East Court Street; ( 2) hold a public hearing on the street closure; and (3) authorize the clerk to publish notice of the public hearing. ¶4. Subsequently , M ir i a m H o p k i n s , E ld o n S ew ell, D in a S ew ell, A b b ie P atrick , Jaris
P atrick , J o v i ta B o g g an , R ita Wig g in t o n , an d A n n Wo m ack ( co l lectiv ely ref e r red to as “H o p k i n s”) f

i led a protest and objection to closing the portion of East Court Street. A public hearing was held on April 26, 2010, a n d b o t h p r oponents and opponents o f the proposed street closure were provided the opportunity to debate their positions. ¶5. On June 1, 2010, the Board adopted Ordinance 244, which stated: SECTION 1. That First B aptist Church is the o nly adjoining l andowner of the part of said str e e t to be closed and have petitioned the May o r and B oard of Alderm en to close that portion of said street herein described. SECTION 2. That the g overning body f inds and adjudicates that First Baptist Church c onstitutes all of t he interested and abutting landowners t o that part of said street to be closed and vacated. That the City of M endenhall has the legal right to vacate and close s a i d p o rtion of said street. The governing body f urther f i nds and of

f icially adjudicates that the c losing of said portion of E a st Court Street will c ause m i nim a l inconvenience to the g eneral p u b l ic due to num erous alternative streets. The City of Mendenhall now f inds and of

f icially adjudicates that said p o r t i o n o f the street should be closed and v acated as provided by

law. SECTION 3. That p ortion of East Court Street m ore particularly described as that portion of East Court Street ly ing between East Street and Oak Street, City of Mendenhall, M ississippi, per m ap and plat on f i le in the of

f ice of the Tax Assessor of Sim

pson County , should be and is hereby vacated and closed. SECTION 4. That the governing body f inds and a djudicates that the c losing of the a b o v e - d escribed part of said s t reet would be in t he best interest of the City of Mendenhall, Mississippi, and the citizens thereof

.
2SECTION 5. That the City Clerk shall cause this Ordinance to be published according to state statute in the Sim pson County

News. SECTION 6. That t his Ordinance shall take e f f e ct and be in f

orce a s provided by law. ¶6. On June 8, 2010, H opkins appealed the adopt i o n o f t he ordinance to the Sim pson County Circuit C ourt. A bill o f exceptions was prop e r l y a nd tim e l y f iled. Af ter a hearing

on August 30, 2011, the c ircuit court upheld the City ’s adoption of Ordinance 244. Hopkins f iled a m otion to reconsider, to alter o r am end, a n d f o r a n ew trial, which the circuit court denied. ¶7. Hopkins appealed. In H opkins v. City of

Mendenhall , 116 So. 3d 166, 1 67 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), this Court held t hat the r ecord contained no f i ndings of f

act and reasons f

or the City ’s decision s uf

f icient f or appellate r eview. Theref ore, this Court reversed the circuit court’s judgm ent a nd rem anded the case to t he circuit c ourt f or f urther proce e d i n gs consistent with our decision. Id. at 170 (¶17). ¶8. Af ter r em and, the Board held a m eeting on J une 27, 2013. The m ay or not i f i ed the

m em bers of the Board that they were t o provide f actual f indings of the Board’s adoption of Ordinance 244. Minutes were presented f rom the public h earing previo u s l y conducted on April 26, 2 010, wherein n ine people gave testim o ny , with six i n f avor of closing the portion of East Court Street. The Board determ ined that the f actual basis f

or c losing the portion of
E a s t C o urt Street was the saf ety of the citizens of M endenhall that attend f unctions at t h e Church or the Church’s Fam i ly Lif e Center. On S e p t e mb e r 20, 2013, the City f iled the Board’s f i ndings of f

act in circuit court. The circuit court c onsidered the m atter a n d entered

3an order that upheld Ordinance 244. Hopkins has again appealed this m atter. DISCUSSION I. Standing ¶9. W e begin with the City ’ s challenge to the standing of the concerned citizens w ho have brought this appeal. “‘Standing’ is a jurisdictional issue which m a y b e raised by any party

o r the Court at a ny tim e.” Hall v. City of Ridgeland , 37 So. 3d 25, 3 3 ( ¶23) (Miss. 2010) (quoting In re Enlargement & Extension of the M un. Boundaries of City o

f Horn Lake , 822 So. 2d 253, 255 (¶10) (Miss. 2002)). “This Court reviews questions of standing de novo.” Id. (citing Gartrell v. Gartrell , 27 So. 3d 388, 391-92 (¶10) (Miss. 2009)). ¶10. This Court has recently held: Mississippi’s s tanding requirem ents are quite l iberal. Federal courts adhere to a stringent def

inition of standing, lim ited by Article 3, [ S]ection 2 of the United States C onstitution t o a r eview of a c tual cases and controversies, but the Mississippi Constitution contains no s uch r estrictive l anguage. The Mississippi Suprem e Court has been m ore p erm issive i n granting standing to parties who seek review of governm ental actions. Hudson v. Jones Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs , 77 So. 3d 1148, 1 1 5 0 ( ¶4) (Miss. C t

. App. 2011) (internal quotations om itted) (quoting Burgess v. City of Gulfport , 814 So. 2 d 1 49, 151-52 (¶13) (Miss. 2002); S

tate v. Quitman Cnty. , 807 So. 2d 401, 405 (¶11) (Miss. 2001)). ¶11. “‘In Mississippi, p arties have standing t o sue w hen they assert a colorable interest in the subject m a tter of the litigation or experience an a dverse ef f ect f rom the c o n d u c t of the def enda n t , o r a s o therwise p rovided by law.’” Id

. at (¶5) (quoting Burgess , 814 So. 2d at 152-53 ( ¶13)). “ ‘Colorable,’ when used to describe a claim or action, m eans ‘appearing to be true, valid, or right.’” Id

. (quoting Hall , 3 7 So. 3d at 33 n. 6). “‘To e stablish standing on

4grounds o f experiencing an adverse ef f ect f rom the conduct o f the

. . . appellee, t he adverse ef f ect experienced m

ust b e dif f erent f rom the adverse ef

f ect experienced by the g e n eral public.’” Id

. at (¶6) (quoti n g H a l l , 3 7 S o . 3 d a t 33-34 (¶24)). “Further, the m ere f act that [ the appellant r esides] i n the City is not suf f icient to conf

e r standing.” Burgess , 814 So. 2d at 153 (¶16). ¶12. In Ball v
. M

a y o r & B o a r d o

f A ldermen of City of Natchez , 983 So. 2d 2 95 (Miss. 2008), residents of t he City o f Natchez f iled a n a ppeal with respect to the city ’ s sale of land

to a condom inium developer. H all , 3 7 So. 3d at 3 4 ( ¶ 2 6 )

. O n c r o ss-appeal, the City of Natchez challenged the residents’ standing. Ball , 983 S o. 2d at 298 (¶6). The Mississippi Suprem e Court reasoned that standing existed because “the [ residents] were property owners in the city ”; “their property w as located near the [ subject property ]”; and they “ alleged that the [ developm ent project] would adversely im pact t heir p roperties.” H

a l l , 37 S o. 3d a t 34 (¶26). ¶13. The f

acts in t he instant case are sim ilar to the f acts in Ball in t h a t H o p k i n s owns property in the City of M endenhall; Hopkins’s property is l ocated near the s ubject property ; and H opkins alleges t hat the closure of the street will have an a d verse im pact. Theref

ore, we f ind that the City ’s argum ent that Hopkins does not have standing is without m erit.
II. Ordinance 244 ¶14. “This Court em

p loy s a lim ited standard of review when considering the a ctions o f a

m unicipal board.” Hopkins , 116 So. 3d at 169 ( ¶11) (citing Precision Commc’n s , I n c
. v. Hinds Cnty., Miss. , 74 So. 3d 3 66, 369 ( ¶9) (Miss. C t. App. 2011)). “‘For questions of law,

5a m

unicipal board’s decision is reviewed de novo.’” I d

. “Furtherm ore, we em

p loy a de novo standard of review when considering issues of statutory interpretation.” Id

. “‘Otherwise, we will not set aside the action of the governing body o f a m unicipality u nless such acti on is clearly shown to b e a rbitrary , capricious, or discrim inatory or is ill e g a l o r without a substantial evidentiary basis.’” Id

. “‘An act is a rbitrary and capric i o u s w h e n it is done at pleasure, w i t h out reasoned j udgm ent or with disregard f or the surrounding f

acts and circum stances.’” I

d

. at (¶12). “‘Substantial evidence is such relevant e v idence as r easonable

m inds m ight accept as adequate to support a conclusion or m o re than a “ m e re s cintilla” of evidence.’” Id

. ¶15. “ A d d i t i o n a l l y , this Court has f ound that ‘ bef

ore a m unicipality m ay c l ose a publi c road, it m

ust (1) f ind the c losing is f

o r the public good and (2) com pensate abutting landowners f

or any dam ages.’” I

d

. at (¶13) (quoting Mill C reek Props., Inc. v. City of Columbia , 944 So. 2d 67, 69 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)).

A. Public Good ¶16. A s s t a t e d , “[ b]ef

ore a m unicipality m ay c l ose a public road, i t m ust

. . . f i n d t h e closing is f

or the p ublic good[ .]” M

ill Creek , 944 So. 2d at 69 ( ¶8). “[ A] city m ay not close a road just to benef

it a private party .” Id

. at 69-70 (¶8). ¶17. In Laurel I

mprovement C

o. v. Rowell , 84 Miss. 435, 3 6 So. 543 (190 4 ) , t h e C i t y of Laurel closed P o s t Street a nd gave it to Laurel Im provem ent C o., t o the e xclusion of all others. Mill Creek , 944 So. 2 d at 70 (¶9) (citing Laurel Improvement C o
. , 84 Miss. at 435, 36 So. at 543). L aurel I m provem ent Co. then b uilt a f ence a r o u n d t h e r o ad and erected

6buildings on it. Id

. The Mississippi Suprem e Court f oun d t h e o n l y reason the street was closed w as in order to g ive it to L aurel Im provem ent Co. Id

. The court held this action was outside the city ’ s powers. Id

. ¶18. This Court applied Laurel Improvement Co. t o Mill Creek

. However, this Court fo und the board’s resolution to approve the c l o s i n g of Colum bia-Purvis Road was f

or the public good. Mill Creek , 944 So. 2d at 70 (¶12). Unlike Laurel Improvement Co. , this C ourt f ound the r eason f

or closing the road was traf f ic and saf ety

. Furtherm ore, the decision t o close the

r o a d w a s based on substantial evidence c onsisting o f an af f idavit and t estim ony of on e person. Id. at (¶11). ¶19. H e r e , the portion of E ast Court Street was n ot closed f or the purpose of

benef i t t i n g the Church. The Church would benef it f rom the closed street, but not t hrough o w n e r s hip. Instead, the Church would benef it m erely because it was closed f or the saf e ty of the citizens of Mendenhall that attend f unctions at the Church. Furtherm ore, the C ity ’s decision to close the p o r t i o n of East Court Street w as based on the testim ony of nine persons, of w hich six were in f avor of closing the portion of

the street. ¶20. T h e re was substantial e vidence t o support t he City ’s f i nding that E ast Court Str e e t needed to be closed f

o r s af ety reasons. The question rem ains whether the City was required

to com pensate Hopkins bef

ore it closed the road.
B. Com

p ensation ¶21. “‘[ B]ef

ore a m unicipality m ay close a p u b l i c r o a d , it m ust

. . . com

pensate abutting landowners f

or any dam ages.’” Hopkins , 116 S o. 3d at 169 (¶13) (quoting Mill C reek , 944

7So. 2d at 69-70 (¶8)). “If a landowner is not abutting the closed portion of the road, he m ust
prove special dam a ges in order to recover.” Mill Creek , 944 S o. 2d at 71 (¶17) (citing Puyper v. Pure Oil Co. , 215 Miss. 121, 60 So. 2d 569, 573 (1952)). ¶22. Here, Hopkins is not an abutting landowner, nor a r e the other concerned citizens who pursued this challenge to the ordinance. Theref ore, Hopkins is not entitled to com pensation without proving special dam a ges. H owever, it i s c l ear that H opkins is not asking f or

com pensation. D uring t r i a l , H o p kins’s attorney s tated: “W e don’t say we h ave a right to special dam a ges.” Furtherm ore, the circuit court f ound: “ T here was no testim ony t aken f rom

a n y c itizen who was an abutting landowner to t he subject property or as to a ny spec i a l dam ages he m ight sustain.” For these reasons, Hopkins is not entitled to com pensation. ¶23. W e f

ind that the City ’s argum e nt that Hop k i n s l a c k s s t a n d i n g is without m erit. However, we also f

ind that the City ’s closure of East Court Street was f or the public good and w as not arbitrary , c apricious, or without s ubstantial evidence. For these reasons, we af f irm the circuit court’s decision to uphold the City ’s adoption of Ordinance 244. ¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT C O U R T O F S IMPSON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. A LL C O STS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS. LEE, C .J., IRVING, P .J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXW ELL, FAIR, JAMES AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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